View Full Version : The UK in Afghanistan
davidbfpo
05-31-2011, 08:05 AM
The Deputy ISAF Commander has made a public comment:
Lt Gen Bucknall, the deputy head of Nato's Afghan mission, said alliance forces must remain unchanged until autumn 2012 to consolidate gains made since US reinforcements came last year.
"The coalition has had a good winter," he said. "We have got to hold on to what we have gained and hold that over this fighting season. What we are doing is reaping the benefits of having the resources in place to match the strategy we have always had. Many of those resources only hit the ground in autumn 2010. We need, in broadest terms, that set of resources in place for two winters and two fighting seasons, which would mean we are talking about autumn 2012. This is not the time to send conflicting signals on commitment to the campaign."
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8545952/Afghanistan-withdrawal-no-significant-pull-out-says-senior-British-general.html
How the general reconciles his views with the government's clear commitment to reduce troop levels, the political-military situation in Afghanistan (since 2001), let alone Helmand Province (UK role since 2006) and overwhelming public opposition to our commitment there eludes me.
davidbfpo
05-31-2011, 08:12 AM
Another review of the book by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles 'Cables from Kabul':http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/charlesmoore/8545449/Sherard-Cowper-Coles-Our-frank-frustrated-man-in-Afghanistan.html
Another review of the book by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles 'Cables from Kabul':http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/charlesmoore/8545449/Sherard-Cowper-Coles-Our-frank-frustrated-man-in-Afghanistan.html
Well that certainly made me reconsider joining the Foreign Office
Well that certainly made me reconsider joining the Foreign Office
... and for that you should be eternally grateful. Your honour and integrity are too valuable than to be squandered on the alter of duplicitous and perfidious diplomacy.
... and for that you should be eternally grateful. Your honour and integrity are too valuable than to be squandered on the alter of duplicitous and perfidious diplomacy.
Maybe I'm sufftering from battered wife syndrome and just want to change him, I meant the foreign office. What about the Home Office then?
davidbfpo
06-03-2011, 08:50 AM
TDB wrote:
What about the Home Office then?
John Reid was the UK Secretary of State for Defence who took the decision to deploy UK forces to Helmand Province, accompanied by a public statement IIRC similar to "The troops will assist development and not fire a shot". So I am reluctant to cite him, but in answer to your question.
When John Reid was Home Secretary he announced one of his agencies, the UK Border Agency was 'Not fit for purpose'; well nor is the Home Office IMHO and best kept away from.
Try DFID instead, that's awash with taxpayers money, has an increasing budget, needs young staff to work overseas and may offer adventure too.
TDB wrote:
John Reid was the UK Secretary of State for Defence who took the decision to deploy UK forces to Helmand Province, accompanied by a public statement IIRC similar to "The troops will assist development and not fire a shot". So I am reluctant to cite him, but in answer to your question.
When John Reid was Home Secretary he announced one of his agencies, the UK Border Agency was 'Not fit for purpose'; well nor is the Home Office IMHO and best kept away from.
Try DFID instead, that's awash with taxpayers money, has an increasing budget, needs young staff to work overseas and may offer adventure too.
I've heard as much from a civil service fast streamer, it's the reason the fast stream was set up in the first place, to get out the people who had gotten used to a sedentary way of working. I can imagine DfID being equally frustrating. Maybe the Cabinet Office, though saying that anything i'd say would fall on deaf ears. Well all my future career plans seem to have been undone in a single thread.
I've heard as much from a civil service fast streamer, it's the reason the fast stream was set up in the first place, to get out the people who had gotten used to a sedentary way of working. I can imagine DfID being equally frustrating. Maybe the Cabinet Office, though saying that anything i'd say would fall on deaf ears. Well all my future career plans seem to have been undone in a single thread.
I strongly suggest that you report to ITC Catterick (http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/18145.aspx) for a quick 26 week infantry soldiers course (time flies when you are having fun). It will be a pretty good character building experience while you decide which branch of government you wish to grace with your presence ;)
I strongly suggest that you report to ITC Catterick (http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/18145.aspx) for a quick 26 week infantry soldiers course (time flies when you are having fun). It will be a pretty good character building experience while you decide which branch of government you wish to grace with your presence ;)
Fantastic idea, what would I do without you!
Fantastic idea, what would I do without you!
You like? Then why not go the whole hog and go for Sandhurst (http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/17057.aspx)?
PS: don't worry I'm not a commission based recruiting officer ;)
excadet
06-03-2011, 02:56 PM
Anyone seen Robert Fox's review of his book ? Can't find a link but it is worth a read.
Also Reid didn't take the decision to go into Helmand, he just implemented it, remember he was a political firefighter for Blair, not a member of the inner circle.
You like? Then why not go the whole hog and go for Sandhurst (http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/17057.aspx)?
PS: don't worry I'm not a commission based recruiting officer ;)
By George I'd be daft not to! I'm in the middle of filling out the "How Did You Find Out About This Vacancy" Will JMA suffice or would you rather your full name. I'm considering changing my name to Rupert by deed pole, at a later date because my name is already Tom so I can hold it off for a while.
By George I'd be daft not to! I'm in the middle of filling out the "How Did You Find Out About This Vacancy" Will JMA suffice or would you rather your full name. I'm considering changing my name to Rupert by deed pole, at a later date because my name is already Tom so I can hold it off for a while.
Just tell them it has been your life's ambition to become a Rupert!
http://www.goathearder.co.uk/ekmps/shops/goathearderfm/images/rupert-the-bear-annual-2008-2009-5-p.jpg
Note: for our US friends the Brit other ranks generally refer to their officers as "Ruperts" after the character in the children's book of the same name.
Just tell them it has been your life's ambition to become a Rupert!
http://www.goathearder.co.uk/ekmps/shops/goathearderfm/images/rupert-the-bear-annual-2008-2009-5-p.jpg
Note: for our US friends the Brit other ranks generally refer to their officers as "Ruperts" after the character in the children's book of the same name.
I hope I get to wear those trousers!
davidbfpo
06-15-2011, 10:09 AM
Another contribution, titled 'Breaking Rank' and sub-titled 'Years of timidity from politicians have left our military commanders dangerously overconfident' by Sherard Cowper-Coles in The Spectator:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/7010593/breaking-rank.thtml
Which needs to be read alongside Matthew Cavanagh's earlier article, the author being another "insider", a political adviser in the Labour government:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6846068/operation-amnesia.thtml
Both find fault with how the political-military relationship over Afghanistan is out of balance, not only within the "corridors of power", but with the press.
Similar themes have been found in other posts regarding the situation in the USA, where of course there is a starker, open history of disagreement and sometimes the seemingly abrupt, ruthless decisions of politicians such as Truman and McArthur.
Red Rat
06-15-2011, 10:18 AM
Both articles have attracted some comment in the army and (I suspect) are about to attract more.
There is a perception that senior generals are heavily politicised (small 'p') and are perhaps more focused on telling politicians what they want to hear and not what they should be telling. It is difficult to quantify or qualify the trust of this perception as despite all the leaks, the majority of the battles fought, won or lost in the corridors of power in the Ministry of Defence and Whitehall are not widely known of or discussed.
My personal experience of the senior civil service in the last few years is that they are increasingly focused on meeting Ministers wishes at the expense of meeting Ministers requirements; I suspect that the same is likely to be true (but to a lesser extent) with generals.
The quality of strategic advice and the strategic decison making process for the Iraq Campaign was the subject to considerable scrutiny by the ongoing Chilcott Inquiry (due to report this summer). It will be very interesting to see what they say.
Anyone seen Robert Fox's review of his book ? Can't find a link but it is worth a read.
This one?
Give the Taliban the reins of power? Let's be serious (http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23958479-give-the-taliban-the-reins-of-power-lets-be-serious.do)
davidbfpo
06-17-2011, 07:29 PM
A follow-on article by Toby Harnden:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100090742/my-free-speech-hero-lieutenant-colonel-rupert-thorneloe/
A few days after his death, however, a Welsh Guards officer who had spoken to Thorneloe shortly before he died met an adviser to David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition, at the House of Commons. Shortly afterwards, Cameron tore into Gordon Brown at Prime Minister’s Question Time.
Within a year, most of Thorneloe’s complaints about equipment, manpower and strategy in Helmand had been addressed by the Army.
A follow-on article by Toby Harnden:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100090742/my-free-speech-hero-lieutenant-colonel-rupert-thorneloe/
David, a number of the issues raised by Thorneloe were discussed here a year or so ago. I remember the status quo being strongly defended at the time while there were just a few questioning voices King, Farrell and others who dared to ask the hard questions.
With books like Harnden's being published I foresee/anticipate more people retrospectively jumping on the band wagon and agreeing that there were fatal flaws in the operational approach from (in the case of the Brits) 2006. As the countdown to 2014 continues it is less and less likely that any major changes will be made in terms of tours, operational continuity etc etc and we will see more of that Brit characteristic where they "keep calm and carry on" regardless.
End with an explanation of the current situation from Rommel - he saw it then already:
General Erwin Rommel famously noted this failing in British commanders during his African campaign: ‘Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an Officer Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system . . . A military doctrine has been worked out to the last detail and it was now regarded as the summit of all military wisdom. The only military thinking which was acceptable was that which followed standardised rules.’ (Basil Liddell Hart 1987: 203–4).
davidbfpo
06-19-2011, 01:48 PM
A couple of reports to keep this thread "bubbling" as JMA forecast:
I foresee/anticipate more people retrospectively jumping on the band wagon and agreeing that there were fatal flaws in the operational approach from (in the case of the Brits) 2006.
Under the headline 'Court martial judge questions prosecution of soldier', a simply bizarre piece of prosecution logic:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8583882/Court-martial-judge-questions-prosecution-of-soldier.html
Some pre-publication briefing, found to date only in The Scotsman, on the forthcoming House of Commons Select Committee on Defence's report on Afghanistan, headlined 'MPs carpet Cameron over Afghan war' and a committee IIRC can be accused of 'jumping on the band wagon':http://www.scotsman.com/news/MPs-carpet-Cameron-over-Afghan.6787448.jp
jcustis
06-19-2011, 04:18 PM
A follow-on article by Toby Harnden:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100090742/my-free-speech-hero-lieutenant-colonel-rupert-thorneloe/
In the Marine Corps, we have a similar mindset of carrying on despite fewer resources and manpower. It's more institutional though, at the Service level.
It's easy at times, I think, to lose the ability to discern "carrying on" from "plodding along".
LtCol Thorneloe no doubt sounds like a gallant leader.
Woland
06-20-2011, 10:13 AM
What occurs when we leave Afghanistan, or at least heavily reduce the numbers? What happens when there are no deployments on the horizon because Iraq and Afghanistan have been so damaging to the military and painful to the government that no government will ever send us anywhere else? Bear in mind that the cuts mean our capability will have reduced to such an extent that even if something did crop up, we couldn't deploy even if we wanted to. All the talk is that repeated deployments adversely affect retention, but I'd have to look at that closely and would not apply it to the whole Army. I did Herrick 9 (Sep 08 - Apr 09) and am currently on leave following Herrick 13 (Sep 10 - Apr 11). These were preceded by four or five month training packages which I undertook whilst doing a day job, in the case of prior to Herrick 13 in the still busy Northern Ireland. I'm deploying to another theatre in November for six months minimum, whereupon I'll almost certainly go back for another six to Afghanistan before mid 2013. This is the kind of schedule that commentators say is driving people out of the forces and I have to say that were I an infanteer or in significant danger day in day out, it probably would. But I can see the alternative on the horizon, which is no deployments, no reason to get up in the morning and no work to do. If this were the case now, I as full screw in the J2 world would have a choice of probably four locations where my working week would not be a profound waste of time. If and when it comes about, that will push me out of the forces.
So basically can we please have another Balkan skirmish and I can deploy to Split or Dubrovnik? Pleeeeeaaaaase?
Just a question.
In the Indian Army, the Infantry units (we operate as units, and the personnel are permanent), the operational tenure (Line of Control/ COIN [we call it Counter Terrorist or CT]) is three years and peace and training tenure two to three years. The cycle repeats. It causes great emotional, psychological, education of children and other domestic problems.
Does repeated deployment seriously affect the retention of personnel in the Army wherein soldiers opt out?
We do not have this opting out problem since there is no such avenues, but the intake has gone down in the officers cadre and there is a shortfall of 12000 officers.
Red Rat
06-21-2011, 08:21 AM
With books like Harnden's being published I foresee/anticipate more people retrospectively jumping on the band wagon and agreeing that there were fatal flaws in the operational approach from (in the case of the Brits) 2006. As the countdown to 2014 continues it is less and less likely that any major changes will be made in terms of tours, operational continuity etc etc and we will see more of that Brit characteristic where they "keep calm and carry on" regardless.
I think it is widely agreed that the British approach in Afghanistan until 2009/10 was sub-optimal. The issue is that there are good arguments as to why the UK and the Army in particular sought to do things the way it did. I happen to disagree with many of them, but that is not to say that there was not a logic behind what happened.
As the Afghan campaign enters Transition and towards an exit I suspect that there will be more willingness to make changes to tour lengths, operational continuity etc, not least because they make more efficient use of resources and the UK is very short of resources.
I think it is widely agreed that the British approach in Afghanistan until 2009/10 was sub-optimal. The issue is that there are good arguments as to why the UK and the Army in particular sought to do things the way it did. I happen to disagree with many of them, but that is not to say that there was not a logic behind what happened.
As the Afghan campaign enters Transition and towards an exit I suspect that there will be more willingness to make changes to tour lengths, operational continuity etc, not least because they make more efficient use of resources and the UK is very short of resources.
I would indeed be happy to be proved wrong by seeing some late stage innovation by the Brits through to 2014 and beyond. Certainly if there is to be a training commitment beyond 2014 the foundations need to be put in place now (and not tomorrow).
I notice with sadness a sudden spike in Brit KIA and wonder if that will be as a result of the new "fighting season" or what.
We have discussed the issue of tour lengths here and I wonder whether there has been any movement on the official side?
I am half way through Anthony Beevor's book D-Day and remain amazed that so many of the lessons learned there have been forgotten. For another discussion some other time then.
A couple of reports to keep this thread "bubbling" as JMA forecast:
Under the headline 'Court martial judge questions prosecution of soldier', a simply bizarre piece of prosecution logic:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8583882/Court-martial-judge-questions-prosecution-of-soldier.html
It seems too bizarre to be true (even for the Brit system). Maybe there is more to it than meets the eye?
A little like this report of 2010? - Royal Marine 'beat Afghan prisoner with a Wellington boot' (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7528223/Royal-Marine-beat-Afghan-prisoner-with-a-Wellington-boot.html)
Some pre-publication briefing, found to date only in The Scotsman, on the forthcoming House of Commons Select Committee on Defence's report on Afghanistan, headlined 'MPs carpet Cameron over Afghan war' and a committee IIRC can be accused of 'jumping on the band wagon':http://www.scotsman.com/news/MPs-carpet-Cameron-over-Afghan.6787448.jp
There is something inherently healthy about the Brit system of producing such reports (including the Bloody Sunday one). I certainly hope that they produce a report without fear or favour.
Red Rat
06-21-2011, 01:18 PM
It seems too bizarre to be true (even for the Brit system). Maybe there is more to it than meets the eye?
There is something inherently healthy about the Brit system of producing such reports (including the Bloody Sunday one). I certainly hope that they produce a report without fear or favour.
The report on the cout martial does sound too bizarre to be true. As in at least one case in Iraq a prosecution was sought by the MOD in order to clarify legal issues and ensure that the Army was seen to be not above the law and whiter then white.
The report should make interesting reading. I have not heard of any UK analysis of the British effort in Afghanistan (although by this stage in the Iraq campaign two internal analysis had been produced and a third was in the making).
I would suspect that any training commitment by the UK to Afghanistan will be met by longer tours on a trickle basis, this is certainly the case for Iraq.
davidbfpo
06-22-2011, 09:27 AM
Once again The Scotsman runs a story not seen so far elsewhere in my AM reading:
A clearly angered Mr Cameron yesterday said: "Sometimes I wake up in the morning and read the newspapers and want to tell them 'You do the fighting and I'll do the talking.
(Later)Mr Cameron insisted that Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir David Richards and Admiral Stanhope, who was hauled into Number 10 for his comments last week, are "absolutely clear that we are able to keep up this mission for as long as is necessary".
Link:http://www.scotsman.com/news/39You-do-the-fighting-I39ll.6789091.jp?articlepage=1
The phrase 'this mission' refers to Libya.
I am not versed in UK public expenditure ways, but an insider last week explained there are rules on who funds unexpected spending like Libya, generally the MoD bills the Treasury for extra cash. Indications are that the Treasury has abrogated this rule, so any unexpected spending will impact current spedning and so more cuts are needed. Makes you proud! Not.
Updated early PM. There is wider coverage of this reported civil-military spat and a forthcoming BBC TV documentary is likley to raise the issues again; headline:
Head of British Army questions deadline for Afghan troop withdrawal
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8590812/Head-of-British-Army-questions-deadline-for-Afghan-troop-withdrawal.html
I think it is widely agreed that the British approach in Afghanistan until 2009/10 was sub-optimal. The issue is that there are good arguments as to why the UK and the Army in particular sought to do things the way it did. I happen to disagree with many of them, but that is not to say that there was not a logic behind what happened.
Does that infer that there is the belief that operational efficiency after 2010 has improved?
davidbfpo
06-23-2011, 09:02 AM
The BBC's Panorama reporter, John Ware, weighed last night with an hour long documentary on the UK in Afghanistan from 2001 to today, notably over why we deployed in 2006 to Helmand Province. Amongst the "talking heads" were two civil planners who advised against deployment and were over-ruled; the programme is worth watching for just them alone IMHO.
In fact, the Joint UK Plan for Helmand shows precisely the reverse - in particular just how little was known about the complex dynamics of Helmand's tribal, criminal, religious and political factions.
And the military intelligence assessment failed to anticipate the scale or speed of the violent response from Taliban and other anti-British forces
.
What is puzzling is the decision to deploy beyond the original focus, Lashkar Gar, to the four centres in the north and the political recollection it was not their decision. Now a matter before the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence's current hearings on Afghanistan.
Link to summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804 and added later, see next post for link to programme available outside the UK.
The BBC's Panorama reporter, John Ware, weighed last night with an hour long documentary on the UK in Afghanistan from 2001 to today, notably over why we deployed in 2006 to Helmand Province. Amongst the "talking heads" were two civil planners who advised against deployment and were over-ruled; the programme is worth watching for just them alone IMHO.
What is puzzling is the decision to deploy beyond the original focus, Lashkar Gar, to the four centres in the north and the political recollection it was not their decision. Now a matter before the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence's current hearings on Afghanistan.
Link to summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804
Since being informed that the video "is not available in your area" I had to go looking and found it here (http://www.vidbux.com/c7ykoszj0m2v/afganistan.war.without.end.hdtv.xvid-ftp.r.flv.html)
Found it outstanding and informative and look forward to next weeks part on the war in Helmand by Mark Urban. (Don't know what part three is about)
Its all there:
* Can't win an insurgency then the government is illegitimate and corrupt.
* Failure to take decisive action against poppy cultivation is a major strategic error.
* Failure to consider the adverse effect of Afghan police and military being deployed to an area occupied by another ethnic group.
* Failure to build an army (current shower has a 20% desertion rate) on a sustainable basis will lead to disintegration when US funding dries up.
* etc etc
Probably the only good thing is the special forces actions against Taliban leadership targets which have been (by most accounts) spectacularly successful. (Sadly this has been more than offset by the failure to take out the Taliban leadership in Pakistan)
davidbfpo
06-24-2011, 11:26 AM
Once again The Scotsman "hits the nail" with this short, obvious report that there is a navigation problem ahead:http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=1 (http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=2)
From faraway I've never understood the strategic value of Helmand Province and devoting such a level of resources. Unless the key effect was reducing heroin production, which it is not.
IIRC in 2006 the USA deployed a small force, in one source given as three hundred and their role was as a support unit for SOF / CIA.
Once again The Scotsman "hits the nail" with this short, obvious report that there is a navigation problem ahead:http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=1 (http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=2)
From faraway I've never understood the strategic value of Helmand Province and devoting such a level of resources. Unless the key effect was reducing heroin production, which it is not.
IIRC in 2006 the USA deployed a small force, in one source given as three hundred and their role was as a support unit for SOF / CIA.
Where the troops levels will be reduced is (surely) to be in areas which are handed over to the ANA and not wholesale out of Helmand. The Brits must now insist that they operate in an AO which they can handle with the 9,000 troops they have and is reduced in line with the troop draw down in the future.
Red Rat
06-24-2011, 09:56 PM
The UK does now have an AO appropriate to it's troop levels. The trick from now on will be twofold:
1) to conform to the overall campaign plan in terms of main effort. President Obama's announced troop withdrawals will create gaps, there will be pressure to fill those gaps, especially if Helmand looks increasingly secure (big if! Not sure if Helmand is the Afghan equivalent if South Armargh, but it sounds like it!)
2) as the campaign looks towards handing over to the Afghans the issue will be how does the Afghan government see itself postured after most Coalition forces have left? What may be important to us may not be important to them, and there seems little value to fight and hold real estate that they will not.
Red Rat
06-24-2011, 10:05 PM
Does that infer that there is the belief that operational efficiency after 2010 has improved?
Extended tours, trickling in of HQ elements, better information flows, better TTPs in theatre, a realisticaly sized AO, comprehensive (and working) cross government approach (civil and military), a coherent C2 structure; yes it is better. Could it be better yet? Undoubtedly, but it is a great deal better then it was.
Extended tours, trickling in of HQ elements, better information flows, better TTPs in theatre, a realisticaly sized AO, comprehensive (and working) cross government approach (civil and military), a coherent C2 structure; yes it is better. Could it be better yet? Undoubtedly, but it is a great deal better then it was.
Extended tours?
Depending on how you look at it the glass is either half-full or half-empty. During 2006-07 Helmand was said to be like the Wild West. Even successful military operations have flaws in planning and execution. Should we take away some guy's Silver Star because he should have put a machine gun in on his right flank before he rushed the enemy position? These things can only be fined-tuned but so much.
davidbfpo
06-28-2011, 08:29 AM
Brigadier James Chiswell MC Commander 16 Air Assault Brigade briefed IISS London on British Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan 2010-11”.
He explained the background to the Brigade’s fourth deployment to Afghanistan since 2001, showing how the brigade prepared for the tour. This included formulating a Brigade concept of operations that embraced the complexity of the environment in Afghanistan, the number of actors and the need to build support amongst the Afghan people.
About to listen to the eighty minute long podcast, there should not be any copyright issues:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/2011-events-archive/june-2011/brigadier-james-chiswell-on-operations-in-helmand-province-afghanistan-2010-11/
Infanteer
06-28-2011, 02:24 PM
a realisticaly sized AO
Probably one of the most important aspects - we noticed this when our AO went from Kandahar Province to a District within said province.
Shortens LoC, prevents one from having to run around willy-nilly, improves inter-unit support, etc, etc. All that common dog military stuff.
About to listen to the eighty minute long podcast, there should not be any copyright issues:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/2011-events-archive/june-2011/brigadier-james-chiswell-on-operations-in-helmand-province-afghanistan-2010-11/
The Youtube download is actually the 40 odd minutes address with strangely a repeat to make up the 80 minutes... strange.
The public part of the speech is worth deconstruction at some point. (The question and answer session was off the record)
I note in the early stages that he ascribes the "improvement" in Helmand to the introduction of 20,000 US Marines. He said the increase in troop level went from 7,000 to 30,000 and that the Brits had their borders consolidated into central Helmand. Must have been an improvement.
Interesting to hear his comment on the nuanced change from "courageous restraint" to where soldiers are rather to exercise "patience and precision". I would be interested to hear how he explained that the Brit "Toms" and squaddies (and what their comprehension level was).
I note with sadness that they appear to have no choice but to use the same troops who "cleared" an area for the "hold" and "build" phases. The Brit paras and marines are up there with the best fighting men in the world and to utilise them to effectively protect a road or a construction project or a government or civil authority compound for most of their tour seems to be a massive waste to me.
Probably one of the most important aspects - we noticed this when our AO went from Kandahar Province to a District within said province.
Shortens LoC, prevents one from having to run around willy-nilly, improves inter-unit support, etc, etc. All that common dog military stuff.
Isn't it all about the density and activity of the enemy? I see it as very much a "troops to task" issue. The commander allocates the troops needed to achieve the mission in each area under his command.
In certain provinces and districts of Afghanistan there must surely be a low requirement for troops and in some cases they (by all accounts) hardly leave their bases and seldom if ever seek to (or need to) make contact. There would be a real difference in how troops in high activity/density areas operate as opposed to those in "quieter" areas.
Red Rat
06-29-2011, 09:45 AM
Interesting to hear his comment on the nuanced change from "courageous restraint" to where soldiers are rather to exercise "patience and precision". I would be interested to hear how he explained that the Brit "Toms" and squaddies (and what their comprehension level was).
They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'. I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.
The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.
Red Rat
06-29-2011, 09:48 AM
In certain provinces and districts of Afghanistan there must surely be a low requirement for troops and in some cases they (by all accounts) hardly leave their bases and seldom if ever seek to (or need to) make contact. There would be a real difference in how troops in high activity/density areas operate as opposed to those in "quieter" areas.
That might be true across Afghanistan as a whole, and may in part be due to national caveats (some nations only want to stay in the less hostile or active areas).
In Helmand if an area is quiet then densities are adjusted to reflect.
As Transition progresses quiet areas are also handed over to ANSF elements, allowing ISAF elements to focus elsewhere.
They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'.
As simple as that. I do however think the average troopie needs some guidance on who actually needs to be killed.
I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.
The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.
Please do. Also, please, what the Brit troops found difficult to understand/comprehend about the courageous restraint idea.
Well one hopes that the people who need to be killed are being killed in greater numbers as that tends to send a clear message to the Taliban that if they want to survive then they should avoid contact until (at least) after 2014.
That might be true across Afghanistan as a whole, and may in part be due to national caveats (some nations only want to stay in the less hostile or active areas).
In Helmand if an area is quiet then densities are adjusted to reflect.
As Transition progresses quiet areas are also handed over to ANSF elements, allowing ISAF elements to focus elsewhere.
Yes, thanks, that just about confirms what I was suggesting.
Lifted from another thread to here where it is applicable:
Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:
1 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ec1_1309395808)
2 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=bbb_1309397246)
3 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=685_1309398015)
enjoy
Lifted from another thread to here where it is applicable:
Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:
1 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ec1_1309395808)
2 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=bbb_1309397246)
3 of 3 (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=685_1309398015)
enjoy
This series has been very good so far, it hasn't dumbed down for the most part. Shame it's relegated to bbc 2 where the unwashed masses won't see it.
They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'. I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.
The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.
Talking of Chiswell and a somewhat off topic...
Am doing some research into Op Barras (Sierra Leone - 10 Sept 2000)
Chiswell got his MC there as did a number of others get awards. Have tracked down the awards to the relevant London Gazettes but no luck in getting sight of the citations. Are they available in the public domain?
Thanks
davidbfpo
07-03-2011, 10:48 AM
Hat tip to the newly reactivated Defence of the Realm blogsite for pointing at Mark Urban's BBC Newsnight's report on the Kajaki dam project:
Ever since Western forces plunged into Afghanistan a decade ago, they have realised the importance of winning hearts and minds, particularly in the restive south.
The idea that they could bring electricity to millions of people by upgrading the Kajaki dam in Helmand Province has proven to be a counter of counter-insurgency El Dorado - a quest into which lives and money have been poured, but so far without effect.
General David Petraeus, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, told me during a recent interview that the Kajaki project had proven to be an object lesson in, "overpromising but under-delivery".
The UK and partners moved the parts for a Chinese turbine in August 2008, amidst a PR campaign and they still lie there.
I don't recall this being reported in 2008:
It was only at Kajaki Sofla, a village just a few miles south of the dam, that they met serious opposition.
In Kajaki Sofla, British attempts to buy off the local tribe had been scotched by the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, who ordered them to fight. The result was a battle in which, the British estimated at the time, 200 had been killed.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13925886
DoRealm link, with photos and commentary:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2011/06/doing-honest-thing.html
excadet
07-03-2011, 11:56 AM
It was covered in some detail by Patrick Bishop in "Ground Truth" 2009.
davidbfpo
07-09-2011, 06:02 PM
Months ago we debated 'Courageous Restraint' and in recent UK documentaries there have been episodes in which restraint, aka PID has featured.
Today there is this headline 'Soldiers told not to shoot Taliban bomb layers' and a sub-title:
British soldiers who spot Taliban fighters planting roadside bombs are told not to shoot them because they do not pose an immediate threat, the Ministry of Defence has admitted.
The information came via an inquest Q&A; although I expect it has been seen before.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-told-not-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html
A story like this does little to reassure the UK public of our military mission and the widow's viewpoint is likely to resonate here:
They are not allowed to fire on these terrorists. If they can see people leaving these IEDs, why can’t they take them out? One officer even told him 'I am an army Captain and you will do your job'. We have lost too many men out there, they had seen people planting IEDs yet could not open fire or make contact with them. I believe strongly if people had taken on board what he was saying more he might have been here today.
Months ago we debated 'Courageous Restraint' and in recent UK documentaries there have been episodes in which restraint, aka PID has featured.
Today there is this headline 'Soldiers told not to shoot Taliban bomb layers' and a sub-title:
The information came via an inquest Q&A; although I expect it has been seen before.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-told-not-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html
A story like this does little to reassure the UK public of our military mission and the widow's viewpoint is likely to resonate here:
David this almost defies belief. I really do believe that for the clowns who make these policies and the generals who just roll-over and say "yes" there should be (career ending and pension affecting) consequences (for all the incompetence shown over Afghanistan).
Just for the record on this thread an article by William F Owen in the Spring 2011 BAR entitled Killing Your Way to Control (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/BAR%20151%20Killing%20your%20way%20to%20control%28 2%29.pdf) provides a refreshing approach.
Red Rat
07-11-2011, 08:00 AM
David this almost defies belief. I really do believe that for the clowns who make these policies and the generals who just roll-over and say "yes" there should be (career ending and pension affecting) consequences (for all the incompetence shown over Afghanistan).
It does almost beggar belief and it would be interesting to see the full context of the quote.
UK ROE are based on UK Law and the defining principle is that there must be a clear and immediate threat to life - that has not changed since the start of the AFghan Campaign. The problem with IED emplacement is understanding whether it is an IED being emplaced or not. Generally if suspicious activity is spotted then there are many options available to prevent/disrupt that activity from taking place.
My talks with UK soldiers recently returned from AFG with 2-3 tours of AFG under their belt was that they felt that ROE were robust and sufficient.
The problem with Courageous Restraint when it was introduced was that as it was 'guidance' and not a technical change to the ROE it did what all good guidance is not supposed to do - it cobnfused matters considerably and soldiers were no longer sure as to what they could or could not do. People should be held accountable for that.
In a strange, if predictable official response the first edition's total print run was purchased by the UK MoD and pulped.
Apparently the Estonian government was upset - Stan any comment?
(Added later). The passage Estonia did not like published:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100079812/dead-men-risen-what-the-mod-doesnt-want-you-to-read-1/
And as Major (Retd) John Thorneloe, 88, Lt Col Thorneloe’s father, said recently:
And Toby Harnden now says:
Excellent work by the MoD press officers and those who agreed to this approach.:eek:
Two links, a newspaper story:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100079683/dead-men-risen-the-real-reasons-why-the-mod-want-to-stop-my-book/?utm_source=tmg&utm_medium=TD_100079683&utm_campaign=harnden1503 and a more detailed account:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6766648/pulped-by-the-mod.thtml
In the middle of reading Dead Men Risen at the moment and apart from being quite harrowing it is also rather shocking. The inability of the Army to be self-critical has cause many deaths.
Red Rat
07-15-2011, 04:26 PM
In the middle of reading Dead Men Risen at the moment and apart from being quite harrowing it is also rather shocking. The inability of the Army to be self-critical has cause many deaths.
I think that is a failing of many armies, where there is a tension between a formal hierarchy and discipline with the requirement to critizise and innovate (outside the box). It is exacerbated in the British Army by several things:
Ethos and Culture - the British Army is conservative and British society is largely consensual - we don't like to be blunt with each other (it's rude)
The army is small and getting smaller - politics matter. You need to get on to get up. This leads to
Like selecting like - bucking or critizing the system is unlikely to attract reward
The army is heavily meshed with the Ministry of Defence and its sister services. That means it is hard to keep criticism in-house and anything that hints of criticism of civil servants or other services often gets diluted or written out entirely.
The Army does recognise its failings and some of the Generals that it has now are trying to drag it into a more open and self-critical era, but there is a long way to go yet. :wry:
jcustis
07-16-2011, 02:57 PM
My talks with UK soldiers recently returned from AFG with 2-3 tours of AFG under their belt was that they felt that ROE were robust and sufficient.
RR, the ROE absolutely are robust and sufficient.
You should be coming up on the beginning of your rotation to AFG soon, eh?
Red Rat
07-16-2011, 04:43 PM
The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...
It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life! :D
jcustis
07-16-2011, 05:38 PM
The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...
It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life! :D
I am genuinely sorry to hear that. You had been putting a good bit of effort into the workup.
The Army does recognise its failings and some of the Generals that it has now are trying to drag it into a more open and self-critical era, but there is a long way to go yet. :wry:
This problem seems to repeat itself over time, not so?
If you look at the build-up to the Boer Wars you see the Brits ran through a list of the following:
* 1857 - The Indian Mutiny
* 1878 - Second Anglo-Afghan War
* 1879 - The Anglo-Zulu War
* 1880 - more Afghanistan
Then the First Boer War - 1880-1881 - where the Brits were given a good hiding in the battles of Laing's Nek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Laing%27s_Nek), Schuinshoogte (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Schuinshoogte) and Majuba Hill (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Majuba_Hill).
(Note 1: This war was as a result of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal being annexed by the Brits. To avoid being sucked into a full scale war the Brits concluded a peace treaty. The republic was reinstated and the Brits withdrew their troops.
Note 2: Of military significance the boers employed (one of the first recorded occurrences of) tactical fire and movement during the final assault on Majuba Hill.)
* 1881-1889 - Sudan Campaign continues (and Brit forget lessons of first Boer War)
Then the Brits wrap up the Sudan campaign just in time for a second war with the Boers (hint gold had been found in the Transvaal in 1886).
The Brits finally won in 1902 having had to resort to actions against the boer civilian population to bring the Boer nation to its knees (the methods which the Brits would rather not talk about).
(Note: The Boer nation (now called Afrikaners) resulted from a mix of Dutch and (a few ship loads of) French Huguenots (also Calvinists), a portion of Germans and a pinch of Scandinavians. To state that these people were/are "difficult" is an understatement and in the main they (in the two Boer republics at least) refused to submit to British rule. The weakness (which remains today and probably due to the predominant Dutch genetic influence) is that they can seldom agree with each other. Unity was possible when faced with a war against Britain and when fighting some of the native tribes.)
Now this all brings us to Rudyard Kipling and his poem - The Lesson 1899-1902 (Boer War) - motivated by his being "scandalised by what he had seen of British military planning and preparedness" for the war:
The Lesson 1899-1902 (Boer War) - Rudyard Kipling
LET us admit it fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good.
Not on a single issue, or in one direction or twain,
But conclusively, comprehensively, and several times and again,
Were all our most holy illusions knocked higher than Gilderoy’s kite.
We have had a jolly good lesson, and it serves us jolly well right!
This was not bestowed us under the trees, nor yet in the shade of a tent,
But swingingly, over eleven degrees of a bare brown continent.
From Lamberts to Delagoa Bay, and from Pietersburg to Sutherland,
Fell the phenomenal lesson we learned—with a fulness accorded no other land.
It was our fault, and our very great fault, and not the judgment of Heaven.
We made an Army in our own image, on an island nine by seven,
Which faithfully mirrored its makers’ ideals, equipment, and mental attitude—
And so we got our lesson: and we ought to accept it with gratitude.
We have spent two hundred million pounds to prove the fact once more,
That horses are quicker than men afoot, since two and two make four;
And horses have four legs, and men have two legs, and two into four goes twice,
And nothing over except our lesson-and very cheap at the price.
For remember (this our children shall know: we are too near for that knowledge)
Not our mere astonied camps, but Council and Creed and College—
All the obese, unchallenged old things that stifle and overlie us—
Have felt the effects of the lesson we got—an advantage no money could buy us!
Then let us develop this marvellous asset which we alone command,
And which, it may subsequently transpire, will be worth as much as the Rand.
Let us approach this pivotal fact in a humble yet hopeful mood—
We have had no end of a lesson, it will do us no end of good!
It was our fault, and our very great fault—and now we must turn it to use.
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not a single excuse.
So the more we work and the less we talk the better results we shall get—
We have had an Imperial lesson; it may make us an Empire yet!
And the bad news is... the Brits did not learn the lessons... and continue to this day to be slow to adapt and evolve believing it seems (in what stood them in good stead in bygone times) that in a war (any war) the only battle you really must win is the last one.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Boers_1881.gif
From the Telegraph, Armed Forces too weak to defeat the Taliban (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8642525/Armed-Forces-too-weak-to-defeat-the-Taliban.html)
A devastating report into the Afghanistan war has concluded that the British task force sent into Helmand in 2006 was ill-equipped, under-resourced and too weak to defeat the Taliban.
In Operations in Afghanistan – which is deeply critical of both senior commanders and government ministers – the Defence Select Committee states that the Helmand mission was undermined by bad planning and poor intelligence, and the task force was capped at 3,150 troops for financial rather than operational reasons.
Much of the blame for the failings is levelled at senior officers for claiming that field commanders were content with the support they were receiving, when the reverse was true.
Add to all this the initial (certainly) tactical ineptitude of the brigade/battalion/company/platoon operations and one (certainly me) is left deeply saddened at the depths to which the Brit military was sunk. The fine soldiers found in the ranks of the Brit military deserve better.
The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...
It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life! :D
Sky News tells me that the big announcement re the reorganisation of the military will be made in the House tomorrow. Regular army down to 84,000, I believe, the lowest since the Boer War.
davidbfpo
07-17-2011, 12:25 PM
JMA,
I too have read the story and am slightly puzzled at the timing of the media reports. The report (link below) was ordered to be printed on the 6th July 2011 and a Press Statement is on Parliament's website today - which is not a working day. Methinks a Sunday "filler" item after the media focus elsewhere.
Parliamentary Press release:http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/news/publication-of-operations-in-afghanistan/
Full Report:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm#a7
On a quick read of a few sections there are some "howlers" and whilst not unexpected why were those responsible for decision-making not identified?
There is a section about the 2006 deployment to Helmand and the follow-on decision to man section bases in northern settlements, e.g. Sangin,
General Fry said that the key question about the events of 2006 was how did UK Forces get from the original plan to provide security in a small area to "fighting for their lives no less than two months later in a series of Alamos in the north of the province....
...to win what the MoD described as the totemic battle of the flagpoles—preventing Government flags from being replaced by those of the Taliban.
John Reid, Defence Secretary, at the time of the initial deployment and five weeks later elsewhere:
I understand from inquiries that I made then and subsequently that the matter was not referred to the Secretary of State for Defence who succeeded me. It was never brought to his attention, except in retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view, it was an operational decision which may or may not have been right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic nature of the mission..
Two generals:
General Richards said that the move to the north of Helmand was not a change of mission but a change of tactics.[58] But General Wall said that UK Forces had ended up in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different from the one that was anticipated.
The in place Defence Secretary at the time, Lord Browne:
..a tactical decision was made to deploy forces beyond the lozenge. He told us that he was briefed about this retrospectively and informed by those in command that, in military terms, this was an operational decision.
We are often told we are in the era of the 'Strategic Corporal', well this is evidence of something very different. The Committee's Press Release says:
The Committee considers it unlikely that this fundamental change was put to Ministers.
davidbfpo
07-17-2011, 12:43 PM
The BBC News report takes a wider view, hence the title 'Warning over early Afghan pull-out by British forces', which I will leave you to read.
It ends with a comment by an ex-BBC reporter:
.. the greatest focus should be on the political mistakes rather than the actions of soldiers.
The responsibility in the end is political. What worries me about this report and it's not generated by it at all - it's doing its job - is that now there's a feeding frenzy: let's blame the soldiers, let's push off, it's all over, it's their fault, they got it wrong. This is too simplistic and it's very dangerous.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14175600
JMA,
I too have read the story and am slightly puzzled at the timing of the media reports. The report (link below) was ordered to be printed on the 6th July 2011 and a Press Statement is on Parliament's website today - which is not a working day. Methinks a Sunday "filler" item after the media focus elsewhere.
Parliamentary Press release:http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/news/publication-of-operations-in-afghanistan/
Full Report:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm#a7
On a quick read of a few sections there are some "howlers" and whilst not unexpected why were those responsible for decision-making not identified?
There is a section about the 2006 deployment to Helmand and the follow-on decision to man section bases in northern settlements, e.g. Sangin,
John Reid, Defence Secretary, at the time of the initial deployment and five weeks later elsewhere:
Two generals:
The in place Defence Secretary at the time, Lord Browne:
We are often told we are in the era of the 'Strategic Corporal', well this is evidence of something very different. The Committee's Press Release says:
Thanks for that link. The full text version is interesting. I had asked some time ago what the number of wounded were who would be unlikely to be able to return to duty and got the OPSEC reply. Now we have this:
Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan
10. The worst aspect of operations has been the loss of lives and the number of people receiving very severe injuries. From the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001 to 15 June 2012, 371 British military personnel were killed with a further 586 very seriously or seriously wounded. Over 5,000 troops were admitted to the field hospital of whom 1,712 were wounded in action and the remainder had a non battle injury or disease. Some 4,700 personnel were evacuated back to the UK by air.
Not sure how they classify the wounded. This IED thing is a bitch so I assume the wounds are horrific and can't be compared to other wars statistically.
On the field hospital stats clearly 300 odd were discharged locally but 3288 odd sick soldiers (not WIA) were medevac'd back to the UK. Twice the number as the WIA admitted to the field hospitals and later CASEVAC'd. This is disease and illness. Any idea what?
The BBC News report takes a wider view, hence the title 'Warning over early Afghan pull-out by British forces', which I will leave you to read.
It ends with a comment by an ex-BBC reporter:
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14175600
The draw down must surely be as a result of handing over to the ANA with the remaining area shrinking accordingly?
I think the biggest failing of British forces in Helmand and ISAF troops across the country, was to stumble blindly into the country with only the courage of their convictions to comfort them. As we all know now the US back Karzai to lead and he set up a system of patrionage which alienated the majority of the people, making the Taliban seem like a pretty attractive alternative. Further more when we set off for Helmand, we were, were we not? On a counter-narcotics mission, so fueled by out sense that drugs are bad and so people who, grow, deal and use them are evil then we should destroy opium crops. Again it seems that all to late was it realise that people were growing opium because it made them more money than wheat but still lived hand to mouth. In short decisions were made that created more enemies before we'd even got there.
davidbfpo
07-18-2011, 11:31 AM
TDB,
Partial citation:
..Further more when we set off for Helmand, we were, were we not? On a counter-narcotics mission..
What is remarkable is that the counter-narcotics (heroin) segment of the renewed 'Great Game' in Helmand played an understandably small a role. The UK was not on a counter-narcotics mission in 2006 and IMHO to this day is not. There is another thread on Afghan counter-narcotics, where we have debated the issues, greatly aided by 120mm who has been there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234
The Defence Select Committee hearings include:
General Peter Wall told us that the UK taking on Helmand was consistent with the UK's role in counter-narcotics (held since July 2005).[25]
Earlier in the why did NATO expand it's role in Afghanistan:
General Houghton told us....(southern Afghanistan) being an unsafe place that was host to international terrorism and for which the delivery of good government and governance was essential.[22]
Plus some strategic arguments for UK / NATO and the USA.
The initial objective in 2006 was to establish a central "lozenge of security" around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then move out from there as conditions permitted. The intent was that UK Forces would gain intelligence and a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing a local envelope of security, would be able to help create the right environment for governance, build Afghan capacity and create a capacity for economic growth.[31]
Note counter-narcotics does not appear. There are anecdotes that the UK Army took no action when opiates were found and on some of the film footage recently poppy fields formed the backdrop to patrolling.
Nor has the pre-2006 US presence been let's say robust:
..the US Forces acted in what General Fry described as "a profoundly live and let live" way.[34] Intelligence from such an operation was limited...There were something like 100 members of the US special forces, for example.
Brigadier Butler, the first UK commander in Helmand:
As soon as we arrived in those conditions—and as I have said the Province was already in some form of crisis; they were certainly ready and waiting—of course they wanted to engage us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, whether from the Taliban, from the opiate dealers or from the warlords, because we were threatening their very existence. We were trying to turn a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, as reasonably experienced military men, that we were going to have a reaction.[38]
What undermines the official explanation IMHO is that pre-2006 Helmand Province was a functioning, working and presumably peaceful province where power was split between the Taliban, warlords and opiate dealers. A province where the provincial government was only a token presence. Maybe with rare national i.e. US-funded counter-narcotic visits (another SWC may know if that happened).
Timing is another factor:
43. General Houghton pointed out that a number of factors came together to make the situation particularly difficult in the early months:
Poppy eradication—the fear of locals that their livelihoods would be taken away, which was fuelled by Taliban propaganda;
Some of the (my emphasis as never seen before) 200,000 casual labourers who migrated from Pakistan for the poppy harvest had stayed behind as guns for hire;
In preparation for the arrival of UK Forces, the Americans had conducted a number of kinetic operations culminating in Operation Mountain Thrust which had stirred up the local population; and
The removal of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as Governor and his replacement by Governor Daoud had destabilised the tribal balance and the balance of power within northern Helmand.[49]
There was 'no balance of power within Northern Helmand', the new Governor appointed by Karzai wanted to win the 'battle of the flags'.
Governance is not flag waving and the UK is not in Helmand for counter-narcotics. I have argued before that such a role is in our national interest, a role that would resonate back home, especially in the cities where heroin is freely available (including Muslim areas) and as for the methods look at the linked thread.
I think the biggest failing of British forces in Helmand and ISAF troops across the country, was to stumble blindly into the country with only the courage of their convictions to comfort them.
But the Brits have always done that haven't they?
Given the empire and the military needs spread far and wide the army would be sent all over and arrive under-prepared and wrongly/unsuitably equipped for the required task at hand. Lost a few battles to start with but tended to win the last one (which counted most in those times).
The theory (out here in the colonies at least ;) ) is that this led to the confident air (or arrogant demeanour whichever you prefer) of the British Officer becoming standard. As in when the troops arrive in (say) the Sudan and are faced by the spears and blades of the Mahdi's army and the troopies say "for fook sake!" it is up to the officers to strut their stuff with that air of cool/calm/collected/in-control/relaxed/outward-confidence designed to fool the troopies that they were in control of themselves and therefore the situation.
I would describe this to being like a duck. The key being the difference between the (serene) above water demeanour of a swimming duck as opposed to the (frantic) under water activity of the duck's legs.
So the Brits developed the culture of arriving unprepared, taking a few bloody noses and then muddling through to the point when they finally got their act together and gave the enemy a good hiding. It is this (normal) sequence events that led to bravery and being willing to "die well" being placed above competence in the Brit Army (IMHO).
The sacrifice of subalterns (and many thousands of soldiers) during the 1st World War (where they had a life expectancy of 6 weeks) expresses this priority need to be brave and die well due to a lack of competence of the strategic and tactical abilities of the general staff at the time. (Sounds too close to the Afghanistan situation for comfort?)
(Note: At the start of the 2nd Boer War (1899) my information is that there were two officers based in London who were charged with military intelligence for the empire.)
Sadly going through the motions and muddling through is no longer an option (one would have thought) as the inevitable body counts related to such an approach are no longer acceptable to the British public.
The mind boggles that given this and the demonstrable historical record that in 2006 the Brits once again blundered in and seem happy to muddle through.
Britain had ended up being involved in a role it had not set out to do. Planning for not firing a shot in two years, resulted in something like one million bullets being fired in anger in a year. The lag between the realisation of the situation on the ground and the setting in motion of resources needed for are the biggest issue. The bloody nose situation along with the notion of a stuff upper lip does have its part to play. But also in what is a professional army the fear of speaking out and wrecking your career.
RE: counter narcotics, the UK had agreed to take the lead on counter narcotics even if 16 Air Assault did take part in any CN missions.
While the presence of heroin on British streets is an issue, it could be argued it is mere a symptom of wider issues. Not just that but destorying the poppy fields of Helmand would just see it grown and produced elsewhere within Afghanistan and the wider world. As this report shows http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf
and experience shows from the production of Coca in South America which moves throughout Colombia, Bolivia and Peru as it responds to various counter narcotic efforts.
We would be better off creating a viable alternative to poppy cultivation for Afghanistan if only so Afghan farmers can get a better standard of living not simply to hope it effects the global heroin market.
davidbfpo
07-19-2011, 03:00 PM
TDB,
I have long advocated buying the heroin product direct from the farmers, then destroying it and perhaps over time the farmers will grow something else; hich is on the Afg drugs thread. Given the insurgency in Helmand I see little value in crop eradication by more coercive options.
Governance is not flag waving and the UK is not in Helmand for counter-narcotics. I have argued before that such a role is in our national interest, a role that would resonate back home, especially in the cities where heroin is freely available (including Muslim areas) and as for the methods look at the linked thread.
David, as you will have noted that I too believe that the drug trade (to describe the activities which commence with the cultivation of poppies) should have and now still deserves more "attention" from ISAF. So much so that I do believe that an "independent" investigation should be carried out into the Afghan drug policy as carried out by the US, the UK ISAF and other NATO members deployed (where applicable).
These "old testament" and "iron age" people would understand an approach where if you gathered the village elders together and showed them photos/videos/etc of the effect on the lives of so many people in the West (NATO countries because NATO is deployed in Afghanistan) together with an explanation that they by implication are responsible/culpable for the deaths and destruction of so many young lives (through the use of derivatives of their product) that there actions fall clearly under the category of "an eye for an eye".
By their medieval sense of justice that would be enough to take the menfolk of the village into the nearest field and shoot them out of hand and take and sell their children into slavery/prostitution/whatever. Thankfully (or sadly, whatever be your point of view) the West (meaning in this context the NATO countries) have moderated their response to crimes of this magnitude to the point of impotence (which has been noticed by the Afghan locals and taken advantage of).
So just who is the enemy in Afghanistan?
Sure the Taliban because they harboured AQ and continue to resist the US and NATO for inflicting an illegitimate and corrupt regime on the people living in the geographical area called Afghanistan. But this particular element of the "enemy" must (IMHO) receive more respect than the warlords and the druglords that make up the balance of the broad "enemy" category.
Crazy situation to find the US/UK/NATO either in bed with or going soft on straightforward criminals though. Unacceptable, unforgivable.
ganulv
07-19-2011, 06:14 PM
I have long advocated buying the heroin product direct from the farmers, then destroying it and perhaps over time the farmers will grow something else;
The Taliban would still find a way to take their cut but I suppose it would keep some product off the street (at the cost of some pissed off middlemen). And I bet that creating a guaranteed market like that would put a lot more folks into the business of growing Papaver somniferum (which does have legal uses, of course).
The Taliban would still find a way to take their cut but I suppose it would keep some product off the street (at the cost of some pissed off middlemen). And I bet that creating a guaranteed market like that would put a lot more folks into the business of growing Papaver somniferum (which does have legal uses, of course).
Until it is grown somewhere else, this is my point. Destroying poppy fields in Helmand and the rest of Afghanistan does not mean an end to heroin consumption on our streets. While buying the resin from the poppies to make medical opiates is an idea i guarentee that pharmecutical companies wouldn't get involved because the influx of readily available poppies to harvest would lower to the price on the drug and so make it less cost effective to make.
Contradiction won't work with unguarded borders and corrupt police forces. My point is, for the moment at least fighting the war on drugs in Afghanistan is pointless and counter productive. We should be looking more at drying to decriminalising users and treating drug use as a public health issue not a crimianal one. Destroy the demand, destroy the supply.
davidbfpo
07-21-2011, 05:39 PM
Kings of War have a spirited commentary on the Select Committee report on Helmand plus (Post 769 onwards) by an infantry officer who served there in 2006:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/dsc-report/#comments
It opens with three paragraphs, which I have edited down:
The Report catalogues an array of political, strategic and tactical mistakes and negligence on the part of ministers, military commanders and the Ministry of Defence.
The report has not got the attention it deserves from the media, and the fact that there have been few responses to its publication thus far is an insult to the soldiers and Afghan civilians who died in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2008, when the Helmand operation was woefully under-resourced and under-manned.
The depth of arrogance, ineptitude and negligence revealed in the report is astonishing, and much of its content points the blame at the top military commanders at the time. It seems the decision to deploy to Helmand was not thought through strategically, barely even operationally...
I understand the author's disgust at the lack of public, let alone a political response to the report, as much of the media and political establishment have focussed on the "hacking" scandal for the past ten days or more. What an indictment for a nation supposedly at war in Afghanistan?
I understand the author's disgust at the lack of public, let alone a political response to the report, as much of the media and political establishment have focussed on the "hacking" scandal for the past ten days or more. What an indictment for a nation supposedly at war in Afghanistan?
It seems that pretty much every nations with troops on the ground in Afghanistan behaves in a way the Europeans treated a little colonial adventure which has left the headlines.
In Italy we just had a round number of dead, a small reminder and two internal pages about all those KIA and the next day it was business or Afghanistan as usual. I certainly feel for those serving still serving there, especially when some sparse heroic speeches just make the overall silence more deafening.
Kings of War have a spirited commentary on the Select Committee report on Helmand plus (Post 769 onwards) by an infantry officer who served there in 2006:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/dsc-report/#comments
It opens with three paragraphs, which I have edited down:
I understand the author's disgust at the lack of public, let alone a political response to the report, as much of the media and political establishment have focussed on the "hacking" scandal for the past ten days or more. What an indictment for a nation supposedly at war in Afghanistan?
A nation in denial?
The report is a terrible revelation of just how badly the politicians and the senior military got it wrong.
A year or so ago I was admonished as follows:
Words like "competence," "hopeless" and "attempt to hide the horrible truth" are more likely to incite anger than to promote productive discussion. These are not all black-and-white situations that justify severe moral condemnation.
Well now its official (thanks to this Parliamentary Report). In fact so much so that in using those words and terms I was in fact going easy on the clowns at the MoD and the General Staff.
Moral condemnation is not enough, the MoD should be cleaned out preferably with the use of a... flame thrower ;)
Infanteer
07-25-2011, 06:15 AM
I have some trouble with the claim that we went in unprepared.
ISAF Phase III expansion featured Battle Groups taking over in provinces. The British BG took over Helmand, the Canadian BG took over Kandahar, the Dutch BG Uruzgan, etc, etc. What's more, many of these BGs took over from American companies or moved into areas with no previous presence at all. Looking at an OEF ORBAT here (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_orbat_050115.htm) shows 6-7-ish battalions for the entire country.
That the Taliban offensive of 2006 caught NATO by surprise is a given and I don't know the details enough to state if it was an intelligence failure or not. But I do wonder if it would have been worse had NATO not moved those BGs south and the penny-packeted OEF elements (playing second fiddle to OIF at the time) caught the brunt of the offensive? Considering Canadian light armoured forces were instrumental in stalling the insurgent drive to Kandahar City and getting the British forces in and out of some tough areas, that heavier NATO presence may have been just in time?
Anyways, back to armchair quarterbacking. Considering that NATO BGs were ripping out American units that were driving around relatively unmollested in Humvees in 2005-2006, do you think it may be a bit disingenious to argue that we should have been rolling in with full-up Brigades ready to fight conventional battles with massed insurgents? Would sending 4,000 soldiers to Helmand in 2005 had looked politically palatable?
I have some trouble with the claim that we went in unprepared.
Then take the "we" (or Canadian element) out of it if you wish but accept that the Brit Parliamentary Defence Committee - Fourth Report - Operations in Afghanistan (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55402.htm) has accepted and confirmed that it was most certainly the case (and worse) with the initial Brit deployment. Read the report for yourself.
The simple fact is that the build up to and the initial three years of the Brit Afghanistan deployment is a national disgrace and humiliation (mitigated only to some extent by the solid and courageous performance of the soldiers on the ground). Heads should roll among the general staff of the time (while the politicians and civil servants will deftly doge the bullets - as they always do).
But... if anyone thinks this is bad news then wait for the Chilcot Inquiry's report on Iraq.
The ability to publicly rip off the scab of a festering sore and expose the ugliness is an enduring strength of the Brits and testament to their maturity as a nation. Any other country intend to or are busy with such inquiries?
Infanteer
07-26-2011, 08:28 PM
I have read it. It says nothing that leadership willingly or knowingly sent the wrong force in. What it does say is that nobody anticipated the Taliban resurgence that would blow up like it did in the summer of 2006. Everyone assumed the environment that existed from 2003-2005 would persist.
I don't find this to be a unreasonable assumption. It's easy to armchair quarterback it now, but I'd want to see a full appreciation of the intelligence that was available to decision makers at the time before declaring guilt. I laughed when Brigadier Butler contrasted the 3000 soldiers in Helmand then to the 30,000 there now. Go back to 2005 and argue that you could sell a government on sending 30,000 soldiers to a quiet Afghan province when Iraq was falling apart.
What the British contingent does appear guilty of (and it comes out in the report) is that there was nothing left in the gas tank should the situation go south. Canada's contingent in 25 ton armoured vehicles were the literal cavalry in Southern Afghanistan; some of the soldiers I commanded took part in what were pretty much rescue operations - moving from Kandahar to Helmand to drive into districts, cannons blazing, to provide relief to beleaguered British elements reduced to drinking ditch water. Within 6 months of the roof blowing off the south, we had Main Battle Tanks and other mechanized forces in country. Contrast this to, what appears to me as an outsider, a persistent British effort to somehow shoehorn a Landrover into success.
I have read it. It says nothing that ...
May I suggest you read it again then.
I don't find this to be a unreasonable assumption. It's easy to armchair quarterback it now, but I'd want to see a full appreciation of the intelligence that was available to decision makers at the time before declaring guilt.
Too late. The jury is already in and the guys that count have apportioned the blame.
What the British contingent does appear guilty of (and it comes out in the report) is that there was nothing left in the gas tank should the situation go south. Canada's contingent in 25 ton armoured vehicles were the literal cavalry in Southern Afghanistan; some of the soldiers I commanded took part in what were pretty much rescue operations - moving from Kandahar to Helmand to drive into districts, cannons blazing, to provide relief to beleaguered British elements reduced to drinking ditch water. Within 6 months of the roof blowing off the south, we had Main Battle Tanks and other mechanized forces in country. Contrast this to, what appears to me as an outsider, a persistent British effort to somehow shoehorn a Landrover into success.
This thread is not about the Canadians it is about the Brits. The Canadian 3 PPCLI Battle Group deployed in 2002 and therefore the Canadians should had their act together by 2006. I don't know if they did... why not start a thread on Canadians in Afghanistan and lets see what comes out.
davidbfpo
07-27-2011, 08:52 PM
JMA,
There is a long-running SWC thread on the Canadians in Afghanistan, although not updated of late:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1071
Infanteer,
Slightly puzzled by this post (cited in part):
Canada's contingent in 25 ton armoured vehicles were the literal cavalry in Southern Afghanistan; some of the soldiers I commanded took part in what were pretty much rescue operations - moving from Kandahar to Helmand to drive into districts, cannons blazing, to provide relief to beleaguered British elements reduced to drinking ditch water.
Puzzled as I don't recall such a mention in the UK or Canadian threads.:wry:
I don't suppose a British brigade wanted to admit openly it was rescued by a Canadian battle group. Let alone one with armour; my recollection is that the UK did not use our light, old armour the Scimitar family in 2006. Needless to say thank you.
Infanteer
07-28-2011, 12:54 AM
This thread is not about the Canadians it is about the Brits. The Canadian 3 PPCLI Battle Group deployed in 2002 and therefore the Canadians should had their act together by 2006. I don't know if they did... why not start a thread on Canadians in Afghanistan and lets see what comes out.
The Canadians deployed Kandahar in 2002 but they left that year and Kandahar was a much different place then. Since 2006, when both contingents deployed to the south for Ph III of ISAF's expansion, the British and Canadian experience in Southern Afghanistan has been quite similar, hence the reason I draw parallels between the two.
Last I checked, you don't dictate what and what isn't discussed here. If what I say doesn't fit your broken record message, too bad.
Infanteer
07-28-2011, 01:05 AM
Infanteer,
Slightly puzzled by this post (cited in part):
Puzzled as I don't recall such a mention in the UK or Canadian threads.:wry:
There isn't much mentioned about it open source; I imagine with everything winding down that the operation will start to show up in the histories.
It certainly occured as it is corporate memory in my former battalion. There is brief mention of it in this Wikipedia article:
During the following day Canadian forces were called to support Operation Hewad - a combined endeavour by a complete brigade attempting to clear Taliban from Sangin in Helmand. Canadians were tasked to relieve British soldiers besieged in Sangin district centre, and at the same time pressure Taliban command and control throughout the lower Sangin and Gereshk districts of Helmand, operations that again involved multiple firefights each day with dozes of Taliban casualties, but no Canadian deaths. On July 17 Task Force Orion was ordered to retake the captured towns of Nawa and Garmsir, which they did after intense fighting on 18 July, They stayed for another week in Helmand.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Panjwaii
It certainly speaks to my point above - the British "go light" approach ran into problems when the ink spots became besieged. Friends who were there were convinced on the value of armoured vehicles, even our light ones, in a fight. They chuckled when the book "3 Para" came to the shelves and mentioned the entire operation in a footnote.
jcustis
07-28-2011, 07:55 AM
That's an odd line of discussion. What are you getting at excadet?
excadet
07-28-2011, 08:14 AM
1st. Infanteers arguments as they have developed (rather than his initial and valid point) are perhaps for another thread.
2nd If the Paras are guilty of underplaying the role of the Canadiains perhaps the same can be said of them in relation to US airpower in the operations cited.
Infanteer
07-28-2011, 04:45 PM
Am I missing a post or something?
davidbfpo
07-28-2011, 07:25 PM
Team,
This exchange of information and viewpoints is veering towards a "ditch". There is no need for this apparent "point scoring".:(
If a thread develops a new, worthy theme as a moderator I have a habit of starting new threads and those who break our well established rules will soon know.:wry:
Meantime, back to our normal service, carry on!:cool:
excadet
07-28-2011, 08:20 PM
Apologies Infanteer. I made the same points as above in an earlier post in the thread but deleted it as the wording was inappropriate.
Rory Stewart offers a logical and intelligent take on the intervention in Afghanistan on a TED presentation:
Rory Stewart: Time to end the war in Afghanistan (http://www.ted.com/talks/rory_stewart_time_to_end_the_war_in_afghanistan.ht ml)
So yes it should be acknowledged that the politicians are screwing this one up big time once again (of that there is no doubt) but given that there is a military presence in Afghanistan I personally look more towards the military strategy and tactics employed on the ground and to this end his concluding metaphor about intervention using the example of mountain rescue elucidates an approach I support better than I have been able to express it.
Infanteer
07-29-2011, 03:07 AM
Since we are all calling it from the armchairs, what should the UK have done in early 2006? Ignored NATO? Deployed a different force structure?
How about late 2006 when we all realized that southern Afghanistan was a s**t-storm?
davidbfpo
07-29-2011, 09:44 AM
Infanteer,
A quick response from an "armchair" faraway from the combat frontline, but nearer the public frontline - to your first question:
.. what should the UK have done in early 2006? Ignored NATO? Deployed a different force structure?
The UK should have said no to an intervention in Helmand and stated a clear willingness to reinforce Kandahar, if necessary to work under Canadian command. There was no strategic gain in going to Helmand, either for the UK or Afghanistan. Would that mean ignoring NATO I doubt it. I cannot answer the final part. If we still deployed into Helmand, we should have told the Afghans the "battle over flags" or whatever the phrase was, was not worth the bones of a British soldier. We would of course happily insert and support the ANA to fulfill such a key mission.
Infanteer
07-29-2011, 10:52 AM
Infanteer,
A quick response from an "armchair" faraway from the combat frontline, but nearer the public frontline - to your first question:
The UK should have said no to an intervention in Helmand and stated a clear willingness to reinforce Kandahar, if necessary to work under Canadian command. There was no strategic gain in going to Helmand, either for the UK or Afghanistan. Would that mean ignoring NATO I doubt it. I cannot answer the final part. If we still deployed into Helmand, we should have told the Afghans the "battle over flags" or whatever the phrase was, was not worth the bones of a British soldier. We would of course happily insert and support the ANA to fulfill such a key mission.
My armchair is just as far away now and it was in 2006 as well.
1. "putting all the eggs in one (Kandahar) basket" makes sense as a viable alternative. It would have provided RC(S) with better troop ratios. Can't make it from KAF to Maiwand without getting lit up, well we better not try the drive to Lashgar Gah then....
2. I don't think refusing to go with NATO would have been viable. We (yes we - meaning NATO countries that skipped or were looking for a way out of Iraq) were getting pressure from both the U.S., who needed forces for Iraq, and NATO, who was apparently searching for its next big thing? Regardless of real or percieved national interests, lowest-common denomintor policy at Brussels pushed us all there.
3. From the Kanadahar perspective, I've often thought the war was done for us in 2006. After the Taliban concentrations were smashed in Op MEDUSA, they shifted to a war of exaustion and simply avoided ISAF strength and ramped up the IED campaign. I figure we were probably just as useful (literally and politically) sitting in Kandahar Airfield and sallying forth to destroy concentrations when they manifested themselves. Let the ANSF deal with the unruly locals. Although Helmand was different, one wonders if seeing a British "bring out for the big fights" force in Bastion would have been more suitable.
Certainly, it would be more palatable politically than suffering the death of a thousand IED cuts to patrol the same trails and fight the same xenophobic farmers.
4. Finally, I feel a big lesson was go heavy or go home. Helocoptors are one thing, but they don't let you win a close fight in the kind of terrain that exists in southern Afghanistan. The Canadian decision to deploy mechanized infantry and armour proved to be a boon when the fighting got intense. I don't think the British ever had as good of odds with Vikings, Snatches and whatever else they could muster.
My 2 cents.
Soldiers face longer tours in Afghanistan because of savage cuts to troop numbers (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020388/Soldiers-face-longer-tours-Afghanistan-savage-cuts-troop-numbers.html)
"Soldiers face being forced to do extended tours of duty because of savage cuts to troop numbers, MPs have warned."
and
"Army chiefs have been under pressure to move to nine months on, followed by 27 months off, in a bid to increase the proportion of troops who can be sent to the warzone."
Then there is a comment about "harmony guidelines" as follows:
"... there must be a risk that the length of operational tours will be increased or that harmony guidelines, which set out what proportion of time personnel may spend away from home, will be breached.’"
What the hell are "harmony guidelines" and why would they apply in time of war?
davidbfpo
07-30-2011, 08:49 PM
JMA,
IIRC 'harmony guidelines' are:
The Army guidelines determine that soldiers can be deployed for one six-month tour in every 30 months (six on, 24 off) and during that 30 month period a soldier should not expect to be away from his or her normal place of work for more than a total of 415 days.
From a 2009 parliamentary question:http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-02-11b.253717.h
The issue continues as there was a shorter exchange in parliament in July 2011. Note in 2008 there was an external, medical analysis of the impact of breaches of the guidelines you may enjoy:http://network.civilservicelive.com/pg/pages/view/260118/
JMA,
IIRC 'harmony guidelines' are:
From a 2009 parliamentary question:http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-02-11b.253717.h
The issue continues as there was a shorter exchange in parliament in July 2011. Note in 2008 there was an external, medical analysis of the impact of breaches of the guidelines you may enjoy:http://network.civilservicelive.com/pg/pages/view/260118/
The quick answer to that David is (as I recommended earlier in this thread) is to base the battalions of the brigade in Afghanistan (Bagram) so that it becomes the "normal place of work".
I suggest that the 20% on operations (over 30 months) current requirement can be significantly increased with the proviso that regular short R&R breaks are arranged (accepting that in the main units deployed to Afghanistan do not get rotated "out of the line" in theatre like in the old days).
Your second source led me to the PTSD study (http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60672-1/abstract) of May 2010. I did not shell out the $30 for the full text version but note that they estimate a 4% PTSD rate among those who deployed to Afghanistan (where number of tours did not affect this rate). Alcohol abuse and other behavioural issues are reported but one would need to establish what the rates were at time of joining up and then also measured against a sample of those never deployed to Iraq/Afghanistan (not sure if the full text version does that).
I did not see reference to tour lengths nor can think how that can be a factor as all Brit tour lengths are 6 months (for the battalions). It appears there is a tenuous and circumstantial link created as a result of comparison with US PTSD rates (30%) and the longer combat tours they have.
The invisible division: US soldiers are seven times as likely as UK troops to develop post-traumatic stress (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-invisible-division-us-soldiers-are-seven-times-as-likely-as-uk-troops-to-develop-posttraumatic-stress-2264849.html)
PTSD Affecting More U.S. Soldiers Than British (http://www.miller-mccune.com/health/ptsd-affecting-more-american-soldiers-than-british-32096/)
There must be a different method of PTSD diagnosis used in the US as a seven times difference is just too great to be accepted on face value.
A 30% PTSD rate? ... nah.
The quick answer to that David is (as I recommended earlier in this thread) is to base the battalions of the brigade in Afghanistan (Bagram) so that it becomes the "normal place of work".
I suggest that the 20% on operations (over 30 months) current requirement can be significantly increased with the proviso that regular short R&R breaks are arranged (accepting that in the main units deployed to Afghanistan do not get rotated "out of the line" in theatre like in the old days).
Just to expand upon this a little...
The rationale (as explained to me) behind the short (six month) tours was the potential for increased incidence of PTSD and the adverse effect on family lives.
My experience of these low intensity operations is that a 25% R&R rate (plus annual leave) is individually sustainable on a continuous basis for about three years. A 6:2 weeks (or a eight week to 18 day) ops to R&R mix is about right.
If these battalions are volunteer based (as discussed earlier) then the family issue is minimized.
The PTSD issue will be explored in another post.
The length of tours is a tricky one as you've said JMA the reationale behind the six month length is to avoid adverse affects on family life and to reduce the liklihood of PTSD. The issues surrounding the ability to impact on the ground with only a short period to build up relationships with the locals and ANSF is a problem, however i think they've nailed down the handover process. The 15 month tours the US Army do are beyond understanding in terms of the impact they must have on the soldiers and loved ones. NY Times did a series of articles entitled A Year At War, one of the soldiers explained that he was going back to an empty house because his wife had left him taking their kids with her. Now it would be easy to say "you signed up for this" but for many life in the army is as much a career as it is an adventure, so the government and the military have a responsibility to look after its employees. Since it was decided that British military personel could claim compensation for negligence, we've seen relatives of those who were killed as a result of poor equipment. I think this is a step in the right direction, not simply because i believe that if we send men and women to war we should spend whatever it costs to get them what they need. It is more that I think we need to realise these people are human and should be treated as such, not just tools for a job. Gone are the days "our's is not the reason why, our's is but to do and die".
120mm
07-31-2011, 01:53 PM
The problem with the six month tour is that it is less than worthless.
Which is pretty much inline with ISAF's role in the war.
Your second source led me to the PTSD study (http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60672-1/abstract) of May 2010. I did not shell out the $30 for the full text version but note that they estimate a 4% PTSD rate among those who deployed to Afghanistan (where number of tours did not affect this rate). Alcohol abuse and other behavioural issues are reported but one would need to establish what the rates were at time of joining up and then also measured against a sample of those never deployed to Iraq/Afghanistan (not sure if the full text version does that).
I did not see reference to tour lengths nor can think how that can be a factor as all Brit tour lengths are 6 months (for the battalions). It appears there is a tenuous and circumstantial link created as a result of comparison with US PTSD rates (30%) and the longer combat tours they have.
The invisible division: US soldiers are seven times as likely as UK troops to develop post-traumatic stress (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-invisible-division-us-soldiers-are-seven-times-as-likely-as-uk-troops-to-develop-posttraumatic-stress-2264849.html)
PTSD Affecting More U.S. Soldiers Than British (http://www.miller-mccune.com/health/ptsd-affecting-more-american-soldiers-than-british-32096/)
There must be a different method of PTSD diagnosis used in the US as a seven times difference is just too great to be accepted on face value.
A 30% PTSD rate? ... nah.
Was directed to the full text version of the study mentioned above. (Many thanks and much appreciated)
First, the issue of tour durations/lengths. The Australians have found (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3912/is_201102/ai_n57035893/?tag=mantle_skin;content) in their study:
"The number of months on deployment was categorized as follows: 1 to 3 months, 4 to 7 months, 8 to 10 months, and 11 to 36 months."
and
"There were no statistically significant associations between duration of deployment and either perception of general health or indicating 20 or more symptoms of any severity on the symptoms checklist."
followed by:
"... significant associations were not observed with either of these outcomes when the odds for those who deployed for 1 1 to 36 months were compared to the group who had deployed for one to three months."
(One needs to read the whole study to fully understand the basis for these conclusions)
The Brit study finds reservists more prone to PTSD than regular soldiers:
After the publication of our previous report,1 the UK MoD responded with a series of initiatives designed to improve the mental health of reservists both during and after deployment and to assist in the integration of reservists alongside their regular counterparts. However, reservists still seem to be at greatest risk of the eff ects of deployment.
And finally the Brit study tried ti explain the differences with US findings as follows:
Since the UK are fi ghting the same enemy, on the same terrain, facing similar risks, and using similar tactics, the reason for these diff erences is unlikely to be attributable to the operational location. Many other differences exist between the US and UK military that could account for some of the diff erences in prevalence, including the sociodemographic structure (US troops are younger), length of deployment (12–15 months in the USA vs 6 months in the UK), greater use of reservists within the US military, a higher ratio of troops to leader in the US military, and higher casualties and fatalities in the US military in Iraq, although not in Afghanistan. However, why there are diff erent temporal trends in the UK and the USA is diffi cult to understand.
US Marines do six month tours as well don't they? I remember seeing it in some documentary. They do six months because they often do more intense ops, not sure what Army units would have to say on that.
The Brit study included findings relating to alcohol abuse and common mental disorder.
The tests are very basic and can be found here:
Alcohol Screening Test (http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=1860&cn=14)
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) (http://www.nwph.net/lifestylesurvey/userfiles/mental/things/GHQ12.pdf)
I took the alcohol test answering as accurately as I could going back 30 years and scored Exceeding 'Safe-Use' Guidelines. I was late for work once (by 15 minutes) during my career due to a binge the night before and don't and never have had a substance problem. So at a score of 13 I would have been just two points away from the Hazardous Usage: Help Strongly Urged which would indicate to me that they set the bar too low on this one.
Don't know how they score the mental health one.
The length of tours is a tricky one as you've said JMA the reationale behind the six month length is to avoid adverse affects on family life and to reduce the liklihood of PTSD. The issues surrounding the ability to impact on the ground with only a short period to build up relationships with the locals and ANSF is a problem, however i think they've nailed down the handover process. The 15 month tours the US Army do are beyond understanding in terms of the impact they must have on the soldiers and loved ones. NY Times did a series of articles entitled A Year At War, one of the soldiers explained that he was going back to an empty house because his wife had left him taking their kids with her. Now it would be easy to say "you signed up for this" but for many life in the army is as much a career as it is an adventure, so the government and the military have a responsibility to look after its employees. Since it was decided that British military personel could claim compensation for negligence, we've seen relatives of those who were killed as a result of poor equipment. I think this is a step in the right direction, not simply because i believe that if we send men and women to war we should spend whatever it costs to get them what they need. It is more that I think we need to realise these people are human and should be treated as such, not just tools for a job. Gone are the days "our's is not the reason why, our's is but to do and die".
Look at it from this angle if you will.
There is a war the politicians want to start or get involved in. So they deploy troops there into an environment totally foreign to the soldiers being deployed. Sticking to their comfort zone we hear them saying things like "this is what we do" and "this is how we do it" as they shoe horn their previous experience into the new theatre whether it fits or not.
The Paras got involved in a bunch of mini-Arnhems, while the Marines even managed to do an amphibious landing across Kajaki Dam and the mech boys drove up and down "mowing the grass". Each in their comfort zone, each doing what they know best and in the process leaving the Pashtuns who were sitting on the high ground watching them asking each other WTF the British were doing.
Little attention to terrain and enemy (the whole METT-TC thing).
To make matters worse prior to deployment in Afghanistan they go to Kenya for a month to prepare. Another month away from home where other than the ability to conduct live-firing (away from the prying eyes of the Health and Safety Nazis) any link with Afghanistan is tenuous.
The whole focus is doing the six months tour as per the 'harmony guidelines' and then getting back home (and back to some real soldiering maybe?) The brigadier aims at a CBE rather than a mere DSO and so on down the line to the troopie who just wants to make it home alive and with all his limbs intact.
Some don't make it and the family's pain and suffering is compounded by a public inquest which raises doubts about leadership, training, equipment shortages and the lack of resources (which all serves to undermine the war effort).
Now what is really startling is that the Brit military used to be skilled, resourceful and competent and certainly since Iraq seems to have collapsed in a heap.
Where does the fault lie?
Certainly with the politicians... but then you voted for them so you get what you deserve.
Certainly with the civil servants in the MoD (who IMHO are nothing but flame thrower material ;) ) and should be cleaned out root and branch during the cost cutting.
Certainly with the general staff who have been contaminated (I believe) by their contact with the civil servants in the MoD and Foreign Office (during their attachments to these departments from the rank of major up).
How far does this contamination reach down the ranks?
Then sadly there is a cancer spreading upwards much along the lines of what you mention.
Now while I am in agreement that the military has a duty of care towards its soldiers there must clearly be a limit to what can be tolerated in terms of interference from families on behalf of their poor little darling (who has had his feelings hurt by the drill sergeant who swore at him).
Now when it gets to the serious stuff like sending troops into battle without the correct kit (or IMHO sending them into battle with the correct kit but to the extent that all they can do is waddle around like the Michelin Man) then the families are correct in believing it is tantamount to criminal negligence. (Look back in this thread and you will see that I didn't get too much support for my position at the time.)
My subunit in 1979 had seven married members out of the hundred odd in number. They were among the officers (2) and the senior NCOs (4) and one troopie. Now at the risk of being contentious (which hasn't bothered me before ;) ) I assume that (as in my day) junior officers and troopies have to ask permission to get married? IMHO you don't want to encourage officers to marry before the rank of captain and other ranks until they have been in the service for 5+ years at least.
Sadly the type of girls who often hang around military barracks and prey on the troopies most often don't share middle class family values and would snare a troopie for a roof over their head, spend his money and play the field when he was in the bush. Then there were the girls who were seeing three different guys from different subunits as they rotated for R&R which led to a major show down and fights between troopies when the whole battalion came back at the same time to receive the Freedom of the City. So to be brutally frank domestic issues and dear John letters comes with the territory and is something officers and (mainly) the SNCOs must deal with.
All this said there is a specific type of wonderful woman who as they say is prepared "to follow the drum". They do not compete against the army for the affections of their soldier. When he arrives home to announce that he is off to war in the Falklands, Aden, Borneo, Malaya or wherever she is genuinely happy for him and hides her worries for his safety and keeps her personal considerations to herself. These women are as valuable as gold but sadly they are quite rare. Officers and SNCOs have a duty to keep their troopies out of the clutches of the predatory vixens out there as in no time they can destroy a good soldier.
Then it comes down to the soldier himself. Why did he join up? This is why I believe the units of the greatest value are those where members are required to undergo a "challenging" voluntary selection course. It is quite obvious (IMHO) that it is found that a lower incidence of PTSD (http://occmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/7/552.abstract) is found among the Marines and the Paras as opposed to the crap-hat and fish-and-chip units.
The bottom line I believe is that Britain needs to get a military that want to be soldiers in word and deed and will be found ready and willing when the nation calls. The opportunity in this time of cuts to ring the changes is in the offing... but will they take advantage of the opportunity?
Granite_State
07-31-2011, 11:31 PM
US Marines do six month tours as well don't they? I remember seeing it in some documentary. They do six months because they often do more intense ops, not sure what Army units would have to say on that.
Yup, you beat me to it. Seven month USMC tours don't seem to have crippled us in Helmand.
Granite_State
07-31-2011, 11:36 PM
Another month away from home where other than the ability to conduct live-firing (away from the prying eyes of the Health and Safety Nazis)
Is this true? I trained briefly with Royal Marines last summer (two weeks) and they talked about and showed us videos of pretty aggressive live fire training. I also remember Patrick Hennessey mentioning the British Army's "live fire tactical training" as a particular point of pride in his (great) book.
Infanteer
08-01-2011, 12:22 AM
Since we are all calling it from the armchairs, what should the UK have done in early 2006? Ignored NATO? Deployed a different force structure?
How about late 2006 when we all realized that southern Afghanistan was a s**t-storm?
I'll repost this in response to a nice little PM I got from JMA, keeping in line with the debate as per the moderator direction.
JMA has been critical of the UK effort in Afghanistan since day 1 - which is fine; I've been critical of ISAF as well. However, it's one thing to be critical but its another thing to simply hag on the guy who made the decision without pointing out what he should have done, while being able to (a) admit the circumstances that were beyond the control/knowledge of the decision makers (both military and civilian) (b) understand events that came up after the commitment that may not have been predictable before.
Hence my question - what were real options in 2005 and early 2006? I asked the question, so he can provide the courtesy of an answer, or of at least admit he doesn't have one (if that is the case). That's generally how questions work.
The Brits have been slow learners on this but they seem to be coming round slowly...
Afghan tour of duty could double to 12 months for some British army units (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/01/british-military-afghanistan-tour-duty)
(Brigadier Ed Davis, commander of Task Force Helmand) suggested that the work of the British army in Afghanistan would benefit from increased continuity: "The constant churn of people with whom you have really strong relationships is hard, so I think you need to reduce that by having people in theatre for longer."
"I suspect over time we'll see these changes and a larger percentage of people doing longer tours … We are looking at nine to 12 months."
Well yes... it is truly sad that a once fine military took nearly six years to figure this out.
I wonder if the clowns who thought up the 'harmony guidelines' will ever be named and shamed in public?
Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1312178815&sr=1-1)
While sure to be a painful read I will buy this and read it.
Reviews
'a passionate and at times profoundly shocking account of dysfunction at the heart of Britain's armed forces... razor sharp.' --James Fergusson, author of 'A Million Bullets' and 'Taliban'
'carefully researched and full of telling anecdotes, Ledwidge's book may make uncomfortable reading for politicians and some senior military figures.' --David Loyn, BBC foreign correspondent and author of 'Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan'
Infanteer
08-01-2011, 06:37 AM
The Brits have been slow learners on this but they seem to be coming round slowly...
Afghan tour of duty could double to 12 months for some British army units (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/01/british-military-afghanistan-tour-duty)
Well yes... it is truly sad that a once fine military took nearly six years to figure this out.
I wonder if the clowns who thought up the 'harmony guidelines' will ever be named and shamed in public?
Based upon your previous post and this response, are you saying that if the British units in Helmand spent 12 months in theater instead of 6 months, that they would be much more successful?
120mm
08-01-2011, 08:52 AM
Yup, you beat me to it. Seven month USMC tours don't seem to have crippled us in Helmand.
Depends on what you want the Marines to do, there.
Do you want them to take a bunch of casualties doing stupid stuff? They did, you know.
The problem is, the Marines all are saying "yay, we won!!!" and no-one is really externally evaluating that. Not that I'm aware of, anyway....
120mm
08-01-2011, 08:55 AM
Based upon your previous post and this response, are you saying that if the British units in Helmand spent 12 months in theater instead of 6 months, that they would be much more successful?
Seriously, I think the UK should get out and stay out of Central Asia. The mythology going on about what they are still doing here is rapidly growing to be a major tripping point to winning the war, imo.
The current belief, shared by nearly every Afghan, is that the Brits are running the Taliban through Pakistan, and using the naive Americans to "have their way" with Afghanistan. Whatever that means.
The Brit army in Afghanistan is rough analogous to bringing and IDF battalion to do maneuvers in Saudi Arabia.
Based upon your previous post and this response, are you saying that if the British units in Helmand spent 12 months in theater instead of 6 months, that they would be much more successful?
Actually my position has been that in a war against insurgents who are (in the main) local to the area and know the terrain and climate like the back of their hand you need to strive for continuity not only at the command level but also down to the trigger pullers if you are to neutralise their battlefield advantage.
If you want to follow my train of thought on this you can start at about post #216 of this thread as I really can't answer you with quick yes/no on this.
Is this true? I trained briefly with Royal Marines last summer (two weeks) and they talked about and showed us videos of pretty aggressive live fire training. I also remember Patrick Hennessey mentioning the British Army's "live fire tactical training" as a particular point of pride in his (great) book.
I would tend to go with what the Commander of Herrick 11 (six months to April 2010) wrote in his debrief and that was:
Realistic Training. We were hugely constrained by UK safety regulations, and took risk in theatre as a result. I reckon that it took us two months in theatre before we were at our optimum level. Most of my concern lay in the area of live firing, where I believe that our safety margins are far too great for people who are about to deploy on operations, and where things like mortar safety distances and the inability to fire over people constrains realistic training. We currently have to use RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration) to plug the gaps in MST; which is not supposed to be its purpose.
... and what if I may ask made Patrick Hennessey's book 'great'?
I'll repost this in response to a nice little PM I got from JMA, keeping in line with the debate as per the moderator direction.
Oh yes... where would we be without the moderators...
JMA has been critical of the UK effort in Afghanistan since day 1 - which is fine; I've been critical of ISAF as well. However, it's one thing to be critical but its another thing to simply hag on the guy who made the decision without pointing out what he should have done, while being able to (a) admit the circumstances that were beyond the control/knowledge of the decision makers (both military and civilian) (b) understand events that came up after the commitment that may not have been predictable before.
Not quite. A mere observer can tell that a baseball pitcher is bad or damn useless without necessarily being able diagnose the problem with his technique or suggest remedial action. It would be obvious.
I seem to recall you were a platoon commander back in 2006 when you did your Afghanistan tour. Surely now as you look back you will 'see' things that you could have done better and that you would recommend young officers following along should adopt? Also things which should not be done?
If you read this thread (and some others) you will see where the remedial action was not just plain better basic training I did in fact suggest some alternatives. In some cases I probably didn't offer alternatives (I can't remember). But I did get the "then you do better" retort. And the answer to that is yes I could do better (in nearly every case, certainly couldn't do worse) and believe there are probably 100s who could do better. A lot of the problems relate to the strategy which the subunits on the ground can do nothing about but an equal amount relates to just plain poor soldiering skills.
I remember one of the first s**t storms (to use your term) I got into here was when I criticised the conduct of an ambush a US platoon screwed up. Yes they killed some Terries but there was enough there to have jailed at least two of the platoon (the one who compromised the ambush before initiation and the other who looted a cellphone which could have been used for immediate battlefield int and psyops). A swarm of bees descended... and incompetence was defended strenuously.
Then more recently I made some comment on video of a US callsign in contact where the quality of the tactics and drills quite frankly defied belief. Again the swarm descended and incompetence was strenuously defended.
Even more recently a series of BBC videos on aspect of the Brit deployments in Helmand have been made available about which I have not yet really commented on... mainly because the Brits are down, they know they are down and there is no point in putting the boot in.
Hence my question - what were real options in 2005 and early 2006? I asked the question, so he can provide the courtesy of an answer, or of at least admit he doesn't have one (if that is the case). That's generally how questions work.
And my answer on this is that reading the Defence Committee - Fourth Report
Operations in Afghanistan (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55402.htm) will reveal it all. There is no longer any need to speculate its all there. There is a lot in that report that needs to be digested.
We need to be critical of how we have operated in Afghanistan, failing to admit we have done something wrong or that perhaps went about it in the wrong way means that mistakes will me made again and again. The quality of British soldiers in the field is just one point, not having served in the military i don't feel i can, or should comment on such matters. In terms of COIN stragetgy i feel thats a different matter, i might be an armchair commentator but the char is surrounded by a lot of reading material. Getting back to the current discussion however, i'm interested in what JMA is saying. Outside of pre-deployment training restrictions, where do you see the shortfallings in the British military? We shouldn't be slinging mud, these is a place for healthy debate.
Red Rat
08-02-2011, 07:47 AM
Look at it from this angle if you will.
There is a war the politicians want to start or get involved in. So they deploy troops there into an environment totally foreign to the soldiers being deployed. Sticking to their comfort zone we hear them saying things like "this is what we do" and "this is how we do it" as they shoe horn their previous experience into the new theatre whether it fits or not.
The Paras got involved in a bunch of mini-Arnhems, while the Marines even managed to do an amphibious landing across Kajaki Dam and the mech boys drove up and down "mowing the grass". Each in their comfort zone, each doing what they know best and in the process leaving the Pashtuns who were sitting on the high ground watching them asking each other WTF the British were doing.
Little attention to terrain and enemy (the whole METT-TC thing).
Not true. I would say that it displayed little understanding of terrain (especially the human terrain), but it certainly was not ignored. I suspect that the fact that the UK entered Helmand with no clearly articulated strategic objectives (or strategy to achieve them) and there was no coherent campaign plan (UK, NATO or ISAF) in the early years also attributed to the lack of tactical coherence with each brigade fighting its own 6 month campaign.
To make matters worse prior to deployment in Afghanistan they go to Kenya for a month to prepare. Another month away from home where other than the ability to conduct live-firing (away from the prying eyes of the Health and Safety Nazis) any link with Afghanistan is tenuous. Not true. Kenya is not mission specific training, it is generic (routine) training and the live firing rules used in Kenya are exactly the same as those used in the UK. Training in Kenya is pertinent to, but not for, operations in Afghanistan. We trained in Kenya prior to Afghanistan and will train there after Afghanistan.
The whole focus is doing the six months tour as per the 'harmony guidelines' and then getting back home (and back to some real soldiering maybe?) The brigadier aims at a CBE rather than a mere DSO and so on down the line to the troopie who just wants to make it home alive and with all his limbs intact. More then a little truth in this less the 'real soldiering' swipe. Harmony guidelines is a complex area based around medical, welfare and organisational issues. They need looked at and I favour 9 month tours with 24 months tour intervals - this will not breach medical guidance.
Some don't make it and the family's pain and suffering is compounded by a public inquest which raises doubts about leadership, training, equipment shortages and the lack of resources (which all serves to undermine the war effort). True. I do not favour the personification of war and I think that Coroners' Inquests do as much harm as good; but the law states they are to happen and no politican will change this law. Of course if we buried our servicemen overseas there would not be the same requirement...
Now what is really startling is that the Brit military used to be skilled, resourceful and competent and certainly since Iraq seems to have collapsed in a heap.
Where does the fault lie?
Certainly with the politicians... but then you voted for them so you get what you deserve.
Certainly with the civil servants in the MoD (who IMHO are nothing but flame thrower material ;) ) and should be cleaned out root and branch during the cost cutting.
Certainly with the general staff who have been contaminated (I believe) by their contact with the civil servants in the MoD and Foreign Office (during their attachments to these departments from the rank of major up).
Several points to address:
The army was probably never as competent as you think it was. Certainly the history of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns looks very similar to the earlier Afghan Wars, Crimea, Boer, WW1, WW2 and N Ireland campaigns. Armies prepare for one war, fight another and learn - the issue is how quickly they learn.
The politicians reflect society
The army reflects society
The ways wars are fought reflect the societies fighting the war
Civil servants are not the issue, but the (dysfunctional) chain of command is.
The armed forces have been politicised (small 'p'), especially at the higher levels.
Now when it gets to the serious stuff like sending troops into battle without the correct kit (or IMHO sending them into battle with the correct kit but to the extent that all they can do is waddle around like the Michelin Man) then the families are correct in believing it is tantamount to criminal negligence. (Look back in this thread and you will see that I didn't get too much support for my position at the time.) There is an element of 'have your cake and eat it' here... The Army started the AFG and Iraq with an attitude towards risk that was robust - kit was 'sufficient' not necessarily the best. As the casualties mounted and the coroner's inquests were heard the appetite for risk declined significantly. This has lead to the current waddling around like the Michelin Man - a direct result of coroner's reports and families' concerns which are largely (but not exclusively) focused on physical protection. This is also a reflection on political and societal realities in what is for the UK at large, a small and discretionary war.
My subunit in 1979 had seven married members out of the hundred odd in number. They were among the officers (2) and the senior NCOs (4) and one troopie. Now at the risk of being contentious (which hasn't bothered me before ;) ) I assume that (as in my day) junior officers and troopies have to ask permission to get married? IMHO you don't want to encourage officers to marry before the rank of captain and other ranks until they have been in the service for 5+ years at least.
Sadly the type of girls who often hang around military barracks and prey on the troopies most often don't share middle class family values and would snare a troopie for a roof over their head, spend his money and play the field when he was in the bush. Then there were the girls who were seeing three different guys from different subunits as they rotated for R&R which led to a major show down and fights between troopies when the whole battalion came back at the same time to receive the Freedom of the City. So to be brutally frank domestic issues and dear John letters comes with the territory and is something officers and (mainly) the SNCOs must deal with.
Permission to marry no longer required. The adage of 'subalterns cannot, captains may, majors should and colonels must' still holds true, but it cannot be enforced. Same applies to junior ranks. However I am glad to see that some things never change and that your boys knew the same kind of girls that my boys do! :D
Then it comes down to the soldier himself. Why did he join up? This is why I believe the units of the greatest value are those where members are required to undergo a "challenging" voluntary selection course. It is quite obvious (IMHO) that it is found that a lower incidence of PTSD (http://occmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/7/552.abstract) is found among the Marines and the Paras as opposed to the crap-hat and fish-and-chip units.
The bottom line I believe is that Britain needs to get a military that want to be soldiers in word and deed and will be found ready and willing when the nation calls. The opportunity in this time of cuts to ring the changes is in the offing... but will they take advantage of the opportunity?
Infantry soldiers join up because they want to fight - especially at the moment where they know that they all will deploy on operations and get a fight.
It is a truism that those units that undertake a challenging voluntary selection course, elite units, tend to attract a higher calibre of soldier and select an on average higher calibre of soldier. However good soldiers join 'crap hat' and 'fish and chip' regiments (I joined my regiment because it was my family and local regiment :p). While there are good and bad soldiers good and bad units are normally made by good and bad leaders and training. The impact of the current cuts and the drawdown in operational tempo is likely to make it harder to recruit and retain personnel.
Red Rat
08-02-2011, 07:56 AM
Over ambitious (or poor strategic decision making mechanisms in government which fail to tie in 'ends', 'ways' and 'means' effectively).
Under-resourced (or just exceptionally bad at resource management).
Sclerotic chain of command.
Intellectually weak and lacking in intellectual integrity.
Politicised (small 'p') general staff.
But things have improved hugely over the last 6 years in all areas. The biggest changes still be made are in intellectual ethos, a (still) unwieldy and bureacratic chain of command and the politicisation aspect.
Good to hear from you again. Lets deal with the areas of non-agreement first, shall we.
Not true. I would say that it displayed little understanding of terrain (especially the human terrain), but it certainly was not ignored. I suspect that the fact that the UK entered Helmand with no clearly articulated strategic objectives (or strategy to achieve them) and there was no coherent campaign plan (UK, NATO or ISAF) in the early years also attributed to the lack of tactical coherence with each brigade fighting its own 6 month campaign.
I said 'little attention' and you said 'little understanding' and I did not say 'ignored'.
I will rephrase my original comment as follows: Too little attention to terrain and enemy (the whole METT-TC thing).
Let me try and expand on what I mean.
Am reading Forbes' The Afghan Wars at the moment and given the Brit military history with Afghanistan there should have been a better appreciation of what can go wrong in such campaigns and what will go wrong if such campaigns are approached in a half hearted manner. Yet the campaign was approach 'on the cheap' and strictly on terms of comfort to the military (i.e. the harmony guidelines) without making any significant changes that would require discomfort of the military having to adapt to the campaign on hand. What was the hackneyed comment of the time about the army not going to take its attention off some future hypothetical war by too narrow a focus on Afghanistan again? Big mistake paid for (as they say) through blood and treasure.
Remember, my point all along was that the way to ensure operational efficiency was through continuity and that could only be assured through permanent battalions with a trickle replacement policy. It certainly works in terms of terrain. We had poms/yanks trickling in over the years and they were easily absorbed and adapted in remarkably short time to the terrain and vegetation etc etc. I always smiled when after six months a pom would greet a new one and begin to clue him in on the African bush. They learned fast when they were thrown in with a bunch who had been around. I had a young yank who loved it. Said it was like being in the middle of a national geographic movie (when in remote areas) and even better as he got the chance to shoot some 'bad guys' (he returned to the US after the war and ended up as a CSM (in their sense) and is I believe in the Ranger Hall of Fame). But to toss a whole 'virgin' company into the deep end is just plain stupid IMHO.
Forbes quotes General Nott:
The conduct of the thousand and one politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throats of every European in this country to the sword and knife of the revengful Afghan and the bloody Belooch; and unless several regiments be quickly sent, not a man will be left to describe the fate of his comrades.
These past experiences should have alerted the military to how the shenanigans of the politicians would impact on the soldiers down the line. No lesson learned. Seems that the only people who trust British politicians and civil servants are the Brit military ;)
Then to the enemy and from Skeen's Passing It On:
The truth is, you can do a great deal that seems risky, provided you put yourself in the enemy’s place, think as he would, and then don’t do what he expects you to. And when he has been fooled two or three times, play for a change the straight silly game he is accustomed to from us, and his heart will break.
This applies to every act, from the decisions of the higher commanders to the handling of the section by the latest lance-corporal. One of the reasons why the Pathan has been so successful in the past and has such a reputation for cunning is that he has reckoned on our playing the obvious soldier’s game, and has been right. Copy his game, and go one better, and he is done.
To achieve this you need to know your enemy.
OK, so how prepared were the Marines for the current deployment? What percentage arrived with some degree of command of Pashtu? How many hours of training in Pashtun culture and traditions was received by all troops? What training was carried out in (as close as damn it) similar terrain? How much longer range (than usual) shooting training carried out?
I could go on but I believe I have made my point. The Afghan tour remains shoe-horned into a busy schedule where the real soldering gets done... and as a result the regiments pay the price.
Not true. Kenya is not mission specific training, it is generic (routine) training and the live firing rules used in Kenya are exactly the same as those used in the UK. Training in Kenya is pertinent to, but not for, operations in Afghanistan. We trained in Kenya prior to Afghanistan and will train there after Afghanistan.
I stand corrected. So there is really no reason to go to Kenya for a month then. So what is the real reason behind having a Brit battalion in Kenya (almost) all the time? A hedge against a coup there? ;)
As I said earlier if it is OK to take the soldiers away from home for another month in the 'harmony guidelines' cycle then add it to the Afghan tour and allow for a battle camp of a month in Afghanistan to allow for acclimatisation and training on the local terrain of the latest TTPs.
Red Rat
08-02-2011, 05:59 PM
I said 'little attention' and you said 'little understanding' and I did not say 'ignored'.
I stand chastened at attention!;)
Am reading Forbes' The Afghan Wars at the moment and given the Brit military history with Afghanistan there should have been a better appreciation of what can go wrong in such campaigns and what will go wrong if such campaigns are approached in a half hearted manner. Yet the campaign was approach 'on the cheap' and strictly on terms of comfort to the military (i.e. the harmony guidelines) without making any significant changes that would require discomfort of the military having to adapt to the campaign on hand. What was the hackneyed comment of the time about the army not going to take its attention off some future hypothetical war by too narrow a focus on Afghanistan again? Big mistake paid for (as they say) through blood and treasure.
Until late 2008 Iraq remained the UK's Main Effort and Afghanistan was a subsidiary effort.
They were both campaigns on the cheap because they were not the national main effort and they were not wars of national survival; they were both 'small' discretionary wars.
The armed forces however did not go on to a war footing until 2008/09, far too late. There were various reasons for this, institutional and political; none in my opinion good.
I think that the 'hackneyed comment' you refer to is the army's desire to "train for 'a' war, not 'the' war". This is still the case. The army trains generically on the basics and then, 9 months out, trains specifically for Afghanistan.
Remember, my point all along was that the way to ensure operational efficiency was through continuity and that could only be assured through permanent battalions with a trickle replacement policy. It certainly works in terms of terrain. We had poms/yanks trickling in over the years and they were easily absorbed and adapted in remarkably short time to the terrain and vegetation etc etc. I always smiled when after six months a pom would greet a new one and begin to clue him in on the African bush. They learned fast when they were thrown in with a bunch who had been around. I had a young yank who loved it. Said it was like being in the middle of a national geographic movie (when in remote areas) and even better as he got the chance to shoot some 'bad guys' (he returned to the US after the war and ended up as a CSM (in their sense) and is I believe in the Ranger Hall of Fame). But to toss a whole 'virgin' company into the deep end is just plain stupid IMHO.
There are pros and cons for keeping people a long time in theatre and in combat. There are also second and third order organisational issues by adopting such an approach. I do not think that the UK approach was right. My preference was and is for a permanent cadre for formation HQs and enablers (int, sigs, logistics et al) and units rotating in for 9 month tours. Units rotate in on a trickle basis, saving pressure on the training equipment pool and the airbridge. I think if we had put units into AFG on a permanent footing and trickle people in as you suggest the impact would have been:
Recrutiing and retention in the non-deploying army would have collapsed
Training in the non-deploying army would have all but stopped (we had run out of money by 2007, if training could not be linked to deployment it just was not happening)
Forbes quotes General Nott:
These past experiences should have alerted the military to how the shenanigans of the politicians would impact on the soldiers down the line. No lesson learned. Seems that the only people who trust British politicians and civil servants are the Brit military ;)
I do not think that the Brit military trusts the politicians in the sense that you say, but I do think that the relationship between politicians and senior military appears to have been dysfunctional at best.
To achieve this you need to know your enemy.
OK, so how prepared were the Marines for the current deployment? What percentage arrived with some degree of command of Pashtu? How many hours of training in Pashtun culture and traditions was received by all troops? What training was carried out in (as close as damn it) similar terrain? How much longer range (than usual) shooting training carried out?
I could go on but I believe I have made my point. The Afghan tour remains shoe-horned into a busy schedule where the real soldering gets done... and as a result the regiments pay the price.
If my memory serves me right: One in every company will have been on a 12 month language course, one in every platoon on a 3 month language course, one in every section on a 3 week course and everyone will have had some basic language training.
I stand corrected. So there is really no reason to go to Kenya for a month then. So what is the real reason behind having a Brit battalion in Kenya (almost) all the time? A hedge against a coup there? ;)
We get to do training there cheaply, in hot arid conditions, in a foreign culture, practising our expeditionary logistics and we do not have sufficient training areas in the UK to train all the units we have to the level we require them to be trained at. For the troops currently moving back from Germany we are having to try and buy a new manoeuvre training area in the UK to replace those we currently use in Germany. The UK is a small island with an awful lot of people, there is not much area available, that which is cheap is not suitable, that which is suitable is not cheap...:rolleyes:
As I said earlier if it is OK to take the soldiers away from home for another month in the 'harmony guidelines' cycle then add it to the Afghan tour and allow for a battle camp of a month in Afghanistan to allow for acclimatisation and training on the local terrain of the latest TTPs.
Harmony guidelines also incorporate training time spent away. We could quite easily do as you say and stop training in Kenya and conduct that training in Afghanistan (troops do conduct an extensive training package in theatre on arrival), but we are capped on the number of troops we are allowed in theatre and that is a flat cap that is not cognisant of what they are actually doing - so if we bring troops in to train we have to take troops out... It is barking - but that is the way it is!
In short:
The army failed to adapt quickly enough to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The army remains loathe to twist itself entirely out of shape for operations in Afghainstan for some good and some bad reasons.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were limited wars and fought with limited resources and limited political capitol.
The strategic direction of the war was poor.
The Ministry of Defence is not functioning well as either a department of state or as an operational HQ (it is both).
The civil military relationship at the highest level appears not to be functioning well.
davidbfpo
08-02-2011, 08:51 PM
JMA,
You asked:
So what is the real reason behind having a Brit battalion in Kenya (almost) all the time? A hedge against a coup there?
IIRC there is an Anglo-Kenyan defence agreement, dating back to independence, which allows the UK access to Kenyan facilities, but not fixed bases. Google defeated my research to find a reference for a formal treaty; there is this official MoD website entry:http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx
Note the declared training is not all-year and is well explained officially on:http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15686:british-army-trains-for-rapid-response-in-kenya&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105
My recollection is that for many years after Kenyan independence in 1965 there were no permanent UK presence, let alone exercises and I expect relations only changed in 1979-80 when Kenya contributed to Rhodesia's transition to Zimbabwe. The Royal Navy regularly visited Mombasa for a long time.
Responding to a coup is not a rationale for our presence. The British Army engineers did once deploy in Nairobi, when the US Embassy was attacked in 1998, with their heavy lifting equipment, although you will not readily find any newsreel or photos of this - a sign perhaps of Kenyan sensitivity?
JMA,
You asked:
IIRC there is an Anglo-Kenyan defence agreement, dating back to independence, which allows the UK access to Kenyan facilities, but not fixed bases. Google defeated my research to find a reference for a formal treaty; there is this official MoD website entry:http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx
Note the declared training is not all-year and is well explained officially on:http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15686:british-army-trains-for-rapid-response-in-kenya&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105
My recollection is that for many years after Kenyan independence in 1965 there were no permanent UK presence, let alone exercises and I expect relations only changed in 1979-80 when Kenya contributed to Rhodesia's transition to Zimbabwe. The Royal Navy regularly visited Mombasa for a long time.
Responding to a coup is not a rationale for our presence. The British Army engineers did once deploy in Nairobi, when the US Embassy was attacked in 1998, with their heavy lifting equipment, although you will not readily find any newsreel or photos of this - a sign perhaps of Kenyan sensitivity?
I ended my question with a wink as it was tongue in cheek.
Thanks for the explanation. I suppose it is a matter of use it or lose it then (meaning the access for training).
Remind me, if you will, how Kenya endeared herself to the Brits over Rhodesia.
[B]More then a little truth in this less the 'real soldiering' swipe. Harmony guidelines is a complex area based around medical, welfare and organisational issues. They need looked at and I favour 9 month tours with 24 months tour intervals - this will not breach medical guidance.
Reminds me of a quote attributed to Farrar the Para (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Farrar-Hockley): 'The thing about war is it sorts out the professionals from the time servers.' For time servers a war can be a real bother and upset their comfortable routine.
And I would counter by saying that instead of the "Harmony guidelines is a complex area based around medical, welfare and organisational issues." they should be based on straightforward operational requirements.
Some months ago longer tours seemed unlikely but due to the cost cutting (and sadly not driven by operational continuity considerations) they are now but still under the harmony guidelines. Perhaps it is time to revisit the rationale behind these guidelines?
True. I do not favour the personification of war and I think that Coroners' Inquests do as much harm as good; but the law states they are to happen and no politican will change this law. Of course if we buried our servicemen overseas there would not be the same requirement...
Interesting point.
The positive is that these public inquests somehow may serve to shame the MoD/Military into correcting the obvious shortcomings.
Several points to address:
The army was probably never as competent as you think it was. Certainly the history of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns looks very similar to the earlier Afghan Wars, Crimea, Boer, WW1, WW2 and N Ireland campaigns. Armies prepare for one war, fight another and learn - the issue is how quickly they learn.
Big armies don't stand a chance for reform but smaller more focussed armies do. The officers that must be selected for are those that can operate intelligently and intuitively in relative independence of a tight chain of command. Officers who can't operate outside laid down doctrine and TTPs (while acceptable in a general mobilisation) should be selected out.
As the military history of nations goes the Brits are up there with the best... in most cases they won the last battle of each war.
The politicians reflect society
Yes you get what you deserve.
The army reflects society
Not quite. You generally get to be able to have some reasonable employment criteria. Yes I know there are anti-discrimination laws which tend to allow access by all sorts of odd bods but there must be a work around for that, surely?
The ways wars are fought reflect the societies fighting the war
And if it gets any worse for some that the only viable option for some countries will be to use proxies.
Civil servants are not the issue, but the (dysfunctional) chain of command is.
I tend to believe both are equally part of the problem.
The armed forces have been politicised (small 'p'), especially at the higher levels.
That should be relatively easy to address (through the cuts and redundancies). The only problem is that the commander needed to implement that would himself be tainted by virtue of his seniority.
There is an element of 'have your cake and eat it' here... The Army started the AFG and Iraq with an attitude towards risk that was robust - kit was 'sufficient' not necessarily the best. As the casualties mounted and the coroner's inquests were heard the appetite for risk declined significantly. This has lead to the current waddling around like the Michelin Man - a direct result of coroner's reports and families' concerns which are largely (but not exclusively) focused on physical protection. This is also a reflection on political and societal realities in what is for the UK at large, a small and discretionary war.
As we have discussed ad nauseam it is the IED casualties which have been and remain the problem. Can anyone in the MoD or military stand there with his hand on his heart and say that everything possible was done to reduce the IED carnage? And here I am not only talking about countermeasures but also TTPs.
Permission to marry no longer required. The adage of 'subalterns cannot, captains may, majors should and colonels must' still holds true, but it cannot be enforced. Same applies to junior ranks. However I am glad to see that some things never change and that your boys knew the same kind of girls that my boys do! :D
Yes funny that. These kids could be as brave as hell in the tightest situations yet were no match for the guile of these predatory vixens. Sad isn't it.
Infantry soldiers join up because they want to fight - especially at the moment where they know that they all will deploy on operations and get a fight.
They will be disappointed as they will be lucky to get more than six months of fighting in their first four years. I wonder what the response would be if a recruiting drive for four years based in Bagram (with R&R in the UK and a nice combat allowance thrown in). Yes, and if they wanted to stay on thereafter they would have first option of transferring to one of the home regiments.
It is a truism that those units that undertake a challenging voluntary selection course, elite units, tend to attract a higher calibre of soldier and select an on average higher calibre of soldier. However good soldiers join 'crap hat' and 'fish and chip' regiments (I joined my regiment because it was my family and local regiment :p). While there are good and bad soldiers good and bad units are normally made by good and bad leaders and training. The impact of the current cuts and the drawdown in operational tempo is likely to make it harder to recruit and retain personnel.
Is there anyone stupid enough or brave enough (as you please) to call a Jock regiment a crap-hat or fish-and-chip outfit (other than a drunk Aussie in a pub full of Jocks)?
davidbfpo
08-03-2011, 11:21 AM
A month old, RUSI commentary on relations between the UK military and politicians, which starts with:
Recent tensions between British politicians and the military top brass are a symptom of the uncertainty over whose long term vision for British defence policy is the more realistic. Such tensions are not new, demonstrating the inability of policymakers to get to grips with strategy.
Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4E10D753A41ED/
Infanteer
08-04-2011, 03:20 AM
The army failed to adapt quickly enough to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The army remains loathe to twist itself entirely out of shape for operations in Afghainstan for some good and some bad reasons.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were limited wars and fought with limited resources and limited political capitol.
The strategic direction of the war was poor.
The Ministry of Defence is not functioning well as either a department of state or as an operational HQ (it is both).
The civil military relationship at the highest level appears not to be functioning well.
As usual, very astute post Red Rat.
I can't help but think that bullet 4 is the critical pre-summer 2006 point. ISAF in 2005 seemed reduce strategic thinking to the lowest common denominator; was the spread of PRTs under ISAF to take over OEF the means to an end or the end in itself? I know the government will profess the former but it often seems the latter.
Again, I don't know what the intelligence picture was looking like for decision makers in 2005 - were the Canadians, Dutch and British too optimistic in seeing the relatively lukewarm insurgency continue, or were we ignoring the obvious?
Points 1-3 stand as the the critical post-summer 2006 points; once the nations of ISAF realized they were handed a s**t-sandwich from OEF, did they take the right steps? JMA's comment about CBEs is accurate - I always got the impression that the Institutional Army tried to bend the Campaigning Army to its will. Things like making the effort to get computers delivered to remote outposts to have yearly evaluations written (at the start of fighting season, of all times) or the fact that a battalion was losing its best NCOs to French language training during a critical relief in place; I've seen similar anecdotes with the British Army.
Over all, these big hand, small map issues are the ones to look at. I feel that the debates between 6 month vs 9 month tours or more helicopters aren't important in terms of decisive campaign issues, as those tactical matters would make no difference to the fact that you have a Pashtun population who isn't very receptive to Kabul or its foreign friends; those forces of history are hard to fight.
Red Rat
08-04-2011, 07:48 AM
I am reading 'AFGHANTSY' at the moment (Amazon Link (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Afgantsy-Russians-Afghanistan-Rodric-Braithwaite/dp/1846680549/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1312442758&sr=1-1)) and it is amazing the similarities between our experiences and the Soviet...
I think in terms of intelligence picture we went in effectively blind and without an understanding of what we could be getting in to let alone why.
In terms of IEDs I think the British Army was well aware of the IED threat, it was our biggest killer in N Ireland from the 80s onwards and our biggest killer in Iraq. When I first went to Afghanistan (2004) there was much concern then about the proliferation and speed of development of IEDs. I think that across the board the army did adapt very quickly to IEDs, with equipment and TTPs (I feel the 'Snatch' debate (over the use of lightly armoured landrovers) is almost a red herring in that their use was determined by risk. What the debate was about was how much risk was acceptable). In terms of ECM our equipment continued to evolve to keep abreast of the threat, as did our TTPs, (one could argue that current TTPs are driven by the IED threat to the exclusion of other threats now). The same with vehicles - several types of vehicles have entered and left service over the course of the campaign to meet threats, but there will always be a lag between threat and protection, if only because it takes time to develop and then produce protection.
I am not quite sure what 'CBE' stands for (Infanteer) but until 2008 the army was not put on a war footing, and even in 2008 the explicit orders received to put the British Army on a war footing explicitly excluded many personnel factors - leading to many of the factors that JMA (quite rightly) rails against.
I stand chastened at attention!;)
I owe you one, you owe me one, will you be available late September?
Until late 2008 Iraq remained the UK's Main Effort and Afghanistan was a subsidiary effort. They were both campaigns on the cheap because they were not the national main effort and they were not wars of national survival; they were both 'small' discretionary wars. The armed forces however did not go on to a war footing until 2008/09, far too late. There were various reasons for this, institutional and political; none in my opinion good.
Surely any war (in which you get to bury your soldiers) should be taken seriously? One does not expect a general mobilisation and also not quite as much effort as the Falklands but certainly a serious adjustment to the routine between tours. So what I am saying that even a small war needs to be taken seriously and properly resourced as it is only the scale and the troops and assets required that varies.
I think that the 'hackneyed comment' you refer to is the army's desire to "train for 'a' war, not 'the' war". This is still the case. The army trains generically on the basics and then, 9 months out, trains specifically for Afghanistan.
Well if you have a current war on at least do that one justice as failure to do so will result in national humiliation on the battlefield with attendant loss of life. That is unforgivable.
Look I hate to tell you this but if what was shown on the BBC 'Our War' series represents the result of nine months specific Afghanistan focussed training then one must despair.
There are pros and cons for keeping people a long time in theatre and in combat.
The cons seem to be relating to marital strain and increased potential for PSTD.
As to PTSD (as diagnosed by the Brits) its not really a major issue among regular troops (and even less so among the better units). And really it is the incidence of acute PTSD that one should be mainly concerned with (rather than the level of PTSD a civie involved in a nasty motor accident would get).
There are also second and third order organisational issues by adopting such an approach. I do not think that the UK approach was right.
Yes I'm sure the MoD and Army HQ would be able to come up with any number of reasons why Afghanistan should not receive close attention that may mean (heaven forbid) adapting and interfering with the peacetime routine. Certainly the approach was not right but the question is whether anyone has learned from it.
My preference was and is for a permanent cadre for formation HQs and enablers (int, sigs, logistics et al) and units rotating in for 9 month tours. Units rotate in on a trickle basis, saving pressure on the training equipment pool and the airbridge. I think if we had put units into AFG on a permanent footing and trickle people in as you suggest the impact would have been:
Recrutiing and retention in the non-deploying army would have collapsed
Training in the non-deploying army would have all but stopped (we had run out of money by 2007, if training could not be linked to deployment it just was not happening)
Not sure exchanging one of the seven battalions every month is a trickle (maybe for the yanks it would be given their force level).
I agree that any continuity is better than none but continuity at company and platoon levels is just as important given the area bound pop-centric approach in Afghanistan.
Clearly I don't know what the financial constraints were/are but my point remains simply that (for better or worse) there is a war in Afghanistan and the Brits should at least give it their best shot.
I do not think that the Brit military trusts the politicians in the sense that you say, but I do think that the relationship between politicians and senior military appears to have been dysfunctional at best.
...and the relationship between the civil servants (in the MoD and Foreign Office) and the general staff?
If my memory serves me right: One in every company will have been on a 12 month language course, one in every platoon on a 3 month language course, one in every section on a 3 week course and everyone will have had some basic language training.
Not really good enough is it. Do you still have an Education Corps? If they were to attach a team of Pashtu speakers (probably on contract) to a battalion for the two years between tours perhaps there would be some progress in language and cultural studies. And since there is no money for training there will be plenty of time for language classes ;)
We get to do training there cheaply, in hot arid conditions, in a foreign culture, practising our expeditionary logistics and we do not have sufficient training areas in the UK to train all the units we have to the level we require them to be trained at. For the troops currently moving back from Germany we are having to try and buy a new manoeuvre training area in the UK to replace those we currently use in Germany. The UK is a small island with an awful lot of people, there is not much area available, that which is cheap is not suitable, that which is suitable is not cheap...:rolleyes:
Add that Kenya month on the front end of a tour and do a battle camp in Afghanistan. Let the non-deploying units use Kenya. My point is simple, a month of training and acclimatisation in Afghanistan at the start of the tour has more value than a month in Kenya a few months before.
Harmony guidelines also incorporate training time spent away. We could quite easily do as you say and stop training in Kenya and conduct that training in Afghanistan (troops do conduct an extensive training package in theatre on arrival), but we are capped on the number of troops we are allowed in theatre and that is a flat cap that is not cognisant of what they are actually doing - so if we bring troops in to train we have to take troops out... It is barking - but that is the way it is!
I would have thought that it would be easy to change given the advantages and benefits. If not look towards a tame Pashtun area in Pakistan ;)
In short:
The army failed to adapt quickly enough to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The army remains loathe to twist itself entirely out of shape for operations in Afghainstan for some good and some bad reasons.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were limited wars and fought with limited resources and limited political capitol.
The strategic direction of the war was poor.
The Ministry of Defence is not functioning well as either a department of state or as an operational HQ (it is both).
The civil military relationship at the highest level appears not to be functioning well.
Yes to all with the question what is being done about it.
As to the Grand Strategy (which I presume is a united Afghanistan under a central government in Kabul) I am not sure it is achievable without a fair amount of autonomy for certain areas.
If the Grand Strategy is not achievable then really all else does not matter. But the soldiers instead of just going through the motions should at least give it their best shot with the best resources being made available.
I am not quite sure what 'CBE' stands for (Infanteer) ...
I mentioned that the brigade commanders were motivated to earn a CBE rather than a mere DSO and as such needed to do something spectacular during their tour.
davidbfpo
08-04-2011, 09:30 AM
I am reading 'AFGHANTSY' at the moment (Amazon Link (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Afgantsy-Russians-Afghanistan-Rodric-Braithwaite/dp/1846680549/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1312442758&sr=1-1)) and it is amazing the similarities between our experiences and the Soviet...
There are two links to excerpts from 'Afghantsy' on the Soviets in Afg. thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9483
Red Rat
08-04-2011, 10:31 AM
I owe you one, you owe me one, will you be available late September?
Unlikely :( Work going through a certain degree of turbulence at the moment...
Surely any war (in which you get to bury your soldiers) should be taken seriously? One does not expect a general mobilisation and also not quite as much effort as the Falklands but certainly a serious adjustment to the routine between tours. So what I am saying that even a small war needs to be taken seriously and properly resourced as it is only the scale and the troops and assets required that varies. Quite right, and the Army and the MOD failed to make the necessary and sufficient adjustments in time.
Look I hate to tell you this but if what was shown on the BBC 'Our War' series represents the result of nine months specific Afghanistan focussed training then one must despair. If you are referring to a certain 'fish and chip mob' from eastern England then yes, that was very embarrassing...:o
The cons seem to be relating to marital strain and increased potential for PSTD.
I suspect that the cons are more the fact that if we went to the system that you propose we would be able downsize the army considerably more then the generals wish.
Yes I'm sure the MoD and Army HQ would be able to come up with any number of reasons why Afghanistan should not receive close attention that may mean (heaven forbid) adapting and interfering with the peacetime routine. Certainly the approach was not right but the question is whether anyone has learned from it. Hard to say. Most of the scrutiny is coming from external sources; I have heard of very little internal (MOD) scrutiny as to what we did and why. I suspect that individuals have learnt (indeed I have heard very senior figures elucidate what went wrong and why and express an intention to fix it), but the organisation has not. Certainly I have yet to hear of any evidence of significant change in the decision making machanisms that caused the less then optimal performance...
Clearly I don't know what the financial constraints were/are but my point remains simply that (for better or worse) there is a war in Afghanistan and the Brits should at least give it their best shot. You would think so wouldn't you... I think the House of Commons Defence Committee report is clear that there was a significant breakdown in what the tactical commanders were saying and what the operational and stratageic level HQs were telling politicians. This may have lead to the Government thinking that it was resourcing effectively....
Not really good enough is it. Do you still have an Education Corps? If they were to attach a team of Pashtu speakers (probably on contract) to a battalion for the two years between tours perhaps there would be some progress in language and cultural studies. And since there is no money for training there will be plenty of time for language classes ;) Still have the Education Corps! Every soldier deploying on the front appears to know some 20-30 Pashtu phrases which seems to cover them for day to day interaction with the locals. As ever we can throw more resources at the problem, but there is a finite pot of resources. Pashtu teachers are expensive to hire and we found very few willing to relocate to Germany (for instance) to train our people. Plus soldiers are busy so we are fitting more stuff into a crowded programme or we will have the assets sitting idle. I am not saying that it cannot be done, but the cost/gains benefit might not be great.
I would have thought that it would be easy to change given the advantages and benefits. If not look towards a tame Pashtun area in Pakistan ;) Yes, but tame areas tend to turn not so tame with the addition of foreign troops!
As to the Grand Strategy (which I presume is a united Afghanistan under a central government in Kabul) I am not sure it is achievable without a fair amount of autonomy for certain areas. What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...
I am reading 'AFGHANTSY' at the moment (Amazon Link (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Afgantsy-Russians-Afghanistan-Rodric-Braithwaite/dp/1846680549/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1312442758&sr=1-1)) and it is amazing the similarities between our experiences and the Soviet...
I also found The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Great-Gamble-Soviet-War-Afghanistan/dp/0061143197/ref=cm_cr_pr_sims_t) to be a good read. (Available on Kindle)
Grau et al's The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Soviet-Afghan-War-Superpower-Fought-Studies/dp/070061186X/ref=cm_cr_pr_pb_t) from the Soviet angle is one I will pick up there next month.
I wonder how many officers who have served in Afghanistan have studied (not just read) Grau's other books? And if he is still with us how many times has he been invited to talk to the officers and men during their preparations to deploy?
Maybe a few.
So his next book will be "The US in Afghanistan: How another Superpower Fought and Lost."
davidbfpo
08-07-2011, 10:54 AM
Moderator's Note
Many of the recent posts do not sit well in this thread, The UK in Afghanistan, so I will be moving them to the more general, current thread Winning in Afghanistan:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7128&page=44
I will add a caption to that thread and any posts moved. Work in progress today. Meantime carry on.
Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1312178815&sr=1-1)
While sure to be a painful read I will buy this and read it.
Book available on Kindle.
A Frank Ledwidge article of some value:
Frank Ledwidge on changing fashions of Counterinsurgency (http://www.yougov.polis.cam.ac.uk/frank-ledwidge-changing-fashions-counterinsurgency)
davidbfpo
08-20-2011, 07:37 PM
I have read the Ledwidge article, it has valid points, but as is my way the final sentences jar. Nor is citing Martin van Creveld entirely appropriate, as SWC have discussed before.
The last sentences being:
One hopes that the words of the eminent Israeli historian Martin van Crefeld are then recalled: ‘The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value’. I am not sure whether the remaining 1 percent is worth reading either.
Anyone know of a military institution that has dispensed with 99% of the literature it uses? I fear the author will remain at Cambridge University awhile yet.
I have read the Ledwidge article, it has valid points, but as is my way the final sentences jar. Nor is citing Martin van Creveld entirely appropriate, as SWC have discussed before.
I am not sure where you are coming from here? I searched SWC and only found his contribution on Airpower.
I know relatively little about this man but even if he is a heretic in the eyes of some of the honoured and trusted around here we should not be shunning a person espousing a dissenting view, should we?
Anyone know of a military institution that has dispensed with 99% of the literature it uses? I fear the author will remain at Cambridge University awhile yet.
That said I would not support a book burning session (even) of a failed doctrine either. These (counterinsurgency) books need to be retained for the study by future generations of how badly the US and Brit militaries got it all wrong (as a sort of lessons learned).
davidbfpo
08-21-2011, 12:43 PM
I am not sure where you are coming from here? I searched SWC and only found his contribution on Airpower.
I know relatively little about this man but even if he is a heretic in the eyes of some of the honoured and trusted around here we should not be shunning a person espousing a dissenting view, should we?
That said I would not support a book burning session (even) of a failed doctrine either. These (counterinsurgency) books need to be retained for the study by future generations of how badly the US and Brit militaries got it all wrong (as a sort of lessons learned).
JMA and others,
My apologies it was a bad post. First I confused:eek: Martin van Creveld, who is a well known author with one SWC citation, to Edward Luttwak, who has appeared more often here.
Second, that prejudiced my post.;)
Back to the citation by Martin van Creveld, with a fresh look:
The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value.
I really do doubt that much of the counter literature is written by the losing side; only if you look hard enough can books by the guerilla or terrorist be found - whether loser or winner in their contest. To throw away 99% of the literature strikes me as a very odd recommendation. So I stick to my comment Frank Ledwidge's viewpoint will remain a jarring voice of dissent.
PS. Wiki on van Creveld:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_van_Creveld and Luttwak appears in thirty-four threads, including one where his is the subject.
Infanteer
08-21-2011, 04:38 PM
That was an excellent article, thanks for posting it.
I found myself agreeing with the author taking Nagl to task for ignoring the obvious differences between Malaya and Vietnam in his flawed "Soup with a Knife".
The focus on population control, all but absent from FM 3-24, is crucial as well; nobody wants to talk about its effectiveness to keep modern COIN theory politically correct.
davidbfpo
09-01-2011, 06:38 PM
Thanks to accidental open government, a Cabinet member having an official document on display leaving No. 10 Downing Street:
..revealed that the British government was not unduly concerned about President Karzai leaving office in 2014.
However, less coverage was given to another point in the document's final paragraph, which reveals that there is substance to rumours that a second Afghan bank - after Kabul Bank - may be facing financial problems. This probably refers to Azizi Bank, the country's second largest financial institution, which is thought to face a shortfall of funds and for which the IMF has demanded an audit.
Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/08/ministers-gaffe-reveals-imf-audit-of.html
Personally I wondered :eek: reading this:
Afghan perceptions of violence are very important for their confidence in their future and for their readiness to work for the Afghan government. Have we got the strategic communications on levels of violence right?
How long have we been there now? Since 2002 and in a big way since 2006. So in August 2011 that question is being asked is not a confidence-building step.
A review by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles who was Britain's ambassador to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009. His memoir "Cables from Kabul" is published by HarperPress.
A decade of misadventure in Afghanistan. - Blood and treasure (http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2011/08/afghanistan-iraq-british)
It starts with:
Lieutenant Commander Frank Ledwidge, RNR (retired), has written one of the most upsetting books I have read about Britain's part in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Anyone who wants to understand what happened should read it. Yet this extended, occasionally emotional indictment of the British army should be approached with steady nerves - and taken with the occasional pinch of salt.
And ends with:
Afghanistan is great blood and treasure - getting on for £6bn a year for Britain alone. Sooner or later the account must be settled. Ledwidge's well-aimed missiles hit the secondary targets - the foot soldiers in this Afghan march of folly - but not the political high command. It is to the latter that the invoice for a decade of expeditionary excess should properly be addressed.
jmm99
09-10-2011, 06:02 PM
The last three paragraphs (http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2011/08/afghanistan-iraq-british) apply to both sides of the Atlantic - tenfold in the case of US politicians and policymakers, especially those who believe that "Little Americas" are possible:
On both sides of the Atlantic, every politician of any calibre now knows - as the press and the public know - that the military campaign in Afghanistan is going nowhere, and can go nowhere unless it is integrated into a clear political strategy. Unfortunately, that strategy is still missing in inaction, yet that doesn't stop western politicians from popping up in Kabul or Kandahar to mouth the same old platitudes about progress being made, though the challenges remain. They still subscribe to the big lie that the Afghans will be ready to secure and govern their country to a timetable dictated neither by conditions on the ground nor by progress towards a Afghan settlement, but by the unforgiving calendar of western elections.
That is why I conclude that Ledwidge's book may be telling the truth, but not the whole truth, about why we are losing these wars. It is unfair to blame soldiers for being soldiers. In a democracy, those responsible for such mistakes are the political leaders and their advisers, who decide to do not what they know to be right in Afghanistan, but what they believe to be expedient; leaders who have too often chosen to go along with military advice that they know to be overoptimistic and self-serving.
Afghanistan is great blood and treasure - getting on for £6bn a year for Britain alone. Sooner or later the account must be settled. Ledwidge's well-aimed missiles hit the secondary targets - the foot soldiers in this Afghan march of folly - but not the political high command. It is to the latter that the invoice for a decade of expeditionary excess should properly be addressed.
I will not hold my breath waiting for that butcher's bill to be sent.
Regards
Mike
The last three paragraphs (http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2011/08/afghanistan-iraq-british) apply to both sides of the Atlantic - tenfold in the case of US politicians and policymakers, especially those who believe that "Little Americas" are possible:
I will not hold my breath waiting for that butcher's bill to be sent.
Regards
Mike
Yes the politicians on both sides have a lot to answer for... but then so have the generals.
The Brit Chilcot Inquiry (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/) seems to have exposed 'problems' in the upper echelons of the military as well. We await the release of the findings.
Having spent a delightful day yesterday (Sunday) with an friend (ex-Rhodesian Lt Col, now retired and Boer War enthusiast) and a visiting serving US officer at the site of the Battle of Spionkop (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Spion_Kop) I was shocked at the ineptitude of the British generals of that battle (Buller and Warren). The defeat of the British was severe when after losses of 322 killed or died of wounds, 563 wounded (almost as bad as the 5-year losses in Afghanistan as of a year ago but here over two days) and 300 missing/captured and ended with a general British withdrawal back across the Tugela river.
Also stopped at the site where the young Winston Churchill was captured when the armed train on which he was travelling was ambused by the Boers.
As always there was a spark of life in the officers at battalion level (in this case the Earl of Dundonald and his mounted troops amongst others) but where the strategy is a cock-up no amount of bravery and bold action can save the day (and as usual there were a number of young officers who 'died well' leading their troops in a futile battle).
This is so like the Afghanistan one reads about in books like 'Dead Men Risen' (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Dead-Men-Risen-Britains-Afghanistan/dp/1849164215/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1315804009&sr=8-1)and is so terribly sad for the Brit soldier who has proven time and again that given the right leadership in battle they are a formidable fighting force.
But how to save them from their politicians and their general staff?
excadet
09-12-2011, 11:39 AM
We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.
We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.
I hope you have been able to steel yourself and read: Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan - Frank Ledwidge (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1315980500&sr=1-1).
The question is where the problem lies. Currently we will wait to see what Chilcott finds but can be reasonably sure that it all starts to unravel above half-colonel (as at Spionkop and the Boer war in general).
Some time ago I put my finger on what I believe to be a contributing factor in this problem and that being non military postings of officers to the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Military Attachés) and such - where they forget that their role is to close with and destroy the enemy (or at least those under their command should) and become seduced by the 'soft' world of politics and diplomacy (where everything is negotiable). Of course at the time I was told I was talking nonsense but with the passing of time we shall see...
Yes I understand the first response is to want to string up those generals who have failed the British people (and of course they should be) but really one needs to go to the causes and not the symptoms.
I guess the question is how and by whom this can be done.
Slight off sub-topic here. Last night BBC1 showed a nice little docu entitled "Bomb Squad", title says it all. It gave an interesting insight to this side of the Afghan conflict. Showing what they could of CIED methods. Well worth a watch, not much point in my passing on a link as those of you outside the UK won't be able to watch it. It will no doubt turn up in a torrent or on LiveLeaks.
Well I think the most interesthing thing about small wars or insurgencies in the last decade is that there had been a great deal of soul searching. People, academics, militaries have set out to find a catch all way of winning them. Now while it isn't this simple, they have tried to find a strategy that is broad enough that given any situation those on the ground can fill in the blanks. The problem is though that militaries don't seem to follow their own manuals. We could get bogged down in picking apart how COIN in Afghanistan compares to FM 3.24. My point is either the situation on the ground doesn't fit or that those on the ground seem to think that they can do better. COIN is supposed to be 80-90% civilian in nature after all, yet looking at Afghanistan it seems the reverse of this. Now for one we know that development without security is difficult at best, working in tandem and where possible seems to make the most sence. Robuts SSR is much needed, looking more the judiciary though keeping a keen eye on the ANSF. So after a great wall of text we can some up the last 10 years in three words, one of those an expletive...
We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.
Spion Kop (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Spion_Kop) followed about a month after Black Week (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Week)
In one disastrous week, dubbed Black Week, from 10-17 December 1899, the British Army suffered three devastating defeats by the Boer Republics at the battles of Stormberg (690), Magersfontein (948) and Colenso (1,138), with 2,776 men killed, wounded and captured. The events were an eye opener for the government and troops, who had thought that the war could be won very easily.
These events really focused the minds of the Brits and Lord Roberts was brought in to replace Buller.
Note: Roberts' son Freddy was killed in the Battle of Colenso and posthumously awarded the VC, making it a rare occurrence where both father and son were awarded the VC.
But once again (virtually) no lessons were learned from the First Boer War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Boer_War)1880-81. Again in this war it was generalship which let the Brits down, in this case Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley.
Afghanistan indicates that the problem lies in the same area.
This is where (I humbly submit) it continues to be the problem with the Brit military to this day. Somewhere the selection process of those officers advancing beyond Lt Col seems to be a major problem.
Well I think the most interesthing thing about small wars or insurgencies in the last decade is that there had been a great deal of soul searching. People, academics, militaries have set out to find a catch all way of winning them. Now while it isn't this simple, they have tried to find a strategy that is broad enough that given any situation those on the ground can fill in the blanks. The problem is though that militaries don't seem to follow their own manuals. We could get bogged down in picking apart how COIN in Afghanistan compares to FM 3.24. My point is either the situation on the ground doesn't fit or that those on the ground seem to think that they can do better. COIN is supposed to be 80-90% civilian in nature after all, yet looking at Afghanistan it seems the reverse of this. Now for one we know that development without security is difficult at best, working in tandem and where possible seems to make the most sence. Robuts SSR is much needed, looking more the judiciary though keeping a keen eye on the ANSF. So after a great wall of text we can some up the last 10 years in three words, one of those an expletive...
There is no catch-all way of fighting and winning insurgencies (small wars which are not insurgencies are generally straight forward unless the politicians get involved and screw it all up).
The search for a COIN 'prophet' is futile.
Read widely and learn from as many sources as can be assimilated and use intellect to apply the right lesson of history to the current situation that manifests itself.
This is what the conventional types can't stand about TE Lawrence and that is that all he had was a classical education and a sharp intellect but no formal military indoctrination... I mean training.
There is no little book (like Mao's little red one) containing the' truth' that can be clutched to ones breast like the holy-grail of COIN. This why FM 3.24 has been so counterproductive in real terms.
Study, commitment and hard work is what is required... and not short in-and-out tours with ever changing command.
The other problem area is the confusion with regards to the political/military mix. There is a real problem that because someone came up with the 80:20 ratio that some have come to believe that this works also for all military interventions as well. Political action by politicians (on both sides) are of course the aspects which start insurgencies, make sure they continue and ultimately end the wars. But that does have little effect upon the soldiering requirements down at section/platoon/company level where military action is required to prevent a military solution being imposed by the insurgents.
A must read for the confused is: Killing Your Way to Control - William F. Owen (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/BAR%20151%20Killing%20your%20way%20to%20control%28 2%29.pdf).
davidbfpo
09-25-2011, 12:45 PM
Based on a NATO post-incident report and headlined:
Commanders ignored warnings that British troops were at risk from attack by Afghan allies
British troops face such danger from their allies in the Afghan army and police force that they should carry a loaded pistol whenever they are working alongside them, a secret Nato report has warned.
The report, ordered after a rogue Afghan policeman shot dead five British servicemen, recommended that British troops should be armed with 9mm pistols at all times - even when sleeping - because of the high risk of being attacked.
It also called for British soldiers to have separate sleeping and living quarters from Afghan troops, and for all British "administrative areas" to be covered by armed sentries, such were the fears of further incidents.
(My emphasis)But the rulings were never implemented amid fears they would lead to a breakdown in trust between members of the Afghan security forces and the British troops who train them and fight alongside them.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8786746/Commanders-ignored-warnings-that-British-troops-were-at-risk-from-attack-by-Afghan-allies.html
Sad, well at least a few commanders issued different orders.
Red Rat
09-26-2011, 02:08 PM
This is where (I humbly submit) it continues to be the problem with the Brit military to this day. Somewhere the selection process of those officers advancing beyond Lt Col seems to be a major problem.
That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.
To be a general means that you are a successful soldier, it does not necessarily mean that you are a good soldier. Plus you may be a successful and good soldier in previous conflicts - but not this one. So every conflict should see a winnowing of General Officer ranks as those who are no good are extracted and suitable talent brought in.
The current problem with the British General Officer Class is that not only does The Peter Principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Principle) apply, but the confused chain of command and short tours means that we cannot even readily identify (and thereby sack) those who have reached their level of incompetence.
Ken White
09-26-2011, 02:34 PM
That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.One could say that larger insures greater.
Ve haf effidence... :wry:
Red Rat
09-26-2011, 03:12 PM
I can see why most coups are initiated by junior officers up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel... :D
That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.
Yes... but that does not depreciate the very real problem the Brit army continues to face.
To be a general means that you are a successful soldier, it does not necessarily mean that you are a good soldier. Plus you may be a successful and good soldier in previous conflicts - but not this one. So every conflict should see a winnowing of General Officer ranks as those who are no good are extracted and suitable talent brought in.
The other thing of course is that in peacetime a different type of officer seems to advance faster up the promotion ladder. This of course becomes a problem when war breaks out.
The current problem with the British General Officer Class is that not only does The Peter Principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Principle) apply, but the confused chain of command and short tours means that we cannot even readily identify (and thereby sack) those who have reached their level of incompetence.
The trick is then to identify the when an individual reaches his highest level of competence rather than let The Peter Principle kick in. Any ideas on how to achieve this?
davidbfpo
10-03-2011, 10:04 PM
Ken White has posted an important paper on the UK & COIN elsewhere:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14285
Today there was an interesting radio discussion on Afghanistan and SIS (MI6), with Rory Stewart, Frank Ledwidge and Gordon Corera, which is available on a podcast, hopefully without problems of access!
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/people/presenters/andrew-marr/
davidbfpo
10-06-2011, 12:34 PM
Thanks to Circling The Lion's Den for pointing at a House of Commons Library report on 'The cost of international military operations':http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03139
The outturn cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan totalled £21.6bn between 2002/03 and 2010/11. The Government has estimated the costs of maintaining operations in Libya for six months to be £260m.
From Circling's comment:
Total costs for the current financial year are likely to be £4.0 billion.
The report also provides details of the increase in troop numbers since June 2002 when there were only 400 UK troops in Afghanistan. Those seem like faraway days. Since April this year there have been around 9,500 military personnel deployed in Afghanistan, the highest figure ever in the present campaign.
davidbfpo
10-08-2011, 11:21 AM
A broad brush article by the BBC Defence Correspondent, which starts with:
The Armed Forces' reputation has paradoxically both suffered and been enhanced by its decade of experience in Afghanistan.
Ens with:
The Armed Forces' reputation has paradoxically both suffered and been enhanced by its decade of experience in Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/15212871
From the BBC we get Upper Gereshk: The Helmand plan meets tough reality - John Cantlie (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14897977) and this quoted from a US Marine:
"Every time we leave the wire we get shot at or find an IED, either with our engineers or by treading on it. The Taliban have freedom of movement and we can't engage until they've engaged us first. Sometimes it's hard to see what we're supposed to accomplish out here."
We have had a go at the politicians and the generals yet nothing has changed on the ground. I guess it is now time to start firing battalion level officers. I said some time ago (to much derision) that there should be seats reserved on every flight out of Afghanistan for all officers and men who prove to be incapable and unfit to fight (with the aim of closing with and killing the enemy). Its not too late.
Can they not see this so-called stalemate is turning into a military defeat?
Ken White
10-09-2011, 03:26 AM
Can they not see this so-called stalemate is turning into a military defeat?The only question was the magnitude, small or smaller. It will change little in the world.
Both nations foolishly rushed into playing in a game they did not understand on turf they did not know and got their a$& handed to them -- easily predictable. It wasn't a foregone conclusion but a number of factors, many political, trended to assure it was the most likely outcome.
More aggressive tactics would have made little difference and more troops also would've been inconsequential. Both probably would really have done more harm than good. Everyone wants to imitate Malaya. Can't, totally different conditions elsewhere and in other such affrays.
No third party nation is going to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency in this era, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome and history shows that as time passes -- and the insurgent is constantly stalling for time -- that acceptability is defined down.
Most Commanders realize that and while it's easy to sit in comfort thousands of miles away and second guess them, all of them want to avoid as many losses as possible in view of the fact they have been told by their political masters there will be no 'win.' Under the circumstances, I submit you would react pretty much the same way, I know I would. Announcement of drawdowns is prima facie 'we're quitting.' The opponents know that, the troops know that and their Commanders know that.
Out of order:
We have had a go at the politicians and the generals yet nothing has changed on the ground.What do you mean "we've had a go..." If you mean anything written here, that's laughable. If you mean both nations have new senior leaders, that's true but irrelevant -- the Bureaucracies that actually drive what happens on the ground have not changed. The new governments are in thrall to those bureaucracies, like it or not. Those bureaucracies are toting up costs and benefits and have told their govenrments its time to pull the plug.
I guess it is now time to start firing battalion level officers. I said some time ago (to much derision) that there should be seats reserved on every flight out of Afghanistan for all officers and men who prove to be incapable and unfit to fight (with the aim of closing with and killing the enemy). Its not too late.That 'idea' attracted derision because it is patently unworkable in either the UK or US today. While it has military merit, it is politically totally impossible.
Plus, while there is no doubt that's merited for a few, you would in far too many cases penalize folks who did their best with a really bad hand dealt by echelons above reality -- those bureaucracies again. Your ire is merited, it is wrongly focused.
The only question was the magnitude, small or smaller. It will change little in the world.
It's bad for the US and other NATO countries to lose even the smallest wars. Look at the Lebanon and Somalia for example. When the US likes it or not both or seen as victories against the US. In changes little in real terms but it changes a lot in terms of the perception of the US and its power.
Both nations foolishly rushed into playing in a game they did not understand on turf they did not know and got their a$& handed to them -- easily predictable. It wasn't a foregone conclusion but a number of factors, many political, trended to assure it was the most likely outcome.
I guess the politicians called the generals in and said this is what we want to do. The generals must must have agreed. The failures must be laid as much at the door of the generals and the rest of the army as at the door of the politicians. The obvious failure to study the enemy and the terrain ( both human and geographical) is clearly a military failure and add to that the lack of continuity through short tours and you get a class one cock-up of the military's making.
Of course the politicians should never have got into a shooting war in Afghanistan ( for the reasons I have mentioned above) but they did and in the best traditions of the military they needed to make the best of it. I don't see any evidence that they have in fact quite the opposite which is very very sad. This cock-up has been going on for years now and as such the military has become complicit.
More aggressive tactics would have made little difference and more troops also would've been inconsequential. Both probably would really have done more harm than good. Everyone wants to imitate Malaya. Can't, totally different conditions elsewhere and in other such affrays.
In Helmand more troops seem to have made a difference. The question is what tasks were required to be carried out? Certainly in Helmand all the Brits had were army units of the fighting type. The local police and army were conspicuous by their absence and there were no Brit or NATO Civil Action troops to step in once the Taliban had been cleared from an area. You found the bizarre situation where the best but troops after a short sharp clearing operation were left to defend ground like a militia. It made no military sense.
What you could certainly take from Malaya is the appointment of a 'supremo' who is in total command. How the command structure works in Afghanistan is likely to be hilarious... Which is why it probably doesn't work.
No third party nation is going to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency in this era, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome and history shows that as time passes -- and the insurgent is constantly stalling for time -- that acceptability is defined down.
You are correct only if you mean the way the US prosecutes counterinsurgencies. Sri Lanka has just put an insurgency to bed (admittedly) using means not acceptable to any of the NATO powers. Brutality will work but is not on the list of options for NATO. There are other such examples and one needs to keep an eye on what the Russians and the Chinese are doing in their own backyards.
Most Commanders realize that and while it's easy to sit in comfort thousands of miles away and second guess them, all of them want to avoid as many losses as possible in view of the fact they have been told by their political masters there will be no 'win.' Under the circumstances, I submit you would react pretty much the same way, I know I would. Announcement of drawdowns is prima facie 'we're quitting.' The opponents know that, the troops know that and their Commanders know that.
Ah... We are back to the armchair general defence. Commanders must be made aware that they are accountable for their actions and sadly simply viewing much of the video material available it is an indictment. Blind loyalty to poor soldering (or worse) does not help in any way whatsoever. We are five years down the line (since 2006) since the proper war began and it seems that the command and control issues are still unresolved. So who is to blame for this? Yes it was insane to lead the world (and the Taliban) know that they just have to wait another 18 months then all they will have to deal with is the pathetic ANA.
Out of order:What do you mean "we've had a go..." If you mean anything written here, that's laughable.
Sorry, bad choice of words. By 'we' I mean those who years ago saw the futility of the intervention and it's ineffective implementation (or worse) and said so. You were not one so sorry to drag you in where you don't belong. ;)
If you mean both nations have new senior leaders, that's true but irrelevant -- the Bureaucracies that actually drive what happens on the ground have not changed. The new governments are in thrall to those bureaucracies, like it or not. Those bureaucracies are toting up costs and benefits and have told their govenrments its time to pull the plug. That 'idea' attracted derision because it is patently unworkable in either the UK or US today. While it has military merit, it is politically totally impossible.
As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you?
Plus, while there is no doubt that's merited for a few, you would in far too many cases penalize folks who did their best with a really bad hand dealt by echelons above reality -- those bureaucracies again. Your ire is merited, it is wrongly focused.
Well when I talk about firing I mean the right people in other words those who screw up, be they officers, NCOs or troopies. There has to be some process to ensure that only the failures get sent home and not some fall-guy. I'm just a little worried that with the focus on the politicians and generals people who screw up at the lower levels will get away with it. My experience was that we tended to wait too long to act in this regard. Better to move them on and if the Army wants to give them a second chance somewhere else then it's good and well but to keep them on in the unit is asking for trouble.
It's interesting when you speak to the Brits and ask them how they dealt with IEDs in Northern Ireland and they will tell you that they used helicopters extensively. Then and when you ask them what about Helmand the long stories start to come out. Sad really sad.
Ken White
10-09-2011, 04:04 PM
What you could certainly take from Malaya is the appointment of a 'supremo' who is in total command. How the command structure works in Afghanistan is likely to be hilarious... Which is why it probably doesn't work.Hard to do when you are not THE government as the British were in Malaya; even harder if a coalition of other nations is involved.
You are correct only if you mean the way the US prosecutes counterinsurgencies. Sri Lanka has just put an insurgency to bed (admittedly) using means not acceptable to any of the NATO powers. Brutality will work but is not on the list of options for NATO. There are other such examples and one needs to keep an eye on what the Russians and the Chinese are doing in their own backyards.You just answered your own complaint; what is easily militarily possible is precluded politically.
Ah... We are back to the armchair general defence. Commanders must be made aware that they are accountable for their actions and sadly simply viewing much of the video material available it is an indictment. Blind loyalty to poor soldering (or worse)...Don't be snide, it aids nothing. You are as aware of political realities as am I or anyone else -- wishing them away doesn't change facts and you know it.
As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you?Nope, not a clue -- but I can't help comparing your tone in this post to the far more realistic effort here (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=126651&postcount=1022). :D
...Better to move them on and if the Army wants to give them a second chance somewhere else then it's good and well but to keep them on in the unit is asking for trouble.I agree, most politician in democratic nations will not -- they're into 'fairness' and 'sunk costs.' War isn't fair or cheap but there we are... :rolleyes:
Red Rat
10-10-2011, 10:28 AM
In Helmand more troops seem to have made a difference. The question is what tasks were required to be carried out? Certainly in Helmand all the Brits had were army units of the fighting type. The local police and army were conspicuous by their absence and there were no Brit or NATO Civil Action troops to step in once the Taliban had been cleared from an area. You found the bizarre situation where the best but troops after a short sharp clearing operation were left to defend ground like a militia. It made no military sense. You have to provide a basic element of security before you can start to deal with civil issues. At the beginning of the AFG campaign the issue was more that we could not provide that basic level of security; not the lack of specialist troops. The early years of the AFG campaign saw pretty stiff levels of close combat fighting so I see no problem with using fighting troops then. Now fighting has dropped off considerably and we are using more militia forces for garrison work.
As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you? Casualty levels are down both proportionately and overall (despite the increase in the number of troops). Like for like statistics, this year from last, show that the tempo of fighting has dropped in Helmand. this summer's fighting season in Helmand was considerably calmer then last year's.
It's interesting when you speak to the Brits and ask them how they dealt with IEDs in Northern Ireland and they will tell you that they used helicopters extensively. Then and when you ask them what about Helmand the long stories start to come out. Sad really sad. But we never had enough helicopters in NI to do everything that we wanted, we sufficed. And we also used armoured vehicles extensively (the Humber 'Pig', Snatch and APV). There were other techniques in common use that are not necessarily applicable to Afghanistan in use, ie: extensive use of covert vehicles by all troops was the norm (except in South Armagh). Helicopters in NI were focused on the rural areas of Armagh and Fermanagh for troop lift and hotspots province wide for surveillance.
Our most effective means of dealing with IEDs was however intelligence collation and our ability to identify pattern setting and stop it. I would say that a clearer example of the British Army's rupture from the past and best practice was not the lack of helicopters (which were split among three operational theatres until 2008 and two until 2009), but the lack of G2 and G3 intelligence/information collation, interrogation and diffusion systems, procedures and capabilities. What had been ingrained in the army when dealing with an IED threat in NI was lost in the space of 10 years from 1995 - 2005.
davidbfpo
10-16-2011, 02:05 PM
JMA for one will welcome this, maybe?
A BBC report on a Royal Marine Commando using the Three Palms training ground for training, as it matches Afg:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15327943
The RM will deploy to Afg in a year's time and half are just out of training.
JMA for one will welcome this, maybe?
A BBC report on a Royal Marine Commando using the Three Palms training ground for training, as it matches Afg:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15327943
The RM will deploy to Afg in a year's time and half are just out of training.
Certainly an improvement on Kenya if out of the clutches of the Health and Safety nazis. But still I fail to understand why no such facility has been erected in Afghanistan itself which ISAF and ANA can use. If a battalion can be flown to the US for training then surely they can do it in Afghanistan? Any legislative technicality should be dealt with. Oh yes and it reduces the amount of training kit required.
Flighted in the blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-the-british-army) the article in The Economist, The future of the British army - On the defensive (http://www.economist.com/node/21533406) contains an action by the Brit military that needs to be noted.
It should be noted that the Dr Fox, the Defence Secretary, (no friend of the MoD) had:
... appointed one of the ministry’s harshest critics, Bernard Gray, to bring some realism and order to procurement.
In the wake of Dr Fox's resignation (one wonders who or what had a hand in the leaking of evidence to the press) as Defence Secretary he:
General Sir Peter Wall, the head of the army, asked Major-General Nick Carter, a former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan and the director-general of land warfare, to carry out a review that would shape the army of the future.
This is no doubt Carter's opportunity for redemption (as he must surely carry much of the responsibility for the abysmal British performance in Afghanistan during his tenure).
The report is a concern because he seems to ignore that in military planning one always works backwards from the desired end point (or outcome) so as to chart your course of action (that is everything being related to D-Day and H-Hour... remember?).
His first reported issue is:
“getting off the Afghan hamster wheel”—extracting men and equipment from Afghanistan in good order Not sure what the problem is afterall with mass change-overs every six months the one aspect the Brits are masters at is how to get 10,000 soldiers out of Afghanistan in quick time.
Next:
Where deep cuts are made, the emphasis will be on preserving institutional readiness by retaining just enough skills, expertise and equipment to regenerate capabilities quickly.
Interesting. I wonder what the plan is. The key to this will be 'how quick is quickly'.
And finally:
... putting a lot of emphasis on “upstream” conflict prevention and capacity-building. The army already carries out training missions in bits of the Middle East and Africa, but the idea is to go much further, with around 3,000 of its people actively engaged around the world.
The idea is that somehow that such a group of 'bright and culturally sensitive people' will somehow prevent wars breaking out. WHHBS? (what has he been smoking)
Perhaps this is the time for the Brits to put together civic action units for this dubious purpose rather than attempt to expect this from line infantry units as a matter of course. Here they need to go to McCuen (http://www.amazon.com/art-counter-revolutionary-war-strategy-counter-insurgency/dp/B0006BOEKK) to see that a leaf must be taken out of the French Algeria experience with teams of S.A.U.'s and S.A.S.'s (not to be confused with the British term) on how to counter-organise the population against the insurgents. Again though there is that underlying thread of staggering arrogance to think that the Brits or any military can have units/teams waiting to deploy to just about any potential conflict area and achieve what the local government has themselves failed to achieve.
At least the Brit general staff have started thinking and that for many will be a novel experience and should be welcomed by all.
Red Rat
10-24-2011, 12:18 PM
Flighted in the blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-the-british-army) the article in The Economist, The future of the British army - On the defensive (http://www.economist.com/node/21533406) contains an action by the Brit military that needs to be noted.
It is a very good article, and a very well informed one to boot. The passing of Dr Fox is widely lamented within the defence establishment; even if I suspect that some will be breathing sighs of relief.
This is no doubt Carter's opportunity for redemption (as he must surely carry much of the responsibility for the abysmal British performance in Afghanistan during his tenure). Well, he was only there for one year and that was 2010-2011.
The report is a concern because he seems to ignore that in military planning one always works backwards from the desired end point (or outcome) so as to chart your course of action (that is everything being related to D-Day and H-Hour... remember?).
In theory we have an endstate which is the UK's Future Character of Conflict Paper (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/00CD3C81-8295-4B79-A306-E76C370CC314/0/20100201Future_Character_of_ConflictUDCDC_Strat_Tr ends_4.pdf) and the UK's National Security Strategy (http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf) (NSS) together with various statements from the current government on UK defence spending. Unfortunately the NSS is a series of rather bland statements that can be viewed as strategic goals but certainly do not form a coherent strategy.
His first reported issue is: Not sure what the problem is afterall with mass change-overs every six months the one aspect the Brits are masters at is how to get 10,000 soldiers out of Afghanistan in quick time. Well it took us years to get the equipment in to Afghanistan (we do not change the equipment over every time we rotate troops) and so it will take years to get the equipment out. But as the Ministry of Defence does not own the majority of the equipment per se it also has to decide which equipment is Afghanistan specific and which is likely to form core equipment for future conflicts and then figure out where to get the money to pay for it all from. Money is a big issue; the UK Government has stated that the UK's deficit is the single largest strategic threat to the UK's prosperity and way of life that currently exists; it is tightening the purse strings accordingly.
The idea is that somehow that such a group of 'bright and culturally sensitive people' will somehow prevent wars breaking out. WHHBS? (what has he been smoking) The idea is that by strengthening the institutions of government we can help prevent failing states from becoming failed states. If conflict does break out then we have people who are culturally attuned to the conflict area. It is much more like the US Army's FAO programme.
Perhaps this is the time for the Brits to put together civic action units for this dubious purpose rather than attempt to expect this from line infantry units as a matter of course. Here they need to go to McCuen (http://www.amazon.com/art-counter-revolutionary-war-strategy-counter-insurgency/dp/B0006BOEKK) to see that a leaf must be taken out of the French Algeria experience with teams of S.A.U.'s and S.A.S.'s (not to be confused with the British term) on how to counter-organise the population against the insurgents. But this approach can only be done by the indigenous government or by others acting on behalf of the indigenous government. The latter presents clear problems of implementation as seen only too clearly in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Again though there is that underlying thread of staggering arrogance to think that the Brits or any military can have units/teams waiting to deploy to just about any potential conflict area and achieve what the local government has themselves failed to achieve.
Again think prevention and not cure. These teams will be permanently deployed like the US Army FAOs or like the loan service personnel we have in many Middle Eastern countries. Again they are envisaged as strengthening the institutions of government; they will not be able to directly influence indigenous government policies or politics. The issue of them achieving what the local government has failed to achieve is just not on the cards; that is not their role and I doubt an indigenous government would allow them that much leeway.
Of course if Scotland votes for independence in 2015 then this is all a moot point ;)
It is a very good article, ...snipped for brevity
I will drop the t for t response at this point as we have all but exhausted the aspects IMHO.
COIN will never work in an instance where there is no legitimate indigenous government on whose behalf the 'assistance' is being given.
It worked for the Brits in Malaya, was problematic for the yanks in Vietnam and the French government walked out of Algeria on the cusp of victory.
The Times (London) is reporting that British troops are to hand over Nad-e Ali (www.thetimes.co.uk). Can watch the video on the main page without having to subscribe.
The Times (London) is reporting that British troops are to hand over Nad-e Ali (www.thetimes.co.uk). Can watch the video on the main page without having to subscribe.
I guess Nad-e Ali will from now on be as safe as Kabul.
davidbfpo
11-07-2011, 12:18 PM
A curious report in the Daily Telegraph, which appears to be based on interviews granted by a USMC general and a somewhat awkward UK MoD response in London.
The article is headlined 'Helmand killing fields to be handed back to Britain' and sub-titled:
The number of American troops in Helmand is to be cut in half leaving Britain to take the lead in the Afghan province, a US general has told The Daily Telegraph.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8873334/Helmand-killing-fields-to-be-handed-back-to-Britain.html
Opens with:
The substantial reduction in US forces could mean that British forces will resume control of former bases such as Sangin, Musa Qala and Now Zad. It is understood that the force of 20,000 US marines in Helmand, which has done much to restore stability, could even be cut to almost a quarter of its strength by September next year.
No doubt General Toolan has his national orders, the reduction in US troops and if current, official statements are credible Taliban overt activity has dropped - so US Marines can be redeployed. All sound militarily, then you notice some of his words of caution:
Afghan security forces are in a good place but very few if any are in a position where they can operate totally independently. More time is needed to address the insurgency.
I am sure the USA has coordinated with ISAF, in particular with those nations present in Helmand (UK, Denmark, Australia & the Baltic States).
That does leave a political dilemma for the UK, does it redeploy back to the "hot spots" like Sangin? Or encourage the ANSF to do so, with adviser teams and with ISAF only in a support role?
I am aware that the US Army has made some significant withdrawals in other parts of Afghanistan, notably in the East.
Clearly this post could sit comfortably in 'The Uk in Afg' thread, but it is a significant decision and worthy of standing alone for the moment.
davidbfpo
11-13-2011, 12:44 PM
A nice catchy title for the first media interview of the new UK Defence Secretary, which has a number of topics and a good measure of "spin":http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8886095/Philip-Hammond-I-shook-hands-with-Sinn-Fein-we-must-talk-to-the-Taliban-too.html
He has just been to Afghanistan and been briefed accordingly.
Talking to the Taliban is a process the Afghans have to manage. It is their country.
The goal from their point of view is peace, from our point of view it's stability. That can only happen by an inclusive political settlement that will involve bringing elements of the Taliban into that process.
But negotiating with the Taliban must be done from a position of strength. Negotiating from a position of weakness would be a disaster. Nobody must every think of this as being a measure of failure or abandoning the sacrifices which have been made.
This is a classic:
Some of the so-called spectaculars that we have seen rather suggest desperation. They're designed to grab headlines rather than to achieve military objectives.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8886095/Philip-Hammond-I-shook-hands-with-Sinn-Fein-we-must-talk-to-the-Taliban-too.html
Someone needs to widen his briefing material and include as an example the Tet Offensive, with the attack on South Vietnamese cities, including the US Embassy. The Taliban are Afghans (mainly), with a strategy aimed primarily at other Afghans and impacting their calculation of future loyalties.
The Brits finally get the idea ;)
MOD/1/109/666
STAFF GUIDANCE ON DEFENCE RESTRUCTURING
1. This guidance is being issued to remedy a perceived difficulty experienced by Staff at all levels in understanding the rationale behind recent Defence re-structuring. In particular many Staff Officers seem not to understand how reducing the numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery and soldiers results in a more flexible, robust and effective fighting force.
2. In particular it seems that much of the confusion stems from a systemic misunderstanding of the correct use of military terminology. A list of common terms and actual meanings follows.
3. In addition there follows an explanation of the key assumptions embedded within the Defence Review. All Staff Officers are encouraged to seek clarification through their Chain of Command if they still have any questions.
4. Staff Terminology used in the new Defence Plan;
Term MOD meaning
Flexible- a. Smaller
b. Unable to operate unless under US protection
Robust- a. Smaller
b. Lacking reserves or regeneration capability
Networked- Smaller, but still unable to talk to each other
Capable- Smaller
Agile- Really, really small
Deployability- Method of making the Forces, primarily the Army, able to send higher percentages of their manpower to a distant location. This is achieved by reducing the overall numbers involved, i.e. “In future the Army will be able to send 50% of it’s manpower to Africa in the back of a Cessna, thus achieving greater deployability”.
Reach- The distance the Americans are willing to fly us
Efficient- Much, much smaller
Streamlined- Just unbelievably small
Just in time- For the funeral.
Integrated- Process by which all three services get to brief against each other in public leaks, attempting to justify and defend their own budget against cuts, thereby doing the Treasury’s work for them. Taken to extremes by the Army in which Corps and Regiments fight each other, and perfected within the Infantry.
Technically ambitious- a. Slang, as in “He was being a bit technically ambitious when he tried to drive that car through the wall” (cf, “To propose a Bowman”)
b. Description of the far future
Reserves- Integral part of current Operational Manning.
Rationalisation- a. Cuts
b. Psychological term, meaning to use complicated arguments to avoid facing unpalatable truths, i.e. , “we don’t need to pay for both expensive servicemen and equipment, because we will be networked, agile, and technically ambitious” .
Rapid- Used in a comparative sense, as in “The rapid erosion of the Himalayan Mountains…”
Modernisation- Cuts
Radical- Deep Cuts
Transformation- Really Deep Cuts
Sustainable- Assuming zero casualties, no leave and no emergencies.
Sentences such as “these proposals capture our aim for a speedy deployable, agile, joint and integrated, technically ambitious defence capability” will make more logical sense to the experienced Staff Officer once the above definitions are applied.
5. It will also help if Staff Officers bear in mind the following Planning Principles. Point C will be of particular relevance in explaining the rationale behind restructuring to Junior Staff.
a. Use of Special Forces. No one in the general Public has a clue how many there are, so they can be announced as deploying to every country in the world.
b. Aggressive use of terminology can compensate for lack of actual forces. For example in the past, effective deterrence of a reasonably capable Maritime threat would require the despatch of a task force, consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and possibly even a carrier. In the future this task will still be achieved by a task force; but task-force will be the new description for a mine-sweeper.
c. The new Defence Plan was not resource driven. A comprehensive strategic estimate was conducted, from first principles, identifying the current and potential threats to the UK and its interests, allowing a reserve for the unexpected, and also allowing for recurrent non-warfighting tasks such as Fire Strike cover and Foot and Mouth disease. Against the tasks identified an ideal manpower establishment and Task Org was then identified. By an amazing coincidence it happened to fit almost exactly within current Treasury MOD expenditure plans, and even allow the MOD to carry half the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. Much of the current crisis in Defence Spending can be directly traced to the high costs of legacy equipments. These were ordered at a time of ignorance in the past when Planners naively seemed to believe that the threat they identified as imminent would remain the same for the 20-30 year service life of the equipment they were ordering. The assumption in the 1980’s and 90’s that tanks, artillery, and aircraft would be needed in the future was ridiculous, as none of these equipments have been used by the British Armed forces to any degree since the Falklands war.
However, current planners possess better foresight and are able to predict future threats for at least the next 40 years. We are therefore able to be certain that Britain is unlikely to need any tanks, aircraft, submarines etc. past about 2015.
e. Britain no longer needs a significant anti-submarine capability. No other nation possesses submarines in any numbers, submarine technology is unlikely to advance at all over the next few 30 years, and should anti-submarine technology or skills be required at any point in the future they can be reconstituted overnight from the reserves. (Once the reserves have been reconstituted). In any case by 2020 the UK will be fully integrated into mainland Europe, and will therefore no longer have a coastline to defend or be reliant upon sea-supply.
f. Similar arguments apply to air defence.
g. The Regimental System. In the past the Regimental System has been seen as the corner-stone of British Military success, creating a system in which the individual is made to feel part of a greater family, often stretching back hundreds of years, in which he is nurtured and developed, and to which he feels such great loyalty that he is inspired to sacrifice himself if need be for his Regimental comrades. However, the British youth of today are so naturally self-sacrificing and community spirited that additional incentives are now unnecessary, and in any case the threat to soldiers on the ground has been assumed away. There is therefore no further need for a system whose main purpose is to generate fighting spirit, and it can be safely emasculated to achieve administrative efficiency (see “Efficient” above).
h. High divorce rates within the Services will solve manpower crises, by ensuring all service personnel will be happy to conduct back-to-back tours forever, as no one will have any families or friends to miss.
i. Savings will be ploughed into the purchase of large numbers of hats. This will be essential as in future everyone will be at least treble or quadruple hatted. Wars will be fought in rotation on a strict “first come, first served” basis.
k. Future savings will be made by abolishing all training for the Chiefs of Staff. After all they haven’t proven remotely as effective at manoeuvre warfare, disruption, dislocation or divide-and-rule as the Treasury.
l. Successive efficiency measures can be made to reinforce each other. For example, each time troop numbers are cut, a unit can then be tasked to conduct the same jobs as before. Provided there are no actual massacres of Friendly Forces, the new troop numbers can be seen to have been fully as effective as the previous numbers, and so can form a baseline for achieving efficiency cuts to new troop numbers. Savings can then be invested in new equipment, in the same way that British Airways fires half its pilots every time it needs to buy a new plane. The ultimate aim is to have one man, but equipped like Dr Octopus. He will sleep with one eye open at all times to replicate full manning.
m. Key Assumptions: Current levels of operations are an aberration, will never be repeated, and should form no guide to current manning requirements, let alone future ones. Gerry Adams has embraced peace, there is no more requirement for crowd control in Northern Ireland, the FBU have forsworn strikes along with all other key public workers, Osama Bin Laden is history and the Easter Bunny will be providing Area Air Defence for London.
6. More detailed guidance can be found in JSP 4708- “Magic Mushrooms, their consumption, effects and results in the MOD” and the Defence Secretary’s Autobiography “What Colour is the Sky in My World?”
{CHOtS SIGNED}
I M Promoted
SO2 Spin
Ministry of Truth
Orwell Bldg
MOD 1984
Added by Moderator: this comes from:http://www.arrse.co.uk/armed-forces-jokes/142735-staff-guidance-defence-restructuring.html
Slow learners : How Iraq and Afghanistan forced Britain to rethink COIN (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/11/6292362)
BY CAPT. ANDREW P. BETSON
The last paragraph:
The British military’s experience in contemporary COIN operations elicited an unfortunate smugness and complacency in an organization that thought that it “got it.” Successful experiences in the past gave it a false sense of security in its approaches to Iraq and Afghanistan, and it suffered the consequences. Officers within the organization identified these shortcomings, but also began to point out failures in adaptation, while the U.S. seemed to embrace change. Though the early misperceptions may have delayed the response, the British military — especially the Army — eventually experienced very similar dynamics as its U.S. counterpart in its approaches to counterinsurgency.
Takes me back to those 'heady' days of the 'Wilf Wars' some time back in this thread.
Jedburgh
11-17-2011, 03:50 PM
PRIO, 15 Nov 11: Faithful Ally: The UK Engagement in Afghanistan (http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1239209179/Suhrke%20(2011)%20Faithful%20Ally%20(PRIO-CMI).pdf)
This case study first contextualizes the UK Afghanistan engagement in light of the broader foreign policy concerns, and then focuses on the development and adjustment of military strategy in relation to other components of the engagement. In this respect, special attention is given to the importance of realities on the ground in Afghanistan, organizational (NATO) interests, and domestic factors.
davidbfpo
11-21-2011, 03:29 PM
Thomas Harding, the Daily Telegraph’s defence correspondent, has returned from his 12th visit to Afghanistan since British troops deployed to Helmand province five years ago. Here, he reflects on what has been achieved.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8903334/Afghanistan-what-happens-when-we-leave.html
Some interesting parts alongside the odd, well at least from this "armchair":
The odd:
With political stability offered by Nato and Afghan forces, Helmand’s 180,000 farmers are able to sow pomegranates and carrots rather than opium poppies.
How often has this version of KLE been tried?
The British have also been adept at fostering good relations. Brig Patrick Sanders, the commander in Helmand, invited his opposite number, Brig-Gen Sheren Shah, and the chief of police, Gen Hakim Angar, to his Wiltshire home to meet his family. Hospitality is important in Afghan society and the gesture cemented a key relationship.
The ANP:
The police, on whom security will largely depend, are not the most trustworthy bunch. One police station had to be disbanded after officers robbed and murdered the owner of a new Shogun car carrying £1,500 in cash. At another station I visited with an Army officer, the reception from the commander was cordial at best. “He’s probably in the pay of the Taliban,” the officer quietly told me. “We just don’t tell him much at a tactical level.”
Level of activity:
in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8903334/Afghanistan-what-happens-when-we-leave.html
Level of activity:
That level of activity quote again:
But in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days.
now read that in conjunction with this piece:
The US Marine Corps, responsible for much of the stability in Helmand, is planning to drop to as low as 6,000 troops within the next 10 months. Soon after, Britain is expected to start reducing its force of almost 10,000.
How does one interpret that?
I suggest it is safe to conclude that ISAF have given up on trying to clear Helmand (which is the first step in the clear, hold, build theory which has apparently been applied in Afghanistan).
Another failed theory which will probably be (harshly) judged as another military defeat of the major powers by a rag tag band of mercenaries (the Taliban). It will be difficult to argue against claims of victory by the Taliban when the US Marines are all but gone and the Brits are reducing their forces and conceding ground to the Taliban.
It would be interesting to hear it from the smart guys who run ISAF how it can be explained that before the armed mercenaries of the Taliban have been killed, captured or dispersed out of the area ISAF can be contemplating a reduction in force levels.
On that platoon's 21 contacts in 27 days. One needs more context but it is fair to assume that these contacts did not produce significant results for either side and the Taliban stayed right there in the area.
One may also wonder why given that they knew where this group of Taliban were located that the battalion and even the brigade reserve were not deployed to deal decisively with them?
If the Brit military thought the Iraq enquiry was harsh on them they better stand-by for the one on their performance in Afghanistan, its going to be a rough ride.
Red Rat
11-24-2011, 08:05 PM
Clear, build hold still seems like a straightforward operational design concept which appears to work. However if it is applied as part of a fundamentally flawed strategy then it is not going to work.
I am not sure whether ISAF has given up on clearing Helmand per se. I am pretty certain that the intent is not to clear Helmand completely (I am not sure if that was ever the intent, if it was it would have been a naive intent), but as the campaign has evolved so have the strategic aims and with that the strategy. IMHO intent should be (now) to gain and maintain those areas that the Afghanistan Government think necessary for its long term viability. The drawdown in ISAF troop numbers also has to be balanced against the increase in ANSF numbers and the increased effectiveness of said ANSF elements.
I don't have the context on these specific troop contacts, most contacts nowadays are small arms fire, few result in casualties. I suspect that the reason the reporter picked up on this was that it was the exception that proved his point. 21 contacts in 27 days sounds intense but a 3 round 'shoot and scoot' carried out by one man is still a contact, carried out 21 times over 27 days...;)
Again without knowing the context of the contacts or how serious they were one cannot tell what steps were appropriate to be taken, let alone what steps were taken to deal with the issue. The pervasiveness of persistent wide area surveillance within Helmand means that follow up can be conducted in a variety of ways in a variety of timeframes.
Lastly a robust and independent scrutiny of the Afghanistan Campaign would most definitely be welcome by both the Armed Forces and (I suspect) by the (current) UK Government. I am sure we would learn a great deal from it. :D
jcustis
11-24-2011, 08:37 PM
The drawdown in ISAF troop numbers also has to be balanced against the increase in ANSF numbers and the increased effectiveness of said ANSF elements.
Our performance in ANSF development has had a very deleterious effect on our ability to complete the clear.
We performed the clear, but had to go back to it in order to address a lot of loss of ground during the hold. In some areas, they were never 'clear', and we probably used poor descriptions for what 'clear' looked like in the first place.
davidbfpo
12-04-2011, 09:48 PM
A slightly adapted title from The Guardian, which has an interview from the No.2 ISAF commander, Lieutenant General James Bucknall, who has just stood down:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/04/top-british-general-afghanistan-warning
It opens with:
.. the Taliban cannot "assassinate their way to power" and too many lives have been lost over the last 10 years for the west to flinch in its campaign against the insurgents.
Then and I'm sure I posted a remark on this theme recently:
We almost owe it to those who have gone before to see the job through,...Having made this investment in blood, I am more determined. If I didn't think we could do this I would take a very different view but I am confident we can do it...
These are the two top ingredients. We have to stick together. We went in together, and we go out together. Managing a coalition in a draw down requires an awful lot more work than managing a coalition during a surge
More of the interview is on:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/04/afghanistan-james-bucknall-british-general?intcmp=239
ganulv
12-04-2011, 10:54 PM
We almost owe it to those who have gone before to see the job through,...Having made this investment in blood, I am more determined. If I didn't think we could do this I would take a very different view but I am confident we can do it...
The courage to stay the course or throwing good money after bad? Making the distinction is an unenviable task indeed.
Ken White
12-05-2011, 12:14 AM
The courage to stay the course or throwing good money after bad? Making the distinction is an unenviable task indeed.Further consider the sentiment expressed in your quote is not even a glimmer of an issue with said Political types and the thought in your statement is barely so.
The Generals merely try to provide some cover for their Bosses while -- hopefully -- rallying the troops... :rolleyes:
jcustis
12-05-2011, 01:46 AM
He's been there for 18 months, which is notable. I for one am keen to learn more about his thoughts and assessments, and what he measures a "good summer" by.
He's made some exceptionally distinct statements about insurgents not being able to hold ground, and reverting to a terrorist organization, and so I wonder. And when he is quoted as saying that "we are on track," I'm left wondering on track for what?
BushrangerCZ
12-10-2011, 03:40 PM
I´ve seen Brits using new, short barreled (I guess 13 inch) .308 assault rifle in A-stan, is it standard issue or just for sharpshooter´s role? If standard, is it going to completely replace SA80 (or however is its newest modification called) in whole army, or just for deployed units? Thanks...
jcustis
12-10-2011, 04:23 PM
What brand is it?
At 13 inches, I doubt it's being employed as a tack driver in any precision shooting application.
BushrangerCZ
12-10-2011, 05:45 PM
my bad, it´s probably 16 inches, I´ve seen crappy picture. Now I understand it´s just for designated sharpshooters.
http://t3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcRKjoN_JWyggKCU-6ZOZVL7IjOgnalacUaT9RkcdibKqEY4Cm4I
So SA80 goes on for regular rifleman?
jcustis
12-10-2011, 06:32 PM
Yes, as it seems you discovered, that's the Lewis and Machine Tool (LMT) L129A1.
http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2010/01/21/lmt-l129a1-lmt-308/
The SA80 remains the frontline service rifle.
davidbfpo
12-18-2011, 11:12 PM
Post 883 refers to the 2IC ISAF General James Bucknall being interviewed upon leaving his appointment.
Frank Ledwidge, a critic of the UK's campaign, contributed a response days later (which I missed) and some points he made have appeared here. For example:
Prior to the British deployment in 2006 Helmand was a relatively rich, virtually conflict-free province. When our current chief of defence staff General Sir David Richards, who was at the time commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan said, "Where's Helmand? It's not important" he was right. There were very few Taliban in central Helmand or indeed anywhere else in the province and the small US garrison had suffered no serious casualties. The SAS had ranged the area for years, successfully gaining intelligence and ensuring that al-Qaida could gain no traction. Before the British got to Helmand there was no "Taliban heartland" there.
He ends with:
It must be time now even for senior soldiers to admit that this has become a very bad investment indeed. We "owe it" to those whose lives and limbs may yet be saved to cut our losses.
Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/05/afghanistan-investment-in-blood-james-bucknall
jcustis
12-19-2011, 01:55 AM
That's a peculiar analysis. Al Qaeda had no need to try to gain traction in Helmand. It's Helmand after all, and with nothing going for it besides agriculture and the popppy/marijuana harvests, it wouldn't make sense to Al Qaeda to have any interest.
The lines of communication in and out to Pakistan are difficult, resources to sustain oneself when not forcing the locals to feed and shelter you are low, and there aren't too many development projects or licit commercial activities that would garner an IO victory if attacked.
I understand the comments about Taliban in Helmand are sort of an aside to the main thrust of his article, but the writer is way off.
davidbfpo
12-28-2011, 05:45 PM
I am sure the town of Nad-e-Ali has appeared before in Afghan threads, but I don't recall this story:
The Taliban were firmly entrenched in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand, with the population cowed and British soldiers confined to moving within a few hundred yards of their bases, when Lt Col James Coates took over the area. The commanding officer of 3 Para introduced a new tactic called “precision strike”, combining high level intelligence, CCTV camera surveillance and the use of precision missile attacks to wipe out Taliban command while causing minimal civilian casualties. In the coming months, the formerly fractious area will be handed over to Afghan control. British success attracted a host of inspecting VIPs. It was, said Gen David Petraeus, “a most impressive way to do business”. Precision strike is now used across Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8979968/Britons-of-the-year.html
Strange place for the story to appear.
A little digging found:
The unit served as part of Operation Herrick 13 in Helmand Province between October 2010 and April 2011.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-15123581
davidbfpo
12-30-2011, 12:31 AM
Ryan Evans is now at ICSR, London and was a member of a HTT n Helmand Province; he has written a FP Blog piece 'COIN is dead, long live the COIN' and is preparing:
..an article on the specific context of Central Helmand Province and the limits of COIN operations there due to specific local political, historical, and economic circumstances.
I have just listened to a short podcast of a talk Ryan Evans and a recently retired British Army Lieut.Col. Dougie Graham, whose last posting was Helmand, which has some gems and worth listening to. The seminar summary:http://icsr.info/seminar/counter-insurgency-in-helmand-and-beyond and the podcast is on:http://dl.dropbox.com/u/13850824/evans%20-%20main.wma
It was notable that the Dougie Graham conceded for the locals the GIRoA was seen as the enemy and that 99.9% of the dead insurgents lived with ten mile of their last contact.
davidbfpo
01-03-2012, 02:01 AM
A laudatory article on the RN helicopters, designed for anti-submarine operations, identifying the Taliban's supply routes:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8988260/SAS-target-Taliban-using-Royal-Navy-submarine-technology.html
What I noted was, with my emphasis:
By tracking pickup trucks and camel trains, the Navy team of three Sea King helicopters and 43 servicemen, including engineers and analysts, have produced a map made up of millions of dots that shows the highways across the desert. The lines show 12 main routes, most going to Pakistan but at least four heading into Iran.
I am always puzzled why such technology is revealed. (Addition follows). Apparently the technology in use is a variant of well known ISR technology:
...the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) had proved invaluable in the tracking and prosecution of enemy ground forces. ..radar is similar to the U2 ASARS radar, and collects SAR imagery and GMTI data. Which is deployed on a UK aircraft:http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/sentinelr1.cfm
I would speculate that the routes heading into Iran are the mass movement of heroin.
davidbfpo
01-27-2012, 11:44 PM
This is the headline in the Daily Telegraph and is IMO long overdue. I cite the sub-title:
Britain's most senior military officer has said the military move into southern Afghanistan was “amateurish” and “verging on the complacent” and accused ministers of failing to learn lessons from Iraq.
It appears that his remarks appear in a new book 'War Against the Taliban' by Sandy Gall.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9045079/General-David-Richards-Afghan-campaign-was-woeful.html
General Richards comments do not appear to answer all the critical points made here over the years, such as the six month tour of duty rotation system. Note he remains optimistic on the war in Afghanistan.
Link to Sandy Gall's book:http://www.bloomsbury.com/War-Against-the-Taliban/Sandy-Gall/books/details/9781408809051
ganulv
01-28-2012, 01:11 AM
I would speculate that the routes heading into Iran are the mass movement of heroin.
I’ve made the acquaintance of a young Afghan man over the past couple of months (a student at a nearby college) and the last time I saw him our conversation veered into a short discussion of Helmand. He is quite well traveled in Afghanistan and Pakistan and I asked him if he had visited Helmand. He replied that he had not, that it was a very dangerous region. Unsolicited, he went on to explain that the danger stemmed from the movement of heroin bound for Iran through the area. Regardless of whether or not his statement is anything more than “that’s what everyone says, anyway…” it does fall in line with your speculation.
davidbfpo
02-06-2012, 11:54 AM
The RUSI is holding a public event on 29th February 2012, entitled 'The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06' and from the flyer:
A panel discussion including Sir Kevin Tebbit and Professor Michael Clarke on RUSI's latest Whitehall Paper assessing the controversial decision to go into Helmand province, Afghanistan. In 2006, British forces entered the Helmand Province of Afghanistan in what would become one of the defining military campaigns of the decade. At great cost in blood and treasure, the UK waged a protracted counter-insurgency against a resurgent Taliban. But how was the decision taken to commit Britain to such a difficult and drawn-out campaign?
Link:http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4F2ABF372E699
It will be curious to see how this institution so close to Westminster-Whitehall handles the issues.
davidbfpo
03-07-2012, 11:13 PM
Following on the death of six soldiers in Afghanistan yesterday, when a Warrior APC was demolished by an IED on Highway One, the Defence Secretary has written this article and the headline says it all:
Afghanistan: we owe it to all those who have sacrificed their lives to see this mission successfully concluded
Nothing unexpected in his explanation:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9129894/Afghanistan-we-owe-it-to-all-those-who-have-sacrificed-their-lives-to-see-this-mission-successfully-concluded.html
From the BBC report on the deaths:
The number of British military deaths in Afghanistan since 2001 is now 404.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17288766
davidbfpo (summarising some nincompoop) posted "The sacrifice made is justified"
Sadly David, this is what the Brit public is being asked to accept.
The Brits went into Afghanistan on the coat tails of the yanks and in the hope of redeeming themselves after the Basra debacle.
This lunacy has now cost 404 lives and the (almost worse) life changing injuries/wounds to 100s more.
The Brits should (quietly yet forcefully) explain to the yanks that the "special relationship" has been stretched to breaking point and that they should now go find some other 'patsy' to tag along behind them like a pet dog.
Fuchs
03-08-2012, 04:47 AM
Afghanistan: we owe it to all those who have sacrificed their lives to see this mission successfully concluded
Remove the man from office ASAP.
He's either lying to the public or an idiot who falls into the sunk costs fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost_fallacy#Loss_aversion_and_the_sunk_cost_ fallacy) in one of the worst topics imaginable for this classic mistake.
He's unacceptable - no further proof should be required.
Remove the man from office ASAP.
He's either lying to the public or an idiot who falls into the sunk costs fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost_fallacy#Loss_aversion_and_the_sunk_cost_ fallacy) in one of the worst topics imaginable for this classic mistake.
He's unacceptable - no further proof should be required.
All true.
I don't have the time to sit down and produce a piece that I would if I were in his position. Difficult... very difficult.
He begins:
... the mission is necessary for national security.
He ends:
...our national security requires us to see the job through and we owe it to the all-too-many who have sacrificed their lives to see this mission successfully concluded. This is a volatile region from which threats to Britain and our allies may continue to emerge. Walking away is not an option. I know that our nation will continue to stand by our Armed Forces and the sacrifices they and their families make.
His whole premise is based on delusion...
All true.
I don't have the time to sit down and produce a piece that I would if I were in his position. Difficult... very difficult.
He begins:
He ends:
His whole premise is based on delusion...
A delusion that's more palatable to the British public, than the truth of a botched nation building exercise.
That said, if you were read the comment on The Guardian we (the British) are there so the Americans can build a pipeline or some other crap.
A delusion that's more palatable to the British public, than the truth of a botched nation building exercise.
That said, if you were read the comment on The Guardian we (the British) are there so the Americans can build a pipeline or some other crap.
Not found... I presume a reader's comment?
But good to see you still around and thanks for the steer to The Guardian where I found another depressing Frank Ledwidge article on Afghanistan:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/08/helmand-lost-children-afghanistan-civilian-deaths
Saw a reference there to a book "No Worse Enemy: The Inside Story of the Chaotic Struggle for Afghanistan" by Ben Anderson: http://www.amazon.co.uk/No-Worse-Enemy-Struggle-Afghanistan/dp/1851688528/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331210580&sr=1-1. Do you have a comment on this book perhaps?
...and finally from friends in the UK I read a dark mood over the continued presence in Afghanistan. Do you have an opinion?
Comments on a rather crass cartoonhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cartoon/2012/mar/08/steve-bell-cartoon-british-soldiers-death-afghanistan.
What a poorly written article! I found myself having to re-read paragraphs more than usual. Someone misquoting Clausewitz, bloody hell, what a world we live in. I need to stop reading the comments, people's idiocy makes me angry. I haven't read the book, I do like Ben Anderson's documentaries though.
I really don't know anymore. You have to ask why we're actually there, what we are achieving and what will the end result be.
The answers to all of those questions are far from simple and have been covered in this thread before.
I'm not sure it even matters anymore.
Red Rat
03-14-2012, 02:50 PM
...and finally from friends in the UK I read a dark mood over the continued presence in Afghanistan. Do you have an opinion?
The latest polling (Ipsos MORI annual polling on the British Army) shows some interesting statistics:
"We are making progress in Afghanistan (57%), and we should stay (56%), however there is a dichotomy as few believe that we will succeed (36%)."
That I think sums it up. The public does not think that we can succeed, the timeline for withdrawal has been written and increasingly the question is being asked "why?"
When asking how important an issue Afghanistan is one does however have to remember that the same polling indicates that:
"Defence is considered to be relatively unimportant (9%) compared to the economy (62%)".
The latest polling (Ipsos MORI annual polling on the British Army) shows some interesting statistics:
"We are making progress in Afghanistan (57%), and we should stay (56%), however there is a dichotomy as few believe that we will succeed (36%)."
That I think sums it up. The public does not think that we can succeed, the timeline for withdrawal has been written and increasingly the question is being asked "why?"
When asking how important an issue Afghanistan is one does however have to remember that the same polling indicates that:
"Defence is considered to be relatively unimportant (9%) compared to the economy (62%)".
Good to see you are still around (if only sporadically and fleetingly).
Had a little spike in public interest after the recent six KIA from the jumbo IED. yes?
Two questions (if I may)...
Any change in your (or the official) view on six month tours?
Should the tosser(s) who insist on the continued use of the Warrior (flat bottomed vehicles) be considered criminally liable?
Good to see you are still around (if only sporadically and fleetingly).
Had a little spike in public interest after the recent six KIA from the jumbo IED. yes?
Two questions (if I may)...
Any change in your (or the official) view on six month tours?
Should the tosser(s) who insist on the continued use of the Warrior (flat bottomed vehicles) be considered criminally liable?
I think the liability should lie with the idiots at the MoD who pissed away billions through poor aquisition. When it results in the deaths of soldiers in the field and the overall weakening of our armed forces, heads should roll.
I don't know of any change to the six month tour, it would be an extremely hard sell. As far as I'm aware the six soldiers killed last week were sent off ahead of the main force for the handover. Anyone here still in the forces with a recent tour under their belt that could tell us how the handover is managed these days? Certainly my impression that it's handled a little better.
I think the liability should lie with the idiots at the MoD who pissed away billions through poor aquisition. When it results in the deaths of soldiers in the field and the overall weakening of our armed forces, heads should roll.
I agree.
However, perhaps more so in this case it is the misapplication of resources (which otherwise would have suited another - IED free - theatre perfectly satisfactorily) and the misapplication of troops to task which should also be considered.
I hesitate to use the word COIN for the simple reason that the yanks have got hold of the word and are jerking the semantics around to the extent that it no longer resembles the term the Brits used in Malaya or we used in Rhodesia. In fact they don't even know what it means themselves.
So lets talk rather of a theatre where the insurgency calls for high mobility to deal with an elusive enemy mingling with the population.
So what do the Brits do? They start to deploy mechanised troops (who still retain the old cavalry mentality that a third class ride is better than a first class walk) who are wedded to their vehicles and proceeded to apply their mechanised troops in pointless tactical ways (remember the mowing the grass fiasco?)
It would soon have become evident that the armoured vehicles were in fact death traps. Read Toby Harnden's - 'Dead Men Risen' (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Dead-Men-Risen-Britains-Afghanistan/dp/1849164215/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331779763&sr=1-1)- I quote:
The Vikings, they said, were coffins on tracks. Soldiers were threatening to refuse to get back into one. Young men were vomiting before patrols.
How the hell did it ever get to that?
So IMHO the 'crime' is that once it became apparent that the vehicles available to troops in theatre were indeed coffins on tracks/wheels nothing significant was done about it (and British troops continued to be tied to the predictable use of these coffins on the limited road network... a mine and IED layers dream).
SO you are correct... someone should be held to account for this.
I don't know of any change to the six month tour, it would be an extremely hard sell. As far as I'm aware the six soldiers killed last week were sent off ahead of the main force for the handover. Anyone here still in the forces with a recent tour under their belt that could tell us how the handover is managed these days? Certainly my impression that it's handled a little better.
I bought Ben Anderson's - 'No Worse Enemy (http://www.amazon.co.uk/No-Worse-Enemy-Struggle-Afghanistan/dp/1851688528/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331780483&sr=1-1)' on Kindle (referred to above) and he too comments on what others elsewhere (and me here) have been harping on about the utility of six month tours:
If I were Afghan, especially in Helmand, I certainly wouldn't be picking sides. Certainly not if the American Marines and British soldiers who were asking me to are replaced every six months, and will be gone altogether within two to three years.
There are ways around the problems associated with 'long' tour lengths. Some have been discussed here but I am assured that none are possible within the confines of the Brit military bureaucratic system. That then, quite simply, makes it a self inflicted wound. It imposes a limitation on the troops to the extent that it makes the war unwinnable (if this war was ever winnable in the first place).
As to hand overs, I don't know but what I do know is that all Afghans know that a change in troops is about the take place and the Taliban has plenty of time to arrange an appropriate reception for the NFGs (to use an American term).
I agree.
However, perhaps more so in this case it is the misapplication of resources (which otherwise would have suited another - IED free - theatre perfectly satisfactorily) and the misapplication of troops to task which should also be considered.
I hesitate to use the word COIN for the simple reason that the yanks have got hold of the word and are jerking the semantics around to the extent that it no longer resembles the term the Brits used in Malaya or we used in Rhodesia. In fact they don't even know what it means themselves.
So lets talk rather of a theatre where the insurgency calls for high mobility to deal with an elusive enemy mingling with the population.
So what do the Brits do? They start to deploy mechanised troops (who still retain the old cavalry mentality that a third class ride is better than a first class walk) who are wedded to their vehicles and proceeded to apply their mechanised troops in pointless tactical ways (remember the mowing the grass fiasco?)
It would soon have become evident that the armoured vehicles were in fact death traps. Read Toby Harnden's - 'Dead Men Risen' (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Dead-Men-Risen-Britains-Afghanistan/dp/1849164215/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331779763&sr=1-1)- I quote:
How the hell did it ever get to that?
So IMHO the 'crime' is that once it became apparent that the vehicles available to troops in theatre were indeed coffins on tracks/wheels nothing significant was done about it (and British troops continued to be tied to the predictable use of these coffins on the limited road network... a mine and IED layers dream).
SO you are correct... someone should be held to account for this.
I bought Ben Anderson's - 'No Worse Enemy (http://www.amazon.co.uk/No-Worse-Enemy-Struggle-Afghanistan/dp/1851688528/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331780483&sr=1-1)' on Kindle (referred to above) and he too comments on what others elsewhere (and me here) have been harping on about the utility of six month tours:
There are ways around the problems associated with 'long' tour lengths. Some have been discussed here but I am assured that none are possible within the confines of the Brit military bureaucratic system. That then, quite simply, makes it a self inflicted wound. It imposes a limitation on the troops to the extent that it makes the war unwinnable (if this war was ever winnable in the first place).
As to hand overs, I don't know but what I do know is that all Afghans know that a change in troops is about the take place and the Taliban has plenty of time to arrange an appropriate reception for the NFGs (to use an American term).
You're right, situation with the Warrior is exactly the same as it was with the Viking. Both vehicles designed for use in a war that never happened and unsuitable to this kind of conflict. Reading Dead Men Risen, I shocked that the disconnect between the "frontline" and Bastion was as bad as it was, let alone between theatre and White Hall.
The six month tour really hamstrings the effort, while I'm sure six months seems like a long time to the Toms on the ground, it makes no sense when conducting counter-insurgency operations. Building up a rapport with the locals is crucial.
A recent series about the Royal Marines on tour there last summer illustrated this point nicely for me. There was a Royal Navy intelligence guy there who had learned Pashto, a great skill obviously. All the locals knew him, they even nicknamed him Sikandar Khan, the Persian name of Alexander The Great. The locals clearly had a lot of affection for the guy. The problem was of course that the end of his tour, he'd be gone and all that effort would go to waste. Now I'm not suggesting that soldiers stay indefinitely, there's not real solution to this problem.
This is slightly off topic, but it made me chucle. Somtimes satire can say it best.
From The Daily Mash: Predator drone visiting Afghan families on condolence mission. http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/war/predator-drone-visiting-afghan-families-on-condolence-mission-201203135003/
Afghan subsistence farmer Samoud Jalal said: "The murders have this city on a knife-edge. When the knock came at the door my son had his AK-47 ready to fire. But when my eyes met its multi-spectral targeting system and it mechanically intoned 'I am sorry for your loss of family, friend or member of your religious community,' I felt a sincerity I had never felt from any American.
and
The drone is programmed to offer sympathy to all civilians who have reported the loss of a family member, or limb, to US troops, and has more than 3,000 stock phrases of consolation including 'There, there', 'Life goes on,' and 'You will be reunited, inshallah, in paradise'
Jokes aside, while the use of armed UAVs seems on the increase, their use is still prone to the same human error and faulty intelligence that has caused the bulk of civilian deaths in Afghanistan.
Red Rat
03-15-2012, 07:04 PM
Good to see you are still around (if only sporadically and fleetingly).
Had a little spike in public interest after the recent six KIA from the jumbo IED. yes?
Two questions (if I may)...
Any change in your (or the official) view on six month tours?
Should the tosser(s) who insist on the continued use of the Warrior (flat bottomed vehicles) be considered criminally liable?
I've not noticed any enduring upswing in interest as a result of the six KIA. What interest there was lasted a day or two and focused heavily on the human impact.
Six month tours. My offical view remains that they are bad ;) The army's view I believe remains that they suffice and that sufficient mitigation has been done in terms of extended tours for specialists etc. Don't shoot me I'm only the messenger :o
Use of Warrior. One cannot protect against all risks and Warriors have been proof against most risks in Theatre. It is liked by the troops using it. In Iraq it was the vehicle of choice to move and fight in. There is one infantry company of Warrior in theatre and it is used for those tasks and in those areas that are appropriate to the vehicle. From what I have heard of the IED in question it was of a size that even a V shaped hull is unlikely to have countered the threat. The vehicle fleet and TTPs continually evolve as the threat evolves; it has been ever thus.
I've not noticed any enduring upswing in interest as a result of the six KIA. What interest there was lasted a day or two and focused heavily on the human impact.
A nation numbed?
Six month tours. My offical view remains that they are bad ;) The army's view I believe remains that they suffice and that sufficient mitigation has been done in terms of extended tours for specialists etc. Don't shoot me I'm only the messenger :o
Here is another messenger:
“If I were Afghan, especially in Helmand, I certainly wouldn’t be picking sides. Certainly not if the American Marines or British soldiers who were asking me to are replaced every six months, and will be gone altogether within two to three years. If someone built me a school or repaired my mosque, I would undoubtedly smile, shake their hand, maybe even make them a cup of tea or pose for a photograph. But this would be simple pragmatism. It would not mean I offered them my loyalty, much less that I had rejected the Taliban. The nature and detail of this pragmatism is entirely lost on idealistic foreign commanders.” - Ben Anderson from ‘No Worse Enemy’
BTW... pleas not to shoot the messenger are good for 2012? Got to learn to take it on the chin like what happened here in 2010/11 ;)
Use of Warrior. One cannot protect against all risks and Warriors have been proof against most risks in Theatre. It is liked by the troops using it. In Iraq it was the vehicle of choice to move and fight in. There is one infantry company of Warrior in theatre and it is used for those tasks and in those areas that are appropriate to the vehicle. From what I have heard of the IED in question it was of a size that even a V shaped hull is unlikely to have countered the threat. The vehicle fleet and TTPs continually evolve as the threat evolves; it has been ever thus.
"vehicle of choice" ? ... or the best of the unsuitable crap available given the local IED threat?
I suggest that the single greatest military failure of this particular Afghanistan war has been the inability of the Brits (and other ISAF) to adapt and counter the IED threat. This to the degree of criminal negligence... IMHO.
Quite frankly when the deputy-commander of Task Force Paladin states the obvious then you realise there is no hope:
"When we come up with measures to defeat their tactics, they change them. When we introduce new counter-measures they change again."
Well yes... you #%*#*! How long did you take to figure that out? Now go figure how these Iron Age relics are able to out-think the combined intellect of the ISAF?
Hint: Learn from Chess... learn to think two moves ahead.
The yanks have got their own problems... but the Brits have IMHO run out of excuses. I copy from an earlier post of mine:
Somewhat in support in this is the British manual 'Keeping the Peace' Part 2 - Tactics and Training - 1963.
332. Leadership and battle discipline.. Fighting an underground enemy probably requires a higher standard of junior leadership than any other type of warfare yet experienced. ... Command often has to be decentralized and the training of junior commanders must, therefore, be directed towards giving them the ability and confidence to make sound decisions and act on their own initiative.
Still churning out junior leaders incapable of using initiative in close combat. There is no excuse.
Infanteer
03-18-2012, 05:30 PM
Still up to your old, tired rant.
1. 6 month tours. Would it make a difference if a guy was there for 2 years and left? Is there a substantive difference in areas where U.S. soldiers were for 15 months vice other guys for 6 months? The guy is still leaving, the local making the choice knows that and the insurgent knows that.
2. Lack of ability to adapt and counter the IED threat. Care to back that up with anything substantive? Do you know the stats of IEDs found/recovered to those that hit our guys? The enemy gets lucky once in a while, but you write as if NATO forces bumble around with no clue of what to do.
3. Junior leaders incapable of initiative in close combat. Do you have anything to prove this statement?
Still up to your old, tired rant.
Ah... someone forced you to comment?
1. 6 month tours. Would it make a difference if a guy was there for 2 years and left? Is there a substantive difference in areas where U.S. soldiers were for 15 months vice other guys for 6 months? The guy is still leaving, the local making the choice knows that and the insurgent knows that.
Are those the only permutations you can come up with? Still too junior perhaps?
Work on the mindset that there is always a better way. Intelligent officers with enquiring minds would (or rather should have) by now started to figure it all out, yes?
Oh yes (and I wouldn't have thought it necessary to mention) that one would tend to build the deployment schedule around operational and continuity considerations, yes?
The wise old soldier around here has said (something like to the effect) that the US is prepared to lose small wars rather than inconvenience themselves by making any changes to make these interventions more efficient and effective.
The Brits much the same.
2. Lack of ability to adapt and counter the IED threat. Care to back that up with anything substantive? Do you know the stats of IEDs found/recovered to those that hit our guys? The enemy gets lucky once in a while, but you write as if NATO forces bumble around with no clue of what to do.
I probably know more than you think. Now if you dust off your doctrine manuals you will find that one of the uses of minefields is to channel the enemy. Try and get your head around that will you?
Contrary to repeated nonsense spoken about the supposed 'cowardly' use of IEDs by the Taliban they are in fact more intelligent than given credit for.
75% plus ISAF casualties over the past few years are from IEDs and the wounds of those who survive are so horrific that they probably wish they were dead.
So what is the real effect on the ground? Read. Try to find the reality behind the verbal reports (from those who have been there) and then grasp the horrible reality about who has the initiative.
To help you on this journey read Ben Anderson's recent book 'No Worse Enemy' (http://www.amazon.co.uk/No-Worse-Enemy-Struggle-Afghanistan/dp/1851688528/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1332098876&sr=8-1). See if you can pick up patterns. See if you can figure something out.
Remember... there has got to be a better way.
3. Junior leaders incapable of initiative in close combat. Do you have anything to prove this statement?
Ask some senior Brit and find out how badly the tight ROE and operational constraints from Northern Island destroyed the use of initiative at junior leader level. Once done ask them if this has been rectified since. Got it?
You must be a captain by now so you should start to have more answers than having to ask questions... got it?
Bertie390
03-19-2012, 09:48 PM
6 month tours are currently the norm but it has been floated that 9 month tours should be considered. This would alleviate the pressure on the operational training cycle and in addition provide longer time for units in Th.
Your comments regarding initiative have no basis. Yes, ROE are stringent but they do not inhibit the inherent right to self defence. Junior commanders have shown innovation while working within the constraints to conduct successful operations.
6 month tours are currently the norm but it has been floated that 9 month tours should be considered. This would alleviate the pressure on the operational training cycle and in addition provide longer time for units in Th.
Bertie welcome!
Back in this thread the issue of short tours and the 'short termism' of the Brit approach has been covered pretty exhaustively. A re-read of Matt Cavanagh's classic essay from The Spectator Operation amnesia (http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6846068/operation-amnesia.thtml) may jog the memory.
As I said to the Canadian youngster there are more permutations that those available under the current 'harmony guidelines' or other legislative, bureaucratic or mental straight jackets. In the days of Empire the Brits knew how to do it. They sent an expeditionary force to a place to deal with the 'troubles' and some times had to top up the force levels if they found they had bitten off more than they could chew. Inevitably the Brits won the last battle (which was the one that counted) then it was home for (almost) everyone for tea and medals.
There was continuity. The local theatre expertise built up over time and was retained in theatre.
Admittedly the best approach to do the war justice is not possible because the will is not there to make the necessary changes. This will not stop me stating the obvious just because the painful truth may irritate those sitting in the camp of those unable or unwilling to figure out a solution to this issue.
Your comments regarding initiative have no basis. Yes, ROE are stringent but they do not inhibit the inherent right to self defence. Junior commanders have shown innovation while working within the constraints to conduct successful operations.
You have just provided that basis ;)
Surely the Brit troops are sent to Afghanistan armed with more than 'the inherent right to self defence'? What happened to sending the troops out to find the enemy and kill them?
Perhaps the constrained mindset from Northern Ireland has become so ingrained that independent deployments (over days) by sections commanded by a corporal are no longer even considered?
Ashdown: What I told Gordon Brown about Afghanistan (http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2083801/ashdown-what-i-told-gordon-brown-about-afghanistan.thtml)
Found this yesterday. Good for Paddy his comment has stood the test of time.
He said (amongst other things):
“We do not have enough troops, aid or international will to make Afghanistan much different from what it has been for the last 1000 years – a society in which the gun, drugs and tribalism have always played a part. And even if we had all of these in sufficient quantities, we would not have them for sufficient time – around 25 years or so – to make the aim of fundamentally altering the nature of Afghanistan, achievable."
404 KIA and 1,000 odd maimed... there should be consequences for the decision makers!
Now Paddy clearly had a better grip of the Afghanistan problem than the US Administration and the Brit government's of the day. Least said the better about the competence of the last two (more) US Presidents and Blair/Brown. Young David started well but his tenure can be can be described as follows: "After initial promise David failed to develop his potential as a statesman and leader of the nation."
davidbfpo
04-26-2012, 10:21 PM
Hat tip to a "boots on the ground" input on FRI, even if not supported by a document or source it probably fits well into what happened in 2006:
I remember back in 06 and 07 when the human terrain started to shift a little. What I didn’t know then was the tide of unease flowing through the population was (in part) triggered by the arrival of the British army in Helmand. Apparently the SAS and their American counterparts had conducted a comprehensive study of the Helmand in 2005 and had come up with a really good deployment plan. They recommended to the army that it fortify the two largest towns, engage in reconstruction in those towns, leave the current governor in place even though he was a Narco Khan, and most importantly, stay out of the rest of the province. Her Majesties government instead insisted that Karzai remove the governor, focused on poppy eradication and, based on intel that there were only 420 Taliban in the province, decided they could ruck up to densely populated areas and kill them while ignoring all the other pricks milling around as if they were gliding through the ####ing matrix.
Later there is a comment, with a similar caveat:
In ‘06 the British requested ANA reinforcement for Lashkar Gah. We deployed the Kandak’s second company, along with their ETTs and some SF guys. The British commander on site gladly accepted the ANA, but told the US troops “You lot are too aggressive. We don’t need you.” The ANA looked at the situation and told the ETTs, if you aren’t staying, neither are we.” The whole caravan mounted up and headed back to FOB Rescorla. Since when is being aggressive a bad thing in a combat soldier?
Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4808#comments
The citations are a minor point within a wide-ranging article, the focus being the period living with the Afghans and the arrival of a contractor that contributed to living within the wire - will locate a suitable thread for that.
davidbfpo
08-12-2012, 10:52 AM
Two soldiers died this week and that is the KIA figure today.
The number of British troops in Helmand will be reduced by around 500 between September and the end of the year....to around 9,000 troops...three of the brigade’s infantry companies, which number around 150 personnel, will only serve for three months...
Bye, bye USMC:
Meanwhile the size of the US force in Helmand will reduce from 20,000 US Marines to 7,000 by the end of October
This is "spin" or wishful thinking:
It is understood that ISAF numbers in Helmand will be boosted by Afghan security forces and that there will be no requirement for Britain to backfill the US drawdown.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9469671/Dead-British-officer-was-due-home-from-Afghanistan-in-weeks.html
As previous posts have discussed the UK's presence in Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, has little to do with maintaining local security. As every day passes national reputation and how to leave without giving the appearance of the Taliban winning become the deciding factors.
I remain unconvinced that President Karzai and his motley coalition will give Helmand Province the priority for ANSF deployment that first the UK - with allies did - and then the USA, with two USMC brigades.
Two soldiers died this week and that is the KIA figure today.
Bye, bye USMC:
This is "spin" or wishful thinking:
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9469671/Dead-British-officer-was-due-home-from-Afghanistan-in-weeks.html
As previous posts have discussed the UK's presence in Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, has little to do with maintaining local security. As every day passes national reputation and how to leave without giving the appearance of the Taliban winning become the deciding factors.
I remain unconvinced that President Karzai and his motley coalition will give Helmand Province the priority for ANSF deployment that first the UK - with allies did - and then the USA, with two USMC brigades.
When will an honest appraisal of where the reductions will leave the balance of power in Helmand be available?
davidbfpo
08-12-2012, 12:44 PM
JMA asked:
When will an honest appraisal of where the reductions will leave the balance of power in Helmand be available?
Such an appraisal will not be placed in the public domain by the UK government. It may appear in US Congressional testimony or US "think tank" reporting. It is possible that a non-official British reviewer of the situation may appear, either an academic or journalist who can survive the reaction of the MoD.
I cannot readily think of a single analytical assessment of the UK in Helmand, let alone the balance of power appearing in public. Yes, we have embedded journalists writing and TV documentaries.
JMA asked:
Such an appraisal will not be placed in the public domain by the UK government. It may appear in US Congressional testimony or US "think tank" reporting. It is possible that a non-official British reviewer of the situation may appear, either an academic or journalist who can survive the reaction of the MoD.
I cannot readily think of a single analytical assessment of the UK in Helmand, let alone the balance of power appearing in public. Yes, we have embedded journalists writing and TV documentaries.
It seems that the military has an idea of where this is heading:
David Cameron warned that Afghanistan pullout could allow al-Qaeda to return (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9450503/David-Cameron-warned-that-Afghanistan-pullout-could-allow-al-Qaeda-to-return.html)
Quote:
Military commanders have warned the Prime Minister that Afghanistan’s future could be jeopardised with al-Qaeda returning to the country if foreign troops are withdrawn too quickly, senior sources have disclosed.
Do you think anyone cares about "Afghanistan's future"? ... or are they just intent on getting out of there ASAP?
davidbfpo
08-12-2012, 04:57 PM
JMA asked:
Do you think anyone cares about "Afghanistan's future"? ... or are they just intent on getting out of there ASAP?
The UK government and all the main political parties remain committed to our current policy - which is to be the USA's most steadfast ally in Afghanistan. The moment American policy changes the UK will swiftly follow. Afghanistan's future and that of its citizens feature very low in political priorities; concerns over women's rights, education and other "advances" do affect a small cross-party minority, such as the Conservative MP Rory Stewart.
Yes there is a strategic assumption, which underpins not just UK policy, that the political and military presence stops Afghanistan being used by AQ. Arguing that "nation building" is under-way in 2012 is rather stale.
The biggest political obstacle to the UK leaving is how to manage the consequences of a Taliban victory - an observation from a Whitehall-Westminster watcher.
Secondly he posted:
It seems that the military has an idea of where this is heading
It is easy to suggest two big factors explain the military viewpoint: after the end of a direct combat role more cuts can be made to them and how internally all the losses, principally in blood, can be explained if the Taliban win and the Kabul regime falls.
JMA asked:
The UK government and all the main political parties remain committed to our current policy - which is to be the USA's most steadfast ally in Afghanistan. The moment American policy changes the UK will swiftly follow. Afghanistan's future and that of its citizens feature very low in political priorities; concerns over women's rights, education and other "advances" do affect a small cross-party minority, such as the Conservative MP Rory Stewart.
Yes there is a strategic assumption, which underpins not just UK policy, that the political and military presence stops Afghanistan being used by AQ. Arguing that "nation building" is under-way in 2012 is rather stale.
The biggest political obstacle to the UK leaving is how to manage the consequences of a Taliban victory - an observation from a Whitehall-Westminster watcher.
Secondly he posted:
It is easy to suggest two big factors explain the military viewpoint: after the end of a direct combat role more cuts can be made to them and how internally all the losses, principally in blood, can be explained if the Taliban win and the Kabul regime falls.
It's probably reasonable to assume that there will be a betrayal of the current Afghan "allies" on a parallel course as for Vietnam. One can hardly blame those in the Karzai regime for diverting a percentage of the "aid" money to purchasing retirement mansions and establishing big bank accounts in Dubai.
Anyone want to put money on this?
New Season of Our War is out. Episode One is now on YouTube:
Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlCZnAPM4sk)
Tonight - 27 Aug - 21.00 UK time - is episode 2 in BBC 3
davidbfpo
08-27-2012, 03:46 PM
JMA,
Thanks for locating the YouTube link. The programme was very good, yes sad and left one wondering what the infantry company was doing - diverting the Taliban from hindering highway building and becoming a bullet & IED "magnet".
A few "armchair" points: the British RoE prevented firing on vehicles carrying the Taliban into position was left unexplained. The Taliban's preparation of deserted compounds with multiple IEDs and the British ability to move at night unhindered.
BBC News articles in support of the film; a three minute clip:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19315410
A British military operation in Helmand claimed two lives in the summer of 2010, including that of Capt Andrew Griffiths. His father, Brig Mike Griffiths, is the most senior serving officer to have lost a child in Afghanistan, and two years on, he uses his own experience of grief to advise visiting officers, whose job it is to break the news of deaths and injuries to Army families.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19243508
JMA,
Thanks for locating the YouTube link. The programme was very good, yes sad and left one wondering what the infantry company was doing - diverting the Taliban from hindering highway building and becoming a bullet & IED "magnet".
A few "armchair" points: the British RoE prevented firing on vehicles carrying the Taliban into position was left unexplained. The Taliban's preparation of deserted compounds with multiple IEDs and the British ability to move at night unhindered.
BBC News articles in support of the film; a three minute clip:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19315410
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19243508
David, watched the second episode last night live (using a UK proxy). Will watch for it to appear on YouTube.
Your comments are IMHO valid. This footage is circa 2010 so one sincerely hopes "things" have improved since.
davidbfpo
08-28-2012, 06:04 PM
Last night's episode was not so grim, even if a deployment in 'Death Valley', between Gereshk and Sangin IIRC. The infantry platoons featured each took over a patrol base from a USMC company, on a tarmacked highway alongside the 'Green Zone'; initially they tried foot patrolling and had to change to vehicle-borne patrolling. The main enemy being IEDs and snipers.
The most significant segment came at the end. Following an IED killing a minibus full of locals en route to a wedding, even though it ignored signals to stop by the troops, the local Afghan attitude swiftly changed. Measured in friendly encounters and enrolling thirty military age males a day on biometrics, which IIRC led to three arrests including one prison escapee.
Oddly no there was no commentary on the accompanying ANSF, on patrol and inside the patrol bases. They appeared to be ANCOP, not ANA.
New Season of Our War is out. Episode One is now on YouTube:
Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlCZnAPM4sk)
Tonight - 27 Aug - 21.00 UK time - is episode 2 in BBC 3
I note that this episode has been taken down on YouTube. Pity.
I note that this episode has been taken down on YouTube. Pity.
The first episode is back up... for how long I don't know:
Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJmEjp9wNBA)
Plus the second episode:
Our War - Return To Death Valley (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqEIF-K15A4)
.
I watched the third episode last night, harrowing stuff. I've read Dead Men Risen and seen some of the clips of the contact which killed Mark Evison before. Seeing it in it's entirety was all the more gut wrenching. Powerful stuff indeed.
davidbfpo
09-04-2012, 07:08 PM
TDB,
Yes the third episode was grim, especially as it was Lt. Mark Evison, of the Welsh Guards - whose diary was partly published shortly after his death by his mother. Three years on I just remember his criticism "mowing the lawn" and questioning the rational for their presence.
Worth reading his mother's recent interview too; she consented to the footage being shown:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/9514331/The-mother-who-wants-the-public-to-see-how-her-son-Mark-Evison-died-fighting-in-Afghanistan.html
I have chosen one short passage, which is prefaced with:
But while public support for front-line soldiers has steadily grown, ignorance lingers about just what they face in Afghanistan.
(Then she speaks) Programmes like Our War are important,even if I find them very upsetting. They show the grittiness, the hands-on aspects of the war, exactly what is going on. There is still very hard fighting in Afghanistan.
Ok, Episode 3.
60mins was too long to deal with the death of Lt Mark Evison. There was too much trivia from troopies whose overly profane - and often inane - comment was used as fillers.
Having read the book and already seen the key footage there were no surprises except that shot of the little "shrine" 7 Platoon erected when they heard Evison had died. He meant something to his men.
This was folowed by the report that on that very night the Taliban gave the platoon base a buzz and the troopie said (something like): "They chose the wrong fooking night to have a buzz." Good to see the Brit spirit is alive and well.
Three years have passed so one assumes that the obvious tactical issues have been dealt with.
I wonder about the radio problems. Nothing seemed to work. Outrageous situation.
My final comment on this series is that once again the lack of operational continuity at platoon/company level has an obvious impact on field performance. Nothing will improve as the Brits are already reducing their numbers. Think this will be a war the Brits will want to forget.
Episode 3 now on YouTube:
Our War - The Lost Platoon (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpmiU1vIXV4)
.
davidbfpo
09-07-2012, 10:35 AM
Indeed, why would anyone do so? The link is to a blog on the UK DFID website by their top official in Helmand:http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/catrionalaing/2012/09/05/helmand-development-conference-why-would-anyone-invest-in-helmand/
It is well different and far too much "spin". Take this passage for example:
So what makes Helmand – only one of Afghanistan’s 34 Provinces different? Well one difference is that Helmand is the largest Province by geography.
Yes, but hardly anyone lives outside the Helmand Valley, better known as 'The Green Zone'. Not a word about poppy growing.
I couldn't resist the offer to give feedback and my comment is 'awaiting moderation':
Simple answer, no I will not invest in Helmand. Nor should my government. This campaign since 2006 has overall been a disaster for the UK and the local people – who have died in their thousands or had their homes destroyed.
Yes Helmand Province is large, but 90% plus of the people live in the ‘Green Zone’ and as recent footage has shown this means it is densely populated.
If the locals want democracy what happened in the six districts that do not have ‘simple democracy’ Which districts are they?
Even ISAF admit 90% of the Taliban fight within a few kilometres of their home; quite contrary to your passage ‘ This makes it much more difficult for the insurgency to present a credible alternative’. We may not like it, but the Taliban have become a rival government. Let alone the impact of the local, Pashtun culture and history of resistance to outsiders.
This is from DFID who spent cash on a children’s adventure park with a Ferris wheel, paid for water wells at the cost of US$100k each – after GIRoA took its fee – sorry bribes – and supplied farmers with ammonium nitrate in a chemical composition that enabled its use as an explosive.
Finally the conference in Kabul aims to ‘lock in’ outsiders, the people who will decide are the local people, who will they choose after 2014 GIRoA or the Taliban? You use the word ‘fragile’, better would be temporary.
ganulv
09-07-2012, 12:32 PM
Yes, but hardly anyone lives outside the Helmand Valley, better known as 'The Green Zone'. Not a word about poppy growing.
I’m friends with a young Afghan man who has traveled all over Afghanistan and Pakistan with his father buying up bike parts for their shop in Kabul and the only place I have ever asked him about in Afghanistan that he has described as being so dangerous he would not want travel to or through it at this point is Helmand. Before I could ask why he said, “Because of the drug trade.”
Interesting book on Afghanistan:
Company Commander
by Major Russell Lewis MC - OC B Coy, 2 Para
http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51n%2BrT9U34L._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA278_PIkin4,BottomRight,-70,22_AA300_SH20_OU02_.jpg
His summary answering the question, "What have I learnt?"
What have I learnt? I have learnt that I don’t panic in a crisis situation. I have learnt what it is like to be in combat. I have learnt that you have got to keep calm because panicking really doesn’t help. I have learnt that six months is too long somewhere like this, with the conditions and the tempo the way they are. I have learnt that you have got to temper your expectations. I have learnt that people will surprise you in both a good and a bad way. I have learnt that combat is a great leveller; people’s true self comes out, you just can’t hide it. I have learnt that command is very lonely and that you have to make unpopular decisions. I have learnt what leadership really is.
Lewis, Russell (2012-06-07). Company Commander (p. 389). Random House UK. Kindle Edition.
Pity it took until he was a major to learn these basics...
(Any Brit readers know where to find his MC citation?)
Granite_State
09-16-2012, 03:20 AM
Read that on a flight back from London a few weeks ago. Pretty good, gave me a look at a Helmand deployment that was the opposite of my own (which was pretty non-kinetic, way down south, counter-narcotics, a lot of needles in haystacks). 8-10 man patrols were our standard, seems like he and his "Toms" never went deep into the green zone with less than a company (-).
Read that on a flight back from London a few weeks ago. Pretty good, gave me a look at a Helmand deployment that was the opposite of my own (which was pretty non-kinetic, way down south, counter-narcotics, a lot of needles in haystacks). 8-10 man patrols were our standard, seems like he and his "Toms" never went deep into the green zone with less than a company (-).
Yes it is an interesting account. Hoewever, I am generally cautious of officers constructing a book based on a journal which was maintained for that purpose. (Rather like form the book "Platoon Leader" by James R McDonough took - not sure it was from a journal though). One gets the feeling that such works are written as possible future "recommended reading" titles ...
Back to the book...
There remains a concern about the departure from fundamental Principles of War in Afghanistan operations and how the Brits (certainly) lost the initiative as a result. In this case once again the failure to apply the principle of "Concentration of Force" - called in the US, as I understand, "Mass".
As Rommel said of the Brits way back then: "What difference does it make if you have two tanks to my one, when you spread them out and let me smash them in detail?" Same apply to penny-packeting your troops in Helmand?
By all means put some "bait" out there in a FOB or on patrol so long as when the Taliban expose themselves - by attacking either - you have the reserves and resources to respond and deploy and implement the last two of the "Find, Fix & Finish" doctrine.
The Brits never had the means to do this but the yanks do/did.
davidbfpo
09-16-2012, 10:58 AM
JMA asked:
Any Brit readers know where to find his MC citation?
A little research found this text in Major Lewis's old school magazine, which IIRC is likely to be based on the official text which would have appeared in 'The London Gazette', but that website eludes easy use.
St Albans soldier wins Military Cross in Afghanistan - Major Russell Lewis MC (S86-91)
A soldier from St Albans has won a top bravery award for his actions in Afghanistan. “Major Russ Lewis, aged 35, has been awarded the Military Cross for his heroic leadership of a company of the Parachute Regiment during a six-month tour in southern Afghanistan.
“Major Lewis and his company of 160 troops of 2PARA were located in a Forward Operating Base deep in the hostile Upper Sangin Valley and were subjected to almost daily rocket and mortar attacks. He led many foot patrols through the dense vegetation, canals and compounds of the surrounding countryside and during frequent bouts of intense fighting with the Taliban.
Major Lewis’ citation described him as "tenacious and courageous in attack" and added: "Major Lewis has set an outstanding example to his company at significant personal risk and has been an inspiration to all ranks."
“Major Lewis lives with his wife Andrea at Colchester where his unit is stationed. His wife, who is pregnant with their first child, is a major in the Queen Alexandra Royal Army Nursing Corps and set up the first field hospital in Iraq.
“Said Major Lewis of the bravery award: "I have mixed feelings about the award. It's a fantastic honour to receive such an award and I do think that it represents all of B Company, 2 PARA and what we achieved last summer".
Speaking about the intensity of the deployment on the Army’s website after his Company’s return from Afghanistan at the end of October, Major Lewis said: “Once it started it didn’t really stop for three months. We were just in the thick of it. We went through a period where every single patrol that went out came into contact of some description. There have been some horrible moments. I said before we went, I felt this tour would give us the best soldiering days of our careers and our worst. It has.”
Major Lewis described the soldiers under his command as “the finest generation of paratroopers in the history of the Parachute Regiment”. He added: “we lost three in one go to a suicide bomber and that was just an awful day, but it’s amazing how the guys deal with it. We had a night of grieving and the next day we were back out there. We had to, but I think that was what we wanted to do for our comrades, we are paratroopers and we go straight back out there and take the fight to the enemy.”
Link:http://www.oldaldenhamian.org/Download/Aldenhamiana37.pdf
I note the Major now offers to talk on leadership, for a fee 3-4k.
Two other Para majors and one private got the MC, along with thirty others getting awards; the brigade lost eleven dead, nine from 2 Para.
Yes it is an interesting account. Hoewever, I am generally cautious of officers constructing a book based on a journal which was maintained for that purpose. (Rather like form the book "Platoon Leader" by James R McDonough took - not sure it was from a journal though). One gets the feeling that such works are written as possible future "recommended reading" titles ...
In response:
I note the Major now offers to talk on leadership, for a fee 3-4k.
Oh dear...
davidbfpo
09-17-2012, 10:56 PM
Today after the camp Bastion attack and two dead soldiers in a "green on blue" attack by an ALP member, the UK Defence Secretary stated in the House of Commons:
The security of our troops on the front line in Afghanistan, or for that matter anywhere in the world, remains our priority...In recent days we have again been reminded of the difficult and challenging environment in which our armed forces operate. We cannot and will not allow the strategy to be derailed... The pain felt is all the more raw when the incident undermines the trust that our armed forces have built in Afghanistan.
It is rare for British MPs to openly say enough:
..former Conservative cabinet minister John Redwood called for UK troops to be withdrawn from their security role and brought home "in time for Christmas"....(Paul Flynn, a very minor) Labour MP made the same demand, during some heated scenes in the Commons chamber.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-19627090
The whole ALP scheme was a disaster waiting to happen
Read that on a flight back from London a few weeks ago. Pretty good, gave me a look at a Helmand deployment that was the opposite of my own (which was pretty non-kinetic, way down south, counter-narcotics, a lot of needles in haystacks). 8-10 man patrols were our standard, seems like he and his "Toms" never went deep into the green zone with less than a company (-).
Just thinking... it may be of interest to those in the US that Major Lewis was commissioned in 1994 - so entered the army in 1993 - and finally got command of B Coy, 2 Para in 2007 - just before the tour of Afghanistan in 2008.
That is 13 years of commissioned service (14 years of total service) before he was given command of a parachute company at the age of 34.
davidbfpo
09-21-2012, 10:39 AM
Amidst all the news of Camp Bastion, Prince Harry and "green on blue" along comes an article on what the UK and allies are doing on the ground:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/20/afghanistan-british-military-insurgents-taliban
the cost:
Eighteen British soldiers have died there since the beginning of the year, nine in the last 10 weeks. Afghan soldiers have perished in even greater numbers, 25 since April. Hours before this security meeting, a government official was assassinated less than a mile away.
Yes there is a good amount from senior officers - following the official legend. There is a closing comment by an ANA commander, which might actually happen sooner than expected:
This is our country and our people, and it is our obligation to take responsibility for their safety. There will be peace. The only question is when.
JMA asked:
A little research found this text in Major Lewis's old school magazine, which IIRC is likely to be based on the official text which would have appeared in 'The London Gazette', but that website eludes easy use.
Link:http://www.oldaldenhamian.org/Download/Aldenhamiana37.pdf
I note the Major now offers to talk on leadership, for a fee 3-4k.
Two other Para majors and one private got the MC, along with thirty others getting awards; the brigade lost eleven dead, nine from 2 Para.
David, found the list of awards in "The London Gazette" but not his citation or any of the others. The Brit are cunning the way they turn navigating a website into a puzzle ;)
Suffice it to say from what was posted above and from my enquiries elsewhere Lewis' MC was a general one and not for a specific action. Don't know how the yanks work but my experience was that "crosses" were for individual acts of bravery/gallantry/valour while "orders" were for successful operational command at company/battalion/brigade level. So forgive my confusion on this as I had visions of the company commander personally leading the final bayonet charge (like Major John Kiszely of the Scots Guards in the Falklands at Tumbledown).
As an aside... quoting:
“Said Major Lewis of the bravery award: "I have mixed feelings about the award. It's a fantastic honour to receive such an award and I do think that it represents all of B Company, 2 PARA and what we achieved last summer".
No names no pack drill but... I recall from my war the story of an SAS officer who got a medal after which he clumsily told his men that it was "our medal in recognition for the achievements of all of us". A few weeks went by until one of the lads had the opportunity to ask the question, "Sir, I am going to a military wedding this week-end would you mind if I wore our medal". One red face and a lot of laughter.
.
Marines charged with murder over Afghanistan death
Five Royal Marines charged with murder over the death of an insurgent in Afghanistan in 2011
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/14/marines-charged-murder-afghanistan
Well this is curious. The article itself is a load of bollocks, not only do they call the marines "soldiers" but they also says British ROE are "largely derived from the Geneva conventions". Forgive me if I'm wrong but I'd say current ROE in Afghanistan are a fairly modern invention? Worth noting that a documentary aired on channel 5 in January follow some marines from 42, in which they expressed frustration with the ROE. Not the first and certainly not the last. I'd be interested to hear what other people thought on the ROE, in particular anyone who's had to work within them.
Marines charged with murder over Afghanistan death
Five Royal Marines charged with murder over the death of an insurgent in Afghanistan in 2011
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/14/marines-charged-murder-afghanistan
Well this is curious. The article itself is a load of bollocks, not only do they call the marines "soldiers" but they also says British ROE are "largely derived from the Geneva conventions". Forgive me if I'm wrong but I'd say current ROE in Afghanistan are a fairly modern invention? Worth noting that a documentary aired on channel 5 in January follow some marines from 42, in which they expressed frustration with the ROE. Not the first and certainly not the last. I'd be interested to hear what other people thought on the ROE, in particular anyone who's had to work within them.
Couple of points...
First it is of note that 5 (I think it is) have been formally charged with murder and remain in custody. So this is more than fishing/probing investigation. They believe they have the evidence to make a murder charge stick.
We have heard around here (on SWC) that soldiers on the ground in Afghan (both Brit and yank) are "happy" with the RoE. Where does the truth lie?
What acts would constitute the murder of an insurgent in Afghanistan?
.
Marines charged with murder over Afghanistan death
Five Royal Marines charged with murder over the death of an insurgent in Afghanistan in 2011
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/14/marines-charged-murder-afghanistan
Well this is curious. The article itself is a load of bollocks, not only do they call the marines "soldiers" but they also says British ROE are "largely derived from the Geneva conventions". Forgive me if I'm wrong but I'd say current ROE in Afghanistan are a fairly modern invention? Worth noting that a documentary aired on channel 5 in January follow some marines from 42, in which they expressed frustration with the ROE. Not the first and certainly not the last. I'd be interested to hear what other people thought on the ROE, in particular anyone who's had to work within them.
From The Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9607343/Five-Royal-Marines-charged-with-murder-following-video-footage-discovery.html):
The servicemen are understood to have been arrested after a video was discovered on a laptop belonging to a Royal Marine.
The clip appears to show members of a Royal Marine patrol standing around a Taliban fighter as he lay injured on the ground in a compound.
They were apparently discussing what to do with him and whether to administer first aid but the film is said to cut out before anything happens.
davidbfpo
11-04-2012, 02:31 PM
A recent piece of research, based on opinion polling:
The research is the first major study into British public attitudes towards the military and is published today as part of the 2011 British Social Attitudes survey.
Link to review article, with links to authors and more:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/newsevents/newsrecords/armedforces.aspx
Link to the Survey's section:http://bsa-29.natcen.ac.uk/read-the-report/armed-forces/introduction.aspx
The research found that nine out of ten people respected the UK Armed Forces and eight out of ten had a high or very high opinion of the Services. The UK Armed Forces was also more respected as a profession than doctors, lawyers or the police. It seems that support for the UK Armed Forces is significantly higher among men, older people, those with lower educational qualifications and people who align with parties on the political right, as found in overseas studies.
The study also showed that 58% of the UK public were opposed to Iraq and 46% disapproved of operations in Afghanistan, with women, older people and people supporting minor political parties significantly more opposed to the missions. Despite this, more than 90% supported military personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, regardless of their agreement or disagreement with these missions.
davidbfpo
11-10-2012, 07:45 PM
A commentary on the debacle over giving troops better vehicles in Afghanistan, with a rather stark comparison between the labour government and the current Conservative-Liberal coalition:
Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief history. First, for all the Conservatives’ agitation between 2006 and 2010, there has been no significant change since the election in either scale or urgency in supplying equipment to our forces in Afghanistan. In opposition, David Cameron and his team argued consistently and stridently that they would have been able to supply the necessary equipment much faster. But Foxhound has proceeded on exactly the same two-year timetable which the army and the Ministry of Defence, left to their own devices, always insisted was the fastest possible. The striking exception to this timetable remains the Mastiff, which was ordered in July 2006 and deployed in December of the same year — through the personal intervention of the then Defence Secretary Des Browne, and the hands-on management of the procurement minister Lord Drayson — but rather than being used as a model for a new approach, this seems to have been quietly forgotten.
Link:http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2012/06/foxhound-arrives-in-afghanistan-five-years-too-late/
davidbfpo
11-16-2012, 11:44 AM
Paddy Ashdown, a former leader of the Liberal-Democrats awhile ago, an ex-SBS officer and with the experience of Bosnia, has a rather unusual place in British politics - he is listened to with respect.
So when he makes these remarks some will listen, HMG certainly will not and the public will agree. So what did he say?
The only outcome of staying longer is more deaths for no purpose; most of them now caused not by the enemy in front of our troops, but by the enemy among them. It is not worth wasting one more life in Afghanistan.
All that we can achieve has now been achieved. All that we might have achieved if we had done things differently, has been lost. The only rational policy now is to leave quickly, in good order and in the company of our allies.
Lord Ashdown conceded that British forces have succeeded in driving out al-Qaeda, the main reason behind the conflict, but he said:
In almost all the other tasks we set ourselves, especially the establishment of a sustainable state, we have failed.
The interview first appeared in The Times, this is behind a pay wall, so I use this second hand report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9682302/We-have-failed-in-Afghanistan-and-should-pull-out-immediately-says-Paddy-Ashdown.html
A former Afghan veteran added (via Twitter):
Only we won: AQ smashed, OBL dead.
davidbfpo
12-17-2012, 09:05 PM
The UK CDS, General Sir David Richards, has spoken publicly on wider matters and of course leaving:
It is vital that Afghan confidence in the West’s long-term commitment to their country is retained. Why, should this be lost, would they stay the course themselves let alone fight to protect us in 2014 when, absent successful reconciliation, we will be at our most vulnerable?
And why should the Taliban reconcile, if they thought we were ‘cutting and running.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9751264/British-troops-most-vulerable-during-Afghan-withdrawal.html
Given the state of the UK economy I was mildly surprised mention was made of future deployments in the Middle East, with local allies, like Jordan.
davidbfpo
01-26-2013, 02:36 PM
Lt Mark Evison, a Welsh Guards officer died after being shot in Afghanistan in mid-2009, his incredibly brave mother, Margaret, has written her story: 'Death of a soldier: A Mother's Story' and was reviewed in 'The Spectator' recently:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/8806561/the-further-tragedy-of-unknowing/
Mark Evison coined the phrase "mowing the grass" IIRC when his letters or diary were released after his death - asking what exactly were the soldiers doing.
...she realises that some things about the official account of what happened to him don’t add up. Why did it take so long for a helicopter to airlift him out? As a result of the delay, Mark bled until his heart was ‘dry’ just 30 kilometres from a sophisticated hospital base.
(Ends) She never really gets to the bottom of what happened to her son — and in a way it’s this lack of answers that makes her book so powerful. Quite possibly, she acknowledges, there is no sinister back-story, no dark chicanery. Instead, there is just blunder and evasion. As she writes, ‘The muddle over Mark’s death seemed to reflect a more fundamental Army and political muddle over Afghanistan, as well as a muddle about itself.’
davidbfpo
03-20-2013, 11:19 PM
A very curious way to tell the UK public, an Army brigadier in Afghanistan being interviewed by the BBC's Mark Urban:
We have reduced our profile to such an extent that we don't do ground combat type operations anymore...[The] Afghans with whom we work still like to know that they can call upon us...
Alas an ANA Brigadier in central Helmand dissented:
In terms of combat we did not need any help with that and we have not asked for any.
Mark Urban questioned why so many UK troops remained, the answer was slightly odd - hinting at far fewer being in Helmand and Urban writes:
During the current six month troop rotation - now coming to its end - around 900 troops were sent home early, bringing the total down to around 7,000. There are plans to cut back to 5,200 by the end of the year, both figures exclude the special forces group of around 1,000.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-21839451
Elsewhere an observer reports an infantry battalion (2 Royal Scots) is about to leave, to mentor the ANP.
The main thread 'The UK in Afghanistan' is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644
davidbfpo
03-21-2013, 11:32 PM
A "lurker" has pointed out that the Danish Battle Group, long assigned to the UK forces in Helmand, will leave by March 2014, six months earlier than previously announced.
davidbfpo
04-12-2013, 03:06 PM
The UK in Afghanistan has been the subject of a House of Commons Select Committee on Defence review, for odd reasons it was published this week when parliament was on holiday and so had little coverage amidst the focus on Lady Thatcher's demise.
Link:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/413/413.pdf
There have been a few comments, so starting with Paul Rogers:
.. there is deeply conflicting evidence as to whether the Taliban are actually in retreat; the second is that the committee has faced great difficulty in trying to find out how Britain plans to aid Afghanistan after the withdrawal.
(Later) In the British parliamentary system, select committees are (with a few exceptions) not particularly effective at calling governments to account - and usually this is even more true for the defence committee. Its Afghanistan report is different: a welcome sign that at least one part of the political system is trying to get a stronger focus on what is really happening in Afghanistan, and whether the UK and other governments should be replacing their "boots on the ground" with much greater efforts to help Afghans rebuild their own country.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/afghanistan-day-after
Kings of War:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/04/hammers-spanners-and-civil-wars/
The Daily Telegraph's Foreign Editor:
One of the more depressing observations made by a defence select committee report this week concerned the apparent lack of interest that both the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office have displayed in Afghanistan’s administration post-2014 – when Nato’s combat operations officially conclude. Given that these departments were responsible for dispatching thousands of British troops to southern Afghanistan in the summer of 2006, one would have thought they would be doing their best to ensure that the sacrifices of the past decade – the total British death toll stands at 441 – are not in vain.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9987145/Britains-Afghan-war-is-over-but-there-is-still-no-sign-of-peace.html
The Guardian's correspondent has some "boots on the ground" experience and concludes:
Unfortunately, it looks like the need for a quick exit will mean the west caves in to Pakistan's demands. At that stage, we will have gone full circle in Afghanistan since 2001, with Pakistan once again back in the driving seat and civil war the only realistic outlook.
Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/12/civil-war-price-afghans-criminals-west
Last night the BBC re-ran what appeared to be a short clip of an interview with Lt. General Nick Carter, ex-RC(S) and now Deputy ISAF CO; in which he stated:
Cutting British forces in Afghanistan too quickly could "endanger" progress at a critical time, the UK's top commander there has told a paper......But he warned any move to thin out UK forces too soon would be unforgivable.
I have just noted the report is dated April 1st 2013.
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