The Kill Company

[drewconway]

Excellent piece on platoon level dynamics in this week's New Yorker magazine. Registration required to read the full text (http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=2009-07-06#folio=041).

The Kill Company (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/07/06/090706fa_fact_khatchadourian)
Did a colonel's fiery rhetoric set the conditions for a massacre?


ABSTRACT: A REPORTER AT LARGE about the fatal shooting of eight Iraqi men during a U.S. Army-led mission called Operation Iron Triangle in May of 2006. Writer tells about Army Colonel Michael Dane Steele, a veteran of actions in Somalia and Bosnia and the commanding officer of Operation Iron Triangle. When Steele landed in Iraq, he was the only brigade commander there to have experienced sustained urban warfare before 9/11. He arrived with a clear sense of purpose: to subdue violence with violence, to hunt down and kill insurgents. A number of soldiers, among them General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s Vice-Chief of Staff, believe that Steele set the conditions for a massacre by cultivating aggressiveness in his soldiers, and by interpreting the rules of engagement in a way that made the killing of noncombatants more likely. Steele has since entered Army folklore as a cautionary figure. The debate over Steele’s leadership touches on larger questions about modern warfare: about the distinction between killing and murder on the battlefield. As Major General Michael Oates told the writer, “The story of Colonel Steele and Operation Iron Triangle is about a fundamental difference of opinion about how to prosecute the war in Iraq.” Tells about the third brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, which Steele commanded. Its members are known as Rakkasans, and have a reputation for aggressiveness and individual initiative. Describes how Steele prepared his men for combat in Iraq. Steele believed that since the end of the Cold War the Army had placed too many nonmilitary burdens on soldiers. He wanted to make his men skilled at killing but also capable of restraint. He told his men to think of themselves as apex predators (“If you mess with me, I will eat you.”), but also called them “sheepdogs”—creatures bred to protect the defenseless. Discusses how Steele’s ideas ran contrary to those of Chiarelli, who placed an emphasis on civil outreach and reconstruction in Iraq. Describes the difficulties faced by U.S. soldiers in the Salah ad Din province where Steele and his men were deployed. Tells about Steele’s most daring unit, Charlie Company, its commanding officer, Captain Daniel Hart, and its ranking non-commissioned officer, First Sergeant Eric Geressy. After a few months in Samarra, Charlie Company became known to some soldiers as the Kill Company. Some of the company’s own soldiers were disturbed by the emphasis on killing. Discusses the Army’s rules of engagement in Iraq and the use of status-based targeting by Steele’s men. Tells about Steele’s obsession with the idea of killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his preparations for Operation Iron Triangle, an assault on an area near the Al Muthanna chemical-weapons complex where, intelligence suggested, insurgents were operating. Describes the assault in detail and relates the conflicting accounts of how the eight Iraqis came to be killed. Tells about the findings of Brigadier General Thomas Maffey’s investigation into the operation and the hearings convened for the soldiers involved in some of the killings. Steele was formally reprimanded by General Chiarelli. Describes Steele’s devotion to his men and his focus on their safety in combat. Quotes from a speech about the Army given by Steele earlier this year at the Georgia Farm Bureau.

[Schmedlap]

I don't have a subscription and it doesn't appear to be up on Lexis-Nexis or any similar tool yet. But, I have some knowledge of that particular unit. An earlier comment that I made (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61731&postcount=52) speaks briefly to this.

[Cavguy]

I don't have a subscription and it doesn't appear to be up on Lexis-Nexis or any similar tool yet. But, I have some knowledge of that particular unit. An earlier comment that I made (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61731&postcount=52) speaks briefly to this.

I have a PDF of the article received via email, too big to post here (not even accounting for copyright), PM if you want it.

It is honest, balanced, and thoroughly disturbing. I found myself saying "I can't believe a unit would do this" multiple times. I'm surprised it was allowed to go that far. In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go. GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.

As I said on the Stern article thread, incidents like this have made me cease denying allegations of murder/torture out of hand.:mad:

[Tom Odom]

I have a PDF of the article received via email, too big to post here (not even accounting for copyright), PM if you want it.

It is honest, balanced, and thoroughly disturbing. I found myself saying "I can't believe a unit would do this" multiple times. I'm surprised it was allowed to go that far. In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go. GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.

As I said on the Stern article thread, incidents like this have made me cease denying allegations of murder/torture out of hand.:mad:

Agreed and the only thing I would add is that units with issues in training have issues downrange.

Tom

[Ken White]

Agreed and the only thing I would add is that units with issues in training have issues downrange.I needed that... ;)

[Greyhawk]

On the other hand, some - given orders no more clear than "keep a lid on it" - managed to create our current model for COIN ops.

[William F. Owen]

GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.


That's worth a thread by itself. It clears the field in a useful way.

[Schmedlap]

In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go.

And the second order effect is zero continuity from BCT to BCT (or even company to company). My company RIP/TOA'd with companies from two different battalions of 187. Neither company inherited our AOR. Our AOR was handed off to an IA force that we had only stood up a few months prior and lacked the training, experience, rapport with the community, and logistics support to do anything more than accompany us on low-risk missions. The companies that we RIP/TOA'd with took AORs to our north and to our battalion's north (my company was in the southern part of the AOR - none of this made any sense, but my BN CDR did the right thing and forced us to accommodate the incoming unit in order to make their transition simpler). So what did RIP/TOA consist of? Basically signing over property. I could have told my counterpart all about operations in our AOR, but it wasn't the one that he was inheriting. I was sure to pass along the info anyway, because it seemed obvious to me that they would be bailing out IA patrols that got in over their heads or simply assuming the IA mission since it was, as noted earlier, not even close to being prepared for the mission.

Two months prior to RIP/TOA I escorted two BN XO's from 187 around our patrol base and AOR and we discussed manpower requirements. I still recall one of them asking me if a company half the size of mine was sufficient for an AOR twice the size of what we were responsible for. I told him that what we had was pretty much stretching us to our breaking point and would not have been sustainable had we not reached the end of our block leave period and regained all available Soldiers. We were only able to maintain security by dispersing the company throughout the AOR in 3-man teams, which carried with it significant risk (see here (http://jeffemanuel.net/the-longest-morning/) for an example of the risks). During the 2005 voting we had to be augmented with Soldiers from two other battalions. The expression on his face told me quickly that he knew neither my advice, nor the obvious situation on the ground, was going to change decisions made at the BCT regarding how units were arrayed and who took what AOR.

As a side note, many Soldiers communicated with local civilians via email. They continued intermittent communication after redeployment. Most of the Soldiers said that the residents were freaking out after we left, stating that there were masked gunmen on every street corner and not a US Soldier in sight. After all of the progress that was made in that area (1st ID and 3ID slugging it out with insurgents during 2004 and the first half of 2005, resulting in relative calm in the second half of 2005) the locals were flabbergasted and asking, "why did you leave?" Sorry bro, but it wasn't our call. Ask the new chain of command.

[Brandon Friedman]

This is also indicative of how much a single person can influence and affect a unit. Steele's "leadership" was not reflective of how the Rakkasans operated during the previous two combat deployments--OEF I and OIF I. I can provide examples if anyone is interested.

I left right before Steele took command, but I know he was never a good fit at 187 and that he managed to horrify many of his subordinates with a manner that hadn't changed all that much from the way he was portrayed by Mark Bowden in Blackhawk Down.

[Michael C]

The conversation concerning COL Steele and the Rakkasan's reminded me of a recent post on Kings of War (http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/06/24/does-brutality-work/) about brutality and warfare. I have noticed this trend occurring more frequently in recent months as Soldiers question whether the soft side of counterinsurgency is worth it. The argument being that if force alone seemed to work in dealing with the Tamil Tigers, why do we need counter-insurgency?

I haven't read the New Yorker piece yet, (New Yorkers arrive a week late to Europe APO boxes) but my platoon mentor in IOBC was from the Rakkasans and he told plenty of stories. He summed up the attitude clearly, saying that the Rakkasans' goal was to be the biggest bad asses in Iraq. If they were, then the insurgents would go elsewhere to fight. He said it worked well for his battalion, but I don't think the gains were permanent.

Michael C at www.onviolence.com

[Brandon Friedman]

I haven't read the New Yorker piece yet, (New Yorkers arrive a week late to Europe APO boxes) but my platoon mentor in IOBC was from the Rakkasans and he told plenty of stories. He summed up the attitude clearly, saying that the Rakkasans' goal was to be the biggest bad asses in Iraq. If they were, then the insurgents would go elsewhere to fight. He said it worked well for his battalion, but I don't think the gains were permanent.

Michael C at www.onviolence.com

When was your platoon mentor there?

[William F. Owen]

I have noticed this trend occurring more frequently in recent months as Soldiers question whether the soft side of counterinsurgency is worth it. The argument being that if force alone seemed to work in dealing with the Tamil Tigers, why do we need counter-insurgency?


Sorry to say this, but that argument can only be symptomatic of a profound misunderstanding as to the nature of the issue.

Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.

What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.
Inherent to this killing and capturing, is killing the right people, and that applies to all forms of warfare.

D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....

[Fuchs]

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.

Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.

Second, I'm sure that lots of compromise peace agreements have been made. I recall many such agreements from history books.

Third, those agreements were most likely nothing the rulers were bragging about (and thus didn't enter official history).

Fourth, some insurgencies defeat themselves because they cannot sustain their effort logistically (the relief force at Alesia and Sitting Bull's army, for example).

Fifth, some insurgencies failed when their leader dies of natural causes.

Finally, even the proven tactic of taking hostages most likely made up more than a per cent. I've read quite often about that in history books as well.

[William F. Owen]

Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.
Maybe, let's take it as a starting point, for further discussion.

Second, I'm sure that lots of compromise peace agreements have been made. I recall many such agreements from history books.
Sure. That is why I explicitly said "military defeats", not peace treaties

Fourth, some insurgencies defeat themselves because they cannot sustain their effort logistically (the relief force at Alesia and Sitting Bull's army, for example).
That is military defeat. Given no enemy action, they probably could have sustained themselves.

Fifth, some insurgencies failed when their leader dies of natural causes.
Again, military defeat as in a failure to sustain command. Given no enemy action, they should have endured.

Finally, even the proven tactic of taking hostages most likely made up more than a per cent. I've read quite often about that in history books as well.
How is taking hostages not inherent to "killing and capturing". You detain (capture) someone and then threaten them harm (Killing) if your wishes are not met.

[Rex Brynen]

Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.

What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.


Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.


Without a clearer definition of terms, I'm not sure this is going to be a very productive debate. One can equally say that 99% of all military defeats inflicted on irregular forces have been the direct result of politics (that is, sustaining a state capable of extracting resources and projecting military power; developing ideologies and recruitment systems that place motivated soldiers on the battlefield; shaping a domestic political environment in which killing insurgents enjoys a degree of popular acceptance or support among vital constituencies, and doesn't destabilize the regime; etc.)

I do think Wilf is absolutely correct in suggesting, however, that Sri Lanka's ultimate success was not achieved through population-centric COIN. Partly this reflected a political context in which Tamils represented under 10% of the population, and their support is not necessary for either regime survival or military resources. In a more divided society, or a case where a relatively small number of external forces are undertaking a stability operation, things could be rather different. At the risk of channeling Ken, METT-TC :D (with an emphasis here on the C).

The Sri Lankans might also find that the Tamil insurgency returns again in the future if the Sinhalese majority doesn't address some Tamil grievances.


D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....

Actually Wilf, as I'm sure you know, we didn't do a lot of "capturing" against the 12th SS in June 1944, once dead Canadian PoWs started showing up. :eek:

[William F. Owen]

One can equally say that 99% of all military defeats inflicted on irregular forces have been the direct result of politics (that is, sustaining a state capable of extracting resources and projecting military power; developing ideologies and recruitment systems that place motivated soldiers on the battlefield; shaping a domestic political environment in which killing insurgents enjoys a degree of popular acceptance or support among vital constituencies, and doesn't destabilize the regime; etc.).
Well as all war is political, I hope that is true! .. but my wider point being very few insurgencies, that have ever developed into insurgencies have ever gone away because they realised they lacked popular support. It is an absolute myth the irregular forces, be they insurgents or not, require the support of the population to succeed militarily.
Virtually no one in Sierra Leon supported the RUF, yet they controlled 75% of the country at one time, and thrived whilst doing so.

Actually Wilf, as I'm sure you know, we didn't do a lot of "capturing" against the 12th SS in June 1944, once dead Canadian PoWs started showing up. :eek:
Yep. Barb wiring prisoners to the glacis plate of your Sherman's can be be mis-understood!

[Valin]

GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.

Does the term "Herding Cats" ring a bell?

[Michael C]

It is an absolute myth the irregular forces, be they insurgents or not, require the support of the population to succeed militarily.

The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.


Without a clearer definition of terms, I'm not sure this is going to be a very productive debate.

The Sri Lankans might also find that the Tamil insurgency returns again in the future if the Sinhalese majority doesn't address some Tamil grievances.


I agree that we should define terms more appropriately. It seems like there is a dichotomy between what I initially described as "soft" counter-insurgency and its opposite, lethal counter-insurgency. Mr. Brynen hit the nail precisely on the head when he replaced soft with population-centric COIN. So you can call population-centric COIN either soft, non-lethal, or non-kinetic but it means the operations not considered conventional.

Mr. Owen describes targer-centric COIN. I call that the lethal, kinetic or traditional approach. In the article "Kill Company," COL Steele absolutely argues for this approach to COIN. He says clearly that his BDE will win if "they get violent the fastest."

Rethinking my original comment, I think I set up a false dichotomy. In an article for the Naval Postgraduate School, "The Tao of Special Forces" The Tao of Special Forces (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA424849) The authors present an excellent schema for analyzing COIN. The break up the operations a counter-insurgent force can conduct into four types: counter-force, counter-logistics, counter-leadership/ideology and counter-infrastructure.

This schema allows us to see that the soft-side of warfare incorporates both counter-infrastructure and counter-leadership operations. When Fuchs gave his examples of irregular defeats by means other than military he described counter-leadership and counter-logistics operations.

We can also see that the Rakkasan's problem in Iraq was a total focus on counter-force operations to the exclusion of any other type of operation. The example of the Tamil Tigers seems like a successful counter-force example; but so too did the French after the initial Battle for Algiers, and they ended up losing.

Population-centric COIN really just includes all the types of operations to defeat an enemy, the so-called soft skills.

[Fuchs]

The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.

The question is whether that support needs to be voluntary.

Furthermore, the requirements for any violent endeavour depend strongly on the extent of opposition.

[William F. Owen]

The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.
So what percentage of support are we talking about, and is that willing consent or coerced consent? If the premise of FM3-24 is as you describe then it is deeply flawed and has not read deeply into the history of irregular warfare. The very fact they call it "COIN" should act as a warning


Mr. Owen describes targer-centric COIN. I call that the lethal, kinetic or traditional approach. In the article "Kill Company," COL Steele absolutely argues for this approach to COIN. He says clearly that his BDE will win if "they get violent the fastest."

If you want to state what I am describing, then please describe it correctly. I in no way condone the idiotic approach exemplified by the article. Being British and not American, I've dealt with COIN since basic training, so please don't tarnsih me with the same brush as those who stumbled across COIN just a couple of years ago.

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!

Hope that helps.

[IntelTrooper]

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!

Hear, hear... maybe this should be in one of those new-fangled wiki FMs.

[Ken White]

Hear, hear... maybe this should be in one of those new-fangled wiki FMs.Might even be put in a DoD Directive and thus it could replace a WHOLE lot of excess verbiage and half a dozen new manuals involving reinvention of wheels... :wry:

[J Wolfsberger]

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!


I'd like to nominate this for Quote of the Year.

[Ken White]

Though this one from Coldstreamer merits mention: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=73577&postcount=9)

[Fuchs]

The "hearts and minds stuff" appears feasible to me during the fighting. It's just unreasonable to expect to benefit by its fruits before the level of violence is below appropriate levels.

Fighting the wrong way does furthermore limit the "freedom of action" in later "hearts and minds stuff".

[Rank amateur]

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other.

Can I assume then that you agree with Hamas? The only way the Palestinians will ever get their own country is by overcoming the other armed group?

[William F. Owen]

Can I assume then that you agree with Hamas? The only way the Palestinians will ever get their own country is by overcoming the other armed group?

Huh? Of course I don't agree with Hamas, or any bunch of terrorists. One armed group overcoming another is an observational definition of warfare. Not a moral justification for the political aims for which Hamas or any other bunch of clowns want to apply violence. Hamas is actually a major obstacle to the creation of the Palestinian states.

[Brandon Friedman]

Huh? Of course I don't agree with Hamas, or any bunch of terrorists. One armed group overcoming another is an observational definition of warfare. Not a moral justification for the political aims for which Hamas or any other bunch of clowns want to apply violence. Hamas is actually a major obstacle to the creation of the Palestinian states.

I'm not following. Based on my read of your reasoning, either you're suggesting that the Palestinians and Israelis are not technically in a state of warfare, or you're saying one of the armed sides will ultimately have to overcome the other in combat for peace to occur.

However, I would say they are at war, and the Palestinians will ultimately gain independence without overcoming the Israelis through armed force.

[J Wolfsberger]

I'm not following. Based on my read of your reasoning, either you're suggesting that the Palestinians and Israelis are not technically in a state of warfare, or you're saying one of the armed sides will ultimately have to overcome the other in combat for peace to occur.

However, I would say they are at war, and the Palestinians will ultimately gain independence without overcoming the Israelis through armed force.

Brandon, I think you and Rank amateur are misreading what William wrote. His statement was value neutral observation on warfare.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not following. Based on my read of your reasoning, either you're suggesting that the Palestinians and Israelis are not technically in a state of warfare, or you're saying one of the armed sides will ultimately have to overcome the other in combat for peace to occur.


What I said and am saying is,

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!
That is a commonly accepted definition of warfare with an added context relevant to countering insurgents.

What on earth has that got to do with Israel and the Palestinians?

[carl]

Tom Ricks posted a an Army report about COL Steele and how he dealt with his battalion commanders. This is the link to the particular page on Ricks' blog

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/?page=1

It is the first entry. The report is from Wikileaks. I don't know what the policy here is on those things are so forgive me if I made an error.

[Michael C]

So what percentage of support are we talking about, and is that willing consent or coerced consent? If the premise of FM3-24 is as you describe then it is deeply flawed and has not read deeply into the history of irregular warfare. The very fact they call it "COIN" should act as a warning

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!


I am new to this forum so if I speak brashly, I apologize for my inexperience. All my experience with irregular warfare or insurgency comes from one tour to Afghanistan as a platoon leader. In that tour, I definitely fought insurgents, but I also conducted humanitarian operations (the soft side or hearts and minds).

When reading the responses to my second comment, it seemed like the responders glossed over Mr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?

Second, Mr. Owens definition of warfare is a correct start, but leaves out the most important detail. Rank Amateur and Brandon were hinting at this specific deficiency. Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist.

Further, Mr. Owens provides the next point: "Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting. In Carl's link above, Thomas Ricks describes killing people as the least effective way to combat insurgents. I agree. You can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.

Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Unfortunately, for soldiers in the US Army and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-insurgency is never the simple decision between killing the enemy or population-centric counter-insurgency. Soldiers conduct humanitarian operations, build the local government, train local security forces all while conducting counter-force operations (killing the enemy). What the Rakkasans--to bring this back to the article "Kill Company"--really failed to do was conduct full-spectrum counter-insurgency, and that is why they are a cautionary tale to modern soldiers.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com

[Ken White]

that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?The statement that they do not require the support of the population is correct. Having the support of the population makes the insurgents job easier but such support is NOT required. I have read FM 3-24 (and 3-24.2 which is a slightly better document) and it is an overwordy academic tome that is better than nothing but is flawed, IMO, on several levlels.

Writing a 'counterinsurgency' manual and relying on a number of 'experts' whose experience was in insurgencies during which they were part of the government forces and who wrote in a time of ideological turmoil resulted in a skewed effort that place excessive emphasis on population control -- governments can do that; intervenors like the US in other nations (Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq to name three) cannot exercise such control -- and most 'host' governments are not likely to do so. The Roman, Mongol and even the British solutions are no longer practical. So you are NOT going to control the population.

If you aren't going to control it, the best you can hope for is to guide the population into not offering active support for the insurgency. You cannot prevent them from offering tacit support unless you're prepared to use the same techniques the opponent uses and scare them into it. If you aren't going to do that, your alternative is to make the opponent cease terrorizing the population to get tacit support. To do that, the best solution is to kill the opponents -- being very careful not to kill relatively innocent members of the population.

That requires telling the good guys from the bad guys. How do Americans do that in a culture the like of which most of them even after a couple of tours can barely comprehend? The answer is that with rare exceptions, who can and do 'go native,' you cannot. That means you have to have locals to tell who's on what side.

This in an area where Achmat, Elder in Sturm Walla will gleefully shop Abbas in the next valley because Abbas was toying with Achmat's cousin's third wife in 1976. So you need reliable locals, say a Political adviser and an Interpreter Walla (think a British RSM type) to keep all a Battalion's interpreters in line while the PolAd insure that he and the 'terps give the straight scoop. That can take three to five years to vet, build and staff. We're just getting around to something on that line and it'll work.Like the manual, better late than never.

Realize also that Afghanistan is not a COIN fight -- the Afghans may have some elements of one but we do not -- and that's not a semantic quibble, that's a critical difference. There are FID and SFA elements but for most troops, it's a war, pure but durn sure not simple...
...Without politics, warfare would not exist. Do the Religious fanatics of the world, past and present know that? Loaded question, I know -- religion is political in many senses. However, while your statement is basically correct it has little to do with the reality on the ground. Side trips into Hamas et.al. do not change the fact that Wilf's comment was, as J Wolfsberger noted, a value neutral statement on warfare. It did not address the political aspects, nor is that an Army's job.
Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds. Absolutely correct for openers, agree with you wholeheartedly until the last clause -- you are not ever going to win anyone's heart or mind. What you can do is convince most people that you do consider their interests and that you can clobber the bad guys anytime you can locate them and that you are trying to do this without being counter productive by killing the wrong people.

Realize that all most of the population in such a situation wants is for everyone to go away and leave them alone. If you or the bad guys offer any benefits, they'll take 'em. If you pose a threat, they'll do what you want them to -- as long as you're watching. If the bad guys do a better and more constant job of watching than you do (and they almost always will), then you need to destroy their ability to do that or negate it in some other way.

Since they really do not like being visited in the night by Afghan Talibs, Pakistani Talibs, AQ and allies, Smugglers, Opium Traders and other tribes with a grudge and the odd batch of just plain old border Banditti or Crooks (all called 'insurgents' for simplicity's sake... :D ) in various combinations and with unpleasant ramifications; if you can look like you're going to remove that unpleasantness, you will not win a single heart or mind but they will cease active if coerced support to the bad guys and as you reduce the number of said miscreants and the night visits decline in number and intensity, they will cease fear driven tacit support to them and give it to you -- not out of fear (or gratitude -- all our projects are seen as partial compensation for our presences, no more) but simply because you can reduce the fear quotient. You can remove the violence.

Thanks for the job you do and keep on keepin' on... ;)

[William F. Owen]

I am new to this forum so if I speak brashly, I apologize for my inexperience. All my experience with irregular warfare or insurgency comes from one tour to Afghanistan as a platoon leader. In that tour, I definitely fought insurgents, but I also conducted humanitarian operations (the soft side or hearts and minds).



Mr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed.
It is historical fact that many insurgencies have not enjoyed total or even widespread support from the populations they are fighting amongst. Nor have many regimes. If 5% support them, does that count as "support of the population." What if it is 1%? What if they 90% in one village and then 1% in the next? To fixate on the popular support is simplistic. Insurgent use violence against the population to gain support


Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist. Precisely my point. I am a Clausewitian. Reading some of my other posts would show this.

"Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting.
That is why I said "enables." As in any form of warfare, all the instruments of the state can be applied. Seeking to influence, killing the leadership and interdicting logistics are done in most forms warfare. You cannot do any of those things without demonstrating an ability to apply lethal force, better than they can.
Allowing the enemy leadership a place in government is usually surrendering to the insurgents, as that is what they want.


You can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.
The Insurgents are using killing and violence to break your will. They are also employing all their instruments of power against you, just like any form or warfare. How do you get them to quit fighting without killing a few first? The basis of warfare is to kill enough to convince the majority to quit. Clausewitz and his student Mao-Tse-Tung wrote at some length on this


And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
Well that's simplistic, and not always true. Gaining intelligence against an irregular force is done by developing and exploiting and all sources approach that allows civil and military agencies to basically work as one, and at a level of detail, most military intelligence cannot work at. Again, military history is quite clear on this. Some irregular warfare intelligence work is conducted in extremely hostile environments and with no aid from the local population, other than covertly developed sources. - sorry to bang on, but this is something I was involved in, in a past life.

A'Stan and Iraq and not the only insurgencies that ever occurred. Do not snap shot these and go "oh look! This is COIN!"
We've had irregular forms of warfare for 3,000 years. War isn't changing and all wars get won the same basic way.

[Ken White]

It is from a different perspective and is admittedly biased toward that perspective but it makes a point that merits some thought by a lot of people.

The Civil and the Military efforts in stability operations are two different things. In US practice for a variety of reasons, the Armed Forces have assumed primacy in such operations and we have thus mingled the two efforts in an unsatisfactory blend that does neither the Civil or the Military role as well as could be expected -- and as should have been expected...

One of those reasons, BTW, is not the oft quoted "The military folks have to do it due to the security situation." That can be true early on; it should not be allowed to continue past its 'sell-by' date.

So, biased, yes -- but it merits thought with respect to what is a military function and what is not: LINK (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/09/AR2009070902501.html?hpid=opinionsbox1).

[IntelTrooper]

Absolutely correct for openers, agree with you wholeheartedly until the last clause -- you are not ever going to win anyone's heart or mind. What you can do is convince most people that you do consider their interests and that you can clobber the bad guys anytime you can locate them and that you are trying to do this without being counter productive by killing the wrong people.

To misquote Hawking misquoting Johst, "When I hear 'hearts and minds' I reach for my gun."

Seriously, though, this phrase needs to be eliminated from US military vocabulary. Yes, it is good to be polite, culturally sensitive, yadda yadda yadda. Yes, it is good to provide HA and projects and all that stuff. But it is not going to make everyone your friend, turn on the insurgents and win the day. Not on a mass scale, anyway. Not even on a village level. Probably not even on the family level.

Ken, as usual, is precisely correct. The ultimate purpose is for the government/counter-insurgent force to be able to effectively project a reasonable level power anywhere within its borders, or at least enough so that its residents have a belief that the government can protect them (presumably from insurgents and criminals). It should also be perceived as representing the interests of the residents, but that isn't necessarily absolute.

I see a lot of inexperienced, starry-eyed Americans get dumbfounded when they show up in a village, make a big show of meeting with the local malik and pass out a few bags of rice and blankets and then don't get the local Taliban just handed over to them. Anyone with an elementary grasp of human motivation and psychology (especially Maslow's hierarchy) should immediately sense what is going on -- Americans/Afghan government have no credibility, they show up, give out some cheap gifts, and leave. Then they expect the locals to put their lives in danger by cooperating with the government, a government that is absent 99% of the time and has no ability to provide even basic services or security.

No matter how good of "friends" you are, no matter if in their hearts and minds are tattooed Afghan and American flags, no one -- very few, anyway -- is dumb enough to switch sides based on some common courtesy and cheap HA. They will switch sides when they believe it is in their best interests to, and in the rural villages where people have a very long institutional memory, the Coalition and Afghan government is going to have to provide extraordinary proof that they are going to be around for the long haul.

/rant

[Ken White]

Well said all (except that part about me being correct, you misspelled unusual...). Agree with all but two things struck me in particular. One made me laugh, the other is sort of sad:
"...meeting with the local malik and pass out a few bags of rice and blankets and then don't get the local Taliban..."My first thought was why on earth would we expect him to turn himself in. :D

Not funny really but it does happen that we unknowingly give gifts to the local Talib's or Smuggler's point men. What that does to our credibility is an interesting question...
"Then they expect the locals to put their lives in danger by cooperating with the government, a government that is absent 99% of the time and has no ability to provide even basic services or security."True dat. Couple that fact with the problem that we, NATO, other Coalition members and the Afghans do not have the troop strength available to change that. Nor are we likely to. Thus you're confronted with the harsh fact that the only viable military option is to remove as many of the opposition as possible as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. Which, after all, is why the armed forces are there in the first place...

As a young troop in my son's airplane rifle platoon before his second deployment in 2003 told an inquiring Australian TV journalist who asked what he was going to do; "Shoot bad guys." She said "but isn't this about winning hearts and minds?" He said "Nah, I've talked to 'em, they ain't coming on that, besides the government's got other people to try to do that stuff -- we kill people." Gotta give the kid credit. He was a Specialist, a lowly SPC, an uneducated, far from powerful peon; Joe. Yet he understood the population's attitude and knew precisely what his job was.

And who was responsible for what.

And that was six damn years ago... :mad:

[J Wolfsberger]

As I follow this discussion, the thought strikes me (doesn't hurt much) that we've seen this before in the CIDG and Mike Forces in Viet Nam highlands. The A Teams went in and stayed. The activities were a blend of civic action, self defense training and equipment, and offensive operations.

There seems to be a tone of exclusive "either-or" to the discussion. Is that really the case?

[Ken White]

The CIDG effort worked well with the right tribes -- and failed miserably with others. That was sometime due to the particular tribe, sometimes due to the particular SF team. There was indeed 'civic action.' Concrete pads for people who insisted on building their dwellings on stilts being my pet example; they built new houses on new stilts and built pens for their pigs on the pads... :rolleyes:

The Mike Force didn't really work all that well and most, after the fact, admitted that overall, the cost of the effort did not get returned by results. Neither program did what was promised. Both affected a microscopic segment of the population while the bulk of the populace derived little to no benefit -- nor did the US derive much from it. Except experience. Which we discarded. So we can now learn the same lessons again...
There seems to be a tone of exclusive "either-or" to the discussion. Is that really the case?I think the answer in the minds of most at this time would be no, that should not be the case, the Army and Marines must be 'full service COIN operators.' I do not dispute that idea in event there is no other alternative but I strongly believe that the Armed Forces effort to both the fighting and the civil side efforts should be restricted to the minimum possible amount of time for each -- and they will likely be differing lengths of time.

Such operations involve trying to aid the population. The Armed Forces are not in that business other than for short term emergencies. They do not have the disposition, inclination or the expertise to do the civil support jobs other than minimally. They can and will do a barely passable job overall. We have been in Afghanistan approaching eight years. Efforts to build up the civil side and remove the Armed Forces from the bulk of that effort will likely take another three or four years to fully implement. State will get the primacy on the civil side they should have always possessed.

The real problem is that Afghanistan is not COIN, it's a war. Our efforts to treat it as COIN effort and our US Government wide institutional failure to be prepared for or to reject participation in such conflicts are partly why it is now a war.

We can do the Stability Op / FID / SFA thing if we must but let's do it right. Going in as outsiders to 'help' people who do not want your help is not easy, not simple, will generally produce stopgap efforts of little merit and really needs to be avoided if at all possible. If we better prepare the Intel Community, State and USAID to do their jobs -- as well as better training our Armed forces -- perhaps we won't have to do this again for a long while. We certainly should not. If we do, one would hope we were better prepared next time.

There are two components to such operations. The military effort can aid the civil power and effort. It cannot replace that civil power and attempts to make it do so will always produce uneven and less than satisfactory results.

[Schmedlap]

Tom Ricks posted a an Army report about COL Steele and how he dealt with his battalion commanders. This is the link to the particular page on Ricks' blog

What baffles me is that Steele's antics were well known for years. The guy was notorious throughout the Army for being a loud-mouthed, arrogant, arguably incompetent, and reckless leader. My NCOs had the displeasure of working with him in 3/75. Their assessment bore true in real life when I was deployed at the same time in Bosnia when he was there as a Bn Cdr - thankfully I did not have much interaction with him, but even then his antics got ample attention throughout the MND. And as noted earlier on this thread, I had the misfortune of doing RIP/TOA with his BDE when they arrived in theater. Within one week, tales of his antics were circulating and BDE policies that he put into effect left us all scratching our heads. The guy was a clown.

Steele has been a known quantity for years. Why was he put in command of a Brigade (let alone a BN before that)? I'm glad that some ADC finally took the initiative to look into this and officially record it, but it seems like too little, far too late. The damage has been done - to the mission, to innocent Iraqis, to the reputation of the Army and 187, to any decent subordinate who chose to ETS (to the detriment of the Army) after enduring his crap, and to any Soldiers who may have been misled by his disgraceful example and thought it right to emulate him.

[Steve Blair]

What baffles me is that Steele's antics were well known for years. The guy was notorious throughout the Army for being a loud-mouthed, arrogant, arguably incompetent, and reckless leader. My NCOs had the displeasure of working with him in 3/75. Their assessment bore true in real life when I was deployed at the same time in Bosnia when he was there as a Bn Cdr - thankfully I did not have much interaction with him, but even then his antics got ample attention throughout the MND. And as noted earlier on this thread, I had the misfortune of doing RIP/TOA with his BDE when they arrived in theater. Within one week, tales of his antics were circulating and BDE policies that he put into effect left us all scratching our heads. The guy was a clown.

Steele has been a known quantity for years. Why was he put in command of a Brigade (let alone a BN before that)? I'm glad that some ADC finally took the initiative to look into this and officially record it, but it seems like too little, far too late. The damage has been done - to the mission, to innocent Iraqis, to the reputation of the Army and 187, to any decent subordinate who chose to ETS (to the detriment of the Army) after enduring his crap, and to any Soldiers who may have been misled by his disgraceful example and thought it right to emulate him.

The sad thing is that some of this is very reminiscent of the conduct encouraged by the CG of the 9th ID in Vietnam during 1968-1969. Seems we never DO learn.....

[Uboat509]

This comment worries me a little. Please define coercion as it you believe it would apply in American police practice.

An example I was thinking of might take the form of, "If you don't tell me who shot the victim I will charge you as an accessory." That is not the physical type of coercion that I suspect that original poster had in mind but I believe that the principle is the same. You are attempting to gain information from a source by threat of an unpleasant consequence.

It would be nice if more people just did the right thing and freely provided information. It would be nicer still if life were like CSI and the suspect would just admit to everything once they were confronted with the evidence. Unfortunately, life is not like that, at least not in Iraq. We have to find other ways to get people provide information, whether that takes the form of paid informants or threats of greater charges or longer prison sentences, or whatever other means that they have within legal bounds.

SFC W

[Ken White]

It has a lot going for it but it must be tempered -- and too few are willing to temper the "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" mentality but are more than willing to stomp on any attempts at imaginative or innovative tactics or new ideas.

Hard to fire people in the Army other than those you can Chapter out (too easily IMO); thank, in Steele's and many others cases, AR 600-200, DOPMA and OPD 21 and the Congresses that dictated them in a well intentioned effort to be fair and prevent abuses. It's as difficult to fire people in the Armed forces as it is to fire Civil servants, all thanks to Congress. Plus the personnel system creates a lot of problems for itself. Can't say that COL X is a slug because LTG Y sat on his promotion board. We are reflective of a nation awash in political correctness; can't criticize others, can't embarrass the institution.

While it can embarrass itself with impunity, speaking truth to power -- or the prevailing wisdom -- just isn't done.

Fortunately, some of our friends aren't so encumbered. For example, it doesn't seem to have gotten to these two smart Strynes who have figured out that bogus COIN is not the way to go. LINK (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/thoughts-on-operations-in-sout/), LINK (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/time-to-move-on-from-hearts-an/).

What is being called COIN is a dangerous road for anyone. If you're an outsider intervening in another Nations, it is doubly dangerous. If you're a generally disliked outsider, it becomes triply dangerous. If you have not been trained for the role, it is quadruply dangerous. You cannot expect a force told to do only high intensity conflict to adapt quickly to the stability ops environment without hiccups, big ones. Steele and the Rakkasans sort of showed that, the two linked articles sort of highlight it.

[Greyhawk]

In the interest of balance - in that the article itself isn't accessible, a couple brief quotes from it:



"During his deployment in Iraq, Steele saw eighteen of his soldiers killed in action—the same number as in Somalia. The brigades that preceded and replaced the Rakkasans each lost more than twice as many men."

and



"Quantifying the level of discipline in a unit as large as a brigade is not easy, but, according to Army data, the number of Rakkasan escalation-of-force incidents in 2006 was below the median for brigades in Iraq."

Meanwhile, elsewhere and more recently (while it could stand alone I think it has a place here)...
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009430464_afghanistan08.html


CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan — U.S. Marines trapped Taliban fighters in a residential compound and persuaded the insurgents to allow women and children to leave. The troops then moved in — only to discover that the militants had slipped out, dressed in burqas, the loose enveloping robes some Muslim women wear.

The fighters, who may owe their lives to the new U.S. commander's emphasis on limiting civilian casualties, were among hundreds of militants who have fled the offensive the Marines launched last week in southern Helmand province.

[Schmedlap]

"Quantifying the level of discipline in a unit as large as a brigade is not easy, but, according to Army data, the number of Rakkasan escalation-of-force incidents in 2006 was below the median for brigades in Iraq."

In regard only to that point, that is easily impacted by what EOF incidents are reportable. For example, my company in 2005 was in an AO that was more violent than adjacent AOs to our north, east, and west, and significantly more violent than the BN AOs surrounding our BN AO. Other battalions were required to report every warning shot. We only reported sustained engagements. The BDE experimented with having us report every gunshot. After three days, they reversed that policy because we flooded them with so many incidents (I think our company and the company to our south reported over 100 incidents in 3 days). I'd be curious to know what the 187 policy was for what type of incidents were reportable.

It is also worth noting that Salah ad Din province is not really comparable to most other BDE AOs. I don't think they inherited Baquba, so that would only leave Samarra and Beiji as the big hotspots and 187 barely even covered down on Samarra - only putting 1/3 the number of Soldiers of the previous unit there. Areas in and around Tikrit were pretty quiet. Even if Baquba was covered down on, in 2006 that was still not much of a comparison to, say, a BDE responsible for a sector of Baghdad, Mosul, or - at that time - a sector in Anbar.

[Greyhawk]

Good points, Schmedlap. I'll add that I don't find "violence metrics" particularly useful.

Beyond the apples/oranges points, the "next Brigade" losing more soldiers doesn't necessarily indicate the previous one did a better job - in fact the opposite could be argued. Brigades in '08 lost considerably fewer soldiers than the ones they replaced - one would be wrong to claim that's because they were better, smarter, or faster.

But these numbers do offer some perspective on what we're talking about here - I didn't intend them to refute anything said previously or dismiss the significance of the discussion. Given that we are discussing a document that others can't see I likewise think it's worthwhile to point out said document isn't a one-sided hit piece on the subject. (In fact, ultimately the author does not condemn him but acknowledges things aren't quite as black and white as he thought when he began.)

[Michael C]

The real problem is that Afghanistan is not COIN, it's a war. Our efforts to treat it as COIN effort and our US Government wide institutional failure to be prepared for or to reject participation in such conflicts are partly why it is now a war.


I read this comment echoed several times on this thread and others. Afghanistan is counter-insurgency fighting. An insurgency attempts to overthrow the government; a counter-insurgency attempts to defeat those attempts. By defining insurgency and counter-insurgency like this, we can see that politics is the key driving force on either side (whether your politics are religiously motivated or not, they are still politics).

I have to define Afghanistan as a counter-insurgency because it will require political solutions. When commenters say it is not COIN it is war, what they mean is it is not Iraq. That is true, it is a rural insurgency fought mainly with guerilla tactics. It is also extremely intense and kinetic, but it is still COIN.

[Ken White]

I read this comment echoed several times on this thread and others. Afghanistan is counter-insurgency fighting. An insurgency attempts to overthrow the government; a counter-insurgency attempts to defeat those attempts. By defining insurgency and counter-insurgency like this, we can see that politics is the key driving force on either side (whether your politics are religiously motivated or not, they are still politics).I agree with all that. I could quibble and point out that most armed disagreements have politics as the key force on either side but that's minor.
I have to define Afghanistan as a counter-insurgency because it will require political solutions.Does this mean that war is not amenable to political solutions?
When commenters say it is not COIN it is war, what they mean is it is not Iraq.Incorrect statement. It may be true for some people but you did not qualify it by adding 'some.' It is absolutely not true for me. I suspect most others here who have said the same thing would also say it is not true for them.

I said it is not a COIN operation for the simple reasons that: (1) the US is not the government with an Insurgent problem; It may be a COIN effort for the Government of Afghanistan, it is not for the US. That, as they say, is doctrine. We are engaged in FID LINK (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf) and SFA LINK (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf) (both links .pdf) (2) there are other armed and hostile players aside from the insurgents that are admittedly present thus while there may be insurgents, there are other -- and larger -- problems. If that were not true, we would likely not be there in the first place... (3) Facets of conventional and irregular warfare aside from COIN like efforts are imperative or the coalition casualty rate will climb rapidly.

None of that is semantic or doctinaire nit picking, those are significant points and that last item is overlooked by entirely too many, some in high places, some actually on the ground, who fail to understand that reality and get people killed unnecessarily.
...it is a rural insurgency fought mainly with guerilla tactics.So far and in general if not in totality; we'll see if that remains the case. Night vision devices and much improved TTP have already been detected in use by the bad guys...
It is also extremely intense and kinetic, but it is still COIN.You may call it what you wish. What is important is that we realize the US is not engaged in a COIN effort, it is engaged in a stability operation assisting a foreign government which has an insurgency and a major lawlessness problem and that many efforts that government would apply in a COIN effort cannot be applied by us in Afghanistan as we aren't the government nor can many be applied by the Afghans themselves due to the nature of the society and their economic circumstances. Also, as you say, it is indeed extremely intense and kinetic and thus many things one would do ordinarily in support of a COIN effort cannot be done at this time (I'd suggest that alone makes it a war, YMMV).

I'm reminded of Rifleman's old tag line (and use it hoping he won't mind) quoting a Hessian officer who said, "Call this war by whatever name you may, only call it not an American rebellion; it is nothing more or less than a Scotch Irish Presbyterian rebellion." He was correct but many British Officers disagreed -- they were also correct as later events showed. Names aren't that important. What is important is that those involved (and those here in CONUS) realize it may be a COIN effort for the Afghans with us and others in support and that certain techniques must be employed but that it is in fact a war for all practical news release and funding purposes.

More important is what's being done to bring it to a reasonably acceptable conclusion. You're doing your part, for which I thank you.

[IntelTrooper]

I said it is not a COIN operation for the simple reasons that: (1) the US is not the government with an Insurgent problem; It may be a COIN effort for the Government of Afghanistan, it is not for the US. That, as they say, is doctrine. We are engaged in FID LINK (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf) and SFA LINK (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf) (both links .pdf) (2) there are other armed and hostile players aside from the insurgents that are admittedly present thus while there may be insurgents, there are other -- and larger -- problems. If that were not true, we would likely not be there in the first place... (3) Facets of conventional and irregular warfare aside from COIN like efforts are imperative or the coalition casualty rate will climb rapidly.

More important is what's being done to bring it to a reasonably acceptable conclusion. You're doing your part, for which I thank you.
I put these two portions together because I think they are closely linked. The fact that we are engaged in SFA and FID should determine our way forward more than focusing on a COIN strategy, per se. Points number 2 and 3 should be heavily considered (and I believe they will be) with the "reasonably acceptable conclusion" always in mind.

In my experience with the Afghan government, honestly, there were times that I found myself empathizing with the Taliban. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is one of the major roadblocks to establishing lasting security and governance in Afghanistan.

As Shmedlap and others have pointed out, we have two competing insurgencies struggling for control. One of them is savvy, plays on the emotions and sympathies of the masses, has an effective IO campaign, and an extensive support network. The other is clumsy, dishonest, elitist, and insenstive with an ideology that resonates with few people. I'll let you figure out which is which.

[Ken White]

...I found myself empathizing with the Taliban. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is one of the major roadblocks to establishing lasting security and governance in Afghanistan."As it was in the beginning, is now ..." :wry:
As Shmedlap and others have pointed out, we have two competing insurgencies struggling for control. One of them is savvy, plays on the emotions and sympathies of the masses, has an effective IO campaign, and an extensive support network. The other is clumsy, dishonest, elitist, and insenstive with an ideology that resonates with few people...We, the US, do have a knack for getting into similar situations again and again. We seem to have done that about once a generation since 1898. One would think there'd be a message in that but apparently not.

In any event, I expect little real change in Afghanistan; our opponents are more patient than we are while temporary and expedient deal making there has been the way to go for 3,000 years. We'll do what we can and it will be better than it was when we arrived...

[IntelTrooper]

"As it was in the beginning, is now ..." :wry:
We'll do what we can and it will be better than it was when we arrived...
Indeed. The Soviets provided the airfields for us this round, and the next foreign power to get involved will have some ready-made operating bases and better roads...

[Ken White]

Left 16 big airfields in Viet Nam. :D

[jmm99]

to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (p.31 pdf):


(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war.

From the standpoint of military logic (not looking at the legal aspects), who has taken the strategic initiative (US or Karzai govt) ?

[Ken White]

Seriously, US forces assisted in the toppling of the previous imposed Afghan government and in the establishment of a new, democratically elected government. That was a strategic effort which was completed. That was followed by an operational effort to assist the newly formed government using FID authority under a Congressional Resolution and with continued support by Congress at that level. That supported Afghan government is in no position to launch a strategic initiative at this time so they are unlikely to attack Pakistan. Nor are we likely to do so as it isn't in our interest.

Thus it seems to me that the answer to your question is that no one has taken the strategic initiative; the 'D' in FID is Defense and that is what's occurring. You should be concerned with the legal aspects because that is the intent of the paragraph you quote.

On a practical rather than a legal level, people are making things go 'boom' and people are being killed -- that makes it a war, as I said earlier, a war with COIN like efforts included:
war (wôr)
n.
1.
a. A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties...A for real war in dictionary and practical terms if not one in US legal terms.

You and others may call it a COIN operation if you wish, you may call it FID if you wish. You may call it frangipani if you wish. You may also play with 50 USC 33 if you wish, I'm not going to do that and I'll call it a war because of the killing and dying. Besides, Joe will want to tell his Grandchildren he was in a war... :wry:

[Schmedlap]

Perceptions of "what is a war?" are weird.

I once had a law student tell me that the invasion of Iraq was not a war. This left me scratching my head. I then asked him a few questions, such as, "so the US military fighting against the Iraqi military is not a war?" Finally, he explained that it was not a declared war. Once that was established, I had to ask what significance that had to the original topic that we were discussing. He couldn't think of one. Neither could I. But it was weird that he would suddenly rise up on this point that was so insignificant within the context of the discussion. It is not an uncommon reaction - I've seen and heard it several times in other situations. I've never understood why people insist upon declaring open hostilities involving military forces to not be wars.

[Ken White]

Perceptions of "what is a war?" are weird...I've never understood why people insist upon declaring open hostilities involving military forces to not be wars.they'd rather be involved in helping others than acknowledge the job is essentially killing people; do all the COIN stuff you want to, you're still helping the Armed forces of the US kill opponents. For others, it's that line in the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8; "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" They read the first clause and ignore the rest and assume it has to be 'declared,' not knowing that if it is declared, there are a slew of Statutes on the books that give the Executive branch of the Federal Government some awesome powers and Congress wants to avoid that. That's why all our wars since WW II have not been 'declared.' I think all that boils down to differing agendas, perhaps... :rolleyes:

Then, of course, there are those who just want to be contrary. ;)

Best way to make the determination IMO is ask the folks that are there. All of 'em, see what the consensus is. On balance, I'm with you, even with those explanations seems to make little sense to me...

Quit picking on the squirrels at AM. 22-6 indeed... :D

[Greyhawk]

I think much of what drives this semantic discussion is that our political leadership is very much concerned with the semantics. This has much to do with now being in charge of things they've opposed (implied they would end, even) for the past few years and coming up with ways to explain and support the effort without using exact terms that countless YouTube clips would reveal them condemning.

This is not a comment on the worthiness of either our leadership or the semantic discussion here, merely an observation of what I perceive is happening. I believe that for some participants the NCA-level semantic discussion is divorced from any strategic decision making, btw. While that relationship is of concern to those here, and the framework of these discussions, for those "calling the shots" it's less "what is this that confronts us and is there an appropriate strategy" and more "how do we sell this? It's X but we can't call it that, we're anti-X after all."

(X meaning "war" or "surge" or any number of things. "Nation building" is certainly unpalatable too, for a slightly different reason.)

Speaking of marketable semantics, here's a WaPo headline over a well written and in many aspects troubling account of Marines in A'stan from Rajiv Chandrasekaran): "A Fight for Ordinary Peace".

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/11/AR2009071102815_pf.html

[Greyhawk]

The Marines will get no extra troops, American or Afghan. In light of that they've asked if they can arm the locals ala SoI (another semantic story, by the way) - but whatever it might be called, so far the answer is also "no".

What do they get? They get one year to do what Marines do. I'll bet they're well aware of what they're doing, and quite adept at explaining it in the correct terms to media embeds.

To bring that more in line with the topic of this thread, hopefully few will get their names in the paper for all the wrong reasons. Apparently (from another account) one group of Taliban, cornered in a building with female hostages walked away dressed in Burkas as part of a deal to let those females go.

On a "positive" note re: numbers - not in that story, but meanwhile some in Britain are arguing they should send more troops and gear. Their Afghan death toll just exceeded Iraq, and that "more" argument is the opposition response.

[Kiwigrunt]

Good article, Greyhawk. (‘A fight for ordinary peace.’)

Something else I think is potentially troubling is this:


Experts from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development will arrive in Nawa this summer to assist with longer-term reconstruction and governance initiatives, including a $300 million program to provide agricultural aid to 125,000 farmers through vouchers to purchase seeds and farm equipment. That program will also seek to employ 166,000 young men in projects for six months.

Once these hearts and minds have been bought, sorry, won, what happens in six months time? Do the farmers receive more vouchers? Are the workers given new jobs? It would appear to me that hearts and minds bought and then lost may end up becoming more troublesome than hearts and minds never won. And I say this without wanting to get into the ‘hearts and minds’ conversation as such (which I'm enjoying;)).

[added] hmmm, just realised this post is a bit off topic here.

[Ken White]

I think much of what drives this semantic discussion is that our political leadership is very much concerned with the semantics.The Truman, Kennedy and Johnson administrations all played that game in big wars while Reagan and Clinton played it in small ones. The more forthright Bush adminsitration initially did not but after the media jumped them over the 'harsh' rhetoric, even they played the game -- deluding the ignorant. :rolleyes:

Oh, well, at least we're still honest enough to call a Destroyer a Destroyer... :wry:
(X meaning "war" or "surge" or any number of things. "Nation building" is certainly unpalatable too, for a slightly different reason.)True; we have a poorly educated public and give too much space to far out fanatics on both sides of the political divide.
On a "positive" note re: numbers - not in that story, but meanwhile some in Britain are arguing they should send more troops and gear. Their Afghan death toll just exceeded Iraq, and that "more" argument is the opposition response.Simply the 'one-third rule' in operation. That's what drives the semantic discussion above.

Kiwi Grunt makes a pertinent observation:
Once these hearts and minds have been bought, sorry, won, what happens in six months time? ...Point derived from the linked articles and the comment is that we, NATO and other coalition members do not have enough troops to employ "COIN tactics" in Afghanistan -- much less will we all provide enough to do that. We can plus up the ANA and Afghan Police -- but who's going to pay for that plus up (Heh...)? Who's going to sustain that huge amount of money when, as they surely will, the west leaves?

Hearts and minds being won, foolish term that is often misunderstood as has been mentioned, costs big bucks. There is also a pretty tough human cost. Armed Social Work is not the panacea many seem to believe. Go in, stir things up to 'help,' to 'stabilize the situation' (by adding to the instabilty? :rolleyes:), make a big mess -- then leave.

Brilliant...

[jmm99]

My wife tells me my order from Amazon has arrived, including this one: Rules of Engagement? A Social Anatomy of an American War Crime. Operation Iron Triangle, Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0875866727/ref=ox_ya_oh_product). The blurbs indicate this is more a forensic study (with documentation) - so, perhaps more to a lawyer's interest than general interest.

Anyway, I expect I will be doing some reading in the next few days, since the order also includes Luttrell's Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B002B55XGI/ref=ox_ya_oh_product), which also was an ROE and Laws of War problem....

and two books by Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0316040932/ref=ox_ya_oh_product); and On Combat, The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0964920549/ref=ox_ya_oh_product). These could be total bullroar, but the blurbs looked interesting.

[IntelTrooper]

Anyway, I expect I will be doing some reading in the next few days, since the order also includes Luttrell's Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B002B55XGI/ref=ox_ya_oh_product), which also was an ROE and Laws of War problem....

I know this story is a sacred cow for many and Marcus Luttrell is undoubtedly a hero, but take his accounting of the events leading up to the firefight with a grain of salt.

[Ken White]

They tell me. :wry:

[IntelTrooper]

They tell me. :wry:
We must have acquaintances in common. ;)

[Ken White]

were involved in the aftermath and the -- is there a foremath? :confused:

Anyhoo, cleaning up is hard to do.

[IntelTrooper]

were involved in the aftermath and the -- is there a foremath? :confused:

Anyhoo, cleaning up is hard to do.
Pre-math? :p
I won't play the "do-you-know..." game, but as you know, there are those who know a lot about the circumstances and individuals involved who have elected not to speak out, so I'll honor their decision. I know they have their reasons. America needs a hero sometimes.

[Ken White]

with the hand they're dealt. Can't ask for more than that. We can and should ask that sometimes the dealers do a better job...

They don't always do the best they can with the deck they're given.

[IntelTrooper]

We can and should ask that sometimes the dealers do a better job...

They don't always do the best they can with the deck they're given.
Absolutely agreed.

[Greyhawk]

...who annoyed Hackworth by responding to his Vietnam criticisms that "war is war". :o

[Ken White]

and got 'em in ascending order of flakiness, too.

My opinion, of course. Good job. ;)

War is war, no one should get annoyed at that. Warfare differs wildly from time to time and place to place and person to person. Marshall and Hackworth were legends in their own minds. Grossman is less dangerous but not all that much though he is getting smarter as he gets older. Marshall and Hackworth did not; Hack in fact, got worse.

[Uboat509]

and two books by Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0316040932/ref=ox_ya_oh_product); and On Combat, The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0964920549/ref=ox_ya_oh_product). These could be total bullroar, but the blurbs looked interesting.

I'm reading On Combat for my Psychology 101 class. It's not bad so far.

SFC W

[jmm99]

or what ? ;)

Yes, I will heed your advice in reading the books - having read Marshall on Marshall, Hackworth on Marshall and Hackworth on Hackworth, following that advice will not be hard. Actually liked Hackworth's TV persona, lacking any personal knowledge of the man.

Grossman is an unknown quantity to me - anyway, those two books were for my personal consumption (perhaps, a better picture of my dad; probably not).

I growled my way through the first 20 pages of the first ROE book (which does have a lot of original documentation in later chapters). Let's say that the author and I have some basic differences on the Laws of War and ROE/RUFs. Which is not bad - scarcely worthwhile reading a book that completely agrees with me. Slow reading though. Hey, that's wrong - so, compose the counter-argument in my head. Next paragraph, same thing.

Regards to all you wise men :)

Mike

[Ken White]

I'm reading On Combat for my Psychology 101 class. It's not bad so far.I thought it was a lot better than "On Killing." Eight years later and the presence of co-authors probably helped. I've also talked to folks who've been to his recent lectures and apparently he's gotten still smarter. Some people do that as they age -- I, of course, elected not to do so... :D

I'm probably excessively suspicious of anyone who puts much reliance on psychology; while I acknowledge it's a discipline and has merits, I also believe people are very difficult to pigeon hole and that events can affect or change people in unexpected ways. I've seen veritable Tigers fall apart at small provocation and mousy types take on a Company -- literally. You never know what drives people...

[Greyhawk]

...the only good unit seen in Vietnam on their co-tour was his old one. They did everything perfectly.

Never crossed paths with any of the gentlemen, but that part of Hackworth's story had me shaking my head and chuckling. Maybe it was accurate, I don't know, wouldn't claim the right to judge and don't believe my opinion matters. But had he been a bit less glowing in his praise (esp in comparison to all others) he would have convinced me.

[Ken White]

As Vicky said, 'we were not amused.' LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=65320&postcount=11), LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76558&postcount=29).

Marshall was a political, cheerful and sort of unfocused type IMO -- did have some good stories, though. At least he had a sense of humor and was funny.

Hackworth OTOH was one of those people you meet everywhere, not just in the service, and who are memorable only for the force of their egos and their focus on appearances.

My son met Grossman, says he's okay. More than he says about some other icons he's met who are named here on occasion... :wry:

[Uboat509]

Group brought LTC Grossman in to speak to us before OIF V. At the time, we didn't know much about him other than some idea about his controversial theories. We were not enthusiastic about listening to that. It turned out though that he actually had some good stuff about physiological and psychological reactions to stress as well as some good stuff on PTSD. I thought he was a pretty good speaker. A good friend of mine was a little less impressed. He refers to him as the Tony Robbins of combat stress theory.

SFC W

[Fuchs]

It's (I think so) a bit related:

The Israelis have again troubles with "Cast Lead" veterans speaking out about war crimes. An organization called "Breaking the silence" seems to have published a report with testimonies.

German newspaper source (http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~EB9B27AAD41C4411EB1E8227DF7DB9408~ATpl~Ecommon ~Scontent.html) (newspaper with one of the best reputations in Germany)

My take on such things is probably already known, but I'd like to repeat myself:

War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war. Good example, discipline and control (good leadership) can only reduce the problem.

There's no white and black, and "our boys don't do that" is naive. Humans are almost the same everywhere, and they can turn ugly with an unpleasantly high chance once they've been subjected to war-like conditions.

It's about the environment, the conditions - not the boys.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment

[Ken White]

War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war. Good example, discipline and control (good leadership) can only reduce the problem.

There's no white and black, and "our boys don't do that" is naive. Humans are almost the same everywhere, and they can turn ugly with an unpleasantly high chance once they've been subjected to war-like conditions.Yes, true indeed. While those are true statements, a degree of naivete exists in the world. Putting anyone into a situation of danger is going to bring some pretty normal reactions -- even if those reactions would not be normal absent the danger. For example, in a similar story LINK (http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/666402), the headline is "Gaza invasion: 'If you're not sure – kill'."

Yes. Exactly what almost everyone in that situation should logically be expected do...

[William F. Owen]

It's (I think so) a bit related:

The Israelis have again troubles with "Cast Lead" veterans speaking out about war crimes. An organization called "Breaking the silence" seems to have published a report with testimonies.
Can't see how it is related, but this is the second bite at this one. Once the allegations made by some, were proved to be untrue, we now have a bunch of anonymous claims, which cannot be investigated.


There's no white and black, and "our boys don't do that" is naive. Humans are almost the same everywhere, and they can turn ugly with an unpleasantly high chance once they've been subjected to war-like conditions.

I concur, but there is vast difference, between abuses, and war crimes. Shooting holes in someone rooftop water tank, is not a war crime. Selective definitions of what does and does not constitute a crime is being used for political purposes. British Troops allegedly killed prisoners in Basra (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/06/basra-deaths-independent-inquiry). War crime? Abuse for sure.

GROSSMAN
Treat with extreme caution. I wrote a re-buttal to "On killing" a while back. He misuses several pieces of evidence and once challenged the core of his argument falls apart. Failure to participate in combat is not based on a lack of desire to kill. For example, he cites Marshall, but not Wigram. I have it in my list "misleading works."

[Starbuck]

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups.

Can we more correctly say "two or more armed groups"?

[William F. Owen]

Can we more correctly say "two or more armed groups"?
We could just say, "conflict between armed groups, of which two are the minimum number required to qualify."

[Polarbear1605]

"War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war."

Fully agree with the above statement but it raises the question of why, it seems, the general officers did not see these war crime incidents coming. Consequently, moving forward, if they are now expected, is there a better way to handle them? We seem to want to handle war crimes as a legal issue vs a laws of war issue. In my mind there is a significant difference. In Rules of Engagement? A Social Anatomy of an American War Crime. Operation Iron Triangle, Iraq., Mestrovic makes the point that when we go to prosecute the soldiers or Marines for a war crime, we do so with little or no evidence. It is very hard for anyone to collect legal evidence on a battle field; the plastic evidence bags make too good of a target as you seal them with your hands in front of your chest. In other words, I just can’t imagine a crime scene investigator stringing yellow crime scene tape across a battlefield. This then gets us into judicial water boarding http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/08/judicial-waterb.html that gives the appearance and perception of unfairness. Seems to me, we need to get the determination of a war crime away from the lawyers and back to the commanders.

[jmm99]

Good to see a post from you. :)

I'm presently slogging through Grossman's "On Killing" and Mestrovic (who drives me up a wall - he is a major piece of work).

Mestrovic is not gospel on this point:


from PB1605
Mestrovic makes the point that when we go to prosecute the soldiers or Marines for a war crime, we do so with little or no evidence. It is very hard for anyone to collect legal evidence on a battle field; the plastic evidence bags make too good of a target as you seal them with your hands in front of your chest. In other words, I just can’t imagine a crime scene investigator stringing yellow crime scene tape across a battlefield.

as Schmedlap points out in another thread, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=77128&postcount=53). As to the current abililty of combat units to gather evidence, I'll go with our CPT here at SWC rather than Mestrovic whose practical knowledge of such things is zilch.

I've got through only 3-1/2 chapters of Mestrovic's book (hard to read fast when every other paragraph gets a mental critique). I will say one good thing of him: he verbatims a lot of the evidence. And, there was a lot of evidence; the problem was that it was inconsistent.

He also is hung up on ROEs (which he does not understand). His thesis (as I now understand it) is that the "new ROE" (as he calls it) was a factor in the shootings of 4 Iraqis (the one in the window initially; and the 3 detainees later). I can't form any conclusions until I work through the book - and, if it seems worthwhile, look for more data via Google.

Your point here (in response to Fuchs) is a good one:



from Fuchs
"War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war."

from PB 1605
Fully agree with the above statement but it raises the question of why, it seems, the general officers did not see these war crime incidents coming. Consequently, moving forward, if they are now expected, is there a better way to handle them? We seem to want to handle war crimes as a legal issue vs a laws of war issue. In my mind there is a significant difference.

and ties in with Wilf's comment:


from Wilf
... there is vast difference, between abuses, and war crimes. Shooting holes in someone rooftop water tank, is not a war crime. Selective definitions of what does and does not constitute a crime is being used for political purposes.

I can't comment on flag officers' foresight. I do believe that these incidents loom much larger in hindsight (which, of course, is perfect), than in foresight. In short, if the incident is big enough, it is easy for an outside reviewer to say that the flag officers "should have known they were likely to occur and should have taken steps to prevent them."

In fact, that is Mestrovic's position, since he is in love with the Yugoslav-Hague and ICC rules that superior officers can be held liable on a "should have known" basis.

Truth in lending: that was the US position in Yama####a (http://supreme.justia.com/us/327/1/case.html) (Frank Murphy, a WWI Inf CPT, dissented with logic that applies as well today).


A military commission was appointed to try the petitioner for an alleged war crime. The trial was ordered to be held in territory over which the United States has complete sovereignty. No military necessity or other emergency demanded the suspension of the safeguards of due process. Yet petitioner was rushed to trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the most

Page 327 U. S. 28

elementary rules of evidence, and summarily sentenced to be hanged. In all this needless and unseemly haste, there was no serious attempt to charge or to prove that he committed a recognized violation of the laws of war. He was not charged with personally participating in the acts of atrocity, or with ordering or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit the acts of atrocity. The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford not the slightest precedent for such a charge. This indictment, in effect, permitted the military commission to make the crime whatever it willed, dependent upon its biased view as to petitioner's duties and his disregard thereof, a practice reminiscent of that pursued in certain less respected nations in recent years.

In my opinion, such a procedure is unworthy of the traditions of our people or of the immense sacrifices that they have made to advance the common ideals of mankind. The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied. But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned today. No one in a position of command in an army, from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. Indeed, the fate of some future President of the United States and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have been sealed by this decision.

In effect, Yama####a was executed on a charge of passive negligence.

The standard for war crimes has changed since the days of Yama####a and Nuremberg. In the Yama####a case, no question existed that Japanese forces had committed serious war crimes (some against friends of Frank Murphy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Murphy), who was the pre-WWII Governor-General and then High Commissioner of the Philippines). From my armchair, the standard appears to have moved more and more into the area of common crimes.

For example, CPT Hill and his 1SG were charged under the War Crimes statute (as incorporated into the UCMJ), but the facts would support only simple assault charges under criminal law (the 1SG for sitting on the guy's chest; Hill for discharging his pistol some distance away from the detainees as an implied threat).

----------------
PS: Wilf, if your review of "On Killing" is online, I'd appreciate a link.

[Polarbear1605]

Jmm99: like you, I am wading through Mestroic and you are not alone climbing those walls. Mestroic, however, does present a view from a very different angle that provides a good operational check of the brain housing group functional cycle; your replies to my blog comments have a similar effect. ;) I appreciate the mental function check.

I read “Schmedlap’s” link you provided. A whole bunch of questions there; Which army are we talking about? I believe that the US military has made little or no effort to charge, investigate and prosecute war crimes committed against US soldiers, Marines or civilians in either Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, General Ordinao, just released a enemy prisoner that executed four soldiers after they were captured. All DoD and Services Orders are very clear and state something like all war crimes will be reported, thoroughly investigated and corrective action taken of all war crimes committed by or against US and enemy personnel. To date, the US military seems to have ignored the word “against” in those Orders. And that is Orders with a capital “O”.
Next question: Is Schmedlap talking about war crimes or civil crimes? And this plays into one of my old arguments. In war, especially in insurgencies, judges are not always available. In the Haditha incident … no judges, no police, or any government reps…they were all beheaded or driven off by the bad guys. The only law that the Marines could bring to Haditha were the Laws of War. My old argument is that for that reason, in insurgencies, that has to be a conscious designated decision point, to switch from the Laws of War to the Rules of Law. You can’t make that switch until the friendly government has established itself in the area the military has seized, cleared and secured.

Your Capt Hill and 1stSgt Scott example surprised me. I must have missed it when they were charged with war crimes under the UCMJ 134 Article. I will go back and do some more research. But if so, that will be one of the first true War Crime cases I have come across. I say true because from my understanding, the only way to bring a Title 18 War Crimes charge into the military legal system is Art 134. BTW I have yet to find a military lawyer that would recommend that route.
I think, the Capt Hill case is a better an example of an officer standing by his integrity (to his detriment…basically, he admitted, Yes! That is exactly what I did) and his service working the legal plea bargaining system to avoid the embarrassment of a court martial lacking physical evidence. In addition, and I don’t think that Capt Hill realized this, but his defense was an argument for the Laws of War principle of “military necessity” and that is where it would have gotten embarrassing for the Army. And again, the only law Capt Hill had out there in "only Gawd knows where Afghanistan" were the Laws of War and again, we switch the trigger pullers, to their detriment, back to the Rules of Law standard using the UCMJ.

Your turn to think...;)

[jmm99]

than my avatar - so how could I disagree with you - see me submitting - Baaaa ... And besides, the Golden Rule for French-Canadian males is not to get mixed up with Polar Bears. Of course, you also know that the Golden Rule for French-Canadian women is the opposite. :D

I'll take your comments in reverse order - actually no real mind benders here (most all of this stuff is taught in one or another of the USMC manuals, which you know better than I).


I think, the Capt Hill case is a better an example of an officer standing by his integrity (to his detriment…basically, he admitted, Yes! That is exactly what I did) and his service working the legal plea bargaining system to avoid the embarrassment of a court martial lacking physical evidence. In addition, and I don’t think that Capt Hill realized this, but his defense was an argument for the Laws of War principle of “military necessity” and that is where it would have gotten embarrassing for the Army. And again, the only law Capt Hill had out there in "only Gawd knows where Afghanistan" were the Laws of War and again, we switch the trigger pullers, to their detriment, back to the Rules of Law standard using the UCMJ.

Amen - and "necessity" was exactly the defense my brain came to.


Your Capt Hill and 1stSgt Scott example surprised me. I must have missed it when they were charged with war crimes under the UCMJ 134 Article. I will go back and do some more research. But if so, that will be one of the first true War Crime cases I have come across. I say true because from my understanding, the only way to bring a Title 18 War Crimes charge into the military legal system is Art 134. BTW I have yet to find a military lawyer that would recommend that route.

Yup, I too was surprised by the use of this combo of Title 18 + Art 134 (not that it could be used - here is a long 2005 article on it in html format (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6007/is_57/ai_n16520067/?tag=content;col1) and pdf format (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435148&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) analyzing "Integrating Title 18 war crimes into Title 10: a proposal to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice", which I downloaded last year). I got the Title 18 charge reference from the lawyers' statement (http://www.puckettfaraj.com/cpt-roger-hill/):


Puckett & Faraj, PC are often called upon to defend the courageous and moral men and women of our military. In their service to their country, these young military members are called on to make difficult decisions to save the lives of those they lead. CPT Roger Hill did just that on the battlefield in the mountains of Afghanistan last fall. The Army charged him with wrongfully inflicting cruel and inhuman treatment to detainees under the 18 USC Section 2441 — War Crimes.

Under the Rule of Law (domestic US), the facts alleged in the charges would support a simple physical assault (1SG), unlawful discharge of a firearm and a non-physical assault if that discharge caused someone to feel "threatened" (CPT). No way those "civilian" charges would support a charge carrying a life sentence. But, that is how Title 18 + Article 134 were used to coerce the 1SG and CPT. A low day for military lawyers (IMO). End soapbox speech.


Next question: Is Schmedlap talking about war crimes or civil crimes? And this plays into one of my old arguments. In war, especially in insurgencies, judges are not always available. In the Haditha incident … no judges, no police, or any government reps…they were all beheaded or driven off by the bad guys. The only law that the Marines could bring to Haditha were the Laws of War. My old argument is that for that reason, in insurgencies, that has to be a conscious designated decision point, to switch from the Laws of War to the Rules of Law. You can’t make that switch until the friendly government has established itself in the area the military has seized, cleared and secured.

I'll let Schmedlap tell you what he is talking about. This is a "transition" issue, which is your area of expertise. From my armchair, establishing a HN Rule of Law presence in an AO is a tough proposition (not impossible, just tough) and requires more than a military effort. The "more" being a large civilian input (cops, lawyers & judges, at least as advisors), which so far has been hard to come by to meet the standards of, say, Dobbin's Nation Building.


I read “Schmedlap’s” link you provided. A whole bunch of questions there; Which army are we talking about? I believe that the US military has made little or no effort to charge, investigate and prosecute war crimes committed against US soldiers, Marines or civilians in either Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, General Ordinao, just released a enemy prisoner that executed four soldiers after they were captured. All DoD and Services Orders are very clear and state something like all war crimes will be reported, thoroughly investigated and corrective action taken of all war crimes committed by or against US and enemy personnel. To date, the US military seems to have ignored the word “against” in those Orders. And that is Orders with a capital “O”.

Again, Schmedlap can throw in his 2 or more cents worth. I agree and suggest that "war crimes" prosecutions, either before (1) revived MCA commissions; (2) Federal District courts; or (3) a National Security Court, would be a method of taking offensive lawfare against members of Transnational Violent Non-State Actors. In fact, I would go a step further and indict AQ as a international war criminal organization ala the Nurenberg standards and RICO.

Take a few ibuprofens for your head - and stay cool (or move up here - think we may have come close to frost last nite). Noticed I screwed up and promoted you from leaf to bird. That's at least better than what I did to Tom Odom last year by making him a deceased LTG by calling him Bill. :D

Cheers to all

Mike

[Polarbear1605]

And learning always creates additional questions. I understand War Crimes can carry a greater max punishment when compared to the UCMJ. But your comment then gets us into the role of plea bargaining that happens in most of these cases. There is no provision for plea bargaining in the UCMJ. What is the authority for plea bargaining in the UCMJ process? …it has to be the Commander (Convening Authority). Do commanders understand that? I ask that question because I feel that plea bargaining if a lawyer's “free kill zone” despite a set of legal ROE.

And a clarification here, in Capt Hill’s case, if the charges are War Crimes, are the elements of proof things like “military necessity, distinction, and proportionality” compared with the Rules of Law elements of proof?

That reference “Integrating Title 18 war crimes into Title 10” is what I have been in search of for months…THANKS!

[jmm99]

In reverse order - and after some thought, CPT Hill had at least two defenses, which are interconnected.

One is the argument that only "grave breaches" of the Laws of War and the Conventions are subject to the criminal sanctions of "war crimes". MCRP 4-11.8B (http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCRP%204-11.8B%20War%20Crimes.pdf) War Crimes (2005), pp.10-11, gives an overview. This is a good publication (and it's doctrine ;) ; although it has to be read in light of the cases since 2005).

The other defense is "necessity" (in the legal sense), which is controversial (especially if someone is killed). The argument is that "legal necessity" applies when the harm generated by the decision is materially less than if the decision had not been made. In the UCMJ context, the concept is not that much different from “military necessity, distinction, and proportionality”. I don't know whether a military judge would buy that defense, or whether it has ever been asserted in a court-martial (as a formal defense).

--------------
As to plea bargains under the UCMJ, my experience is limited (more in the civilian criminal justice area). Plea bargains have many reasons. One is that the prosecution overcharged (as in Hill). Another is that without them (try every case) the system would overload and grind to a halt. Anyway, they are with us as part of the institutionalized system.

Once upon a time (a long time ago), JMM tried a UCMJ case to its conclusion - before a military judge, sans a military jury. The case involved a nuclear device and a B-52 (which is to say enough). Judgment was for the accused, which ended the matter, right. No, wrong. Higher command was very unhappy with the result (as a precedent for future cases - and possible publicity). My client was happy with the result, but there were some future adverse civil consequences. Some genius (that's not being sarcastic) at higher HQ came up with a solution that involved dropping all charges (as though the case never happened) and giving my client a bargain he couldn't refuse - no coercion, he thought it was a good deal.

So, plea bargains can cut both ways and become something of a win-win for each side.

[Greyhawk]

...and by that I mean "I'm confused".

Was Cpt Hill "charged" with anything? Was there a "plea bargain" in the legal sense? (There seems to have been a bargain, as happens in such cases.)

There was an art 32 hearing, there was no court martial. I'm not certain the art 32 hearing reached any conclusion. (Though it did end.)

[jmm99]

but let's work through the 2008 MCM (http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/mcm.pdf).

A court-martial is (RCM Rule 103):


(8) “Court - martial” includes, depending on the context:

(A) The military judge and members of a general or special court-martial;

(B) The military judge when a session of a general or special court-martial is conducted without members under Article 39(a);

(C) The military judge when a request for trial by military judge alone has been approved under R.C.M. 903;

(D) The members of a special court-martial when a military judge has not been detailed; or

(E) The summary court-martial officer.

So, a court-martial technically is the folks who try you - not the trial or the process leading up to the trial, or following it. That being said I have a tendency to be sloppy and say X was court-martialed (pedantly wrong).

However, RCM Preamble, 2(b) has this to say:


(b) Agencies. The agencies through which military jurisdiction is exercised include:

(1) Courts-martial for the trial of offenses against military law and, in the case of general courts-martial, of persons who by the law of war are subject to trial by military tribunals. See Parts II, III, and IV of this Manual for rules governing courts-martial.
....
(4) Non judicial punishment proceedings of a commander under Article 15. See Part V of this Manual.

Now, of Parts II (RULES FOR COURTS–MARTIAL), III (MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE) and IV (PUNITIVE ARTICLES), Part II cover the "court-martial" process from initiation of charges through final appeal.

In time order, we have RCM Rule 307 Preferral of charges; and then Rule 405 Pretrial investigation (Article 32 investigation). The charges and specifications have to be in standard form - Charge Sheet (DD Form 458). A Rule 405 Pretrial investigation is required unless waived by the accused.

My understanding from reading what Greyhawk and I posted elsewhere (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76831&postcount=23), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76903&postcount=27) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76905&postcount=28)) is the following:

1. Charges and specifications were filed - I haven't seen the charge sheet (looked for an on-line, but found none).

2. An Article 32 investigation was launched and almost completed, except for the Article 32 report (maybe filed, but not released; I don't know).

3. The process was then diverted to an Article 15 via the agreement, but I've seen no documentation on how that was done - or what the Article 15 looked like.

If anyone has found the documentation for the Hill case on-line, that would be helpful.

[Schmedlap]

Quit picking on the squirrels at AM. 22-6 indeed... :D

Are you referring to this (http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/07/send-coin-manuals-india.html)? That could have been any Schmedlap. I admit nothing.

[Ken White]

I knew your Uncle Smedley -- he was devious also... :D