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SWJED
03-19-2006, 08:04 AM
19 March London Times - British Face 20-year War to Tame Taliban (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2092461,00.html).


The objectives of the British mission to Afghanistan could take as long as 20 years to achieve, according to a confidential Ministry of Defence briefing seen by The Sunday Times.

The assessment by senior military officers highlights the risks to the 3,300 British troops to be deployed to the lawless Helmand province and warns that even in five years the best that can be hoped for in terms of security and stabilisation would be “interim status”...Moderator at work

A stand alone 2009-2010 thread 'Britain at home and the war in Afghanistan?' has today been merged into this thread. Over a few years smaller threads have been merged to here; today 23rd October 2014 three 2014 threads were merged in (ends).

Uboat509
10-08-2006, 06:57 PM
I was just watching an author interview on CSPAN-2 with Sarah Chayes. She is a former foreign correspondent for NPR who reported from afghanistan during and after the fight for Kandehar and then stayed in Afghanistan to run an NGO. She seems to really have a finger on pulse of Afghan society. She has a book out called "The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban." During the interview she had some fairly sharp criticism for Karzai for his failure to remove the various warlords from power. She does not seem to be some shrinking violet bleeding heart. When I get some time I will have to check out her book.

SFC W

SWJED
10-08-2006, 07:29 PM
The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (http://www.amazon.com/gp/explorer/1594200963/2/ref=pd_lpo_ase/102-4910846-3812140?) and help support the SWC and SWJ. Yes, a shameless ad - but we are on the verge of adding many new features and could use a boost. Thanks...


Afghanistan only uncovers itself with intimacy, and intimacy takes time," writes Chayes, a skilled but increasingly frustrated journalist, whose determination "to grasp the underlying pattern" during and after the toppling of the Taliban in late 2001 chafes against her editors' post-9/11 comfort zone. With keen sympathy for Afghanistan's indomitable people, Chayes eventually swaps NPR and its four-and-a-half-minute slots for an NGO, becoming "field director" of Afghans for Civil Society, spearheaded by Qayum Karzai, the president's brother. ACS's humanitarian work, which includes rebuilding a bombed-out village, brings Chayes into direct conflict with the warlords with whom U.S. policy remains disastrously entangled. This is the point of her engrossing narrative, which begins in Pakistan, inside the U.S.-backed Afghan resistance pushing northward to Kandahar, and is framed by the 2005 murder of police chief Zabit Akrem, a key ally in the fight against Kandahar's corrupt warlord-governor. Throughout, Chayes relies on exceptional access and a felicitous prose style, though she sacrifices some momentum to cover several centuries of Afghanistan's turbulent past in an account that adds little to those by Ahmed Rashid and others. However, her hands-on experience as a deeply immersed reporter and activist gives her lucid analysis and prescriptions a practical scope and persuasive authority.

SWJED
02-02-2007, 09:34 PM
... plus, at the British ARmy Rumour SErvice (http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/index.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=56955) (ARSE).

davidbfpo
06-09-2007, 10:31 PM
I know similar stories have appeared here, this one is British and the young soldier has been nominated for the Commenwealth's highest military medal, the Victoria Cross. The last winner was L/Cpl. Beharry, in Iraq.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/09/nhero109.xml

There is an option to post comments on the Daily Telegraph's website.

davidbfpo

RTK
06-10-2007, 12:16 AM
I know similar stories have appeared here, this one is British and the young soldier has been nominated for the Commenwealth's highest military medal, the Victoria Cross. The last winner was L/Cpl. Beharry, in Iraq.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/09/nhero109.xml

There is an option to post comments on the Daily Telegraph's website.

davidbfpo


I know this isn't intentional, but we have to rethink our mindsets. Again, as I've said with the American Congressional Medal of Honor, nobody "wins" a medal; they earn it.

Culpeper
06-10-2007, 01:37 AM
Thanks for sharing this awesome report with us.

Jedburgh
10-18-2007, 01:34 PM
House of Commons Defence Committee, 9 Oct 07:

UK operations in Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/1024/1024.pdf)

1. The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence Select Committee’s (HCDC) report on the UK operations in Afghanistan (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/408/408.pdf).

2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) joins the Committee in recognising the scale of the challenge in Afghanistan. The country has come a long way since the overthrow of the Taliban regime but the size of the challenge was, and remains, vast. As the Committee highlights in its report, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world; with weak government authority outside the capital, limited infrastructure, and where educating women used to be a criminal offence. The Secretary of State and other government officials have always made clear that addressing these problems will take a number of years.

3. Yet despite the scale of the challenge, real progress is being made, bringing tangible changes to the lives of ordinary Afghans. Seven million children are now in school and there are ten universities operating around the country, against one (barely functioning) under the Taliban. 83% of the population now has access to medical facilities, compared to 9% in 2004. In addition, 4.8m Afghan refugees have returned to their homeland, safe from the oppression they suffered under the Taliban. Significant progress is also being made at a Provincial level. In Helmand alone, the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team has implemented over 150 projects, often with engineering support from the military. Examples include the building, extending or refurbishing of 12 schools, the construction of three new parks including a women’s park, 6 projects improving local healthcare facilities including the construction of a twenty-room midwifery hostel, and 5 projects improving the rivers and irrigation canals that enable local farmers to earn a living. While there is much still to do, the International Community is making good progress in helping Afghanistan recover from decades of civil war and Taliban rule.

4. We are grateful to the Committee for recognising the efforts made by the MoD to increase the number of UK Forces, the firepower they have at their disposal, and the selection of vehicles available to Commanders in theatre. Protecting our troops is paramount and although it is impossible to protect them from every eventuality, we do as much possible to provide the best protection we can. We also welcome the Committee’s recognition of the increase in the number of helicopters that the MoD has provided since the initial deployment in 2006. We keep our force package in Afghanistan under continual review to ensure that commanders have all that they need to achieve the ISAF mission.....
Complete 14 page document at the link.

davidbfpo
11-06-2007, 09:48 PM
Yesterday the BBC Panorama programme had an hour long report following a Grenadier Guard platoon in Helmand Province - follow the link:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/programmes/panorama/default.stm

Under the title Taking on the Taleban - the Soldiers Story, there is a short report and a comments area:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7071859.stm

There have been similar documentaries, notably by Sean Langan, but not in such a prime time slot (Monday evening). It is amazing footage, albeit with a "spin doctor" stopping some filming and the words of the Guardsmen say it all.

davidbfpo

Norfolk
11-07-2007, 12:58 AM
Yes, I watched part of this last night. I'm not quite sure what to make of this piece. On the one hand, the BBC reporter actually seemed to be trying to get under the surface and actually kind of understand what he was witnessing; on the other hand, he still didn't seem to really quite grasp just what it was he was witnessing. Good effort though, especially by the standards of our times. I don't think I either saw (or at least noticed) the "minder"; maybe inattention on my part or I just plain didn't see those parts.

As I said, I'm not sure what to make of this documentary; in some ways it's impressive, and in other ways it (the BBC reporter actually) struck me as not really understanding what was going on. I wonder what the general public thinks when they watch this.

tequila
12-31-2007, 10:12 AM
Much longer piece (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n01/ande03_.html)by Ben Andersen on the Grenadier Guards in Helmand. Well worth the read.

Biggest takeaway is that COIN ops in Afghanistan are definitely NOT ongoing in Helmand - British and coalition troops are not present in enough numbers to hold population centers, much less provide genuine population security, and depend upon firepower to maintain tactical dominance over a foe unafraid to tactically close with them.

Along the same line, Sebastien Junger on American paratroopers in Nuristan (http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/01/afghanistan200801?printable=true&currentPage=all).

davidbfpo
01-06-2008, 08:25 PM
Thanks Tequila, both excellent articles by embedded reporters / cameramen and alongside for weeks.

There is another SWJ thread on whether domestic opinion will NOT oppose continuing military involvement in Afghanistan. The LRB article by the BBC reporter in its comments on the ANA and the UK soldiers reaction to the ANA reinforce my view UK opinion will not be patient for the ten years required.

Today's SWJ Blog article by Captain Hsia (?) and LTC Gentile's reply indicate the divergence between domestic priorities and fighting overseas. How long will US opinion stand for apparently fruitless attrition?

davidbfpo

Ken White
01-06-2008, 10:23 PM
T... How long will US opinion stand for apparently fruitless attrition?
davidbfpo About 30% will object to any attrition of the type you mean, about 30% will tolerate it for ten or more years and the other 60% will vacillate depending on the apparent futility or success of the effort.

There is always a divergence between domestic priorities and fighting overseas -- that was true even during WW II. There is also a divergence between those who willingly fight and those who do not agree with fighting (or a particular fight -- the latter divide being mostly political while the former is more emotionally based) -- that, too occurred even during WW II. To my mind, such a divergence is perfectly natural, has historical antecedents and is not at all worrisome. I'd be more inclined to worry if such a divide did not occur...

For most of the years of existence of both our societies, the relatively small Armies did their thing and were totally divorced from civil society -- both sides were content that such a divorce existed -- and we survived. While both societies today are more sensitive and softer in outlook (for lack of better terms), my belief is that the raw numbers and basic beliefs of both sides are pretty much the same and I do not find it all worrisome.

To the point of your question I quoted -- I suspect the answer is quite few more years at the current rates.

John T. Fishel
01-07-2008, 12:31 PM
To what do you attribute the apparent lack of recognition of the American public of the fact that we have a truly all volunteer military? That is the kind of military that is, as you put it, divorced from the general public. Disregard, please, the partial exception of the Guard and Reserve when you think about my question since it changes the dynamic.

JohnT

Ken White
01-07-2008, 05:57 PM
the Armed Forces of this nation among the total population is so low and of such questionable content among the few that have some knowledge that most people tend to ignore the services unless something focuses their attention on them. That has generally been the case and that trend has been exacerbated in recent years due to some anti-war films, TV shows and a skeptical if not hostile media class.

I also think that is essentially a normal condition and has been less true only during and after the big wars, Civil, WW I and WW II when there were numerous veterans among the population (and, importantly, Congress and the 'ruling' elites).

Most of the public treats Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines just like they do Butchers, Cops and Garbage Men -- someone who does the nasty jobs that society does not want to do for itself and "I wouldn't want my daughter to marry one -- much less my son to be one." They sense it is NOT a nice job -- and it is not in many respects -- therefor the people who engage are unlikely to be nice. In earlier times with a draft (which we do not need to return to), and far larger forces, that was ameliorated by the sheer number of neighbors kids and relatives serving. That amelioration dissipated in the late 70s and was effectively gone by 1995.

The problem is not confined to the population at large; many of the senior folks in all services have, IMO, an antiquated view of their own (and other services) and the WW II model is firmly fixed in the eye of entirely too many people, military and civilian.

World War II was an anomaly, couched as a war of national survival (it was not IMO), it was absolutely a war of national commitment and that is, I believe, rightly rare. We effectively fought in Korea and in Viet Nam using that WW II model downscaled to fit (and how did that work out for us...) and for various reasons without the national commitment. We did it again with some modification in Desert Storm and to a far lesser --and far more effective -- extent in the early stages of OIF. Yet, we still are training on the WW II model with some slight changes introduced by civilian educators hired during the 1970s who had to figure out how to train MacNamara's project 100,000 (which expanded to far more than that number...).

Starting in 1980 we recruited a lot of bright kids and the complexion of the service changed; most of the senior leadership missed that and continued to treat their minions as Project 100K dregs. If the leaders missed it; there's no way the public could understand it.

With about 1.5M serving actively, you've got an activity that engages about .005 of the population; a population that is attuned to sound bites, is effectively taught no civics, no history and is beaten over the head with the socialistic cant that war is Evul -- and that includes many in Congress. No surprise at all they don't understand it -- or even want to think about it if it can be avoided.

The average US citizen is not aware of any of that -- given our pathetic education system and overemphasis on self esteem accompanied by a clueless media dominated by and subservient to the entertainment industry, how could they be aware?

It's my opinion that the services themselves have not adapted to the talent they have, that they have all done a pathetic job of stating the case for their existence and for the way they do some of the things they do and that they have unduly antagonized the media to some detriment. I also believe that Congress critters -- at least some of whom have a duty to know and understand the services -- have not done their jobs well in that respect. That in turn means that knowledge of the services and knowledge of the kids that make up those services is narrowly held by mostly immediate families.

Most people, properly, recoil at the thought of warfare. Many are deeply offended by the thought of the killing and maiming it causes. That's okay, yet, as the Marines say "Nobody wants to go to war but somebody better know how." That's a message most anyone could understand but we do not use it other than poorly; "Peace is our profession" was not a good slogan... :D

You mention the Guard and Reserve; these unprecedented 'peacetime' callups may to a slight extent contribute to some amelioration of the trend but I suspect it'll be slight and temporary. We'll have to see how that works out. hopefully many of them will run for Congress... :cool:

In any event, having been raised around the Navy in the 1930s and 40s, I was quite aware that I lived in a sub set of US Society, that most of the people in that sub set were there because they wished to be and that most had a rather dim but still charitable view of the larger society (exempt the four plus years of WW II). When I came back from my first trip to Korea, I was upset because no civilians seemed to realize or care there was a war on. When I came back from the second, I realized that was true -- and that was the way it was, that was really alright -- and that was their problem, not mine. When I cam back from my first tour in Viet Nam, I even found out that there were people in the Army who didn't seem to know there was a war on. :rolleyes:

I think the divide is totally natural, I think that many in the services will think they're a notch better than most of their civilian acquaintances and that the feeling will be returned by said civilians (on a totally different basis), creating a slight tension between the two societies -- and I do not see that as at all worrisome. Natural, I'd think.

Stan
01-07-2008, 06:13 PM
Ken, very well put !



Most of the public treats Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines just like they do Butchers, Cops and Garbage Men -- someone who does the nasty jobs that society does not want to do for itself and "I wouldn't want my daughter to marry one -- much less my son to be one."

I recall reading this Russian article and wondering about the state of our public opinion (having reached this side of the world).

USA treats its war veterans like garbage (http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/13-11-2007/100747-war_veterans-0)


War veterans in the United States make up a quarter of all homeless people across the nation. It is a whole army of 200,000 people, which is close to the number of the US military contingent deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this case, the veterans who ruined their health “defending democracy and freedom” have nothing to do but hope for the help of charitable organizations.

selil
01-07-2008, 06:34 PM
During the Democrat portion of the debate Saturday I believe it was Edwards who said this is one of the worst flaws in America. Treating our veterans in such a way he expressed great sorrow over. In ramarkable news he actually seemed genuine about it. Edwards and Obama were the only two that seemed truly interested in the plight of the poor.

John T. Fishel
01-08-2008, 02:28 AM
You said it well and your insights need to be pondered a bit. Don't agree with everything you said but you said a lot and I do agree with a lot.:wry:

I'm not sure the RC really ameliorates the situation but rather presents the military as being somewhat more like the draft military of old. The analogy is overdrawn of course but it may have an impact on why most Americans fail to recognize the volunteer nature of the all volunteer force. What the RC does ameliorate IMO is the apartness of the military from the rest of society, a good thing, I think, for American civil-military relations.

Again, your insights are always worth reading and pondering.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
01-08-2008, 03:22 AM
You said it well and your insights need to be pondered a bit. Don't agree with everything you said but you said a lot and I do agree with a lot.:wry:

collusion... ;)


I'm not sure the RC really ameliorates the situation but rather presents the military as being somewhat more like the draft military of old. The analogy is overdrawn of course but it may have an impact on why most Americans fail to recognize the volunteer nature of the all volunteer force. What the RC does ameliorate IMO is the apartness of the military from the rest of society, a good thing, I think, for American civil-military relations.

Excellent point, hadn't considered that and the involuntary lengthy call ups are very likely to have that effect even though most RC types have gone willingly and with remarkably little complaint. I have a lot of respect for them due to that.

Thinking on it for a second, the long term effect may be as you say a good thing long term. I still hope a bunch of 'em run for Congress... :cool:

Take care,
Ken

Presley Cannady
02-06-2008, 01:15 AM
During the Democrat portion of the debate Saturday I believe it was Edwards who said this is one of the worst flaws in America. Treating our veterans in such a way he expressed great sorrow over. In ramarkable news he actually seemed genuine about it. Edwards and Obama were the only two that seemed truly interested in the plight of the poor.

I noticed a great deal of sentiment and not much in the way of a plan. But to be fair, it's not like anyone else--from the parties to the pundits to even veteran's organizations--propose anything transformational over what's been done for the past sixty years. The reintegration World War II veterans may be a singular event in American history, coinciding with a uniquely slackish post-war economy just ready to make the most of their federal benefits and their well-earned goodwill. So how do you achieve the same level of satisfaction in an economy that is near full employment in a not so grateful society?

davidbfpo
06-10-2008, 06:54 PM
This milestone has been passed now, with three Paras killed in a suicide bombing and much comment / reporting in the UK press.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/frontline/2095470/British-death-toll-in-Afghanistan-reaches-100.html - which includes 'Not a single British soldier has been fatally shot for almost nine months'.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/frontline/2101959/What-the-Army-faces-in-Afghanistan.html

There's also a photo gallery: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2095153/Roll-call-of-British-soldiers-killed-in-Afghanistan.html

How this milestone will play out with the public is unknown.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-10-2008, 06:57 PM
Following on from the BBC Panorama programme, November 5th 2007, which was on this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4262

Last night Panorama provided an interesting short update on how the soldiers feel now: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7437580.stm

davidbfpo

Ken White
06-10-2008, 08:39 PM
for the links.

davidbfpo
06-15-2008, 09:42 AM
Issued yesterday to coincide with the Trooping the Colour ceremony: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/06/15/do1511.xml

The Welsh Guards colour was being trooped and there was footage of a group temporarily assigned to the Royal Irish, in Afghanistan.

Nothing startling in the article, but some may like it.

davidbfpo

SWJED
09-13-2008, 12:59 PM
British Operations in Helmand Afghanistan
by Dr. Daniel Marston, Small Wars Journal

British Operations in Helmand Afghanistan (PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/98-marston.pdf)


I’m going to try to provide an overview of British operations, called HERRICK, in Helmand (HLD) province, Afghanistan, over the last couple of years. The situation in southern Afghanistan (RC South) is widely considered to be worsening, with the Taliban controlling entire districts and launching major attacks. The British, along with the rest of our allies, have faced heavy criticism for their prosecution of the war in the south. I will look at how the British have adapted to changing conditions, and their understanding and application of COIN principles. My assessment is not official in any way, and any errors of fact or interpretation are purely mine. This assessment is drawn from the many conversations which I have been privileged to have with commanders from brigadier down to platoon level on all British operations, as well as from field reports and visits with units.

davidbfpo
10-05-2008, 07:08 PM
Under the headline 'Grim reality of life beyond Helmand' the (UK) Sunday Times has this report, subtitled 'British officials are pleased with their reconstruction. Our correspondent finds little for them to crow about':

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle4882416.ece

It should be read alongside a longer article on the military campaign, under the headline 'Relentless Taliban just keep coming' and subtitled:
As their gruelling tour of duty in Afghanistan ends, men of 2 Para tell of relentless battles with an enemy that simply doesn’t know when he is outgunned

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle4882417.ece

Includes remarks made by the Brigadier in charge of the UK brigade in Helmand, who are about to leave.

Note one platoon in 2 Para of thirty men had six fatal casualties in their tour; a one in five ratio does not bode well - in Afghanistan and here IMHO.

Posted in another thread too.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-22-2009, 09:51 PM
An article in the 'Restricted' British Army Review (BAR) has appeared in the public domain: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5587822/British-Army-officer-launches-stinging-attack-on-failing-UK-strategy-in-Afghanistan.html

I am sure the author, a UK Army major, is echoing many comrades views.

Hat tip to: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama and that refers in the comments section to another UK officer, David Benest, on UK COIN doctrine and associated problems: http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/events/reports/tt08_benest.asp

Not that this publicity will affect the UK government.

davidbfpo

Blackjack
06-22-2009, 11:15 PM
An article in the 'Restricted' British Army Review (BAR) has appeared in the public domain: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5587822/British-Army-officer-launches-stinging-attack-on-failing-UK-strategy-in-Afghanistan.html

I am sure the author, a UK Army major, is echoing many comrades views.

Hat tip to: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama and that refers in the comments section to another UK officer, David Benest, on UK COIN doctrine and associated problems: http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/events/reports/tt08_benest.asp

Not that this publicity will affect the UK government.

davidbfpo

Thank you for the link to the article. I must admit it was rather harsh, but possibly not off base. The part that really got me as a former NCO was when the article stated the following;


Maj Miller also castigated senior officers for the strategy of "Clear, Hold, Build", which he stated had become a "parody of itself".

He added: "We are really only clearing the immediate vicinity of the security force bases, we are only holding the major settlements, and we are not building.

"Self-protection has become the main tactic, reinforced by air strikes that can backfire and undermine the campaign.

"Even as the Army renders itself more and more immobile with heavier vehicles and infantrymen weighing as much as a medieval knight, still the fantasy of the "manoeuvrist approach is peddled in staff courses.

"There is nothing manoeuvrist about weeks of petty, attritional fire fights within a few kilometres radius of a Forward Operating Base. The reason for all this is clear – zero casualties has become the tacit assumption behind operations.

"The Taliban are not being "coerced", "deterred", or "destabilised". They simply disperse, knowing that the British cannot sustain pressure, and they return like the tide when the British troops withdraw, after a short period, back to their bases."

In concluding his essay, Maj Miller wrote the "British Army must believe that it can win wars again".

It sounds like an utter disaster and like the leadership lives in some sort of fantasy land, or echelons above reality. Some of us have lost good friends along the way in these small wars, or been wounded ourselves. However it is important to recognize that risk is part of this thing we do. We should not be so adverse to casualties that it stops us from doing our duties on the ground.

carl
06-23-2009, 03:52 AM
Is there any way to access the actual British Army Review article?

davidbfpo
06-23-2009, 09:18 AM
Carl,

BAR is not available publically in the UK and sometimes back issues appear in the RUSI Library (Whitehall think tank). I understand copies circulate in US staff colleges etc (as indicated by Jon Custis recently and others before, on different threads). I will check when in RUSI this week.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-23-2009, 09:22 AM
I will post this too in an OEF thread, but as it is a UK Army operation starting here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5608929/Black-Watch-troops-launch-major-Afghanistan-assault.html

What is amazing IMHO is the reference to 'Operation Panther's Claw, an assault by the Scots soldiers on one of the last Taliban strongholds in Helmand Province...' Bold added by me.

Does this exclude the two large refugee camps, which had Taliban rule eighteen months ago in Helmand Province?

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
06-23-2009, 10:26 AM
Hat tip to: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama and that refers in the comments section to another UK officer, David Benest, on UK COIN doctrine and associated problems: http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/events/reports/tt08_benest.asp


Colonel David Benest, former CO 2 PARA, has only recently retired. I know him well. Unlike a lot of folks this guy actually is a Counter-insurgency expert, with a 30-year operational track record, from the early days in Northern Ireland until A'stan last year.

I don't wish to place words in the Colonel's mouth, but my conversations with him seem to indicate that he is very sceptical of "COIN Doctrine/manuals" or "theoretical approaches." He is very much for the hands on approach and teaching what works, based on actual evidence, and not "pet theories."

William F. Owen
06-23-2009, 10:41 AM
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5587822/British-Army-officer-launches-stinging-attack-on-failing-UK-strategy-in-Afghanistan.html

I have started this as a new thread because I think it is deserving of our collective attentions.

Suffice it to say, I doubt these are "UK only" problems. Moreover, as many of you know I am not entirely convinced that Afghanistan is actually suffering from an insurgency. There might actually be a war going on.

Bob's World
06-23-2009, 12:40 PM
While I can't get on board with all of the Major's points, his frustration is certainly valid.

But at the heart of the matter, as he alludes to, and WILF states above: If you don't understand what the problem is that you are trying to solve, any solution you devise is likely to come across as a confused, inefficient mess.

(Though WILF, I do have to call you out a little bit: I thought your position was that insurgency is war, but now you identify the difference as critical? Shed some light, brother. What factors are you seeing that are making you see this as trending across some line, and what that line is.)

For me, I would set "Clear-Hold-Build" on a shelf, right next to the concepts that we can either kill enough "bad guys" to win; or build enough infrastructure to win. In fact, toss up on that shelf the concept of the coalition "winning" or "losing" altogether, as this tends to shape our actions more to save our own face rather than to stabilize Afghanistan.

What I would take down from the shelf is a shift to a focus of attaining localized "goodnees" and doing so in a manner that minimizes any perceptions of legitimacy of the Coalition over whatever government the Afghan people choose to put in place. I would then seek a strong partnership with Iran to help implement this process, and also thereby diluting any perceptions of western legitmacy over the Afghan government. Simplify the solution and reduce the amount of control we seek over that solution. We must merely enable an Afghan solution, not impose a western one.

William F. Owen
06-23-2009, 12:50 PM
(Though WILF, I do have to call you out a little bit: I thought your position was that insurgency is war, but now you identify the difference as critical? Shed some light, brother. What factors are you seeing that are making you see this as trending across some line, and what that line is.)


Call away Brethren. Call away! What's the difference between an insurgency and a war? I merely suggest that in wars the primary purpose of operations is to defeat the enemy (defeat as in render the enemy unable to stop you doing what you want to do).
I believe that should be the object in what some call "COIN". How it is best done will depend on the specifics of the circumstance, but painting yourself into the "POP-centric COIN" corner is not necessarily progress, if the population is inclined to support which ever side is winning.

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 10:16 PM
A lengthy speech by the next UK Army chief, full text: http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E496B737B57852/info:public/infoID:E4A4253226F582/ and a commentaries: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ and: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5626220/Army-must-change-or-risk-failure-warns-future-chief.html

Too late to fully absorb now.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-26-2009, 10:12 AM
The first seven posts were on a different thread on the UK Army problems: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819&page=5 and rightly Wilf thought a new thread was needed and I later moved the seven posts to this thread.

davidbfpo

Coldstreamer
06-26-2009, 10:14 AM
I'm not sure its as bad as all that. Queen's Birthday Parade went well.
I had a splendid time in Afghanistan, and was quite clear what my purpose there was.




Bringing all my men home alive. Preferably without setting the neighbourhood on fire.
Any thing else was a bonus.

davidbfpo
06-26-2009, 10:36 AM
Daily Telegraph comment on the choices: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/5636460/General-Sir-David-Richards-call-for-a-review-of-the-Armed-Forces-is-timely.html

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-09-2009, 03:35 PM
Following the death of Lt.Col. Thorneloe, once a student of his Professor Richard Holmes (once a TA / Reserve Army brigadier) has written this savage IMHO attack on the UK lack of a strategy: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6652496.ece

Incidnetally the more popular newspaper The Daily Mail on 7/7/09 had an editorial comment: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1198171/DAILY-MAIL-COMMENT-Tell-troops-fighting-for.html. Followed by Max Hastings article: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1198458/MAX-HASTINGS-Why-Lance-Corporal-Elson-175-soldier-killed-unwinnable-war-deserve-better-country.html - within are two pithy sentences
'Soldiers know the harsh statistic, that an infantryman faces a one-in-ten chance of suffering a life-changing injury during a tour in Helmand' and 'They perceive their courage exploited, their lives risked, merely so that Britain can 'show willing' to the Americans'.

In evidence to a House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Stephen Grey, a Sunday Times journalist, was scathing in his criticism - not of the troops: http://files.stephengrey.com/OpSnakebite/Defence%20Select%20Committee%20090630%20uncorrecte d%20SG%20transcript.doc

Then we can read that UK aid has created a park for women at Lashka Gar:
To the utter bemusement of the local Afghanis, DFID has invested no less than £420,000 on a (-) leisure park for Women, complete, you will be pleased to know with a (-) Ferris wheel. Called Bolan Park, when it was completed just over a year ago, it had "puzzled residents" asking why so much money was being spent on leisure when the most pressing problem – security – was getting worse by the day. Said Amir Mohammad, 44, "If the international community wants our country to be prosperous, they should first worry about peace and security. Then we can have parks."

Then there's the good news:
As for the IEDs that have been killing "Our Boys" – many of them now home-made using agricultural fertiliser - the aid agencies thought about that as well. Very helpfully this season, they have supplied the (Taleban) Afghani farmers with a total of 4,749 metric tons, conveniently packaged in 25-kilogram bags.

Last two comments from: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Meantime the official line is
'The way forward is hard and dangerous. More lives will be lost and our resolve will be tested.' From the Defence Minister's speech; in full: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/AinsworthProgressAndMomentumInAfghanistan.htm

The speech was delivered at Chatham House, London a think tank and unusually for such a gathering his speech recieved some hostile comments over the lack of helicopters in the Q&A.

Apologies for length, IMHO the issue of 'Why Afghanistan?' appears to be moving into the public domain and public support for the policy is simply evaporating. In late 2008 a poll IIRC found 80% opposed our presence.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-11-2009, 10:45 AM
Extensive UK media coverage on the latest losses in Helmand Province, with eight dead in one day (fifteen in a week): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8145603.stm and HMG's attempts to explain why: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5802488/British-troops-giving-their-lives-to-secure-Britains-future-says-David-Miliband.html

Note no figures for injuries and we know IEDs often cripple others. Morale and injuries are found in this (incredibly) upbeat: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5797872/British-offensive-in-Afghanistan-hits-tipping-point.html

I am mindful of Robert Haddick's comment on SWJ Blog:


Using Stoker’s framework, it’s clear that while the Taliban’s ideas and tactics are unpopular, the militants have a resilient and adaptive structure. Most important, they are now employing a strategy that takes advantage of what they see as their adversary’s biggest weaknesses: the U.S. public’s impatience and aversion to casualties. Thus, unlike most modern insurgencies, the Taliban may not be making enough mistakes to lose.

Ken White
07-11-2009, 04:00 PM
The US public is not nearly as adverse to casualties as many think. The public will accept casualties without a qualm (except for the chattering classes, who have qualms about everything...) provided results are being obtained -- fail to get results in your war, the public will eventually get angry at non-performance, not at casualties. The US Congress, OTOH, is a different thing. Congress always wants to appear as doing something about any problem, no matter minor or major, their reaction is the same -- panic! then pass another law, quickly! Idiots.

The larger issue is not US aversion to casualties, it is NATO aversion to them and therefor the potential for early departure from the theater and fragmentation of the coalition. That will create an added burden on the US to compensate as a result. Congress (not so much the public) will not be pleased.

The various fighting factions in Afghansitan, including but not limited to the Taliban are well aware of all that and while they will inflict a number of casualties on the US due to the sheer size of the troop commitments, they will concentrate on inflicting casualties on all the other Nation's forces in country. They are in particular targeting Canada and have said so, I suspect that their next in line targets are the UK and Germany as they are the two largest force elements aside from the US. They'll keep tweaking Canada just to insure the Canadians adhere to their stated 2011 withdrawal plan. I anticipate increased attacks on the Italians and Spanish as well.

All that said, Haddick is correct in that they are aiming for casualties versus western impatience as as a strategy. That should not be a surprise to anyone. It could easily have been predicted in 2001 -- or 1966 or 1952... :mad:

davidbfpo
07-11-2009, 06:14 PM
Ken,

We have covered aversion to casualties before, when discussing public opinion in WW2 and other wars. I should have adapted Robert Haddick's comment on SWJ Blog and now have:


Using Stoker’s framework, it’s clear that while the Taliban’s ideas and tactics are unpopular, the militants have a resilient and adaptive structure. Most important, they are now employing a strategy that takes advantage of what they see as their adversary’s biggest weaknesses: the U.S. and ISAF allies public’s impatience and aversion to casualties. Thus, unlike most modern insurgencies, the Taliban may not be making enough mistakes to lose.

I am also mindful, without minimizing the impact of recent losses, that this is the UK press "silly season", when normal editorial priorities change and stories that would normally not get attention get headlines. Clearly the UK government would prefer that official reassurance is accepted without murmur, almost "All is well, don't panic".

Clarity of aim needs to be explained far better and saying that operations in Helmand are vital to the UK and will prevent terrorism here is simply incredible.

davidbfpo

Ken White
07-11-2009, 06:28 PM
do is simply incredible... :D

No intent to quibble with you or Haddick on the statement, just adding to it, really. Sometimes my add ons are clumsy. :o

kingo1rtr
07-11-2009, 06:31 PM
Alot of this debate, both within the media and also to mainstream politics, in UK and US, highlights the effects of a distinct lack of a coherent strategic narrative on the coalition effort in Afghanistan.

IMO such a narrative needs to address why we are there, what we are doing there and gives some clear definition of what must be achieved before we can leave. In sum, a campaign vision that integrates the military and non-military strategic lines of development. From that will flow a campaign context allowing the operation to be better framed and a military campaign plan to be be more focussed on objectives. In turn that would allow the aims of the tactical level actions such as the ongoing Panther's Claw to be understood more clearly to a public [keen to support but short on understanding] and provide some rationale for the loss of lives. For the soldiers the old adage 'ours is not to reason why' remains a constant, BUT neither the public nor the media will be bought off so easily.

Ken White
07-11-2009, 08:23 PM
I'll avoid repeating my earlier comment on incredble actions. :wry:

I'm not sure how a narrative that reads:

"We sort of blundered into this without thinking it through, ignored the advice of those who were current and familiar with the area and essentially said we'd fix something that might not be fixable in the time we're willing or able to allot but we are now committed and are trying to get it organized. If the NATO Steering Committees will just cooperate, we can pro ..."

Will be received by a public that I agree is keen to support and that fails to understand what we have done thus far or now are doing. It's a public which has a surprisingly good appreciation for what we can actually do and who sense most of what both our governments say is not quite, umm, er, accurate. In view of all that, both nations peoples have been pretty patient...

Political spin to tarnish home opponents by all concerned, both sides of the aisles, is not only unhelpful, it is a distinct disservice to those they have sent to fight in this war. :mad:

You're absolutely correct that the effort must produce:
"...a campaign vision that integrates the military and non-military strategic lines of development."The good news is that It seems we are finally doing that. Bad news is that sooner or later, the public is gong to ask why it took eight years to get started doing that.

That will only take another three or four years to implement although we don't know what will then happen. The Japanese, more forward looking and more patient than we scruffy barbarians, are planning on aid and support in Afghanistan for 20 more years. No easy answers...

Fortunately, as you say, the Troops, Bless 'em all, will keep plugging. :cool:

William F. Owen
07-14-2009, 07:35 AM
This is probably worth taking some note of. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5820679/Mark-Evison-We-are-walking-a-tightrope-in-Afghanistan.html)

davidbfpo
07-14-2009, 06:49 PM
Remarkable and candid diary by Mark Evison.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-15-2009, 11:32 AM
A short summary of the history of Afghanistan and UK (Imperial) interventions: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8151294.stm The last two paragraphs:


The difference now is that much more attention is being devoted to understanding the culture of Afghanistan and to finding solutions that do not necessarily involve military action. Efforts are being made, with some success, to incorporate cultural understanding in all military activities, from fighting to reconstruction.

But with a resurgent Taliban, apparently committed to an extremist vision of Islam and harbouring terrorists, it will also be necessary and unavoidable to use military force. Awareness of the cultural dimension will not necessarily guarantee victory, but ignorance of it, history shows us, will guarantee defeat.

davidbfpo

Fuchs
07-15-2009, 12:00 PM
We don't know how much cultural empathy was in play in the early invasions.

The need to adapt to local culture and win over locals is not something that officials from a high civilization in Europe would have easily admitted in writing during the 19th century.

davidbfpo
07-15-2009, 02:07 PM
In the Afghan context I doubt that there was much cultural empathy between Imperial India - both civil and military - with the Afghans. Respect yes for their fighting skill and knowledge that they'd do unspeakable things to you. The stuff of legend.

The First Afghan War pre-dates the Indian Mutiny, when drammatic changes occurred in Imperial outlook and was only a few years after Imperial India came up to the north west border (not then so firmly established).

Later as North West Frontier fighting and managing was embedded deeper, almost the UK's only significant frontline military commitment, there was far greater culture awareness and maybe empathy along the border. Well illustated IMHO in 'The Frontier Scouts" by Charles Chevenix-Trench and John Master's writings: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Masters .

Anecdote today indicates that the Afghans continue to detest, if not worse, Punjabis more than other visitors.

davidbfpo

marct
07-15-2009, 03:51 PM
RUNNING OUT OF TIME: ARGUMENTS FOR A NEW STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

By GILLES DORRONSORO Professor of Political Science at the Institut d'études politiques in Rennes, France, and Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C.

In this working paper, co-produced by CIPS and the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Professor Dorronsoro argues that even with the addition of more US troops this year, there has been a startling lack of strategic innovation in the Afghanistan mission. There is very limited time to change the dynamics of the conflict. NATO should focus on redeploying its forces to the cities and to more stable areas of the country where it has a chance of making a difference, as a step towards eventual NATO withdrawal.

Full Text of this Working Paper (http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1102640221618&s=17&e=001F8xmHh9EEbTUoqp-szZ1x5oHl2JHsdYLCriy-KhJRE0wUIE2RliqFKWH8uiYCyUMOd7zm8ciBnf40Vmz-RL6-21muNG_L1hDkV7TPLuXIbguoXvCozvZjC4hO1bMVim-Tgev33LACOP4FoI0poXRlDCIGsyH4FMvKuLXQ0RYQaYOeThotz L4M73DkSkw7iVOKjzummAj_PL1gAGbDo1DTg==)
.............

davidbfpo
07-16-2009, 10:26 AM
THis is a very odd story in The Scotsman: http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/Afghanistan-39Britain-is-backing-the.5464013.jp

Whatever the truth it is an illustration of how the locals may view our presence.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
07-16-2009, 12:28 PM
Whatever the truth it is an illustration of how the locals may view our presence.

So much for information Ops. How do you compete with local legend, popular opinion and cultural myth?

As keep saying, most folks believe in flying saucers, despite the complete lack proper evidence.

marct
07-16-2009, 04:35 PM
Whatever the truth it is an illustration of how the locals may view our presence.


So much for information Ops. How do you compete with local legend, popular opinion and cultural myth?

I found this to be quite interesting:


He had fond memories of Taleban rule. "The Taleban are the enemies of the international community, but they were good for the welfare of ordinary Afghans, for poor people like us," he said. "In Taleban times, there was punishment for criminals. They didn't mind executing people, or cutting off their hands, so from one lesson, a hundred others would learn."

It's a really good example of idealization, i.e. taking a past reality and remembering only the good parts about it that are applicable to current problems. To my mind, it indicates several things: a breakdown in the ability of tribes/clans to maintain justice, a belief that the Taleban will provide it, and a belief that the Afghan government is part of the criminal "factions" attacking the average person.

Ken White
07-16-2009, 05:07 PM
...a belief that the Afghan government is part of the criminal "factions" attacking the average person.Is that not true of most of us? :o

I'll paraphrase Rodney Dangerfield; 'Take my Congress...' :D

Kevin23
07-18-2009, 06:45 PM
I was reading a weekly column on Foreign Policy Magazine in joint collaboration with Small Wars Journal. About the war in Afghanistan and it's effects on polls on the UK homefront and British politics. From it as I'm sure many of you have read is that discontent over how the British Government and it's handling of it's part of the conflict in Afghanistan is growing stronger then ever before as the article stated. As casualties mount I'm strongly curious as to if the British commitment in Afghanistan will remain open ended? Or will the government under the very unpopular Gordon Brown and Labour Party opt to establish a timeline for a withdrawal date like Canada has kind of done or other countries have actually done? This should be especially interesting given that Britain is going to be having Parliamentary elections next year and how all three major parties will approach this increasingly loud debate.

Any opinions?

For one I could see Labour try to attach a date some considerable time from now to wind down the British commitment in Afghanistan. I also find it hard to see how the Conservatives will deal with this issue.

davidbfpo
07-18-2009, 06:55 PM
Kevin23,

I posted some earlier comments on SWJ Blog:

The current public and political debate over the UK's role in Afghanistan reflects the longstanding opposition to the policy, not the soldiers. Yes, the losses have been the catalyst. So has the USMC operation just to the south of the UK campaigning - with apparently fewer casualties.

The UK role in Helmand has appalling explained by the government before now. What are we doing, is it worth it and what national interests are involved.

A few weeks ago the Whitehall-Westminster coalition were all gloomy about the potential impact on the cherished 'special relationship' and sometimes that is still mentioned in press articles. That is not the argument the public will accept now; for a variety of local reasons the 'relationship' is no longer highly regarded and is under strain.

Even this morning on BBC Radio 4 two politicians were asked why. One of them, Patrick Mercer, Tory ex-soldier, mentioned the importance of Pakistan to UK national security and the impact of a retreat from Helmand. Explaining the role of Pakistan in UK national security is not made loud enough here.

The press and politicians have focussed on the lack of helicopters, that is one of many equipment issues. Yes, it is a scandal that so few are in theatre for so many who need them.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-18-2009, 07:20 PM
(taken from) 1. As casualties mount I'm strongly curious as to if the British commitment in Afghanistan will remain open ended? 2. Or will the government under the very unpopular Gordon Brown and Labour Party opt to establish a timeline for a withdrawal date like Canada has kind of done or other countries have actually done? 3.This should be especially interesting given that Britain is going to be having Parliamentary elections next year and how all three major parties will approach this increasingly loud debate.

1. Currently the UK commitment is open ended, although not well explained or understood outside government. IMHO our commitment is not as strong as the USA, largely due to the public imagery of 9/11 and the quest to eliminate AQ as a threat (leaving aside many issues, like Saudi Arabia). I cannot see the UK being there in the long term, due to Afghan history (as I have posted on other threads before).

2. No, in my opinion this Labour government will not establish a timeline for withdrawal. The UK role in Iraq was far more unpopular at home, amongst the Labour Party and with Muslim voters in key marginal parliamentary seats. No timeline appeared, I think it would have been an astute domestic political move, but damaging to UK national interest - notably with the USA.

3. It is too early to see any impact on the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Note the UK media are in the annual "silly season" when stories get unusual attention when parliament goes on holiday (in fact on 21/7 for three months) and holidays for others. None of the main parties are against this overseas role, although the Lib-Dem leader has broken the collective vow of silence to challenge policy.


Any opinions? For one I could see Labour try to attach a date some considerable time from now to wind down the British commitment in Afghanistan. I also find it hard to see how the Conservatives will deal with this issue.

A future date to exit sounds nice, but is unlikely for political and national interest reasons. There is such institutional loyalty to the 'special relationship' with the USA, reflected in many of the editorial or comment articles now and recently before the body count climbed - similar to "we must not disappoint our ally, so must stay firm". Try the RUSI website: http://www.rusi.org/ or any mainstream newspaper like the Daily Telegraph or The Times.

It is our shaky financial position that is far more likely to decide. Can any UK party cut welfare spending for example and transfer the funds to defence? There are cheaper options, but the Ministry of Defence appears to avoid those - view this for far more detail and comment: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

I hope this helps.

davidbfpo

kingo1rtr
07-18-2009, 08:41 PM
At the strategic level the support is there and senior military figures have appeared to achieve a concensus amongst poilitical leaders (note - not necessarily their followers) that this may be a long campaign. I think Rory Stewart's view will gain traction.

Recent casualties are tragic and regrettable and cause the public, quite understandably, to doubt the need for our involvement. The public debate is very useful as it is forcing a discussion that will generate greater clarity on the narrative of why we are there and equally importantly, will underline the need for cross government departmental support.

The key outcome I suspect will be to set some context for the upcoming strategic defence review; by that I mean that the SDR will be forced to take account of the need for success on current operations (accepting now that the timeframe for involvement in Afghanistan is long enough to butt into the SDR timeline). That in turn should allow for a much more focussed debate in SDR on the things the Army feel it needs now and in the short term, putting pressure on things like carriers and joint strike fighters.

So in sum, definite disquiet amongst the public, but service chiefs giving clear signals on sustaining a campaign in Afghanistan. Clear evidence that lessons learned from some of the concerns over how we managed the perception of the UK drawdown in Iraq, within both public and political domains, here and in US, have been taken on board.

davidbfpo
07-18-2009, 09:16 PM
I think Rory Stewart's view will gain traction.

(Taken from another thread re Rory Stewart's views) A lengthy commentary on the Afghan situation and whether it is really that vital a battleground; the author Rory Stewart has been a soldier, diplomat and academic and has travelled extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. Living in Kabul in 2005: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...annot-win.html A slightly longer edition: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

Worth reading through for its many pertinent comments and seems to fit here, even if killing is not the focus.

davidbfpo

kingo1rtr
07-18-2009, 09:56 PM
- its a very useful link. I think that Rory Stewart's views are beginning to resonate in the upper echelons of the military chain. No doubt the military do find some of his views uncomfortable, but I think his warning on both the potential length of the campaign, problems in Kabul and the need to get more non-military activity going are accurate. Both NI and Iraq point to that need - both were much longer in duration than originally thought. Ergo, whatever timeline we have in mind for the current chapter in the Great Game, add 5 years.....

I posted my last onto the Foreign Policy page at Haddicks article. Hopefully it will provide useful, balanced, counterview.

kingo1rtr
07-19-2009, 08:41 PM
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/will-pike-and-patrick-little-we-are-at-war-but-where-is-the-leadership-1752208.html

Well worth a read. Most of the points land on target.

Ken White
07-19-2009, 08:50 PM
government to adopt... :mad:

Both authors have been there and speak truth. Thanks for linking it.

davidbfpo
07-19-2009, 09:30 PM
Those who criticise our Afghanistan policy for lacking a credible plan and being lost in empty rhetoric are right. We are fixated on what allies and partners call "Helmandshire". Unlike our American allies, we lack a cross-government strategy and plan, the commitment, resources and Whitehall willingness to change sufficiently to deliver success.


What would success be? We have to stabilise the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan – bring the Pashtu into the fold, give them a stake in their nations' politics, wean them away from extreme Islam, deny sanctuary to terrorists and give the Afghans a state that can deliver what they want. Without Pashtu support, extremism in the region will decline. These are substantial aims, but failure, which would increase extremism – with inevitable and violent consequences within the region and internationally – is not an option.

From: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/will-pike-and-patrick-little-we-are-at-war-but-where-is-the-leadership-1752208.html

Good article that assumes public unity in the UK on why we fight there and secondly what we aim to do is shared by the local population - as distinct from the state(s).

davidbfpo

kingo1rtr
07-20-2009, 06:51 AM
Another good article. Well thought out and accurate on a number of levels. Its encouraging that the debate in the media is moving gently towards a more sophisticated level that just pure equipment shortfalls. Lets hope the politician follow on as the whore to her pimp!


http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/bruce-anderson/bruce-anderson-the-british-admire-their-army-ndash-but-they-dont-understand-it-1753030.html

William F. Owen
07-20-2009, 07:08 AM
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/bruce-anderson/bruce-anderson-the-british-admire-their-army-ndash-but-they-dont-understand-it-1753030.html

Interesting article, but

We urgently need a defence review, and not in order to produce further economies. Although there is scope for re-deployments, there is no scope for reducing the defence budget – unless we want to imperil our ability to conduct high-intensity warfare. We have to think through the relationship between resources and commitments. That will not happen under this brain-dead Government. Perhaps the Tories should ask General Dannatt to undertake the task, once he retires.

That's only part of the answer. Patrick Little's RUSI article makes the point that actually we have quite a few "brain dead" senior officers. Nothing wrong with the courage and skill of the boys on the ground, but a lot that is wrong with the British Army is the British Army, and not political machinations that fund and task it. - and I have spent a good deal of time in Officers Messes, talking to serving officers and corresponding with them.

davidbfpo
07-20-2009, 07:44 AM
From a well-known reporter, Robert Fisk; short article and I will show two paragraphs: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fiskrsquos-world-some-lessons-in-sacrifice-from-liverpool-in-two-world-wars-1751587.html


I said that we should not be in Afghanistan, that we Westerners now have 22 times as many military personnel in the Muslim world than the Crusaders had in the 12th century .... Send them our doctors and our teachers and our agronomists – but not our soldiers. They should be brought home....And to my astonishment, the burghers and their families, students and their mums and dads – hitherto silent in expectation of a soft homily – began to clap, a great wash of sound that spread through the chapels and aisles of Scott's cathedral.


In just one month – May of 1941 – Liverpudlians lost 1,453 men, women and children to Luftwaffe raids. In my cruel calculations, this means that our 185 dead in Afghanistan in eight years – from all over Britain – represent a mere seventh of what Liverpool alone suffered in one month of the Second World War.

A different viewpoint I readily admit, worth reading in full.

davidbfpo

slapout9
07-20-2009, 09:49 AM
Interview on CNN Fareed Zakaria (sunday) between Killcullen & Bacevich(spell)

Highlights from Killcullen:
1- Iraq was a mistake never should have gone there, there was no threat!
2-Pakistan is the Center of Gravity not Astan!

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/bestoftv/2009/07/19/gps.afghanistan.worth.it.cnn

Red Rat
07-20-2009, 10:59 AM
The politicians have not clearly articulated why Afghanistan is so important.

The public can discern that here is a palpable disconnect between importance and resourcing: If it is so important for us to be there why have we not resourced it accordingly?

The campaign is perceived as floundering with no clear plan or defined endstate.



The combination of all three is leading to considerable disquiet in the public ranks. Add to this an unwillingness on the part of the political class to engage with the issues. In my opinion very few UK politicians wish to commit themselves beyond the term of the parliament. Political thinking is currently dominated by short term thinking with decision making left until the last safe moment, possibly workable in major combat operations but the antithesis of COIN operations!

Scrutiny from political classes and the public is also beginning to focus much more on the senior echelons of the armed forces with the tarnish from Iraq leeching across to Afghanistan. 'Lions lead by donkeys' has been muttered. The usual Services internecine politics in advance of expected budget cuts does not help either.

With the insurgents in Afghanistan viewing operations as 'Influence operations with a kinetic element' I would expect increasing focus on causing casualties in the UK element.

On the Home Front I would hope to see clearer articulation of why we are there and greater clarity and focus at the operational level. The reccommendations in the Independent article are sound, but judging by the comments made by Lord Digby-Jones and others about the way the UK government (dis)functions both within and across government departments I somewhat doubt that improvements will be either quick or effective.

William F. Owen
07-20-2009, 12:53 PM
With the insurgents in Afghanistan viewing operations as 'Influence operations with a kinetic element' I would expect increasing focus on causing casualties in the UK element.


Ahhh! I like that. I like it a lot.
Kinetic effect/action consistently the most effective way of creating influence. When was it ever not, in any war? Not much has changed in 3,000 years!

Ken White
07-20-2009, 04:13 PM
Highlights from Killcullen:
1- Iraq was a mistake never should have gone there, there was no threat!
2-Pakistan is the Center of Gravity not Astan!True not a threat, not so easy a call on should have never gone. The problem is that the Bush Administration sold Iraq as threat for several reasons. They later acknowledged that was a mistake but have never announced the total rationale for going there. My contention is that reason was to shake up the ME, the source of the Islamist international terror business since the early1970s. If that is correct or even if it was a synergistic side effect, then Kilcullen (and Bacevich) are wrong and are homing in on the wrong rationale.

As for Pakistan, true -- but Pakistan did not host the guys that paid for the attack on US soil. Plus Pakistan was and is a far tougher nut to attack than was Afghanistan. Afghanistan was an announcement that attacks on US soil will not be tolerated and, as a Pakistani neighbor, a lever to influence Pakistan -- one that may or may not work. However, we sort of had to try...

Iraq was an announcement to the ME that attacks from there on US interests around the world, an issue since 1979, would no longer be tolerated. Had it been better executed by DoD and the Army, it would have made an effective and powerful message. In the event, the message got diluted a bit but it's still been made and will have an effect. The worst gig about attacking Iraq was the timing; later would've been better.

Too early to make sweeping pronouncements about either operation; it'll take another 20 years plus to even start getting a good handle on them. :wry:

davidbfpo
07-22-2009, 02:48 PM
First an "outsider" ex-diplomat minister comments: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5881753/Lord-Malloch-Brown-interview-This-dangerous-gridlock-that-taints-our-politics.html (note next suggests a slight retraction) and then an ex-UK Army brigadier, who commanded in Helmand last year: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5887092/British-military-in-Afghanistan-insufficiently-resourced-says-former-commander.html

The domestic "front" rumbles on.

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
07-22-2009, 03:45 PM
The Economist weighs in with a briefing on the issue, 16 Jul 09:

British forces in Afghanistan: And the soldier home from the hill (http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14033362)

.....The war in Afghanistan has, until recently, had an oddly low political profile in Britain. One reason is that it was long overshadowed by the conflict in Iraq. With the withdrawal of Britain’s last combat troops from Basra, that is no longer the case. The other reason is that, unlike the conflict in Iraq, the Afghan war has commanded broad political support. Whereas the Liberal Democrats, the country’s third party, opposed Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq, all the main parties have supported the country’s involvement in Afghanistan since the outset. At least, they have done so until now.

The cross-party consensus on Afghanistan is under more strain than ever before. Both the Tories and the Lib Dems still say they back the deployment, but they attack the government’s perceived lack of strategy and its parsimony towards the armed forces. Liam Fox, the Tory shadow defence secretary, has accused the government of “the ultimate dereliction of duty”. The Tories have concentrated their fire on the shortfall in the helicopters (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/434/434.pdf) available to British forces—though the criticism is undermined by their reluctance to promise extra defence spending if they win the election due by next year. Nick Clegg, the leader of the Lib Dems, has been sharper: he talks about soldiers’ lives being “thrown away”, describing the mission in Afghanistan as “over-ambitious in aim and under-resourced in practice”.

Yet the most important divide may not be between political parties but between government ministers and military commanders.....

davidbfpo
08-08-2009, 12:34 PM
This is the BBC's title for a short article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8191018.stm based on a far longer article, interviewing the General Sir David Richards, the UK's new top soldier (CGS), in The Times: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6788062.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1


It will take time. This is nation-building – not the starry-eyed type, but nation-building nonetheless. It is not just reconstruction; jobs and simple governance that works are key, and there has to be a strong reconciliation element to the latter. The Army’s role will evolve, but the whole process might take as long as 30 to 40 years. There is absolutely no chance of Nato pulling out.

Later
I believe strongly that it is winnable. Demanding, certainly, but winnable. And when people say, ‘How can you use the term “win”?’ I retort, ‘Well, I will certainly know if we have lost.’ Can you imagine the intoxicating effect on militants if we were defeated? Can you be certain there would not be an export of terrorism to the streets of London? It’s a risk we should be very wary of taking... But, of course, the end will be difficult to define; it won’t be neat and clear-cut like the end of some old-fashioned inter-state war might have been. And, as I have said many times, everyone involved needs to realise it will take a long time and considerable investment. We must remember, though, that we are not trying to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland.

How the UK public react to such a statement by the CGS, starting a three year tour, is a moot point. Let alone the government or opposition, who for very different reasons see Afghanistan differently.

How would the US public react to a forty year presence?

We have discussed before the Western public and political impatience for long wars. A factor the Taliban appear very well aware of.

The latest BBC radio news had a very short item on the interview and a renewed call by a Labour backbench MP for other NATO nations to share the burden. A so far largely a forlorn hope.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
08-08-2009, 02:18 PM
In this hour long, regional BBC-Wales documentary they report on a Welsh (armoured) regiment in Afghanistan: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00gd41j/Frontline_Afghanistan/ The programme is available till 1214hrs Monday 10th August 2009.

Some interesting footage; note filmed in March 2009 before the US surge into Helmand Province.

At the end when asked "can we win..is it worth it?'" a NCO (troop commander) says 'No' and "history shows we cannot". This portion starts at 56:28.

davidbfpo

frank
08-08-2009, 02:39 PM
No UK government -or the UK public as such- is willing to stay decades in Afghanistan.
They remember their failurs from the past in that region.

milnews.ca
08-09-2009, 12:21 PM
No UK government -or the UK public as such- is willing to stay decades in Afghanistan.
They remember their failurs from the past in that region.
I think most taxpayers in any western democracy, unless convincingly, consistently and repeatedly sold on the benefits, would balk at committing troops/aid for a generation - especially when politicians doing the selling are thinking in a "next election" timeframe.

Not knocking democracy, but I see this as the fundamental tension at play: governments looking for and offering solutions that get "results" (and you can spend a pretty long thread debating "results" vs. "success" vs. "victory" when defining exit strategies) in the short-ish term for situations that need commitment in the loooooooooooooooong term.

Jedburgh
08-11-2009, 06:57 PM
UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09:

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/302/302.pdf), Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence.

Report

Conclusions and recommendations

1 Introduction
2 The role of the international community in Afghanistan
3 Where Afghanistan is now: an assessment
4 Pakistan’s strategic importance and role in relation to Afghanistan
5 The Obama plan: addressing previous failings?
6 The UK’s mission in Afghanistan
7 The UK’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: a way forward?
8 Future prospects: towards a political settlement?

Maps
Annex: Foreign Affairs Committee visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 April–1 May 2009
Glossary of Terms
Formal Minutes
Witnesses
List of written evidence

davidbfpo
08-16-2009, 11:09 AM
In a BBC News report on 200+ deaths in Afghanistan: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8203975.stm there is a mild rebuke to General Richards recent '40 years' comment by the UK Secretary of Defence:

But, referring to comments by incoming head of the army Gen Sir David Richards, he said:
"The notion that we are going to be in Afghanistan in 30 to 40 years in anything like the form we are now is ludicrous."

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
08-16-2009, 01:00 PM
But, referring to comments by incoming head of the army Gen Sir David Richards, he said:

"The notion that we are going to be in Afghanistan in 30 to 40 years in anything like the form we are now is ludicrous."


Hmmmm.... Is it not wonderful that we have politicians, gifted with such an ability to see the future? I remember being told in 1980, that Northern Ireland deployments "could not go on for another 10 years."

Mark O'Neill
08-16-2009, 01:17 PM
I know similar stories have appeared here, this one is British and the young soldier has been nominated for the Commenwealth's highest military medal, the Victoria Cross. The last winner was L/Cpl. Beharry, in Iraq.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/09/nhero109.xml

There is an option to post comments on the Daily Telegraph's website.

davidbfpo

Trooper Mark Donaldson VC, Australian Special Air Service Regiment, won a VC for actions in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan on 2 Sep 2008. Story from the Australian Defence Force Website (http://www.defence.gov.au/special_events/TPR_markDonaldson.htm ) follows:

For most conspicuous acts of gallantry in action in a circumstance of great peril in Afghanistan as part of the Special Operations Task Group during Operation SLIPPER, Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan.

Trooper Mark Gregor Donaldson enlisted into the Australian Army on 18 June 2002. After completing Recruit and Initial and Employment Training he was posted to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. Having successfully completed the Special Air Service Selection Course in April 2004, Trooper Donaldson was posted to Special Air Service Regiment in May 2004.

On 2 September 2008, during the conduct of a fighting patrol, Trooper Donaldson was travelling in a combined Afghan, US and Australian vehicle convoy that was engaged by a numerically superior, entrenched and coordinated enemy ambush. The ambush was initiated by a high volume of sustained machine gun fire coupled with the effective use of rocket propelled grenades. Such was the effect of the initiation that the combined patrol suffered numerous casualties, completely lost the initiative and became immediately suppressed. It was over two hours before the convoy was able to establish a clean break and move to an area free of enemy fire.

In the early stages of the ambush, Trooper Donaldson reacted spontaneously to regain the initiative. He moved rapidly between alternate positions of cover engaging the enemy with 66mm and 84mm anti-armour weapons as well as his M4 rifle. During an early stage of the enemy ambush, he deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire in order to draw attention to himself and thus away from wounded soldiers. This selfless act alone bought enough time for those wounded to be moved to relative safety.

As the enemy had employed the tactic of a rolling ambush, the patrol was forced to conduct numerous vehicle manoeuvres, under intense enemy fire, over a distance of approximately four kilometres to extract the convoy from the engagement area. Compounding the extraction was the fact that casualties had consumed all available space within the vehicles. Those who had not been wounded, including Trooper Donaldson, were left with no option but to run beside the vehicles throughout. During the conduct of this vehicle manoeuvre to extract the convoy from the engagement area, a severely wounded coalition force interpreter was inadvertently left behind. Of his own volition and displaying complete disregard for his own safety, Trooper Donaldson moved alone, on foot, across approximately 80 metres of exposed ground to recover the wounded interpreter. His movement, once identified by the enemy, drew intense and accurate machine gun fire from entrenched positions. Upon reaching the wounded coalition force interpreter, Trooper Donaldson picked him up and carried him back to the relative safety of the vehicles then provided immediate first aid before returning to the fight.

On subsequent occasions during the battle, Trooper Donaldson administered medical care to other wounded soldiers, whilst continually engaging the enemy.
Trooper Donaldson’s acts of exceptional gallantry in the face of accurate and sustained enemy fire ultimately saved the life of a coalition force interpreter and ensured the safety of the other members of the combined Afghan, US and Australian force. Trooper Donaldson’s actions on this day displayed exceptional courage in circumstances of great peril. His actions are of the highest accord and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the Special Operations Command, the Australian Army and the Australian Defence Force.

davidbfpo
08-16-2009, 02:02 PM
Mark,

Thanks for the extensive update on the Australian VC.

I read Johnson Beharry's auto-biography recently and sat back in astonishment at what he did on two days. His citation is on: http://www.victoriacross.org.uk/bbbeharr.htm

davidbfpo

Mark O'Neill
08-16-2009, 02:08 PM
Mark,

Thanks for the extensive update on the Australian VC.

I read Johnson Beharry's auto-biography recently and sat back in astonishment at what he did on two days.

davidbfpo

The depth of commitment and courage displayed by men such as these is truly amazing,

regards,

Mark

davidbfpo
08-23-2009, 12:32 PM
From a rather too laudatory article IMHO on General Petraeus, after a visit to Scotland last week.

In response to a question based on John Nagl's criticism of the UK in Helmand, he replied:


The distinction that Brits have always are those that are found in a relatively small number of militaries around the world – confidence, courage, an almost unique capacity for independent action, initiative, innovativeness, perseverance and just sheer will… there is an indomitable will there and there always has been. There is something about your soldiers that is very, very impressive.

The remainder of the article has some local "colour", including a meeting with Gordon Brown at his holiday home: http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/Petraeus-it39s-the-human-terrain.5579643.jp

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
09-07-2009, 10:57 PM
In his article 'New Afghan war: Frontline correspondent says fight has morphed – but we still can't afford to lose' Michael Yon has some very interesting and general comments on the war in Afghanistan.

He also comments on the UK, which will not earn "points" with officialdom:


Instead of concentrating on training and operating with Afghan forces, the British are involved in a daily struggle for tiny pieces of real estate.

Having just spent another month with British forces in Helmand, today I am on my own in the same province. During the last month, our great allies the British lost dozens of soldiers who were killed or wounded. Cooperation from locals is almost nonexistent in many places. Interaction between civilians and British soldiers was nearly zero. The British treat the civilians very well, but being polite and respectful is not enough.

Without significant reinforcements, the British likely will be defeated in Helmand within a couple of years. My respect for British soldiers is immense. I have been in combat with them many times in Iraq and Afghanistan, including during the last couple of weeks and would go into battle with them today. (My bold) Yet it must be said that the average British soldier has practically no understanding of counterinsurgency.

I am not persauded, from my faraway "armchair", that others are not fighting for real estate, e.g. Korengal Valley and inter-action with Afghans is better.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
09-08-2009, 06:48 AM
Yet it must be said that the average British soldier has practically no understanding of counterinsurgency.

Huh? Well that's a plainly ill-informed comment and one that assumes there is a set standard of COIN practice, which is equally ignorant. I suppose Yon gets his understanding from the very variable understanding contained in FM3-24.

Rex Brynen
09-08-2009, 11:06 AM
Huh? Well that's a plainly ill-informed comment and one that assumes there is a set standard of COIN practice, which is equally ignorant. I suppose Yon gets his understanding from the very variable understanding contained in FM3-24.

I really enjoy reading Yon's war reporting, but I must admit the statement baffled me. He seems to be basing it on the absence of interaction with the locals--but almost every other dispatch (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/precision-voting.htm) he filed while on the embed emphasized how very overstretched the British were, unable to maintain sufficient patrolling to prevent IEDs from being repeatedly placed (daily) within a hundred meters or two of FOB Inkerman, and the 7km to nearby FOB Jackson unsafe to travel except by helicopter. Presumably being overstretched makes it difficult to do very much at all.

It would require a much more considered analysis than a couple of sentences if he really wants to make that case.

milnews.ca
10-15-2009, 02:19 PM
Looking for something else, I spotted this little chart (http://is.gd/4jrZT) in the UK's Hansard from earlier this week:

http://milnewsca.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/chart-tics-helmand-jun06-feb09.jpg?w=300&h=268

Some caveats apply, of course:

Without undertaking a detailed assessment of each engagement, it is not possible precisely to define in every case whether an attack was aimed at UK forces, at our ISAF partners, or against Afghan units. Data is therefore collected on the number of incidents involving ISAF forces in Helmand without attempting to identify the nationality of the forces actually being attacked. The environment in which forces are operating makes it extremely difficult precisely to distinguish between incidents initiated by insurgent forces and those initiated by ISAF. This data is based on information derived from a number of sources and can only be an estimate

Still, it looks like the numbers are steadily rising.

davidbfpo
10-31-2009, 12:24 PM
The (UK) Daily Mail is running a piece today which reveals that Lt-Col Thorneloe, of the Welsh Guards wrote a secret memo, a month before he was killed by an IED while riding in a Viking, complaining of the shortage of helicopters. the full article: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1224192/Colonel-Thorneloes-memo-MoD-warned-helicopter-shortage-cost-lives--weeks-later-dead.html

On June 5, reports the Mail, he had chillingly predicted the circumstances of his own death in his weekly report to the Ministry of Defence. Headed "'Battle Group Weekly Update", it reads in part:
"I have tried to avoid griping about helicopters - we all know we don't have enough. We cannot not move people, so this month we have conducted a great deal of administrative movement by road. This increases the IED threat and our exposure to it."

There is a fuller comment on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/10/over-my-dead-body.html

The issue for the UK remains mirred in accusations of a lack of resources, coming a poor second is the strategy (covered consistently by KOW blog) and a substantial body (majority) of public opinion opposed to our campaign in Afghanistan.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
10-31-2009, 01:18 PM
A few weeks ago there was a discussion at The Frontline Club, London on Afghanistan, this is the video: http://www.terraplexic.org/visual-stream/2009/9/7/frontline-afghanistan-then-and-now.html (Frontline site currently offline). This is an astute challenge to why and our 'Special Relationship': http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2009/9/7/afghanistan-and-the-uks-desperate-flirtation-with-america.html

The last paragraph:
The lessons of Afghanistan for the UK ought to be entirely chastening – a more modest assessment of our capabilities, a more realistic understanding of what a nation-building intervention can achieve, and a realisation that once you make a commitment, you may well be stuck there for much longer than your public is willing to tolerate.

davidbfpo

tequila
10-31-2009, 01:31 PM
Rory Stewart is also becoming a Conservative politician:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/oct/26/rory-stewart-penrith-tory-seat

davidbfpo
11-02-2009, 10:32 PM
From the dependable Defence of the Realm a pointer to Adam Holloway's new pamphlet:http://www.cps.org.uk/cps_catalog/inbloodsteppedinsofar.pdf

The author's bio: Adam Holloway is a Conservative Member of Parliament. He sits on the House of Commons Defence Select Committee. He is a former soldier and television reporter. He worked in Bosnia during the Sarajevo siege, and in Iraq in 2003. His first visit to Afghanistan was with the anti-Soviet Resistance in the 1980s. He now travels there independently and with the Defence Committee.

He concludes:
We should focus on what we can actually achieve, not what we think would be rather nice to achieve. There is always going to be some level of insurgency in Afghanistan, but we need to manage it, not fuel it. We should not reinforce failure. Instead, we should have a long look at why we are failing. There are no easy answers: there is no package of perfect solutions. But the way forward lies more in working with the grain of Afghan society, than in sending more troops to work against it. The last thing we needed is more “Big Army”. President Obama seems to understand this, but we will have to wait and see what he decides. Maintaining our partnership with the US is vital to the UK’s national security. (My added bold)Protecting our population from terror attacks is our first duty: picking fights with tribesmen in southern Afghanistan is not.

A summary and comment is:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/11/seeing-light.html

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
11-08-2009, 01:17 PM
A number of UK media reports on how UK public opinion thinks about Afghanistan, partly as a new opinion poll was revealed as part of Rememberance Sunday and reflective moments.

From the BBC:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8348942.stm

The pollong:
I feel I have a good understanding of the purpose of Britain's mission in Afghanistan: Agree 54%, disagree 42%, don't know 4%

All British forces should be withdrawn from Afghanistan as quickly as possible
Agree 63%, disagree 31%, don't know 6%

The war in Afghanistan is unwinnable: Agree 64%, disagree 27%, don't know 10%

The levels of corruption involved in the recent Presidential election show the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting for: Agree 52%, disagree 36%, don't know 12%

In an interview with the Grenadier Guards CO (who lost three men thsi week) are some interesting points, but I cite only one:
The Afghan people are stuck between what we are offering and what the Taliban are trying to do. There is no BBC or Sky TV out there, there are no newspapers so everything is done by word of mouth and it is very easy for the Taliban to misrepresent what we are trying to do. A lot of these locals don't know any better and they will believe what they are told. So the idea is to get our message across through the ANA and the ANP to the village elders.

From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/6520572/British-Army-commander-speaks-of-monstrous-killing-of-five-soldiers.html

The Scotsman has an interview with Col. Bob Stewart, a Bosnia veteran and frequent commentator:


We need to get a decent strategy. It is no good saying we are going to be there up to 30 years. What I'm saying is that we've got to have a strategy that convinces the people of this country and – most importantly – the soldiers on the ground that what they are actually doing there is for a point. The death rate is a damn sight higher than Northern Ireland. I was warned when I went to Bosnia that I might well have up to 25 per cent casualties but that never really happened. But 16 per cent – that's pretty high.

In forthright terms, he set out his own Afghanistan objective.


Put crudely in military terms, it is to cut the balls off the Taleban so they can't hurt us, but putting it in political terms, it is to ensure the people of Afghanistan have a decent way of life and that Afghanistan is neutralised as regards any threats to our country. I think the crude way of putting it sounds better. That timetable should not be beyond five years. It definitely includes 'Afghanisation' of the security services; training up their people. And it definitely includes a timetable for how we actually achieve our objectives.

From:http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/-Losing-the-battle-for.5805056.jp

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
11-08-2009, 11:18 PM
A small UK Sunday paper 'The Independent on Sunday' has today called for withrawal, the first to do so:http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-why-we-must-leave-afghanistan-1816835.html

The better selling 'Sunday Telegraph' has a leader comment and I cite part:
...Those levels of dissatisfaction reflect the failure of political leaders to explain clearly and convincingly why we need to be in Afghanistan. It is simple enough to state the aims of the military operation: to prevent the return of a Taliban-dominated theocracy; to ensure that the country cannot go back to what it was prior to the Allied invasion in 2001 – a centre for planning mass murder in Western countries; and to ensure that the jihadists cannot take over neighbouring Pakistan, gaining control of that country's nuclear weapons....It is much tougher, however, to explain how those aims will be achieved.

From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/6521617/Restore-trust-in-the-democracy-for-which-so-many-died.html

I am not sure how this is going to develop. There have been a few quiet MP's giving voice to their opposition, none IMHO are "heavyweights", but as parliament lacks public credibility at the moment (a long story) it may not be the key factor.

Saying there has been a failure to explain the mission, admitting failures in command and providing equipment cannot be attributed to the politicians alone, others have a role - their civil and military advisers. This could get messy, I cite in support the "spin" and allegations made by the government when General Dannatt retired.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
11-14-2009, 08:30 PM
Two linked articles from an embedded Daily Telegraph reporter with UK troops in Helmand, note the stress on killing the Taliban and development:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/6568319/Afghanistan-dispatch-British-troops-take-aim-at-the-Taliban-in-Helmand.html and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/6569206/Afghanistan-British-troops-in-Helmand-kill-80-Taliban-in-10-days-of-fighting.html

Later comments on the ANA and ANP:
We had the Afghan National Army and Afghan Police embedded with us and they were fantastic...They are our eyes and ears. They see the things we miss and they know when the atmospherics are right.

Firn
11-14-2009, 10:19 PM
Two linked articles from an embedded Daily Telegraph reporter with UK troops in Helmand, note the stress on killing the Taliban and development:


Blood calls for blood, even in the eye of a modern public. So this might be a good bit of reporting for the people back home. It should be also good for the morale of the soldiers to get a shot or two at the guys which try to kill them and their comrades and which pose a huge threat on every step.

The rest of the article is also perfectly reasonable. The war can only be won with the local armed forces and by putting able-bodied males at work.


Firn

davidbfpo
11-16-2009, 10:33 PM
Firn,

I echo you:
The war can only be won with the local armed forces and by putting able-bodied males at work.

Alas much of the strategy and on the ground approach ignored both steps.

davidbfpo
11-16-2009, 10:38 PM
As part of the 'spin" for an annual speech by the UK Prime Minister in the City of London; he will announce that he plans to hold a summit for the Nato allies to discuss a timetable for withdrawal starting in 2010.

He will be mindful of an opinion poll on Sunday that showed 71% of British voters now back a phased withdrawal of British troops over the next year.

From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/gordon-brown/6582927/Gordon-Brown-London-summit-to-decide-end-game-in-Afghanistan.html

davidbfpo
12-03-2009, 09:27 PM
The UK's top serviceman (CDS) spoke today in London:
Declining public support may harm the UK military mission in Afghanistan, the head of the armed forces has warned....The mission is achievable and at last we have a properly resourced plan to deliver the strategy...Our people in theatre know this. The greatest threat to their morale is not the Taliban or IEDs [improvised explosive devices], but declining will at home...Support for our service men and women is indivisible from support for this mission.

See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8394269.stm

The UK's top soldier (CGS) General David Richards spoke to ITV after President Obama's statement:
There was no question that they would "cut and run".....I absolutely emphasise, I am aware of no plan that contemplates withdrawing.

See:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6711594/Armed-Forces-heads-Sir-Jock-Stirrup-and-Sir-David-Richards-warn-over-Obamas-2011-withdrawal.html

As some have noted the CGS view is rather at odds with Prime Minsiter Brown's statement on Afghanisation and handing some districts over to the Afghans by 2011.

davidbfpo
12-06-2009, 10:46 PM
Ex-CGS General Dannatt weighs in with his viewpoint:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6738109/A-deadline-for-withdrawal-in-Afghanistan-plays-into-the-enemys-hands.html

I do wonder how the CGS (2006-2009) can say this (below) when our strategy in Helmand Province since 2006 is labelled "mowing the lawn" as soldiers fought over the same patch of ground again and again.


There is an increasing awareness that this is a conflict truly conducted among the people – the people are the environment, the background to everything that the military is doing. We also know that it is a conflict that is about the people – about the people's hearts and minds, as we seek to persuade them that there is a better way of life than falling, once again, under the repressive extremism of the Taliban.

More puzzling is where this fact comes from:
The Helmand poppy crop, for example, was down by about a quarter last season.

I suppose the General was saying this to the government whilst serving and I've seen this said IIRC by others (probably critics of the government):
So of course we need to win the hearts and minds of the people in Helmand. But perhaps more critically, we also need to win the hearts and minds of the people of this country, too. The biggest threat to our success in Afghanistan is not the Taliban, but a loss of will by the people at home to see this vital task through.

From my comfortable "armchair" faraway I shall now be reckless. I am not convinced 'hearts and minds' really applies in Afghanistan. The time to win that if it ever did apply has gone or is about to.

libertariansoldier
12-07-2009, 07:41 AM
I was just watching an author interview on CSPAN-2 with Sarah Chayes. She is a former foreign correspondent for NPR who reported from afghanistan during and after the fight for Kandehar and then stayed in Afghanistan to run an NGO. She seems to really have a finger on pulse of Afghan society. She has a book out called "The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban." During the interview she had some fairly sharp criticism for Karzai for his failure to remove the various warlords from power. She does not seem to be some shrinking violet bleeding heart. When I get some time I will have to check out her book.

SFC W

The book covers both before she left reporting for NPR, as well as after when she starts up a woman's NGO in Kandahar, , which speaks to her having a large set of ovaries, to say the least. Her financial support is from the Karzai family. It does not offer anything new in a macro sense to people who are already familiar with AFG; her run-ins with the US forces and others, such as trying to get on KAF, and the bureaucracy she deals with, are at least entertaining. I think it is useful both to help disillusion anyone about hope for the future here, and to overcome prejudices about NPR reporters (mine have greatly diminished :)).

Woland
12-07-2009, 10:09 AM
More puzzling is where this fact comes from:
Quote:
The Helmand poppy crop, for example, was down by about a quarter last season.

I don't have the precise figures to hand but the UN's annual survey (Google Afghan Opium Survey or something akin) did report a sharp (ish) drop in Helmand's opium production between Sept 08 and Sept 09. Great fanfair ensued, though my own view is that high food prices made wheat and other crops more attractive than opium to some farmers. Secondly, cultivation has been so high over the last few years that the Taleban/narco traffickers could rely on vast stockpiles and direct that production be halted in order to try and drive up the price. A senior officer I briefed this view to seemed somewhat crestfallen that despite the myriad attempts at meaningful counter narco initiatives, it was good old market forces that produced results of a sort.

Woland
01-07-2010, 11:18 PM
Moderator's note: see Post No.2

Ladies and gents

I wonder if it might be of use if I provide a link to the full text of this paper. None of the media reports I've seen have given a link to it, or provided a title which one can Google. I've managed to dig it out, however. Timely stuff, given the recent release of Maj Gen Flynn's work. Though I've not had the opportunity to read it thoroughly yet, I would guesstimate that Maj Gen Mackay's paper is the closest publicly available UK equivalent, though it isn't J2 centric.

http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/sf-publications and select the second link down.

For those unfamiliar, find some background here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8439945.stm

davidbfpo
01-07-2010, 11:52 PM
Woland,

The full paper did appear on SWJ just before Xmas, in full and is on this:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9298 where seven comments are shown and a separate SWJ post when Col. Gian Gentile responded: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/war-is-about-killing-and-destr/ and thirty seven comments followed.

I too have not read the Mackay & Tatham paper fully yet. In view of the current, renewed interest in intelligence management I will leave this thread open.

Secondly on my reading of the linked comments etc intelligence was not the focus of the Mackay paper IMHO.

davidbfpo
01-22-2010, 11:35 PM
This letter appeared in The Daily Telegraph 15th:


SIR – In his letter concerning force levels available for combat, Kevan Jones MP (Letters, January 15) says that, despite the number of infantrymen who cannot be deployed, “all units deploy at the required strength for the tasks they are asked to complete”. What typically insulting rubbish.

During Operation Herrick Five in Afghanistan,(My emphasis) 42 Commando Royal Marines had its force level capped by the Government at 555, when its planned fighting strength, and the strength at which it trains, was – and remains – in the region of 608. The same capping applied to the commandos during Operation Herrick Nine and I have no doubt the same for the Army’s battalions during the other Herricks.

The fighting strength of a battalion – or commando – is not an arbitrary figure to be adjusted by a government to suit disingenuous politics and especially not prior to a complicated, six-month battle. It is a figure that has been agreed through empirical experience over many years to ensure success on the battlefield via a organisation plan that starts with – in the Commando Brigade – an eight-man section. When the politicians reduce this to six, the knock-on effect is felt upwards through the whole unit, but never more so than when in a firefight.

Interviewing Royal Marines back from Helmand I have not heard one complaint about their role, their kit or the lack of helicopters. The only adverse comments I receive are towards politicians for preventing them, inexplicably, from fighting with the correct number of men to achieve their government-given mission.

Fewer men, paradoxically, usually leads to more casualties.
Lt-Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour
Ermington, Devon

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/7012282/Alcohol-is-not-the-problem-but-a-culture-that-tolerates-drunken-behaviour.html

The original letter on the 15th, refers to a press story over unfit soldiers:
Unfit to fight
SIR – You report (January 13) Conservative claims that nearly 20 per cent of infantrymen cannot be deployed for health reasons.

The majority of the infantry (80 per cent) are fit to deploy in their primary role as soldiers. But of the 9 per cent subject to limitations due to medical reasons, some will still do their normal job, and others will contribute in different roles.

More than 5 per cent of infantrymen cannot be deployed for non-medical reasons, such as being under 18, or for disciplinary, compassionate and welfare reasons, or because they are in their last few months of service. Regardless, all units deploy at the required strength for the tasks they are asked to complete.

A small number are not well enough to deploy but we are committed to providing excellent care for injured personnel and we continue to look for ways to improve it.

Kevan Jones MP
Minister for Veterans

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/6989390/Raising-the-price-of-drink-hurts-the-majority-while-public-disorder-goes-unpunished.html

davidbfpo
01-26-2010, 09:56 PM
An article by Christina Lamb in 'The Spectator', which is a scathing IMHO review of the UK presence in Afghanistan.

Link: http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-targets.thtml

(One particular part is on the ANP thread).

davidbfpo
01-31-2010, 08:46 PM
An open source review of the situation, dated September 2009, which I'd missed of Helmand Province, where the UK (with allies like the Danes) has concentrated its attention and now the junior partner to the USA: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/securing-helmand-understanding-and-responding-enemy

Pete
02-04-2010, 09:49 PM
The following is from The Times of London, February 4, 2010. One wonders why this operation is being announced in advance--perhaps it's being done in deference to the advocates of information operations, or some such rationale. Unconventional thinking has its place, and in the aftermath of 9/11 much was said about the need to think "outside of the box"--in hindsight what we got was a series of decisions made with little thought about the probable consequences.


In an unusual departure from conventional military policy, the coming operation has been briefed to reporters in advance.

Speaking at the Ministry of Defence, the director of communications for operations in Afghanistan, General Gordon Messenger, said that the coming offensive would feature British forces in "a central role".

"Helmand is at the heart of General McChrystal's plan to demonstrate decisive success against the Taleban insurgency," said General Nick Parker, speaking from Kabul.

However, it is understood that US Marines will form the majority of the forces in the push.

The unusual openness from the military reflects a shift in strategic thinking driven by the US commander, General Stanley McChrystal, from a strategy focused on targeting and killing the Taleban to one rooted in the protection of the population.

"The plan is to do it in the least aggressive way possible," General Messenger said. But he added: "Clearance operations by their very nature are high risk. We can't discount a fight and we can't discount casualties."

The entire article can be viewed using the link below:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7015193.ece

davidbfpo
02-04-2010, 10:09 PM
Pete,

From faraway I am not unduly concerned. We know from recent history UK and allies have regularly fought over the same places, time after time, hence the "mowing the lawn" term - which IIRC first came from a British Army officer, who was killed there.

Tonight the ITN News have explained that the target area contains 600-1500 Taliban, including 150 foreign fighters and suggests that the publicity might encourage them to fade away. Pop-centric strategy - fighters fade away, leaving civilians behind.

This is not a new approach as previous offensives have been trumpeted before.

William F. Owen
02-05-2010, 06:52 AM
If the idea is that they just fade away, how do you stop them fading back again?

Based on a number of conversations I have had recently, I think the UK is actually killing very few Taliban, compared to what is claimed.

Thus "Mowing the lawn" speaks to a failure of tactics, and/or lack of resources. Either way it's not being done well.

The options we seem to be opting for now seem borne of that realisation.
I hope I am wrong

tequila
02-05-2010, 09:48 PM
Operations Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury were trumpeted widely as well. I remember the first Fallujah operation was widely blamed for the insurgent offensive that swamped Mosul in 2004, as insurgent leadership moved into western Mosul and nearly overran the city.

davidbfpo
02-07-2010, 12:12 PM
The 'we are coming' operation to take Marjah, in Helmand Province has led to more stories, like this one, which is odd and psyops implied 'Special forces assassins infiltrate Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan': http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7017921.ece

From Kings of War http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/operation-ssssshhhh/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+KingsOfWar+(Kings+of+War)


Here they come. You must have read about it already. Didn’t anyone tell them surprise was a key Principle of War? Is that sensible?

The man from the WSJ, among the many hacks briefed ahead of time, had doubts:


By surrendering the element of surprise, the coalition has given its enemy time to dig entrenched fighting positions and tunnel networks. Perhaps worse for the attacking infantrymen, the insurgents have had time to booby-trap buildings and bury bombs along paths, roads and irrigated fields. Such hidden devices inflict the majority of U.S. and allied casualties.


Two very sound reasons for the lack of operational secrecy suggest themselves. First, I’d back the insurgents to know something was coming, even without a subscription to the Journal.

Second, more importantly, avoiding a big fight is the name of the game for the coalition. Preserving your force and securing the people are key objectives if you’re going to do population-focused counterinsurgency. Ideally you want to take control of the populous areas with minimal fighting, and you want the insurgent out in the sticks, where he can be hunted down more readily than among the population, and where there’s less chance of large-scale civilian casualties.

The insurgent, meanwhile, must fight among the people, not just for safety, but to retain his relevance. Announcing that you’re coming gives him a tough choice.

Ken White
02-07-2010, 06:27 PM
is, as was done in Fallujah, to allow the civilians in the town to leave. I imagine that several other towns will follow at about quarterly interval ending with Kandahar at the end of next year...

Some of the lesser committed bad guys will also leave and as Wilf says, will then return -- but those will not be the hard over zealots so that's no big thing. He's also correct in that it is not an ideal strategy but lacking troop numbers (which the west doesn't and won't have) it's a reasonable alternative.

That Western troop strength problem is not going away and thus, hopefully, future politicians will make more informed decisions and avoid such operations which are a residual not of Cold War thinking as many pundits (and a few Posters on this board. Yes, Bob... ;) ) like to say but really of WWI / WW II thinking -- the western military personnel systems are not the only thing stuck in a time warp. So too is training -- and, obviously, 'strategic' (read mass armies and balance of power politics) and even so-called 'operational' thought (a flawed concept unnecessarily adopted from two Armies which are no more...). :rolleyes:

Ken White
02-07-2010, 11:33 PM
LINK (http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100207/wl_nm/us_afghanistan_1)

LINK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8503074.stm)

Pete
02-08-2010, 01:00 AM
My understanding is that the operational level of war was introduced in the 1981 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the one that introduced the AirLand Battle concept. The operational level is below the strategic level and above the tactical.

The following is part of what the 2001 version of FM 3-0, Operations, says about the operational level. (I believe the Army is changing to the joint service numbering scheme for its field manuals.) There is a more recent version of FM 3-0 but I don't have HTML access to it.


2-7. Operations usually imply broader dimensions of time and space than tactics; the strategic orientation at the operational level requires commanders to look beyond the immediate situation. While tactical commanders fight the current battle, operational commanders look deeper in time, space, and events. They seek to shape the possibilities of upcoming events in advance to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders, whose tactical activities execute the campaign. Likewise, operational commanders anticipate the results of battles and engagements, and prepare to exploit them to obtain the greatest strategic advantage.

Ken White
02-08-2010, 01:36 AM
to an extent back in October. Almost 30 posts worth:LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8647). That thread is one I recall, it's been discussed off and on.

My point on it was and is that the US army had not used that 'level,' that it was adopted during the heyday of 'The USSR will clean our clock unless...' (a line I never believed. FWIW, neither did Barry McCaffery among others). We were in love with all things German and the USSR was allegedly ahead of us in many ways. We see how that ended...

As Tom Odom said on that thread, it was created to give the Corps some tasks -- and as I said, it was an early 80s justification to retain the Corps which some senior folks had wanted to disappear in the mid 70s...

All I can see that it has accomplished is giving us LOO (for whatever benefit one sees in them) and further complicating the MDMP... :rolleyes:

That and we still have the Corps. Keep it, I guess -- but either it or the Division should go -- unless, of course, one needs those flags to justify spaces...

Pete
02-08-2010, 03:30 AM
First off, to amend my previous message in this thread, I should have said the 1982 version of FM 100-5, not 1981. The article "The Origin of the AirLand Battle Concept" by John M. Romjue in the May-June 1984 issue of Air University Review magazine had the following to say about the origin of the operational level of war:


The new FM 100-5 [of 1982] adds precision to earlier statements of the AirLand Battle concept. It is explicit about the intent of U.S. Army doctrine, and it conveys a vigorous offensive spirit. AirLand Battle doctrine "is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy. . . . Army units will. . . . attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective." it also notes that "our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the enemy."

An increase in clarity has been added by inserting into the manual a new level of military art. Between tactics and strategy, the manual inserts the intermediate level traditionally recognized by the German and other armies as the operational level of large units (i.e., the operations of armies and corps that involve activities below the level of military strategy and above the level of tactics). Throughout the manual, the writers held to a clarifying distinction between circumstances and actions at the tactical level and those at the operational level.

The addition of the operational level resulted from a decision made by General Starry's successor at TRADOC, General Glenn K. Otis. This decision was made late in the writing of the manual. The addition of the operational level had been strongly urged by the Army War College and was discussed by German Army reviewers during the staff review process. Indeed, there was much doctrinal interaction with the German Army General Staff during the course of the Army's development of the new FM 100-5. General Starry favored a close doctrinal compatibility with German Army manual 100-100, Command and Control in Battle.

In the thread you referred me to in one of your messages you said that the introduction of the operational level was a way of tailoring U.S. doctrine to a specific theater--you're right, AirLand Battle and the 1982 FM 100-5 were refinements of the old Fulda Gap scenario. Deep attack in AirLand Battle was seen a way of disrupting the echelons of the Warsaw Pact forces that would be following the first wave to hit us. Thus the division would be fighting at the tactical level of engaging forces with which we were then in contact with while corps and army on the operational level would anticipate the fight with the echelons that would be hitting us several days or weeks later.

The entire article from Air University Review is in the link below. It's a good read if you like "evolution of doctrine" stuff.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html

Ken White
02-08-2010, 05:28 AM
...the introduction of the operational level was a way of tailoring U.S. doctrine to a specific theater...Thus the division would be fighting at the tactical level of engaging forces with which we were then in contact with while corps and army on the operational level would anticipate the fight with the echelons that would be hitting us several days or weeks later.That was pretty much the official version, the actuality was that accommodation with the Germans was VERY important -- in order to get the Pershing IIs and USAF BGM 109 Cruise Missiles into Germany -- and the Army was told to do whatever the Germans suggested. Plus Glenn Otis knew he'd probably go to CinCUSAREUR (not SACEur, Bernie Rogers was presumed to have a lock on that until Doomsaday... :wry: ) and that cooperating with the Germans was simply good business. Add the evil hordes from the east and its easy to see why the Operational level was adopted when it was and for what potential war and location.

The fact that it justified the Corps -- which Bernie Rogers and Shy Meyer had sort of eyed for elimination was a bonus. :D

The issue and question is really how useful it might be in other wars or theaters against other enemies...

baboon6
02-16-2010, 03:47 PM
Great recent news report (11mins or so) showing a patrol by a British infantry section in Nad-e-Ali district, Helmand province:

http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bctid=66448008001

davidbfpo
02-16-2010, 06:03 PM
The written word too:
The brave and honourable spirit of Britain's soldiers will benefit us all. The daily exercise in Afghanistan of will-power and leadership serves the best human instincts, says Crispin Black.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7245723/The-brave-and-honourable-spirit-of-Britains-soldiers-will-benefit-us-all.html

The response has been very mixed and I fully accept the timing suggests PR.

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 08:49 PM
A short PPT on the UK campaign, nothing startling, but "all in one place" and critical: http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/3424/

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 10:07 PM
An eleven minute newsreel clip following a UK Army patrol from a FOB at Kushal Kalay, Helmand Province into the nearby fields and then being fired at. Hat tip to Kings Of War.http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/frontline-on-the-frontline/

Personally from faraway I asked myself what were they doing, "mowing the lawn" once again seems appropriate. Note the apparently "new" sniping capability has appeared in other news stories and on FRI.

davidbfpo
02-26-2010, 11:51 PM
Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7325525/General-Sir-David-Richards-Taliban-thought-we-were-on-run-but-the-tables-have-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7326145/General-Sir-David-Richards-Forces-reach-turning-point-in-Afghanistan.html

On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9718

I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.

Also on the battle for Marjah thread.

davidbfpo
02-27-2010, 02:19 PM
General Sir David Richards adds to the BBC:
Britain will be "militarily engaged" in Afghanistan for a further five years, the head of the Army has said.
General Sir David Richards told the Daily Telegraph, while on a visit to Helmand, that he expected the military conflict to "trail off in 2011". But British troops will continue in training and support roles, he said.

From:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8540402.stm

davidbfpo
02-28-2010, 10:53 AM
A leaked document written by General Sir David Richards and his response when in Afghanistan:
In a confidential draft memo prepared for ministers he wrote that soldiers and their families felt “undervalued” (and now comments)....'We need our soldiers to be ready, mentally and physically, to endure repeated tours in Afghanistan, in a harsh environment, with the real prospect of significant casualties each time. To maintain the necessary morale and cohesion, they must see tangible signs between tours that they and their families are valued'.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/7334510/British-troops-are-facing-crisis-of-morale-warns-army-head.html

baboon6
03-01-2010, 12:30 PM
Another interesting video:


http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/poli...n+lines/3549942

http://link.brightcove.com/services/player...tid=67312757001

EXCLUSIVE: in a remarkable close-up account from behind enemy lines in Afghanistan, Channel 4 News video journalist Vaughan Smith joins the Grenadier Guards to reveal how British forces are using ambush strategies to beat the Taliban.

A clandestine operation carried out by the Reconnaisance Platoon of the Grenadier Guards battle group took place in northern Helmand province during the initial stages of Operation Moshtarak.

Channel 4 News has had unique access to the strategic operations and preparations behind the offensive.

Video journalist Vaughan Smith, a former army captain, was embedded with the Grenadier Guards in the weeks leading up to Moshtarak, based in an old British fort, now called Camp Shawqat, in the central Nad-e-Ali district.

Captain Jim Young, the officer who led the platoon, confirmed that his men had "65 confirmed enemy kills" in the four months leading up to the new offensive.

Channel 4 News filmed the troops as they lay in wait for Taliban insurgents. British soldiers worked side by side with their counterparts from the Afghan National Army.

At least three enemy insurgents died in the ambush which was intended to destabilise the Taliban.

In the next phase of the operation the Grenadiers with an attached company from the Royal Welch Regiment then "cleared" the village of Kushal Kalay of roadside bombs as part of the "clear, hold and build" objectives of Moshtarak.

IED threat
Roadside bombs are a constant threat to British soldiers. In one incident during Vaughan Smith's four-week period embedded with the British Army, three Afghan soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb. One British and two Afghan soldiers were also lightly wounded.

He said:
The threat had changed since the last time I was there. Now it is now all about the dangers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Radio-controlled and so called 'command wire' mines are common now, but the Taliban are constantly adapting their bomb making techniques to avoid detection. These days insurgents are using less metal in their IEDs - which means British troops have to use more sophisticated technology to find and destroy them. Each cost just a few pounds to make - the operation to remove one took eight men, three painstaking hours and millions of pounds worth of equipment.

'Thinking man's war'
Smith, who often found himself under fire, explained:
Afghanistan has become a thinking man's war. While I was there complex tactics were used. Men would sometimes fires shots into an empty field. It was done so that the Taliban would return fire and expose their positions. But done in a way to ensure no civilian casualties.

Smith, who first went to Afghanistan with the Grenadier Guards in September 2007, added:
It was a different war back then. In 2007 it was aggressive and mobile. This time I was surprised to see how different things looked. The army now has a clear idea of what it wants to do. That is, deny them the thing that the Taliban need most - control of the civilian population.
The Afghan people have seen fighting for too long. The country has been at war for 40 years. All they want now is peace.

William F. Owen
03-01-2010, 01:18 PM
'Thinking man's war'
Smith, who often found himself under fire, explained: "Afghanistan has become a thinking man's war. While I was there complex tactics were used. Men would sometimes fires shots into an empty field. It was done so that the Taliban would return fire and expose their positions. But done in a way to ensure no civilian casualties."

Can't access the links, but the above statement is profoundly stupid. I doubt he ever said it. Firing shots to into an empty field is "Reconnaissance by fire." It's not a complex tactic. Part of the basics, even back when I was young, nearly 30 years ago.

baboon6
03-01-2010, 01:56 PM
Links fixed:

http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/afghanistan+ambush+behind+taliban+lines/3549942

http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid62612474001?bctid=67312757001

EXCLUSIVE: in a remarkable close-up account from behind enemy lines in Afghanistan, Channel 4 News video journalist Vaughan Smith joins the Grenadier Guards to reveal how British forces are using ambush strategies to beat the Taliban.

Sorry should work now on this version. My edit button seems to have disappeared so had to do it like this.

William F. Owen
03-01-2010, 03:25 PM
Sorry should work now on this version. My edit button seems to have disappeared so had to do it like this.
Cheers for that. Amazing (not really) how infantry operations have not changed much, if at all in about 30-40 years, as concerns the basics.

davidbfpo
03-08-2010, 08:54 PM
The BBC Newsnight Defence Correspondent, Mark Urban, reports from Sangin:
Sangin in Afghanistan is the most dangerous place in the world for UK troops, with six UK servicemen being killed there since the beginning of this month.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8555922.stm

Fuchs
03-08-2010, 09:05 PM
Can't access the links, but the above statement is profoundly stupid. I doubt he ever said it. Firing shots to into an empty field is "Reconnaissance by fire." It's not a complex tactic. Part of the basics, even back when I was young, nearly 30 years ago.

Come on, everything is complex. Ask neuroscientists. :D

Said recce by fire can at times be quite amusing. It was used early on to fool Leclerc Plts, for example. Their protection system popped smoke every time when the tank was hit by a laser. Red teams learned to simply scan tree lines with lasers... :D
It's indeed old.


I do sometimes wonder whether officers are really that ill-educated on military history and tactics or maybe they just offer dumb statements because they have to hide their brilliant stuff.
Sadly, my personal experience has a strong bias in this question, and it's not nice.

baboon6
03-14-2010, 04:04 AM
Vdeo of British EOD team in action; hours to clear just a little stretch of road:

http://www.channel4.com/news/article.jsp?id=3578257&time=201532

http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid62612474001?bctid=71660498001


In the war of the IED - Improvised Explosive Device - it is the loneliest of lonely walks. The last 30 yards out from your colleagues, dropping off your cover man 20 yards out from the bomb, writes Alex Thomson.

On your own, you have the last few yards to yourself. You are going into the death zone. A place where if you make a mistake, no flack jacket or helmet will make the slightest difference.

Forget please, the absurd nonsense served up to us recently in The Hurt Locker. This is no world for mavericks or heroes: just close-knit, tight teamwork.

It starts with an urgent notification that an IED has been found. They call them ten-liners, emails of ten lines detailing everything known about the device. But teams like that led by "Woody", Staff Sergeant Gareth Wood of the Royal Logistic Corps sometimes get more than ten such warnings in one day. At the bomb site, best forget everything you have seen about police cordons, crowd safety and other quaint British notions.

Clearly the Afghan locals all seem to know where the bombs are laid. They'll drive round columns of heavily armed military vehicles because they want to be on their way and to hell with Nato.

Instead of diffusing the bomb, soldiers usually have to yell at people to go back from the bomb zone. Traffic must be halted. Warning flares fired if necessary. It all sort of works, eventually.

In the heat, tension and general sense of chaos the British team must also be mindful of an ambush. Nothing is more exposed and static than soldiers painstakingly feeling their way to a buried bomb, warily waving their mine detectors.

About the only thing the British have going for them, the Pashto word for mine, is mine.

Now for obvious reasons I'm not going to tell you, indeed I'm not allowed to tell you, what really goes on in the death zone. But the bombs are not the sophisticated devices used in Iraq or Northern Ireland.

So it is a matter of breaking the link between the pack of batteries wired into the detonator and the container of ammonium nitrate and sugar, or ammonium nitrate and aluminium depending on your recipe.

Variations abound, the team we filmed discovered both home-made explosive mixtures: pressure plate triggers, release pressure triggers, small devices and much larger ones of 40kg or more explosive.

Some of the diffusing methods are almost quaintly old fashioned. No robots on the team we filmed, still less the Oscar-laden moon suits of The Hurt Locker. No no, this thing the British army think more along the lines of cables, hooks and elbow grease to haul bombs out of the road to a safe distance.

"It's surreal really, you're just in you're own world. It's my office I suppose" said Staff Sergeant Wood. "It's just what we do."

Though that extraordinary work ethic was seriously tested as we filmed bomb after bomb detected then diffused. There were so many, our convoy drove past several before they were even discovered. But nobody dwells on lucky escapes.

After nine hours in the blazing heat with no break, yet another notification, a ten-liner: "Oh not another ******* bomb" as one of the team put it.

In the end running low on batteries, fuel, endurance, food, stamina, you name it - the IED team had no choice. All forensics, examination and bagging up of bomb parts, was forgotten n the race against the clock.

Even so the clock won. Edging towards exhaustion two more bombs on the way back to their camp, had to be left and marked for the next day.

All this on one section of road a few hundred yards long in one small part of one small district of Helmand province.

Pete
03-20-2010, 09:10 AM
From the Press and Journal, Aberdeen, Scotland, UK, March 20, 2010:


Black Watch heroes honoured for brave deeds in Afghanistan against Taliban

By Jane Candlish
Published: 20/03/2010

Four Black Watch heroes have won the Military Cross for their bravery in battles against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

A comrade of the Inverness-based soldiers was also given the armed forces’ oldest accolade for gallantry – a Mention in Dispatches – posthumously.

Acting Sergeant Sean Binnie threw a grenade that killed insurgents a split second before he was fatally wounded by a round fired from one of their guns.

The Military Cross is the third-highest decoration given to the British Army and is awarded in recognition of exemplary gallantry during active operations.


To read the entire article click here (http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/1655379#ixzz0ihzuSu8w). The Black Watch is continuing a long and honorable tradition.

davidbfpo
03-21-2010, 08:00 PM
Earlier this week C4 News broadcast a good, long report (16 mins) on a patrol with the Coldstream Guards, complete with ANA alongside - well sort of, as they fired at each other once. The link has the film and a commentary:http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/uk/being+watched+on+the+afghan+frontline/3579862

Hopefully it can be watched beyond the UK shores and another SWC member has located an alternative before.

The report ends with a line missing from the commentary; the allied patrol is withdrawn by three Chinooks, after two days IIRC out in the compounds and fields. How far were they from the FOB? A mile. From my "armchair" this is not encouraging.

davidbfpo
03-21-2010, 08:09 PM
I'm sure I posted this article before (Post 85), based around General Sir David Richards, the UK's top soldier, on a visit to Afghanistan, on 26/2/10: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7325525/General-Sir-David-Richards-Taliban-thought-we-were-on-run-but-the-tables-have-turned.html


I do not think we can afford to fail in Afghanistan because of the intoxicating effect failure will have on those militants who oppose democracy and our freedoms,” he explained. “It would create the view that we are not prepared to fight for that which we hold precious.

A critic Patrick Porter on his blogsite:http://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com/2010/03/21/well-set-about-you/ has commented:
Of all the defences for fighting in Afghanistan, this is the weakest. We must stay and win just in case we excite a group of beleaguered, largely ineffectual and marginal militants?

Read on for more.

I like this comment:
Here's what a CIA veteran who was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats, has to say about AQ:

'We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation," Carle notes, and "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.

davidbfpo
03-24-2010, 09:08 AM
General Stanley McChrystal, the American commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, has paid tribute to the extraordinary courage of British special forces.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7506932/Gen-Stanley-McChrystal-pays-tribute-to-courage-of-British-special-forces.html

davidbfpo
03-27-2010, 10:20 PM
A frank, high-level memo which lays bare the "frustration" felt over the Prince of Wales's trip to Afghanistan has been leaked in Whitehall, causing embarrassment to senior figures in the Foreign Office.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/theroyalfamily/7530794/Prince-Charles-frustration-over-Afghanistan-trip-revealed-in-leaked-Whitehall-memo.html

An earlier report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/theroyalfamily/7523152/Prince-of-Wales-visits-Afghanistan.html

S-2
03-28-2010, 10:10 AM
Thanks, gents, for keeping us in touch with views of this fight from your side of the fence. I'm appreciative.

davidbfpo
03-28-2010, 10:43 AM
British forces are to be withdrawn from Helmand and replaced by United States Marines under controversial new plans being drawn up by American commanders.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7530725/British-forces-to-withdraw-from-Helmand-under-new-US-plan-for-Afghanistan.html

Not exactly a surprise to me, if only for the expected gaps created when the Canadians and Dutch leave the combat role. How this will play out in the UK is unclear, with all the commitment made and deaths since 2006.

General Dannatt, the UK's previous senior general, has weighed in:
If British forces are indeed asked to re-deploy from Helmand to Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul, it would pose a major dilemma for policymakers, writes former Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7530535/At-the-end-of-the-day-what-really-matters-is-success-in-Afghanistan.html

JMA
04-05-2010, 08:29 AM
I have been watching the TV series “Ross Kemp in Afghanistan”.

While I appreciate that what this series depicts is what can be captured on film by a crew and what the Brits allow them to show.

However, what one sees of how the British troops operate there is cause for great alarm.

Take the last segment of the second season for example.

There is this place Kajaki where troops are stationed to guard a hydroelectric scheme. The promise is that once complete the scheme will provide electricity to 1.7m people somewhere down the line.

On one of the shots a line of power pylons can be seen extending off into the distance. If anyone thinks the power will flow if the TB don’t want it to they are in denial.

Again we have vehicles (seemingly critical to the operations) with these called 'Jackals' having mounted MMGs and called the fire support group (FSG). Sounds impressive.

Their task seems to be to clear routes for patrols of IEDs (did I hear correctly?)

Ross Kemp says to them “so your job is really to fight the minefield”, and as one they say “yea”.

WTF!

Ok so now Ross Kemp joins them on an ‘operation’. The FSG are to provide fire support to the infantry so off they go driving down the road up to a point when the road has to be cleared by dismounted ‘engineers’ on foot (shades of the Portuguese in Mozambique – late 60s early 70s) .

Not a tree in sight only the mud walls around the now deserted compounds. Vision as far as the eye can see.

Kemp then says: “We are very close to the enemy now and very exposed”

“We are now moving up to a piece of high ground which we will use and obviously the Taliban know that they use it and its frequently IED.”

“Progress is slow giving the Taliban plenty of time to prepare an attack.”

So we hear that ‘V Company’ is clearing a route to the top of the hill for the vehicles.

They get fired upon and all run back to the vehicles, ground troops walk in and take up positions on the open on the ground . After 4 hours of doing nothing the ground troops withdraw. The FSG then withdraw and are fired upon (the odd shot) so use mortar smoke to cover their ‘move’ (I’m being polite here) back to base.

A successful operation?

How would the Taliban have seen this? Probably, no, certainly they would have seen this as a victory. The Brits drove up to the hill as they were nearing the top they were fired upon so they brought in some foot soldiers and lay around for 4 hours and then went home and as they were leaving the TB fired a few parting shots at them which caused the Brits to use mortar smoke to cover their withdrawal back to their base.

I can just hear the TB singing their victory songs.

So what was the point of this?

(more to follow)

davidbfpo
04-05-2010, 11:26 AM
JMA,

Ross Kemp's latest series on Afghanistan had some moments when his MoD "minder" and later editing failed to remove some "gems". IIRC there were comments on the series earlier on SWC, but not readily found now. Such as a French Mirage providing CAS; noteworthy as there was no footage of RAF CAS. His last episode back in the UK at Headley Court, the UK military rehabilitation centre was excellent - in reminding us at home of the price our servicemen & servicewomen pay.

The Kajaki Dam and the operation to take a replacement Chinese turbine was weird; as you point out if the electricity is generated how will it reach consumers (far beyond Helmand)? The MoD PR machine went into overdrive reporting on this 'success'.

Ross Kemp has done two series now (in 2008 & 2009) and Kajaki may have appeared in the second.

JMA
04-05-2010, 12:38 PM
JMA,

Ross Kemp's latest series on Afghanistan had some moments when his MoD "minder" and later editing failed to remove some "gems". IIRC there were comments on the series earlier on SWC, but not readily found now. Such as a French Mirage providing CAS; noteworthy as there was no footage of RAF CAS. His last episode back in the UK at Headley Court, the UK military rehabilitation centre was excellent - in reminding us at home of the price our servicemen & servicewomen pay.

The Kajaki Dam and the operation to take a replacement Chinese turbine was weird; as you point out if the electricity is generated how will it reach consumers (far beyond Helmand)? The MoD PR machine went into overdrive reporting on this 'success'.

Ross Kemp has done two series now (in 2008 & 2009) and Kajaki may have appeared in the second.

Yes the one I mention is no 5 of the second series and the actual date of filming was 11 Jan 2009 - being the date Marine Travis Mackin was KIA.

The second part is even more weird as this is when Mackin is killed by an IED. It seems almost as if they were trying to draw fire so as to have the pretext to put in a "fast air" strike against that place called Kahalabad. I think I am beginning to understand what the game is there. Are the ROE written up somewhere accessible?

Yes I always look towards the wounded figures to see what that impact is. Do you have the stats as to the wounded - permanently disabled / unable to return to active service? The Brits lost 108 KIA in 2009, so the figure I'm looking for is bound to be scary.

davidbfpo
04-05-2010, 02:06 PM
JMA,

Not the official ones, assuming they are in the open. I do have two anecdotes, both from 2008: one infantry battalion effectively lost a company in one tour, even with a few deaths, the injuries of all types mounted up and the second on a RM Brigade tour that the severely disabled was IIRC around eighty. Both talkers were adamant that this scale of injuries, notably disability, was not sustainable.

IIRC the casualty rate appeared on the KoW blogsite.

JMA
04-05-2010, 03:41 PM
JMA,

Not the official ones, assuming they are in the open. I do have two anecdotes, both from 2008: one infantry battalion effectively lost a company in one tour, even with a few deaths, the injuries of all types mounted up and the second on a RM Brigade tour that the severely disabled was IIRC around eighty. Both talkers were adamant that this scale of injuries, notably disability, was not sustainable.

IIRC the casualty rate appeared on the KoW blogsite.

This is exactly my point, such casualties are certainly not sustainable.

Need to find out what the IED related injuries are that preclude a return to active service as a percentage of the total.

JMA
04-13-2010, 10:34 AM
You have to read this...

http://tinyurl.com/ybd449d

Do you laugh or do you cry?

marct
04-13-2010, 03:44 PM
You have to read this...

http://tinyurl.com/ybd449d

Do you laugh or do you cry?

Unfrakin' real :mad:!

Seahorse
04-13-2010, 07:12 PM
Perhaps these individuals could consider joining another Military. I am aware of several former UK Army personnel that are now gainfully employed with the Canadian Forces. Perhaps they could have a fair hearing that would balance their careers against this transgression and enable their competencies and experience to be fully utilised.

davidbfpo
04-13-2010, 08:57 PM
David Miliband, the UK Foreign Minister, has written a long article in the NY Review of Books 'How to End the War in Afghanistan'; yes, it is carefully crafted, official and optimistic. Have a read: http://ow.ly/1xcBO

IMHO I simply couldn't follow the arguments having read many posts on SWC, notably the Karzai thread. Just noted the article appeared on April Fool's Day, surely a mistake!

JMA
04-14-2010, 06:59 AM
Perhaps these individuals could consider joining another Military. I am aware of several former UK Army personnel that are now gainfully employed with the Canadian Forces. Perhaps they could have a fair hearing that would balance their careers against this transgression and enable their competencies and experience to be fully utilised.

We had a number of Brits in the forces in Rhodesia. The Air Force had two and both were outstanding pilots.

The officers who came out there were a mixed bunch (lets leave it there).

It was among the NCO's and the troopies where the greatest contribution was made. In the RLI we had a number of very solid Brits who once adapted (to enemy and terrain and the quirks of a 'new' army) were as good as you get and boy did they love shooting gooks. Most joined up in the trooper to corporal range and we had a number rise to the level of company sergeant-
major.

My point then is to attract the Brit "squaddie" or "tom" up to say corporal level as they have a good grounding in the main and are not yet totally set in their ways.

I guess they came to Rhodesia for the war... so what would be attractive about a peacetime army?

davidbfpo
04-14-2010, 07:50 AM
Seahorse & JMA,

I know second hand that there is a regular departure from the UK Army to the Australian, so much so that posting an attache is almost a step in the process. Not aware of traffic by non-officers.

JMA,

John Essex-Clark left Rhodesia in 1963 for Australia - in very different circumstances, although I expect you know far more. After UDI and before declaring a republic a handful of Rhodesian officers left too.

William F. Owen
04-14-2010, 08:18 AM
The officers who came out there were a mixed bunch (lets leave it there). The officers who join the British Army are a mixed bunch, and the training and selection mixes it up even more.

My point then is to attract the Brit "squaddie" or "tom" up to say corporal level as they have a good grounding in the main and are not yet totally set in their ways.

Just as a note, what makes British soldiers "good," or seem good, is the culture of the British Army. Take them out of that, and you just have blokes with some training and some hold-over from their Army culture. Culture, as in shared ideas, beliefs and values are critical, and even differs from unit to unit.

JMA
04-14-2010, 10:10 AM
Seahorse & JMA,

I know second hand that there is a regular departure from the UK Army to the Australian, so much so that posting an attache is almost a step in the process. Not aware of traffic by non-officers.

JMA,

John Essex-Clark left Rhodesia in 1963 for Australia - in very different circumstances, although I expect you know far more. After UDI and before declaring a republic a handful of Rhodesian officers left too.

There were a couple of steps in the process the first being the break-up of Federation in Dec 1963. A number of officers took a package and left.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_Rhodesia_and_Nyasaland]

'Digger' Essex-Clark an Australian resigned at the break-up of federation and returned to Oz where he joined the Army where he retired a Brigadier. He is still involved with the RLI Regimental Association.

UDI was in Nov 1965 and some left then too.

JMA
04-14-2010, 10:17 AM
The officers who join the British Army are a mixed bunch, and the training and selection mixes it up even more.

Just as a note, what makes British soldiers "good," or seem good, is the culture of the British Army. Take them out of that, and you just have blokes with some training and some hold-over from their Army culture. Culture, as in shared ideas, beliefs and values are critical, and even differs from unit to unit.

There was 'structure' in the RLI and the Brits fitted in well. They tended to be older than the Rhodesian conscripts and often kept each others company.

Interestingly I was just recently involved in a discussion about culture and tradition within regiments and the value thereof. When is it a truly positive stimulus and when does the past hold them back? You want to go there?

William F. Owen
04-14-2010, 10:37 AM
Interestingly I was just recently involved in a discussion about culture and tradition within regiments and the value thereof. When is it a truly positive stimulus and when does the past hold them back? You want to go there?
I'll go there happily. It's one of my pet peeves. The British Army is extraordinarily bad at telling the difference between culture, cohesion, and tradition.
The Regimental system means many different things to many different people so saying "its a good thing" is simple untrue. What is more there are good Regiments and bad Regiments and being a "regiment" does not make any difference. Most Regimental identities and traditions are pure inventions of convenience.
If you're proud to be in "148 Soup Ladle Cleansing Detachment," then you'll probably fight to the death with your mates. That makes it no different from the Grenadier Guards.

baboon6
04-14-2010, 12:34 PM
There was 'structure' in the RLI and the Brits fitted in well. They tended to be older than the Rhodesian conscripts and often kept each others company.

Interestingly I was just recently involved in a discussion about culture and tradition within regiments and the value thereof. When is it a truly positive stimulus and when does the past hold them back? You want to go there?

Remember that the Rhodesian Army not too long before had been an extension of the British Army, and it had still much of the same traditions, ethos and terminology, so it's no surprise the Brits fitted in well. Apparently a lot of Brits as well as well as Rhodesians struggled to fit in to the SA Army afterwards (for those who don't know, a lot of Rhodesian personnel moved south at the end of the war. The majority didn't stay in the SADF very long though some did make a career of it).

Of course there are many South Africans and Zimbabweans, several hundred of each, mostly white but also some black, in the British Army now. Most had no previous military experience before joining.

JMA
04-14-2010, 01:37 PM
Remember that the Rhodesian Army not too long before had been an extension of the British Army, and it had still much of the same traditions, ethos and terminology, so it's no surprise the Brits fitted in well. Apparently a lot of Brits as well as well as Rhodesians struggled to fit in to the SA Army afterwards (for those who don't know, a lot of Rhodesian personnel moved south at the end of the war. The majority didn't stay in the SADF very long though some did make a career of it).

And some of the officers were trying to be more British than the British. 90% of that crap was over by the end except in the BSAP (British South Africa Police) where there were was still a minority of old (by then) die hards desperately hanging onto the past (being their comfort zone).


Of course there are many South Africans and Zimbabweans, several hundred of each, mostly white but also some black, in the British Army now. Most had no previous military experience before joining.

Yes but remember they are going in, as it were, as a blank slate with no real experience elsewhere so its a markedly different to those who change armies mid career and have a significant basis for comparison.

JMA
04-14-2010, 01:49 PM
The officers who join the British Army are a mixed bunch, and the training and selection mixes it up even more.

Perhaps the RLI was unique where the NCOs were continually being bled off to the Selous Scouts and to a lesser extent the SAS. So young officers did not have the luxury of having a year or so to settle in under the watchful eye of a seasoned sgt. Of course in the Fire Force role they could be closely monitored and mentored by the Commando Commander but would never be deployed on an 8 man external patrol into Zambia or Mozambique (mine laying, ambush, OP etc) until considered competent. It was heard said in the troops that because they had a 'new' officer they were always on Fire Force and never got to do 'externals'. Some troopies liked that, others didn't. The junior officers who performed the best as a whole were the of the 'wild colonial boy' ilk. Fearless agressive bastards. Sure some of their behaviour off duty was a bit wild but then boys will be boys ;-)

JMA
04-14-2010, 02:07 PM
Just as a note, what makes British soldiers "good," or seem good, is the culture of the British Army. Take them out of that, and you just have blokes with some training and some hold-over from their Army culture. Culture, as in shared ideas, beliefs and values are critical, and even differs from unit to unit.

I go with that and it also depends what they go into.

If they go into some private security firm they may well self destruct when under pressure (in action) and I suppose if they go into an army it will depend on the type of unit they were in and whether the reason why the went there in the first place (action) was satisfied.

Perhaps to be brutally honest we need to also accept that the Brits who left their army to go to Rhodesia had probably decided to leave anyway due maybe to that they did not personally have the career prospects they had hoped for or were bored to the point of frustration or even did something that was seriously career limiting. Among these were a reasonable percentage of 'difficult' characters who would probably not survive in a peacetime army beyond the initial three to five years.

We (the Rhodesian Army) should have done better with recruiting Brits and other 'foreigners' in the army.

baboon6
04-14-2010, 02:45 PM
Yes but remember they are going in, as it were, as a blank slate with no real experience elsewhere so its a markedly different to those who change armies mid career and have a significant basis for comparison.

Agreed, I was sort of trying to make that point, should have explained myself better.

baboon6
04-14-2010, 02:58 PM
We (the Rhodesian Army) should have done better with recruiting Brits and other 'foreigners' in the army.

I was under the impression that there were quite a lot anyway, mainly Brits but some Aussies, Kiwis and Europeans, along with South Africans (did our guys count as foreigners?! I suppose they did...), and quite a few Americans in the last few years (I have read a figure of about 300 volunteers from the US overall, don't know how accurate that is).

Anyway this is going way off-topic! Here are some numbers on Commonwealth types in the British Army (not including Gurkhas), over 6000 altogether, with much smaller numbers in the RAF and RN. Sorry for using The Sun as a reference:

Fiji 2000

South Africa 840

Jamaica 820

Ghana 820

Zimbabwe 550

St Vincent 260

St Lucia 220

Malawi 150

Gambia 140

Kenya 130

Read more: http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article623015.ece#ixzz0l5QyC9Gr

And an article originally from The Times:

http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/articles/2107-how-british-army-is-fast-becoming-foreign-legion


THE Army has stopped actively recruiting Commonwealth and foreign soldiers because the numbers joining up have risen by nearly 3,000 per cent in seven years....Defence sources said that the Army had now stopped actively recruiting in the Commonwealth, even though there was still a significant shortfall in manpower.

JMA
04-17-2010, 12:05 AM
You have to read this...

http://tinyurl.com/ybd449d

Do you laugh or do you cry?

It is interesting to follow this story.

41,000 have joined the facebook group "Justice for Royal Marine Commando Mark Leader" http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=110083419024071&ref=mf

When a Captain and a sergeant are discharged from the army it has to be more than the random act of "throwing a 'welly' (Wellington boot) at a suspect. (Even in the Brit army)

Quoting from the BBC "Judge Michael Hunter described it as "a sustained assault on an injured and unarmed prisoner"." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/8622171.stm

It appears they went into the tent where the accused was being held and proceeded to kick his ass. The best they could do was "Mr Ekhlas needed four stitches to his lip, had a cut on his forehead and two of his teeth were loose after the attack." And I thought the Brit Marines were trained in unarmed combat (only kidding).

The Captain admitted to kicking him twice. So the sgt punched him 3 or 4 times and the captain kicked him twice.

What would happen in the US military? Slap on the wrist, court martial, what?
Fine, demotion, dishonourable discharge, what?

We learned quickly in Rhodesia to separate those captured or detained from the troops that their actions may have harmed. We would not leave that 'live bait' lying around as it could only lead to problems. (Have the British army learned nothing in the last 1,000 years?) So as a result of this failure they end up losing a officer and a long service sergeant.

So I wonder when the penny is going to drop with the 40,000 on facebook that there is more to this issue than merely throwing a 'welly' at a suspect who was attempting to escape?

jmm99
04-17-2010, 01:36 AM
and his 1SG, with respect to your question:


from JMA
The Captain admitted to kicking him twice. So the sgt punched him 3 or 4 times and the captain kicked him twice.

What would happen in the US military? Slap on the wrist, court martial, what?
Fine, demotion, dishonourable discharge, what?

Briefly, from his attorneys' webpage, CPT Roger Hill (http://www.puckettfaraj.com/cpt-roger-hill/):


What Happened?

Puckett & Faraj, PC are often called upon to defend the courageous and moral men and women of our military. In their service to their country, these young military members are called on to make difficult decisions to save the lives of those they lead. CPT Roger Hill did just that on the battlefield in the mountains of Afghanistan last fall. The Army charged him with wrongfully inflicting cruel and inhuman treatment to detainees under the 18 USC Section 2441 — War Crimes.
....
In August 2008, intelligence reports cited recent efforts by the enemy to plan and execute a complex attack against one of the three outposts. The Army set up an operation to screen the local nationals resulting in identifying 12 foreign nationals with confirmed ties to the Taliban. One of the most critical infiltrations included Noori Noorula, CPT Hill’s own personal interpreter, an Afghan who he considered a dear and close friend. Army rules required the detainees be transported to a central location for processing, however resources were not available to move the detainees. Dog Company was left with the responsibility of identifying, processing and securing each confirmed insider-threat detainee; a task they were not trained, equipped or manned to accomplish.

Dog Company processed the detainees under International Security Assistance Forces guidelines which directed that the US hand detainees over to the Afghanistan government with proof of Taliban links within 96 hours, otherwise they would be set free.

CPT Hill knew that the Army intelligence proving the Taliban links was not releasable to the Afghanistan government. He made the command decision to utilize a variety of shock tactics to intimidate and scare the detainees. His goal was to extract releasable and valuable intelligence identifying the detainees as Taliban loyalists, and allow them to be handed over to the Afghanistan government without fear they would be released.

CPT Hill took some of the detainees into the yard, leaving those who had critical information in the building. He fired shots into the ground, one shot for each detainee in the yard. These shots were some 20 yards or more from the detainees, but their fellow detainees in the building did not know this.

CPT Hill, a West Point graduate and highly decorated combat veteran of three overseas tours to include deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and Korea, was held accountable in an Article 32 Hearing (similar to a grand jury). In an unheard of move in the military justice system, the results of that hearing have not been released to him. Instead, the Army processed him for separation, awarding him a General (Under Honorable Conditions) discharge..... [more before and after in statement]

See also, from same attorneys, Interrogating Army Justice, A Soldier’s Dilemma (http://www.puckettfaraj.com/2009/02/interrogating-army-justice-a-soldiers-dilemma/).

This case has been discussed here at SWC in a few threads, A War's Impossible Mission (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=62198) and in Law and the Long War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7773&page=2), with links at posts #23 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76831&postcount=23), #27 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76903&postcount=27) & #28 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76905&postcount=28) (some technical stuff at #35 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76954&postcount=35)). Of people who post here regularly, Greyhawk has done the most work in following this case. Also, some technical stuff on the Hill case, in The Kill Company (page 5) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=77263), starting with post #84 and ending at #89.

CPT Hill's Facebook page (www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=59476618947). I don't have any update on this case beyond what has been posted.

Regards

Mike

William F. Owen
04-17-2010, 06:38 AM
So I wonder when the penny is going to drop with the 40,000 on facebook that there is more to this issue than merely throwing a 'welly' at a suspect who was attempting to escape?
Talked to mates in 3 Cdo Brgd last week and they have nothing good to say about the incident. Basically two men beat up a prisoner.

JMA
04-17-2010, 01:05 PM
Talked to mates in 3 Cdo Brgd last week and they have nothing good to say about the incident. Basically two men beat up a prisoner.

Yes and a captain and a sergeant too.

I must say that based on my experiences some 30 years ago this would hardly have raised a ripple let alone led to a court martial and dishonourable discharges.

With all good 'cock-ups' the guys whose incompetence created the opportunity for this to happen are not even on the radar.

Why was this guy not under intense interrogation first in the field then in a suitable facility? Instead he is 'held' in a tent under the guard of a female soldier and probably offered a nice cup of tea with apologies for any inconvenience. This giving him a nice chance to compose himself.

I am desperately in need on any story out of Afghanistan which casts the Brit troops and operation there in a good light. Please help me someone.

JMA
04-22-2010, 09:56 AM
Yes and a captain and a sergeant too.

I must say that based on my experiences some 30 years ago this would hardly have raised a ripple let alone led to a court martial and dishonourable discharges.

With all good 'cock-ups' the guys whose incompetence created the opportunity for this to happen are not even on the radar.

Why was this guy not under intense interrogation first in the field then in a suitable facility? Instead he is 'held' in a tent under the guard of a female soldier and probably offered a nice cup of tea with apologies for any inconvenience. This giving him a nice chance to compose himself.

I am desperately in need on any story out of Afghanistan which casts the Brit troops and operation there in a good light. Please help me someone.

I spoke to a Brit who said that they (his unit) never used to take such people into custody. The trick was to 'hold' the person until a US unit came by and then set him up to be taken into custody by the 'yanks' (his word) who would then bag him and tag him and whisk him away never to be heard of again. But I suppose for that to work one needs to be in close proximity to US forces who had also taken casualties through IEDs.

baboon6
04-22-2010, 11:20 AM
Yes and a captain and a sergeant too.

I must say that based on my experiences some 30 years ago this would hardly have raised a ripple let alone led to a court martial and dishonourable discharges.

With all good 'cock-ups' the guys whose incompetence created the opportunity for this to happen are not even on the radar.

Why was this guy not under intense interrogation first in the field then in a suitable facility? Instead he is 'held' in a tent under the guard of a female soldier and probably offered a nice cup of tea with apologies for any inconvenience. This giving him a nice chance to compose himself.

I am desperately in need on any story out of Afghanistan which casts the Brit troops and operation there in a good light. Please help me someone.

If you look you will find numerous stories of personal bravery and minor tactical successes, but not much else I'm afraid.

Ken White
04-22-2010, 02:05 PM
...But I suppose for that to work one needs to be in close proximity to US forces who had also taken casualties through IEDs.has to do with this:
...taken into custody by the 'yanks' (his word) who would then bag him and tag him and whisk him away never to be heard of again.

JMA
04-22-2010, 03:26 PM
has to do with this:

My Brit source indicates that the US had an effective system for 'dealing' with such suspects whereas the Brits had both hands tied.

You are free to interpret the word 'effective' anyway you wish.

Ken White
04-22-2010, 04:30 PM
My Brit source indicates that the US had an effective system for 'dealing' with such suspects whereas the Brits had both hands tied.As do you. We didn't release them, the British often did. The implication that they were killed or otherwise disposed of, never to be seen again, is just stupid.
You are free to interpret the word 'effective' anyway you wish.Of course I am. You are equally free to interpret the word 'innuendo' any way you wish. :D

jmm99
04-22-2010, 05:12 PM
have surfaced from US military forces managing detentions in Astan. There are two paths, depending on whether the US forces are operating under ISAF or independently under OEF rules.

If under ISAF (from my post above re: CPT Roger Hill):


... under International Security Assistance Forces guidelines which directed that the US hand detainees over to the Afghanistan government with proof of Taliban links within 96 hours, otherwise they would be set free.

If under OEF rules, detainees follow US military processing rules and will be released to the Astan government or detained at Bagram if of high enough value to US interests (subject of habeas cases now on appeal).

That's my general understanding of how detainees have been handled.

Regards

Mike

JMA
04-23-2010, 11:32 AM
As do you. We didn't release them, the British often did. The implication that they were killed or otherwise disposed of, never to be seen again, is just stupid.Of course I am. You are equally free to interpret the word 'innuendo' any way you wish. :D

Ken you need to lighten up.

I can't see any point in detaining anyone unless you intend to do something with him. Like... get intel out of him.

If he admits to planting or assisting with the planting of a IED that would get him the death penalty wouldn't it? The US still has the death penalty, yes? So do the Afghans... so hand him over to the Afghans and walk away and let the proper judicial process run its course.

JMA
04-23-2010, 11:42 AM
have surfaced from US military forces managing detentions in Astan. There are two paths, depending on whether the US forces are operating under ISAF or independently under OEF rules.

If under ISAF (from my post above re: CPT Roger Hill):

Quote: "... under International Security Assistance Forces guidelines which directed that the US hand detainees over to the Afghanistan government with proof of Taliban links within 96 hours, otherwise they would be set free."


That is one thing but what if he confesses to or it is proven that he planted or assisted in planting an IED? Surely these people are detained because there is some real evidence that they were involved in the action or the planting of the IED? So whats the logical outcome 10 years to death or somewhere in between. (I suppose 10 years in an Afghan jail amounts to a death sentence in any event.) Surely such people are not just picked up on a random basis?

Ken White
04-23-2010, 01:52 PM
Ken you need to lighten up.Some things said in jest or nearly so can develop legs if no one takes a tapanga to them.
I can't see any point in detaining anyone unless you intend to do something with him. Like... get intel out of him.That is done, then if they're released, they go right back to doing what they'd been doing, so they get 'tried' one way or another by someone or other.
so hand him over to the Afghans and walk away and let the proper judicial process run its course.That's what's done with most but the Afghan's tend to beat them up a bit and let them go, too expensive to keep 'em around. So we hang on to the hard core types that aren't handed over to the locals.

JMA
04-25-2010, 07:59 PM
Officer questions helicopter shortage over son's death

http://tinyurl.com/yzzse5y

A shortage of helicopters, unnecessary road movement, and what have you all leads to yet more avoidable deaths.

Ken White
04-25-2010, 08:25 PM
Part II


A shortage of helicopters, unnecessary road movement, and what have you all leads to yet more avoidable deaths.A shortage of helicopters means, most likely, that not enough are available due to financial constraints. Lacking helicopters, more road movement becomes necessary so your comment is an oxymoron...

Your argument is, as always, with the politicians. Your comment, as is often the case, uses innuendo to impute that if you were in charge, it would all be different. Of course it would. It would also be different if I were in charge. Neither of us is and if we were there is absolutely no guarantee we would not make the errors you seem to see everywhere (without even being there or having reliable sources who are. Amazing) -- or even worse errors...:rolleyes:

War is stupid, it's the dumbest human endeavor -- yet silly humans will keep starting the darn things. All deaths in combat are avoidable only if the combat is avoided. If the combat is not avoided, there will always be both avoidable and unavoidable deaths. That was true in Rhodesia and is true today in Afghanistan. It will be true in any and all wars ongoing in 2020.

It's a fact of life (pun intended).

JMA
04-25-2010, 09:19 PM
Part II

A shortage of helicopters means, most likely, that not enough are available due to financial constraints. Lacking helicopters, more road movement becomes necessary so your comment is an oxymoron...

In this particular case the question needs to be asked whether the trip was really necessary. It appears that everyone just accepts that the initiative be past to the Taliban. The Brits by all reports are scared s###less about IEDs (understandable as 80% of their deaths are so caused). Yet they have no, offer no, solution other than to spend all day and everyday sending engineers out to clear roads before they can move. Again here we have a whole army of officers and men and nobody seems to be able to come up with a solution. Bizarre.


Your argument is, as always, with the politicians. Your comment, as is often the case, uses innuendo to impute that if you were in charge, it would all be different. Of course it would. It would also be different if I were in charge. Neither of us is and if we were there is absolutely no guarantee we would not make the errors you seem to see everywhere (without even being there or having reliable sources who are. Amazing) -- or even worse errors...:rolleyes:

I do note that the Brits have a habit of having a lot to say after retiring from the forces and having a secure pension. While there though they will meekly go with the flow and help to bury the dead.


War is stupid, it's the dumbest human endeavor -- yet silly humans will keep starting the darn things. All deaths in combat are avoidable only if the combat is avoided. If the combat is not avoided, there will always be both avoidable and unavoidable deaths. That was true in Rhodesia and is true today in Afghanistan. It will be true in any and all wars ongoing in 2020.

Thats too general a comment Ken.

Good planning and good tactics go a long way to reducing the risk of own force casualties. Knowledge of the terrain and the enemy is critical as well.

I just don't see the point in sending out vehicle and foot patrol the purpose of which seems only to locate IEDs (in the worst sense).

Ken White
04-25-2010, 11:34 PM
Re: your first paragraph above: Do you know that or is it an assumption?

Re: the second; as is true of ALL armies... :D

Re: the third. Not too general but an old truth; true on good tactics, etc; and I too do not see any point in sending out patrol whose only purpose is as you state.

Problem is you do not know that is the case, you have, for reasons of your own based on flawed and fragmentary media reports coupled with annoyance at the UK and the US elected to assume that it is the case. ;)

JMA
04-26-2010, 02:20 AM
Re: your first paragraph above: Do you know that or is it an assumption?

Re: the second; as is true of ALL armies... :D

Re: the third. Not too general but an old truth; true on good tactics, etc; and I too do not see any point in sending out patrol whose only purpose is as you state.

Problem is you do not know that is the case, you have, for reasons of your own based on flawed and fragmentary media reports coupled with annoyance at the UK and the US elected to assume that it is the case. ;)

Lets run through it again then Ken.

So am I too understand that the Brits have taken the cause of 80% of their casualties and analysed it inside out and have come to the conclusion that there is no solution so they carry on driving around until the hit an IED and keep sending out foot patrol until they trigger and IED. Is that what we are down to in Afghanistan? The Brit soldier deserves better. As I have said before on arrive you call the incoming battalion commander and ask him how he intends to defeat the IED threat. If his response is "well, um, err, ..." you just tell him his plane back to the UK is leaving in the hour. No soldier should die needlessly because his officers don't have the tactical smarts.

So its OK if the current set of generals all just go through the motions knowing that they have been under resourced and have one or both hands tied behind their backs until they have security a pension and then and only then they go public with their concerns? And in the meantime they help bring in the dead.

No rocket science required Ken. If 80% of Brit casualties are through IEDs then that is their biggest problem right now. If they are on the roads... keep off the roads. If they are on paths... then use only paths that locals use. If the come out to plant them at night... thats when you need to plan to get them. If the use cell phones to trigger them... block the cell phone frequency. etc etc.

Numbingly stupid officers are getting soldiers killed out there. If that does not make you angry then... go ahead and shoot the messenger.

Ken White
04-26-2010, 03:27 AM
Lets run through it again then Ken.

So am I too understand that the Brits have taken the cause of 80% of their casualties and analysed it inside out and have come to the conclusion that there is no solution so they carry on driving around until the hit an IED and keep sending out foot patrol until they trigger and IED. Is that what we are down to in Afghanistan? The Brit soldier deserves better. As I have said before on arrive you call the incoming battalion commander and ask him how he intends to defeat the IED threat. If his response is "well, um, err, ..." you just tell him his plane back to the UK is leaving in the hour. No soldier should die needlessly because his officers don't have the tactical smarts.You seem to wish to understand that, your prerogative. I've seen no evidence the British have come to your conclusion. As for what you'd do with a Battalion commander, since it seems everyone there has an IED problem, then you're effectively saying every Battalion commander from NATO in the country is incompetent -- that doesn't even approach, much less pass, the common sense test.
So its OK ... And in the meantime they help bring in the dead.Your words not mine. What you have not told us is what you plan to do about it to halt these pernicious practices... :rolleyes:
No rocket science required Ken. If 80% of Brit casualties are through IEDs then that is their biggest problem right now. If they are on the roads... keep off the roads. If they are on paths... then use only paths that locals use. If the come out to plant them at night... thats when you need to plan to get them. If the use cell phones to trigger them... block the cell phone frequency. etc etc.If, indeed...

That paragraph is mind numbingly ignorant. You really need to get on the internet, Google or Yahoo or Bing search and get a bit smarter on what is going on in Afghanistan. Not least, you'll discover that everything you suggest is being done, has been done -- and that there are a number of things you haven't even thought of.
Numbingly stupid officers are getting soldiers killed out there. If that does not make you angry then... go ahead and shoot the messenger.That is your assumption, it is based on ignorance and, I suspect, a degree of bias. I am not shooting a messenger, much less the messenger because your message is so flawed that is is borderline comical. If I am shooting anything, in this series of posts on several threads, it is shots across your bow to warn you that you really are missing a great deal of what is happening for some odd reason. You are coming across as not well informed, biased and on a tear about IED casualties -- which worry others much more than they do you; they after all have to write the letters to the next of kin and bear the responsibility as opposed of being able to kibitz from the sidelines. Consider also that if they were a problem as easily handled as you seem to believe they should be, they'd have been eliminated months if not years ago.

William F. Owen
04-26-2010, 05:04 AM
So am I too understand that the Brits have taken the cause of 80% of their casualties and analysed it inside out and have come to the conclusion that there is no solution so they carry on driving around until the hit an IED and keep sending out foot patrol until they trigger and IED. Is that what we are down to in Afghanistan?
Sorry, but the men on the ground are not stupid. I've spent several nights in last 3 months sitting in Officers Mess's in the UK talking to Infantry Captains and Majors, and they "get it." There ARE some issues, but they are nothing to do with the degree of stupidity your comment might imply.

If the come out to plant them at night... thats when you need to plan to get them. If the use cell phones to trigger them... block the cell phone frequency. etc etc.
They know this. - OPSEC is in play here and it's not all of the issue.

Numbingly stupid officers are getting soldiers killed out there. If that does not make you angry then... go ahead and shoot the messenger.
Well there is some numbing stupidity, but it's pretty high up. Part of it is the moronic flow down from "protect the population" and a lot of it flows the conditions set by resources and policies.

Yes, the UK in A'Stan needs a "back to the basics" direction and they would do that themselves if it they weren't been given a fairly stupid policy direction from on high.

JMA
04-26-2010, 10:40 AM
Yes, the UK in A'Stan needs a "back to the basics" direction and they would do that themselves if it they weren't been given a fairly stupid policy direction from on high.

OK I can go with that.

It implies that these units/regiments have to some degree lost contact with the basics, yes?

Secondly exactly how would they address this and the other 'problem areas'? I remember well that we were able to very quickly identify what was wrong and where it was wrong... it took a little longer to fix it. Meaning that the vast majority know what the problem is and just sit around waiting for a unique soldier to start to kick over the traces and take the situation by the scruff of the neck. Then they all fall in behind him in lockstep saying "I told you, this is what we should have done a long time ago."

Rhodesia was easier because we had a young regiment (RLI) and a brand new one (Selous Scouts - commanded by an exceptional man) to turn the situation on its head. Reid-Daly was hated by many because he had a hot-line to the top and could cut through the bureaucracy at will. It was a standing joke that he had more to fear from a knife in the back from jealousy on our side than from the enemy.

With big established armies change is like trying to turn a super-tanker in rough seas.

The one option that should possibly be explored is to create composite units and formations manned by volunteers from all over or by sub-units being attached for a tour. This would cut through the RC (resistance to change) problem where a brigadier and his brigade come complete with all their own regimental baggage.

William F. Owen
04-26-2010, 11:14 AM
It implies that these units/regiments have to some degree lost contact with the basics, yes?
Not really. Only judging on talking to the guys actually doing the operations, the basics seem good, especially at the skills and drills level. Now having said that, I have a lot of questions about the actual planning and conduct of operations.
I loathe judging from the arm-chair (beach chair in may case), but if the descriptions contained in some of the published accounts are to be believed, then their may well be problems.

Secondly exactly how would they address this and the other 'problem areas'? I remember well that we were able to very quickly identify what was wrong and where it was wrong... it took a little longer to fix it.
Welcome to the world of human beings. Why do smart men do dumb things?

It was a standing joke that he had more to fear from a knife in the back from jealousy on our side than from the enemy.

Yep. I got a sack full of extras for asking the new-RSM if he could help me sow a steel plate into the back of Mess kit, now he was in charge!! :)

JMA
04-26-2010, 11:21 AM
You seem to wish to understand that, your prerogative. I've seen no evidence the British have come to your conclusion. As for what you'd do with a Battalion commander, since it seems everyone there has an IED problem, then you're effectively saying every Battalion commander from NATO in the country is incompetent -- that doesn't even approach, much less pass, the common sense test.

My conclusion is that as 80% of Brit casualties in Afghanistan are caused by IEDs they should be working day and NIGHT to address this treat and take the initiative away from the the TB. Then they agree that there should be less road movement they don't have enough helicopters available and of those they have 30-50% are serviceable at any one time? Maybe the drones they need for thermal surveillance are being flown from a base in Nevada or South Korea and are Bde and higher level resources which don't serve their local tactical needs at all. If the battalion Commander is a blithering idiot then how effective does one expect his unit to be?


Your words not mine. What you have not told us is what you plan to do about it to halt these pernicious practices... :rolleyes:If, indeed...

I have no authority to do anything about the IEDs but I suggest that it is in the best interests of the Brits and indeed US forces to think out of the box on this and stop blundering into IEDs day after day, night after night.


That paragraph is mind numbingly ignorant. You really need to get on the internet, Google or Yahoo or Bing search and get a bit smarter on what is going on in Afghanistan. Not least, you'll discover that everything you suggest is being done, has been done -- and that there are a number of things you haven't even thought of.

I said etc etc. And pray do tell how the TB would know where to plant anti-personnel IEDs if every patrol is applying the basics as taught under "route selection and planning"?

OK, so how about applying this one; "If at first you don't succeed then try and try and try again." Or are you saying that the IED situation is insurmountable?


That is your assumption, it is based on ignorance and, I suspect, a degree of bias. I am not shooting a messenger, much less the messenger because your message is so flawed that is is borderline comical. If I am shooting anything, in this series of posts on several threads, it is shots across your bow to warn you that you really are missing a great deal of what is happening for some odd reason. You are coming across as not well informed, biased and on a tear about IED casualties -- which worry others much more than they do you; they after all have to write the letters to the next of kin and bear the responsibility as opposed of being able to kibitz from the sidelines. Consider also that if they were a problem as easily handled as you seem to believe they should be, they'd have been eliminated months if not years ago.

Shooting the messenger again Ken. Do try to stick to the argument.

William F. Owen
04-26-2010, 12:46 PM
My conclusion is that as 80% of Brit casualties in Afghanistan are caused by IEDs they should be working day and NIGHT to address this treat and take the initiative away from the the TB. Then they agree that there should be less road movement they don't have enough helicopters available and of those they have 30-50% are serviceable at any one time?

JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.
What if 66% where Arty or Small Arms fire casualties? The idea that IED casualties are avoidable and other forms are not, makes no sense.

YES, not enough helicopters is a huge problem. The answer is money. That is simply the only constraint - which tells me the UK does not need to be in A'Stan or else they would be prepared to spend far more to there, and deploy at least 20,000 men.

baboon6
04-26-2010, 12:50 PM
OK I can go with that.





The one option that should possibly be explored is to create composite units and formations manned by volunteers from all over or by sub-units being attached for a tour. This would cut through the RC (resistance to change) problem where a brigadier and his brigade come complete with all their own regimental baggage.

This already happens to a large extent. Brigades and battle groups in Afghanistan, no matter what the "name-plate", are made up of units and sub-units from all over the British Army as well as often including some individual reinforcements. For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak) and a coy of Estonians. This besides gunners, sappers, signallers etc. 19 Light Brigade, which was the formation in Helmand in summer last year, was especially formed for that tour from units pulled from other brigades.

William F. Owen
04-26-2010, 01:42 PM
For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak)
...and has happened regularly since the 1960's thus giving the lie to the cohesion argument of the "Regimental system." Once the UK dropped conscription and allowed Regiments to recruit for themselves, a great many Infantry Battalions needed augmenting on deployment, and this was also exacerbate by bad Battalion organisation.

baboon6
04-26-2010, 03:04 PM
...and has happened regularly since the 1960's thus giving the lie to the cohesion argument of the "Regimental system." Once the UK dropped conscription and allowed Regiments to recruit for themselves, a great many Infantry Battalions needed augmenting on deployment, and this was also exacerbate by bad Battalion organisation.

It happened too in WW1, Ww2 and Korea, though that was more a matter of individual reinforcements being posted in to whatever unit needed them, no matter their original capbadge, rather then formed sub-units. In this case I suspect since 1 GREN GDS deployed three rifle coy groups of their own it was more a matter of the BG needing to be quite a bit bigger than a normal light-role infantry battalion rather than the unit being substantially understrength.

This mid-tour report from 2 Coy 1 GREN GDS may be of interest to some:

http://grengds.com/uploads/files/filepath_151.pdf

Ken White
04-26-2010, 06:44 PM
My conclusion...If the battalion Commander is a blithering idiot then how effective does one expect his unit to be?That is not a conclusion, it is an assumption that they are not doing what you say they should be. I think it is a totally incorrect assumption trending to innuendo -- and your concluding sentence above is pure innuendo.
I said etc etc. And pray do tell how the TB would know where to plant anti-personnel IEDs if every patrol is applying the basics as taught under "route selection and planning"?Because the best route selection in the world runs afoul of an entire population which either willingly or through fear informs of every movement. Not to mention that if you sit on a really high mountain, you can see for flipping miles...
Or are you saying that the IED situation is insurmountable?Pretty much. Explosives are cheap, IEDs are easy to produce, they really cause few casualties -- as you know, 80% of a small number is an even smaller number and the other 20% show that your assertion of little US or British tactical ability is incorrect. So, yeah, it's pretty much insurmountable -- you can never eliminate the possibility. There's a reason South Africa (and, while it existed, Rhodesia) excelled at mine proofing and clearance...:eek:

Shooting the messenger again Ken. Do try to stick to the argument.There is no argument, you're arguing with yourself. Futilely, I might add. Thus there is no message.

There is a lot of ill informed innuendo. A question is 'why is that so?' :rolleyes:

Kiwigrunt
04-26-2010, 08:05 PM
JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.
What if 66% where Arty or Small Arms fire casualties? The idea that IED casualties are avoidable and other forms are not, makes no sense.


That’s a good point. It shows the risk of using percentages as a metric. If the IED problem was to disappear the IED percentage would be 0. That would turn the KIA by ‘other stuff’ from 20% to 100% without affecting that actual number of KIA.

Baboon6, thanks for that link (post 149). Reads a bit different from many media reports.

JMA
04-27-2010, 08:23 AM
That’s a good point. It shows the risk of using percentages as a metric. If the IED problem was to disappear the IED percentage would be 0. That would turn the KIA by ‘other stuff’ from 20% to 100% without affecting that actual number of KIA.

Not really.

Last year the Brits lost 108 KIA and 158 very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So far this year (to end march) it is 33 KIA and 31 very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So effectively last year the brits had a whole company KIA (approx) and another whole company (approx) very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So far this year (first quarter 2010) they have a full platoon (approx) both ways.

Even though there are those who sit back and find these statistics 'acceptable' the bad news for the war effort in Afghanistan is that the political impact is mounting and that such losses are unsustainable to the british army (economically, politically and militarily).

Earlier in another post I suggested that those who find the casualty rates (especially from IEDs) acceptable should be the ones to face up to the parents and families of the killed and maimed. "Mrs Smith you must understand that your son's life was an acceptable risk, do try to understand that." the answer would be, "Where is YOUR son?" the answer then, "Oh safe and out of harms way."

We lost a Puma with all 17 on board on an operation in Mozambique back in 1979. It took until Easter last year for the crash site to be located and the process to erect a memorial to begin. See facebook group here: http://tinyurl.com/39undku We don't forget. No body forgets.

So I'm not sure whether my response to those who dismiss casualties and especially those from largely preventable causes (IEDs) with a wide sweep of the hand is one of incredulity or barely controllable anger. The same anger I feel to this day for someone in Rhodesian Air Force Headquarters who turned down the request for expenditure into research to protect our aircraft from strela (SAM-7) attack. After we had lost 4 aircrew the money was suddenly made available and we beat the strela threat. My mate did not need to die.

The bottom line is that the Brits have effectively 'lost' two full platoons in the first quarter of 2010 in Afghanistan. Whether the IED % is still 80% as of 2009 or now 66% as suggested makes for 51 as opposed to 42 directly related to IEDs and as such largely preventable makes no great difference to me quite honestly.

It is absolutely and totally unacceptable.



Baboon6, thanks for that link (post 149). Reads a bit different from many media reports.

I'll wait for Ken's comment on the 'bias' of that report.

JMA
04-27-2010, 08:36 AM
JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.

Is it not obvious that being "COIN skilled" may not include being IED savvy?

JMA
04-27-2010, 08:52 AM
This already happens to a large extent. Brigades and battle groups in Afghanistan, no matter what the "name-plate", are made up of units and sub-units from all over the British Army as well as often including some individual reinforcements. For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak) and a coy of Estonians. This besides gunners, sappers, signallers etc. 19 Light Brigade, which was the formation in Helmand in summer last year, was especially formed for that tour from units pulled from other brigades.

I would actually consider setting up a series of theater specific field HQs, Bde or Bn level depending on locale. These HQ posts would be filled by head hunting. I would then call for volunteers from across the army to fill all posts in the subunits on a permanent basis. This on the basis similar to how the Chindits were raised. Tell the volunteers to leave their regimental baggage at home. Leave the guards to march around London and fill the operational area with soldiers AND Afghans who are serious about making war.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 01:17 PM
I'll wait for Ken's comment on the 'bias' of that report.I saw no bias. As I said, good article. He's got a sense of perspective. He's far less worried about IEDs than you seem to be -- and he's there... :cool:

He also utterly and completely refutes your oft stated contention that no one in Afghanistan knows what they're doing or ever gets in a fight. :D

William F. Owen
04-27-2010, 01:56 PM
It is absolutely and totally unacceptable.


Sorry JMA, I am just not getting this. Is it you contention that all IED casualties are unacceptable or that all casualties are unacceptable?
Also I fail to see how anyone can claim "IED casualties are largely preventable."

As to the observation that the casualty rate is politically unacceptable, so what? That's your opinion and as an observation it does help progress the matter.


Is it not obvious that being "COIN skilled" may not include being IED savvy?
It may not be, but there was extensive training on how to select X-country routes to avoids IEDs and how to cross hedges to make patrols less vulnerable to IEDS.

JMA
04-27-2010, 02:35 PM
I saw no bias.

Of course you saw none, Ken.


As I said, good article. He's got a sense of perspective. He's far less worried about IEDs than you seem to be -- and he's there... :cool:

They Ken, those things are written by all the officers. Then sanitized to not to give anything away and to make sure the necessary "rah, rah" stuff is included.


He also utterly and completely refutes your oft stated contention that no one in Afghanistan knows what they're doing or ever gets in a fight. :D

It does? LOL

Read through that all again and see which of the actions they initiated and which the TB initiated. And then help me here. How is it that enemy casualties are an estimate? And why in the same report the enemy casualties for the same contact are different?

Enquiring minds ask questions...

Ken White
04-27-2010, 03:01 PM
those things are written by all the officers. Then sanitized to not to give anything away and to make sure the necessary "rah, rah" stuff is included.Of course, been that way in all Armies for a good many years. One always has to read between the lines, so to speak (easier than trying to decipher an ignorant journalist's writing...). What's your point?
Read through that all again and see which of the actions they initiated and which the TB initiated. And then help me here. How is it that enemy casualties are an estimate? And why in the same report the enemy casualties for the same contact are different?

Enquiring minds ask questions...I obviously cannot help though goodness knows I've tried. As have others. :rolleyes:

Enquiring minds can ask stupid questions. Considering the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan which have been discussed on this Board at great length and with which I do not agree -- but they aren't my call -- of course the Talibs initiate most contacts. That is not good. While totally unsound militarily, it is politically unavoidable.

The enemy casualties are almost always an estimate in all wars, only very rarely does one do a complete overrun and get all the enemy.

As for your last question, See Sylvan's comment (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97314&postcount=59). :wry:

JMA
04-27-2010, 03:37 PM
Sorry JMA, I am just not getting this. Is it you contention that all IED casualties are unacceptable or that all casualties are unacceptable?

Neither.


Also I fail to see how anyone can claim "IED casualties are largely preventable."

In the simplest terms by not using certain roads and using only those which are protected and cleared before use. As far as the anti-personnel types go very much the same applies. Only go where the TB go.


As to the observation that the casualty rate is politically unacceptable, so what? That's your opinion and as an observation it does help progress the matter.

?... What it does advance is that public support for the war is at an all time low. That impacts on any decision to pull troops out before the mission is accomplished. Domestic pressure whether you or I like it or not is material.

The effect of IEDs in respect of casualties, killed and maimed, also has a deleterious effect on both civilian and military morale.


It may not be, but there was extensive training on how to select X-country routes to avoids IEDs and how to cross hedges to make patrols less vulnerable to IEDS.

When in doubt avoid the areas altogether as it is not like the TB and the locals will want to walk around in minefields either. I often wonder when I see foot patrols crossing open fields what exactly are they doing. Surely they don't expect the TB to be found sitting around armed in these open fields?

I understand that the doctrine says that one should dominate no-man's land with patrols but when you can dominate it by day from an OP and by night with thermal then whats the point of legging it around looking for a trip wire?

JMA
04-27-2010, 03:50 PM
Of course, been that way in all Armies for a good many years. One always has to read between the lines, so to speak (easier than trying to decipher an ignorant journalist's writing...). What's your point?I obviously cannot help though goodness knows I've tried. As have others. :rolleyes:

Good that you can read between the lines of a journalists article but sad that you can't do the same with that army piece.


Enquiring minds can ask stupid questions. Considering the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan which have been discussed on this Board at great length and with which I do not agree -- but they aren't my call -- of course the Talibs initiate most contacts. That is not good. While totally unsound militarily, it is politically unavoidable.

Aah the ROE. A convenient scapegoat for all the problems. How is it that the ROE preclude troops on the ground from initiating contact with the TB?


The enemy casualties are almost always an estimate in all wars, only very rarely does one do a complete overrun and get all the enemy.

Why estimate? Why not just count the bodies and get an accurate number?

Or... are the infantry not closing with and killing the enemy?

Take this snip from that piece:

"During the search we were hit heavily from the south and fought a pitched battle with the Taliban over a one hundred metre field. 66mm rockets, rocket grenades and Javelin were used to good effect to destroy the enemy and aide our safe extraction back to Crossing Point 1."

Now you can really help me by explaining to me how the winner of a battle gets to need to extract itself from the battle? Sure explains how the enemy casualties are reduced to guess work though.


As for your last question, See Sylvan's comment (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97314&postcount=59). :wry:

That's right nobody counted the bodies because nobody got any where near where the bodies were supposed to be.

baboon6
04-27-2010, 04:09 PM
I would actually consider setting up a series of theater specific field HQs, Bde or Bn level depending on locale. These HQ posts would be filled by head hunting. I would then call for volunteers from across the army to fill all posts in the subunits on a permanent basis. This on the basis similar to how the Chindits were raised. Tell the volunteers to leave their regimental baggage at home. Leave the guards to march around London and fill the operational area with soldiers AND Afghans who are serious about making war.

No it is not. Only a small percentage of the Chindits were volunteers. The majority of the men on both the 1943 and 1944 operations were members of normal British or Gurkha infantry battalions who were simply put under Wingate's command. While there was a fair amount of reorganisation regimental/battalion identities were retained.

http://www.chindits.info/Units/Units.html

Why do you need special units made up of volunteers to serve in Afghanistan? All British (and US, Canadian, Australian etc) soldiers are volunteers anyway and I'm sure the majority want to go to Afghanistan. However I don't think you're going to get too many takers for a unit that is permanently deployed. I do think certain advisors and liaison officers should be there on a long-term basis; I believe the US Army is trying to institute such a scheme.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 04:42 PM
That's right nobody counted the bodies because nobody got any where near where the bodies were supposed to be.who was there...:rolleyes:

JMA
04-27-2010, 05:05 PM
who was there...:rolleyes:

...maybe not even the Taliban.

William F. Owen
04-27-2010, 05:10 PM
In the simplest terms by not using certain roads and using only those which are protected and cleared before use. As far as the anti-personnel types go very much the same applies. Only go where the TB go.
None of these guys are dumb. Some have multiple tours. Believe you me, these chaps are taking every possible precaution, but all conflict is adversarial and lethal.

What it does advance is that public support for the war is at an all time low. That impacts on any decision to pull troops out before the mission is accomplished. Domestic pressure whether you or I like it or not is material.
Political problem. The Army cannot do anything about that. If you want to reduce casualties, reduce operations.

The effect of IEDs in respect of casualties, killed and maimed, also has a deleterious effect on both civilian and military morale.
So what you are saying is the IED casualties have MORE of an effect?

When in doubt avoid the areas altogether as it is not like the TB and the locals will want to walk around in minefields either. I often wonder when I see foot patrols crossing open fields what exactly are they doing. Surely they don't expect the TB to be found sitting around armed in these open fields?
What mine fields? If you know anything about IEDs you know very well that the locals are walking all over them and it's only when you walk over them, they get initiated.

I understand that the doctrine says that one should dominate no-man's land with patrols but when you can dominate it by day from an OP and by night with thermal then whats the point of legging it around looking for a trip wire?
Trip wire? There are no trip wires. There are no surface signs what so ever and the IED may well be built into a wall.

With respect, I suggest you read into to the modern IED threat. It's not AP mines or VC-type booby-traps. It's a whole game up.

JMA
04-27-2010, 05:37 PM
No it is not. Only a small percentage of the Chindits were volunteers. The majority of the men on both the 1943 and 1944 operations were members of normal British or Gurkha infantry battalions who were simply put under Wingate's command. While there was a fair amount of reorganisation regimental/battalion identities were retained.

http://www.chindits.info/Units/Units.html


My humble apologies I meant Merrill’s Marauders. Regret any confusion caused.

But it would be more likely that something along the lines of the Chindits would be more likely to become a reality.


Why do you need special units made up of volunteers to serve in Afghanistan? All British (and US, Canadian, Australian etc) soldiers are volunteers anyway and I'm sure the majority want to go to Afghanistan. However I don't think you're going to get too many takers for a unit that is permanently deployed. I do think certain advisors and liaison officers should be there on a long-term basis; I believe the US Army is trying to institute such a scheme.

Exactly.

OK lets start with what you term "certain advisors and liaison officers". What I am advocating is a permanent HQ in any given area. It could be Bde or Bn size subject to location, conditions etc... Because of the need for R&R for the foreigners (US/Brit/what have you) you may need to have more staff on strength than normal.

Lets look at support. Artillery. Say Regiment X is to supply a battery on a permanent basis to area Y. The proviso would be that not more than 10-15% could be rotated at any one time. This would allow for continuity. How the Artillery regiment rotated its men would be their concern. The training of selected local forces would be slowly introduced.

Lets look at Air. Lets say a sqn of Apaches were to be permanently stationed at a given point. The same type of rotation of air crew and tech staff would apply.

Infantry units are a problem as the mind set certainly among the Brits is to get the 6 month tour over and done with and get back home. Can't see how getting a company for 6 months only to be replaced by raw new troops would work. I would off the top of my head suggest all volunteer companies where they have 5 platoons per company. Three on ops at any one time, one on R&R and one on training.

6 month tours (Brits) have little value when the whole unit up and leaves on the same day. The US have a better idea with a year but spoil it all with complete unit rotations thereby losing continuity.

Continuity, local knowledge and experience are key to success.

baboon6
04-27-2010, 07:04 PM
My humble apologies I meant Merrill’s Marauders. Regret any confusion caused.

But it would be more likely that something along the lines of the Chindits would be more likely to become a reality.



Exactly.

OK lets start with what you term "certain advisors and liaison officers". What I am advocating is a permanent HQ in any given area. It could be Bde or Bn size subject to location, conditions etc... Because of the need for R&R for the foreigners (US/Brit/what have you) you may need to have more staff on strength than normal.

Lets look at support. Artillery. Say Regiment X is to supply a battery on a permanent basis to area Y. The proviso would be that not more than 10-15% could be rotated at any one time. This would allow for continuity. How the Artillery regiment rotated its men would be their concern. The training of selected local forces would be slowly introduced.

Lets look at Air. Lets say a sqn of Apaches were to be permanently stationed at a given point. The same type of rotation of air crew and tech staff would apply.

Infantry units are a problem as the mind set certainly among the Brits is to get the 6 month tour over and done with and get back home. Can't see how getting a company for 6 months only to be replaced by raw new troops would work. I would off the top of my head suggest all volunteer companies where they have 5 platoons per company. Three on ops at any one time, one on R&R and one on training.

6 month tours (Brits) have little value when the whole unit up and leaves on the same day. The US have a better idea with a year but spoil it all with complete unit rotations thereby losing continuity.

Continuity, local knowledge and experience are key to success.

Some interesting ideas. I suppose the idea with unit rotations is that unit cohesion is considered important. I agree the problem of continuity is one that has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. As regards brigade/division HQ staff I agree they should stay longer than combat troops. The SA Army's system was to have brigade, sector and battalion HQs in the operational area mainly manned by permanent force personnel who would stay there for up to 2 years while coys/batteries/sqns made up mainly of national servicemen would be rotated in and out on 4 to 6 month tours.As the war went on though there was an increase in locally recruited, basically permanent force units from the South West Africa Territory Force such as 101 Battalion doing a lot of the fighting. How long would your notional 5-platoon coy's rotations for training and Rn'R be? As I stated above you are going to find few takers for almost continuous deployment.

Relief in place does not take one day but usually several weeks and a few members of the unit being relieved will often stay on for a while to provide a degree of continuity but I agree with you it is far from ideal. "Raw new troops" is a bit of an exaggeration- many of the officers, most of the NCOs and quite a few of the private soldiers in a typical British Army unit will have served with that unit on operations before, most likely in Afghanistan too. Some units have now completed three tours and a few individuals more.

It is the US Army which does 12-month tours, the US Marines do 7-month tours.

JMA
04-27-2010, 09:18 PM
Some interesting ideas. I suppose the idea with unit rotations is that unit cohesion is considered important. I agree the problem of continuity is one that has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. As regards brigade/division HQ staff I agree they should stay longer than combat troops. The SA Army's system was to have brigade, sector and battalion HQs in the operational area mainly manned by permanent force personnel who would stay there for up to 2 years while coys/batteries/sqns made up mainly of national servicemen would be rotated in and out on 4 to 6 month tours.As the war went on though there was an increase in locally recruited, basically permanent force units from the South West Africa Territory Force such as 101 Battalion doing a lot of the fighting. How long would your notional 5-platoon coy's rotations for training and Rn'R be? As I stated above you are going to find few takers for almost continuous deployment.

Relief in place does not take one day but usually several weeks and a few members of the unit being relieved will often stay on for a while to provide a degree of continuity but I agree with you it is far from ideal. "Raw new troops" is a bit of an exaggeration- many of the officers, most of the NCOs and quite a few of the private soldiers in a typical British Army unit will have served with that unit on operations before, most likely in Afghanistan too. Some units have now completed three tours and a few individuals more.

It is the US Army which does 12-month tours, the US Marines do 7-month tours.

Lets then accept the concept of of semi-permanent field HQs (without necessarily strictly following the SADF model). It allows for the commanders and their staff to be selected based on suitability for the specific role and function in that theater rather than just happening to be in the position of brigade or battalion commander as a stage in their careers.

Yes local units would by necessity form part of any such structure. They would naturally have built in continuity.

As to rotation. One would need at least a three platoon company and four company battalions in the field at any one time. At company level with 5 platoons rotating you would work a 3:2 system (which could be three months in and one on R&R and one on retraining). Or any other combination using those ratios. The distance to home base and the importance not to keep the troops in country too long so that they start to go "bush" is important. The mindset must be that they are in for the long haul and breaks are for R&R, leave, training etc.

The current Brit system seems to be predicated on one six month tour followed by 18 months elsewhere before the next probable rotation. So to be quite honest by the time any return they will not be theater current and some will have had some active service and combat experience sometime in th past. The lack of continuity sucks. My experience is that if less than 50% have previous recent combat experience you will be playing catch up with the enemy who have no R&R for the duration of any short tour of say 6 months. Yes they will go back experienced and better off militarily but that will be wasted as the disappear back into a peacetime army.

JMA
04-27-2010, 10:09 PM
None of these guys are dumb. Some have multiple tours. Believe you me, these chaps are taking every possible precaution, but all conflict is adversarial and lethal.

I would like to think that as well. It is the casualty rate which screams that they still have much to do.


Political problem. The Army cannot do anything about that. If you want to reduce casualties, reduce operations.

Yes the army can do something MORE about IED casualties. 20 odd per month so far this year is just too much.


So what you are saying is the IED casualties have MORE of an effect?

Yes indeed, psychologically IEDs play havoc with a soldier's morale.


What mine fields? If you know anything about IEDs you know very well that the locals are walking all over them and it's only when you walk over them, they get initiated.

A metaphor a very dangerous area with many IEDs


Trip wire? There are no trip wires. There are no surface signs what so ever and the IED may well be built into a wall.

A metaphor for getting ones self into a position where an IED can be detonated.


With respect, I suggest you read into to the modern IED threat. It's not AP mines or VC-type booby-traps. It's a whole game up.

Yes the nature of command detonated IEDs has made the Afghan battle field very lethal to all troops (and civilians it must be said.) There is no question that the Taliban are winning this part of the war even though our guys are "taking every possible precaution".

The question needs to be asked again and again until somebody can provide an answer, how are we to wrest the IED initiative away from the Taliban? In the meantime just 'trying ones best' is simply not good enough.

William F. Owen
04-28-2010, 04:22 AM
Yes the army can do something MORE about IED casualties.
Specifically what?
What IED casualty rate is acceptable?

William F. Owen
04-28-2010, 10:41 AM
JMA

You may want to plug the words "Op Barma" and "Op Karla" Drills into Google and get up to speed on the current threat. The specifics of the Drills are classified, but a man of your experience should be able to read between the lines.

Should have said this earlier.

baboon6
04-28-2010, 10:49 AM
Lets then accept the concept of of semi-permanent field HQs (without necessarily strictly following the SADF model). It allows for the commanders and their staff to be selected based on suitability for the specific role and function in that theater rather than just happening to be in the position of brigade or battalion commander as a stage in their careers.

Yes local units would by necessity form part of any such structure. They would naturally have built in continuity.

As to rotation. One would need at least a three platoon company and four company battalions in the field at any one time. At company level with 5 platoons rotating you would work a 3:2 system (which could be three months in and one on R&R and one on retraining). Or any other combination using those ratios. The distance to home base and the importance not to keep the troops in country too long so that they start to go "bush" is important. The mindset must be that they are in for the long haul and breaks are for R&R, leave, training etc.

The current Brit system seems to be predicated on one six month tour followed by 18 months elsewhere before the next probable rotation. So to be quite honest by the time any return they will not be theater current and some will have had some active service and combat experience sometime in th past. The lack of continuity sucks. My experience is that if less than 50% have previous recent combat experience you will be playing catch up with the enemy who have no R&R for the duration of any short tour of say 6 months. Yes they will go back experienced and better off militarily but that will be wasted as the disappear back into a peacetime army.

1. Most ISAF units have their ANA partner unit, which usually includes an ISAF OMLT (Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team). However the OMLT can only advise, sometimes very strongly, they can beg, plead, cajole and threaten, but they cannot actually make the Afghans do something. A possible solution would be something like the "loan service" scheme the British had with several Arab and other countries in the past, most recently in Sierra Leone. A few ISAF officers and SNCOs would be seconded to the ANA with command and disciplinary authority. However I am fairly sure that this is a political impossibility.

2. How long would this 3:2 cycle last for a particular unit? Also you would have to increase unit strengths quite significantly, or carry out a major reorganisation into fewer but larger units.

JMA
04-28-2010, 11:39 AM
1. Most ISAF units have their ANA partner unit, which usually includes an ISAF OMLT (Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team). However the OMLT can only advise, sometimes very strongly, they can beg, plead, cajole and threaten, but they cannot actually make the Afghans do something. A possible solution would be something like the "loan service" scheme the British had with several Arab and other countries in the past, most recently in Sierra Leone. A few ISAF officers and SNCOs would be seconded to the ANA with command and disciplinary authority. However I am fairly sure that this is a political impossibility.

The local forces must be under direct operational command. If they just dump some bunch of dope smokers from another ethic group on you then you are wasting your time. Spending too much time worrying about these clowns than getting on with the war. With these local units it is always the officers and the NCOs who are the problem. So recruit your own locally.

If that doesn't work out so well initially then live with it until it improves. And local must mean local... born and bred in that exact same operational area. This can work either on the model of how the Brits raised battalions of colonial troops or like irregulars were raised like Renamo (in Mozambique) or most likely a balance between the two.


2. How long would this 3:2 cycle last for a particular unit? Also you would have to increase unit strengths quite significantly, or carry out a major reorganisation into fewer but larger units.

The aim of the exercise is to ensure long term continuity. People will come and people will go but as long as changes/rotations at any time are no more than 20% of the force level and at no time is a brand new platoon or company brought in on its own. A platoon can be rotated as long as when it comes back at least 80% of those returning were there on the last deployment (don't use the word tour). If for some reason a returning platoon comes back with less than 80% old hands then there would be inter platoon transfers to sort that out.

How best to work the cycle? 3:2 works for a five platoon company. It all about sustainability. We used to deploy for 6 weeks then out on ops then 10 ten days back on R&R (but that was because the war was a few hours drive from home). There is a cost factor and there is a fatigue factor. After three years of that the officers were moved on, NCOs had breaks when they went on courses, the national servicemen did their year then left. It was the regular soldier other ranks who took strain. He was a private soldier or L/Cpl with no greater potential, you had to watch these guys as after 3 or 4 years of that they would be howling like dogs at night and crawling up the walls... totally 'bush'.

Best to work this out on the ground as too little action and the troops would die of boredom and too much action and they would get worn out.

baboon6
04-28-2010, 12:07 PM
The local forces must be under direct operational command. If they just dump some bunch of dope smokers from another ethic group on you then you are wasting your time. Spending too much time worrying about these clowns than getting on with the war. With these local units it is always the officers and the NCOs who are the problem. So recruit your own locally.

If that doesn't work out so well initially then live with it until it improves. And local must mean local... born and bred in that exact same operational area. This can work either on the model of how the Brits raised battalions of colonial troops or like irregulars were raised like Renamo (in Mozambique) or most likely a balance between the two.



The aim of the exercise is to ensure long term continuity. People will come and people will go but as long as changes/rotations at any time are no more than 20% of the force level and at no time is a brand new platoon or company brought in on its own. A platoon can be rotated as long as when it comes back at least 80% of those returning were there on the last deployment (don't use the word tour). If for some reason a returning platoon comes back with less than 80% old hands then there would be inter platoon transfers to sort that out.

How best to work the cycle? 3:2 works for a five platoon company. It all about sustainability. We used to deploy for 6 weeks then out on ops then 10 ten days back on R&R (but that was because the war was a few hours drive from home). There is a cost factor and there is a fatigue factor. After three years of that the officers were moved on, NCOs had breaks when they went on courses, the national servicemen did their year then left. It was the regular soldier other ranks who took strain. He was a private soldier or L/Cpl with no greater potential, you had to watch these guys as after 3 or 4 years of that they would be howling like dogs at night and crawling up the walls... totally 'bush'.

Best to work this out on the ground as too little action and the troops would die of boredom and too much action and they would get worn out.

1. Recruiting your own locals in AFG? I just don't see the Afghan government allowing it. Which is why I suggested the "loan service" idea, which has been done with sovereign countries in the past. Even though I don't that would be acceptable either.

2. Yes it's bit different when the guys can get home every 6 weeks, see the family, get drunk, get laid, whatever. Very difficult in the expeditionary wars of today.

JMA
04-28-2010, 03:43 PM
1. Recruiting your own locals in AFG? I just don't see the Afghan government allowing it. Which is why I suggested the "loan service" idea, which has been done with sovereign countries in the past. Even though I don't that would be acceptable either.

I am not familiar with the 'loan service' idea but must say that any idea is better than being forced to work with 'independent' Afghan forces of whom are probably texting the TB of your every move. Better to have nothing.


2. Yes it's bit different when the guys can get home every 6 weeks, see the family, get drunk, get laid, whatever. Very difficult in the expeditionary wars of today.

Currently for the Brits its a six month turnaround for a full battalion. So every six months they have the costs of moving a battalion worth of people and some equipment back and forth (one in, one out). So theoretically there you have your transport budget. The permutations are endless. And yes that is what R&R is for. Things are as difficult as they are today because we choose to make them so. Keep forcing square pegs into round holes.

baboon6
04-28-2010, 03:51 PM
As promised some more battle group newsletters

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, from the last rotation, Herrick 11:

http://www.shinycapstar.com/Documents/COLDM%20GDS%20BG%20Newsletter%2001%2001%2010.pdf

http://www.shinycapstar.com/Documents/2%20Coy%20Christmas%20and%20New%20Year%20Newslette r%2010%2001%2014.pdf

Some older ones from 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers during Herrick 10 (April-October 2009), entitled "Musa Qa'leh Mail:"

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/aprilnewsletter.pdf

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/maynewsletter.pdf

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/junenewsletter.pdf

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/julynewsletter.pdf

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/augustnewsletter.pdf

http://www.sekentfusiliers.co.uk/fusilierimages/octobernewsletter.pdf

And finally "The Afghan Hound" from 1st The Queen's Dragoons Guards, Herrick 9:

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound4.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound5.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound6.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound7.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound8.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound9.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound10.pdf

http://www.qdg.org.uk/pdfnews/AfghanHound11.pdf

JMA
04-30-2010, 04:50 AM
Specifically what?
What IED casualty rate is acceptable?

Came across this other thread here:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8062

I think the article referred to gives a good example of what I am saying must be avoided at all costs.

We lost 17 KIA in one incident when a Puma chopper was shot down. Strangely we could handle that as it comes with the territory when you are flying into action. Could have lost a Dak loaded with paras to on any given day.

But deaths by IED are exasperating because of the lack of a physical enemy force to make contact with. It is clearly seriously psychologically damaging to the troops in the field. That is why more emphasis must be placed on the whole IED situation.

He highlights what I have been complaining about around here in the last few weeks and that is the amount of road movemnt and the resources tioed down to that end.

'Due to the pitiful numbers of support helicopters and Apaches needed to escort them, every day troops on the ground are forced to expend an enormous amount of hours and manpower just standing still. They sacrifice their reserves of energy, motivation and willpower securing and picketing routes for the never-ending vehicle convoys that have to keep happening in order to resupply the patchy spread of patrol bases with water, ammo and rations; as well as recovering the vehicles that invariably go into ditches and securing helicopter landing-sites for the evacuation of casualties from improvised explosive device strikes'.

There is a desperate urgency in this matter and it appears we are seeing a super tanker trying to turn around in high seas.

William F. Owen
04-30-2010, 08:39 AM
But deaths by IED are exasperating because of the lack of a physical enemy force to make contact with. It is clearly seriously psychologically damaging to the troops in the field. That is why more emphasis must be placed on the whole IED situation.
I'm pretty much stuck to see how deaths from IEDs can be more tragic than any form of KIA/WIA. I don't remember any IED hit in Ireland (including Warren Point) as being any more demoralising apart from the numbers involved.

...but the point is not "IEDs". The point is criminally small numbers of Support Helicopters and too few troops deployed. The lack of resources is the issue. The IED hits are just the one of the symptom...... and more helo is not going to save you from the bomb planted in the wall of an alley, command detonated by string.

Infanteer
05-01-2010, 06:40 PM
Although troops to task is a good factor in IEDs, I've seen insurgents get IEDs emplaced right under the noses of friendly forces. They are pretty crafty.

I find the claim of support helicopters to be a bit of a red herring. IEDs aren't necessarily confined to highways where Coalition vehicles move - a large percentage of IEDs I witnessed (first or second hand) targeted dismounted patrols. Unless a Chinook is going to drop me off 800 meters from the COP to the village, I don't think it's going to make a huge dent in IED casualties.

Veterans of Northern Ireland should be real familiar with this....

William F. Owen
05-01-2010, 06:53 PM
I find the claim of support helicopters to be a bit of a red herring. IEDs aren't necessarily confined to highways where Coalition vehicles move - a large percentage of IEDs I witnessed (first or second hand) targeted dismounted patrols.
Well aware, but I submit that on route IEDs and all the personnel and efforts assigned to securing them, might be better used if 90% of tactical and administrative movement was done by helicopter. In the eyes of most of the men I talk to, lack of Support Helicopters is a very significant issue.

Veterans of Northern Ireland should be real familiar with this....
In South Armagh, in the 1980's 90% of tactical and administrative moves were done by Support Helicopter. Yes IEDs still threatened dismounted patrols, but it made the bad guys life very much harder.

Kiwigrunt
05-01-2010, 09:52 PM
In South Armagh, in the 1980's 90% of tactical and administrative moves were done by Support Helicopter. Yes IEDs still threatened dismounted patrols, but it made the bad guys life very much harder.

Just a thought. If there was to be a radical shift towards this 90% is it than not likely that the TB would react by dropping focus on IEDs, and RPG-ing the odd helicopter in a more target rich sky? Just the odd one (relative to a great number in the air) would possibly equal or exceed the casualty rate currently inflicted by IEDs. I think again of “Blackhawk Down” and the large number of helicopters lost in Vietnam. Those two Blackhawks were near enough empty; they could have had half a platoon on board. And the choppers in Nam were smaller than what we typically use today.

We’ll probably never find out though, because those chopper will indeed not likely become available at those rates.

William F. Owen
05-02-2010, 03:49 AM
Just a thought. If there was to be a radical shift towards this 90% is it than not likely that the TB would react by dropping focus on IEDs, and RPG-ing the odd helicopter in a more target rich sky?
It's entirely possible that they might try. Enemies do adapt, which is not news to anyone that reads books.....

But, yes, your point is well made. However, flying to the threat would mitigate some of the risk.

JMA
05-02-2010, 12:27 PM
I'm pretty much stuck to see how deaths from IEDs can be more tragic than any form of KIA/WIA. I don't remember any IED hit in Ireland (including Warren Point) as being any more demoralising apart from the numbers involved.

...but the point is not "IEDs". The point is criminally small numbers of Support Helicopters and too few troops deployed. The lack of resources is the issue. The IED hits are just the one of the symptom...... and more helo is not going to save you from the bomb planted in the wall of an alley, command detonated by string.

I did not say more tragic I used the words "exasperating" and "psychologically damaging'. All KIA are tragic and even 30 odd years after the fact I/we deal with parents/siblings who have never gotten over the deaths of their loved ones. The failure to demand more and make more use of helicopters and the failure to address the IED effectively is incompetence on a scale of the "Charge of the Light Brigade". Wasted lives, broken families... all due to senior military and political incompetence. Heads should roll... oh that's the French method... stretched then?

JMA
05-02-2010, 12:37 PM
Although troops to task is a good factor in IEDs, I've seen insurgents get IEDs emplaced right under the noses of friendly forces. They are pretty crafty.

Crafty yes, but just as likely to be because the friendly forces are "switched off" or just plain dumb, yes?


I find the claim of support helicopters to be a bit of a red herring. IEDs aren't necessarily confined to highways where Coalition vehicles move - a large percentage of IEDs I witnessed (first or second hand) targeted dismounted patrols. Unless a Chinook is going to drop me off 800 meters from the COP to the village, I don't think it's going to make a huge dent in IED casualties.

Veterans of Northern Ireland should be real familiar with this....

Surely you must understand that if you reduce your use of roads by 70, 80, 90% then the rate based incidence of road based IEDs must reduce commensurately, yes?

Why drop you off as far as 800m from the village? Use smaller choppers and get the troops right up close. Which will drop the off road IED risk by how much?

JMA
05-02-2010, 12:43 PM
Well aware, but I submit that on route IEDs and all the personnel and efforts assigned to securing them, might be better used if 90% of tactical and administrative movement was done by helicopter. In the eyes of most of the men I talk to, lack of Support Helicopters is a very significant issue.

Absolutely. We are on the same page on this.


In South Armagh, in the 1980's 90% of tactical and administrative moves were done by Support Helicopter. Yes IEDs still threatened dismounted patrols, but it made the bad guys life very much harder.

Again yes. And if the use of dismounted patrols is more intelligently planned then the risk reduces even more.

William F. Owen
05-02-2010, 12:45 PM
The failure to demand more and make more use of helicopters and the failure to address the IED effectively is incompetence on a scale of the "Charge of the Light Brigade". Wasted lives, broken families... all due to senior military and political incompetence. Heads should roll... oh that's the French method... stretched then?

I'll grant you that the failure to have enough helicopters is unforgivable, but what do you suggest on IEDs?

a.) The UK is one of worlds most experienced Armies in IEDs. The devices faced in NI were many more times sophisticated than those seen in Helmand. I cannot see how they can do more than they can.

b.) You are almost picking on the one area where the Army cannot be said to be at fault. Technology is cutting edge and there simply is no better trained force facing that threat. I was introduced to all the counter IED stuff back in 1980, during basic training. They've been doing it a very, very long time.

....and the Charge of the Light Brigade, was a very sound decision, "prevent the carrying away of the guns", brilliantly executed, but sadly into the wrong valley, as the man writing the orders did not know what the Cavalry could see - cos in those days Maps were Army level assets.

JMA
05-02-2010, 12:57 PM
Just a thought. If there was to be a radical shift towards this 90% is it than not likely that the TB would react by dropping focus on IEDs, and RPG-ing the odd helicopter in a more target rich sky? Just the odd one (relative to a great number in the air) would possibly equal or exceed the casualty rate currently inflicted by IEDs. I think again of “Blackhawk Down” and the large number of helicopters lost in Vietnam. Those two Blackhawks were near enough empty; they could have had half a platoon on board. And the choppers in Nam were smaller than what we typically use today.

We’ll probably never find out though, because those chopper will indeed not likely become available at those rates.

Not quite. The current situation and unsustainable for Brit forces.

Yes there is a risk to the choppers and one would assume that the air tactics
would evolve to preempt any TB threat.

In addition it would provide the opportunity to concentrate forces quickly in one place to up the kill rate per contact so that there is not as now a steady increase in the level of experience of the TB forces who are able to "shoot and skoot" and live to fight again.

The use of support helicopters to replace road transport is one thing but I'm not sure the Brits will initiate an agressive use of helicopters in a combat roll despite having had a sniff of the potential in Sierra Leone. I'm afraid it will come down to a US unit commanded by a man of vision and flair who will start the ball rolling. What about the Mountain guys with choppers from some National Guard chopper unit... they might just have the ability to think out of the box.

(PS: contact me and I'll put in touch with people now living in the US who have knowledge to advise on had to kick start this process... ;-)

JMA
05-02-2010, 01:14 PM
I'll grant you that the failure to have enough helicopters is unforgivable, but what do you suggest on IEDs?

Avoid them.


a.) The UK is one of worlds most experienced Armies in IEDs. The devices faced in NI were many more times sophisticated than those seen in Helmand. I cannot see how they can do more than they can.

Well the question must be asked as to where this experience lies. I guess we should run a test of the knowledge the individual squaddie or Tom has in these matters rather than assume that all this experience from over the years has been effectively passed down to those likely to trigger this things or have them triggered when they pass by.


b.) You are almost picking on the one area where the Army cannot be said to be at fault. Technology is cutting edge and there simply is no better trained force facing that threat. I was introduced to all the counter IED stuff back in 1980, during basic training. They've been doing it a very, very long time.

Some of this answered above. I would be wary of passing all the blame to the politicians. As I have said the basic soldier deploying to Afghanistan should have more than an introduction if they are to be given a fighting chance of avoiding these IEDs. Formal training, regular refreshers etc etc. I'll wager it is not happening in the detail it is required.


....and the Charge of the Light Brigade, was a very sound decision, "prevent the carrying away of the guns", brilliantly executed, but sadly into the wrong valley, as the man writing the orders did not know what the Cavalry could see - cos in those days Maps were Army level assets.

So like the current situation in Afghanistan where excellent troops with good training and infantry equipment are being thrown into battle using the wrong tactics and employment methods. Lambs to the slaughter.

William F. Owen
05-02-2010, 02:22 PM
Avoid them.
How? Really, give me specifics.

Well the question must be asked as to where this experience lies. I guess we should run a test of the knowledge the individual squaddie or Tom has in these matters rather than assume that all this experience from over the years has been effectively passed down to those likely to trigger this things or have them triggered when they pass by.
Sorry JMA, but what is it you know, that all collective OP Barma training, Op Klara, training doesn't cover?

Formal training, regular refreshers etc etc. I'll wager it is not happening in the detail it is required.
And you'd loose the wager badly. They get all that in spades. Most of it is rightly classified. Constant tech INT updates. Constant TTP reviews and equipment updates.

JMA
05-02-2010, 10:43 PM
How? Really, give me specifics.

If you reduce the use of road transport you reduce the the possible incidence of road located IEDs. Extend that to reducing the amount of aimless wandering around (which seems to pass for patrolling) and that will further reduce the exposure to IEDs. The all round benefit will be significant.


Sorry JMA, but what is it you know, that all collective OP Barma training, Op Klara, training doesn't cover?

The casualty statistics scream out that something is not working. The outcome informs the opinion of the training or lack thereof.


And you'd loose the wager badly. They get all that in spades. Most of it is rightly classified. Constant tech INT updates. Constant TTP reviews and equipment updates.

You say they get all the training and refreshers in the required detail yet the results through the casualty rates inform us that there is either a problem with the training or with the soldiers themselves. Either/or or both.

Fuchs
05-03-2010, 12:27 AM
The casualty statistics scream out that something is not working. The outcome informs the opinion of the training or lack thereof

I can tell you what's not working: Peace. It's war, therefore the casualties.

The qualitative, quantitative and material superiority of the Western forces is so great that the repertoire of their enemies is limited to almost nothing.
The Western forces' losses are accordingly minimal.

Let's recount the Taliban's repertoire:
- remote controlled mines
- inaccurate RPG fire
- inaccurate small arms and machine gun fire
- light/medium mortar shoot & scoot harrassment
- light MRL shoot & scoot harrassment
- violence against civilians
- occasionally overwhelming small isolated ANP personnel

That's almost no repertoire. It's far below the abilities of an average infantry battalion. Judging by feeling, I'd say their repertoire includes about 0.01% of the full modern warfare potential.
A capable enemy would have destroyed dozens of outposts and convoys.

There's a decreasing rate of return (a decreasing marginal rate) in effect. You can do more and more to limit the enemy's abilities (repertoire) to even less, but it's unlikely that you'll eliminate his repertoire completely and you'll get ever less effect for your effort.


It's fine to think & discuss about better training, but let's set our expectations on a realistic level.
There will always be troubles in war, and the TB as an enemy have almost been reduced to almost no combat capability in comparison to what's possible in war.
A mere 500 WW2 snipers could have caused much more harm than the TB did.

I doubt that fighting better would help much anyway. The problem is the identification of the enemy when he attempts to avoid detection (among the populace).
The military isn't going to achieve much unless it makes progress in regard to the ID problem.


Btw, it's a good thing that war without friendly casualties hasn't been invented yet (save for the Kosovo Air War). We'd have far too many warmongers ruining countries if we could wage and "win" wars with no friendly casualties.
A few more casualties in a stupid war may actually save us from another stupid war with much, much more casualties.

Chris jM
05-03-2010, 12:52 AM
If you reduce the use of road transport you reduce the the possible incidence of road located IEDs. Extend that to reducing the amount of aimless wandering around (which seems to pass for patrolling) and that will further reduce the exposure to IEDs. The all round benefit will be significant.


Claiming that ISAF is engaged in 'aimless wandering around' is a rather large accusation to be leveling. Where is the evidence of this, and how else do you propose ISAF forces secure the population in Afghanistan? Descending via helicopter for every Key Leader Engagement or info-gathering mission is neither possible nor desirable, and the nature of the insurgency is such that direct action ala Fireforce tactics is nigh on impossible given the tendency for the Tb to 'melt away' from sight when they don't want to be identified.

I would dispute both the fact that current patrolling is 'aimless wandering around' and also the claim that we should conduct less ground patrols. IEDs are an evil, but if we start fighting the IED threat in isolation we won't be fighting the causation of the IEDs - the insurgency itself.

William F. Owen
05-03-2010, 03:59 AM
The casualty statistics scream out that something is not working. The outcome informs the opinion of the training or lack thereof.
So how do you explain the UK forces discover and recover far more IEDs than they trigger ( 75% + )?

You say they get all the training and refreshers in the required detail yet the results through the casualty rates inform us that there is either a problem with the training or with the soldiers themselves. Either/or or both.
Sorry, but you are seeing something in the casualty statistics that I am not.
If you are trying to allege that the UK is poorly trained when it comes to dealing with IEDs, then you are plain wrong. Who is better trained?

Infanteer
05-03-2010, 04:33 AM
Crafty yes, but just as likely to be because the friendly forces are "switched off" or just plain dumb, yes?

Sure. Too bad you weren't out there to set them straight.


Surely you must understand that if you reduce your use of roads by 70, 80, 90% then the rate based incidence of road based IEDs must reduce commensurately, yes?

Sure. All but 1 incident during my time in country that resulted in a KIA involved attacks against dismounted patrols. Helicopters and smaller AOs eliminate the need for longer road moves, but road moves can never be eliminated 100% and the enemy simply switches to targeting dismounts.

Fact of the matter is that the enemy will use IEDs to target your TTPs, regardless of what they are. I've seen this firsthand. Your claim of ending or significantly curtailing the IED threat by simply getting more helicopters is, according to my experience, baseless. Most of my business was done without vehicles and IEDs still remained the primary threat to Coalition Forces.

William F. Owen
05-03-2010, 05:31 AM
Your claim of ending or significantly curtailing the IED threat by simply getting more helicopters is, according to my experience, baseless. Most of my business was done without vehicles and IEDs still remained the primary threat to Coalition Forces.
I think a distinction needs to be made here. The UK is/was critically short of helicopter lift.
If you have more helicopters, you can significantly reduce military road traffic - as shown in South Armagh in the 1980's.
For me personally, that is the limit of my conjecture. Helicopters are good housekeeping. They do not solve the IED problem, in and of themselves.

JMA
05-03-2010, 08:12 AM
I can tell you what's not working: Peace. It's war, therefore the casualties.

The qualitative, quantitative and material superiority of the Western forces is so great that the repertoire of their enemies is limited to almost nothing.
The Western forces' losses are accordingly minimal.

Let's recount the Taliban's repertoire:
- remote controlled mines
- inaccurate RPG fire
- inaccurate small arms and machine gun fire
- light/medium mortar shoot & scoot harrassment
- light MRL shoot & scoot harrassment
- violence against civilians
- occasionally overwhelming small isolated ANP personnel

Of the seven items in the Taliban's repertoire the first one, IEDs, is brutally effective. So much so that a disproportionate amount of time and resources are being spent on actions defending against this threat.


That's almost no repertoire. It's far below the abilities of an average infantry battalion. Judging by feeling, I'd say their repertoire includes about 0.01% of the full modern warfare potential.
A capable enemy would have destroyed dozens of outposts and convoys.

There's a decreasing rate of return (a decreasing marginal rate) in effect. You can do more and more to limit the enemy's abilities (repertoire) to even less, but it's unlikely that you'll eliminate his repertoire completely and you'll get ever less effect for your effort.

Its strange that such an ineffective force is able to tie down increasing numbers of coalition forces. Again we need to assess the need for evry convoy and the tactical necessity of every outpost.

If the effectiveness of the IED tactic is severly curtailed they may well have to resort to greater use of the other options in their repertoire which will allow you to get them out into the open where you can engage them. They don't want that, that's why they concentrate on IEDs and they are for the moment calling the shots.

(other stuff snipped)

JMA
05-03-2010, 08:43 AM
Claiming that ISAF is engaged in 'aimless wandering around' is a rather large accusation to be leveling. Where is the evidence of this, and how else do you propose ISAF forces secure the population in Afghanistan? Descending via helicopter for every Key Leader Engagement or info-gathering mission is neither possible nor desirable, and the nature of the insurgency is such that direct action ala Fireforce tactics is nigh on impossible given the tendency for the Tb to 'melt away' from sight when they don't want to be identified.

I would dispute both the fact that current patrolling is 'aimless wandering around' and also the claim that we should conduct less ground patrols. IEDs are an evil, but if we start fighting the IED threat in isolation we won't be fighting the causation of the IEDs - the insurgency itself.

The Brits have been using the patrol base strategy (as opposed to the ink blot) so when you put a company in a patrol base they are expected to patrol, yes?

What type of patrols are carried out? Must be fighting patrols because they can't be anything else when platoons and companies go walk about. Are these patrols based on good intelligence (or any intelligence at all?) What are the chances that they will 'bump' into armed Taliban moving around in a group?

The wheel is being reinvented here. I and thousands (maybe millions) of soldiers like me spent days, weeks, months, years of our lives on walk abouts in the hope of a chance contact with the enemy. We wasted millions of man hours and it seems each new generation knows better and will do the same.

What are the statistics for contact initiated by Brit patrols which lead to positive outcomes? Not talking about those initiated by small arms or IEDs by the Taliban. Like vehicle movement routine patrol patterns allow the TB to place IEDs for use with maximum effect.

I have no opinion on whether Fire Force tactics would work or be suitable in the Afghanistan theater. I just don't know the situation there. And of course there are those who may not really understand the fire force concept to even know if it would work there.

I'm not sure that given the shortage of helicopters available to Brit forces whether the potential use for helicopters has been fully explored.

JMA
05-03-2010, 09:16 AM
So how do you explain the UK forces discover and recover far more IEDs than they trigger ( 75% + )?

That comparison is cold comfort to the soldiers killed, maimed and mutilated by the remaining 25%

When it comes to life and death situation 75/100 is surely not a pass.


Sorry, but you are seeing something in the casualty statistics that I am not.
If you are trying to allege that the UK is poorly trained when it comes to dealing with IEDs, then you are plain wrong. Who is better trained?

75% is just not good enough when the remainder result in death or terrible wounds.

Who is better trained? I don't know, we are talking about the Brits. What are the US stats? I don't know but it really doesn't matter as we are talking about the Brits here.

a 25% failure rate with the accompanying kill and wounded is not good eneough.

JMA
05-03-2010, 09:34 AM
Sure. Too bad you weren't out there to set them straight.

I had my own problems in my own time. I could have and probably should have done better. So it is out of experience that when I see or hear something like that that the lights start flashing and the alarm bells start ringing. I know that tired and/or bored troops tend to switch off (mine certainly did) I know that troops tend to find shortcuts for routine time consuming tasks. You do appreciate the difference between good soldiers who are switched off and those who know no better?

[QUOTE]Sure. All but 1 incident during my time in country that resulted in a KIA involved attacks against dismounted patrols. Helicopters and smaller AOs eliminate the need for longer road moves, but road moves can never be eliminated 100% and the enemy simply switches to targeting dismounts.

Sever wounding of the enemy in war is often better than a clinical KIA. We are seeing that in the mounting alarm and horror in the UK as the maimed and mutilated amputees become more and more visual in society. We are not talking loading the medical facilities here we are talking about the mounting subliminal paranoia amongst serving troops of the IED threat.


Fact of the matter is that the enemy will use IEDs to target your TTPs, regardless of what they are. I've seen this firsthand. Your claim of ending or significantly curtailing the IED threat by simply getting more helicopters is, according to my experience, baseless. Most of my business was done without vehicles and IEDs still remained the primary threat to Coalition Forces.

Once we have gained agreement that only absolutely vital and necessary road movement is allowed on Afghanistan roads we can start to look towards applying the same principle to foot patrols.

In Northern Ireland the Brits through using helicopters for troop transport largely neutralised the road based IED threat and prevented the scale of waste of manpower and resources trying to protect road movement as we see in Afghanistan.

If you don't drive on roads you can't he hit by and IED... pretty simple logic.

Chris jM
05-03-2010, 10:14 AM
What type of patrols are carried out? Must be fighting patrols because they can't be anything else when platoons and companies go walk about. Are these patrols based on good intelligence (or any intelligence at all?) What are the chances that they will 'bump' into armed Taliban moving around in a group?

The wheel is being reinvented here. I and thousands (maybe millions) of soldiers like me spent days, weeks, months, years of our lives on walk abouts in the hope of a chance contact with the enemy. We wasted millions of man hours and it seems each new generation knows better and will do the same.


The purpose of patrolling as it was told to me was primarily to 'seize and retain the initiative'. Walking around for a 'chance contact' is what I hope we're not doing, and in my limited experience and exposure it isn't. Yes, everyone is ready for the chance encounter but by patrolling we are ensuring that the Taliban don't have freedom of movement to access the roads, plant IEDs and plan ambushes. On patrol ISAF members are talking to locals, checking on ANP activities, providing a security presence and gaining valuable intelligence we wouldn't get from any other means unless we were meeting face to face with the populace. COIN doctrine as it stands tells us that we are patrolling in order to secure the population from Taliban (or at the very least, denying and harassing the ability of Taliban to access, move amongst, threaten and conduct political activities within the population).

If we follow your course of action and effectively leave the roads, limiting our patrolling to our distributed patrol bases supplied by an armada of helicopters, then what? I'd suggest that the Taliban would focus their strength on our weakness, as that's what I'd do. They'd harass civilian traffic, impose illegal VCPs, conduct intimidation activities and generally be all round bad, nasty, despicable and horrible human beings all along the roads where we are not. The ANP would suffer a huge set-back both in the eyes of the population and in their ability to police their country (that's putting it lightly - I would suggest they would collapse as a police force if they were regularly challenged along their lines of communication), and ANA would be forced to endure far more difficult tasks when they deploy - unless we helo them everywhere, too?

That's hardly an end-state we want to be working too.

MikeF
05-03-2010, 12:17 PM
What type of patrols are carried out? Must be fighting patrols because they can't be anything else when platoons and companies go walk about. Are these patrols based on good intelligence (or any intelligence at all?) What are the chances that they will 'bump' into armed Taliban moving around in a group?

JMA,

SWC has had a rather long discussion on patrolling in the thread entitled What is presence patrolling? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9069&highlight=Patrolling) If you take some time to review it, then you'll see that many of put serious thought and reflection into what our troops are doing.

Yes, sometimes we are relearning lessons of the past and sometimes units have bad leaders, but it is a mistake to generalize that onto the entire military.

On a side note, no one here is discounting the impact of casualties in war. Many of us are intimately familiar with it. So, you are amoung like-minded individuals. Through discussion and sometimes lively debate, we try as you are doing to find better solutions to seemingly intractable problems.

v/r

Mike

Fuchs
05-03-2010, 01:44 PM
Its strange that such an ineffective force is able to tie down increasing numbers of coalition forces. Again we need to assess the need for evry convoy and the tactical necessity of every outpost.

If the effectiveness of the IED tactic is severly curtailed they may well have to resort to greater use of the other options in their repertoire which will allow you to get them out into the open where you can engage them. They don't want that, that's why they concentrate on IEDs and they are for the moment calling the shots.

That's the difference between the potential and the remaining repertoire. Sure, they could man lines, dig their own outposts, set up guns at valley entries, man permanent checkpoints, siege and storm cities - but all this has already been diminished due to their inferiority.

The IED capability is also mitigated by about 50-95% by intelligence, detection, jamming, passive protection and medical services.

What's left is an enemy with inferior numbers of fighters and a ridiculously small repertoire, incapable of doing (and getting away with doing) almost everything in the modern conventional war playbook.

I'd like to stress that imposing further restrictions will most likely require ever larger effort for ever smaller gains. All cheap answers have most likely already been given.


Let's say we get starship Enterprise-D in orbit and they detect and disarm every IED in Afghanistan.

At that point, the TB would likely divert their efforts away from IEDs and either attempt to enlarge their repertoire or to spend more effort on other parts of their repertoire.
They could buy and smuggle some 12.7 or 14.5mm rifles or produce some, add a cheap 4x optic (used PSO-1, for example) and let men with good eyesight snipe.

They could also increase sabotage effort - or focus on actions against the civilian populace (which would mean that solving the IED problem would have been contrary to the ISAF mission of providing security).
They could as well turn almost completely to politics and spend money on bribing instead of mercs.

To squeeze the IED out of their repertoire would most likely not lead to mission success in itself.

William F. Owen
05-04-2010, 04:43 AM
What type of patrols are carried out? Must be fighting patrols because they can't be anything else when platoons and companies go walk about. Are these patrols based on good intelligence (or any intelligence at all?) What are the chances that they will 'bump' into armed Taliban moving around in a group?
Sorry, are you asking because you do not know or you have some specific opinion at to Patrol conduct.
a.) Patrols aim to reduce the enemies freedom of action.
b.) Of course intelligence informs planning. I'm not sure how much info on the "Light EW Detachments" is open source, but I see few dropped balls in this area.


The wheel is being reinvented here. I and thousands (maybe millions) of soldiers like me spent days, weeks, months, years of our lives on walk abouts in the hope of a chance contact with the enemy. We wasted millions of man hours and it seems each new generation knows better and will do the same.
Some armies do patrolling well, some badly. Patrolling is like washing or eating. You cannot not do it. Every single operational patrol in the British Army has a specific, clear and stated purpose. No one is simply bumbling around trolling for contact.

I'm not sure that given the shortage of helicopters available to Brit forces whether the potential use for helicopters has been fully explored.
Believe me, it has and is constantly debate and examined.

That comparison is cold comfort to the soldiers killed, maimed and mutilated by the remaining 25%

When it comes to life and death situation 75/100 is surely not a pass.
Really? Are you serious? Are you really comfortable with the reasoning that statement implies? Actually based on those I talk to, the boys in theatre are pretty pleased drills and skills substantially mitigate the risk? No one in theatre expects Air line levels of safety.


Who is better trained? I don't know, we are talking about the Brits. What are the US stats? I don't know but it really doesn't matter as we are talking about the Brits here.
I am flat out asking you, what is it you think is lacking? I cannot see you point, apart from casting aspersions on operational conduct, you fully admit that you are not well versed in. What is your point?

JMA
05-05-2010, 07:43 AM
That's the difference between the potential and the remaining repertoire. Sure, they could man lines, dig their own outposts, set up guns at valley entries, man permanent checkpoints, siege and storm cities - but all this has already been diminished due to their inferiority.

The IED capability is also mitigated by about 50-95% by intelligence, detection, jamming, passive protection and medical services.

What's left is an enemy with inferior numbers of fighters and a ridiculously small repertoire, incapable of doing (and getting away with doing) almost everything in the modern conventional war playbook.

I'd like to stress that imposing further restrictions will most likely require ever larger effort for ever smaller gains. All cheap answers have most likely already been given.


Let's say we get starship Enterprise-D in orbit and they detect and disarm every IED in Afghanistan.

At that point, the TB would likely divert their efforts away from IEDs and either attempt to enlarge their repertoire or to spend more effort on other parts of their repertoire.
They could buy and smuggle some 12.7 or 14.5mm rifles or produce some, add a cheap 4x optic (used PSO-1, for example) and let men with good eyesight snipe.

They could also increase sabotage effort - or focus on actions against the civilian populace (which would mean that solving the IED problem would have been contrary to the ISAF mission of providing security).
They could as well turn almost completely to politics and spend money on bribing instead of mercs.

To squeeze the IED out of their repertoire would most likely not lead to mission success in itself.

If I were the TB I would be rationalising the military situation in terms of that they and the local people know that they are inflicting more damage on the coalition forces (through IEDs and tying down 1,000s of troops to defend barren, stony terrain) than is being inflicted upon themselves (through direct military action). In other words they see themselves as winning.

From the coalition forces point of view the emphasis seems to be more on neutralising or defeating the IED threat than tracking down and killing the TB. a victory is going out on a patrol and returning without being hit by an IED. Whether we like it or not the coalition forces have been psychologically pushed off balance by the IED tactic.

The TB would be crazy to try and hold ground. I don't expect them to behave suicidally. So the more the IED threat is reduced (and 75% is better than a kick in the pants) the less effective the TB will be. Of course the trick will be to hand over to Afghan forces and see whether there is a TB resurgence or not.

JMA
05-05-2010, 09:26 AM
Sorry, are you asking because you do not know or you have some specific opinion at to Patrol conduct.
a.) Patrols aim to reduce the enemies freedom of action.
b.) Of course intelligence informs planning. I'm not sure how much info on the "Light EW Detachments" is open source, but I see few dropped balls in this area.

I was trying to get you (or someone) to respond by saying that these much vaunted "presence patrols" are not meant to result in contact with the enemy (unless the enemy so desire). Its all about walking around, chatting to the locals, smiling, showing off the tough looking well equipped soldiers straight out of the UK. Not really designed for a war zone, these presence patrols, more for peacekeeping and policing.

Actually patrols also try to locate, contact and kill the enemy.

I quote RTK: "We called "presence patrols" more appropriately "trolling for RPGs." It seemed more akin to chumming when you're fishing for sharks."

Well said sir!


Some armies do patrolling well, some badly. Patrolling is like washing or eating. You cannot not do it. Every single operational patrol in the British Army has a specific, clear and stated purpose. No one is simply bumbling around trolling for contact.

When you are merely patrolling to dominate ground you can't possibly have specific enemy targeted missions for each patrol. They become routine, they become meaningless because they see you coming and when you exit out the front door the TB come slip back in through the back door. This dominance is a temporary thing, it is an illusion, you are only kidding yourself.

Bumbling around they certainly are (after all its a presence patrol) and they are certainly not looking for a contact (as that is not the aim of the presence patrol).


Believe me, it has and is constantly debate and examined.

Yes, I had a quick look at the "Presence patrols" thread and my take after a quick scan of the entries is that as this is the hand that has been dealt people are trying to make the best of it.

These presence patrols to a trained soldier are like kissing your sister, a poor substitute for the spice of the real thing (a patrol that leads to a contact on your terms)... and in the main a waste of time. Leave them to the Afghans to do.

But all this maybe informs us that there no real intelligence on the location of the TB so we stroll around handing out sweets and trinkets half expecting the village elder to say "my son is a TB he lives in the 3rd house on the left."

In this sort of environment you dominate the ground only for as long as you physically occupy it. Sad but true.


Really? Are you serious? Are you really comfortable with the reasoning that statement implies? Actually based on those I talk to, the boys in theatre are pretty pleased drills and skills substantially mitigate the risk? No one in theatre expects Air line levels of safety.

A 75% success rate is a giant step in the right direction but we need more progress and quickly. In the past 48 hours 3 Brits have died in Afghanistan, 2 from IEDs and 1 from a vehicle accident.

Now please take the time to read the list of dead with causes and remember to add probably twice that as maimed or mutilated and figure the psychological effect all this is having on the troops and the British public at large. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8579889.stm

We need to remember what Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup said: "I think that we were a bit too complacent about our experiences in Northern Ireland and certainly, on occasion, we were a bit too smug about those experiences. You are only as good as your next success, not your last one. You can never rest on your laurels and I think we may have done that." Wise words of caution.

There is a tendency to try and rationalise situations when we run out of ideas. I get the sense that the current IED casualty rate has reached that point and we are starting to hear that "well it not too bad for a war zone" or worse still "at least its less than the yanks."

I suggest we have now reached the hard part with respect to IEDs where the law of diminishing returns comes into play. To make any further improvements will require greater effort and we should go for it rather than just say we have done enough.


I am flat out asking you, what is it you think is lacking? I cannot see you point, apart from casting aspersions on operational conduct, you fully admit that you are not well versed in. What is your point?

My point is simple and that is that the Taliban have found the Achilles heel of the coalition forces in the use of IEDs and while significant progress has and continues to be made in terms of dealing with IEDs through location and disarming of these devices not enough effort has been made to alter/adapt/change the tactical modus operandi to just simply avoid IEDs. Here meaning the reduction of vehicle movement and changes to the all too predictable and routine patrolling.

Then of course there is this gem:

Slapout9 said: "IMO part of the problem is that in most Military patrols you want to detect the presence of the enemy but not reveal your presence until the time of the attack. COIN/Police patrolling is the exact opposite you want to be highly visible for the deterrent effect.....you will get caught so don't commit the crime. Problem is you become a great big target if you are facing a ruthless enemy as opposed to a run of the mill criminal."

How on earth can it be said that COIN patrolling must be "highly visible"?

It seems obvious that no one knows where the Taliban are or they would go and get them. Intelligence gathering must become the priority together with IED disruption. And my guess is that the intelligence is not coming from the local population.

William F. Owen
05-05-2010, 11:22 AM
When you are merely patrolling to dominate ground you can't possibly have specific enemy targeted missions for each patrol. They become routine, they become meaningless because they see you coming and when you exit out the front door the TB come slip back in through the back door.
Utterly wrong. You have a patrol planning and patrolling plans. Nothing routine about it, in fact the object of the entire exercise is not to set routine - which is why you also have deception plans written into the patrol plan.

Bumbling around they certainly are (after all its a presence patrol) and they are certainly not looking for a contact (as that is not the aim of the presence patrol).
Why do you assume this? How many folks either in, or recently back from theatre do you talk to?

Now please take the time to read the list of dead with causes and remember to add probably twice that as maimed or mutilated and figure the psychological effect all this is having on the troops and the British public at large. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8579889.stm
Sorry, but I'll treat that suggestion and it's patronising intent, with the contempt it deserves.

We need to remember what Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup said: "I think that we were a bit too complacent about our experiences in Northern Ireland and certainly, on occasion, we were a bit too smug about those experiences. You are only as good as your next success, not your last one. You can never rest on your laurels and I think we may have done that." Wise words of caution.
Some were too complacent about the NI experience, except it has to be realised that 90% of men who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, had never served a tour in Northern Ireland and most who had, served after the cease fire. BUT - what does read across and has paid huge dividends, is the operational learning process and the counter-IED skill set.

...... not enough effort has been made to alter/adapt/change the tactical modus operandi to just simply avoid IEDs. Here meaning the reduction of vehicle movement and changes to the all too predictable and routine patrolling.
...and your basing this opinion on what?

How on earth can it be said that COIN patrolling must be "highly visible"?
I do not, nor should it be, unless you are seeking to generate that effect for a purpose.

Intelligence gathering must become the priority together with IED disruption. And my guess is that the intelligence is not coming from the local population.
.....and? So we should do what? - that we are not already?
JMA. Sorry to say this, but your comments here are not those I would expect from someone of your experience. You are clearly asserting that UK tactical conduct is verging on the moronic, but do not seem familiar with in-theatre TPPs.
Moreover I still cannot fathom your bizarre perception of the IED threat.

JMA
05-06-2010, 10:05 AM
Utterly wrong. You have a patrol planning and patrolling plans. Nothing routine about it, in fact the object of the entire exercise is not to set routine - which is why you also have deception plans written into the patrol plan.

So each and every patrol is based on hot intel relating to the presence or intended presence of TB? You can't plan that far in advance. When it comes in you react.

But... if you are talking about presence patrols (aka wandering around or as member RTK says "trolling for RPGs.") then I guess you could plan far ahead. Even use throws into a dart board to generate the days and the times when each local village will be visited.

Deception plans for what? To drop off a 4-man to lie up and do the business at night somewhere based on hard intel or to try to confuse the intentions and destination of a presence patrol?


Why do you assume this? How many folks either in, or recently back from theatre do you talk to?

I'm not talking about the work the "supers" and para support are doing but that being carried out by the "crap hats".

They live in a patrol base so they must patrol. Intel or not they must patrol... they call it dominating the ground. Whats the point as soon as the go around the next bend out come the TB again and its as if the patrol was never there.

So the outcome of this random bumbling around is that the TB don't walk around openly displaying arms. That's no train smash for them as they only need to carry weapons when they are going to do the business.

Presence patrols are a mere irritation to the TB. No more.


Sorry, but I'll treat that suggestion and it's patronising intent, with the contempt it deserves.

The truth is not going to go away.

Read the following list of the British dead in Afghanistan and see if you can fail to see where the real problem lies: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8579889.stm

That IEDs encountered by British forces are 25% effective should be giving everyone sleepless nights especially seeing that the number of deaths and mutilations so caused are not minor.

I am not saying that the Brits and the US forces are doing nothing about IEDs, I am saying that even the 25% effectiveness remains totally unacceptable and unsustainable. The ways to avoid IEDs needs more attention.


Some were too complacent about the NI experience, except it has to be realised that 90% of men who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, had never served a tour in Northern Ireland and most who had, served after the cease fire. BUT - what does read across and has paid huge dividends, is the operational learning process and the counter-IED skill set.

Some also say that the reducing the effect of IEDs to 25% is acceptable and the British people should accept the current casualty rate.

Dividends from NI? I don't know. With the Iraq experience the US forces seem to be caught on fast. What could be the carry over from NI that could not have been learned in Iraq?


...and your basing this opinion on what?

The simple and unpleasant statistics. That 80% of British casualties are through IEDs. So let us try to understand where we are going with this. Are the presence patrols actually mine (IED) clearing patrols? Are these patrols absolutely necessary in terms of the military aim? Is the current amount of road movement absolutely necessary? Why spend zillions on blast/mine protecting vehicle when you could just fly right over the area? etc etc


I do not, nor should it be, unless you are seeking to generate that effect for a purpose.

COIN patrolling cover the full gambit of patrol types and most of these are clandestine in nature. So I ask you what is the point of the troops forming up and walking across large open areas? What id being achieved othe than as member RTK says "trolling for RPGs."?


.....and? So we should do what? - that we are not already?
JMA. Sorry to say this, but your comments here are not those I would expect from someone of your experience. You are clearly asserting that UK tactical conduct is verging on the moronic, but do not seem familiar with in-theatre TPPs.
Moreover I still cannot fathom your bizarre perception of the IED threat.

Of course you are entitled to your own opinion as I am mine.

Lets agree that you use your words to describe your position or opinion and I mine. Lets not assign words to each other.

My perception of the IED threat (as I have stated) is that 80% of Brit casualties are caused by IEDs. Despite 75% of IEDs either being detected or otherwise failing to function fully 25% remain the single cause of 100s of deaths and even more mutilations of British forces in Afghanistan. This carnage is both militarily, socially and politically unsustainable. The praiseworthy progress in IED training and location needs to be pushed further to strive to lower the effective % of IEDs while the obvious movement risks of vehicle movement and predictable patrol patterns should be equally addressed.

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 11:00 AM
So each and every patrol is based on hot intel relating to the presence or intended presence of TB? You can't plan that far in advance. When it comes in you react.
No. Your patrol plan insures there are men available for tasks that are either planned or ongoing. So things like Base Plate checks, OP Support and yes, even the QRF. If intelligence comes in that requires a response, then hopefully you have the men available for it.

But... if you are talking about presence patrols (aka wandering around or as member RTK says "trolling for RPGs.") then I guess you could plan far ahead. Even use throws into a dart board to generate the days and the times when each local village will be visited.
Some may troll for RPGs. It is not a practice I see as useful, and nor does anyone with an opinion I value, nor does it reflect the experience of those I talk to.

Deception plans for what? To drop off a 4-man to lie up and do the business at night somewhere based on hard intel or to try to confuse the intentions and destination of a presence patrol?
Again no. Deception plans cover a whole range of tasks to ensure the enemy are mostly unable to predict what it is you are doing - or even not doing. So actually it is more likely doing a drop off, when no one is in fact dropped off.

Now I'm going to leave it there, because I am having increasing difficulty in understanding, why I am having to explain this stuff to an Officer of your experience.
Yes, you are entitled to your opinions, but I suggest commenting on the conduct of operations that you do not appear to be well informed on, is getting everyone nowhere.

baboon6
05-06-2010, 01:05 PM
Wilf (and others) I think you will find this thread on ARRSE regarding soldier's load, training and tactics in Helmand very interesting. About 17 pages so far:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/t=148286/postdays=0/postorder=asc/start=0.htm

Especially these posts from "MrBane" who has recently returned from deployment:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/p=3320118.html#3320118

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/p=3320687.html#3320687

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 01:36 PM
Wilf (and others) I think you will find this thread on ARRSE regarding soldier's load, training and tactics in Helmand very interesting. About 17 pages so far:
Yup, noted. I monitor it when I time.

JMA
05-06-2010, 09:43 PM
Wilf (and others) I think you will find this thread on ARRSE regarding soldier's load, training and tactics in Helmand very interesting. About 17 pages so far:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/t=148286/postdays=0/postorder=asc/start=0.htm

Especially these posts from "MrBane" who has recently returned from deployment:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/p=3320118.html#3320118

http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/p=3320687.html#3320687

Thanks for this stuff. The first link does not open for me.

The other two links confirm exactly what I have been saying. Lets take a look.


"Almost every single time we came under contact, you could class it as an ambush."

The initiative with the TB... the result of wandering around instead of patrolling.


"So every contact we ever had bar a few, were ambushes."

That's what my understanding is. Then again maybe someone could apply some spin to that situation by saying "we cornered them, they had no option but to open fire."


"... basically meant that you threw yourself face down whilst trying to figure out where the f**k those rounds came from. "

Crack and thump?


"So with the new emphasis on no warning shots"

WTF?


"Most times you just ran for cover, and kept running until you got some."

What were you doing right out in the open in the first place sunshine?


"The biggest problem was the short burst ambushes. You'd get a spray of fire in your direction, you'd get as far as STA (s*** yourself, take cover, 'ave a peek) but couldn't S(hoot back) as you couldn't identify the firing point, and didn't want to risk an innocent casualty."

Lets measure this comment against the battle drill "Reaction to EFFECTIVE enemy fire".


"Plus, snatch shots to return fire immediately, are also ill-advised, as if there are civilians around, then you might, just might, due to reflex, shoot one of them, if your eyes see things that aren't there, or your mind just doesn't focus sharply enough."

What a bizarre situation for a soldier to find himself in.


"As for holding the ground, well. We cleared a lot of areas but inevitably moved on, and sure enough, the would always come back."

Exactly. Strange that anyone thinks otherwise.


" Plus there are a fair few units sitting with thumbs up arses not doing anything, sending out a GDA once a day to cover a few hundred metres. "

Oh yes, its those damn 'crap hats' again ;-)

It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that OEF is in real trouble.

baboon6
05-07-2010, 12:04 PM
T








Oh yes, its those damn 'crap hats' again ;-)

It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that OEF is in real trouble.

I don't think this guy is a Para or Marine.