The UK in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

It appears the UK just cannot draw down yet:
Thousands of British troops will start serving longer tours in Afghanistan from October, the defence secretary has announced....And it means that only another two brigades will serve ....rather than three.. The UK has 7,900 troops in the country, set to fall to 5,200 by the end of the year.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22520249 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/14/british-troops-longer-tours-afghanistan

Given the SWC debate on length of operational tours it does strange longer tours come at the end.

The value of having an entire brigade in Helmand, largely within Camp Bastion, when the ANSF are becoming independently capable is lost on me in my armchair.

[davidbfpo]

Chatham House has published a report 'The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012' by two Kings College War Studies academics, both with "time served" in Afghanistan, mainly in Helmand. Unusually it is freely available as a twenty-eight page PDF:http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_4/89_4_03_FarrellGiustozzi.pdf

There's also a podcast with Theo Farrell:http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/193055

Meantime two passages to whet the appetite:
Far from helping to secure Helmand, the arrival of the British triggered a violent intensification of the insurgency.....

.....What we find is an insurgency that is driven both by a strong unifying strategic narrative and purpose – jihad against foreign invaders – and by local conflict dynamics: rivalry between kinship groups and competition over land, water and drugs.

Citations from:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/10/uk-forces-helmand-afghanistan?CMP=twt_gu

Yes, there is a long running thread 'The UK in Afghanistan' from March 2006, with a thousand posts and 103k views - which is one of the highest on SWC. One day this thread will be merged into that thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644

[davidbfpo]

In 2010 Matt Cavanagh, an external 'special adviser' to the previous Labour government, wrote a review of Bob Woodward's book 'Obama's Wars' which I missed and today he Tweeted a reminder:http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/inside-the-anglo-saxon-war-machine/#.Ugfht21h9ec

It is an interesting commentary on the management and political direction of the UK's war in Afghanistan, or more accurately non-management rather than a book review and contrasts what the USA did too.

[davidbfpo]

Elsewhere on SWC and SWJ IIRC references have been made to the continuing American assistance given to the ANSF, in particular its SOF components, so it comes as no great personal surprise the UK does too. In their mixed up way British officialdom maintains:
We have reduced our profile to such an extent that we don't do ground combat-type operations any more.

Now we learn, via a regimental journal, that a company of the SFSG in partnership with Afghan commandos has mounted combat operations:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10251377/Elite-forces-in-secret-raids-against-Taliban-bomb-makers.html

[Red Rat]

All is clear in the fog of command chains.

Task Force Helmand (essentially the British Brigade in Helmand)
as I understand it is not longer involved in routine combat operations.
The Special Forces Support Group are not part of Task Force Helmand but probably come under a CJSOTF lead.

I have only seen the newspaper article, but even from that it would seem that the focus on operations mentioned is on mentoring the Afghans.

this to me sounds more like a good illustration of how the military likes to build a narrative. The UK may no longer be involved in routine combat operatuions, but that does not necessarily mean that UK personnel are not routinely engaged in combat!

[davidbfpo]

The UK (447 dead), with allies, then the USMC (374 dead) in 'surge' mode from 2010, have fought in Helmand Province since 2006 and now it appears the gains are slipping away before the final withdrawal later this year.

Oddly media coverage in the UK is very limited, maybe the festive season has better news to cover. More likely is that the media presence is reducing, especially as Western reporters can only rarely go around unaccompanied. I have seen more regularly clues appearing on Twitter, even if linked to reports in 'The Times' behind a pay-wall.

Pre-Xmas there were reports of a local agreement in Sangin between the GIRoA and the Taliban, with alleged 'joint patrols':http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/afghanistan/article3951966.ece

An interesting non-media explanation that such a relationship is good news for Afghans:http://sunnyinkabul.com/2013/12/21/ana-patrol-with-taliban-in-sangin/?utm_content=buffer0d708&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Buffer
Then a detailed WSJ article:http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702304361604579288413792632566-lMyQjAxMTA0MDAwMzEwNDMyWj

Just what is actually happening - from faraway - is not clear and UK political-military leaders have made some reassuring remarks. So we have PM David Cameron on a pre-Xmas visit, with 'mission accomplished' as the headline:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10397126/David-Cameron-declares-mission-accomplished-in-Afghanistan.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25398608

The UK's most senior generals comment, which refers to possible Taliban gains:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10538658/Taliban-could-retake-key-territory-says-Army-head.html

RUSI Director Professor Michael Clarke responded with:
Whether Afghanistan will succeed after 12 years of involvement is something that we really can't do very much about, and that's not really a strategic success.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25407073

For sometime now the British public has had enough of our military role in Afghanistan and one Whitehall observer commented directly two years ago:
We are stuck in Afghanistan until the politicians find a suitable narrative to explain why it was possible to exit, when in fact the original narrative's objectives have not been achieved.

There is a long running thread 'The UK in Afghanistan', which has much of the background alongside comments by those who have been "boots on the ground" and just some critical thinking IMHO. So this thread is likely to be merged there one day:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644

Enough, time to go quickly and some expect a "backlash" here against such interventions - personally I'm unconvinced as few politicians want to assess what we did. No 'lessons learnt' here!

[Red Rat]

Lessons have been identified and applied. This can most readily be seen in the military's transformation of Mission Specific Training, equipment, adoption of new targeting methodologies (F3EA) and in the military's lessons exploitation process.

From an institutional perspective what will be interesting is to see how many of these lessons get taken into 'core' so to speak. In particular those lessons that apply to institutional behaviour and the manning & promotion systems (institutional behaviour & HR are the two areas that in my opinion adapted least and last).

Where lessons if they have been identified almost certainly will not be learnt (applied) is at the higher echelons of defence and government, the operational and strategic levels. At these levels the requirement to protect reputations & maintain face mean that any lessons that threaten the powerful (whether individual or corporate) will be suppressed.

Without a culture of transparency & accountability (rarely present in any bureaucracy) lessons will not be learnt effectively.

[carl]

Where lessons if they have been identified almost certainly will not be learnt (applied) is at the higher echelons of defence and government, the operational and strategic levels. At these levels the requirement to protect reputations & maintain face mean that any lessons that threaten the powerful (whether individual or corporate) will be suppressed.

Without a culture of transparency & accountability (rarely present in any bureaucracy) lessons will not be learnt effectively.

It will be the same thing for us. Our variation will be that the Afghans were such nebbishes that it is all their fault, no blame ascribed to us at all.

Ironically though, the critical failure on our part, failure to recognize and deal with Pak Army/ISI as the enemy, has been pointed out to us by the Afghans for years.

[JMA]

Carl, no matter how they try to spin this, Afghanistan is another war lost at a terrible cost.

Newsweek of 9 Jan sums it up well: http://goo.gl/9Q73Cc



It will be the same thing for us. Our variation will be that the Afghans were such nebbishes that it is all their fault, no blame ascribed to us at all.

Ironically though, the critical failure on our part, failure to recognize and deal with Pak Army/ISI as the enemy, has been pointed out to us by the Afghans for years.

[JMA]

And if that was not bad enough:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/the-looming-narco-state-in-afghanistan/283114/




Carl, no matter how they try to spin this, Afghanistan is another war lost at a terrible cost.

Newsweek of 9 Jan sums it up well: http://goo.gl/9Q73Cc

[davidbfpo]

To many this headline will not be a surprise:
British ex-commander hits out over 'inadequate kit' in Afghanistan. Exclusive: Major Streatfeild speaks of shame at defending equipment and calls for MoD apology over friendly-fire death

Just an indication of what he says now, with a book coming out:
Streatfeild said he now felt ashamed at how he toed the MoD line in reports for the BBC, defending kit he knew to be inadequate.

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/14/british-ex-commander-hits-out-inadequate-kit-afghanistan

Sad.:(

[JMA]

David,

I raised these issues - and more - years ago in this thread and all and sundry attempted to shout me down.

(go back and read a bit for a good laugh - or a cry - depending on where you stood back then)




To many this headline will not be a surprise:

Just an indication of what he says now, with a book coming out:

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/14/british-ex-commander-hits-out-inadequate-kit-afghanistan

Sad.:(

[davidbfpo]

That delightful phrase 'learning the lessons' I know features on SWC threads, but I am encouraged to post this official UK Army account of how it is going to work now.

Their title:
Operational lessons learnt in Afghanistan have made the British Army a more effective fighting force.

Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/news/afghanistan-experience


A successful ‘lessons learnt’ process should enhance our tactics and procedures, reduce casualties, mould our training so troops are better prepared, and lead to the development of better kit.

The system ensures the Army remembers and acts on what it learnt during the last fighting system, from every training event and every incident. It is vital that personnel at all levels contribute and we’ve worked hard to make sure it’s as easy as possible for people to do so.

I would be mildly intrigued how this process has gone elsewhere, especially amongst those armies who have left or ceased combat operations. Yes, calling the Canadians, Aussies and Kiwis. Anyone else is welcome to join in!

[JMA]

The paper opens with this:


Operational lessons learnt in Afghanistan have made the British Army a more effective fighting force.

This is obviously correct.

I suggest the test comes when the next generation of soldiers - those who have no afghan experience - come along. Do they have the lessons learnt effectively passed onto them? Wait and see.



That delightful phrase 'learning the lessons' I know features on SWC threads, but I am encouraged to post this official UK Army account of how it is going to work now.

Their title:

Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/news/afghanistan-experience



I would be mildly intrigued how this process has gone elsewhere, especially amongst those armies who have left or ceased combat operations. Yes, calling the Canadians, Aussies and Kiwis. Anyone else is welcome to join in!

[JMA]

If proof was needed of the quality of the British fighting man herewith the latest operational honours list of 117 members:

Operational Honours and Awards List: 21 March 2014 (http://www.noodls.com/view/2DD2D272EA33D4E964468BB0AD92A94CE61F7067?4987xxx13 95389157)

The British politicians and senior officers have screwed up once again at a cost in blood and treasure of their nation. The soldiers pay the price for this incompetence.

The US story is much the same.

[jcustis]

To many this headline will not be a surprise:

Just an indication of what he says now, with a book coming out:

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/14/british-ex-commander-hits-out-inadequate-kit-afghanistan

Sad.:(

David, the trooper's death which that major highlighted is indeed sad, as is any serviceman's death. It doesn't sound as though we should mourn him for the major alleges.

When you look at it in the context of things, the major sounds, frankly, like the type of risk-averse fellow who prefers to wrap the troops in pillows and stuff an excessive amount of tech in their hands. Perhaps if the major were allowed to go down to sandals, an outfit, a bandoleer of three magazines, and rifle, he would have felt more comfortable being on even footing.

As for the locator beacon, if the article reported it correctly, and the major was in fact referring to the emergency personnel locator beacon issued to US Army troops, he has a terrible misunderstanding of how it works and is used to locate missing personnel. It would likely not have prevented the lance corporal's death.

As for his assertion that more radios would have made a difference, it's hard to dissect that without knowing what the issues were. Were there too few or too many in maintenance? Were they allocated to the wrong echelon? Did the lance corporal's section leader not have a personal radio? At some point a radio becomes another pillow, and without a sound grounding in basic navigation, radio procedures, C2 protocol, or identification of friend or foe techniques, radios are only going to exacerbate a bad situation.

Something doesn't smell right with the reported complaints, and it seems Streatfeild has an axe to grind to bolster book sales. OEF has its issues, but it's not these.

[JMA]

To many this headline will not be a surprise:

Just an indication of what he says now, with a book coming out:

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/14/british-ex-commander-hits-out-inadequate-kit-afghanistan

Sad.:(

This story is unfolding...

Bought the book on Amazon... pity it will take 10 days to get here.

First, The Sangin Diaries.

LEt's pick up the piece from the NYT:

When the End of War Is the Beginning of War (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/world/europe/when-the-end-of-war-is-the-beginning-of-war.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0)


Maj. Richard Streatfeild, 41, was a commander in the hotly contested Sangin region in 2009 and 2010 who became what newspapers called a “poster boy” for the British Army through his blogs about the valor and sacrifice of soldiers on one of the BBC’s most prestigious radio news programs.

In those broadcasts, known as The Sangin Diaries, he acknowledged this week, he played down concerns about poor equipment and training, a lack of radios and a shortage of armored vehicles to protect soldiers from hostile fire and explosives in what he called “the most dangerous place in the world.”

The truth, it is often said, is war’s first casualty.

He gets taken on in a radio interview on BBC RADIO 4 TODAY (https://audioboo.fm/boos/1996950-admitting-problems-over-army-equipment-would-have-undermined-operation)

From the Drum: How the BBC was deceived by Major Richard Streatfeild's propaganda (http://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2014/03/17/how-bbc-was-deceived-major-richard-streatfeilds-propaganda)


This sorry saga of the BBC being conned emphasises more than ever that on the battlefield as in general life, independent journalism is the lifeblood of truth.

Streatfeild now admits that hundreds of soldiers were sent to the most dangerous area of Helmand Province without a single armoured or mine-resistant vehicle; troops who would have to search for deadly Taliban mines using metal detectors had to train using broomsticks and a quota system for gallantry medals meant top brass won awards, while junior soldiers involved in fierce fighting against the Taliban lost out.

The Daily Mail has more interesting stuff:

British snipers killed Afghans in pointless 'turkey shoot' and boosted support for the Taliban, says major who revealed how troops died due to lack of equipment (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2587070/British-snipers-killed-Afghans-pointless-turkey-shoot-boosted-support-Taliban-says-major-revealed-troops-died-lack-equipment.html)


In his book, Streatfeild also launches a sensational attack on former service chief General Sir Mike Jackson, who he accuses of waiting until his ‘splendidly rewarded retirement’ before calling on the MoD to improve soldiers’ welfare.

Sir Mike, 69, Head of the Army from 2003 to 2006, was popular among troops and a formidable leader. But Streatfeild said last night: ‘Let’s look at the record of Sir Mike.
'He waited for his pension then burst into print. He had the rank and position to do more before then.’
Following his retirement in 2006, Sir Mike wrote a memoir in which he accused the MoD of failing to value the contributions of soldiers and their families.


Strange that Streatfeild can't see that he lays himself open to the same criticism that he levels at Jackson.

All that said it is good that finally the truth comes out even if there is a profit motive behind it all.

Oh yes from the book blurb:


In 2009 Major Richard Streatfeild and his men fought for six months against the Taliban in Sangin, northern Helmand. They were engaged in over 800 fire-fights. They were the target of more than 200 improvised explosive devices. Ten men in his company were killed, 50 were wounded.

Those losses are reminiscent of WW1 as they occurred over a six month period.

[jcustis]

Moreover David, his interview leaves me with the nagging impression that he should have spent his time focusing on the enemy or minor tactics of the fight, instead of crafting the 29 diary pieces.

[davidbfpo]

In 2009-2010 the UK campaign in Helmand Province was beginning to have problems on the home front. I have little doubt that it was the MoD PR machine which lobbied the BBC to accept the Sangin diaries by Maj. Richard Streatfeild.

With rare exceptions UK media reporting from Helmand, was invariably from within Camp Bastion and the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, and rarely gave us at home an overview. I know of army officers saying freely that the BBC's Defence Correspondent, Caroline Wyatt, was "on side" and reliable.

The comment 'How the BBC was deceived...' simply lacks credibility. The BBC knew it was broadcasting a sanitized explanation of events in Sangin. Yes they failed to add a "health warning" and this weeks 'Today' programme interview reflects that failure. Claiming the BBC was lied to is IMHO bizarre.

Incidentally the "turning point" for me was C4 News, with an Alistair Thomson report on a company-sized visit to a village, flown in by Chinooks, which was short-lived as sniping intensified and his punch line was that the Chinooks took them back a kilometre to their FOB.

Whether the Major should have done the BBC diaries whilst fighting in such a contested location I cannot judge.

Sangin IRRC was a 'hot spot' with a hostile population that consistently rejected GIRoA and its allies. Only when the USMC arrived was it subdued for a time. My recollection is that Sangin was where the most UK troops died; the figures are probably in a post in this thread.

A number of very interested parties to the UK role have long preferred to have the public "support our boys" and not ask, let alone contest, why are they there? As SWC posts show this divergence was reflected in public opinion polling and the displays at Wotton Bassett as corteges passed by.

[jcustis]

David, Sangin's significance as a rat-infested warren is made all the more pronounced by recent news reports.

Although the CENTCOM homepage recently highlighted an all Afghan-planned and Afghan-executed clearing operation in Sangin, in advance of elections, one should wonder why those are considered achievements if we are still "clearing" the place.

I certainly respect the Brit forces for the fight they faced, which was hampered by so many factors out of brigade and battalion control.

[JMA]

General Sir Mike Jackson on Head to Head on Aljazeera:

Should the West end its wars? (http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2014/03/should-west-end-wars-201438144631862912.html)

Jackson tried valiantly to present a positive spin on the Afghan situation:


"It is a great, great challenge. Afghanistan is on the way. We have not failed in the way you insist on putting it so dramatically."

When pressed he was able to produce one benefit arising out of the political/military action in Afghanistan - improved education for women.

Interesting viewing... but sad, really sad.

[JMA]

Not quite as it seems but...

British sniper in Afghanistan kills six Taliban with one bullet (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10735666/British-sniper-in-Afghanistan-kills-six-Taliban-with-one-bullet.html)


A British sniper in Afghanistan killed six insurgents with a single bullet after hitting the trigger switch of a suicide bomber whose device then exploded...

[JMA]

British Armed Forces complete handover of Helmand Province after eight years and 448 lost lives (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10738050/British-armed-forces-complete-handover-of-Helmand-Province-after-eight-years-and-448-lost-lives.html)


Moving ceremony at Camp Bastion sees UK officially cede operational command in Helmand to US, ahead of full withdrawal later in 2014

[davidbfpo]

A simple eloquent article, under the title:
Christina Schmid: ' I question the wisdom of what we did in Afghanistan'

Christina Schmid, who gave defiant public support to the Armed Forces after the death of her husband, reveals her reservations about the human cost of the campaign

One wonders, even after the Syria vote, if our politicians will follow her advice:
This country is still on its knees. We cannot intervene. Morally, spiritually, physically, economically, we are broken from the last decade of conflict. We have to be realistic, to tread carefully, to ask what can be achieved.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10744722/Christina-Schmid--I-question-the-wisdom-of-what-we-did-in-Afghanistan.html

[davidbfpo]

It is time that the British government, the military and Parliament draw the correct lessons from this failure, and change the way we operate. The decision to “surge” troop numbers was doomed to fail because we had the wrong people, and the wrong objectives for our Afghan strategy. And we lacked the structures, oversight, and culture to put this right, over more than a decade. This was true across all parts of government.....It took us 10 years to begin to acknowledge failure. and extract ourselves, rather than “digging deeper”. Much of this mind set was reminiscent of the attitudes that led to the banking crash of 2008.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10745977/Afghanistan-Britain-got-almost-everything-wrong-and-should-admit-its-failure.html

[JMA]

David, are Brit soldiers happy this woman deems to speak on their behalf?



A simple eloquent article, under the title:

One wonders, even after the Syria vote, if our politicians will follow her advice:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10744722/Christina-Schmid--I-question-the-wisdom-of-what-we-did-in-Afghanistan.html

[davidbfpo]

David, are Brit soldiers happy this woman deems to speak on their behalf?

No idea. I would expect a measure of respect for her husband's service, her composure on his return and best wishes on having a new partner. Mrs Schmidt speaks for herself, not others.

I have encountered a resistance - even when in private - within the British Army to examine the Afghan campaign, identify and follow through the 'lessons'. One soldier stated an official study of 'lessons learned' 1998/99 to 2009 found no lessons had been learned - which is hardly encouraging.

[davidbfpo]

Having an insider write about recent political decision-making is quite rare, so I have created this thread for Matt Cavanagh's May 2012 RUSI Journal article 'Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment', which today was made freely available (8 pgs):http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2012.675798

He is not sparring in his criticism of politicians, the military and civil servants. The wider context is set, in which going to Helmand Province appears almost a "side issue"; until 2006 the UK's contribution was a PRT in the north west, troops in Kabul and sharing ISAF command - excluding SOF. Going to Helmand was an opportunity to display the UK's power, to 'crack on', principally to the USA and NATO.

How much intelligence existed on the conditions "on the ground" he says was minimal. A point some insiders dispute, partly citing UK SOF's scouting presence. As Carter Malkasian wrote it takes a long time to understand the Afghan 'human terrain'; something it took the UK a long time to grasp IMHO.

[davidbfpo]

Almost laughable MoD performance:
A captain in the Territorial Army has resigned after a dispute with the Ministry of Defence over a book he has written that is critical of the conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan's Helmand province.

The MoD commissioned the book by Dr Mike Martin, but took exception to parts of the account. The dispute has gone on for more than a year.

Officialdom said the MoD:
has a strong record of learning from previous campaigns and encourages its officers to challenge existing norms and conventional wisdom. However, the publication of books and articles by serving military personnel is governed by well-established policy and regulations. When these are breached, the MoD will withhold approval.

The book, An Intimate War – An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012., is due to be published next week.

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/09/territorial-soldier-resigns-book-afghanistan

The author has Kings Ph.D. and is speaking there tomorrow. From the Kings website:
This book—based on both military and research experience in Helmand and 150 interviews in Pushtu—offers a very different view of Helmand from those in the mainstream. It demonstrates how outsiders have most often misunderstood the ongoing struggle in Helmand and how, in doing so, they have exacerbated the conflict, perpetuated it and made it more violent—precisely the opposite of what was intended when their interventions were launched.

Dr. Mike Martin is a Pushtu speaker who spent almost two years in Helmand as a British army officer (covering Operation HERRICKs 9-16). During that time, he pioneered and developed the British military’s Human Terrain and Cultural Capability—a means to understanding the Helmandi population and influencing it. He also worked as an advisor to several British commanders of Task Force Helmand. His previous publications include A Brief History of Helmand, required reading for British commanders and intelligence staff deploying to the province. He holds a doctorate in War Studies from King’s College London.

Ex-CDS General Sir David Richards review (yes the CDS and ex-ISAF CO):
An Intimate War is, quite simply, the book on Helmand. I sincerely wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan. Military, diplomatic and development professionals involved in Afghanistan, and elsewhere for that matter, read this and take note.

Link:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/events/eventsrecords/martin.aspx

Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/An-Intimate-War-Conflict-1978-2012/dp/1849043361

Will this be a British equivalent to Carter Malkasian's book? Time will tell and I might ask for this as a present.

[davidbfpo]

An insider has written a blog commentary after his three years working with the British Army as a lessons analyst for the British Army’s Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC). He was an infantry officer for ten years, left to work as an analyst and then back inside.

From his commentary:
The British Army has put much effort, time and resources into improving its learning capabilities but it has much more to do, as does any organisation that seeks to learn. My article at this link here sets out how the Army developed learning capabilities but also argues, strongly, that cultural factors remain that, unless addressed, will continue to inhibit its opportunity to improve performance. It imparts no classified information but covers the following:

The expansion of the British Army’s KM and OL analytical capacity from 2009 onwards;

The development of Mission Exploitation Symposia to socialise hard-won knowledge;

The use of lessons as part of risk management;

The endorsement of the ‘lessons learned’ approach by the Army Inspectorate;

Small signs of progress that learning is actually taking place

He cites from 'Dead Men Risen' by Toby Harnden:
Major Giles Harris DSO, who commanded the Prince of Wales’s Company of the Welsh Guards on their bloody tour of Afghanistan in 2009:

The British are very good at whipping ourselves into a sense of achievement….we almost have to, to make it bearable. You can’t do something like this and analyse it all the way through and think: “Actually we got that wrong.” You just can’t. It takes so much emotional investment. I’m not saying we lie to ourselves but there’s an element of telling yourself that it’s all right and it’s going well, just to keep going.

First link:http://rupertlescott.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/learning-lessons-british-army.html

Second link is to a twelve page article, which expands upon the first:http://www.slideshare.net/barmychap/20140409-learning-lessonsthebritisharmyexperience

[davidbfpo]

In a public lecture in 2013 a British Army officer commented that in Northern Ireland:
We got to a capability to find a needle in a haystack, by time we got to Herrick 9 we had sixty-nine dead and had no intelligence. In the First Gulf War we had absolutely no intelligence what was over the border.

Then came the "gem" for this thread:
Between 1998/99-2009 no lessons learned were rectified.

A different, retired officer commented not one piece of work undertaken as post-graduate study by British Army officers lead to any positive effect on what the army did up to 2000.

[JMA]

David,

Mike Martin was on SkyNews last night.

I found this book here (http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/an-intimate-war/) a while ago and was monitoring the publishing date of May 2014.

Given the slow process of Chilcot (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk) I suggest that the Afghanistan enquiry will also be delayed as it will also be a bitter pill for the British military and the British people and coming on the heels of the fiasco in Iraq might just be too hard to take for the nation.




Almost laughable MoD performance:

Officialdom said the MoD:

The book, An Intimate War – An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012., is due to be published next week.

Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/09/territorial-soldier-resigns-book-afghanistan

The author has Kings Ph.D. and is speaking there tomorrow. From the Kings website:

Ex-CDS General Sir David Richards review (yes the CDS and ex-ISAF CO):

Link:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/events/eventsrecords/martin.aspx

Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/An-Intimate-War-Conflict-1978-2012/dp/1849043361

Will this be a British equivalent to Carter Malkasian's book? Time will tell and I might ask for this as a present.

[davidbfpo]

Former Captain Mike Martin and author of a new book has a lengthy comment in The Daily Telegraph:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10755057/Britain-didnt-understand-the-enemy-in-Helmand.html


But we have yet to leave Afghanistan and I believe that it is worth studying our experience there, and in Iraq, while it is fresh in our minds. I would argue that our performance – in terms of achieving our objectives – has been very poor. In the case of Afghanistan, and specifically Helmand Province, where the majority of our forces have been based, we have failed to understand the Helmandis. We have also failed to understand their culture, their history and their motivations.

Most importantly, we have singularly failed to understand the Helmandi conflict. And to paraphrase Clausewitz, the most important thing to do in war is understand what type of war you are fighting. Many non-Helmandis view the violence through the narrative adopted by the international community. According to the “insurgency narrative” widely espoused by Western governments, a legitimate Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), which is recognised and supported by the international community, is violently opposed by a movement of insurgents, called the Taliban, who have sanctuary in Quetta, Pakistan.

Thus, the Taliban are religiously inspired insurgents who are opposed to the democratic and women’s rights that the GIRoA embodies and promotes. But this “insurgency narrative” does not fit with my experiences as an officer. I went to Helmand several times (in and out of uniform), with appropriate gaps between visits for study and reflection, and this analysis seemed further and further from the events that I was observing and participating in. In my view, the Taliban are not the main drivers of conflict; and earlier periods, including the Soviet, the civil war and the Taliban eras, have been similarly misconstrued.

[JMA]

David,

While the Brits have their problems coming to terms with the message Mike Martin is conveying in his book the top level of the US military has already accepted it:


“We’ve learned some hard lessons over the last 12 years. We went to war without understanding the human domain. We don’t want to make that mistake again.”- General Raymond Odierno

General Raymond Odierno, Army chief of staff, at an Oct. 23 forum on Strategic Land Power at the Association of the United States Army’s Annual Meeting and Exposition at the Washington Convention Center. as quoted in Journal article: Conceptualizing Human Domain Management (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/conceptualizing-human-domain-management#_edn1)


Someone needs to take the fall for the best-equipped militaries in history being defeated by a group of illiterates wearing flip-flops carrying an AK and a few magazines.

The fault does not lie with the junior ranks and no one should expect a mea culpa from any senior officer, administrator or politician - this is the greatest tragedy of the Afghanistan fiasco.

[JMA]

Afghans 'Thought UK Troops Worked With Taliban' (http://news.sky.com/story/1239787/afghans-thought-uk-troops-worked-with-taliban)


Former Captain Mike Martin said the clear conflict between British commitment to reconstruction and their actions - the use of firepower - meant the British, in the view of locals, must have been working with their stated enemies.

That British tactics were manifestly inconsistent with their stated aims was proof of a conspiracy was derived from the notion that "the Helmandis could not believe that the British were that stupid".

Little wonder the MoD wants the publication of the book stopped.

[davidbfpo]

Whatever the rational for the MoD's opposition to publication the resulting publicity is reported to have boosted sales (No.45 on Amazon UK).

A comment by Alexander Alderson who was the author's boss:
I read every word of every draft of each chapter....I was very conscious of the Official Secrets Act, I’m satisfied, as someone who holds the very highest security clearance, that there’s absolutely nothing in what he’s saying that transgresses the Official Secrets Act. I don’t think embarrassment and institutional failure is covered by it,

Link:http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/united-kingdom/140410/british-army-afganistan-book-helmand

[JMA]

Major Richard Streatfeild - Former British Army Officer on BBC News Channel : HARDtalk

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b040w6jq


The British military pull out from Afghanistan will soon be completed. Digesting the painful lessons from a 12 year deployment will take a whole lot longer. HARDtalk speaks to Richard Streatfeild, a former infantry officer in Helmand during some of the toughest fighting with the Taliban. Back then he kept an upbeat audio diary of life on the frontline; now he takes a more jaundiced view of Britain's Afghan commitment. Is it time to acknowledge failure?

Streatfeild is the author of the book:

Honourable Warriors: Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan - A Front-line Account of the British Army's Battle for Helmand (http://www.amazon.com/Honourable-Warriors-Fighting-Afghanistan-Front-line/dp/1783462272/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1397470093&sr=1-1&keywords=Richard+Streatfeild)

Interesting comment from Streatfeild was that when the British arrived in Helmand they thought they were taking part in an Afghan 'nation building' exercise while the Afghans were sure that the British had returned to revenge the defeat at the Battle of Maiwand of 1880 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Maiwand).

[davidbfpo]

A Kings of War article with David Betz's short opening comment and then is by Mike Martin:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/04/an-intimate-war-and-academic-freedom/

David Betz:
....tells the story of the last thirty-five years of conflict in Helmand Province....this period is often defined through different lenses—the Soviet intervention, the civil war, the Taliban, and the post-2001 nation-building era. Yet, as experienced by local inhabitants, the Helmand conflict is a perennial one, involving the same individuals, families and groups, and driven by the same arguments over land, water and power....It demonstrates how outsiders have most often misunderstood the ongoing struggle in Helmand and how, in doing so, they have exacerbated the conflict, perpetuated it and made it more violent—precisely the opposite of what was intended when their interventions were launched.

[davidbfpo]

A WoTR review of An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199387982/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0199387982&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwaronthec-20&linkId=ZAFYXXFRWOX5FFB7)by a former British Army officer, who servied in Helmand twice alongside the author, Mike Martin:http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/an-incompetent-war-britain-in-helmand/

Here are two passages:
I find that his picture of Helmand and Helmandis resonates with my own experiences exactly. I found myself nodding along enthusiastically during his discussion on the unsatisfactory labels of ‘Taliban’ and ‘Government’ and his conclusion that “whilst they may have simplified the narrative, they ended up robbing us of an intelligent war.”

The reading then becomes even more uncomfortable for the MOD as Martin asks: “if you side with the Government because you assume they are the good guys, what happens when your assumption is wrong and the Government is acting worse towards its people – then when do you stand? And how useful is counterinsurgency as a doctrine?” Uncomfortable or not, these are sorts of difficult questions that the MOD now needs to reflect on in the aftermath of the Afghanistan campaign

The last paragraph is aimed at the UK MoD:
When former CDS, General Sir David Richards (http://afghanappealfund.org.uk/author-donates-profits-from-sales-of-new-book-on-helmand-afghanistan-to-the-aaf/) lent his praise to An Intimate War (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199387982/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0199387982&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwaronthec-20&linkId=ZAFYXXFRWOX5FFB7) (saying, “I wish it had been available to me when I was ISAF Commander in Afghanistan”) he was presumably talking about the quantity and quality of the research contained within its 398 pages, rather than its stinging criticisms. The irony is that the unless the MOD changes its attitude towards criticism from within and actually engages with learning lessons, the next ISAF Commander won’t get this type of knowledge either.

The book has arrived here today, so one day I will add my armchair review.

[davidbfpo]

The British PM has spoken in Kabul today and his speech referred to the thirteen years of intervention and the loss of 453 British service personnel:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11137692/David-Cameron-makes-surprise-visit-to-Afghanistan-for-talks-with-new-president.html

Then there was this admission, in full and his words:
When you think about it in very bald, British terms, what is it we have been trying to achieve? That is to deny a safe haven to al-Qaeda....This was the place where the 9/11 attacks were plotted from. This was the place where countless attacks were planned. Al-Qaeda and the training camps have been driven out of Afghanistan. When I became Prime Minister I think something like nine out ten plots we faced on the streets of Britain came from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. That is now well down - somewhere below half, from the latest figures I saw.Earlier this week the UK Defence Secretary acknowledged the fragility of the Afghan state after 13 years of Western involvement:
There can be no guarantees but we can be proud of having helped to give Afghanistan the best possible chance of a stable future...
SWC has a long running thread on the UK in Afghanistan, from 2006, with 1,027 posts and 127k views. Yes, into which this thread will merge one day.

'We shall remember them'.

Just what the political impact back home will be is very unclear. The armed services have shrunk and appear to want to avoid reviewing what happened. The national politicians, from the three main parties, would prefer we forgot thirteen years - already our role in Iraq is largely forgotten. Yes there is a high degree of public support for the armed services, for them, not their mission.

[davidbfpo]

The headline for a review of a forthcoming, two-part BBC documentary 'Afghanistan: The Lion’s Last Roar', which promises to:
...break the culture of relative silence that has surrounded the military presence in AfghanistanLink to BBC, first programme Sunday evening 9PM (BST):http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04nd3rq

Link to the review in The Daily Telegraph, by Peter Oborne:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11180774/Brave-as-lions-but-poorly-led-the-British-heroes-of-Helmand.html

Oborne's review has several themes, here are some tasters:
... it is obvious that neither the politicians nor the generals who reported to them knew what they were doing. Britain had no serious knowledge or understanding of southern Afghanistan.

(Citing General Sir David Richards) We were actually hoping for the best and planning for the best.

To sum up: British forces were ill-equipped, underprepared and, at the most senior strategic level, atrociously led. The men themselves were nevertheless brave as lions. The conflict in Helmand will be remembered for centuries as a shining example of astonishing heroism combined with pointless sacrifice.Listeneing to Whitehall-Westminster voices and the military they all want to maintain the key national, British interest 'The Special Relationship' Oborne concludes:
They even failed in their key strategic objective of maintaining our alliance with America. Basra and Helmand have caused the United States to lose faith in the capability of the British Army.

There is a main thread for the UK in Afghanistan, with 135,545 views.

[davidbfpo]

A commentary by retired General Dannatt, :
As Britain prepares to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, General the Lord Dannatt reviews a mission that has taken 13 years, cost 453 lives, but left a troubled nation with hopeLink:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11187574/General-Dannatt-We-are-giving-the-Afghans-a-chance-at-a-better-life.html

There are some odd passages, notably over the Helmand deployment in 2006, for example:
As British patrols fanned out across Helmand, the Taliban challenged our presence. In June 2006, a major firefight took place in the town of Now Zad. At the time, it was not known whether this was a one-off testing of the British resolve or the pattern of things to come. It was the latter and, fearful of a resurgent Taliban movement, the Helmand provincial governor, backed by President Hamid Karzai, requested that the district administration centres be held by the British forces. This request was granted and most of the 3 Para battle group was committed to holding these centres, which became major battlegrounds.As the UK & USA have handed over Camp Bastion to the ANSF, the BBC has a series of articles. Within one is this poignant comment:
Any reading of the culture, the history or politics should have prevented us from taking on Helmand.Plus a radio programme next month by a Major General Mackay who resigned after his command tour, I shall listen and report back.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29744972

[SWJ Blog]

US, British Forces Close Base in Southern Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-british-forces-close-base-in-southern-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-british-forces-close-base-in-southern-afghanistan) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

I enjoyed watching the first episode of ''Afghanistan: The Lion’s Last Roar', although in places it was disturbing - at how reckless we were - and sad.

At one point Geoff Hoon, the Defence Minister, aware senior (army) officers were critical over the deployment to Helmand took them to meet Tony Blair, the Prime Minister. None of them then said a word!

Rather oddly interviews with soldiers dominate; all three services were deployed (notably the Royal Marines, though a Major General does appear) and the RAF officer head of all UK forces 2006-2010 did not appear.

The planning and limited on-site recce do get a mention, by a specialist civilian team and the SAS - who looked and reported without shooting. Some background reading is in this:http://cips.uottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/CIPS_PolicyBrief_Williams_Nov2009.pdf

[davidbfpo]

An analysis by RUSI's Director, Michael Clarke:https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C544FB6405510C/#.VFFbWGet0dX

It starts with - in the sub-title:
This week, UK Armed Forces formally ended combat operations in Helmand. British troops return from Afghanistan not with a victory, but a score draw away from home; a job well done in unpropitious circumstances.

(Ends with) It’s not a peace to be celebrated in Trafalgar Square. But nor is it dishonourable or a source of national humiliation.

I do not agree with his conclusions. Nor his optimism that the USA regards the UK military, maybe the nation, in the same way it did in 2001.

[Bill Moore]

David,

I think you guys are still sore at us for that little event that happened in 1776, because we Yanks are not allowed access. However, YouTube to the rescue, for now at least.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMP8O_pIMxE

Apparently this is named after a book reference the Suez incident (another thing you guys may still be sore about)

http://www.amazon.com/The-Lions-Last-Roar-Suez/dp/0060108584

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I doubt anyone at the BBC remembers 1776, even 1956. We can be quite forgiving you know. Few recalled we'd burnt down The White House two hundred years ago.

[Red Rat]

A commentary by retired General Dannatt, :Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11187574/General-Dannatt-We-are-giving-the-Afghans-a-chance-at-a-better-life.html

There are some odd passages, notably over the Helmand deployment in 2006, for example:As the UK & USA have handed over Camp Bastion to the ANSF, the BBC has a series of articles. Within one is this poignant comment:Plus a radio programme next month by a Major General Mackay who resigned after his command tour, I shall listen and report back.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29744972

Dannet's article is interesting on a number of points. I will confine myself to two:

"From 2006 until the arrival of a large US contingent in Helmand in 2010, British operations, despite the heroic endeavours of successive Brigade groups, were always constrained by lack of manpower on the ground. The operational design to clear areas of Taliban, to hold them securely and then build, in partnership with the local population, a more stable community for the future was sound, but hobbled through lack of manpower."

Why have an operational design that was not resourced? You either resource your plan or amendthe plan to the level of resources allocated.

I am not sure an effective ANSF of 300,000 is necessarily force for stability if (as is reported) this is an unsustainable strength. Who is going to pay them?

I will see if I can master technology sufficiently to see and listen to the BBC!

[davidbfpo]

Yesterday I posted an analysis by Michael Clarke, RUSI's Director. This is my reply.

His final two sentences should be read again: ' It’s not a peace to be celebrated in Trafalgar Square. But nor is it dishonourable or a source of national humiliation'.

The end of the UK military campaign in Afghanistan, principally in Helmand Province, has not left that country at peace. If you look hard the Taliban have been successful in returning to control towns already in Helmand's "Green Zone" (alongside gains elsewhere). Often in towns and villages where ISAF took casualties and expended a lot of gold.

It is far too early to judge whether our nation's sacrifices in Helmand are only very temporary gains for the government and people of Afghanistan. Perhaps next year we shall look back and see that the Taliban have been kept at bay.

Dishonourable? Few doubt the commitment and sacrifice made by those who served in Afghanistan, but it is clear a good number of veterans have already asked was "mowing the lawn" really a national necessity. That is why a number of army officers resigned, a few who went onto write books.

Did we as a society dishonour those who served, civil and military, maybe at times we did. Did our national politicians dishonour them? Yes, yes. Whether it was the lack of resources for years (helicopters for example), the deployment in 2006 itself and the absence of political control over the key local command decision to spread troops thinner in "platoon houses" which is one example now in the public domain.

Afghanistan 'a sustainable democracy and a better economy' - really? It is an economy addicted to foreign aid, measured in US$ billions - more than all of Western Europe got in Marshall Aid after 1945. A nation that cannot itself fund its own military. Once the thousands of foreigners exit the only booming industry? Opium poppy cultivation and then heroin production!

A steadfast, capable ally for the USA? Well Whitehall-Westminster may think the 'Special Relationship' is unaffected by the American re-assessment of the British contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan they are fools. We are NO longer seen as a capable ally, for some Beltway insiders Australia is a better ally.

We rightly went to war in 2001; along with virtually every NATO country we were distracted by Iraq for five years and allowed ourselves to dream that Afghanistan could be rebuilt as a nation with an effective national government. Then for reasons of national pride we deployed not to Kandahar Province, but to Helmand Province - a "backwater" in my opinion. Once I heard at RUSI it explained as the Canadians were already there we had to go elsewhere; that they were an ally seemed to have been lost. Or that Kandahar is of far greater strategic value.

Sadly today my judgement is that our Fourth Afghan War is a national humiliation.

[davidbfpo]

A comment by an academic, Andrew Mumford, 'Legacies of the War in Afghanistan':http://nottspolitics.org/2014/11/03/out-of-the-hornets-nest-legacies-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/

Here is one passage:
There was unwillingness within the highest echelons of the British military and political establishment to face up to the difficulties of prosecuting a complex counter-insurgency war in a country that had never been successfully occupied by outside forces. Senior British officers were chastened (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/554.pdf) by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee in July 2011 for ‘moderating the demands of commanders in the field’ when briefing ministers on the Afghan war. This led to a situation whereby the unwarranted optimism of the highest ranks ‘denied the necessary support to carry out the mission from the outset’. The lack of a consistent campaign narrative and chronic equipment shortages were also factors cited by the committee as failings of the British war effort.

[davidbfpo]

A short, anonymous commentary 'The UK Military: Lessons from the Fourth Anglo–Afghan War 2001–2014':http://goglobalmedia.com/the-uk-military-lessons-from-the-fourth-anglo-afghan-war-2001-2014/

To which one UK Army officer stated:
Flawed and confused in part, but analysis of where issues are is good.

[blueblood]

Watched episodes 1 & 2. Before this, I have watched two earlier documentaries covering some what similar subject. Both are on youtube if anyone is interested.

Afghanistan -The Battle For Helmand:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jR6-ZAn5nKc (Added this appears to be a BBC documentary by Mark Urban, probably made in 2011 and lasts just under one hour).

Pathfinders- Into The Heart of Afghanistan:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kXL05kuICyg (Added this is a Sky documentary from 2013 and lasts around 45 minutes)

I think British withdrawal and less than commendable operations, as Bruce Ridel put it, signifies the end of British as a global military power and lieutenant of the US.

[davidbfpo]

Episode Two is on: 1) BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b04nzglz/afghanistan-the-lions-last-roar-episode-2

2) YouTube:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z79oUhIcmiM

For those without time to watch, this is the BBC News written summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29714738

Apologies for the delay in posting the links.

[blueblood]

@davidbfpo, thanks for the links. I was too lazy to do so.:o

[davidbfpo]

A review article on four current books on the UK in Afghanistan, by a British writer who went there himself and who is not a military journalist, so he is rather direct:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n24/james-meek/worse-than-a-defeat

[davidbfpo]

The former diplomat and at one time the British 'special rep' to Afghanistan-Pakistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, has added a few pithy phrases on the political-military relationshipat a session of the House of Commons DEfence Select Committee:
The lack of military knowledge among politicians meant they found the Armed Forces’ plans and jargon-filled briefings incomprehensible and could not question their strategy.

His actual words were: There were times in Afghanistan that I felt both in the Ministry of Defence and across Whitehall civil servants civilian advisers to ministers and their political masters did not show the moral courage, the intellectual courage they needed sometimes to challenge advice from the Armed Forces. At times and in places one saw military advice to ministers which was driven by a military view of the situation which was not necessarily the same as what the wider national interest might or might not be.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11297058/Ministers-didnt-know-Tornado-from-torpedo-over-Afghan-strategy.html

[davidbfpo]

As the new NATO mission arrives, as part of the reflections upon 2014 for the UK, The Guardian columnist, Will Hutton (not known for his comments IIRC on Afghanistan) has a column and the headline & sub-title indicate his viewpoint:
Right-of-centre ideology has lost us the war in Afghanistan and much more besides The ignominious retreat from Afghanistan is emblematic of a wider malaise that is afflicting Britain today


Link:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/28/rightwing-ideology-lost-britiain-war-afghanistan-and-is-destroying-state-and-country

Sadly I agree with some of his points:
The truth is inescapable: we are no longer a great economic, technological or military power..... If one aim was to make the British homeland safer by victory in southern Afghanistan – a fantastical claim of last resort – Britain is now less safe. More widely, our failure in Helmand, following on from the disaster in Basra where our forces were beaten back to the airbase outside the city and only the intervention of the US army allowed an orderly exit, has led to America’s profound re-evaluation of our usefulness as an ally.

[davidbfpo]

The official UK Operation Herrick Campaign Study, published March 2015, is now in the public domain. Not an easy read if only from the size, 614 pgs:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492757/20160107115638.pdf

Published by the Directorate Land Warfare Lessons Exploitation Centre. The UK government marking 'Official Sensitive' has been crossed out; just why they didn't do a cleaner version eludes commonsense IMHO. Spotted four pgs removed too. It looks like a photocopy too.

Maybe not suitable for publication before the May 2015 General Election?

One Tweet summed it up too well:
The document that will launch a thousand headlines in the next few weeks

[davidbfpo]

In The Times (behind a paywall) there is a short article that states the study was released after a FOI application and appeal. Plus there is a theme of arrogance cited by the UK's partners.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a "lurker" for this Daily Mail story, about a small detachment of Paras and the Royal Irish, in 2006 holding a compound @ Musa Qala, as the newly arrived UK presence moved - at local and GIRoA insistence - to "platoon houses" to "show the flag".
Their story has not been officially recognised, but C4 TV has assembled a documentary, which will be broadcast on August 16th. Perhaps it will be available beyond the UK afterwards.
Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3727024/Cut-Surrounded-Outnumbered-Just-88-British-soldiers-resigned-defeat-fighting-500-Taliban-54-days-against-odds-Miracle-escape-Rorke-s-Drift-Paras.html
The story starts with:
Outgunned, outmaneuvered, hopelessly outnumbered and besieged in the Afghan desert, a small band of British soldiers chose to save a final bullet for themselves rather than fall into Taliban hands.

For nearly two months, the 88 men of Easy Company – a mix of Paratroopers and the Royal Irish – had faced the overwhelming force and firepower of up to 500 Taliban determined to over-run the remote Helmand outpost of Musa Qala.
And their near miraculous survival has been described as a latter day Rorke’s Drift, evocative of the 1879 siege in which 140 British soldiers held off a Zulu force of 3,000, later immortalised in the blockbuster film starring Michael Caine.
For 56 days in the autumn of 2006, the men at Musa Qala faced constant fire from fixed machine gun posts and mortars. I note the Danes were there first:
..the Danes took with them more than 40 armoured vehicles, eight heavy machine guns and a 12-strong medical team with armoured ambulances.
Their British replacements had just two heavy machine guns, one doctor, two medics and a quad bike. When Taliban spies reported the huge reduction in armour and weaponry, the terror leaders scented an easy victory.
I am sure other nations faced such Taliban attacks, in sieges.
The UK in Afghanistan thread was closed upon the UK's exit from Helmand. It has 1052 posts and 194k views. Musa Qala appears in several other threads, including when the USMC fought there.

(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3727024/Cut-Surrounded-Outnumbered-Just-88-British-soldiers-resigned-defeat-fighting-500-Taliban-54-days-against-odds-Miracle-escape-Rorke-s-Drift-Paras.html)

(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3727024/Cut-Surrounded-Outnumbered-Just-88-British-soldiers-resigned-defeat-fighting-500-Taliban-54-days-against-odds-Miracle-escape-Rorke-s-Drift-Paras.html)

[Granite_State]

Good find, thanks David.

"The Junior Officer's Reading Club" (and many other Helmand memoirs, I'm sure) includes some stories of how dire things were for over-extended British units in 2006.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up. This excellent, if sad and embarrassing documentary is available via Channel Four's video on demand, for nineteen days via:http://www.channel4.com/programmes/heroes-of-helmand

I don't know if the C4 option will work beyond the UK.

There is a possible alternative via YouTube, which does not display in the UK:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ILW0zBiszM

Please update with a post whether either them work.

Moderator adds: 238,851views when three smaller threads merged in (ends).

[davidbfpo]

The 'Daily Mail' reports on the:
The truth about SAS shoot-to-kill night raids, by the hero of 200 secret ops: Soldier breaks ranks to defend elite unit from witch-hunt but says illegal killings were ‘unwritten rule of our job’

The report relies on an ex-SAS member coming forward, his views are summarised as:
A former SAS soldier has admitted to The Mail on Sunday that illegal killings were 'an unwritten rule of our job' but strongly defended the regiment's actions; His account comes after claims emerged that SAS members killed unarmed civilians in cold blood and falsified mission reports; He revealed how he took part in 200 night raids between 2010 and 2013, many investigated as potential war crimes by the RMP
Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4678308/The-truth-SAS-shoot-kill-night-raids.html

An official MoD response:
They have found no evidence of criminal behaviour by the Armed Forces in Afghanistan, have discontinued over 90 per cent of the 675 allegations made and less than ten investigations now remain.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Theo Farrell, Kings War Studies, has written and advised the UK's effort in Afghanistan and now has published a book 'Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001 - 2014 (Pub. Bodley Head).

Robert Fox, ex-BBC and now London's Evening Standard has a critical review:
His title says it all — for the British campaign, almost by design, and despite several stabs at retuning, reinforcing and adjusting, had little chance of success. At almost every level — international, national and the peculiar nature of Helmand and its narco-politics — the odds were against. The book started out as an official history..... it is a tour de force and a must read for anyone interested in how and why Britain became enmeshed by such a cockeyed intervention, and might do so again.Link:https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/books/unwinnable-britain-s-war-in-afghanistan-20012014-by-theo-farrell-review-a3652561.html

I'd better get a copy, even if I have four other books waited to be read.

Amazon UK, with glowing publisher reviews:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Unwinnable-Britains-War-Afghanistan-2001-2014/dp/1847923461/ref=sr_1_1?tag=independen058-21&s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1507298561&sr=1-1&keywords=unwinnable+theo+farrell