Has the US Solved the Urban Combat Problem

[William F. Owen]

Has the US Solved the Urban Combat Problem (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/has-the-us-solved-the-urban-co)

So was the 2008 battle for Sadr City a one-off, the result of unique circumstances? Or is it a model for future U.S. MOUT operations? If U.S.-led coalition forces can dominate urban terrain almost as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, what are the consequences for irregular adversaries? And how might they adapt?

Readers, I welcome your comments.

Happy to comment. In my opinion it's a one off, because context is everything.
Sadr City is only 6 x 5 km laid out on a near perfect grid, and the US held all the cards, as concerns when and where to act.
Going by what was said at CNAS, what happened in Sadr City is what should happen if you prepare properly for that type of operation. Nothing the US did there was new, or original. It's all urban operations best practice from the last 10 years.

To try and draw lessons across to other circumstances may not give any useful insight, unless the same level of resources and preparation can be applied to circumstance that is substantially similar.

To assume that coalition forces can dominate urban terrain as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, would be grossly misleading based on the quality of evidence to hand.

[slapout9]

1-I would try and hi-jack some of the US vehicles and use them against them.

2-IED's are just land mines to me and they could be exploited a lot further than they have been without having to use any type of remote or electronic ignition.

3-Animal/insect delivered bio-agent.

4-Scorched earth/ burn the place down since I couldn't get out alive.

5-A lot of off the shelf security technology could be altered/used to give me some of the same benefits you would have.

6-Hand held guided missiles that could be built locally, pretty much by hand.

[Schmedlap]

- Figure out how they gather their intelligence and then feed them information that leads them to conclude that raids or airstrikes must be conducted at x school or y mosque or z children's clinic. Then invite the media for the after-party.

- Sabotage or infect the water supply at the start of summer, creating a humanitarian disaster to blame on the occupiers

- Have 10-year-olds fire mortars and dare the US to fire counterbattery.

- Arrange outdoor meeting places for women only, where even the most conservative women could feel comfortable walking about unveiled only around other women and then accuse the US of using their UAVs to spy on the women to satisfy their perversions.

- Conduct peaceful demonstrations demanding that the US leave; turn it into a media circus where unarmed civilians shout at armed US Soldiers and throw shoes and rocks at them

- Arm insurgents with reflective belts

[Ken White]

- arm insurgents with reflective belts. :d

[Fuchs]

So the 900 pound gorilla has finally learned how to hit a squirrel without hurting himself too much?
I doubt that this would work against another gorilla.

It's possible to adapt. Camouflage, concealment and deception would work just fine.

The army may have learned to copy police methods (police helicopter support) on larger scale. That's no solution, it's just some support.


Airpower has played an important role in urban warfare before without being a great solution.
http://www.personaldefenceweapons.com/Volkssturm%20Fahrrad%20Panzerfaust.jpg
(picture is on MY webspace)

[Ken White]

it would work against even a reasonably sized Rhesus Monkey, much less a Gorilla...

[Schmedlap]

It's possible to adapt. Camouflage, concealment and deception would work just fine.
Yup. The best form of camouflage is the populace. We've gotten better at spotting insurgent activity when they think that they're safe from detection, let their guard down, and don't use camouflage. There's a fix to that. Call the people out into the streets and smuggle weapons through the market places or emplace IEDs while surrounded by crowds. All that the UAV is going to see is a mass of people. Likewise, fire your mortars and rockets from crowded open-air markets. What are we gonna do about it? Shoot back and kill everyone in the market place? We're seeing the blowback from that in Pakistan. Looks like the Taliban pretty much figured out what the Shia militiamen didn't.

I also disagree with the author's assertion that we are doing things "cleanly and cheaply." There is nothing cheap about multiple UAVs, air weapons teams, armored vehicles, etc. There is also nothing clean about taking 5 years to gather the necessary intelligence and develop the techniques and procedures necessary to "dominate" a unique piece of terrain. I also dispute that we are dominant - as opposed to having an advantage that could slip away - and I think it is worth emphasizing again that the terrain that we are allegedly dominating is unique and it has taken us too long to figure out how to be more successful on that unique piece of terrain. Our slow climb up the learning curve is a frightening indicator of our ability to apply our craft in areas outside of that few square miles of ground. Rather than patting outselves on the backs, we should be asking why it took us so long to get to this point.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

Looking for some clarification here.

Are the article and associated comments referring to the multiple challenges caused by urban terrain during COIN and low intensity operations specifically, challenges caused by urban terrain during conventional warfare and high intensity conflict specifically or challenges caused by urban terrain during both?

Also, there are a variety of disadvantages to operating in urban terrain while engaged in a counter insurgency which previous posters have mentioned, including collateral damage, use of civilian areas by enemy forces and a restrictive operating environment. But are there any advantages which urban terrain offers to the COIN forces while conducting a counter insurgency campaign?

[Jones_RE]

I'll bite. The urban environment offers a concentrated population which may make providing security easier - i.e. you don't have dozens of scattered villages to protect. It may also simplify some of the logistics of delivering humanitarian aid. Cities tend to grow up in accessible areas. However, I'd bet that overall the urban environment makes things harder.

[charlyjsp]

As always, thank you for highlighting these events that us not in the U.S. miss. Btw, are we assuming the urban area is cleared of people or not?

On the question, alas, no solution. To my limited understanding, Sadr City involved luxurious amounts of ISR and time, and in its own way was a 'brute force' approach (throw as many ISR, firing platforms and other assets at the problem as possible), a bigger less defined and multi-layer urban area would require exponentially more assets. I suggest it's possible to learn from Sadr City, not copy it - but that is what I'm guessing Gen. Petraeus meant.

In any case, brief thoughts on #2,4 & 5:

2) No need for coalition ground forces to go house-to-house, wrecking the city in the process,

Unless there is some magic to tell me what people living in houses are thinking, or indicate prepositioned explosives (mines etc), I would still want to go house to house. Whether or not going house to house necessarily means wrecking the city is up to all combatant actors.

4) Much reduced non-combatant casualties and refugee flows, resulting from persistent observation and precision fires,

Persistent observation theoretically exists in CCTV systems, but even there it's hard to (in advance) know what is in a bag, car etc. From the description provided, overhead observation of Sadr City was not persistent in the way CCTV potentially is...so many ways to not see what the adversaries are actually doing (seconding Ken White's decoys, deceptions line of thought). The main problem, to me, is how it is possible to (pre-) identify targets, or positively post-identify them (make sure you know the guy about to be shot is the same person who shot at you).

5) Perhaps most important, no climactic drama and resulting media attention.

I understand the broader point of this, but surely for the population (residents in Sadr City) there was drama, that will be remembered (positively or negatively). This would then have an effect on how the population responds to further combat/aid etc.

On potential adaptations, they are surely location-culture specific, but if the U.S. can see above ground, going underground seems logical (ok, this may apply mainly to cities with water-sanitation infrastructure that is underground, or where digging tunnels is possible.)

[Massengale]

Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.

[Massengale]

I wouldn't assume that the defenders going underground makes much of a difference...it might even make things worse...for them.

[Ken White]

Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.Perhaps even a great deal more.

As I often found out in earlier times, I'm also sure the plentiful and accurate ISR only told them of some of the problems they might face. Regrettably, that knowledge does not help much in dealing with those who object to your presence... :wry:

Nor does it help in digging out the large number who survive the fire and other support poured upon them -- above or below ground. :(

[goesh]

I'm not surprised kids got mentioned early in this thread. I'm not sure what role kids played in Iraq other than being light mules, Intel and spotters. Did they engage like the Palestinian kids did? If not, why not? What are the protocols for young teens engaging in non-lethal contact? If I were an enemy commander, I certainly would be exploiting kids more than they are.

Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet. Said kids after their first 'fight' fully realized that but in a few short years, they would have an AK in their hands and not some rocks. Can the unconventional take this edge way on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

[jmm99]

goesh
Can the unconventional take this edge way [away?] on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

I'd be interested in the view of the "Military" here (most of the folks here) on these questions, because the answers would inform my thoughts on the LOAC and ROE/RUFs, etc.

[Ken White]

toward innovation and a more free flowing, less structured but still well disciplined bunch of units that need to have a common operating methodology and goal set but are not only allowed but encouraged to pursue various approaches and to allow subordinates to make decisions. Haven't been able to say that for over 35 years...

My personal belief is that it is great that is occurring and that not only the Armed Forces but the nation can benefit.

As I understand your question and the basis therefor, I think the answer is that there will be efforts to identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits and staying legal in the process. The down side of that is that there will be errors as people overshoot.

The reaction of the leadership, the media, the politicians and yes, the lawyers, to such errors will determine whether or not the willingness to allow some sensible freedom of action continues -- and real lasting benefit accrues.

[William F. Owen]

Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet.
... but rubber bullets and tear gas get used by police and military all over the world. Those weapons don't have that effect on other populations. The other option is 5.56mm ball. That causes a lot more upset.

[goesh]

Action Specific: A crowd of teens throwing rocks at a check point manned by a squad, they are close enough to inflilct personal damage, 30-40 in number and they've got a dozen 4-5 yr olds out in front of them as human shields, a small crowd of adults has gathered cheering and laughing.

Conventional: Up comes a Hummer with teargas and rubber bulletts are issued, an Iraqi response team is delayed, their Commander is on the phone because his wife is sick and may need a doctor, but nobody is going to gas some 4 yr olds or allow them to get hit with rubber bullets. The rocks are flying, 2-3 men have been ordered to drop any teen that pulls a gun, some barrels are leveled, tunnel vision and adrenalin our side, fun and aggression on their side and the teens are winning and sending a powerful message to mom and pop back home, cell phones are documenting it all.

Unconventional: Up comes the oldest and ugliest beater of pickup truck obtainable manned by several GIs. This is coming at them at their level, no superior high techery shock and awe, which is what the teens expect and must have to win the psychological battle. They want to fight the Hummer. The GIs have an improvised, giant sling shot and water balloons filled with feminine colored, non-toxic dye to splatter the punks with, including the human shields and they cut loose and splatter them rapid fire with pink and orange dye. About then the Iraqi cops show up and thump a few on the legs with night sticks and its over. Young Ahmed goes home colored like a woman and his bravado is gone, he is shamed and not hurt and Mom and Pop are glad they are not burying him or taking him to the hospital. They might even tell him to quit messing with the Americans.
This is no different than the GIs at Normandy who improvided those gouging shields on tanks to get through the hedgerows with - it just happened, out of box, jumping a dimension, a technical break in the chain of command set things in motion.

What are the risks associated with this example of out of the box thinking, specifically, could there be internal repercussions for some LT or Senior NCO for so ordering this action?

[tankersteve]

For this specific instance, the ramification for using an unauthorized and unarmored vehicle, contrary to force protection standards (possibly the biggest obstacle when it comes to U.S. forces and their innovation and effectiveness) may be a really loud counseling by the unit commander to the PL, if the CO had not been previously briefed on the plan.

In general, a lawyer and safety officer might want to weigh in on the potential for blinding a child with the balloon, the toxicity and environmental impact of the balloon dye, and where balloons fit within the escalation of force and the ROE. Big Army weapon managers would want to evaluate the rate of fire and reliability in arctic conditions, establish the maximum and effective range, and determine if the Lighthouse for the Blind could build a knockoff for .50 cents less than the regular commercial manufacturer. And the division commander would want to ensure the color of the dye is standardized across the AO, and the pink and orange color are not the same shade as our pink and orange VS-17 panels, used to mark friendly troops.

While I am being slightly cynical, this was the result of only about 5 minutes of brainstorming to come up with the typical U.S. Army bureaucratic response. I think the idea of shame and embarrassment employed would be effective and the troops who do the timeless 'ask for forgiveness, not permission' get a lot further with initially employing these kind of techniques.

I always encouraged my troops to improvise with different ideas, mainly with modifying current equipment or techniques. We used the long-range voice-mitters with MP3 players to stop traffic at highway overwatch positions to allow U.S. convoys to cross with less risk. We also modified smoke grenade launchers to fit on the gun shields to provide directional obscuration. One technique worked, the other needed refinement, and the decentralized nature of the AO prevented any higher from ever taking notice. Note that I didn't come up with either idea, my junior NCOs did.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

Too true in some respects...