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Fuchs
07-01-2009, 02:36 PM
This is a (my) translation of the first page of a Stern (http://www.stern.de/) article of April 2nd.
"Stern" is one of the three major political weekly journals in Germany.
Circulation is about 950k, readership about 7.5 million.



Strategy of failure

The people in the town called him "Mr. Hassan", he had studied, was teacher at times - but for years he was cook in the guest house of the mayor and always provided hot tea or listened to his favourite cassettes in the atrium.
Most likely he would have liked that the new American president wants to send hundreds of new aid workers to Afghanistan, Hassan's home town of Imam Sahib far in the north belonged to the most peaceful towns in Afghanistan. there were no Taliban and the greatest concern was to get the spray car to fight the dust on the roads.

But Mr. Hassan is dead, just like Ahmad, the kinky Faktotum who washed cars all the time in the, the bodyguard and his cousin Sar-e-Pul, who was living there while searching for a job.
Victims of an assault at dawn. At about four o'clock on March 22nd came two Chinook helicopters and dismounted 60 soldiers of a U.S. special forces unit who blew up the gate to the compound of the mayor.
They shot Hassan and Ahmad in their beds, the puddle of blood still show their position, before the other three were executed as well. The face of one of the dead was almost irrecognizable afterwards. The bodyguard of the family pleaded for minutes that the Americans should not proceed, as women and children were in the next building.
Finally the soldiers killed him as well, took four guests as prisoners - and flew away.
None of those independently interviewed witnesses heard a shot fired with a Kalashnikov. Only the fizzle of the silenced rifles of the soldiers.

The press release of the next morning from the headquarter of OEF claimed that they eliminated a terror network, had asked civilians to leave the building, was then being shot upon and had killed five enemy fighters and confiscated numerous weapons.
Women and children would not have been in the attacked buildings.
A report, of which nothing was correct except the number of dead and the date.

It's not been the first time that something like this happened, but it was the first time that it happened in the German area of responsibility in Kunduz.
The airfield operated by the Germans had been used, but they didn't tell the Bundeswehr what they were about to do.
The U.S. terror searchers in Kabul meant that this was about the arrest of an Iraqi who was possibly courier for al-Qaida.
Yet, to kill the whole personnel of the local mayor for it and afterwards claim that it was a terror network?
(...)
"I have lived there myself for two and a half months in the guest house. Everybody can live there, because Imam Sahib has no hotel."
(...)
At the day after the assault more than 1,000 people from the whole north join for the mourning.

(...)
"We want no revenge" says the mayor, who escaped the shots in the next house: "We want clarification of facts! Justice!What shall we do with democracy and elections if it's allowed to simply kill us?"
Even in case that terrorists were indeed in the house, "the Americans could have encircled the house and knock."

The crowd comes the muttered question why nobody of the Bundeswehr has come to condole.

The next pages of the article are about rampant corruption, how a police chief steals the pay of his policemen, how a highway police chief is even worse ans actually that bad that police officers fear that many Afghans in the area would turn to the Taliban if the highway police chief became police chief of the town. Apparently not an unlikely prospect, as it was said that the highway police chief had already "removed" several competitors.
Oh, and the police chief was immune to prosecution because he's member of Karzai's tribe and friend with him as well.

Plus two more pages of the usual terrible stories about Afghanistan.

Contact me by PM if you want a scan of the translated page.
I attempted to translate as close as possible, bear with me if readability suffered.

Ken White
07-01-2009, 05:20 PM
where, as in the Middle East, nothing is as it seems...

Assuming the report is accurate, the shooting of two people in their beds is possibly wrong. Not enough information provided to tell.

There is a probabiltiy that the report is not accurate but was based on what the Reporter was told; local custom is to ask for solatia payments and that 'corruption' cited extends to making the circumstances look terrible to increase the amount of said payments if at all possible. Folks in that area are quite pragmatic.

The fact that the women were in an adjacent house is indicative of the fact that the "guests" were probably foreigners (read not from that tribe or area) and thus quite likely to have been the courier(s) alleged. Mounting an operation with two Chinooks and 60 people in an area nominally under NATO / German control is highly unlikely to have been undertaken without pretty firm evidence -- we're a rather risk averse nation nowadays -- and some thought.

Moral of the story is, I think, four fold:

Security force assistance is always a dirty, messy job.

One should be selective in ones guests.

The old media cliche, "If it bleed it leads" is still true -- worldwide, apparently.

Afghanistan hasn't changed much in several thousand years.

Uboat509
07-01-2009, 11:27 PM
The sixty "Special Forces" in two Chinooks armed with silenced rifles who executed an Afghan after he begged them not to attack one of the buildings for fear of injuring women and children all pegged my BS meter. I don't know where the reporter got his info from but I'm just not buying a lot of it.

SFC W

jmm99
07-02-2009, 03:18 AM
Here is the sequence of stories as I found them.

New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/world/asia/23afghan.html) broke it the same day (22 Mar 2009); and the same version by AP was distributed by 24 Mar (where it showed up on Michael Moore com (http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/latestnews/index.php?id=13611) !). This story lacks the "detail" of the later April articles.

------------------------------
A much shorter version appeared on 23 Mar in the Peoples Weekly World. This is the old Daily Worker's successor (official newspaper of CPUSA (http://www.pww.org/article/static/320)). It led its story with "hundreds of Afghans" rallying re: the event (full story since it's short):


Author: Morning Star (http://www.pww.org/article/author/view/1212)
People's Weekly World Newspaper, 03/23/09 12:32

Original source: morningstaronline.co.uk (http://81.21.76.62/morningstaronline.co.uk/index.html)

Hundreds of Afghan citizens rallied for an end to the occupation of their country on Sunday after US-led forces killed five civilians in Kunduz Province.

According to Afghan officials, US soldiers broke into the house of Imam Sahib Mayor Abdul Manan before dawn and killed two of his bodyguards and three other employees including a cook and a driver.

The US insisted that the morning raid had targeted a "terrorist network" and asserted that the five killed in the operation were insurgents.

The Pentagon released a statement which asserted that the raid had involved Afghan police and targeted a "terrorist network."

But a senior Imam Sahib official rejected the suggestion, saying that Afghan police were neither involved in the operation nor aware of it.

And Kunduz governor Juma Din claimed that all the victims of the attack had been local-government employees.

The Afghan Interior Ministry said only that "five of our countrymen" had been killed in the mayor's house and a spokesman declined to label them as either militants or civilians.

Deputy provincial police chief Abdul Rahman Akhtash said that about 300 people had gathered in Imam Sahib to protest against the raid and the increasingly bloody occupation.

US and NATO officials insist that they are doing all they can to limit civilian casualties and observe that guerillas regularly operate in residential areas.

The highlighted urls lead nowhere as to "Morning Star" or its source.

---------------------------
The Stern story of 2 Apr adds details not found in the three above. Have no idea of sources.

--------------------------
The next round comes from Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) - read its About (http://iwpr.net/?p=-&apc_state=henh&s=o&o=top_aims.html) - which published the report of its "investigative probe", based on "extensive interviews with local people", on 16 Apr 2009 (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=351790&apc_state=henparr) (it has some resemblence to the Stern article, but is much longer - too long to quote).

This report gave rise a number of reposts, e.g., at AlterNet (http://www.alternet.org/world/137190/local_probe_challenges_u.s._military_account_of_ki llings_in_afghanistan/) on 17 Apr, which has this comment appended:


Killing civilians as usual
Posted by: john2007 on Apr 19, 2009 9:12 PM

There is absolutely no reason to believe the statements from Colonel Greg Julian about the killing of these people. Maybe he's telling the truth but it's more likely he is lying; after all, that's what they pay military spokesmen to do.

The elite troops that did the killing should be dragged into a military court and charged with murder. If it turns out the villagers are telling the truth then there should be severe punishment, including the death penalty.

We, as Americans need to start demanding that when our troops kill innocent civilians they are committing crimes against humanity as well as crimes against their fellow Americans.

I wonder whether john2007 is a general death penalty proponent - or does he reserve it only for US troops.

-------------------
I will neither analyse nor comment on this "stuff". I've learned that analysis of alleged war crimes requires a judicial record where evidence is subject to rules and cross-examination; and classified evidence can be reviewed and protected. Trial by media leads to john2007s.

Schmedlap
07-02-2009, 04:56 AM
The same bits of information that pinged UBoat's BS-o-meter also pinged mine, so I presume that both of our meters are properly calibrated.

The less sensational story from the NY Times seems a little more believable. It would not be the first time that a US force hit the wrong target and used a bit too much force (black SOF, anyone?). The details in the BS story that were not present in the NY Times story sound to be entirely fabricated. When is the last time that you saw a Soldier take the time to discuss with a target whether or not he was going to shoot him? Makes no sense. Likewise for shooting people in their beds, especially if they went on to take prisoners (why not take the sleepers, as well?). And silenced rifles? Maybe it happens, but I've never seen a force conduct a raid on a building with silenced rifles. Seems a bit awkward and unnecessary. Shorter barrels seem to be the preferred tools.

I could fathom the real story being somewhat similar to the NY Times piece, with flabbergasted locals contriving the added details in the BS story in an attempt to draw attention. But even that is a stretch. Not having any additional information, I'm more inclined to believe the PAO. They have learned their lessons the hard way over the past 8 years. Honesty (and speedy disclosure) is the best policy and I think our PAO's know that.

Surferbeetle
07-02-2009, 10:40 AM
This is a (my) translation of the first page of a Stern article of April 2nd.
"Stern" is one of the three major political weekly journals in Germany.
Circulation is about 950k, readership about 7.5 million.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stern_(Zeitschrift)

Ich habe gesucht fur Strategie von Versagen (http://www.stern.de/search/?stern=1&guj=1&category=&q=strategie+von+versagen&Suchen=Suchen) aber habe dieser Artikel bei Stern und Google News Deutschland nicht gefunden. I would be interested in seeing a url if this article made it to the web. Stern (http://www.quantcast.com/stern.de) is certainly not the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurter_Allgemeine_Zeitung) but neither is it Bild (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bild) either.

Der Spiegel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der_Spiegel) carried this article this morning Bundesregierung fordert Ende der Kriegsdebatte (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,633855,00.html)


Berlin - Trotz der steigenden Zahl getöteter Soldaten sieht die Kanzlerin keine Alternative zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan. "Wir stehen hier weiterhin vor großen, vor schwierigen und vor gefährlichen Herausforderungen", sagte Angela Merkel am Donnerstag im Bundestag. "Aber ich sage auch: Ziel und Strategie des Einsatzes der Nato und unseres zivilen Engagements sind ohne vernünftige Alternative."

My quick translation:

Berlin-Despite the rising count of killed soldiers the Chancellor (fem.) does not see an alternative to the Bundeswehr element/mission in Afghanistan. "We continue to stand behind large, difficult, and dangerous challenges." said Angela Merkel on Thursday in the Bundestag (Lower House of German Parliment). "However I also say: The objective and strategy of the NATO element/mission and our civilian engagements are without reasonable alternatives."


Das Ziel sei, dass die Streitkräfte und die Polizeikräfte die Sicherheit des Landes selbst garantieren könnten. "Dazu bedarf es der internationalen Hilfe." Es gebe aber auch Fortschritte, wenn zum zweiten Mal ein Präsident gewählt werde.

My quick translation:

The objective is that the (Afghani) military and police forces can ensure the security of the country. "In order to do so will require international assistance." A second Presidential election however, will be making progress (towards this objective).

Fuchs
07-02-2009, 11:39 AM
The story is entirely believable in my opinion, including the "begging" part (I assume he was interrogated meanwhile, but that was uninteresting for the author).

I think it's believable because it's not surprising me.
This kind of stuff is normal in war, especially in a war that has been raging for many years. War brutalizes people, it's been known for ages.

Nationalities with a history of having been at least once on the evil side may understand this more easily than nationalities who are able to keep the illusion that they're always the 'good guys'.
This shouldn't be much of a problem in this forum,a s everyone here should be aware of enough military history, like the Philippine insurrection in the case of the U.S..

This is an important part of every war and should be understood by any student of war. The participation in a war means the commitment of war crimes. It's inevitable.

It's inappropriate to think of a clean record good guys army vs. a terrorist monster enemy because the real world looks grey - no matter whether veterans can accept that or not.

I've seen a lot of remarks over time that took press releases by OEF-A as gospel and true but beleievd in every atrocity of Talibans. That's badly misleading, as OEF-A was proved to have lied many times (and along the same patter as Western military lies since at least 1991) while likely not every atrocity attributed to Taliban is true and not every Taliban propaganda is untrue (except probably a standard exaggeration).

Fools believe in wartime propaganda, but students of war should see through this veil.


The article had an interesting quote that should be emphasized:

"What shall we do with democracy and elections if it's allowed to simply kill us?"

To create "security" for the population (if that's possible at all) is not just about keeping Taliban away. It's also about taming the own demons.

J Wolfsberger
07-02-2009, 01:04 PM
The story is entirely believable in my opinion, including the "begging" part (I assume he was interrogated meanwhile, but that was uninteresting for the author).

I think it's believable because it's not surprising me.
This kind of stuff is normal in war, especially in a war that has been raging for many years. War brutalizes people, it's been known for ages.

Nationalities with a history of having been at least once on the evil side may understand this more easily than nationalities who are able to keep the illusion that they're always the 'good guys'.
This shouldn't be much of a problem in this forum,a s everyone here should be aware of enough military history, like the Philippine insurrection in the case of the U.S..

This is an important part of every war and should be understood by any student of war. The participation in a war means the commitment of war crimes. It's inevitable.

It's inappropriate to think of a clean record good guys army vs. a terrorist monster enemy because the real world looks grey - no matter whether veterans can accept that or not.

I've seen a lot of remarks over time that took press releases by OEF-A as gospel and true but beleievd in every atrocity of Talibans. That's badly misleading, as OEF-A was proved to have lied many times (and along the same patter as Western military lies since at least 1991) while likely not every atrocity attributed to Taliban is true and not every Taliban propaganda is untrue (except probably a standard exaggeration).

Fools believe in wartime propaganda, but students of war should see through this veil.


The article had an interesting quote that should be emphasized:

"What shall we do with democracy and elections if it's allowed to simply kill us?"

To create "security" for the population (if that's possible at all) is not just about keeping Taliban away. It's also about taming the own demons.

Well, as long as it comes from trustworthy propaganda sources ...:rolleyes:

It pegged my BS meter, too. Then this: "What shall we do with democracy and elections if it's allowed to simply kill us?" Oh, well. Meter busted. :(

Fuchs, there is so much in your post I vehemently disagree with that I don't know where to begin. Maybe this weekend when I have more time. Until then, you should follow your own advice: "Fools believe in wartime propaganda, but students of war should see through this veil."

Entropy
07-02-2009, 01:58 PM
I think it's believable because it's not surprising me.
This kind of stuff is normal in war, especially in a war that has been raging for many years. War brutalizes people, it's been known for ages.

Well, hey! Who needs evidence when we can let confirmation bias do our thinking for us?

You're right that a lot of bad things happen in war, but that doesn't mean one should believe every story that comes along. Doing so is simply enabling propaganda.

Fuchs
07-02-2009, 02:16 PM
You two seem to have missed the difference between "believe" and "believable".

There are few certainties in war, and reports about actions are never certainly true.

All these "BS-meters" mentioned here may be fine - it's just important that they're not blind on one eye.

Steve Blair
07-02-2009, 02:22 PM
I think it's believable because it's not surprising me.
This kind of stuff is normal in war, especially in a war that has been raging for many years. War brutalizes people, it's been known for ages.

Fools believe in wartime propaganda, but students of war should see through this veil.

I'm quoting these two lines for a reason. There's a chance that the story as reported is true, BUT there's also a chance that the story did not happen as reported. As any student of war and history should know, the truth is most likely somewhere in the middle (shaded toward one end or the other) and may never be found.

Obviously war brutalizes people. But it also enables sensationalist propagandists on BOTH sides of the spectrum. One source, no matter how appealing it may be to a person's innate views and biases, does not truth make. Any historian with an ounce of common sense and an education that stretches beyond one term paper should know this. All accounts are in some manner suspect, so a good historian (and a good reporter, although these seem to be few in number these days) gathers as many accounts as possible and then tries to distill a better view of what probably happened. Something students of war should keep in mind.

Entropy
07-02-2009, 02:27 PM
You two seem to have missed the difference between "believe" and "believable".

There are few certainties in war, and reports about actions are never certainly true.

All these "BS-meters" mentioned here may be fine - it's just important that they're not blind on one eye.

My comment stands.

In the end there isn't a lot of space between "believe" and "believable." What criteria do you use to judge something believable? After all, you state there are few certainties in war. A lot of crazy stuff can and does happen, so by what metric do you divide believable from unbelievable? Atrocities do happen in war, so does that mean we must consider any reported atrocity "believable?"

No, that is simply confirmation bias (either positive or negative). Regardless, "believability" is only about perception - little to no actual evidence is needed, only the belief that it may be true. That's exactly what propagandists want out of you....

William F. Owen
07-02-2009, 03:22 PM
Hold on a second....

OK, while I have grave doubts about the veracity of the Stern article, I think all concerned should hold fire on Fuchs for posting it. Good job that he did and well done for doing it.
Those that seek comforting reinforcement of their own beliefs should feel uncomfortable on SWJ. I think that's why it exists?
Unless you were there, you don't know what happened. "Our boys don't do that," is not indicative of nothing bad having happened. I spend a good deal of my time defending the IDF against pure fabrications, innuendo and fact free sniping, but that is not to say some downright bad crap does not happen. It does. The same is also true of the British Army. BS meters are generally poorly calibrated, for anything other than the obvious.
The US Army is a murder mile away from either being the best or the most professional military organisation on the planet. Not saying who is, because I don't know, and that is not the point.
Point is, someone did something that made this look and seem like this might have happened. All your "info Ops" just went out of the window if Mr and Mrs Average German now believes this is par for the course in A'Stan and want their Government to have nothing to do with it. I suggest we collectively consider it, in that light.

Ken White
07-02-2009, 03:41 PM
-- and I do -- thank him for doing that.

It may or may not be true and we have no way of determining its veracity -- the fact is that it was published in Germany and that the publication is likely to affect German views of the US. Briefly, to be sure; that kind of stuff is transitory for all but the most confirmed war haters -- or America haters -- so it is likely to have no great impact on the world.

Fuchs is correct in that war brutalizes people but others are correct in that the whole story is a bit flaky and some of the allegations do not compute to anyone who really knows how such things are done as opposed to having read about it. I mentioned the quest for solatia payments by exaggeration earlier and that is a possiblity. We're unlikely to find out.

Steve's got it right, I think, the truth is almost certainly somewhere between the poles.

Fuchs
07-02-2009, 03:56 PM
It's not only about the German opinion.

The article also quotes an Afghan who meant that they in the north thought the horror stories about American bombardments in the South were wrong...they changed their opinion.

That was a damn expensive AQ courier snatch operation - if there was an AQ courier.


The best of the whole story is probably that the German leadership in Kunduz could - if it's smart - exploit it.
Along the lines of
'Keep the Taliban away, don't accept them - or else the Americans will come and replace us and our methods. Remember how fine and peaceful you had it with us'.

Entropy
07-02-2009, 05:54 PM
Just to clarify, my criticisms are not against Fuchs posting it. To be honest, I really like and appreciate that Fuchs often takes contrarian positions and makes provacative posts.

The issue I have is really just about believability and propaganda and the irony in some of Fuch's comments.

Uboat509
07-02-2009, 06:20 PM
The US Army is a murder mile away from either being the best or the most professional military organisation on the planet. Not saying who is, because I don't know, and that is not the point.


What does this cheap shot have to do with the rest of your point?

SFC W

William F. Owen
07-02-2009, 06:46 PM
What does this cheap shot have to do with the rest of your point?

Not a cheap shot. My point was that even in good armies, full of well trained and conscientious well meaning men, very bad stuff happens. I count the US Army as being pretty damn good, but it is not so good, that real tragedies and gross acts of stupidity cannot occur.

William F. Owen
07-02-2009, 06:53 PM
The issue I have is really just about believability and propaganda and the irony in some of Fuch's comments.
...but that's the point. Not wanting to believe it, or not believing it, is irrelevant to the fact that something happened that created that story. That's what the IDF puts up with on an almost daily basis.

Welcome to "info ops" where what might be pure invention ends up in a highly respected Journal, however well executed and professional your tactical actions may have been. - re: "my cheap shot," previously referenced.

Ken White
07-02-2009, 07:34 PM
The best of the whole story is probably that the German leadership in Kunduz could - if it's smart - exploit it. Along the lines of
'Keep the Taliban away, don't accept them - or else the Americans will come and replace us and our methods. Remember how fine and peaceful you had it with us'.That'll work until someone finds out the German leadership in Kunduz was forewarned to preclude fratricide. :wry:
That was a damn expensive AQ courier snatch operation - if there was an AQ courier.Nah, not really. It'll cause a momentary bubble in a few places; will confirm the evils of war to some and / or the evils of America to others. That will be true whether there was a courier or not. If there was one, then it's a draw or a win, depending on the information said courier might have had. If there was a screwup on the mission -- and there may or may not have been -- then action will probably be taken against he who erred and we'll never hear about it.

Welcome to not only South Asia and to COIN / Staility Ops but to the modern western nation doing its thing in with a gullible sensitive media wandering about...

Speaking of which and only since you offered the totally gratuitous and unnecessary " - if there was an AQ courier." you may recall these gems including the skull bit.LINK (http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument.html?titel=German+Army+to+Investigate+Rac ist+Incident&id=51231697&top=SPIEGEL&suchbegriff=Bronx&quellen=).

Nobody's perfect. Nobody.

Schmedlap
07-02-2009, 11:45 PM
The story is entirely believable in my opinion, including the "begging" part (I assume he was interrogated meanwhile, but that was uninteresting for the author).

I think it's believable because it's not surprising me.
This kind of stuff is normal in war, especially in a war that has been raging for many years. War brutalizes people, it's been known for ages.

Fuchs,

I understand what you're saying. In a nutshell, people occasionally do very horrible things in war. But I think you are overlooking that some elements of the article make zero sense regardless of the intent of the individuals involved. In particular, silenced rifles for an air assault raid on a building? That makes no sense. First off, what is the value of silencing your gunfire if you lose the element of surprise immediately upon your arrival? Once inside the building, the silencer would extend the length of the barrel, making it more difficult to maneuver in the building and increase the odds of a malfunction (for example, if you strike the side of the silencer on a wall or doorway, this is more problematic than if you strike the end of a muzzle). This makes about as much sense as a unit opting to carry shotguns in lieu of rifles for a movement to contact. The assertion that this detail in the story is "BS" is not based upon the morality of the actors. It is based upon a straight-face test of, "is anybody really that stupid?" Certainly no professional force is that stupid, especially if it arrives at and then leaves the scene in two extremely loud Chinooks. Do you see why that particular piece of information does not make any sense? That is not to reject the article in its entirety, but just to highlight that some of the information in the article is highly suspect.

As I noted earlier, I do not reject the possibility that some atrocity occurred. I've had tasks associated with the mitigation of black SOF in Iraq dumped onto my lap before. There were at least a few occasions when they were, in my opinion, overly reckless. But we should temper our leaps to judgment by looking at each fact, rather than the story as a whole. We do not need to believe or reject the article in its entirety. We can recognize that some elements of the article may be believable and some are not. I see some believable elements of the German article, but see much of it as obvious fabrication.

In regard to the "IO" angle, the elements that I regard as obvious fabrication would most likely be seen by most Americans as "likely fabrication" so I don't think this article is all that troubling. It will appeal to people who already hold very skewed negative views of the US military. It is preaching to that choir, isolated in its echo chamber. For those who are indifferent or hold no strong opinions or who are predisposed to assuming no ill intent on the part of our Soldiers (which, thankfully, is still the vast majority of Americans), this will be perceived as just another crackpot article, assuming that anyone even notices it (which is pretty unlikely).

jmm99
07-02-2009, 11:49 PM
stuck in my craw as well. But, since I didn't know what it might mean to a Brit, I found its Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_mile):


The Murder Mile was an informal nickname for Ledra Street, in Nicosia, Cyprus. It was called thus by British forces during the EOKA campaign of the late 1950s, due to the hazards presented to patrolling British troops by nationalist fighters.

The term has since been used to describe various dangerous areas, normally characterised by high crime, such as the streets surrounding Lower and Upper Clapton Roads in Hackney in East London, or a section of North Belfast in Northern Ireland. It is mentioned in this context in the Elvis Costello song Oliver's Army.

So, translating from the Brit:


The US Army is a [hard row to hoe (or a tough walk)] away from either being the best or the most professional military organisation on the planet.

I'll take that as Wilf's meaning (which is another thread).

In the present context (where US troops are being accused of murder), "murder mile" was a poor choice of wording for a US audience unfamiliar with Brit slang.

jmm99
07-03-2009, 12:15 AM
the Stern article of 2 Apr (?) is not the article to analyze. The article to analyze is the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) report of 16 Apr 2009 (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=351790&apc_state=henparr), which I probably should have discussed more fully in post #4 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75706&postcount=4).

The problem with discussing this particular case is that the evidence is one-sided. What we have here is a problem in Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), where the Golden Rule (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art11.html) is:


Analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) requires an analyst to explicitly identify all the reasonable alternatives and have them compete against each other for the analyst's favor, rather than evaluating their plausibility one at a time.

In this case, ACH (whether formal or informal) requires two sets of evidence - one each for the conflicting hypotheses. We have one (the IWPR report), but require the after-action reports and reviews for any reasonable ACH analysis - or, at least an unclassified executive summary as in the case of the May bombing investigation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75487&postcount=130).

The truth may be ...


from Ken
...the truth is almost certainly somewhere between the poles.

but so far, only one pole has been presented - we may never see the other pole. So goes Infofare vs OpSec.

Ken White
07-03-2009, 12:18 AM
Having been accused to my face of being a murderer by Americans, Brits, Canadians, French, Germans and sundry Arabs (Surprisingly, no Iranians -- they're too polite) as well as a few unidentified folks a couple of dozen or so times to the point where anyone joining that crew is no big thing and being aware of the 'Murder Mile' connotation -- plus being firmly convinced that the US Army is not the most professional by a long shot, I didn't take umbrage at the comment.

There are a lot of folks that are more professional than we are -- mostly because they do not have to put up with the US Congress. There are some that are more competent -- not many but a few, very few (competent and professional are not the same thing). There are some things we can do that no one else on the globe today can do and that plus our size and wealth gives us an awesome capability; we can do things others cannot do. However, anyone who thinks we're the most professional or even the most competent is, IMO, not really paying attention to the little things that count.

Fuchs
07-03-2009, 12:18 AM
@Schmedlap

M4 carbines ("rifles" for civilians) of SOCOM are afaik often silenced.
This does almost eliminate the muzzle flash (important at night for eyesight, starlight scopes and stealth).
Silencers also reduce the battle noise very much (especially indoors), which improves communication.
The removal of the silencer changes the zero badly (much changed vibration of the barrel = much changed internal ballistics = difference between hit and miss at 250 m). So it's better to have it on all the time than to miss it critically when you need it.
In fact, the indigenous people had little chance of making this up because there was very little if any opportunity of getting familiar with silenced weapons. You don't add elements to a story if you don't know about the elements.

The use of silenced 'rifles' is therefore plausible and realistic.
That's a false BS meter alarm (or if right, then it's a random hit in my opinion.

- - - - -

I believe you're overly optimistic about the "crackpot article" thing.

There are three important regions for this:

1. U.S. : most likely doesn't get published there (at least not prominently)

2. Afghanistan : I've heard so many REALLY crackpot rumours from there that are supposedly well-regarded in much of its population that I'm strongly inclined to believe that such an affair does damage.
A thousand people joining the mourning the very next day reminds me A LOT of "accidental guerrilla" (I wish I would invent such catchy terms).

3. Europe : It got published in a conservative-leaning (conservatives are the most pro-U.S. party here) top 3 weekly political journal. Any more questions?

I have seen dozens of German mass media reports about reckless U.S. forces (and seriously, the U.S. forces have done a lot for that reputation since the Sudan bombing!) and not a single one about how U.S. soldiers are nice, build schools and dams (the usual reports in the early German ISAF years).


This wasn't the only example of horror stories about USSOCOM personnel.
I recall a report years ago when KSK members complained about the situation in Afghanistan. They were suddenly being trained for assassination missions.
One of their assertions in the article was that U.S. troops would and did kill civilians to merely keep their own location secret (it was pretty similar to the "Bravo Two Zero" story incident with the shepherd boy, when things started to go wrong).
That was if I remember correctly a story in Spiegel, a social-democrat biased and the most important German weekly political journal.


The behaviour of U.S. troops in Afghanistan isn't very relevant for our ISAF participation, though. That will exclusively be decided in coalition talks next fall and is therefore subject to political trades. The majority of the Germans (about 55-60%) has always been against our participation in ISAF.

A poor reputation can do significant political long-term damage, though.

Schmedlap
07-03-2009, 12:27 AM
M4 carbines ("rifles" for civilians) of SOCOM are afaik often silenced.
This does almost eliminate the muzzle flash (important at night for eyesight, starlight scopes and stealth).
Silencers also reduce the battle noise very much (especially indoors), which improves communication.
The removal of the silencer changes the zero badly (much changed vibration of the barrel = much changed internal ballistics = difference between hit and miss at 250 m). So it's better to have it on all the time than to miss it critically when you need it.
When I was in the school house and when I was a 2LT, those were all reasons that I asserted for why we needed silencers/suppressors. Then my platoon sergeant pulled me aside and explained that, aside from the "no chance in hell" probability that we would get such toys, he went on to explain that while my schoolhouse theories were solid reasoning on paper, they broke apart brilliantly in practice - in particular for the reasons that I cited (barrel length, increased chance of malfunction) and he also pointed out that the issues raised (by you and I, to include noise and muzzle flash reduction) were largely irrelevant, especially when you white light the room and you're using monocular NVDs, rather than the old-school PVS-7s. Lastly, stealth is irrelevant, as I already noted, if one arrives and leaves in loud helicopters.

Again, I am not attacking the article in its entirely - just the tidbits that don't make sense.

jmm99
07-03-2009, 12:54 AM
sweeping assertions without any linking to any source, as in this and what follows:


from Fuchs
M4 carbines ("rifles" for civilians) of SOCOM are afaik often silenced.

Have you been a member of an ODA or SMU recently; interviewed team members; been a part of SOCOM, etc., etc. ? - or, if you read that, good manners in discourse suggest you provide the source.

Note Bene: You still haven't supplied a link to the 2 Apr Stern article - some folks here do read German and just might be interested in going to your source.

And, yes, this civilian does know the difference between a carbine and a rifle.

Fuchs
07-03-2009, 02:20 AM
The article was printed, but it isn't online. That's not uncommon.
I offered to provide the page in question as a jpg file if someone asked by PM (and actually already did so to the only one who asked).
I could have provided a link to the uploaded scan openly, but such links get deleted by moderator here.

I think adding an "afaik" to my reply was enough to avoid making the statement too "sweeping". It's an expression of not being 100% sure, and therefore less of a "sweeping assertion" than the vast majority of what's being written in this forum.

Besides; ad hominem is useless and always fails to impress me.

Uboat509
07-03-2009, 03:10 AM
M4 carbines ("rifles" for civilians) of SOCOM are afaik often silenced.

Not so much. Schmedlap has already discussed the problems with barrel length and the shear pointlessness of using a suppressed weapon after landing on a helicopter.


This does almost eliminate the muzzle flash (important at night for eyesight, starlight scopes and stealth).
Silencers also reduce the battle noise very much (especially indoors), which improves communication.

I have been doing this CQC thing for a while now and I have never even heard of anyone using suppressors for reducing battle noise for communication or reducing muzzle flash.



The removal of the silencer changes the zero badly (much changed vibration of the barrel = much changed internal ballistics = difference between hit and miss at 250 m). So it's better to have it on all the time than to miss it critically when you need it.

Relevant to snipers, not so much to assaulter's going into a building at night where combat ranges are typically 3-7 meters.


In fact, the indigenous people had little chance of making this up because there was very little if any opportunity of getting familiar with silenced weapons. You don't add elements to a story if you don't know about the elements.

The elements they describe could have come from any number of movies.

I could point out more things that peg my BS meter but really, there is nothing in this article that makes it sound like anting more than the type of fact-lite hit pieces that Sarajevo used to post.

SFC W

jmm99
07-03-2009, 05:11 AM
post #28
The article was printed, but it isn't online. That's not uncommon.

Not of great importance - but, a non-online newspaper today does strain credulity.

Anyway, Steve (and others), here's a German strudel for you - 10.04.2009, 10:00 Uhr, Krieg in Afghanistan: Strategie des Scheiterns (http://194.12.210.202/politik/ausland/:Krieg-Afghanistan-Strategie-Scheiterns/660461.html):


Von Christoph Reuter

Zum 60. Jahrestag der Nato präsentierte US-Präsident Barack Obama eine neue Strategie für den Krieg in Afghanistan: Mehr ziviler Aufbau, weniger Kollateralschäden. Soweit der Plan. Derweil kämpfen seine Truppen in Afghanistan weiter im Rambo-Stil - und zerstören so die Fortschritte niederländischer Soldaten in Urusgan.

Die Leute im Ort nannten ihn "Herr Hassan". Denn er hatte studiert, war eigentlich Lehrer - aber sorgte seit Jahren als Koch im Gästehaus des Bürgermeisters dafür, dass stets heißer Tee da war, und hörte im baumbestandenen Hof seine Lieblingskassetten. Vermutlich hätte es ihm gefallen, dass der neue amerikanische Präsident Hunderte zusätzlicher Aufbauhelfer nach Afghanistan schicken will, denn Hassans Heimatstädtchen Imam Sahib ganz oben im Norden gehört zu den friedlichsten Orten Afghanistans. Wo es keine Taliban gibt und eine der größten Sorgen darin besteht, einen Berieselungswagen gegen den Staub auf den Straßen zu bekommen. ... [and so forth]

Today's front page of stern.de (http://www.stern.de/), for anyone interested.

--------------------
PS:


I think adding an "afaik" to my reply was enough to avoid making the statement too "sweeping". It's an expression of not being 100% sure, and therefore less of a "sweeping assertion" than the vast majority of what's being written in this forum.

"afaik" is not a source; and adding it to an otherwise sweeping statement, does not make that statement any less sweeping - only that the statement is based on your personal knowledge, whatever that might be.

Ken White
07-03-2009, 06:31 AM
Take the Article at face value. Most of us agree it will, in the west, affect few and is likely to be transient in that limited effect. It's accuracy is a least questionable and some will realize the discrepancies, some will not. Disregard the west.

Use this article as an example. Look at at it from the Operational (i.e. in Afghanistan) IO stand point and from the Afghan standpoint, both locally and nationally. What could we do to preclude erroneous reporting (not saying it is present but that it may be or certainly could be in another situation)? How do we handle it locally, IO - wise? Nationally in Afghanistan?

I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?

Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?

Cavguy
07-03-2009, 07:03 AM
Take the Article at face value. Most of us agree it will, in the west, affect few and is likely to be transient in that limited effect. It's accuracy is a least questionable and some will realize the discrepancies, some will not. Disregard the west.

Use this article as an example. Look at at it from the Operational (i.e. in Afghanistan) IO stand point and from the Afghan standpoint, both locally and nationally. What could we do to preclude erroneous reporting (not saying it is present but that it may be or certainly could be in another situation)? How do we handle it locally, IO - wise? Nationally in Afghanistan?

I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?

Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?

I agree this article smells, but after reading the "Kill Company" article in the New Yorker, the Sassman incident, etc., I no longer dismiss these things out of hand.

I do disagree that because a few have committed such violations it represents the conduct of the whole.

William F. Owen
07-03-2009, 07:30 AM
I do disagree that because a few have committed such violations it represents the conduct of the whole.
Precisely, but try telling Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch that.

davidbfpo
07-03-2009, 10:00 AM
Taken from

Use this article as an example. Look at at it from the Operational (i.e. in Afghanistan) IO stand point and from the Afghan standpoint, both locally and nationally. What could we do to preclude erroneous reporting (not saying it is present but that it may be or certainly could be in another situation)? How do we handle it locally, IO - wise? Nationally in Afghanistan?

I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?

Anyone have any ideas?

Ken,

A few years ago this type of follow up action (heaven forbid not learnt from the Colombians) started to feature in some parts of the UK, after police-led execution of search warrants - albeit only for drugs. Experience found that the locals reciprocated - quietly - with information and support. The RUC / PSNI found the same, after the PIRA ceasefire, that action on public nuisances, e.g. abandoned cars, had the same effect.

davidbfpo

jmm99
07-03-2009, 12:40 PM
as a work in progress, see here starting with this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75823&postcount=4) (last paragraph).

Schmedlap
07-03-2009, 01:18 PM
I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?

Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?
We can, we should, and we do. I've been involved in numerous missions where we had a PSYOP team attached for that specific purpose. Believe it or not, we did it as early as 2003, and continued to do it until my last deployment in 2007. I'm sure it is even more commonplace today. We actually went one step further than the Columbians, planning this well ahead of the mission, anticipating the need when we were hitting a target that was clearly sensitive (such as a mosque) or going after a target whom we knew would respond by pumping disinformation through an al-Reuters stringer or through contacts with the AP. Documentation was SOP, regardless of the nature of the mission. No mission was considered complete in 2007 without the "money shot" of all of the weapons, explosives, cash, etc, that was seized, dropping calling cards, preparing the press release, and follow-up engagement with the locals, and several other steps.

Surferbeetle
07-03-2009, 01:32 PM
Anyway, Steve (and others), here's a German strudel for you - 10.04.2009, 10:00 Uhr, Krieg in Afghanistan: Strategie des Scheiterns (http://194.12.210.202/politik/ausland/:Krieg-Afghanistan-Strategie-Scheiterns/660461.html):

Mike,

Strudel's are great and I always enjoyed the weissbier, brochen, and wurst for breakfast as well.

Back to our topic, this was a nice catch. Scheiterns: Fail because of negotiations, break down, be stopped. Versagen: Refuse, deny, forgo, fail, breakdown, misfire. It saves me a trip to my university library to see the Stern hardcopy.

I'll echo what most here have noted, the article does not 'smell' right, but bad things do happen in war, and it does harden the participants. We will see.

I'll also note that I appreciate Fuch's posts and enjoy watching the interplay between two cultures meeting. Now add 125F, a language barrier, hard feelings and weapons and you have some insights into why Civil Affairs work is so interesting...and why we will always need barristers and judges ;)


I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?

Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?

Ken,

On the CA side of things we did some of this in OIF1, but approached it more from a property damage standpoint in order to try and level the playing field in terms of payments. From a practicality standpoint it was not always possible and more akin to trying to bail the ocean...lots of things were happening on the battlefield and not everybody was focused upon it. My friends in the JAG section sure did appreciate it however...

With training this TTP could be done if it was a priority...from a lawfare standpoint, this is of course a two-edged sword. Speaking of which lets think about troops to task: MP's are scarce, the JAG section is light on people, CA-bubbas are rarer than hens teeth (and some would say just as useful), soooo.... will our company commanders be thanking us for another FRAGO?

Best,

Steve

carl
07-03-2009, 05:17 PM
We can, we should, and we do. I've been involved in numerous missions where we had a PSYOP team attached for that specific purpose. Believe it or not, we did it as early as 2003, and continued to do it until my last deployment in 2007. I'm sure it is even more commonplace today. We actually went one step further than the Columbians, planning this well ahead of the mission, anticipating the need when we were hitting a target that was clearly sensitive (such as a mosque) or going after a target whom we knew would respond by pumping disinformation through an al-Reuters stringer or through contacts with the AP. Documentation was SOP, regardless of the nature of the mission. No mission was considered complete in 2007 without the "money shot" of all of the weapons, explosives, cash, etc, that was seized, dropping calling cards, preparing the press release, and follow-up engagement with the locals, and several other steps.

If this had been done at Farah last May it may have gone far in helping to ameliorate what was in effect a serious defeat for us.

Surferbeetle
07-04-2009, 04:41 PM
From this mornings Spiegel: Neue Regeln erlauben Deutschen offensiveres Vorgehen (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,634338,00.html)

New rules allow German (soldiers to engage in) offensive operations


Deutsche Soldaten können künftig in Afghanistan schneller ihre Waffen einsetzen: Die Bundesregierung hat einige ihrer bisherigen Vorbehalte zum Nato-Operationsplan fallenlassen. Der Verteidigungsausschuss war über diese Änderungen nicht informiert.


German soldiers will be able to use their weapons faster in Afghanistan: The German Government has dropped a previously held condition/proviso to NATO Operations Plans. The Defense Committee (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verteidigungsausschuss_des_Deutschen_Bundestages) (of the Bundestag) was not informed about this change.



Kabul - Um deutschen Soldaten in Afghanistan ein offensiveres Vorgehen zu ermöglichen, wurden nach SPIEGEL-Informationen die "Nationalen Klarstellungen" zum Nato-Operationsplan geändert. Folgender Satz wurde komplett gestrichen: "Die Anwendung tödlicher Gewalt ist verboten, solange nicht ein Angriff stattfindet oder unmittelbar bevorsteht."

Kabul- In order to enable German soldiers to engage in offensive operations the ‘National Clarifications’ of the NATO-Operations Plan, according to Spiegel sources, was changed. The following phrase was completely stricken: “The use of deadly force is forbidden, as long as there is not an immediate/direct or impending attack.”


Zudem entfällt der Begriff "Einsatz angemessener Gewalt" für deutsche Aktionen, künftig gilt stattdessen das Wort "Angriff". Der Verteidigungsausschuss des Bundestags war über diese Änderungen nicht informiert.

This is with the understanding/caveat that (the phrase) “apply measured force” for the German actions will be used instead of the word “attack”. The Defense Committee (of the Bundestag) was not informed about this change.

Fuchs
07-04-2009, 08:22 PM
Zudem entfällt der Begriff "Einsatz angemessener Gewalt" für deutsche Aktionen, künftig gilt stattdessen das Wort "Angriff". Der Verteidigungsausschuss des Bundestags war über diese Änderungen nicht informiert.
This is with the understanding/caveat that (the phrase) “apply measured force” for the German actions will be used instead of the word “attack”. The Defense Committee (of the Bundestag) was not informed about this change.

It's the other way around.
"Angriff" (attack/assault) is the new word, they deleted the other one.
There's no caveat in the sentence.

By the way; the last rumour I heard about why it's officially no war shows how ridiculous our government is (I don't believe the rumour, but rumours tell a lot):
'The life insurances do allegedly not pay for KIA/WIA at war, and the SecDef has no budget to pay himself.'



The Bundestag committee on defence issues is notoriously disregarded by the SecDef. That's unlikely to change unless they get a more powerful politician as chairman. A weak SecDef was apparently not enough to raise the committee's relevance.

We're quite off-topic, aren't we?

Surferbeetle
07-04-2009, 08:55 PM
It's the other way around.
"Angriff" (attack/assault) is the new word, they deleted the other one.
There's no caveat in the sentence.

Practice makes perfect, thanks for the help.



We're quite off-topic, aren't we?

I would disagree.

The Stern article by Christoph Reuter (http://http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christoph_Reuter_(Journalist)) (a fluent Arabic speaker) contrasted the 'American' approach with the 'European' approach in Afghanistan. It was not the most favorable review of the American approach, but be that as it may it is interesting to me to watch the European approach adapt to the realities of the battlefield just as does the American approach.

The Russian transit assistance (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8134064.stm) is also of interest.

There are commonalities between our approaches...and while this may distress some in both of our respective cultures the presence of these commonalities will ultimately lead to workable solutions that benefit those involved.

This change in approach, as I understand it, is a pretty big thing for Germany, how do you see it impacting the intent of the Grundgesetz (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_Law_for_the_Federal_Republic_of_Germany)?

Fuchs
07-04-2009, 09:16 PM
The RoE change was necessary because one of both coalition parties will leave the government and need at least one coalition partner in fall.
Most other parties would have been opposed to the change (and actually the whole mission) as junior partners in the next coalition.

The constitutional aspect is difficult. The only real provisions for military action are
* U.N. authorized missions (Not allowed by the constitution in itself, but by the constitutional court about 15 years ago.)
and
* Verteidigungsfall (case of defence; 'the Russians are coming').
The latter would have drastic consequences.

Nobody really expected that we could become entangled in a war WITH U.N. mandate.
An official war would also move the command authority from SecDef to chancellor (and she doesn't seem to be eager about that).

We had 19 deaths so far in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that's already a war (for us - it is for sure one for the Afghans). It would certainly be a strange and minimalist war if seen in a historical perspective.

'Violent peacekeeping' does probably apply much better, because we basically do that: We keep the peace as much as possible till the Afghan government takes over. It's not about breaking the enemy or his will by ourselves.

Surferbeetle
07-04-2009, 10:01 PM
The RoE change was necessary because one of both coalition parties will leave the government and need at least one coalition partner in fall.
Most other parties would have been opposed to the change (and actually the whole mission) as junior partners in the next coalition.

Thanks for the insight on the timing, I am aware of the upcoming September elections (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4275807,00.html), but had not yet put two and two together with respect to the ROE change.


The constitutional aspect is difficult. The only real provisions for military action are
* U.N. authorized missions (Not allowed by the constitution in itself, but by the constitutional court about 15 years ago.)
and
* Verteidigungsfall (case of defence; 'the Russians are coming').
The latter would have drastic consequences.

Anticipating changes can be tough. The fall of the Berlin Wall was a shock for me while the implosion of Yugoslavia was less so (local schools were gathering food and blankets to send to Yugoslavia for a while before it all went bust). I was living in Europe at the time and I was not alone in this surprise. In contrast this retrospective (http://www.signandsight.com/features/1850.html) on that time was a recent interesting read.


Nobody really expected that we could become entangled in a war WITH U.N. mandate.
An official war would also move the command authority from SecDef to chancellor (and she doesn't seem to be eager about that).

We had 19 deaths so far in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that's already a war (for us - it is for sure one for the Afghans). It would certainly be a strange and minimalist war if seen in a historical perspective.

All deaths are regrettable. The actions of the German military command authority is fairly opaque to me but interesting nonetheless. Die Zeit (http://www.zeit.de/index) seems to like to follow it, its a bit highbrow for me, but sometimes its worth the effort.


'Violent peacekeeping' does probably apply much better, because we basically do that: We keep the peace as much as possible till the Afghan government takes over. It's not about breaking the enemy or his will by ourselves.

I have always been pretty impressed with the professionalism and competence of the Polizei (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Police_(Germany)), in general they are not somebody to mess with, and as a result the actual results (http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3879765,00.html) of the Polizei training mission in Afghanistan have been a bit of a mystery to me. I have also had some exposure to the Carabinieri (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carabinieri) and continue to wonder why an Afghani Gendarmerie is not something we push harder. The saga of the development of the Kosovo police (http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090630-714164.html) I would guess is the counter argument.

Fuchs
07-04-2009, 11:06 PM
The simple reason is that we're able to order soldiers to Afghanistan (there are no conscripts in those units), but we cannot order policemen to go.
Policemen with adequate experience have usually a family and there were simply just a few dozen volunteers.

Even a career progression bonus for volunteers would not motivate much because of how the careers are organized. There are only 3x4 police ranks. The top four (gold) are restricted to high brass with law degrees. The bottom four (green) are usually not qualified as trainers. The typical experienced potential trainer would be 2nd to 4th in the middle (silver) group and even maximum promotion (to 4th silver rank) would only mean a tiny increase in pay and likely no improvement in everyday work.


The ministers of the interior didn't seem to be much interested in the project anyway. It was the pet project of foreign affairs & defence ministers.

The past two ministers of the interior liked to focus on police and intelligence service CT work (all to often scrapping rights and pushing for population surveillance and data bases on their path).
There was no public pressure on the police training program to speak of. Even ISAF is a marginal topic in our news, to be heard of maybe five to ten times a year in TV news (just my memory).

Last but not least: police is a state job in Germany. The federal minister of the interior has only control over the federal police - what happened to be the border police (= your link). The state ministers of interior are even less occupied with AFG, of course.



I have yet to understand why we didn't simply set up police training facilities in Kyrgyzstan or similar areas. Less risk and high bonuses would have meant more volunteers.

Disclaimer:
I wasn't very interested in the whole AFG police training affair and have no real details on it.

jmm99
07-05-2009, 02:33 AM
The 2007-2008 UNAMA Report (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/JBRN-7PCD3P-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict had an impact on the current changes in US Astan ROE/RUF (discussed extensively in another thread). My citation to that report here is re: the UN view of the armed conflict in Astan:


(p.9, 9-10)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, it is not a UN force but a “coalition of the willing” deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. In August 2003, upon the request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. The NATO force currently comprises some 55,000 troops (including National Support Elements) from 41 countries as well as 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Since November 2008, the Commander of ISAF serves also as the Commander of US Forces Afghanistan, although the chains of command remain separate.
.....
OEF: “Operation Enduring Freedom” is the official name used by the US Government for its contribution to the War in Afghanistan under the umbrella of its Global War on Terror (GWOT). It should be noted that Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan, which is a joint US and Afghan operation, is separate from ISAF, which is an operation of NATO nations including the USA and other troop contributing nations. Most US forces operating under OEF since October 2008 have been incorporated into “US Forces Afghanistan” (see below) under the command of General McKiernan, who is also ISAF Commander - although some special forces remain under separate command.
....
US Forces Afghanistan: or “USFOR-A” is the functioning command and control headquarters for US forces operating in Afghanistan. USFOR-A is commanded by General McKiernan, who also serves as the NATO/ISAF commander. Under this new arrangement, activated in October 2008, the approximately 20,000 US forces, operating as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, were placed under the operational control of USFOR-A. The ISAF and OEF chains of command remain separate and distinct, and US Central Command continues to oversee US counterterrorism and detainee operations.

The legal stance of the US is roughly reflected in the reference to "the War in Afghanistan" and GWOT (now a dated terminology). In short, to the US (under the refined definition adopted by the Obama administration), Astan is an "armed conflict" subject to the 2001 AUMF. That topic has been completely discussed in the War Crimes thread and needs no repetition here.

Note that ISAF operates under a "peace enforcement" mandate, not a "peacekeeping" mandate. The distinction between those two types of peace operations is doctrinally defined in JP 3-07.3 (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3073.pdf): Joint TTP for Peace Operations:


p.I-10

6. Distinction Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

a. A clear distinction between PKO and PEO is important. Although both are PO, they are not part of a continuum. A distinct demarcation separates these operations.

PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances, characterized by three critical factors — consent, impartiality, and the use of force. Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation. These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation. Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim. This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties.

During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties — employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. The French Army has called this notion "active impartiality". Parties may believe they are being treated unfairly and will accuse the PO force of favoring the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. But impartiality does not imply that a PO will affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict.

This standard does not preclude the use of force in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for self-defense. In the latter, force is used to compel or coerce compliance with established rules. Moreover the central “goal” of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission.

The decision to change US ROE/RUF was made before GEN McChrystal left DC; and was a presidential decision (apparently as part of a larger strategic plan) after everyone had their say. Reference in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75844&postcount=136).

The shift in US policy may be from an armed conflict standard toward more of a peace enforcement standard in some areas or facets of the Astan conflict. The shift in German policy (if implemented) may suggest a shift toward the peace enforcement standard defined in JP 3-07.3.

I'm making no predictions here. We have to see what develops. But, the two US generals are too smart (IMO) to go off half-cocked.

Surferbeetle
07-23-2009, 06:14 PM
Today I'll cheat my body (my drill sgt would be po'd) and post a German article written in English...

From Der Spiegel: Afghanistan Offensive 'Dispels German Illusions' (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,637817,00.html)


In a step that marks a major psychological milestone in postwar Germany, Bundeswehr soldiers are now on the offensive in Afghanistan. Some German commentators are angry; others saw it coming. But they all agree that Germany can not preserve its "special status" within NATO forever.

The days of German troops only conducting defensive operations are quickly becoming a thing of the past. In a press conference in Berlin on Wednesday, German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung announced that 300 German soldiers were backing 1,200 Afghan army troops in a major offensive against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. But what was important about the announcement was not just the fact that the Bundeswehr, Germany's armed forces, was participating but also that it was putting some serious offensive firepower behind its actions. Since coming to Afghanistan in 2002 as part of the NATO-led ISAF peacekeeping force, around 3,700 German soldiers have been in charge of the more peaceful northern part of the country, where they were mostly involved in civil reconstruction and training efforts.

But since late last year, the Germans have had to face increased attacks from a resurgent Taliban. In the run-up to the country's Aug. 20 presidential election, NATO has decided to take the fight to the Taliban. At the beginning of July, US marines launched a surprise offensive in southern Afghanistan. And, as of Sunday, the Germans -- alongside the Afghan soldiers they trained -- are on the offensive in the north. In Wednesday's press conference, Wolfgang Schneiderhan, Germany's highest-ranking officer, stressed the precedent-setting importance of the actions, describing it as "probably the biggest" deployment by German forces in Afghanistan. And he underlined how the soldiers are now using heavy weapons, such as mortars and Marder armored infantry vehicles, in a fight that involves "house-by-house searches and looking for the enemy." SPIEGEL ONLINE has also reported that German fighter jets are firing missiles at suspected insurgents for the first time.

For Germans, having their military on the offensive for the first time since World War II involves passing over a major psychological threshold. And it takes place in the context of a war that has grown more unpopular over the years, after having initially received widespread support. It's also a war that Jung -- to the consternation of many -- has refused to call a war.