Blog Post Critique of FM 3.07

[mikekuhn]

I found an interesting blog on International Aid that is hosted/written by Dr. William Easterly titled "Aid Watch". He's the author of the book “White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”. There are a pair of posts on his blog that might be of particular interest to the SWJ Community; in one post titled "J'accuse: the US Army's Development Delusions (http://blogs.nyu.edu/fas/dri/aidwatch/2009/06/jaccuse_the_us_armys_developme.html)" Dr. Easterly goes after FM 3-07 saying that "(m)ore in sorrow than in anger, I see the utopian social engineering craze might affect actions of people with guns. I am sad for Iraqis and Afghans that the U.S. Army is operating in their countries guided by such misguided ideas”. In a response to his critique, LTC Steve Leonard, from LTG Caldwell’s Commander’s Initiatives Group, (http://blogs.nyu.edu/fas/dri/aidwatch/2009/06/the_us_army_fights_me_back_in.html) argues that “the manual is not intended to serve as military solution to a much broader and more complex problem, but a guide for military leaders to better understand and execute their appropriate roles and responsibilities within the framework of national and international approaches to these operations”.

Dr. Easterly’ blog is a bit provocative, but I've found it interesting and the debate worth reading. Just thought I'd share in case it would interest anyone.

[Ken White]

"More in sorrow than in anger, I see the utopian social engineering craze might affect actions of people with guns."I could phrase it differently but his point, Armies are not the right people for the job, is more than valid.

[goesh]

It sure makes the Obama Admin look weak, IMO, very weak and femmy when it comes to killing enemies - dragging ol' 'shotgun' Cheney into it, like a bunch of whining kids uncertain of themselves and needing a scapegoat in case something doesn't show well in the polls.

[William F. Owen]

we will …defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. …. to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world….{with} a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.

Correct me, if I'm wrong, but isn't that all about strategic aims?
Isn't this a bit above the pay grade of those associated with issue concerned? Stability Operations, should support the strategy. Not the other way around.

[Tom Odom]

Correct me, if I'm wrong, but isn't that all about strategic aims?

Answer: yes, certainly relates to lines of effort


Isn't this a bit above the pay grade of those associated with issue concerned?

Answer: hardly, as they are inherent in stability operations to one degree or another, which are in support (hopefully) of a strategy

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Answer: yes, certainly relates to lines of effort

Answer: hardly, as they are inherent in stability operations to one degree or another, which are in support (hopefully) of a strategy

Tom

OK, the content and purpose of the Manual is predicated, on explicitly stated strategic aims, such as,
"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world."
Am I the only person uncomfortable with that? Sounds like a an entirely political statement to me.

[Tom Odom]

OK, the content and purpose of the Manual is predicated, on explicitly stated strategic aims, such as,
"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world."
Am I the only person uncomfortable with that? Sounds like a an entirely political statement to me.

Wilf

It is an FM on stability operations; as such it is a user's manual for those handed such missions, not a guide to picking them.

Tom

[marct]

Hi Folks,


OK, the content and purpose of the Manual is predicated, on explicitly stated strategic aims, such as,
"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world."
Am I the only person uncomfortable with that? Sounds like a an entirely political statement to me.


It is an FM on stability operations; as such it is a user's manual for those handed such missions, not a guide to picking them.

Tom, while I agree with your point, I think that Wilf is raising an important issue that this is, broadly speaking, "political". As an analog, how well do you think DoS would do if they were told to use all means necessary (without DoD) to restore peace in Somalia :wry:?

Kidding aside, that phrase "address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world" bothers me. It assumes that


those causes are known;
the way to correct them is know;
the corrections will end up serving US strategic purposes; and, finally,
the "root cause(s)" are not the result of US operations.

It furthermore implies that any root causes leading to conflict amongst enfranchised populations are to be outside the scope of stability operations. In effect, it is mirroring the ontological position that assumes that if they are democracies they will be fine and our friends; a dangerous (and invalid) assumption.

I'll second Wilf and go a bit further: it is not only a political mission, it is a political mission with a very clear agenda ( a "mission with a mission" as it were :wry:).

Now, having written that, and probably PO'd a fair number of people, let's flip it around. First off, I would hold that all military action is "political" is some sense. Second, all "political" action is local action (I'm showing my early readin in Alinsky here!). "Stability Operations", as currently conceived, is all about coming up with some type of satisficing behaviour, not about achieving Utopian results. Yes, it is "political", but it is political in the "knock there heads together until they can play nicely" type of schoolyard politics.

[William F. Owen]

It is an FM on stability operations; as such it is a user's manual for those handed such missions, not a guide to picking them.


I fully agree with that statement, so why are the two introductions giving me clear political contexts and circumstances in which those operations will be applied.

Surely you aim to conduct stability operations "as and when required." Stability being relative and very context specific.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, while I agree with your point, I think that Wilf is raising an important issue that this is, broadly speaking, "political". As an analog, how well do you think DoS would do if they were told to use all means necessary (without DoD) to restore peace in Somalia ?

Again this is an Army FM--it is not an exclusionary document that says we will operate by ourselves (as in the Army and greater DoD). Yes it is political and it has to be: a stability operation is very political in all phases.

As for assuming that causes of instability can be identified etc etc, it has to assume those in non-specific terms because again it is a manual and as such provides a general approach versus a specific approach.

It is therefore making no specific assumptions; rather your argument assumes that it is.

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,


It is therefore making no specific assumptions; rather your argument assumes that it is.

Actually, I agree with most of your points (general vs. specific, political, etc.). I do, however, think that it is making certain specific assumptions some of which are generally valid (i.e. the basic need for "security") and others which aren't (i.e. broad assumptions about democracy). We can certainly agree to disagree on their existence ;).

Cheers,

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Hi Tom,



Actually, I agree with most of your points (general vs. specific, political, etc.). I do, however, think that it is making certain specific assumptions some of which are generally valid (i.e. the basic need for "security") and others which aren't (i.e. broad assumptions about democracy). We can certainly agree to disagree on their existence ;).

Cheers,

Marc
Marc and Wilf,

General equals broad. A need for security is broad as they get. The point being is that someone using this manual will at least consider those elements in connection with (hopefully) a joint (interservice), interagency, and combined (multinational) planning effort.

Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.

None of what I said so far is an argument for more stability operations or a pitch that military forces are the best tool in the toolbox. It is certainly not an argument that such efforts will succeed; each case is different and success (or failure) is equally relative.

But as I work right now in one--my third--I can attest that we do get picked when no one else can or will do the job. We do not get to pick or not pick our missions; our influence is on how we execute those we are picked to do and this manual addresses that issue.

No worries
Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Wilf, you don't have the good or misfortune to teach at a university but you are probably as aware as Marc or I of the lousy quality of the textbooks that often are used. Even some of the "good" ones have serious problems. Many of you are familiar with AMU. Here is an example from there:
I just finished teaching a grad course on International Political Systems. The textbook - there were numerous additional readings as well - was one of the standard undergraduate IR texts, this one by Chuck Kegley. Chuck is an excellent scholar and his text is one of the better ones. But as an overview of IR it leaves much to be desired - as do all the others.:eek: I see FMs as being the military's textbooks. They provide a place to start thinking about how to address the problems of their particular topic. In no way do they provide all the answers.

Marc, so do you support CvC or are you on some other side of the
issue?:confused:

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

I see FMs as being the military's textbooks. They provide a place to start thinking about how to address the problems of their particular topic. In no way do they provide all the answers.


To me, FMs, FSR, or any Manual is actually quite important. It's more than a text book. It's what you teach, or should be. It should provide the common text on which collective understanding and discussion takes place.

So an FM on "Jungle and Forest Operations" should layout all you need to know about operating/fighting in the jungle. It should cover both the Why and How. "Helicopters are important because..."

It should at no stage should it say, "We must operate in jungles to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." - which sounds like the Soviet Field Service Regulations!

It might say, "The Commander in chief requires the US Army to be proficient in conducting all forms of military operations in jungle and forest terrain."

I take your point about bad text books. Is the one under discussion an example?

[marct]

Hi John,

Love the textbook analogy :D!


Marc, so do you support CvC or are you on some other side of the issue?:confused:

"Support" him? In what way? CvC had his worldview based in Newtonian physics, while mine is based in quantum mechanics. There are definite points of overlap, but we aren't operating in the same universe of discourse.

If you mean his "continuation of politics [actually, I think "policies" is a better translation] by other means", then the answer is "sort of". I view politics as the ecology of human interaction where that interaction takes place along a series of skewed probability vectors based on a) froms of social relations, b) cultural forms of interaction, and c) a co-operation-conflict continuum.

[William F. Owen]

If you mean his "continuation of politics [actually, I think "policies" is a better translation] by other means", then the answer is "sort of". I view politics as the ecology of human interaction where that interaction takes place along a series of skewed probability vectors based on a) froms of social relations, b) cultural forms of interaction, and c) a co-operation-conflict continuum.

Well I recently had a discussion about applying CvC's observations to the books of the Old Testament. It's all in there!! :D

[marct]

Well I recently had a discussion about applying CvC's observations to the books of the Old Testament. It's all in there!! :D

What, like this one (http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Kjv1Mac.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=all) :eek::D?

[William F. Owen]

What, like this one (http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Kjv1Mac.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=all) :eek::D?

Yep, all good stuff. Nothing much has changed. Annoying things still happen in Samaria and the Syrians are still as much a nuisance. However, I am pretty sure that the Book of the Maccabees does not form part of the old Testament... and just checking the copy above my desk, it does not.

[J Wolfsberger]

However, I am pretty sure that the Book of the Maccabees does not form part of the old Testament... and just checking the copy above my desk, it does not.

For some of us, it does. :D

[Ken White]

Again this is an Army FM--it is not an exclusionary document that says we will operate by ourselves (as in the Army and greater DoD). Yes it is political and it has to be: a stability operation is very political in all phases. True but I flat out object to mellifluous tone of a number of our manuals today. As Wilf mentioned this is scary:

""address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world.""

That's not remotely military and it lays the Army open to being misunderstood -- plus it's indicative of a mind set that says 'we can help the rest of you benighted clods.' Not a good message to send IMO.
But as I work right now in one--my third--I can attest that we do get picked when no one else can or will do the job. We do not get to pick or not pick our missions; our influence is on how we execute those we are picked to do and this manual addresses that issue.Understood and agreed -- I submit we are also guilty for various selfish reasons of encouraging that pick; that our influence could be better (for us and the nation) used to insure the best agencies get picked for jobs, not the one that is most available and that it would behoove us on some of these missions to be more honest and up front with our political masters.

John T. makes a very cogent point:
I see FMs as being the military's textbooks. They provide a place to start thinking about how to address the problems of their particular topic. In no way do they provide all the answers.He, as usual, is correct. The problem is that we do not educate or train people to realize that; we tell 'em the book is the gospel -- mostly because it's easier on the trainers. That is IMO, more criminal than not telling the politicians all we know about what's likely to happen.

MarcT's comment:
If you mean his "continuation of politics [actually, I think "policies" is a better translation] by other means", then the answer is "sort of". I view politics as the ecology of human interaction where that interaction takes place along a series of skewed probability vectors based on a) froms of social relations, b) cultural forms of interaction, and c) a co-operation-conflict continuum.Is correct I think and is more than pertinent because the probability of "skewed probability vectors" is significantly enhanced when force is introduced (no matter by whom). Put force in the equation and you really get very badly and dangerously skewed probability vectors. Add in the other two factors and you go from bad to worse. Those situations are not fun...:wry:

That leads back to another accurate comment from Tom Odom:
Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.The Prof is mostly wrong on that but it does send a message that brilliant minds have considered this and it is feasible. It may not be -- Afghanistan being an example -- and it, unless you read the fine print (which Politicians are unlikely to do or understand even if they did) sends the message 'this can be done and we really know how.' IOW, the METT-TC problems are elided for the civilian policy maker who thus might make a flawed decision. I've noticed many of those do not trust folks in uniform and thus read our books to make their decisions...

John's point also comes into play -- people believe the book, rightly or wrongly. If the book say this is good, people will believe that -- even if it's dumber than a box of rocks as a thing to do. Therefor, what is written in the books becomes terribly important in the armed forces...

As an aside, committees of scholars under time pressure and concerned with politically acceptable phraseology likely will not produce good books that can be read and applied by the inexperienced. Napoleon knew this (at least mythically). :mad:

Thinking about something in advance is emphatically better than ignoring it until too late. Wasn't there some idea of teaching people HOW to think instead of what to think? I believe thinking in advance is highly desirable -- but flawed thinking can send you on tangents and into doing things better done in other ways.

[Old Eagle]

The point of 3-07 was to give substance to that block of full spectrum operations called stability operations. Mind you, I was forced to take 2.5 credit hours of STABOPS in undergrad a hundred years ago, so this is by no means "new".

In the years after the live fire exercise in Southeast Asia, we got exceptionally good at "two up and one back". The various MRE/MRXs made us an Army second to none in that area. But every major exercise I ever participated in, ENDEX was called, AAR, clean the gear and go home. This inculcated the misperception that in real combat, once the military force was defeated (or disappeared) we could declare victory, AAR, clean the gear and go home. Everything else was allocated to the "not my yob" box. This attitude is both wrong and dangerous, as we learned after completion of major combat operations in Iraq.

3-07 provides insight for planners and operators on what additional challenges might lurk around "2 up & 1 back" and ways to think about dealing with them.

[marct]

Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.The Prof is mostly wrong on that but it does send a message that brilliant minds have considered this and it is feasible. It may not be -- Afghanistan being an example -- and it, unless you read the fine print (which Politicians are unlikely to do or understand even if they did) sends the message 'this can be done and we really know how.' IOW, the METT-TC problems are elided for the civilian policy maker who thus might make a flawed decision. I've noticed many of those do not trust folks in uniform and thus read our books to make their decisions...

John's point also comes into play -- people believe the book, rightly or wrongly. If the book say this is good, people will believe that -- even if it's dumber than a box of rocks as a thing to do. Therefor, what is written in the books becomes terribly important in the armed forces...

That was pretty much the point I was trying to get at in my ham fisted way, Ken. Basically, if you have a "book" then people who don't know better will think that you can do StabOps, and the activists amongst them will think that you should do them (think Darfur for an example). Whether we look at them as textbooks (here's how you do it), capabilities statements (look, we can do it) or political works (here is why you do it), they will be misread by a lot of people... including politicians :D!

ps. And yes, I do think that thinking in advance is an excellent idea, Tom :D.

[John T. Fishel]

Marc, ol' CvC was hamstrung by the German language which, like Spanish and others, uses one word - politika or politica - to mean both politics and policies. CvC uses it to mean both, depending on context and uses similar phrases throughout all 8 Books of On War.

Other than that, i'm with you.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

Warning: I have not yet read this manual, and have only briefly scanned the comments in this thread, but a couple of quick comments:

1. ]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/I]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID). This should also be supported by a solid effort to go after the insurgent himself (direct approach) and establish security; again, executed ideally by-with-and through the Host nation.

(note to all who think "indirect approach" means using HN forces to kill rogue members of his populace -- it's not. That is still the direct approach, and still focused at the symptom of the true problem.)

2. I suspect the Army's approach to "root causes" is probably way way too focused on producing effectiveness of government. This is where I see us often making a multi-billion, multi-year, mistake. Insurgency is neither caused nor cured by ineffective governmental services per se. I stand by the much simpler standard of addressing "poorness" of governance. BW defined as some grievance, real or perceived, held by some significant segment of the populace that they feel so strongly about as to rise to violence; that they also perceive they have no legitmate means to address.

This means:
Leave the Battalions of foreign civilian workers at home; set your bag of effectiveness metrics down; and simply get out among the people and conduct some polling to identify and map these core issues. Then implement a program to help the HN to address these issues (which may well cause significant changes of that same government) concurrent with driving the devlopment of a reliable system for the populace to address such issues in the future short of conflict.

We make this harder than it needs to be; and meddling in another country's internal conflicts is hard enough as it is. Also, taking this leaner, less US-Centric approach also helps minimize the perception of US legitimacy over the HN government, and that should always be our primary goal of any engagement, be it with friend or foe.

[John T. Fishel]

worked pretty well in El Salvador (FID/COIN - we do former they do latter), Panama (simple intervention followed by FID) but it didn't work and won't work in Haiti - a failed state in 1915, 1994, 2004, and today. The choice there is keeping the lid on and mitigating the worst effects of state failure for a very long time of finding the "root causes" of that failure and fixing them which may be mission impossible or at least mission too costly. I haven't mentioned the Balkan cases or Somalia but the latter has some similarities with Haiti made more urgent by piracy.... FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.A start point? IMO, if the Army has to implement the provisions of that manual in any degree, you've entered at a mid point if not a near end point. If the start point is usually predicted --and it is -- then failure of the US government to act in its interest to preclude deploying forces is a significant abrogation of responsibility and a potential error of great magnitude. That's for the future.

For the past, Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan are exceptions, respectively due to a treaty (which should not have been signed); the need to send a strong message (made so by the failure to act of four previous administrations from both major parties. In the event, better timing and execution would've been nice); and a necessary response to undue provocation (which need not have entailed us saying we would stay and fix it -- but we did). Other smaller interventions on a low key basis have been much more successful; witness 1st SFG in the Philippines today. Even the exceptions noted prove the point that getting smarter up front is beneficial.

Bob's World is correct, the "Indirect Approach" encouraged by SOCOM should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation and early enough to avoid a major troop commitment which is in no ones interest. He adds "they do the COIN, we do the FID". True but better to preempt that need if possible; if that's not possible as will occasionally be the case then the manual is adequate if over wordy. Like me ;)

It is true that Haiti and Somalia are for various reasons particularly intractable and problematic. So is Afghanistan. Entry into the problems of such nations can be seen in advance as particularly onerous and should be avoided other than as one member of a large coalition -- in which we are NOT the largest contributor of money or troops (because the more we do, the less others will do). For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

[Ron Humphrey]

For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

Something that the new command would have been set up to help avoid.

[Ken White]

only hope...

[William F. Owen]

1. ]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/I]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID).

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

[Bob's World]

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

The essence of SF is deal with root causes, and this has little to do with making policy, as we don't pick where we go or determine what our missions are when we get there.

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"... Certainly there is a role they can play as they possess so much tremendous capacity and talent, but as a whole are far better at "pounding out a cure" than subtlely preventing the problem in the first place; which probably gets to the heart of WILF's concern.

[Mark O'Neill]

US SOCOM is not the 'owner' of the idea of the 'indirect approach'. It was (to the best of my knowledge)first codified by Liddell Hart in Strategy (Faber and Faber, London, 1954) and subsequently expanded upon by Andre Beaufre ('war in the minor key') inAn introduction to strategy (1965) and strategy of action (1967?).

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOF.....

Cheers

Mark

[marct]

Hi John,


Marc, ol' CvC was hamstrung by the German language which, like Spanish and others, uses one word - politika or politica - to mean both politics and policies. CvC uses it to mean both, depending on context and uses similar phrases throughout all 8 Books of On War.

Other than that, i'm with you.

Hmm, didn't know that - thanks, John! Quite the argument in support of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapir-Whorf_hypothesis) ;).

[Ken White]

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"...Stupid argument. We're all supposed to be on the same side...

And don't cite 'reality' -- it is reality only because people who should know better and care more continue to perpetrate and encourage it for their own ends. Parochialism is as or more deadly than politics... :mad:

[Ken White]

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOFA lot of things predate the creation of US SOF as it exists today. Some of were doing that stuff before the current version hatched. Some of us were there at the creation. Many of us who strongly support the Force and have done so for years question some of the directions now apparently being taken.

I'd also add that doing the totally expected thing on bad route and / or repetitiously is NOT an indirect approach...

[Bob's World]

US SOCOM is not the 'owner' of the idea of the 'indirect approach'. It was (to the best of my knowledge)first codified by Liddell Hart in Strategy (Faber and Faber, London, 1954) and subsequently expanded upon by Andre Beaufre ('war in the minor key') inAn introduction to strategy (1965) and strategy of action (1967?).

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOF.....

Cheers

Mark

Agree Agree! First place I saw the term is in Sun Tzu. I meant the current GWOT use of the phrase within the US military as based upon operations in OEF-Philippines.

Clearly it is an old phrase with many meanings. The meanings I lay out are those that match its application to the operations that have put it back on the table. No copy right infringement intended!:)

[John T. Fishel]

The article on Sapir-Whorf is interesting. Politica/politika really doesn't cause a problem because what is meant by the term is usually quite clear from the context. It sometimes becomes problematic in translation but then all translation is problematic.:eek: A particularly interesting linguistic example from English v Spanish is the verb to compromise. In English it can mean to become committed or to reach an agreement where each sid gives up something. In Spanish the only meaning of comprometer is to become committed. Kind of like being a littel pregnant - uh, embarasada - embarrassed :o

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

OK, but that's not a decision SOCOM or anyone else in the Armed Forces can make. Military engagement is an entirely political decision driven by party politics that underpin the US foreign policy.

You guys do what the politicians tell you. Helping the disenfranchised is a party political decision.

[John T. Fishel]

Don't mistake the US political system for a European style party system. The 1920s - 30s Oklahoma cowboy humorist, Will Rogers, put it well when he said, "I'm not a member of an organized political party, I'm a Democrat!" While our political parties are the single best predictors of how our Congressmen and Senators vote, the correlation is far from perfect. When Senator Arlen Spector changed parties from Republican to Democrat his new party was well aware that he would vote against them whenever he chose to do so - unlike when Winston Churchill crossed the aisle to become a Conservative again after many years as a Liberal.
Remember too, that there is as much battle between the institutions of government - Pres v Congress - as between the parties. Mr Obama has appointed a couple of Republicans to his Cabinet - most prominent is SECDEF Bob Gates - as his predecessor had appointed at least one Democrat. American policies are not party policies, although party preferences do have an effect on shaping them. They are the product of institutional and personal experiences, education, and training tempered somewhat by party.
So, the American military responds to its political masters far more on an institutional basis than on a party basis. Moreover, by our law - the National Security Act of 1947 as amended - and through 62 years of practice, the American military in the form of the CJCS is very much involved in the deliberations that establish Presidential policy. While the CJCS is a "statutory advisor" to the Pres, SECDEF, and the NSC, he is a full member of the policymaking Principals Committtee, the VCJCS is a full member of the Deputies Committee, and Joint Staff officers are full members of the intergency working groups/committees (by whatever name they currently have) that make defense and foreign policy under the NSC.
In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.:cool:

Understood, and thanks. However, I think my broad point is still valid. The military does not choose the strategy to which they contribute.

Nor, for the most part can they usefully predict what that strategy maybe, unless they can predict political developments world wide - which history shows, none of us can!