Afghanistan ROE Change [Archive]

Ken White

06-23-2009, 12:32 AM

who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed).

Aside from the impacts on own forces, the net result is most likely to be more, not fewer, civilian casualties and the Afghans will figure that out fairly quickly. How long it will take us to figure it out is the issue because the number of added casualties will be difficult to determine. Plus, it's been my observation that when a US General reinvents a wheel; usually by simply modifying the existing model by making it hexagonal or octagonal -- and then it doesn't work -- reversion to the old, round variety is done slowly, quietly and below everyone's radar. :rolleyes:

Good thing about that technique is the reinventor then gets credit for being 'innovative' while everyone forgets that the innovation didn't work.

We need to get over the idea that "COIN" is something new. All this stuff has been done before. From us in Viet Nam, to the French in their colonies, the British in theirs, the poor Federal commanders tasked to hunt down Morgan and Mosby -- the Hittites, for that matter. Or, to put it in the right location; Alexander...

Ken White

06-23-2009, 12:38 AM

Other than that, if we have to run when we're getting shot at, can we at least shoot illum rounds over their houses? :rolleyes:We cannot risk setting a Goat afire. Heaven forbid we burn a Poppy Crop -- neither Solatium Payments for the Goat or Damage Claims for the crop so caused are authorized. :eek:

:D:D

IntelTrooper

06-23-2009, 01:07 AM

We cannot risk setting a Goat afire. Heaven forbid we burn a Poppy Crop -- neither Solatium Payments for the Goat or Damage Claims for the crop so caused are authorized. :eek:

:D:D
I was afraid of that. :( I guess those payments would have to come out of the pocket of the responsible commander.

Ken White

06-23-2009, 01:09 AM

CERP funds again? You Spooks and your nets... :D

Entropy

06-23-2009, 01:24 AM

From my very first operational experience the one consistent theme for our ROE is the inherent right to self defense. That ROE fundamental even applies in peacetime operations. If the reporting is accurate on this, then this ROE change fundamentally alters that and takes away the inherent right of self defense in combat situations that are relatively common in Afghanistan.

The second issue I have with this is that an ROE change is a needlessly draconian, top-down solution to the problem. Why can't the commanding General provide detailed Commander's intent and guidance that subordinates can apply as the situation dictates? Changing the ROE seems to me to show a lack of confidence in the ability of subordinate Commanders to properly follow and interpret the Commander's intent.

IntelTrooper

06-23-2009, 01:37 AM

CERP funds again? You Spooks and your nets... :D
Ask me again in 25 years...

Kiwigrunt

06-23-2009, 01:56 AM

I am reminded of Schmedlap’s post a little while ago on another thread where he said that they got more recognition (Iraq) from the locals once they started making more noise with increased (careful) use of HE etc. This created a perception among the locals that they were doing their jobs!:rolleyes:

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 02:50 AM

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 02:54 AM

The second issue I have with this is that an ROE change is a needlessly draconian, top-down solution to the problem. Why can't the commanding General provide detailed Commander's intent and guidance that subordinates can apply as the situation dictates? Changing the ROE seems to me to show a lack of confidence in the ability of subordinate Commanders to properly follow and interpret the Commander's intent.

That's exactly what it is. The obvious problem is that with the "commanders discretion" guidance we are still making a royal mess of things. Not saying it's the best solution, but may be necessary to get the commander's intent across.

I'm not comfortable with it easier, but much of what I hear/read is that we (ISAF) are very quick to call an airstrike to resolve what could be taken care of by other, less destructive, means that don't hand an IO victory to the enemy.

jmm99

06-23-2009, 03:38 AM

that would require this open-source ROE (positing that the article is accurate ?) - and I am stumped.

Possibly it is an application of Additional Protocals I and II (the best and highest use of Lawfare against the US, so far), which in general shift the burden of civilian protection from the defending force to the attacking force - even though the defending force is hiding amidst the civilians.

On the other hand, it could be a pure and simple political move - or some misguided view of COIN. If fully implemented, this rule would logically result in giving up built-up areas.

But, the article says:

Smith said McChrystal will address in the coming months how U.S. and NATO forces are deployed around the country, and forces could be withdrawn from remote regions in order to concentrate troops around population centers.

So, we remove troops from the boondocks (where they can shoot) to built-up areas (where they can't) ? None of this hangs together.

The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, which announced support for the rule, has a Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign_for_Innocent_Victims_in_Conflict) and official webpage (http://www.civicworldwide.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=54). See its "change the rules" page (http://www.civicworldwide.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=162&Itemid=99).

Placing the burden on the warring parties is cute - where the AQ-Taliban are not complying with the laws of war as they now exist. So, the burden (as with AP I & II) will only fall on those nations who will follow the rules (no matter how stupid they be).

Looks like a lawfare example to this old buzzard. Maybe some of you younger, more sophisticated folks can talk me down.

---------------------------

AP I & II are not accepted by the US (or by either Astan or Pstan, for that matter). They are accepted by most NATO countries.

Ken White

06-23-2009, 03:54 AM

Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see...

Every new Boss is good for three or four wild rumors. :wry:

Surferbeetle

06-23-2009, 04:04 AM

...the WSJ reports U.S. Revisits Afghan Battle Rules (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124571281804038963.html) by Yochi J. Dreazan

WASHINGTON -- The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan is finalizing a far-reaching change in tactics that will generally require U.S. troops taking fire in populated areas to break contact rather than risk civilian casualties, military officials said.

Exceptions will be made when the lives of U.S. and allied personnel are in danger.

The rules make clear exceptions for situations where the lives of U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Afghan personnel are in danger, U.S. officials said. The guidelines allow U.S. personnel to call in airstrikes or use powerful weaponry if they fear being overrun, can't leave the area safely, or need to evacuate wounded colleagues.

Gen. McChrystal, who arrived in Afghanistan last week, is "trying to make it as clear as possible that risking civilian lives for the sole goal of killing the enemy is not acceptable," said his spokesman, Rear Adm. Gregory Smith.

For much, but not all of what we are called upon to do, I am with Cavguy...

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

I have looked for civilian casualties & property damages on the heals of operations with my CA-bubba team. I have also done the life/limb/eyesight coordination/escort for those caught in the middle. My take is that its our guys first & always, certainly, but we also need to play smart when we can. Why add avoidable friction to our operations when many times its a variable that's under our control?

War is messy and alot of #### happens...we all know & accept the risks so try not to beat yourself up...we can't go back and fix things but inshallah we can go forward and apply what we have learned. 1LT Joshua Hurley, RIP (http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/profiles/hurleyjoshuac.html).

IntelTrooper

06-23-2009, 04:38 AM

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house (http://www.ausa.org/Webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/TEUE-7BRSKG). Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.

Blackjack

06-23-2009, 05:07 AM

"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."

For those who have expressed concern over the issue of being all to quick to call in airtrikes for everything, we are in 100% agreement. The idea of containment of an enemy may work at times, situation will dictate. We had CAS on mission at times, but the FAMAS works just as well for what the Legion does. Now maybe the intent was to keep every commander from calling in a JDAM strikes and hellfires every time a mortar tube goes off, but if so that should be covered in a seperate CAS ROE.

If you can run away from the fight go ahead and do it? Gentlemen, none of us wish to harm any non-combatants, but the top down order to flee from the fight because there may be civilians in the compound, and they may be hostages of the insurgents is not a good plan. Loitering around waiting for them to come out and surrendur may not be all that bright either, you would risk your men to any rienforcements jihad joe could call up. One thign we must ask ourselves here in regards to civilian casualties is this. Were they really civilians, how do we know? If they were hostages and we cannot engage these compounds how can we reasonbly expect to clear, hold, or build anything? Do we really think that the civillian that got held hostage for three days and was tormented by the Taliban will somehow respect us more because we ran away and left him to the mercy of such men?

ISAF will likely come out of such situations looking like base cowards to the locals in many of these situations. They may see it as westerners making excuses for ISAF forces not to fight the Taliban. Putting myself in the enemy mindset for a moment; I can see already hear the jokes in the villages about Americans putting both SAPI plates in the backs of their IBAs in my mind. I know if I were a Mujahideen Commander I would order video cameras to be present for any long term occupation of civil compounds. That way I could get video of the kuffr running away and turn it into some good propaganda. I could also remind the locals of how when the Mujahideen came, the Americans and ISAF crusaders ran away.

Find, fix and finish is the simple and effective answer here. Not find, fix and flee. Having said that mouthful above I will say that I have a great deal of respect for the General, and I know I am being unfair to him by bieng so critical when I do not have the burdens of command placed on me any longer. I also know that regardless of the outcome, he has the best intentions in mind here.

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 05:31 AM

One of the doctrinal corner stones of Irregular threats is to, physically, conceptually and morally restrict the Regular Armies use of force. We all know this.

If you think killing civilians is wrong, as an absolute statement, then I can see some are backing themselves into a corner where things are going to get unravelled pretty quickly.
No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.

Tom Odom

06-23-2009, 05:49 AM

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house (http://www.ausa.org/Webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/TEUE-7BRSKG). Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

I am with you Devil

Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

Ken, I will disagree with you on this one. This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.

Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.

Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.

Tom

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 05:57 AM

Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.

I think we generally tend to over-interpret guidance in the US Army, people take all orders to extremes not intended.

I think you are reading it a little wrong, and yes, 10pct will always read it wrong. I think the good general is trying not to use the hammer on all problems that kinda look like nails, and place the thought that occasionally there are other options.

A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.

I think that's what he's getting at. It's up to GEN McCrystal to clarify his intent to the lowest level. I am positive he is not intending to take away a soldiers' right to self defense.

Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.

Experience is something you get after you need it. :mad:

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 05:58 AM

Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.

Like I said, you should not intentionally kill civilians. I absolutely agree with the theory, but who is a civilian? War and conflict is not the realm of absolute truths or absolute solutions.

Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?

Tom Odom

06-23-2009, 06:02 AM

Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 06:12 AM

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

Right.

In Iraq 2007 (and I am sure in A-Stan and Iraq 2009), questionable deaths of civilians or potential law of armed conflict violations required a 15-6 investigation (commander's inquiry). Usually these inquiries existed to clear any questions of wrongdoing, rather than to prosecute soldiers. Rarely has anyone been brought to trial or reprimanded. However, the process does serve as a "check" on tendencies to be less than discriminating.

That said, I was in a unit where one of our company commanders (http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_haunted_040505,00.html)received a bad conduct discharge for a LOAC violation in 2004.

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 06:24 AM

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

I understand ROE and consider them vital instruments, sensibly applied. ROE have to exist in terms of specific guidance. That means you must be able prosecute folks who violate that guidance. Violation of ROE in Northern Ireland, meant murder investigations and UK soldiers being convicted, and placed in prison.

I don't see the same process as being applicable in the circumstances currently prevailing on A'Stan or Iraq, but I may be wrong. Time will tell.

Would violation of ROE be deemed a war crime? Should it be investigated by the UN?

jcustis

06-23-2009, 06:25 AM

No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.

That's a very difficult problem set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?

Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).

I know this is a simplistic view to certainly a difficult issue that is indeed METT-TS&L...and C, and P dependent, but what would you do? Do you have issue with the policy as it seems to be portrayed here, or is it an issue with a policy of measured restraint when civilians are involved and could factor into collateral damage? I ask because I do not want to presume to know, and your responses are unclear in that regard.

I agree with other posters that risk-averse commanders could employ this intent the wrong way. At the same time, perhaps more careful deliberation of the problem set is due in many circumstance we face over there. I dunno, but I'll be finding out in my very next deploy.

Blackjack

06-23-2009, 07:19 AM

Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.

I agree with you on the fact that just because they cannot be proven as civilians means they are targets part Tom. If commanders become too CoA and risk adverse it has the very real potential to become find, fix, flee. Absolutely nothing emotional about that. Just another possibility.

A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.

That is a really great point Cavguy. Patiance, cunning, and flexibility and while it will not work in every situation, it shows people another way of getitng the same task accomplished. What I am concerned about is turning compounds into hostage negotiation sites, or setting up a patrol for an ambush as they try to wait out the insurgents who are callign in their buddies. As you said, damned METT-TC.

I also wished to point out that I am in agreement with you fully in regards to air power, and its uses and abuses in sector.

jmm99

06-23-2009, 07:19 AM

Well, we went pretty quick from a change in the ROEs to prosecuting officers for war crimes - ready, shoot, aim.

Suppose every soldier had a little guardian lawyer angel (let's call him JMM), who will whisper the best legal advice (angel JMM doesn't whisper military advice). Angel JMM might whisper something like this. Niel Smith and Tom Odom, two officers that JMM happens to highly respect, accept the new ROEs; and believe that, if civilians (defined as friendlies) are killed, you my soldier ward could (not necessarily will) be prosecuted for war crimes. So, I'm telling you, scoot & don't shoot. You won't be prosecuted, none of your men will be killed (at least not here), and no civilians will be killed (at least by you).

QED (any lawyer angel who advised otherwise should be given a spaded tail & exiled).

Here is another legal opinion on the same topic. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Law and Military Interventions (http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf): Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (2001; he rose in the world since):

(p.5)
As Reisman and Antoniou indicate, the mere perception of LOAC violations can significantly impact operations. The Gulf War provides two examples of situations where LOAC was not violated yet the perception that it may have been had clear military consequences. The first concerned the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad that was believed by the allies to be a command and control node. Some experts concluded that the post-attack pictures of the bodies of family members of high Iraqi officials (who evidently used the bunker as a bomb shelter) being excavated from the wreckage achieved politically what the Iraqi air defenses could not do militarily: rendering downtown Baghdad immune from attack.[22]

Worried coalition leaders put the city virtually off-limits to avoid a repetition of like scenes reaching their peoples. Similarly, fears about the impact on coalition constituencies of the images of hundreds of burnt out vehicles along the so-called “Highway of Death” following an air attack on retreating Iraqi forces was a significant factor in the early termination of hostilities.[23] That result left the Republican Guard intact to slaughter Kurds and to help keep Saddam Hussein in power to this day.

22 See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War (1995), at 324-326.

23 Id., at 476-477. See also Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), at 520 (“The television coverage… was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”).

This is a short 27 page article, worth reading in full by everyone.

End legal advice by little guardian lawyer angel.

No smiles or other icons - this is a difficult topic (as another officer I respect just posted - hi, jcustis).

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 07:32 AM

That's a very difficult set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?
I'm referring to general circumstances and not specific ones. It's not my place to critique the General from afar, however it is legitimate and necessary to consider the implication of the problem as he allegedly sees it.

I see the issue as being one of commitment to the mission. If insurgents feel that they gain from operating within an environment where the presence of civilians protects them, then you are being suppressed, not them. 99% of civilians live in structures of some kind. That reality needs to be applied to operations.

Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).
No brainier. Surround the compound, and wait it out. Send word into the compound and be prepared to clear each space or dwelling with the appropriate amount of force required to ensure the bad guys get killed or captured, but no civilians are harmed - regardless if they supported the insurgents or not - which is another can of worms.

If I had been GOC A'Stan there would have been a blanket ban on using aircraft or artillery to engage anyone in any structure, for the last 5 years - unless there was a severe risk to the unit concerned. That rule would have been reviewed on a weekly basis. I'd also have different ROE for different areas. - BUT ROE works both ways. Wait for the day that when the Post or the Times runs a story about the 7 soldiers who died obeying ROE, to the letter, and got over run and killed. ROE are political, not ethical. Not killing civilians is only relevant in how it applies to the political part of the conflict, and I specifically include their politics as well as ours.

Blackjack

06-23-2009, 07:42 AM

A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army? I know they would not be so great in an open courtyard, etc. In certian situations where waiting them out may not be a wise option flashbangs followed by a close assault could be used.

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 09:00 AM

A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army?

I'm pretty sure that the UK is currently using something along those lines, but I'm not entirely sure. Having seen the NICO types, used in training, and on demonstrations by Police Firearms teams, I was not that impressed. More obviously I would be advocating the use of CS gas, or something similar, but it's use is banned by NATO, as a chemical weapon.

Anthony Hoh

06-23-2009, 01:34 PM

Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

Tom

You know me, I am not an advocate of bombing what I can shoot. Of course there is merit in waiting things out, or an even handed approach. But the way this ROE change reads (from the little we know of it) when unsure of who else may be injured...flee. IMO that is too far.

You do not need to have a masters in Arab culture to see the implications of this. If you think the Taliban are having a I/O field day now, wait until we pull pitch whenever the shooting starts during unplanned meeting engagements.

I am not gonna break out my been there got the T-shirt drawer with you. Because quite frankly I'd lose. But let me give you another counter point to consider from an Advisors perspective.

Story Time...
No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.

I don’t feel this ROE change will do a whole lot in the credibility/ go protect the populace department, it has the potential to stifle the limited support we get from the populace now for when we do take action. In the micro scale I respect that one Kandak Commanders relationship with his US advisor does not really have strategic impact, but I think we can both agree that these relationship’s are important. There is a reason the ANA want US advisors and not (with all do respect to the foreign memebers of SWJ) French, German, etc… we are not (currently) harangued by our legislature/ civilian leadership with these ridiculous war time caveats. Could the Allies cross the Rhine and take Berlin under these conditions? ( I know you are gonna crucify me for that last sentence but I had to put it in there.)

Tony

Tom Odom

06-23-2009, 02:05 PM

No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.

No doubt it did, But the story is oranges (force protection) to apples (use of fires). In fact the change in ROE is in many ways an acceptance of greater risk.

Again I don't think the ROE change is a change to "flee" or retreat or hide or any other judgement-laden term. It is a change to think hard and adjust accordingly. I also don't see where it will call for withdrawal in unplanned meeting engagements.

When you can show me the Rhine River in Afghanistan I'll tell you whether we can take Berlin.

Best
Tom

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 02:25 PM

Rather than speculate about "running away" and what the new ISAF CG might have said, let's look at what he actually said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/asia/22airstrikes.html?hp

“Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly,” General McChrystal told a group of his senior officers during a video conference last week. “We can lose this fight.”

“When we shoot into a compound, that should only be for the protection of our forces,” he said. “I want everyone to understand that.”

...

Under the rules that General McChrystal outlined, those strikes would almost certainly be prohibited. They would be prohibited, the general said, even if it meant letting some Taliban get away.

Referring to airstrikes, General McChrystal said, “If it is just to defeat the enemy, then we are not going to do it, even if it means we are going to step away from that firefight and fight another time.”

Or from his confirmation testimony:

http://washingtonindependent.com/45389/mcchrystal-paints-bleak-picture-of-afghanistan-war

he repeatedly emphasized how his approach in Afghanistan would be guided by “classic counterinsurgency” precepts, such as protecting the population from insurgent assaults, rather than focusing primarily on killing and capturing insurgents. A “military-centric” strategy would not succeed, he told senators, and pledged to review “all” standard practices and rules of engagement to minimize civilian casualties, which have outraged Afghans and jeopardized the United States’ relationship with the Karzai government. Losing the support of the Afghan population would be “strategically decisive,” McChrystal said, meaning the war would be lost, and said he believed that adverse perceptions of the U.S. caused by civilian casualties is “one of the most dangerous enemies we face” in Afghanistan. Success will ultimately be measured by “the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

Seems to me he's trying to fight on our terms, not the enemy's, and stop playing into their hands with tactical victories but losses in the bigger fight.

Entropy

06-23-2009, 02:38 PM

Thanks for being contrarian Cavguy and for the additional info.

It sounds like he thinks we have been too enemy-centric and aggressive in going after the enemy in Afghanistan without paying enough attention to the wider effects of our actions. It sounds a lot more reasonable than it did to me at first. I guess my only question is, who is the decider? Who will have the authority to determine a strike is necessary to protect our force?

slapout9

06-23-2009, 02:41 PM

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house (http://www.ausa.org/Webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/TEUE-7BRSKG). Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

Like I keep saying the most important TTP's for COIN are how LE handles situations.

Good Example from above. 1st your surround them and tell them to surrender just like TV, then gas them LE can do this but LOAC forbids this....dum.... change the law,then flashbang dynamic entry as a last resort. And you always have the option of a Tactical withdrawal. Often with better Intelligence about how to do something at another time and place for a better result.

But our Forces are not trained that way or equipped that way or have enough manpower to do this if they were trained and equipped to do this.

Good LE organizations are trained to be assertive NOT aggressive and they are trained to DE-escalate not Escalate. Soldiers are not generally trained that way.

We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.:D

J Wolfsberger

06-23-2009, 03:35 PM

slapout9

06-23-2009, 03:40 PM

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Blackjack

06-23-2009, 03:56 PM

Cavguy, I think we share the same ideas on the use of airpower, or more appropriatly not using it. I recall sitting in Corsica and hearing abut the PPCLI getting lit up by two F-16s while on a training range and it made my stomach turn. The same can be said for everytime I hear the words 'airstrike' 'Afghanistan' and 'civilian casualties'. The use of airpower as it has been used in Afghanistan should come to a swift end. Air power should be treated like the W-88 warhead of COIN. Use only as an absolute last resort because the fallout is usually never worth the effects on target.

Old Eagle

06-23-2009, 03:58 PM

I'd like to see exactly what the forthcoming guidance says in detail. Anyone who knows SAM might have a difficult time imagining him issuing a "runaway! runaway!" order.
To a certain extent, we're all commenting on something that hasn't been finalized.

@jw -- based on anecdotal evidence from the Sons of Iraq, Swat Valley, etc., it appears that when the bad guys get abusive, there is pushback from the local population. IMHO, if the balance of violence tips significantly against the Taliban, we will have an opportunity to exploit it. (Keeping in mind that if the central gov't, ANP and other forces of order don't get their acts together, it won't make much difference.)

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 04:05 PM

Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

Last fall I was at a training event and a former MARSOC member told me a story along the following lines (can't remember all the details):

Afghanistan, 2007 (ish). MARSOC unit is participating in cordon of several villages in Afghanistan during an operation. Intelligence intercepts confirm that the AQ/Talib in the area plan to engage the overwatch position as soon as the procession gets close. It would then be filmed and used to illustrate Americans attacking peaceful civilians. Suddenly a funeral party emerges from the town, casket an all, headed directly for the Marines' position. As the procession emerges, the Marines send a rep forward to tell the procession they can't proceed. They protest it is a funeral and they must. The marines then offer them a separate route to the local cemetery not crossing their over watch position, but are told they cannot come that way. The villagers return to the village and do not re-emerge. Later, intelligence sources report frustration the Taliban were unable to provoke an incident.

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

Steve Blair

06-23-2009, 04:10 PM

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

Which makes total sense from their perspective. VC/NVA elements used to do that quite often in Vietnam. Fire from village at passing US patrol, knowing full well that the US grunts would call in fire support. Then fade away and let the village get plastered.

Blackjack

06-23-2009, 04:32 PM

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

40mm Stingball (http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=123)

These could work too. You know, I come from an extremely agressive military culture that is not risk adverse. Even I can see the benefits of these LE tools applied to military operations.

LE does not by any means have all the answers, but they sure have the market cornered in LTL products and their application. Also, these sting balls would probably leave some serious welts. It could be a good way to identify suspected Taliban later on, and aprehend them. The exploding dye packs of the battlefield if you will.

Cavguy

06-23-2009, 04:53 PM

I would love the ability to use non-lethal rounds.

When I was last in Iraq 2006-2007 we were prohibited from using them by the lawyers. The legal reasoning was that sometimes these rounds can kill. Therefore, you can only use them in situations where you would have justification to use lethal force. In said situation, better to use the lethal force than use a non-lethal round that accidentally kills.

I didn't agree then and don't now, but that was the reasoning. Love the lawyers.

carl

06-23-2009, 06:03 PM

We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.:D

Has anybody made a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell yet? That would be about the same and you could mount it on almost anything.

Echo what Slap says, just keep pumping gas in there and wait. Is there any way to get around prohibitions on that? If local police were present could they do it?

jmm99

06-23-2009, 06:06 PM

The legal advice is exactly on point given the ROEs that were in effect. The lawyer was protecting you from a possible manslaughter charge.

I'd prefer ROEs that would leave decisions like that to the field commander (you). Then I could say that your legal options are A, B and C. Which one you select is a military decision, not a legal decision.

But, as you have already said, field commanders were calling in too much heavy stuff; so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

slapout9

06-23-2009, 06:12 PM

Now you guys understand why LE feels the way we do about lawyers:D
Soldiers should be looking at counter lawsuits because they were denied appropriate capabilities to do there job thus having to escalate to deadly force.

Dye marking has a lot of potential, there are a lot of options with stuff like that:wry:

Also I would want lots of snipers (precision guided bullets) and the surveillance ability they have.

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

Which you know..... we keep talking about a new kind of warfare,hybrid,4GW,etc. but nobody is looking at the RULE set we force our military to fight under that could be changed to help level the field some.

slapout9

06-23-2009, 06:16 PM

Has anybody made a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell yet? That would be about the same and you could mount it on almost anything.

Echo what Slap says, just keep pumping gas in there and wait. Is there any way to get around prohibitions on that? If local police were present could they do it?

Colonel Warden told me that the Air Force should concentrate on the capabailtiy to put a loaf of bread (or whatever) right into the hands of people/soldiers on the ground from the Air:eek: Precison Effects!

J Wolfsberger

06-23-2009, 06:20 PM

... precision guided bullets...

We could do that.

What's your budget? :D

Ken White

06-23-2009, 06:52 PM

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?Excellent question -- and I submit they'll try and thereby dissuade us from action on occasion. However, as Old Eagle pointed out and I said earlier:"Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see..."

Tom:
Ken, I will disagree with you on this one.We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

"...I suspect the civilians who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed)."

Note I said not smart on several levels -- not that it was wrong -- and the only level I spelled out was the second quoted paragraph above. Do you disagree with that? What are your other disagreements? (my other concerns are below)

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Wilf said:
"No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see."To my mind that's the gist of this; the thread has been mutated into a COIN best practice tutorial and I don't think anyone is questioning what best practice is -- and killing ANY excess civilians -- even 1, une, ee, fagat yek, hannah, ichi, mot, ein, uno solamente -- is to be avoided. Tactical efforts to preclude harm to civilians should be constant, no question. I see no one above disputing that.

That's not the issue -- the issue is the possible guidance which none of us has apparently seen and its potential effect on the effort of units in Afghanistan. I specifically raised the issue of second order effects and unintended consequences. I have seen such orders before and have seen them fail and be allowed to die, unenforced. The problem: As Cav Guy said, the US Army habitually significantly overreacts to every order...

The Afghan attitude toward fighting differs from the Arab attitude. What effect will the order have on the population it is designed to aid?

I go back to Wilf's comment: ""...rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.""

We need to see the order but when we do whatever we say will have little to no effect -- however, the issue to me is the tone of the order and potential adverse effects; the positive effects and the possible need go without saying. With a kid likely to be there again soon, I got one a them there vested int'rests... :wry:

Oh and Tom, on this
This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this." :D

carl

06-23-2009, 07:14 PM

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

tankersteve

06-23-2009, 10:47 PM

your use of me as an example was a bit too kind, and apples & oranges - for one, I didn't have a guy wounded, which CAN definitely affect your decisions, and two, we really didn't have a plan to get the guy if he didn't come out soon (other than get ready to go get him, just like you).

I really think Blackjack hit the nail on the head when you look at the actual language - air power is the big stick. It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.

I know there are some who think this is too restrictive, but I think the real intent is for troops to really measure the gain (couple of knuckleheads dead, who will likely be replaced tomorrow) versus the loss (an entire village committed to supporting AQ, due to exceptional losses, especially among women/children).

Oh and Niel, I am at Leavenworth, give me a ping.

Tankersteve

IntelTrooper

06-23-2009, 11:44 PM

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.
When your troops are tactically and morally disciplined, uniforms are overrated.

Ken White

06-24-2009, 01:05 AM

...It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.Well said. Afghans understand and accept bullets; 'Be Omeidi Xodah.' Arty and Air not so much...

Blackjack

06-24-2009, 01:32 AM

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

We have a winner! That is exactly what I was trying to get at.

If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Exactly, that is why I compared an airstrike in COIN to a thermonuclear warhead in large wars. Sure, we could use it, but imagine the political, sociological fallout from it. We end up losing the high ground in the battle of hearts and minds a little more with every 155 HE round, or JDAM we drop. How do we get it back? Put one foot in front of the other, chamber a round and start hunting. Let the people know that they will not be robbed by bandits, they will not have to worry about their children going to school only to be slaughtered. They will not have to endure public beatings by madmen, and a hundred other things.

jcustis

06-24-2009, 03:04 AM

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Haha..they hurt...a lot :D.

jcustis

06-24-2009, 03:15 AM

Haha..they hurt...a lot :D.

so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them aa restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.

I will admit that in my prearation for three deployments in support of OIF, the option of fixing, cordoning, and waiting out has NEVER been discussed, trained to, or published as a potential solution.

That commanders have employed it as a tool in the toolbox is a testament to that individual's ability to think on their feet, becauseI for sure haven't seen it ever as a bullet on a training slide. I can't speak for the JRTCs, however.

Tom Odom

06-24-2009, 05:37 AM

Tom:We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

That is where my disagreement comes in--it was a necessary move and one that we have needed to make for the past few years. It is not being done in a vacum; McChrystal's manning plan to improve command consistency should help in its execution.

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Blackjack used the term flee; that means running. How the population takes such a change depends on what you do. CAV offered a scenario that did not kill civilians nor did it allow the bad guys to escape.

Oh and Tom, on this I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this." :D

I would agree that better training would greatly help. I also believe that a command level directive was and is necessary as a rudder shift. That seems to be what McChrystal has in mind. Whether the shift lasts or slowly dies remains to be seen.

Tom

Dayuhan

06-24-2009, 05:45 AM

Given the extensive and negative publicity that has been drawn by actual or alleged civilian casualties from air strikes, and given the very public nature of the announcement under discussion here, is it possible that the announcement is aimed less at altering the tactical environment on the ground than at creating or reinforcing a perception of a shift away from the use of air power in environments where civilian casualties are likely?

I have no doubt that Gen. McChrystal wants and intends to reduce collateral damage, but I'm sure he also wants everyone in the picture to be aware of this intention. When a change like this is announced in the mass media before the new rule is even released, it suggests to me that there's a strong "for popular consumption" factor in the picture.

I would certainly agree with those here who point out that if the JDAM is option A and running away is option Z, consideration needs to be given to the options in between - with full awareness that options are restricted by circumstances.

Uboat509

06-24-2009, 07:32 AM

J Wolfsberger

06-24-2009, 11:07 AM

This morning, Fox news broadcast a piece by Steve Harrigan, on the ground in Afghanistan. The thrust of the piece, which may or may not be accurate, was that the new ROE are intended to place restrictions on the use of air support, particularly with regard to bombs in "urban" areas.

Cavguy

06-24-2009, 02:13 PM

IF this is what it appears to be, then it looks to me like another case of "Some are abusing it so we will deny it to everyone." Maybe it's just me, but I hate taking proven tools out of my toolbox. This particular tool probably has been abused and greater controls over its use are probably warranted, but outright removing it doesn't seem like a good idea. CavGuy's scenario is a great one, IF you have the time and IF you have the resources and manpower and IF you can control the terrain. It is definitely a tool to keep in the box but that doesn't mean it will always be the right tool. It also doesn't mean that assaulting the building or even striking it with indirect or CAS is always the wrong answer.

My point exactly.

Look, I agree with Ken. I wish we would invest in the upfront training and guidance to ensure subordinates aren't denied tools/flexibility they need to do the job.

The unfortunate reality is that time and time again we have failed to exercise restraint.

In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.

As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

Tom Odom

06-24-2009, 02:27 PM

My point exactly.

Look, I agree with Ken. I wish we would invest in the upfront training and guidance to ensure subordinates aren't denied tools/flexibility they need to do the job.

The unfortunate reality is that time and time again we have failed to exercise restraint.

In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.

As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

All good points and in many ways this change reminds me of what happend in Iraq with the change in leadership, change in doctrine, boost in forces, and strategic focus. Different AO with different issues I will readily agree. But I would also say similar in the need to make changes, not all of which can be affected by better training at the tactical level.

Best

Tom

William F. Owen

06-24-2009, 02:45 PM

I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

I was taught about ROE going through basic training in 1980. It's a central pillar of British Army thinking (or used to be). If ROE isn't at the centre of your use of force, then there may be a problem.

Ken White

06-24-2009, 03:55 PM

But I would also say similar in the need to make changes, not all of which can be affected by better training at the tactical level.Totally true -- but that's the wrong focus. Cav Guy's got it right:
"I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions."THAT / those are the problem. Not tactical level training but the mentality we have developed over the last 30 years or so. That, I contend is inculcated by trying to define 'training' down to the lowest possible level and it is exacerbated by a culture that treats minor foul ups as major crimes while ignoring major crimes as non events. We have a minor tactical training problem -- we have major personnel management, integrity and military professional education problems.

This is the result:
" We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad."It's beyond sad, it's flat dangerous.

It results in this truth:
"...It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.My points are that:

- McChrystal should not have to change the rules at any level. We have been in Afghanistan for Seven years and seven months, for chissakes -- or more correctly for seven plus one year or less tours -- that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that.

- The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that. I also question whether it will achieve his apparent goal though I acknowledge it will temporarily assuage some Afghans.

- Johnny can't think for himself because he belongs to an organization that goes to great lengths to discourage such activity in very subtle ways and allows malfeasance and incompetence to survive as compensation. That is indicative of flawed personnel policies, less than competent professional education and a dangerously skewed value system.

Those things need to be fixed. New rules in one theater will not fix them -- nor, given the pervasiveness of those ills, are said new rules likely to have the desired effect.

Rank amateur

06-24-2009, 04:38 PM

Lots of intelligent comments. When you're being population centric, there really is no rush. The population was there in 2001. They'll be there in 2021. It really doesn't matter if the enemy occupies the village today, tomorrow or next week. It only matters whether the enemy is able to reoccupy the village after you guys have cleared it.

As an ad guy, if I were selling the new ROE to the boots on the ground I would say in this one specific situation, if it is safe to do so, treat it as a hostage situation and not a firefight. Part of the safety, of course, is making sure you're not setting yourself up to be ambushed by the hostage takers colleagues. (I don't know the buzzwords for that. "Establish, secure defensible, oversight positions?")

As to the fact this may encourage human shields. Perhaps that's a good thing. people don't like being taken hostage. They don't like their hostage takers. They like their rescuers. After the hostages are rescued, the takers almost always face justice.

Tom Odom

06-24-2009, 04:45 PM

My points are that:

- McChrystal should not have to change the rules at any level. We have been in Afghanistan for Seven years and seven months, for chissakes -- or more correctly for seven plus one year or less tours -- that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that.

- The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that. I also question whether it will achieve his apparent goal though I acknowledge it will temporarily assuage some Afghans.

- Johnny can't think for himself because he belongs to an organization that goes to great lengths to discourage such activity in very subtle ways and allows malfeasance and incompetence to survive as compensation. That is indicative of flawed personnel policies, less than competent professional education and a dangerously skewed value system.

Those things need to be fixed. New rules in one theater will not fix them -- nor, given the pervasiveness of those ills, are said new rules likely to have the desired effect.

Ken

Well said and I agree with all but would say in a case where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp. McChrystal has got to start somewhere, quickly.

Best
Tom

J Wolfsberger

06-24-2009, 05:09 PM

We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.
...

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

Well elaborated on by Ken and Tom. I'll add that we also induct privates into basic training after given them 12 years of experience that mistakes means you're a "failure," with an "F" on a piece of paper to prove it to the entire world. Those who go on to college get another 4 years of reinforcement to the "lesson." (I've had to go so far as telling new graduate employees that if I don't see at least one mistake a week, it will be proof they aren't doing anything.)

Here's the problem: if we want initiative and independent thinking, people must know that they won't be pilloried for getting it wrong. When that happens, you create a risk averse culture. You also start eliminating the possibility that people will learn from their mistakes and become the better for it. (I met an officer from the 11th Cav who stranded his troop on an island during maneuvers. Career over - and the Army lost an officer who for damn sure would never let his unit get trapped on the wrong terrain again.)

The flip side problem, is creating a cultural environment where mistakes are accepted as the price of initiative and independent thinking, without creating one where the duds can "fail up."

So to summarize, solving the problem seems to require creating a culture that addresses two points:

Tolerating mistakes as the result of initiative and independent, creative thought.
Weeding out the people who can't or won't learn from their mistakes, or believe that initiative and independence somehow mean out of control.

Uboat509

06-24-2009, 05:24 PM

I agree that a zero defect mentality exists within the institution but I am not convinced that the root of the problem resides within the institution. In today's modern, media saturated hyper-partisan politcal environment, ground commanders are subject to very public scrutiny of their actions in the press and in the government. Of course our elected officials have always had oversight of the military but I think they are more willing to intrude on operations for political reasons. That's going to foster some risk adversity.

SFC W

Ken White

06-24-2009, 05:29 PM

"...The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that..." (emphasis added / kw)
Well said and I agree with all but would say in a case where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp. McChrystal has got to start somewhere, quickly.It also seems you are corroborating my point that this is a bandaid and that we are attacking a symptom... ;)

Not sniping at you but I think this all too pervasive general idea and attitude "...where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp." is endemic in the Army, more so today as it has been increasing in intensity for over 20 years and that it is exactly why we are where we are in a great many respects.

We have a bad tendency today to put out fires instead of removing the combustibles that allow such fires. People acquire credit and gratification from 'fixing' things that are wrong -- and being seen to do so...

Few seem willing to put in the hard thankless effort required to change the direction of the elephant. That attitude is dangerous and is not good for the long term health of the institution -- or the nation.

I'd like to amend something I said earlier: "...that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that. Append: and fix it before it gets worse..."

jmm99

06-24-2009, 07:33 PM

from Cavguy
As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

JP 1-04 (pp.73, 72) (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_04.pdf):

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
....
rules for the use of force. Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 1-02)

Explanatory article, ROE vs RUF (http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/2006/06CLAMO.html) in Marine Corps Gazette (linked from SWJ Library).

Because RUF generally assume a nonhostile host with a generally friendly population, RUF primarily focus on using force in self-defense as a matter of force protection based on mere presence—rather than an assigned operational mission—or using force in the exercise of a very limited law enforcement or security mission. ROE policy concerns tend to focus on relations with foreign actors and furthering international political objectives. RUF policy concerns tend to focus on domestic or host-nation political objectives and domestic or host-nation public opinion.

I find the distinction between ROE (in foreign ops) and RUF (in domestic ops) to be pretty straight-forward. Where the two are both programmed into the same operation (as JP 1-04 allows or requires ?), I understand the definitions ("will" vs "guide" ?), but do not really understand the possible implementations.

jmm99

06-25-2009, 02:22 AM

I think MAJ Smith has revealed to us a real legal can of worms - as well as a project for education and training of soldiers that is beyond me.

Current SROE/SRUF and consequent ROE/RUF date from the complete 2005 overhaul of that system of rules. The changes are described, with various problem areas highlighted, by Major Daniel J. Sennott, Interpreting Recent Changes to the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/11-2007.pdf), Nov 2007, The Army Lawyer DA PAM 27-50-414, pp.52-78.

MAJ Sennett sums the distinction between the SROE/ROE family and the SRUF/RUF family as follows (pp.52,53; footnotes omitted here - see original for extensive footnotes):

The Department of Defense (DOD) released the current Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF), dated 13 June 2005, in early July 2005. These rules are drastically different from prior versions. Both the format and the language have changed, but probably the most important modification is the addition of new terms and definitions. While some of the modifications serve to simplify the SRUF, other modifications may not be as favorably received. The SRUF, which are designed for use in the United States, and therefore based on domestic law, now include language that is identical to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), which are rooted in international law. As a result, the potential for confusion in application of these two distinct sets of rules may be significant.
....
The DOD defines rules for the use of force as “[d]irectives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations.” This rather general definition is further augmented by the definition contained in the current SRUF: Standing Rules for the Use of Force “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil support and routine Military Department functions occurring within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial seas.”

Perhaps the best way to define SRUF is in the negative: SRUF are not SROE. The SROE “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies . . . occurring outside U.S. territory . . . and outside U.S. territorial seas.” Although SRUF and SROE share some common principles, SRUF are based on domestic law, while SROE is largely based on international law. Therefore, any definitions and concepts contained in RUF must be rooted in the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws.

Not a doubt exists that the primary doctrinal use of the SRUF/RUF family was intended to be in domestic operations within the US.

That having been said, Niel is entirely correct in saying that the SRUF/RUF family can be used outside of the US without violation of doctrine. The Clamo article in the Marine Gazette expressly says that (e.g., references to "host nation", etc.). The 2008 Operational Law Handbook (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2008.pdf), chap 5, lays out the state of SROE/ROE and SRUF/RUF as its CLAMO authors saw it. Whether a specific extension of SRUF/RUF to a foreign operation is wise or not is not an issue for lawyers, military or civilian - it is a command decision.

The combo of SROE/ROE and SRUF/RUF is, to say the least, complicated. Can this combo result in the end state defined by Jon Custis:

I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them as restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.

especially re: his "to train your troops properly in their execution" ?

It is not within my expertise to suggest education or training methods; but unless there is adequate education and training, all this complexity (add EOF - Escalation of Force to the mix) promises to become a mess (IMO).

It is within my expertise to wonder what the Federal courts will do with this. For the past 9 months, the DC District and DC Circuit have been deciding detainee cases based on a strict AUMF-LoW (LOAC) standard. As such, they have accorded NO constitutional rights to detainees other than a limited habeas right; at most, releasing them into the diplomatic custody of the US for possible future OCONUS transfer.

It will be interesting to see what SCOTUS will do with the concept that "definitions and concepts contained in RUF must be rooted in the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws" when SRUF/RUF are applied to Astan. I haven't the foggiest WAG as to whether the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws will become applicable to Astan as a consequence.

----------------------
As further support for Niel's legal position (that SRUF/RUF can be applied), JP 1-04 (cited in my prior post) allows - but does not require (that being a command decision as I interpret it) - use of SRUF/RUF in the Course of Action Development process, across a very broad spectrum:

(pp.32-33)
(b) The joint force SJA reviews other staff section proposals for legal sufficiency. As an example, the joint force SJA assists other staff elements (typically the operations directorate of a joint staff [J-3] or the plans directorate of a joint staff [J5]), in determining whether the standing rules of engagement/standing rules for the use of force (SROE/SRUF) are sufficient to accomplish the mission, and, if not, which supplemental ROE/RUF measures are needed and why. The joint
force SJA should consider and assist other staff elements in considering, for example, whether and
under what circumstances the JFC should request or authorize the following: authority to declare forces as hostile (who and under what circumstances); use of riot control agents, offensive operations, and cross border operations; and use of all necessary means during special operations, collective self-defense (defense of non-US persons and property), beyond visual range engagement of airborne objects, exercise of national self-defense, use of wartime reserve modes, training or spotlighting with a directed energy weapon, collateral damage (LOAC-standard or minimum possible), attacking space assets, computer network attack, destruction of designated lines of communications or facilities, destruction of designated major supplies or resources, and detention of civilians. Other areas that require review include detention and interrogation operations, treatment of civilians, integration of contractor personnel, and intelligence operations.

lobo

06-25-2009, 04:33 AM

Tom Odom

06-25-2009, 05:11 AM

"...The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that..." (emphasis added / kw)It also seems you are corroborating my point that this is a bandaid and that we are attacking a symptom... ;)

Not sniping at you but I think this all too pervasive general idea and attitude "...where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp." is endemic in the Army, more so today as it has been increasing in intensity for over 20 years and that it is exactly why we are where we are in a great many respects.

We have a bad tendency today to put out fires instead of removing the combustibles that allow such fires. People acquire credit and gratification from 'fixing' things that are wrong -- and being seen to do so...

Few seem willing to put in the hard thankless effort required to change the direction of the elephant. That attitude is dangerous and is not good for the long term health of the institution -- or the nation.

I'd like to amend something I said earlier: "...that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that. Append: and fix it before it gets worse..."

No sniping detected. Again I agree on the need for institutional change and I am not saying ignore it. I have advocated change too long to say that. I am saying that whether it is cosmetic or fundamental, an immediate change in approach was needed and McChrystal is doing that. Gates is clearly involved as well.

As for the renaissance or revolution that will come from the younger generation as they move up--at least that is what I hope.

Best
Tom

Entropy

06-25-2009, 02:28 PM

Great thread, which has cleared up some of my false assumptions.

davidbfpo

06-25-2009, 04:05 PM

A short video clip of the UK Commander in Afghanistan (I am sure it is longer on the BBC News itself) and the US Commander - on these issues: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8119396.stm

Incidentally BBC have added a lot of items in last few days.

davidbfpo

Hacksaw

06-25-2009, 04:27 PM

The one thing that gets me is how widespread this information is, part of the way to win any conflict (or battle) is to deny the enemy information on our tactics and battle plans. Announcing to the world (and the enemy) what we will or will not do in a situation is just asking for some "smart" opponent to use this against our troops.
my other point to be made is how this can be confusing to anybody on the ground (or air), the last thing we need is for the troops and/or leaders to start second guessing themselves (or third....) for concern on how their action will be view by others.

just my two cents to a interesting thread
*plink, plink*

Lobo

Call me naive, but...

If you presume that the enemy will read this traffic... and that the enemy will then tend to fuse itself in large numbers to population centers in order to leverage a perceived seam in NATO/US RUF...

Maybe, just maybe... that is part of the design of the public release... in addition to assauging some Afghan sensibilities, perhaps a second order effect of the the wide spread release of the directive is exactly so the adversary will read and respond as mentioned above...

A significant problem in dealing with non-compliant forces in AFG is exactly the fact that after getting some "sch-onion" laid upon them in 2001, that got smart and stopped "pooling" into targetable entities...

Of course that's just a wag... stranger things etc etc etc

Time to make the donuts

Ken White

06-25-2009, 04:57 PM

And an excellent idea you also have. You're more energetic than I am; I'm off to Krispy Kreme ®.

:D :D

jmm99

06-25-2009, 05:26 PM

the BBC transcript (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8118013.stm) (with the audio feed):

The deputy commander of Nato-led forces in Afghanistan, Jim Dutton, said a "fundamental mindset change" had been taking place for some time and was now being reinforced under Gen McChrystal.

"If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so," he told the BBC.

Just before this, Dutton outlined the problem of creating guidelines for troops from 42 nations, etc. He also noted that the rules (RUFs do seem more appropriate a designation, though he used neither ROEs nor RUFs expressly) were intended to address the primary problems of air and indirect fires. However, his quote above encompasses direct fires as well.

Blackjack

06-25-2009, 10:11 PM

I wonder if AQ has a Micromanagement/Risk Aversion/Lawfare Exploitation cell? If is does it is probably working overtime right now.

“If you are in a situation where you are under fire from the enemy... if there is any chance of creating civilian casualties or if you don't know whether you will create civilian casualties, if you can withdraw from that situation without firing, then you must do so".

As I have said several times, I agree with a lot of the members here about the use of air strikes and indirect fires. However, it is fairly obvious the general is speaking of direct fires as well. General Dutton made that abundantly clear as to the commander's intent of these changes. The problem is the overuse of air strikes and arty, yet the change according to General Dutton is clear that the policy applies to direct fires as well. This is precisely why I used the wording I did in previous statements. It went from a suggestion to a lawful order just like that.

All of this has left me with a few more questions like:

Could the fact that there is potential for civilians to be injured or killed in any built up area, this could effectively put build up areas off limits?

How is this going to effect commanders and NCOs? Will we start seeing a more timid form of engagement, unwillingness to engage in the first place if for no other reson than avoiding a lot of investigations, or murder charges?

How long is it going to take for the Taliban and other insurgent groups to exploit these changes and game the system like they usually do?

AnalyticType

06-25-2009, 10:23 PM

[...]How long is it going to take for the Taliban and other insurgent groups to exploit these changes and game the system like they usually do?

About two hours after they have knowledge of the ROE's details and that it's in effect.

Just my 2psi :wry:

But as was brought up previously, it is possible that this publicly-broadcast change is for Talibani consumption. They watch CNN too.

Blackjack

06-25-2009, 10:49 PM

Yes, that is very possible, and the same British General that spoke is speaking of ramping up operations this summer. I still have my doubts, but I will know more by the end of September, as we all will. Hopefully the airstrikes bit is not a play though.

lobo

06-26-2009, 02:21 AM

About two hours after they have knowledge of the ROE's details and that it's in effect.

Just my 2psi :wry:

But as was brought up previously, it is possible that this publicly-broadcast change is for Talibani consumption. They watch CNN too.

true, that is a point to consider. But I can also see certain members of our political leadership and the media screaming that they were used in tricking the enemy and that we need to play by the rules.... *snort*

Lobo
"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother...."
William Shakespeare, Henry V

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 02:38 PM

Niel (if you're still tracking)
Heard, understood, appreciate your previous comments here.

In a slightly different scenario, I wonder how application would have impacted an event like the battle of Sufia, in terms of conduct of the battle and the decision process to engage in the first place. (Would you hesitate to send in ground troops knowing airpower could be denied?) I contend the significance of that event is still under-appreciated in terms of impact on subsequent events in Iraq, but that's a side issue.

I'm talking rotary vice fixed wing here, but much of the discussion I've seen above seems to have fixed wing in mind - I've seen no indication that "the rule" (aka the elephant we haven't seen) will make that distinction.

jmm99

06-26-2009, 05:18 PM

for linking SWC and this thread at Mudville. :)

Also, thank you in advance for taking the time (at your convenience) to fill out your About Me. Not needed for today - since the SWJ Blog feed takes us to your webpage, etc.; but for future posts (hopefully many), the lack of background will cause readers to say "Who is that guy ?" ;)

jmm99

06-26-2009, 06:51 PM

the Captain's Journal (please read the About (http://www.captainsjournal.com/about/)), which is linked from Greyhawk's Mudville (I've visited both sites before) and which has two commentaries on this topic, and many links in the commentaries:

Update on ROE Changes for Afghanistan (http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/06/25/update-on-roe-changes-for-afghanistan/) (opinion piece)

Changes to the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan (http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/06/23/changes-to-the-rules-of-engagement-for-afghanistan/) (analysis piece, mostly; cites this thread :) )

Links to some sources (in latter link; and some caveats about the sources linked - "lesson learned" - check for updated sources)

standing rules of engagement (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/cjcs_sroe.pdf) (at fas; these are the 2000 version, completely revised in 2005 - especially as to SRUF, which is the basic issue here. So, these show what SROEs look like - that's it. Google up what has been released in 2005 and since; much of them are classified).

theater-specific rules of engagement for Iraq (http://wikileaks.org/wiki/US_Rules_of_Engagement_for_Iraq) (from Wikileaks. Without getting too violent, classified should mean that - beyond the legalisms; and a leaked classified document has no good means of validation, anyway. End discussion; except to remind that discussion of specific ROE/RUF are potential OpSec man traps).

rules on the use of force (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3121_02.pdf) (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).

I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.

-----------------------------
Also from the Captain's Journal:

Concerning Snipers, Rules of Engagement and General Kearney (http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/09/21/concerning-snipers-rules-of-engagement-and-general-kearney/) (21 Sep 2007) - dealing with UCMJ (and potential War Crimes) charges vs Soldiers and Marines for alleged ROE/RUF violations. Many links (at bottom of page) to Mr Smith's commentaries (11 in all) on ROE/RUF issues.

For the most part, I've stayed with what JMM believes the "Law is", rather than what the "Law should be" - I think I've been doctrinal, but if not please correct me.

(start IMO)

We shoot ourselves in the foot ("suicide by Lawfare") when we turn ROE/RUFs into iron-clad, restrictive, legislative and legalistic tight boxes.

We also have to remember the source differences for ROEs (Laws of War aka LOAC, international law and relations) and RUFs (Rule of Law, domestic constitution and laws of some jurisdiction - ICONUS: US Constitution, Federal and state laws).

We also have to remember that the default under SROE/SRUF is based on the conduct, not status, of the target. Under SROE, NCA (or an authorized CCOM) can define a "hostile group" allowing its members to be killed or captured based on that status. So, in the sniper example (unarmed Taliban), a conduct-based rule = murder and war crime; a status-based rule = no charge.

So far as I know (please correct me, if I an doctrinally incorrect), SRUF themselves are solely conduct-based (classified portions and mixed ROE/RUF combos aside - which may be what the upcoming rules will turn out to be). So, the differences between ROEs and RUFs are more than semantic (as Niel stated), but also can have horrible consequences to the Soldier or Marine who gets on the wrong side of restrictive and legalistic rules.

In War Crimes (and elsewhere), I have commented on my preference for status-based rules in an armed conflict - as allowed by the 2001 AUMF and the GCs accepted by the US, as so far interpreted by SCOTUS and the lower Federal courts.

That is not to say that an unlimited "hunting license" should exist. Carefully defined command guidance should outline the parameters and provide for specific education and training in real-life situations on an on-going basis - training, training & training (and not reams of paper).

In short, they should be permissive, non-legislative and non-legalistic (the average shooter is not a U of Mich Law grad).

(end IMO).

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 06:57 PM

...24 years, 2x Iraq (04/05, 07) last as SWO to 3CAB/3ID (and part of EASOG) - which is pertinent to discussion here but hopefully in no way shape or form apparent from reading Mudville, which has always been an effort separate from that role.

But enough about me... :cool: / ;)

Cavguy

06-26-2009, 08:27 PM

JMM,

Here's my amateur take on ROE vs. RUF and a response to Greyhawk:

Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.

Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this is my take.

Greyhawk (welcome!) uses our Sofia battle as an example. He asks the impact of the new rules on that. Here are my observations as the guy who managed the BCT level fight:

1) We didn't fire indirect into populated areas, because of standing RUF rules.

2) We utilized aircraft "shows of force" to scare the insurgents away from the populated areas, as well as artillery fired into empty nearby fields.

3) We waited until the insurgents were "in the open" to engage and destroy them.

Now, the obvious danger is that the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them with the aircraft and artillery in their engagement against the tribe. However, if that had been the situation I think we could have rapidly gotten permission to use other assets. I can't go into what our restrictions were on weapons employment in public but let's say most of our larger strikes required 2-star level approval, which usually could be had in less than 10 minutes. I think tactical flexibility could be granted rapidly as well. The broader point is that even if we hadn't had the restrictions, attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys.

And then there is the Cavguy solution. If you're on the ground, and the right and obvious thing to do is staring you in the face, just do it, and take the consequences. That's actually what we did that day of the video. My army experiences tell me well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant.

Niel

slapout9

06-26-2009, 08:34 PM

rules on the use of force (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3121_02.pdf) (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).

I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.

-----------------------------
(end IMO).

JMM, Tennesse vs. Garner is the standard I was taught for use of deadly force. It requires the Bad Actor to have Ability-Opportunity-Jeporady (the LE Holy trinity:wry:). If you can review it and give us a battlefield opinion of how to apply it

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 09:03 PM

Niel,
Thanks for the response.

"...attempting to separate the enemy from the populace was the right thing to do. Leveling the Soda tribe area wouldn't have helped the awakening to get at the AQ guys."

100% concur.

And "the Cavguy solution" as described is where we will win or lose any war we are ever unfortunate enough to fight. (Revisiting the training piece, written or not those oughta be the concluding words in any training session.)

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 09:19 PM

"the insurgents didn't necessarily know we couldn't engage them"

aye - there's the rub. Headlines (accurate or not) to that effect don't help. (I tip my hat again to the "Cavguy solution".)

Ken White

06-26-2009, 09:25 PM

"...well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant."Mine also with some emphasis on the 'well considered' (i.e. you have to know the rules so you know where they can be bent) and the caveat added -- as long as a reasonably acceptable outcome was obtained... :cool:

Doesn't have to be superb or even all that good but it cannot be a disaster. :wry:

jmm99

06-26-2009, 09:28 PM

from Cavguy
Violating ROE usually is a Law of Armed Conflict violation, that can get you sent to jail. e.g. Shoot an unarmed civilian.

Violating RUF is a UCMJ violation, disobeying (or failure to follow) a direct order. That said, I think there is some leeway in RUF, situation dependent, and commander dependent. e.g. utilizing force that while within ROE violates rules imposed by the command.

Not quite (though in the right direction) - we have to work on this. Ruby Ridge, BTW, is a good case study - that is, without getting into its politics. :)

from Slap
Tennesse vs. Garner

Yup, gold standard (there are some later cases); but I don't like some of the language, which depending on how far you push interpretation puts too heavy a burden on LE.

Niel's battle - great factual scenario (leaving out specific rules). The 2-star ref. reminds me of the "Ultimate Aircraft Stack" as visualized by the PL on the ground (a friend who was a SSG, PSG and sometimes acting PL, in Vietnam):

AirForce 1 - LBJ
DoD 707 - MacNamara
chopper MACV - Westy
chopper DIV - MG
chopper BDE - COL
chopper BN - LTC
chopper COY - CPT

Wish I were a cartoonist. :D

I'll look at the first two items - to find some consise sources. But later, I'm existing so far today on coffee - got engrossed in this forum. ;)

slapout9

06-26-2009, 09:45 PM

Has the Air Force ever tried dropping inert munitions? As in Concrete Practice Bombs? They can be GPS guided but do not produce a Blast effect which generally causes the most injury and damage.

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 09:48 PM

Mine also with some emphasis on the 'well considered' (i.e. you have to know the rules so you know where they can be bent) and the caveat added -- as long as a reasonably acceptable outcome was obtained... :cool:

Doesn't have to be superb or even all that good but it cannot be a disaster. :wry:

I think Sun Tzu said "if you know the enemy and know yourself, your survival is not at risk.

"If you know the rules and you know your commander, the victory is complete".

Or something like that...

Greyhawk

06-26-2009, 10:12 PM

...it doesn't take a psychic to expect that at some point we will do something in Afghanistan that appears to be (as in 'is reported as') a violation of this (still as yet unseen) rule. The question becomes "how fast can a (senior enough) commander make an accurate and definitive public response?" ("We're investigating" doesn't count.)

The answer to date has been "not fast enough." I know there are corporate (and legal) reasons for that, but unless there's some sort of "incident qrf" to deal with such things (emphasis on "q") the truth won't matter, and we lose.

This is not new (stomp foot, provide other subtle visual emphasis here), but given publicized "new rules" it will be infinitely more important.

Uboat509

06-26-2009, 10:25 PM

What I have been wondering is, is this policy really General McChrystal's? Or is something that has been quietly dictated to him by someone higher in the COC? Civilian casualties aren't just a liability to our operations in Afghanistan, they are a political liability to our elected officials. Airstrikes in particular look bad on TV. Perhaps it is my cynicism speaking but this could be an attempt to become a more effective COIN force or it could be political expediency.

SFC W

Ron Humphrey

06-26-2009, 10:59 PM

Possibly due to the fact that Urban ops,CT,IW strengths don't a "good" COIN force make until they have about as good an understanding of the political piece as they do the DA piece. And can effectively move in, around, and through both in such a way as to achieve the mission

carl

06-26-2009, 11:21 PM

Has the Air Force ever tried dropping inert munitions? As in Concrete Practice Bombs? They can be GPS guided but do not produce a Blast effect which generally causes the most injury and damage.

They have, apparently on a regular basis since the 90s. If you google "concrete bombs", many references come up.

slapout9

06-26-2009, 11:47 PM

They have, apparently on a regular basis since the 90s. If you google "concrete bombs", many references come up.

Thanks for the tip.

carl

06-27-2009, 12:48 AM

One of the things that has struck me about this thread is how the same things being discussed now, were being discussed, in almost the same ways, 30 and 40 years ago.

In post #45 Steve Blair spoke of the VC/NVA tactic of firing from a village at passing US troops in hopes of provoking artillery or an air strike, thereby creating more VC. When I was about 15 I saw a TV show where 3 VN vets were asked how they would have responded. One said we should get out of VN, one said he would call in the artillery and the third, the only enlisted man, said he would send in a patrol to see what was what. That seemed the only sensible course to me at the time. 40 years hence we are talking about the same thing in Afghanistan.

While in college in the 70s, I read of the folly of applying the "zero defect concept", something created for aerospace production lines, to evaluations of military leadership. Cavguy has refered to exactly this.

It was in the 80s when I first read that if Lt. Chester Nimitz had been judged as officers in the 80s were judged, there never would have been an Admiral Nimitz, just a Lt. Nimitz (ret.). In post #71, J. Wolfsberger spoke of careers being destroyed because honest mistakes are not tolerated.

Ken White has talked of the base problem being a culture that will not change (I hope I got that right Ken.) I could never quite figure out what he meant but now it is beginning to dawn on me.

jmm99

06-27-2009, 04:58 AM

In considering use of deadly force in LE since Tennessee v. Garner, LE has generated some paper policies and hopefully a lot of training and lessons learned. Slap can speak to the education and training aspects required to implement these RUF-type rules.

I've picked out a few (short) example documents reflecting LE practice after Garner. What should be noted well is that all of these rules are based on the target's conduct, not on the target's status.

Deadly Force (http://www.accd.edu/district/dps/policy/402-14%20Deadly%20Force.pdf) (by a Texas PD - a quick 2-page summary of the rules).

Use of Deadly Force (http://www.lmc.org/media/document/1/useofdeadlyforceuseofforcereports.pdf) (League of Minnesota Cities - besides the rules, provides examples - and a 6-point guide on what facts you need to stay innocent).

Use of Force and Deadly Force (http://www.lmc.org/media/document/1/useofforceanddeadlyforce.pdf) (same source as prior - again both rules and examples to cover Garner's expansion in Graham v. Connor).

Police Use of Deadly Force (http://sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/Deadly%20Force.PPS) (we have to have a Powerpoint ;) - not bad; it raises some questions for discussion).

----------------------------------
The SCOTUS opinions:

Tennessee v. Garner (http://supreme.justia.com/us/471/1/case.html), 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

Graham v. Connor (http://supreme.justia.com/us/490/386/case.html), 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

If anyone wants, I can dissect these cases, starting with their initial fallacy (that a homicide, whether justified or not, is a "seizure"). But, regardless of their logical validity, they are the gold standard for the present.

Here (http://www.performanceweb.org/pdfs/events/L272.pdf) is an example upcoming workshop which considers these cases among other force issues in LE (Slap can critique it).

---------------------------------
Will LE RUF-like rules really work in the military ?

There has been debate on that question. Here is an example.

Deadly Force Is Authorized, but Also Trained (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/roe_article.pdf) (Army Lawyer 2001)

Which way do you vote on the question posed at p.15 of Martins' article ?

Here is Martins' bottom line: "Again, training rather than legal drafting is the key." That is also my "battlefield opinion" (Slap's words :) ).

William F. Owen

06-27-2009, 12:22 PM

Oh dear.... see here (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/26/this_week_at_war_no_22).

And under the new rules of engagement, Taliban forces who move into houses and civilian compounds in the unprotected areas will in many cases be immune from coalition raids. It seems reasonable to wonder whether this course will result in as many or more Afghans turning away from the coalition as errant airstrikes.

One final observation. By effectively grounding the coalition's attack aircraft, the Taliban's information operations have revealed themselves to be perhaps the most effective anti-aircraft weapon in history.

Now there is no reason to suppose that the first paragraph is accurate, but if it is, it does seem that the second paragraph, though grossly simplistic, is not actually inaccurate.

slapout9

06-27-2009, 12:30 PM

Oh dear.... see here (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/26/this_week_at_war_no_22).

Now there is no reason to suppose that the first paragraph is accurate, but if it is, it does seem that the second paragraph, though grossly simplistic, is not actually inaccurate.

Lawfare at it's finest, we are disarming ourselves:eek: didn't the dead German guy say that was the means of defeat?

William F. Owen

06-27-2009, 01:09 PM

Lawfare at it's finest, we are disarming ourselves:eek: didn't the dead German guy say that was the means of defeat?

I think regardless of attribution to the dead Prussian, not doing profoundly stupid things based on a lack of understanding was always good advice, in any form of warfare.

Now, before all the emotional responses flow in, I am not saying the "new ROE" are stupid. I believe in ROE. ROE are essential but, they should not prevent you killing or capturing the enemy, - which is what Armed Forces should be doing.

Having said that, how come 5 years of the current ROE, has meant that US Forces have killed more civilians in 2 x COIN campaigns than Israel did 2 x State v State Wars, in the same time period, and nobody blinked?

Ken White

06-27-2009, 03:48 PM

"The hybrid warfare challenge is complicated {1}. The 2010 QDR will be helpful only if it provides clear guidance in response. Planning documents that leave leaders unclear about what they are responsible for will result in confusion, not clarity{2}."{Notes added / kw}While I really agree in principle, in practice I'm terribly afraid Note 1 negates any possibility of Note 2 being provided. Thus it has always been... :wry:

Clarity in military operations is always desirable but rarely provided, thus the requirement for people to THINK instead of merely reacting in a rote manner. He or she who does not rapidly adapt is likely to fail. Any attempt to provide excess clarity in doctrine or planning is also likely to fail -- and to breed further failure in the attempt...

You cannot completely teach adaptability and flexibility. You have to hire for them. As well as fire for the lack of them...

jmm99

06-27-2009, 05:32 PM

from Wilf
Having said that, how come 5 years of the current ROE, has meant that US Forces have killed more civilians in 2 x COIN campaigns than Israel did 2 x State v State Wars, in the same time period, and nobody blinked?

is a profoundly intelligent question which should be answered - if the factual premise of the question is correct (I don't know one way or the other).

So, if you will consent to be the expert witness under barrister examination (;)), what are the statistics for the factual premise and the sources for those statistics ?

As we all know, the statistics for civilian casualities have been a matter of dispute as to the numbers and who caused the deaths; and have been spun, spindled and mutilated with reckless abandon.

The comparisons (hopefully leading to the answer to your question) could relate to the relative kinetics vice the opponents in each conflict, and to the relative kinetics vice the conflicts. But, first we have to have facts we can agree on.

William F. Owen

06-27-2009, 06:29 PM

So, if you will consent to be the expert witness under barrister examination (;)), what are the statistics for the factual premise and the sources for those statistics ?
I would suggest folks research their own statistics, because...

As we all know, the statistics for civilian casualities have been a matter of dispute as to the numbers and who caused the deaths; and have been spun, spindled and mutilated with reckless abandon.

The comparisons (hopefully leading to the answer to your question) could relate to the relative kinetics vice the opponents in each conflict, and to the relative kinetics vice the conflicts. But, first we have to have facts we can agree on.
Actually, I don't really need an answer. Let's say the IDF killed 2,000 and NATO/US killed 1,800. So what? I'm not making a moral argument. It's political-operational point. 3 years after the US became "COIN"-aware F-18's are rolling in on targets, and civilian deaths by NATO are in excess of 500 a year (maybe 800). That to me, is symptomatic of a problem.

jmm99

06-27-2009, 07:11 PM

with the comparable statistics going by the boards; and framing the question in your present terms:

from Wilf
It's political-operational point. [1] 3 years after the US became "COIN"-aware [2] F-18's are rolling in on targets, and [3] civilian deaths by NATO are in excess of 500 a year (maybe 800). That to me, is symptomatic of a problem.

1. Please define the problem; and the general solutions you posit.

2. As to which of the three symptoms does the IDF differ; and how could its experience assist in solving the problem you have defined in answering #1.

I believe your answers will be material to the question of what degrees of force should be used.

PS: This is direct (friendly witness) examination because the questions are totally open-ended - from your friendly barrister :)

slapout9

06-27-2009, 11:27 PM

Child Smugglers are being used to support villages with food in order to survive!!!!

If this situation is accurate it is far worse than any errant Air Strikes. Not following up on situations like this will loose the War for you. If you expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning IMHO.

http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=3926&updaterx=2009-06-27+02%3A03%3A16

Ken White

06-28-2009, 12:14 AM

What do you mean by "expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning..."

I'm not sure what you expect the US to do???

Blackjack

06-28-2009, 02:51 AM

From the report linked below.

Of the 2118 casualties reported in 2008, 1160 (55%) were attributed to antigovernment elements (AGEs) and 828 (39%) to pro-government forces. The remaining 130 (6%) could not be attributed to any of the conflicting parties since, for example, some civilians died as a result of cross-fire or were killed by unexploded ordinance.

Air-strikes remain responsible for the largest percentage of civilian deaths attributed to progovernment forces. UNAMA recorded 552 civilian casualties of this nature in 2008.

AGEs remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian casualties. Civilian deaths reportedly caused by AGEs rose from 700 in 2007 to 1,160 in 2008 – an increase of over 65%.

PGF Civilian Casualties by type
Air-Strikes: 552
Force Protection: 41
Other PGF Tactics: 235
Total: 828

2007-2008 UNAMA Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/JBRN-7PCD3P-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

I read this report a bit ago, and it has some solid metrics in it regarding civilian casualties. IE, who is doing it, what is causing it. I suggest we could learn a bit more from reading it as well. It may give us some insight as to the situation leading to these ROE/RUF changes.

jmm99

06-28-2009, 04:15 AM

only one side of the story. The data required for a full LOAC analysis is probably not open source. You would need something like the following for each air strike:

Type (CAS, UAV, HAB - whatever other types there are)

No. PGF involved; KIA & WIA (any fratricide ?)

No. AGE involved; KIA & WIA

No. NC involved; KIA & WIA

Based on the report, a couple of events = a lot of KIA & WIA. How many airstrikes involved no NC casualties, for example. The idea is to get at the overall military necessity and proportionality.

The professionals here can improve on this by correcting the terminology, etc.

carl

06-28-2009, 04:39 AM

jmm399

Here is a link for the executive summary of the CENTCOM report on the bombing in Farah in early May.

http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/us-central-command-investigation-into-civilian-casualties-in-farah-province.html

It gives most of the info you would need but only for one incident. I thought it very interesting.

jmm99

06-28-2009, 05:17 AM

thanks for the link. I'm downloading the report (9MB) and will read it tomorrow. The problem with one report of huge NC casualties is that it may (since I don't have the metrics) overwhelm the worth of a 100 airstrikes that killed only enemy and saved US lives. On the other hand, Tac Air may not be so important in this kind of armed conflict. I simply don't know.

Don't fly into any geese - and I remember the Blue Goose well. :)

William F. Owen

06-28-2009, 05:52 AM

1. Please define the problem; and the general solutions you posit.
I can't define the problem. I'm not on the ground, but... if if the circumstances are as they are suggested, then a complete prohibition on air strikes against structures would have seemed sensible.... 4-5 years ago.

As to which of the three symptoms does the IDF differ; and how could its experience assist in solving the problem you have defined in answering #1.
The IDF is not doing "COIN". It's fighting a war. Without getting into a fairly pointless argument, about who did what and when, if the rocket team is in the building, you drop the building. All the evidence to date is that Human shields are simply not tolerated. I would strongly suggest that the IDF model is not copied. There is no similarity between the two conflicts.

slapout9

06-28-2009, 06:04 AM

What do you mean by "expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning..."

I'm not sure what you expect the US to do???

In the video I saw we promised the local tribal leader if he quit growing poppies he would receive some financial/economic support. Four years later he has received nothing and his village is starving. That is a good way to drive the village over to the opposition side thus creating as many if not more guerrillas than any Air Strike. If we promise something to somebody we should deliver on it.That is what I would expect the US to do.

William F. Owen

06-28-2009, 07:04 AM

slapout9

06-28-2009, 02:20 PM

Well that strikes to the heart of the POP-COIN approach. Essentially you turn into a Politician offering stuff that you might only be able to deliver. If I understand the "POP-COIN" approach it aims at creating popular support, via delivering protection. To erode that support all the bad guys have to do is prove you cannot do this, or show you do not deliver on some (not all) of your promises.

Yep! and this is also how gangs/criminals take over neighborhoods and recruit new members. And then the country's leadership will stand around an wonder how it happened.

Cavguy

06-28-2009, 03:42 PM

Just wanted to add 2 slides I use on the road occasionally pertinent to this discussion, the first is from FM 3-24, and the second are my caveats about it that aren't in FM 3-24. There's a lot of discussion of detail not in the slide (I use slides as visual aids, not the brief), but I think this crowd gets the idea.

Niel

EDIT: The slides display in reverse order. Oops.

Niel

William F. Owen

06-28-2009, 04:11 PM

Just wanted to add 2 slides I use on the road occasionally pertinent to this discussion, the first is from FM 3-24, and the second are my caveats about it that aren't in FM 3-24.

You nailed it Niel! The Top slide is excellent. First class antidote to all the rubbish washing around. Warfare requires killing. If it doesn't then it isn't warfare.

Bob's World

06-28-2009, 04:53 PM

Well, I can't speak for Nagle, Kilcullen and the rest of the CNAS gang that is pushing "population-centric" engagement; that is rooted in controlling the populace and building effective governance to resolve the insurgency;

I can speak to my own version, that is "populace-centric" engagement that is rooted in understanding and supporting the populace, enabling the HN security and service providers to be more effective only in those focused areas that are of greatest concern to the populace as your main effort.

Supporting effort remains action against the insurgent organization itself, ideally by-with and through HN security forces enabled by the FID force; but unilateral if necessary until such capacity can be built in the HN.

Really just a shift of focus for your main effort from killing the populace to supporting the populace; and a shift of your supporting effort from going around doing random acts of governance to one of tailored engagement to provide security and defeat the insurgent.

Personally I think the CNAS model, as I understand it, is too much about "fixing" the government and therefore requires massive time, cost and imported civil expertise and manpower. None of which we possess. Plus it is based on a flawed (IMO) understanding of insurgency that believes that insurgency is caused by inefficient and corrupt government; my study just doesn't bear that theory out. Most insurgencies are rooted in some respect-based perception of poor governance coupled with a perception that there is no legitimate means to resolve it, so the populace resorts to insurgency.

Bottom line, I guess, is that you can neither kill nor bribe your way to success. Yet killing and provision of services are essential parts of the equation; they just typically have the wrong values associated to them and are used improperly due to a mixing state-based warfare principles into a populace-based conflict situation.

slapout9

06-28-2009, 06:13 PM

All the above gets to SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) which is Targeting is everything. Who you Kill or Bribe is far more important than how you do it.

Contrary to what many people say about the people being the COG they are not! IMO. They are the Target! that means some organization/group/tribe is acting on them and you are going to have to do something to that gang before the final problem is solved.

At the same time ineffective/corrupt government can and does create a situation where an insurgency can flourish and it is almost always the Rich Bastards stealing from the people at large that create this problem often under the disguise of a legitimate Government.

Bob's World

06-28-2009, 07:19 PM

Ken White

06-28-2009, 08:01 PM

In the video I saw we promised the local tribal leader if he quit growing poppies he would receive some financial/economic support. Four years later he has received nothing and his village is starving. That is a good way to drive the village over to the opposition side thus creating as many if not more guerrillas than any Air Strike. If we promise something to somebody we should deliver on it.That is what I would expect the US to do.I hear what you're saying -- but I think there are a few problems with your rationale ,

Consider:

'Promised' that? First, realize that to most in the ME and Afghanistan, if you are from a different tribe and you say something will occur, you are deemed to have given an oath -- made a promise -- that something will occur. Totally different standard of morality ( ;) ). Conversely, if you're an American and you know the 'policy' is to provide aid to reduce the Poppy production, you're highly likely to say, in an offhand way, "Quit growing Poppies and we'll provide assistance" (with no knowledge of what that might entail and with knowledge it might not happen on your tour). You made a comment, he heard a promise. Two different cultures not meshing.

Second, who's the 'we?' Anyone from the American Ambassador to PFC Phugabosky could've said that and even said it in all innocence expecting it to occur. Regardless, all the Afghan knows is that 'the Americans said...' A person who possibly should not have committed the US to a course of action said something or one who could have did and the system did not follow through. All sorts of things could've occurred and we don't know what went down. Given 50K or so Americans wandering around in a nation almost as big as Texas, a State Department totally screwed up by Congressional meddling and not prepared for the job they got body slammed into, it's amazing we've done as well as we have.

No one knew all those cultural nuances early on; first responders did what they though was right and they did it in the absence of training in what and how to do things. We got smart real quick and told the troops "Never tell them you'll do something." A lot of 'promises' that were not really promises snuck in before we got that word out -- and even today, you and I know there's always the 10%, no doubt in my mind SSG Heebly or CPT Cholmondley are inadvertently making the occasional 'promise.'

I don't think you can totally fix that...

Lastly, define the 'US.' Yeah, I expect them to do that also -- deliver on a promise; keep their word. However, having been in that part of the world, I know there are several difficulties with that. A casual comment is not a promise -- and they know that but one will always be used as a 'promise' to get what can be gotten out of it. Haggling is a national sport...

It is not possible to make all Americans behave in the national interest -- look at your crooks and the politicians (but I repeat myself... :D ). The US government is a big, huge, diffuse bureaucracy. The left hand often doesn't know what the right hand is doing. Even within the Army -- heck, within a Battalion -- sometime folks don't know what other folks are doing and it takes a lot of effort to get things pulling together. A LOT of effort...

We have a lot of well intentioned laws to guard tax dollars that aren't helpful to getting projects started or completed, the reviews and checks are significant and a lot of intended things fall afoul of one law or another -- or simply get killed by higher Hq -- due to a law or rule or just the perception that "The Boss doesn't like that stuff..." can pave the road to hell with good intentions that don't happen.

We didn't promise anything; some guy said.

Nor can we do it -- the politicians won't let us... :(

In short, I totally agree with you philosophically but in reality on the ground, it ain't anywhere near that simple.

Ken White

06-28-2009, 08:09 PM

Two very accurate items that bear repeating:
...I think the CNAS model, as I understand it, is too much about "fixing" the government and therefore requires massive time, cost and imported civil expertise and manpower. None of which we possess. Plus it is based on a flawed (IMO) understanding of insurgency that believes that insurgency is caused by inefficient and corrupt government...They are on a course to create more problems than we have. Never a good plan.It's a very western-centric and outmoded set of ideas based on misreading or very selective reading of history and ignoring common sense due to excessive academic rigor mortis...
"Target" is a word that is much over used and carries horrible baggage in terms of narrative. No one draws much comfort from learning that the 500 year-old church in the middle of their town is a "protected target." All they hear is "target."Yes!!!

Thank you.

jmm99

06-28-2009, 09:24 PM

The executive summary of CENTCOM's report on the bombing incident in May, linked by Carl above and whose full .pdf is here (http://www.centcom.mil/images/pdf/uscentcom%20farah%20unclass%20exsum%2018%20jun%200 9.pdf), is a good report and well mapped for understanding.

Before looking at that summary, I should mention Cavguy's course - Counterinsurgency 101 is the first .ppt - which I downloaded (adding his articles - all in their own little folder "Niel Smith COIN") and went through at home in my armchair. I expect his articles supply some of what the actual brief is - and RTFMs cited - adds up to a "Clear, Hold, Build for Dummies" story. Well worthwhile DLing, if you haven't done so. In the process of trying to find the direct url, I managed to wipe out the first version of this post.

Now, back to the executive summary.

The basic factual situation was that Astan forces, contrary to Marine advice, executed an un-planned rush up the road into the arms of what amounted to a L-ambush by 3 Taliban "companies" (roughly 100 men each). The Marines had to go to the rescue. In the course of the firefight and medivacs, 4 F-18 strikes hit the long leg of the ambush; and later, 3 B-1 strikes hit its angle near or in the village. The last two strikes were problematic.

Since the .pdf does not allow cut & paste (at least for me), I've clipped .jpgs of its key points.

Its Overview concludes that there were no LOAC violations (a conclusion totally supported by the longer rendition of facts); but that the last two B-1 strikes, made in the absence of evidence as to the presence and locations of civilians, were contrary to specific guidance and Commander's intent. In a strict sense, the two strikes were not contrary to ROE (engagement was with a hostile force).

Whether there was a strict violation of RUF would depend on the tenor of the specific RUF (not given) - was it termed a "must do" or "should do" (a distinction beween the two flag officers' statements, quoted here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75072&postcount=1) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75319&postcount=82) - pointed out to me by PM from Blackjack).

The F-18 strikes were given a clean bill, but no civilian casualties resulted from them.

The Assessment states that all of the strikes (including the last 2 B-1 strikes) were justified in their "lawful military nature". But, that the absence of evidence re: civilians (precluding a complete pre-strike assessment of possible collateral damage) was contrary to the policy objective of the "US Government".

This choice of wording may evince an important point, that the source of the guidance and intent came from the Diplomacy, Policy & Political Ring of the ROE Triad - which I've explained elsewhere (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=69150&postcount=245) - and not from the Operational Requirements & Law Rings.

The Conclusion - if you take its language literally - would have far reaching consequences for application of proportionality to any situation. Of course, we have no idea of how much of that concept is included in the elephant we haven't yet seen.

I'll take up the 2008 UN report (linked by Blackjack) later tonite if I have the time.

Bob's World

06-28-2009, 11:15 PM

While we agonize over "was it legal or illegal" based on our laws; the populace is probably more concerned about was it "right or wrong based on their perspective.

Legal and wrong may keep you out of jail, but it won't help you quell an insurgency.

The old "we had to destroy the village in order to safe it" line sounds rediculous on its face because it is, regardless of if it was all done within the guidlines provided by the ROE and rule of law.

One more reason why attacks against the insurgent himself, when not done in clear defense of the force and the populace, must be a supporting effort in the larger COIN effort and not the main effort. When one remains focused on gaining and sustaining the support of the populace as ones main effort it helps commanders to make the right decision.

Sometimes you just don't take the shot because the potential downside to your main effort far exceeds your potential upside on your supporting effort.

Or, said another way, never risk strategic failure for a tactical victory unless you have to to protect the populace or your men.

jmm99

06-29-2009, 12:59 AM

I'm not sure where you want to go with the six aphorisms stated. Wherever it is, lay it all out because I'd like to travel along with you on the trip (with or without the dinosaur ;) ).

Let's just take the first one - which really has two parts:

[1] While we agonize over "was it legal or illegal" based on our laws; [2] the populace is probably more concerned about was it "right or wrong based on their perspective.

Point 1: Agonization over "legal or illegal" (add "moral and ethical" ?).

In the actual case under discussion (Farah), no agonization over "legal or illegal" was necessary. Given its facts, legal under LOAC was a no-brainer.

I'd suggest that consideration of "legal or illegal" is a starting point in developing any course of action, military or civilian. Normally, most courses of action are no-brainers (go or no go). Some, however, are real brain breakers, which tend to involve morals and ethics as well as legal or illegal.

Here's a cookie (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/17/killed-by-the-rules/print/) for you and everyone else here.

Friday, August 17, 2007
Killed by the rules

Now that Marcus Luttrell's book "Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10" is a national bestseller, maybe Americans are ready to start discussing the core issue his story brings to light: the inverted morality, even insanity, of the American military's rules of engagement (ROE). .....

[JMM: obviously there are polemics in this article. I suggest looking more to the facts and questioning how would I resolve the legal, moral and ethical issues in my head if that situation came up in my life - not what you would do, because no one can say that for certain.]

This is an on-its-face simple Point A to Point B problem, but with the shepherd boy in the middle. That complicates things.

If you had Yale Kamisar for Crim Law & Proc I, you would have spent 6 weeks on the Case of the Speluncean Explorers (http://www.nullapoena.de/stud/explorers.html), and all the degrees and issues surrounding homicide, justified or not. Now, this case is a make up, but there have been actual cases similar to it - e.g., should we kill and eat the cabin boy ?

Now all of this is more Philosophy than Law - and Practical Layman's Philosophy at that. Here's the course and materials (all in one (http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/lawspelunk.html)).

If you want to know what issues I think about, take the course. It should take a hour to read the materials and the rest of your life to resolve the issues - hint: they are resolved when you die.

So, we should look at legalities, morals and ethics before getting involved in situations - and, where they are brain busters we should agonize before acting. If you are talking about agonizing after the fact, my position is that is closing the door after the horse has escaped. At best, that is a lesson learned.

Point 2: The Village's Perception

I'd posit that all the civilians in the Farah village saw the column advancing up the road as "wrong" (unless they were insane). What civilian wants to be involved in a firefight ? As Cavguy pointed out "Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?"

So, where does that perception take us ? Don't take the column up the road. Which may be a part of the new policy that may be developing, but how do a group of blind men view an elephant ?

Or:"Never, never, leave the f**king boat." But wait, there was a tiger in the jungle. Was it a man-eater ? Don't know; but it charged us. Should we go back to find out ? Will the tiger kill someone else ? What is our obligation ? "Naw, never leave the f**king boat".

More than a little philosophy tied up in that scene as they went upriver to visit the crazy SF COL :D :D :D

OK, enough of a complete devil's advocate. Heck, I'm a civilian; and like talking to animals (it's kind of spiritual), not killing them. I'm about the least physically kinetic person you will ever meet.

So, for most of your populace-centric mumbo jumbo, I'm on board. But, when I work as a lawyer, I'm one very doctrine-based SOB - and I want to see the practical implementations spelled out.

And, there are man-eating tigers in this world - and they have to dealt with - to keep them from killing the innocents.

This took too long - just to answer one sentence.

slapout9

06-29-2009, 03:40 AM

Slap,

While your theory is largely sound IMO, I would caution that getting the narrative right is incredibly important in such operations.

"Target" is a word that is much over used and carries horrible baggage in terms of narrative. No one draws much comfort from learning that the 500 year-old church in the middle of their town is a "protected target." All they hear is "target."

Similarly, if you come to my village and tell me that my people are the "target" of your campaign, you have put yourself in a credibility hole you may never dig your way out of.

The populace is "the source of all strength and power" in any state; and as such they are prize that is being competed for, and they are the strategic COG of any insurgency. He who gains the support of the populace wins in this grand game of tug of war.

If I come to your village I want talk about targeting anything but the food:)

As for the COG I still believe it is the Insurgent Infrastructure as long as that is there the Insurgency can come back and often does as some of your posts have pointed out. This is also why the Strategy of nation building/modernizing/globalization/pop centric may have a Fatal Flaw in it.

You may be doing nothing more then modernizing the Insurgents Capabilities while he does nothing but remain dormant and reemerge at a better time with better capabilities. I have seen gang ops run out of broken down houses and state of the art convenience stores, the difference one had better capabilities than the other. the similarities the same criminal infrastructure still existed.

Your Populace based vs Population Centric would deal with this (I think) and is a better way to go IMO. Incidentally I have seen something similar used in LE with remarkably results but I didn't have the propaganda machine to promote it. Plus it was really invented by a 50 year old grandmother with about a 10th grade education so none of the egg heads were interested in something like that. After all COIN and Crime Prevention are the PHd Levels, the fact that it is waged and won by kinder gardeners escapes them;)

slapout9

06-29-2009, 03:43 AM

In short, I totally agree with you philosophically but in reality on the ground, it ain't anywhere near that simple.

Well.......you need to fix that sheet,man:D:D

Ken White

06-29-2009, 04:10 AM

If you can figure out how to get rid of Wilsons and FDRs bureaucracy, let us know how to do that and it'll get fixed -- cause that and its aftermath are a big part of the problem.

'Bout as soon as you get the crime rate in Alabama to zero....:wry:

jmm99

07-03-2009, 02:25 AM

as reported by McClatchy (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/71134.html):

Posted on Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Troops told to stop Taliban pursuit if civilians are at risk
By Nancy A. Youssef | McClatchy Newspapers

KABUL, Afghanistan — Beginning Thursday, American soldiers in Afghanistan will be under orders to back down when they're chasing Taliban fighters whenever they think that civilians might be at risk.
....
The order is consistent with what National Security Adviser James L. Jones told McClatchy in Washington Wednesday was President Barack Obama's concern about civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

"General McChrystal has been given instructions when he left here that, in all military operations, that we redouble our efforts to make sure that innocent loss of life is minimized, with zero being the goal," Jones said, noting that, "In one mishap you can create thousands more terrorists than you had before the mishap."

The new order, however, is likely to draw criticism from some U.S. troops, many of whom feel the rules that govern how they fight the war already are too restrictive.

Many soldiers here say they depend on air power and heavy weaponry because there aren't enough ground troops to chase Taliban forces on foot. Jones said no additional ground troops will be sent this year, even though some ground commanders want them.

"Everybody had their day in court, so to speak, before the president made his decision," he said. "We signed off on the strategy, and now we're in the implementation phase."

The video clip at the article's top, described as follows:

This video shows an Apache helicopter opening fire on a column of Taliban fighters. It was released by the Pentagon June 24 to show how air strikes should be handled. Conversation about possible collateral damage — sometimes referred to as "collat" — begins 39 seconds into the video; there is no sound before that.

was on FOX last week.

Bob's World

07-03-2009, 02:34 AM

If I come to your village I want talk about targeting anything but the food:)

As for the COG I still believe it is the Insurgent Infrastructure as long as that is there the Insurgency can come back and often does as some of your posts have pointed out. This is also why the Strategy of nation building/modernizing/globalization/pop centric may have a Fatal Flaw in it.

You may be doing nothing more then modernizing the Insurgents Capabilities while he does nothing but remain dormant and reemerge at a better time with better capabilities. I have seen gang ops run out of broken down houses and state of the art convenience stores, the difference one had better capabilities than the other. the similarities the same criminal infrastructure still existed.

Your Populace based vs Population Centric would deal with this (I think) and is a better way to go IMO. Incidentally I have seen something similar used in LE with remarkably results but I didn't have the propaganda machine to promote it. Plus it was really invented by a 50 year old grandmother with about a 10th grade education so none of the egg heads were interested in something like that. After all COIN and Crime Prevention are the PHd Levels, the fact that it is waged and won by kinder gardeners escapes them;)

I have felt and made the case for several years that the COG for AQ, and other like networked organizations is their network. Disrupt the network, disrupt the organization. ID the nodes that are critical to operations by area, and focus on them. Similarly, to pick your HVIs, pick the ones critical to making those nodes function, not just the ones the intel guys say are senior in the chain of command.

To defeat the insurgency however, is another matter. Here the COG is the populace, and their support is essential to the greater victory. Both must be addressed concurrently, but dealing with the insurgent is a supporting effort while addressing the populace the main. That does not mean that one must not at times address the supporting effort first in order to create conditions that allow addressing the populace, but it is still the supporting effort.

slapout9

07-03-2009, 06:28 AM

To defeat the insurgency however, is another matter. Here the COG is the populace, and their support is essential to the greater victory. Both must be addressed concurrently, but dealing with the insurgent is a supporting effort while addressing the populace the main. That does not mean that one must not at times address the supporting effort first in order to create conditions that allow addressing the populace, but it is still the supporting effort.

I am tracking now.

Rank amateur

07-06-2009, 02:51 PM

New ROE seem to be working.
(http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.html)

Meanwhile, a U.S. military official told CNN that its forces are involved in a standoff with insurgents in the south of the country near the Helmand River.

He said U.S. Marines began taking fire from insurgents in the town of Khan Neshin, before they ran into a multi-roomed compound.

Unsure of whether civilians were inside the compound, they had an interpreter talk to the insurgents, the official said. After some time, a number of women and children left the compound.

When asked, the insurgents denied any more civilians were inside, the official said, but the U.S. soldiers held their fire anyway. At about 7:30 a.m. ET, in the midst of the standoff, another group of women and children emerged from the compound, the official said.

As of 8 a.m. ET, the Marines were holding all fire and waiting out the insurgents, the official said.

J Wolfsberger

07-06-2009, 03:12 PM

New ROE seem to be working.
(http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.html)

In all seriousness, I wonder if there will be a Lysistrata effect?

JarodParker

07-06-2009, 03:26 PM

Jeez you guys are quick on the draw. :)

tequila

07-06-2009, 03:27 PM

I think we will have to establish bona fides with a very suspicious Pashtun population first, especially given that the Taliban have held control of these villages for so long. I'd imagine for people inclined to believe the worst of Americans, it's not easy to surrender your women and children --- essentially your own honor --- to them. You could just as easily have a sort of Spartan wife effect --- defend your home and family from the infidel, etc.

Ken White

07-06-2009, 04:09 PM

based on one action that appears to be still in process might not be just a tad premature... :wry:

Old Eagle

07-06-2009, 06:02 PM

Thank you, Ken!!!!

Rank amateur

07-06-2009, 07:45 PM

Ken White

07-06-2009, 08:33 PM

doesn't that shoot your "New ROE seem to be working" theory in the foot? :D

JarodParker

07-06-2009, 08:38 PM

My bad. I didn't realize you guys needed to be told, "Check for hairy feet.":D

"Apparently these were tall, rather broad-shouldered women with hairy feet," Pelletier said. (http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.html)

Still. Having us say the Taliban are cowards who dress as women has got to be better than them saying we kill women and children.

So how much longer before we start allowing female soldiers/Marines to go on these types of mission so our forces are able to detain/search Afghan females. Weren't the Marines doing precisely that during that later OIF deployments? Did we already forget the lessons learned or are there any other factors at play here (such as the declaration that major combat operations were already over; ie- "mission accomplished" banner)?

Ken White

07-06-2009, 09:02 PM

on patrols in Afghanistan since 2002. Given the articles I've read on this one, I saw no opportunity to use any females. Obviously, when the second batch came out, the Marines shouldn't have allowed themselves to be distracted by the one wounded female but they did. That happens -- but they learned and won't make that mistake again.

Next time they'll have the female Marines -- or Soldiers (since the Army has more females in Afghanistan than do the Marines) -- check all 'females' and hold 'em under (female if possible) guard until the action is completed. Early days, new unit, new AO -- there's always a learning curve.

One take on this one could be that the new rules do not work as they were used to manipulate and escape -- but it's way too early to say that, certainly based only on a couple of fragmentary news articles. Time will tell.

Rank amateur

07-06-2009, 09:23 PM

One take on this one could be that the new rules do not work as they were used to manipulate and escape -- but it's way too early to say that, certainly based only on a couple of fragmentary news articles. Time will tell.

I thought how to tell the difference between a woman and a man dressed as a woman was something all soldiers learned on R&R.:D

Steve Blair

07-06-2009, 09:29 PM

I thought how to tell the difference between a woman and a man dressed as a woman was something all soldiers learned on R&R.:D

Only if they're doing duty in the far east and learn the grab check. :eek:

Brandon Friedman

07-06-2009, 10:40 PM

Just a couple of thoughts: On the surface, I'm sure some will try to take the "hairy feet" story and attempt to criticize the new ROE. I wouldn't be so quick to do that, though.

First, as Rank amateur said, we spin this in our direction. It's an information war, so we spread the story all over Helmand: The Taliban dress like women and fear the Americans.

Second, these guys got away. So what? Was it bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Haqqani? Probably not. Probably just some low-level assholes. So when the tribal leaders approach our troops in the area and ask why we allowed them to escape, we say it's because we didn't want to risk harming your families. At that point, if they give us explicit permission to assume that risk in the future, then we have the blessing of the local leaders. Much better to have them request the help--with the attendant risk--than to do otherwise.

Ken White

07-06-2009, 10:41 PM

in the US, little there to grab. :D thus easy to be fooled...

Not to mention that if it looks female in a Muslim area and a male touches it, he's wrong -- no matter if it turns out to be a big ugly guy, he who touched (and his Tribe) were still wrong for laying hands on what appeared to be a female. I'm amazed that anyone could be so culturally insensitive and gauche as to suggest the troops ought to use their hard won R&R skills to check more closely to be sure the jerks aren't in Burqs :eek:

Amazed... :D

Ken White

07-06-2009, 11:01 PM

I wouldn't be so quick to do that, though.Cuts both ways, also...
...The Taliban dress like women and fear the Americans.Good western thought. The average Afghan will applaud them for doing that to escape. Guys have been hiding in Burqas there for centuries.
...ask why we allowed them to escape, we say it's because we didn't want to risk harming your families. At that point, if they give us explicit permission to assume that risk in the future, then we have the blessing of the local leaders.I doubt many will ask; Afghans aren't as nosy and voluble as Arabs. They aren't going to give you such permission because (a) there's nothing in it for them; In the highly unlikely event one or some did give such permission, he who recieves it better check real close -- very probable the Elder(s) know your next objective belongs to a rival. (b) Women are chattels but YOU can't mess with them because they are not yours. Period. (c) even if you cajoled such 'permission' out of them, they'd deny it the first time a female got hurt to avoid risking a cut in the solatia payment. Not their female, no problem, tell he who is bereaved and insist on a share for not telling the Ferenghi...

Western solutions will not work in Afghanistan. Nor will many things that sort of worked in Iraq work in Afghanistan.

Back to the ROE -- it will take a few month to determine the effect they'll have. It'll take even longer to develop effective TTP to cope with the changes, if any. Bad area to try to impose knee jerk quick fixes, those folks have all the time in the world and they are in no hurry. They know we are in a hurry and that we tend to over react. They propose to take advantage of those flaws...

Rank amateur

07-06-2009, 11:18 PM

The average Afghan will applaud them for doing that to escape.

Doubt it will go over so well with the teenage fundamentalists on the jihad websites. "Die like a martyr or dress like a girl: you decide", is probably not their most effective recruiting slogan.

They know we are in a hurry

We shouldn't be. The population ain't going anywhere. A couple bad guys getting away ain't the end of the world. What I'm skeptical about is whether we'll actually hold this village, or any of the other villages we are clearing right now. The tactic only makes sense with a population centric strategy and an operational commitment to holding cleared areas, or whatever the right buzzwords are.

Ken White

07-07-2009, 12:04 AM

Doubt it will go over so well with the teenage fundamentalists on the jihad websites. "Die like a martyr or dress like a girl: you decide", is probably not their most effective recruiting slogan.The point is that the Afghans couldn't care less. Teenage Jihadis can flock to the cause and get killed in carload lots, they are broadly irrelevant to Afghanistan and what happens there -- what the Afghans believe OTOH is important. That tag line won't sway them.
We shouldn't be.I'm with you. Does Congress know that? Does Joe Sixpack know -- or care? Nope, we shouldn't rush it -- but I bet we do... ;)
What I'm skeptical about is whether we'll actually hold this village, or any of the other villages we are clearing right now. The tactic only makes sense with a population centric strategy and an operational commitment to holding cleared areas, or whatever the right buzzwords are.Not necessarily. If one has swallowed the Kool Aid and believes the rather foolish rhetoric that population centric stuff matters, then one could hope for that. Big fly in that pie is that we do not have enough troops, NATO, US, Afghan (Police and Army) to do that. It would take five to ten times the now available strength to do it that way and neither we, NATO or the Afghans (or anyone else) are likely to come up with gold or the people. Plus we Americans just do not do that stuff well -- impatience again, plus the tour syndrome and the domestic political turmoil every two years. Not our bag.

So we go to Plan B. Clear, then dazzle with footwork and get the crowd behind the Goal to wave their pom poms or whatever while building roads and schools and giving the max number of troublemakers an opportunity to repent and be productive Pomegranate growers. We can get there. Just makes it more difficult and more likely to provide a temporary 'OK' solution rather than a long term good one. Tough world out there, people don't play fair... :D

We're not going to change 3,000 years of Afghan history and culture. Never were going to be able to do that. Stuff like that happens when the strategy crowd gets target fixation. We screw up. Then the troops have to go try to pull fat out of fires. Fortunately, they usually do a half fast job and it works out okay in the end. Well, sort of okay... :rolleyes:

slapout9

07-07-2009, 12:09 AM

Let me get this strait....the Enemy..... is a metrosexual...with big hairy feet....and wears a burka? man that Hybrid Warfare is some bad sheet:D:D

Rank amateur

07-07-2009, 01:48 AM

Teenage Jihadis can flock to the cause and get killed in carload lots, they are broadly irrelevant to Afghanistan and what happens there -- what the Afghans believe OTOH is important.

If that's true, then there is no reason to say. We're only there becasue we were attacked from there, and if we're not going to be attacked form there again, we have no reason to stay.

jcustis

07-07-2009, 02:57 AM

We could have just gotten them to talk to the interpreter, answer a few questions, and then take it from there. But as was said, the story is too fragmentary to tell if that was already done.

That's why all people coming out of a structure in a hostage rescue situation are put on their face when they come out. We should have at least controlled their movement, then brought in resources to deal with the issue.

The TTP is valid...seems like we just goofed up the application.

Ken White

07-07-2009, 03:07 AM

If that's true, then there is no reason to say. We're only there becasue we were attacked from there, and if we're not going to be attacked form there again, we have no reason to stay.doesn't mean the little dears don't count elsewhere. Afghanistan is not an Arab nation, nor is it Malay. The Malays and the Afghans don't do the jihadi bit, that's an Arab thing. Arabs think Afghans are barbarians and thus are little concerned with what goes on in Afghanistan and they pay little heed to what Afghans might do. Thus my comment that the jihadis won't care but the Afghans will -- and they've been sneaking around in burqas when it suits for years so we won't get much PR or sales leverage out of the action at Khan Neshin.

Yep, we went because we were attacked. Initial plan was to go in, run off the Talibs and then leave. For various reasons, not all readily apparent, we changed the game and decided to stay. Mistake in my view but they didn't ask me. Not only did we decide to stay, we told the Afghans -- and the world -- that we would. In my view, we didn't have to stay but we said we would and so now we have to.

We are not popular in the world and have not been since WW II for many reasons, mostly size, wealth and arrogance. That dislike goes up and down depending on the world situation and what we're up to. The highest the dislike factor has been in my adult lifetime is 1979-70 during Viet Nam. The second highest was in 1975 -- when we left Viet Nam in an unnecessarily embarrassed mode. There was a spike in 1991 over the Marsh Arabs and the southern Shia in Iraq whom we were seen as abandoning after promising help. Then Somalia was a big flub. Another in 1996 when we had to scramble to get Kurds out of Saddam's way. Surprisingly, one of the dislike low points was in 1986, right after we'd bombed libya in El Dorado Canyon.

Point of all that is that when we don't do what's right, we suffer in world opinion -- more so than when we do what's right and some Governments and their intelligentsia get upset. Long way of getting to the point. We can't fix Afghanistan, never were going to be able to do so. We IMO should not have told them we'd stay and get them on their feet. However, we did tell them that. So now we really need to do that because all those jihadis -- they're just waiting for the US to again turn tail. we just need to be careful what we do and where we go -- and of what we say.

We need to do what we say we will do. The cost of not doing that will be greater than the cost of doing it. We leave too soon -- as we did in 1991 -- and we'll back in ten years and, like 2001, it'll be harder next time.

Ken White

07-07-2009, 03:09 AM

burger things... :D

tequila

07-07-2009, 03:42 AM

Yep, we went because we were attacked. Initial plan was to go in, run off the Talibs and then leave. For various reasons, not all readily apparent, we changed the game and decided to stay. Mistake in my view but they didn't ask me. Not only did we decide to stay, we told the Afghans -- and the world -- that we would. In my view, we didn't have to stay but we said we would and so now we have to.

This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos? What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power? I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique (http://www.newsweek.com/id/177374/page/2), wasn't going to work.

Ken White

07-07-2009, 04:20 AM

This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos?is should we have gone into Afghanistan the way we did. Might it have been better just to reduce every AQ hangout in the country to less than rubble -- we knew where they were and pretty much who was in them. Unfortunately, despite the errors of the Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations, despite the flaws identified in Eagle Claw, we had deliberately NOT developed a strategic raid capabiltiy for several reasons. Thus, to remove the AQ elements in Afghanistan, we had to use the capability we did have and as should have been expected when cranking up systems that hadn't been used for ten years or so with the concomitant skill decay; we screwed things up a bit.
What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power?Nothing then and most likely nothing now. Afghanistan is Afghanistan. It is not going to turn into the Costa Rica of South Asia. we can leave it better than we found it but we will never stay long enough to 'fix' it. Nor should we, not our job.
I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique (http://www.newsweek.com/id/177374/page/2), wasn't going to work.True and we knew that but given the resourcing and the flawed 'strategy,' the guys on the ground had little choice. They did the best they could with what they had.

The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term. However, we needed to do something in the ME -- Afghanistan is not in the ME and the effect was not the same -- as all the hate and discontent came from there; Iraq was the spot; unpopular Dictator, geographically central, no major disruption of world oil supply. so the strategy was okay, the location was good -- but the timing was bad. The Army screwing the operation up didn't help. Iraq may still work out okay. We'll see in about five or ten years. Afghanistan will also probably be okay but little changed from its normative state which should be perfectly acceptable but is certainly not in accord with western values.

The fact that it is not a western state seems to befuddle many...

I think Bush knew that if he did not do Iraq or something like it, his successor probably would not and he thought it needed to be done. I agree with that, just wish he'd waited. Also wish the Army and Marines had done the post June 2003 stuff a little better. It would've also have helped had there been no Paul Bremer

Don't put too much stock in Bacevich -- he's a smart guy but neither he nor I have all the answers. Nobody has 'em. Bacevich does have an agenda, though, which is fine and his right but sometimes those folks with agendas can't see the forest. Sometimes their shattered dreams from earlier wars drive their thoughts on all wars. Often wrongly...

Surferbeetle

07-07-2009, 06:28 AM

We're not going to change 3,000 years of Afghan history and culture. Never were going to be able to do that.

Too true; not Costa Rica, nor "...a Scandinavian Democracy.", nor anything close to a 'western' construct.

If one has swallowed the Kool Aid and believes the rather foolish rhetoric that population centric stuff matters, then one could hope for that. Big fly in that pie is that we do not have enough troops, NATO, US, Afghan (Police and Army) to do that. It would take five to ten times the now available strength to do it that way and neither we, NATO or the Afghans (or anyone else) are likely to come up with gold or the people. Plus we Americans just do not do that stuff well -- impatience again, plus the tour syndrome and the domestic political turmoil every two years. Not our bag.

So then, I agree with you on what the warm chunky goats milk of inadequate force ratios and unrealistic political schedules could to do to us :wry:

....and as a result I am eyeballing that damn population centric purple kool-aid... :eek:

Realworld applications-wise, upping the total force ratios/total mass (our side + % of population) by focusing upon population issues is possible and doable. We did it in Mosul for a while and we have done it in other locations (Japan & Germany, different sized delta yes but there were/still are appreciable cultural differences). The western clock we like to time ourselves on however may be the 'special' ingredient in the purple kool aid that we have to watch for. Reading about Mr McNamara (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124691360779402129.html) in today's WSJ was pretty sobering.

So we go to Plan B. Clear, then dazzle with footwork and get the crowd behind the Goal to wave their pom poms or whatever while building roads and schools and giving the max number of troublemakers an opportunity to repent and be productive Pomegranate growers. We can get there. Just makes it more difficult and more likely to provide a temporary 'OK' solution rather than a long term good one. Tough world out there, people don't play fair... :D

Schools/madrassa's are specialized high end type work that require sustained cash flows and networks, instead simple gpf water & ag projects might be playing more to our strengths....ring road status (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSARREGTOPTRANSPORT/0,,contentMDK:20560890~menuPK:868765~pagePK:340041 73~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:579598,00.html)...

Steve the Planner was saying the other day the Afghanistan once exported ag products and I have read that Kabul U's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabul_university) ag program was supposed to have been pretty strong...where you around/aware when/if that occurred?

Finally, I note that we have transitioned from relying on only our boxing skills and are adapting (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Combatives_School) …it's slow going sometimes but somebody wise told me that the kids always come through…;)

tequila

07-07-2009, 12:20 PM

The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term.

What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?

Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.

The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.

William F. Owen

07-07-2009, 12:22 PM

....that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.

Regardless of what most Afghans wanted? If so, it makes a mockery of the POP-Coin approach.

tequila

07-07-2009, 12:39 PM

Regardless of what most Afghans wanted? If so, it makes a mockery of the POP-Coin approach.

Does POP-COIN require popularity? I thought it was mostly about providing a monopoly of force and then security and stability to the population when faced with an insurgent enemy. The Taliban did so in the east and the south of Afghanistan, which were rife with banditry and warlord gangs. During its drives to the west and the north, it did not face insurgents but rather armies like its own in the forces of Massoud and Hekmatyar, which it defeated in the Afghan version of conventional combat with artillery, tanks, and aircraft, not a COIN campaign.

William F. Owen

07-07-2009, 01:39 PM

Does POP-COIN require popularity? I thought it was mostly about providing a monopoly of force and then security and stability to the population when faced with an insurgent enemy.

Well my understanding of the focus on the population, as opposed to the threat is that you are seeking the popular legitimacy, as being your primary enabler to exercise the actions of the government. People talk about not "out fighting" but "out governing."

In Sierra Leone, if you supported the Government, the insurgents just came and killed you. Same in Algeria. Same in Cambodia.

tequila

07-07-2009, 02:02 PM

Well my understanding of the focus on the population, as opposed to the threat is that you are seeking the popular legitimacy, as being your primary enabler to exercise the actions of the government. People talk about not "out fighting" but "out governing."

In Sierra Leone, if you supported the Government, the insurgents just came and killed you. Same in Algeria. Same in Cambodia.

Isn't that where the whole "separating the population from the insurgents" and "focus on securing the population" comes in? The idea is not to go in without weapons, but rather to use those to protect the population from insurgent attacks rather than attacking the insurgents amongst the population, no?

From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.

William F. Owen

07-07-2009, 02:46 PM

Isn't that where the whole "separating the population from the insurgents" and "focus on securing the population" comes in? The idea is not to go in without weapons, but rather to use those to protect the population from insurgent attacks rather than attacking the insurgents amongst the population, no?
If someone tells me that defending the population is best enabled by killing and capturing the enemy, I am in complete agreement, because if you don't kill them, once you leave, they come back.

From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.
So once the enemy are gone, you re-assert government control. Sounds good!

Surferbeetle

07-07-2009, 03:42 PM

If someone tells me that defending the population is best enabled by killing and capturing the enemy, I am in complete agreement, because if you don't kill them, once you leave, they come back.

So once the enemy are gone, you re-assert government control. Sounds good!

...and even though we blind men are describing different parts of it I think that we are all describing the same elephant.

My experiences, which are just a datapoint and not the end all and be all of anything, are that effective security work & population work are inexorably intertwined.

Lets simplify and only look at water and security in a 'tactical' sense.

Consider humoring me and sketching three lines, two will be vertical and a hands breadth apart while one will connect the two on the bottom...a flattend U if you will. The bottom axis is time (0-100% of the time available for the mission). The left axis is population needs (0-100%) and the right axis is cost (0-100% of cost/resources available for mission).

A horizontal line from about 10% on the population needs axis over to the cost axis would define must haves: enough water and policemen or soldiers to get you through that 125F day without dying. A horizontal line from about 30% on the population needs axis would define should haves: 'enough' water to drink, clean with, grow some crops with and the security to keep you going. A horizontal line from about 40% on the population needs axis would define nice to haves: more than 'enough' water to drink, clean with, grow some crops with and the equivalent security to enjoy them with. Each day could be plotted to get a sense of whats happening.

Get the folks in your AO spending more time on non-kinetic things so that its easier to identify and properly address the troublemakers...go Wilf go :D

Thats an incomplete look of course...there needs to be some sort of local leadership structure which can sustain these tactical things. Now one heads into operational and strategic issues and of course it gets much stickier...

William F. Owen

07-07-2009, 04:25 PM

Get the folks in your AO spending more time on non-kinetic things so that its easier to identify and properly address the troublemakers...go Wilf go :D

Under the circumstances you describe this is most probably correct.

Ken White

07-07-2009, 05:19 PM

What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?None to my knowledge -- that may be why I said bribe them to keep AQ out after we'd shaken them up a bit and destroyed every known or suspected or even slightly possible AQ hangout and cluster. That's a quite different thing.
Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.Really? Who knew....

Who's Steven Pressfield? Should I be concerned with what he says? If so, why?
The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.Be careful with the non-tribal aspect, it can bite. :D
...During its drives to the west and the north, it did not face insurgents but rather armies like its own in the forces of Massoud and Hekmatyar, which it defeated in the Afghan version of conventional combat with artillery, tanks, and aircraft, not a COIN campaign.Not really defeated. Neither of the two were whipped -- suppressed, yes but not defeated. You are correct that it was not a COIN campaign, so few are. There may be a message in that...
From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.Good idea -- lemme know when you round up enough Afghan, NATO, other coalition and US troops to do that.

As Surferbeetle said ""Thats an incomplete look of course...there needs to be some sort of local leadership structure which can sustain these tactical things. Now one heads into operational and strategic issues and of course it gets much stickier...''" Yup. Don't we all just hate it when that happens... :wry:

JarodParker

08-13-2009, 08:54 PM

Marine mission to protect Afghans slows progress Link (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090813/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan)

Valin

08-14-2009, 11:28 AM

Who's Steven Pressfield?

Web Site (http://home.stevenpressfield.com/index.aspSteven Pressfield)

Writer
To name a few...
Gates of Fire
The Legend of Bagger Vance
Killing Rommel

His Blog...It's The Tribes Stupid (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/)

Ken White

08-14-2009, 05:42 PM

Thanks for the info. Your link to the web site doesn't seem to work for some odd reason but I Googled him. Link to the Blog was good.

Thus discovered:

(a) He's a writer whose books I have not read but many others have. I'm happy for him.

(b) I do not need to be concerned about what he says. Which is what I suspected all along. Nor does he need to be concerned about what I say, so we're even.

Abu Suleyman

08-14-2009, 06:06 PM

On this one:Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels...

Has it quietly disappeared?

Greyhawk

08-14-2009, 06:33 PM

13 Aug AP story via Air Force Times (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/08/ap_afghanistan_airforce_noise_081309/):

A new military approach in Afghanistan may mean buzzing rather than bombing the enemy, according to the general taking over the air war there.

It’s known as irregular warfare, designed to protect local people and then enlist their help defeating Taliban insurgents, Air Force Lt. Gen. Gilmary Hostage said Thursday.

“The first thing we do is fly over head, and the bad guys know airpower is in place and oftentimes that’s enough. That ends the fight, they vamoose,” said Hostage, who will direct the air battle over Iraq and Afghanistan. “The A-10 has a very distinct sound. The cannon on an A-10 is horrifically capable and our adversaries know it. When they hear the sound of an A-10, they scatter.”

Sometimes they do.

George L. Singleton

08-14-2009, 07:56 PM

The A-10 is a very old subsonic tank killer.

It sounds like we have nitwits making battle plans if any of these quotes and suppositions are true.

Might as well bang bots together to drive the tiger, but the tiger is still there and will keep killing.

Ron Humphrey

08-14-2009, 11:10 PM

jmm99

09-04-2009, 06:40 PM

From the AP this morning (http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/09/04/nato-airstrike-in-afghanistan-kills-up-to-90-8/):

NATO airstrike in Afghanistan kills up to 90
Afghan official says NATO airstrike on hijacked fuel tankers kills 90, including 40 civilians
FRANK JORDANS
AP News
Sep 04, 2009 09:00 EST

A U.S. jet blasted two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, setting off a huge fireball Friday that killed up to 90 people, including dozens of civilians who had rushed to the scene to collect fuel, Afghan officials said.
.....
In Kabul, the NATO command said a "large number of insurgents" were killed or injured in the pre-dawn attack near the village of Omar Khel in Kunduz province. In Brussels, the alliance's chief said it was possible civilians died.

Kunduz Gov. Mohammad Omar said 90 people were killed. A senior Afghan police officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information, said that included about 40 civilians who were siphoning fuel from the trucks.
...
Navy Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, a public affairs officer, said the attack occurred after commanders in the area determined that there were no civilians there.

In Brussels, however, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said "a number" of Taliban fighters were killed and "there is a possibility of civilian casualties as well."

The German military, which has troops under NATO command in Kunduz, said the airstrike struck the tankers at 2:30 a.m., killing 50 insurgents, adding that "uninvolved (persons) were presumably not harmed."

Militants seized the tankers about four miles (seven kilometers) southwest of a German base and an unmanned surveillance aircraft was dispatched to the scene, German officials said. After the images showed no sign of civilians, the Germans called for a U.S. airstrike, which occurred about 40 minutes after the tankers were seized. ....

From this armchair, this incident confirms that UAV IDs are not infallible, and that civilian casualties come in large bunches where airstrikes are involved (the latter fact is established by the UNAMA Report (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75449&postcount=115)).

This incident is different from the May Farah incident (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75487&postcount=130); although both boil down to how much ID is required to justify an airstrike - and whether the presence of any civilians requires an abort.