Winning hearts and minds

[MikeF]

A continuiation of this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776).....

We take winning the hearts and minds as dogma- simple truth to theory, not to be contested with practice.

Can anyone provide an example of a thriving modern-day nation-state influenced by western intervention...i.e. western intervention won the hearts and minds of the local populace?

Modern day Germany and Japan do not count as they were had democracy/capatilism forced on them through occupation. We proclaim NOT to enforce an empire.....

I find it funny that our own conservatist are so anti-government, but they believe that we have the wisdom to intervene in others' affairs. G. Washington warned us against this...

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

Mike

Winning hearts and minds is a slogan and nothing more to address the non-lethal aspects of COIN, IW or whatever we are calling it at the time. When used in the context of a conflict, it is never applied in isolation. The lethal is always present.

As for the hearts and minds, the reality is like the two guys running from the same bear. One says to the other, "I don't have to out run him. Just you." It is not a popularity context; it is an acceptance of legitimacy issue for the government versus the insurgent.

Are you positing a thriving modern state as the target of a western intervention or the result of such an intervention?

Tom

[MikeF]

Tom,

I wish that I had a position or an answer...As far as current policies go, I'm stuck in the middle. I'm sorry to add that most of our theories will simply play out over time.

My fear is that the "hearts and minds" is over-simplified for the average solder. In this forum, we may call it a slogan, but is that how it is related to the soldier on the ground?


v/r

Mike

[IntelTrooper]

Winning hearts and minds is a slogan and nothing more to address the non-lethal aspects of COIN, IW or whatever we are calling it at the time.

Like most slogans, repetition causes some less informed or less perceptive folks to take the words as representing a literal truth rather than a much more complex, abstract concept (which itself may not even exist in reality). "Conservatists" aren't the only ones susceptible to such errors...
http://question-everything.mahost.org/images/fre01.gif
http://static.open.salon.com/files/che-guevara1232976553.jpg

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

my fear is that the "hearts and minds" is over-simplified for the average solder. In this forum, we may call it a slogan, but is that how it is related to the soldier on the ground?


v/r

Mike


Mike

Perhaps, I am not so sure. As far as I can recall, we never used that particular phrase in training units at JRTC; the scenarios offered were much more complex than that. As for here, media use it as a simplistic capture of a complex subject--makes it easier to dismiss. Down at the manuever companies, the same applies. They fully understand the complexity of the fight. The critical question I believe is do our host country partners understand the same. Most I believe do, some more than others.

Best
Tom

[MikeF]

Mike

The critical question I believe is do our host country partners understand the same. Most I believe do, some more than others.

Best
Tom

Tom, that is why I started this thread. We are hoping that our current partners share the same beliefs, values, and norms as we do.

Hope is not a method.

v/r

Mike

[Spud]

'Hearts and minds' is one of those expressions that when used by my seniors I cringe. It is nothing more than media grab that has become popularised over time.

Matt Armstrong has several ongoing threads about it over at Mountainrunner and I'm pretty much on side with his argument that we (the military) don't do 'hearts and minds' ... we influence 'minds and wills'

There's a significant difference. Firstly it acknowledges that not everyone (and in current ops probably the majority) aren't going to like us no matter what we do so therefore the hearts bit is a falsehood. Secondly it acknowledges that the influence activities we're undertaking are for a purpose in line with our mission ... we're not just doing good for good's sake.

At the end of the day we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent.

[Bob's World]

A continuiation of this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776).....

We take winning the hearts and minds as dogma- simple truth to theory, not to be contested with practice.

Can anyone provide an example of a thriving modern-day nation-state influenced by western intervention...i.e. western intervention won the hearts and minds of the local populace?

Modern day Germany and Japan do not count as they were had democracy/capatilism forced on them through occupation. We proclaim NOT to enforce an empire.....

I find it funny that our own conservatist are so anti-government, but they believe that we have the wisdom to intervene in others' affairs. G. Washington warned us against this...

v/r

Mike


Just to clarify one point here though; while I am not sure what our position was with the Germans, it was probably similar or better to the one we took with the Japanense. At the WWII Museum in New Orleans they have posted on the wall the terms of surrender that we had with this most hated foe, who we had dehumanized for years of bloddy conflict, who we had nuked twice, who had an emperor who they believed was a deity:

"That the Japanese people would have the right of Self Determination"


I love that fact. Prior to 60 years of implementing global control policies on this side of the Iron Curtain in order to support a strategy of containment of the Soviets on their side of the same, we did not believe that we had the right to dictate terms of governance of others, regardless of how we felt about them. After 60 years of such policy we see it as a requirement to do so.

So once again, I state: Its time to retire the Cold Warriors and their policies along with the Cold War; because to hang onto the former without the latter serves only to creat growing friction with our neighbors and to reduce our national credibility.

[Valin]

A continuiation of this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776).....

We take winning the hearts and minds as dogma- simple truth to theory, not to be contested with practice.

Can anyone provide an example of a thriving modern-day nation-state influenced by western intervention...i.e. western intervention won the hearts and minds of the local populace?


Mike

I guess I'd have to ask you to define "thriving".
That said, ROK, Taiwan, Indonesia.

[Valin]

'Hearts and minds' is one of those expressions that when used by my seniors I cringe. It is nothing more than media grab that has become popularised over time.

Matt Armstrong has several ongoing threads about it over at Mountainrunner and I'm pretty much on side with his argument that we (the military) don't do 'hearts and minds' ... we influence 'minds and wills'

There's a significant difference. Firstly it acknowledges that not everyone (and in current ops probably the majority) aren't going to like us no matter what we do so therefore the hearts bit is a falsehood. Secondly it acknowledges that the influence activities we're undertaking are for a purpose in line with our mission ... we're not just doing good for good's sake.

At the end of the day we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent.

Absolutly correct. One major advantage we (the West) have is, while many in the Islamic/Arab world may not like the West and what is being exported into their countries/cultures neither do they want to live under an 11th century way of life.
just one mans opinion, freely given and worth almost that much

[Mark O'Neill]

used by people with no understanding of the practice of COIN warfare who wish to convey to people who know even less than they do about the subject that they are subject matter experts.

Galula suggested in his introduction to Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and practice that plenty of people offer slogans, the difficulty comes in operationalising them.

I am increasingly convinced that the only people who can use the term 'hearts and minds' without any sense of irony or embarassment are 6pm news anchors, undergraduates attempting the 'explain COIN in 2,000 words or less' essay and charlatans.

Cheers

Mark

[Dayuhan]

A continuiation of this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776).....
Can anyone provide an example of a thriving modern-day nation-state influenced by western intervention...i.e. western intervention won the hearts and minds of the local populace?


I suspect that the South Koreans are not altogether unhappy about the outcome of western intervention. Some folks in Kuwait probably feel the same way. Neither, of course, had much to do with "winning hearts and minds" as the concept is generally construed. The South Koreans and Kuwaitis didn't approve of intervention because the intervening force was very very nice, they approved because the intervening force fought against people they saw as invaders. In other circumstances it's a bit more complicated.

I don't much like the term "winning hearts and minds"; it's melodramatic and not very functional. On a practical level it certainly makes sense to avoid actions that are likely to inspire hatred and a desire for revenge, especially when there's little to be gained from those actions anyway. It also makes sense to take some positive actions that make you seem a little more human and a little harder to hate: drilling a well, building a bridge, or passing out medicine may not get a population to love you, but it can make it a little harder for the insurgent to portray you as a rapacious invader.

It's important to recognize that communities in these situations may be a good deal better informed and a good deal more sophisticated than they initially seem. Mud huts and bare feet don't mean people are ignorant or unaware. If a COIN force is deployed in support of a government that is locally perceived as being against the interests of the community/clan/ethnic group etc, "hearts and minds" actions aren't going to accomplish a great deal: the COIN force might make a positive impression but that impression may not be extended to the government the COIN force is defending.

[goesh]

"....growing friction with our neighbors and to reduce our national credibility. "
(Bob's World)
This credibility issue has been bantered about for many years and I truly believe it is static, always there, unchanged. I recall as a kid VP Nixon on a trip down to S. America and the locals surrounded his car and started stoning it and he barely escaped. So from Nixon to the mass protests of the 60s to human shields of recent times and with a litany of bad press and condemnation in a constant flow from many quarters coming our way, I am finally convinced this notion of US Credibility is none other than a case of the have-nots being jealous of the haves.

[Bob's World]

"....growing friction with our neighbors and to reduce our national credibility. "
(Bob's World)
This credibility issue has been bantered about for many years and I truly believe it is static, always there, unchanged. I recall as a kid VP Nixon on a trip down to S. America and the locals surrounded his car and started stoning it and he barely escaped. So from Nixon to the mass protests of the 60s to human shields of recent times and with a litany of bad press and condemnation in a constant flow from many quarters coming our way, I am finally convinced this notion of US Credibility is none other than a case of the have-nots being jealous of the haves.

Throwing stones at the President's car in their land is one thing;

Flying our airplanes into our buildings killing our citizens in our land is quite another.

An escalation that belies any assessment of "static"

oh yeah...and if I hear one more person claim that "they hate us because we are beautiful" I think my head will explode. (probably to much cheering if I do that on a live feed for the SWJ community!)

[Mark O'Neill]

oh yeah...and if I hear one more person claim that "they hate us because we are beautiful"

:eek:
That I have ever heard any of my countrymen (or brits for that matter) say!

Is that a real enemy perception or wishful thinking???

Cheers,

Mark

[goesh]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31918229/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa

"168 feared killed in Iran passenger plane crash"

.........

Tehran blames the maintenance woes of its airlines in part on U.S. sanctions that prevent Iran from getting spare parts for some planes. "

How many thousands of these 'hits' have come our way? I stand by my assertion that "US credibility" is static, despite your excellant point of 9/11, Sir.

[Ken White]

we were beautiful... :confused:

Rich, selfish, ugly, mean on occasion over the last 222 years? Absolutely! :eek:

:D :cool:

[Valin]

we were beautiful... :confused:

Rich, selfish, ugly, mean on occasion over the last 222 years? Absolutely! :eek:

:D :cool:

From "The Wind and The Lion"

Theodore Roosevelt: The American grizzly is a symbol of the American character: strength, intelligence, ferocity. Maybe a little blind and reckless at times... but courageous beyond all doubt. And one other trait that goes with all previous.

2nd Reporter: And that, Mr. President?

Theodore Roosevelt: Loneliness. The American grizzly lives out his life alone. Indomitable, unconquered - but always alone. He has no real allies, only enemies, but none of them as great as he.

2nd Reporter: And you feel this might be an American trait?

Theodore Roosevelt: Certainly. The world will never love us. They respect us - they might even grow to fear us. But they will never love us, for we have too much audacity! And, we're a bit blind and reckless at times too.

[Ken White]

Your last quoted paragraph, spake by Brian Keith in that mostly fictional movie, were true long before they were written in the 1970s and are still true today.

Pity more Americans do not understand that. Be really helpful if more in Congress did...

[William F. Owen]

oh yeah...and if I hear one more person claim that "they hate us because we are beautiful" I think my head will explode. (probably to much cheering if I do that on a live feed for the SWJ community!)

Well there's an old book somewhere with the line that basically says "When my enemies are gone, so will I!." - so don't be exploding your head just yet! If I don't have anyone on SWJ to argue with I will shrivel into irrelevance! :D
- with the same cheering from the SWJ community!

...but, do not underestimate the power of envy, or the stupid and convoluted thinking that sustains it, as a position, to make is seem other than what it is.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


...but, do not underestimate the power of envy, or the stupid and convoluted thinking that sustains it, as a position, to make is seem other than what it is.

Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:


X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.

[Bob's World]

Hi Wilf,



Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:


X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.


I see the guy who is rich and all that he has, and wish I were rich too.

vice

I see a guy who stole my invention and got rich and I wish he were dead and I was rich instead.

Big difference. I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

[marct]

I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

I think that the disparity in material goods / lifestyle enhances the potential for creating a perception of "injustice" that opens the door to all sorts of manipulation. In effect, it makes it much easier to clothe envy in a mantle of rectitude so that it becomes "right and proper" to attack the (obvious) evil-doer. Hey, it's easier to sell that than interpret it as "Well, they got it because they worked their butts off!" :wry:.

[Ken White]

...I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.That's very true but don't forget to add that the Rich guy who didn't steal your invention (well, he did steal some others but just a few) may have picked a few little items someone wasn't using here and there but while he's been fairly honest, he's been selfish and thus doesn't really have many friends (and many who seem to be friends not only do not wish him well but also work actively if in concealment to spread rumors about him and attempt to trip him up) and he's been prone to throw his wealth around lavishly (meaning well for sure but still garish and annoying to many).

There also those that wish to acquire some of his wealth and are endeavoring to do so by various means and, though they don't really like or dislike him, will do things that further their goal of separating the fool from his money. He's also annoyed a few real friends by publicly chiding them about one thing or another. He got in a couple of fights and won with people who have long -- really, really long -- memories...

So now he thinks that if he is less selfish, not so lavish with money and stops being more belligerent than most that others will cease saying bad things about him and he will merely become another wealthy guy who finally smartened up a bit. Everyone will let bygones be bygones?

Not going to happen. The rest of the world isn't as nice as most Americans seem to wish to think. Can we be in a better position by acting with more restraint and sense? Certainly -- but we are never going to be 'accepted' by the rest of the world as just another guy because we collectively violate too many norms.

China and India achieving great power status -- bound to happen -- will cause many to give us some slack. Others will use that change to attempt obtaining long wanted vengeance and still others will try to take what they can from the situation.

[Chris jM]

but I do see merit in the 'hearts and minds' phrase.

Yes, it is simplistic. Yes, it is imperfect. And of course it provides no real basis for action or practical conduct in COIN. What three word phrase does, though? If we avoid 'hearts and minds', are we supplanting willing support of our cause with forced obedience, ala Niccolo Machiavelli -

And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both; but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.

See how fear worked for Alexander and the Soviets in Afghanistan - it might be a temporarily expedient solution to the problem of insurgency, but hardly a sustainable one.

I don't see 'hearts and minds' about people loving us for who we are, but I do see it as convincing them through both the narrative we deliver as part of our IO and through our actions that the agenda we bring is better than the one the enemy (or even neutrality) offers. This means we have to win the minds - convincing them that the cost of supporting our strategy outweighs that opposing us - and the hearts, the belief that what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc as part of our strategy.

Spud. I agree that 'minds and wills' is probably more accurate to what we are trying to achieve in COIN, but arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."

Make them hate us less? Again, I hear the drums of the Prince and it just doesn't sit well with me. Your Army has done very well in ETimor winning the hearts and minds since 1999, which has paid dividends in the second spate of deployments from 2006 onwards. Is that because they fear the diggers less than they feared the militias/ petitioners (rogue army faction), or because they genuinely believed that the Australian forces represented an agenda that best served their families security and their communities chance at prosperity? In order to make someone hate you less than an enemy - in my mind the easiest way to achieve this is to offer benefits, not aiming at fear-at-a-lesser-degree.

I put 'hearts and minds' into the same column where other sayings go - 'every soldier a sensor', 'no better friend, no worse enemy', 'find, fix, strike, exploit', etc etc. Only a fool would use them as the crux of their conduct, but as a saying trying to summarize or encapsulate a rough intent I see no issues with it.

To sum it up, I don't see 'hearts and minds' about making people like us, but I do see it as a valid expression about winning people to our cause.

[slapout9]

I see the guy who is rich and all that he has, and wish I were rich too.

vice

I see a guy who stole my invention and got rich and I wish he were dead and I was rich instead.

Big difference. I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.


Greed and Revenge were two of the most powerful and two of the most common motives for crimes that I saw in LE.

[Ken White]

Fore example:
...This means we have to win the minds - convincing them that the cost of supporting our strategy outweighs that opposing us - and the hearts, the belief that what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc as part of our strategy.You're unlikely to win many minds if any. They are very unlikely to support you -- and that is true whether you are truly performing a COIN operation against insurgents here in the US or are assisting another nation with their insurgent problem.

That, BTW is not semantic -- it is a critical distinction because, quite simply, if you are the government with an insurgency, you can do certain things. OTOH if you are assisting another nation, THEY are the government and you can do only what they want or allow (see Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq).

Regardless, the populace is unlikely to support you and most likely to just want you gone ('and take your Insurgents with you...'). The goal is not to win their minds or their support but simply to make their support for the insurgents certainly not active and hopefully not too much tacitly. Note I say not too much because the bad guys can use fear to obtain support whereas you cannot. Thus it is extremely difficult to wean the populace off at least some support to the insurgents.

The solution, of course is to remove the insurgents because if you do not you're just another Alexander or USSR...

As for the hearts and believing what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc., get rid of the insurgents and do nothing for their communities and families and they will be grateful; provide bike paths and coffee shops, clinics and spas and allow the insurgents to remain and they will hate you.
arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."You may do so but reality is rarely all that pleasant. It's also more than semantic,the phrase induces a dangerous mindset and tends to lead people into erring on the side of development (often excessively so) and avoiding tough issues with respect to security. People love easy, 'nice' solutions. Spud's correct, they are not going to love you no matter what, you're a foreigner. Wealthy, helpful -- no matter. You're still from outside and you will leave and they'll still be where they are. They are very much aware of that immutable fact...
To sum it up, I don't see 'hearts and minds' about making people like us, but I do see it as a valid expression about winning people to our cause.So do many others and that's the problem with the phrase. It tends to paint a quite false picture of what is realistically achievable in most insurgencies. You are not going to win them to your cause, the best you can do is get them to cease supporting your opponents.

To put it in even tighter perspective, take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause?

[Chris jM]

Ken, I believe that I understand your argument.

Putting forward a response in counter to your views:

Stepping back to the big picture - and I do understand that this opens up a lot of unanswered questions as I will tend to veer into theory here, but stay with me - in COIN military forces are serving a political purpose as well as a military one.

The defeat of an insurgency by military means is only part of the mission. In being deployed in a expeditionary COIN role the aim is to defeat the insurgency and set the conditions for a sustainable peace whereby the insurgency will not flare up again. This means, unavoidably, that a COIN mission must conduct a social/ political/ developmental role to address the underlying factors that created the original armed dissension. There is minimal merit in the concept of defeating one insurgent group and pulling out, only for the underlying, unchanged conditions to produce another insurgency.

As such the NATO army in Afghanistan stands not only for the defeat of the TB, but for the promotion of a sustainable representative govt whose policies do not encourage or harbor a security threat to the developed world (i.e. a western friendly GoIRA). This means the west, primarily the uniformed part of ISAF but including the other aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic) has to convince the Afghan population that a govt acceptable to us is also the best option for them. It will bring the benefits of good governance, representation and so on, as well as reaping the benefits of being a developing nation accepted in the global community.

Militarily we seek to conduct all those good tactical task verbs on the Taliban and the insurgents, but if we accept that this course of action is our aim we are undoubtedly fighting a war of attrition against the enemy - and one in which they are better placed to fight, given that they do not have governments constantly facing re-election. Far more efficient is the combination of the security aspect as the stick while showing them the carrot of development (if any debate is to be judged on the use of metaphors, I would instantly lose with that crude example.)

The logical conclusion to your argument, in a hypothetical victory, is to the defeat of the TB with the Afghan population retracting support to a failed TB cause. Any such stability would be ephemeral. Withdraw, and the same causation factors that deny Afghanistan an effective, central government remain. In this sense we are fighting both economics and geography for without progress in either of these areas Afghanistan remains prone to decentralized power-structures and eventual in-fighting. Merely cutting off the head of the current threat in no way secures Afghanistan against the reappearance of the next militant or extremist group.

In seeking to defeat the TB, the easier option is to take away the support of the people by establishing a viable and sustainable alternative. Through pure security means - difficult. By employing all our available resources to gather the population behind a legitimate western style government - still difficult, but a slightly easier and more feasible course, I hope. (I imagine this is something you will disagree with, and I would be interested in knowing if this is an assumption I could be wrong in).

A security-only focus might eventually win, especially if it strengthens the ANSF sufficiently so that they can maintain the legitimacy of the central government. As I see it is far more efficient to simultaneously work towards security while capacity-building the other arms of the government for eventual self-sufficiency.

And... that's it. I doubt I have stated anything new to you, but nonetheless I am interested in your response. As an infantry officer I'd like to be find that you are right and that I can ditch the loathed CIMIC skill sets I have been forced to acquire.

My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.

[Chris jM]

Spud's correct, they are not going to love you no matter what, you're a foreigner. Wealthy, helpful -- no matter. You're still from outside and you will leave and they'll still be where they are. They are very much aware of that immutable fact...So do many others and that's the problem with the phrase. It tends to paint a quite false picture of what is realistically achievable in most insurgencies. You are not going to win them to your cause, the best you can do is get them to cease supporting your opponents.

The best we can do is to get them to cease supporting an opponents cause by replacing it with a cause we champion, I would argue. It's not 'hearts and minds' for altruism, as you have stated, but winning over their hearts and minds to an agenda that benefits our side as well as theirs.


To put it in even tighter perspective, take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause?

I sense a trap. :) If I can answer this question satisfactorily, I'm putting in for an instant promotion.

But to take a stab at it - regardless of our original reasons for intervention, we are in Afghanistan to prevent militant Islam from becoming a viable force. We are combating the virulent form of militant Islam promoted by the TB with an acceptable form of Islamic government that is acceptable to the west.

Now...unleash! What was that, a partial failure or complete and utter failure of a response? :D

[Steve Blair]

My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.

If this is the case, it's really nothing more than a return to some of the profession's original functional (as opposed to envisioned doctrinal) roles, at least in the US. But since history's passe, I won't bore anyone with gory examples....

[IntelTrooper]

If this is the case, it's really nothing more than a return to some of the profession's original functional (as opposed to envisioned doctrinal) roles, at least in the US. But since history's passe, I won't bore anyone with gory examples....
I came for the combat and stayed for the social program administration.

[Ken White]

...in COIN military forces are serving a political purpose as well as a military one.In COIN, they are indeed. Do recall that in Afghanistan and Iraq, we're not doing COIN, we're doing FID and that distinction is important because in FID you CANNOT do all the good things you might do if you were in charge. In FID, you are not in charge. So yes, a political purpose is being served but whose purpose can be an issue...
deployed in a expeditionary COIN role the aim is to defeat the insurgency and set the conditions for a sustainable peace whereby the insurgency will not flare up again.Is it? Perhaps in some cases that should be the case and is not, in others it is truly intended and circumstances change.
There is minimal merit in the concept of defeating one insurgent group and pulling out, only for the underlying, unchanged conditions to produce another insurgency.Possibly true; also, in the case of an intervening nation (i.e. the US) not something that can be controlled. (See Viet Nam, El Salvador post US intervention and today). Problem is that is the purview of the host nation, not those who intervene.
...for the promotion of a sustainable representative govt...This means the west, primarily the uniformed part of ISAF but including the other aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic) has to convince the Afghan population that a govt acceptable to us is also the best option for them. It will bring the benefits of good governance, representation and so on, as well as reaping the benefits of being a developing nation accepted in the global community.Here's where we part company. That is, I believe, a position held by many so you are far from alone. It is also IMO an extremely arrogant and shortsighted idea, flies in the face of a long history and is almost certainly NOT what the Afghan people want. Nor, frankly, do I think there's a chance in a thousand that will be the end result.

I also am surprised that anyone's who's been to Afghanistan can expect it to join the ranks of developing nations any time soon. That gets to the real point, the one that transcends any differences over political goals:

How long do you think that will take?

That also returns to my original question re: Afghanistan, "What precisely is our cause?"

I presume you stated your idea of that cause. Is that the cause of the US Government? Or is this Government prepared to accept a lesser solution?
The logical conclusion to your argument, in a hypothetical victory, is to the defeat of the TB with the Afghan population retracting support to a failed TB cause. Any such stability would be ephemeral. First, wipe out any idea of 'victory.' In an insurgency (which is part of the fight in Afghanistan but not all of it), there is no victory, no win or lose -- the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. So I'm not suggesting a 'victory.' What I am saying is that you cannot produce a functioning government or any real development without security. You do not have that in Afghanistan at this time. Nor do you have or are you likely to ever have the troop strength to provide it unless some real innovation is practiced on the ground. That could happen but I doubt it, I think we've grown to risk averse.

You're not going to defeat the Taliban, there is no way to do that. All you can do is make the area so secure you limit their ability to move and proselyte. Given adequate troops, you can do that. If, as is the case, you do not have enough people -- then you have a problem, as we in fact do...
Withdraw, and the same causation factors that deny Afghanistan an effective, central government remain... Merely cutting off the head of the current threat in no way secures Afghanistan against the reappearance of the next militant or extremist group.True and it's an even greater problem when you cannot snip that head -- and you cannot. It's not a head in any event, it's the arm of a Starfish and even if you lopped it off, it will simply regenerate. The Talibs or something like them will reappear no matter what we do; it may be after I'm dead 'cause I'm old but write it down as it will happen.
In seeking to defeat the TBRecommendation: In this kind of war, purge words like defeat and victory, win and lose, with respect to the entire operation from your lexicon. None of those terms is appropriate. You can win or lose contacts but broadly peaking, you can only deter or inhibit the Talibs, you won't defeat them. Nor can they defeat you.
the easier option is to take away the support of the people by establishing a viable and sustainable alternative. Through pure security means - difficult... (I imagine this is something you will disagree with, and I would be interested in knowing if this is an assumption I could be wrong in).Yes, I do disagree. You're applying a perfectly normal and sensible western outlook. Unfortunately, you are I believe, applying it to a South Asian society that is very independent, tribal and has a very different morality standard (not wrong, BTW, just different). In short, I doubt they'll agree with you on many aspects. I believe their goals and desires trump ours and that we have no right to impose our standards and values on others. The fact that the Afghans will unite and fight us if we try should and hopefully will deter some from even attempting to impose our ways on them.
A security-only focus might eventually win, especially if it strengthens the ANSF sufficiently so that they can maintain the legitimacy of the central government. As I see it is far more efficient to simultaneously work towards security while capacity-building the other arms of the government for eventual self-sufficiency.You seem to continually assume things I did not say or imply. You cannot do security-only and I didn't suggest that. What I did say was you must have security for true development to take place. I also said you're unlikely to attain that state due to inadequate troop strength; implying that you're unlikely to get significant development or a truly functional government of any type unless we get really innovative.
As an infantry officer I'd like to be find that you are right and that I can ditch the loathed CIMIC skill sets I have been forced to acquire.Hang on to those skills, they will always stand you in good stead. Just remember what your Grandmother may have told you as both mine pounded into me -- all things in moderation. Should've listened when they said it instead of finding out years later they were right. :D

Those CIMIC skills are really just common sense, good TTP, doing what's right and treating people decently -- that's always good. Even in MCO, that doesn't go wrong.
My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.Not to worry. Everything goes in cycles, the pendulum will swing back. Almost 30 years as a grunt, trained to go to Europe and fight the Red Horde. Never went to Europe; ate a lot of rice, though. Different hordes, too. Including late night skulkers. Easily whipped, just out-skulk * them. :D

* CAUTION: Not approved for Do It Yourself efforts, additional training and holy water required. :rolleyes:

However, not much; mostly needs will in high places. It could happen, so could a couple of other things. All is not lost, not even. We'll see

In the mean time, don't give up and keep thinking about it -- no one has all the answers.

[Ken White]

The best we can do is to get them to cease supporting an opponents cause by replacing it with a cause we champion, I submit they (most any 'theys' anywhere) are not going to support your cause; nor should they. Anyway, I thought we were there to support their cause... :wry:
I would argue. It's not 'hearts and minds' for altruism, as you have stated, but winning over their hearts and minds to an agenda that benefits our side as well as theirs.Sigh. You are not going to win their hearts. Ever. You can get them to realize that active support of your opponents is bad ju-ju and /or that said opponents are not going to win and thus, their minds will tell them to 'support' you. They won't, really but they'll take what looks like the best deal and be polite.

I sense a trap. If I can answer this question satisfactorily, I'm putting in for an instant promotion...But to take a stab at it - regardless of our original reasons for intervention, we are in Afghanistan to prevent militant Islam from becoming a viable force. We are combating the virulent form of militant Islam promoted by the TB with an acceptable form of Islamic government that is acceptable to the west.Good job, subtle modification to what you said earlier but more accurate -- and achievable -- now. My sensing is that you're correct and that was the position of the Bush Administration and seems to be the more or less implied current position of the serving Administration. It can be achieved, I think but time is going to be the determining factor. We'll see how it goes.
Now...unleash! What was that, a partial failure or complete and utter failure of a response? :DPretty good, I say. You dropped some of the earlier 'developing,' 'good governance' and 'representation' which isn't really our call and which we can only hope to influence but not dictate. So, 13,999 Attaboys and tell the 503d you do not have to paint The Rock and should be immediately promoted because some ORF of a SGM said so...;)

P.S.

Do not fret if 'immediate' takes a while, you know how slow the Army is... :wry:

[Spud]

Spud. I agree that 'minds and wills' is probably more accurate to what we are trying to achieve in COIN, but arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."

Make them hate us less? Again, I hear the drums of the Prince and it just doesn't sit well with me. Your Army has done very well in ETimor winning the hearts and minds since 1999, which has paid dividends in the second spate of deployments from 2006 onwards. Is that because they fear the diggers less than they feared the militias/ petitioners (rogue army faction), or because they genuinely believed that the Australian forces represented an agenda that best served their families security and their communities chance at prosperity?

But I think that's the difference ... trying to align our Timor experience with COIN in far-off lands is problematic. The Timorese were ethnically (somewhat), religiously and historically pre-disposed to INTERFET and what it brought. The fact that our Government did not act 'til well past the last safe moment in many ways set the mission up for success. We truly were liberators in the eye of the population, not occupiers pretending to be liberators. We had the population on side from the beginning and that is the lesson that has to be drawn from INTERFET so that it is not incorrectly applied elsewhere. In essence we didn’t have to win the minds and wills of the majority of the Timorese … it was already done. The key issue was maintaining it. Every one of these operations is about context and the Timor context can not be applied elsewhere. There was nothing pre-emptive or preventive about that deployment ... it was purely a reaction that had the support of the region (including Indonesia) and the world. We could/can only lose their support ... we did not really have to work to hard to gain it. Neither AFG nor IRQ had the Timor start state.

In 2006 it was essentially criminal gangs and disaffected Government workers not an insurgency. And yes the people (government in particular) did hate them more than they hate us. There's a large percentage of the Timor population that wants us gone from their streets now. There's an equally large percentage of Timorese Government officials who want us to stay because it provides them breathing space.

[Greyhawk]

"take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause? "

A fine question. I've another:

Why did Ken have to ask?

[Uboat509]

Ken Said:


As for the hearts and believing what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc., get rid of the insurgents and do nothing for their communities and families and they will be grateful; provide bike paths and coffee shops, clinics and spas and allow the insurgents to remain and they will hate you.

I don't agree with this statement. If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

SFC W

[Bob's World]

Neither public service nor the Insurgent is most important. Get rid of the core grievance, the underlying condition of poor governance that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and the movement will fade away of its own accord. But do so in a manner that you do not impose yourself so significantly that you take on an inappropriate perception of legitimacy over this goverment that you were helping to fix.

Hitler would have just been another drunk ranting down at the beer hall if the conditions of poor governance (imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; and exacerbated by the fact that the Germany Army was never defeated in battle in WWI; and the strains of the Depression); and his Nazi Ideology would have only appealed to a few ignorant crackpots. Did we need to send a huge effort to Germany to build infrastructure? No, it would have been pointless as it did not address the root cause. How about capture kill operations to take out Hitler and his cronies early? No, they would have been replaced by other leaders and new ideology as the root cause still existed; also such actions would have enhanced the support of the populace to some sort of uprising in general.

Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict; and it is failures of governance at home that lead to internal conflict. Populaces do not fail the government; it is always government that fails the populace.

[Surferbeetle]

Uboat509 as usual cuts to the heart of the matter.


If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

SFC W

As always I appreciate Bob's World's posts, but I do not agree with all of the points being presented.


Neither public service nor the Insurgent is most important. Get rid of the core grievance, the underlying condition of poor governance that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and the movement will fade away of its own accord. But do so in a manner that you do not impose yourself so significantly that you take on an inappropriate perception of legitimacy over this government that you were helping to fix.

Well said. The next paragraph however should have reflected some of Uboat 509's points, instead it covered:


Hitler would have just been another drunk ranting down at the beer hall if the conditions of poor governance (imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; and exacerbated by the fact that the Germany Army was never defeated in battle in WWI; and the strains of the Depression); and his Nazi Ideology would have only appealed to a few ignorant crackpots. Did we need to send a huge effort to Germany to build infrastructure? No, it would have been pointless as it did not address the root cause. How about capture kill operations to take out Hitler and his cronies early? No, they would have been replaced by other leaders and new ideology as the root cause still existed; also such actions would have enhanced the support of the populace to some sort of uprising in general.

Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict; and it is failures of governance at home that lead to internal conflict. Populaces do not fail the government; it is always government that fails the populace.

This is where theory and reality clash. Of course it's military business: 'you break you buy it' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aphorism). Lets compare US Military history (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Civil_Affairs) with the thesis that this is not military business:


Early History

Civil Military Operations (CMO) conducted by the U.S. Military go back at least to the American War for Independence. During that conflict, all sides employed civil affairs in every colony/state. Military authorities managed activities that civilians had managed prior to the war. The occupation of Canada was an early example of "how-not-to-do-it", as Patriots were pitted against Tories in 1775 by the first U.S. occupational military government in Montreal.

In the U.S.-Mexican War, Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott could be considered the "Father of Civil Affairs." He displayed a deep respect for the Mexican people and their culture. Scott enjoyed great success in keeping civilian problems from interfering with military operations by issuing General Order No. 20 and ensuring the Provost Marshals office enforced it. The United States Army considers this to be where Civil Affairs (CA) originated.

At the end of the 19th century, and well into the 20th U.S. Army was involved in numerous military interventions in several of the Caribbean and Latin American nations before and after World War I. After the Spanish-American War ended in 1898, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood restored order in Cuba with CA forces. The Army returned to Cuba in 1905, again in 1912, and starting in 1917, was there for a period of fien years. It was again called upon to protect American interests by military intervention in the Dominican Republic (1916 – 1924), Haiti (1915 – 1934), and Nicaragua (1926–1934). The Army was also called to Panama in 1903 to ensure the birth of that nation when it broke away from Colombia to become independent. According to the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at worst, the CMO performance was highhanded and overbearing, while at best, the Army restored more stable economic and political situations in those areas.

Showing "Uncle Sam with a schoolbook in one hand and a Krag rifle in the other" best summarized the civil-military policy in the Philippines, which was also acquired by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War. While Cuba became independent in 1902, the Philippines was granted the status of a territory, with the promise of independence. They became independent after the Second World War in 1946. The payoff of an enlightened military government policy was the Filipinos were the only Pacific colonized peoples to resist the Japanese on any scale.


World War I saw few, if any, civil affairs activities; however, during post-Armistice weeks, the U.S. Army administered the government of an overseas enemy population in the German Rhineland and in Luxembourg where no stable government existed after Germany’s defeat and exit of the region. Between World War I and World War II, the U.S. Army was involved in a surprising number of civic action projects such as the Civilian Conservation Corps.

"The American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty", stated Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, in his report on U.S. military government in Germany after World War I.

He wrote further, "Military government, the administration by military officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare. The US Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate States during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I. In each instance, neither the Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous."


World War II saw the U.S. Army receive its Civil Affairs "charter." The Pentagon in 1943 activated the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD). The major problem faced by the CAD was heavy destruction of the infrastructure. Never before or since has U.S. Army Civil Affairs been so extensively involved in nation rebuilding for so long. The CAD was responsible for 80 million European civilians; yet no documented case of overt opposition has ever come to light. Post-war military government proved extremely successful in our former enemies’ nations. The CAD also returned untold millions of dollars worth of national treasures to their country of origin. The post-war period was the first planned use of Civil Affairs by the modern United States Army, and the greatest use of CA assets to date.[1]

A quick economic compare/contrast using Wolfram Alpha (http://www42.wolframalpha.com/) for Germany (http://www42.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=german+economy), Japan (http://www42.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=japan%27s+economy), Iraq (http://www91.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=iraq%27s+economy), and Afghanistan (http://www91.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=afghanistan%27s+economy) is instructive. If we must intervene, it is to our economic benefit (and I would say that more than economics is involved) to leave behind stable countries which can contribute to the stability of the global system. Lets just focus on US imports (http://www91.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=us+imports+) for those of us who subscribe to the theory that 'the US is a lone grizzly': 2.351 Trillion dollars per year, with China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Germany as the top five. Just to reiterate my point, we did in fact fight with Mexico, Japan, and Germany. Part of this fight included 'nation building' operations which brings us back to Uboat509's wisdom.

[William F. Owen]

Ken You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.


I can agree you have to get rid of the insurgents, but what you do next is very context specific. Schools, clinics, etc, may not be what they want.

[Ken White]

I don't agree with this statement. If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.I named the items I did and not the items you named. I agree that leaving them with nothing is not a good idea and the items you name as desirable are valuable and will increase their gratitude -- if gratitude is what you're after.

Better than their gratitude is helping those who need it with no thought of recompense. If you act like you expect gratitude, you're likely to get resentment instead and if you get practical and offer a ### for tat trade, you're highly likely to find out you got snookered by a sharper trader than you are who'll take your Clinic and well and still support the guys who come in the night...

My list, excepting the Clinics, is all fluff and unnecessary stuff. That was a deliberate jab at us, the US Government (to include all the Armed Forces), for too often providing and building a lot of excessively esoteric stuff that we would like and not down to earth, sensible things (as your list) that will really help them and they will like. You must really understand the culture and the area to know what's important and will be kept and used beneficially versus what's just nice to have or will be discarded as useless or too difficult to operate and maintain.

I'll also note that you cannot provide and sustain much of lasting value until you have security because the smart bad guys will tear it up as quickly as you build it.

Bob's world says something that needs to be repeated because it's really important:
Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict...That's about 100 times more important than is the argument over Hearts and Minds.

Once you commit Armed Forces as opposed to Diplomatic, Intelligence and Special Forces you've admitted error in the vast majority of cases. Read Olson's article "Mistakes Were Made" on the SWJ. It's a lesson plan for how not to do it...

[Ken White]

This is where theory and reality clash. Of course it's military business...If we must intervene, it is to our economic benefit (and I would say that more than economics is involved) to leave behind stable countries which can contribute to the stability of the global system... Part of this fight included 'nation building' operations which brings us back to Uboat509's wisdom.(emphasis added / kw)Note the words I placed in bold -- that's the issue, the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.

There's no question that Civil Affairs as a branch and discipline is necessary nor is there any doubt about the good things they've done. The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities. If such a commitment is necessary, then Civil Affairs will of course be critically important until some stability is obtained and the civil side which is capable of long term effort is able to initially augment and then eventually supplant the CA effort so that CA can reset for the next effort.

Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail. If, however, it's committed, then of course CA is necessary. The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...

No one is arguing that nation building has not been or is not necessary nor does anyone dispute how we we've done it in the past or that CA has done great work -- but we also used to ride to work on elephants...

[Surferbeetle]

... the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.

Ken, no beef with you on this, you are consistent on this and other points in your postings.


The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities.

Effective Interagency efforts can preclude wars and can help to end wars on more favorable terms. If a frog had wings (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=if%20a%20frog%20had%20wings)...as of today our Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past. This was why I posted the CA history; despite our best efforts wars will always occur and in every US war to date the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do the bulk of it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.

Since repeating the same behavior and expecting different results is nonsensical, we need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA (defined here as part of the SOF team AC & RC), call them Advisers, call them what you will, we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get 'Army Strong' in this area. Hindsight being 20/20, early Interagency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan might have been more successful in preventing/deflecting/reducing our troubles with additional SOF/Adviser assistance. Effective Interagency and SOF/Adviser efforts will almost certainly ease our passage from Iraq and Afghanistan.


Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail.


The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...

Truly wise words here and you have argued elsewhere that if we build effective nation building capability (staffing levels and range of skill sets) into the US Military it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road. It's a good and wise analysis my friend, however the requirement still remains, and our history since 1776 reflects that we do not avoid these types of commitments. Accordingly, it is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'


-- but we also used to ride to work on elephants... :wry:

[Ken White]

If a frog had wings...as of today Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past.True on both counts. Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.

Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it.
This was why I posted the CA history: in every US war the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.I don't think that is correct. As your own examples show, that was not true in and after WW II. It was not true in Korea or Viet Nam to my recollection. There was indeed an early burble in Viet Nam but that was because the Army deliberately pushed State and USAid out of the picture -- so whose fault was that...:rolleyes:

Now we want to do that again?
We need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA, call them Advisors, call them what you will we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get strong in this area.Not going to happen. Not affordable or sustainable. We can add some and will; we can better train everyone to do this better and we seem to be doing so. We can take SF / SOCOM / CA elements and apply them in the pre-emptive mode (which is what Bob's World and I are essentially saying) and we can apply others as adjuncts or augmentation to better trained GPF units 'enhanced' to provide advisory and nation building support where necessary -- as is being done.

You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.

If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars. The bulk of the CA effort was where it should have been, in the Reserve (I'd add some in the Guard, as well for several reasons). An AC buildup to augment BCTs is underway and that's all you're likely to get.

As for the RC guys, I've got more than a little familiarity with a number of nominally Civic Action / Training projects here and there including these LINK (http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151372.pdf). Read the practical stuff, pgs 5-7 of the .pdf. GAO is not that swift but other assessments broadly agreed on the training and diplomatic benefits. That is not a knock, merely to point out that you have to grope and spend big bucks for small return to find productive training.

Thus it is in everyone's interest to push the USG to develop the Civil and State / USAid capability because if you don't:
if we build the capability it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road.Just so. Inviting problems to solve is the preferred course of action?
...but once again we have had to do this type of work since 1776...I say again: "but we also used to ride to work on elephants."
The requirement will never go away. It is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'I totally agree! you're absolutely correct. Good point.

It will never go away and the Army needs to be prepared for probable employment and possible expansion as required of both civil affairs and general nation building efforts. We can agree on that. Where we disagree I think is on the extent or limits of sensible expansion in view the world situation today. My sensing is that you wish a significant expansion and my sensing is that the requisite skills are not going to flock to the Army -- especially if we avoid interventions for a while and they are in uniform but way underemployed. IOW, be careful what you ask for , you may get it

We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree. It is not a core task and while it was absorbed by a large conscripted Army of 12M bodies in WW II, it is undesirable in a small professional force -- underline 'small' -- that cannot afford too many off core missions or to devote to may resources to missions that are inherent (like CA etc.). It is one thing to be prepared for full spectrum contingencies and for nation building as many of us advocate. It is quite another to develop excess capability for one spectrum that will adversely impact others and which is unlikely to ever be large or robust enough to operate at needed capacity lacking another major existential war. IOW, if it is almost certainly going to need augmentation, better that augmentation be available.

Going a step further, it is not desirable in my view for the Armed Forces to be the only elements of the USG to have to "embrace the suck" as they say. That needs for many reasons to be shared for the sake of all the nation. So given that, the 'augmentation' problem plus staffing and recruiting realities it seems to me the best course of action is for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building -- I can and will provide entry and non-secure environment capability but it is our considered professional opinion and advice that it would be better for the nation to avoid such cases if at all possible through better intelligence assessments followed by diplomatic, aid and development assistance. However, in the event all that fails and if a military commitment is unavoidable, the nation should be prepared at the earliest possible time to augment then replace the Army's capability." We've about worn out the "Yessir, yessir, three bags full... " option. History also shows where that has gotten us... :wry:

Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.

[Steve Blair]

Actually there was a point where the Army very much wanted to get into the business of what we would now call nation-building. Review the history of our own country between, say, 1850 or so and 1891. There was life before WW 2, after all.....:eek: (I'm just sayin'...)

I'm honestly starting to think that one of the few ways we can avoid military engagement is to go semi-isolationist again. Our system simply isn't set up to develop and maintain a long-term foreign policy of the one Ken seems to be recommending. Grand strategy (no matter what some pundits might say) is really at the polar opposite from our electoral system. Even the much-vaunted Manifest Destiny and the Cold War both lurched along historically, MD more so than the Cold War, and there was never a sort of centralized direction that might seem so crystal clear in hindsight (or that might be claimed by those with agendas good, bad, and neutral). And as I mentioned in another thread, the money to build up State, USAID, etc. will have to come from somewhere...and I just don't see DoD giving up any of its share in the pie. So we end up where we started.

[Ken White]

...I mentioned in another thread, the money to build up State, USAID, etc. will have to come from somewhere...and I just don't see DoD giving up any of its share in the pie. So we end up where we started.even though it is emphatically in their long term interest to do so, they will not want to give up their perceived clout.

So someone will have to make them give up some of it. And they'll have to get used to buying enough 'good enough' items instead of the a surfeit of the 'best.' That would reduce OM costs and with smart buys, could cut personnel requirements which in turn reduce sunk and hidden costs...

I agree the Electoral system is at odds with anything long term. Before, we managed to achieve a degree of continuity with the senior civil service types; they've now been pushed aside by a far larger number of political appointees (LINK) (http://books.google.com/books?id=5DQeqn3nhpIC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=US+Government+Political+Appointment+numbers&source=bl&ots=GUJ6KRKYda&sig=1iCnUVkbE7HWv3FUEGfPXENOBis&hl=en&ei=W9hgSp2sOc-MtgfsvfnjDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1) and their ranks have proliferated and the OPM system moves them frequently to totally different jobs (sounds like the Army, huh...) to such an extent they no longer have much clout. Therefor, there is not nearly as much continuity as there once was and that hurts. Congressional short-termism also hurts. Service senior leader short termism is not helpful.

The way to fix that is attack the bureaucracy; design and stack it so it will do what's needed. ;)

[Uboat509]

Hi Wilf,



Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:


X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.

This is true but it can work both ways. I believe that at least part of the reason for the fall of communism was that people in communist countries got tired seeing all the things that we had in the West while they were waiting in long lines for old bread. They may have been jealous of us and hated us for what we had but they hated the system that kept them from getting it themselves more.

SFC W

[Kiwigrunt]

So someone will have to make them give up some of it. And they'll have to get used to buying enough 'good enough' items instead of the a surfeit of the 'best.' That would reduce OM costs and with smart buys, could cut personnel requirements which in turn reduce sunk and hidden costs...


I fear that that someone, or a large number of someones, are the ones holding the biggest ricebowls. And they would need to break a lot of ricebowls.


...and their ranks have proliferated...
The way to fix that is attack the bureaucracy; design and stack it so it will do what's needed.

Totally agree.....good luck....:mad:
Appears to me that said bureaucracy has grown into such a large beast, with so many self lickers and self fuelers, that it would almost need some sort of revolution to attack it (I'm not suggesting muskets and bayonets.....but then I don't know what I'm suggesting).
Wonder where hearts and minds at home would fit into all that:confused:

[Ken White]

I fear that that someone, or a large number of someones, are the ones holding the biggest ricebowls. And they would need to break a lot of ricebowls.DoD is made of thousands of small ones; like any operation, you just have to attack the nodes. As Slapout will tell you, in SBW, you have to identify those with motive, means and opportunity. That changes from time to time but one can generally track the power centers. For example, Project Manager FCS is no longer one though I'm sure they're fighting for another name and a transfusion.
Appears to me that said bureaucracy has grown into such a large beast, with so many self lickers and self fuelers...True, like I said, many, many -- just hit the right ones, perhaps a couple of dozen. Most of 'em are alright and need little modification, just change the few that one believes need to be modified -- or killed.
Wonder where hearts and minds at home would fit into all that:confused:Nowhere. Bureaucracies are heartless and mindless. This is a good thing, don't need to be sympathetic when attacking them and you can outsmart them. Plus they all have blind spots. However, some do have Scouts and early warning systems and some are devious -- just have to be a little smarter, a bit stealthy and flank 'em on the blind side... :D

[marct]

Hi Uboat,


This is true but it can work both ways. I believe that at least part of the reason for the fall of communism was that people in communist countries got tired seeing all the things that we had in the West while they were waiting in long lines for old bread. They may have been jealous of us and hated us for what we had but they hated the system that kept them from getting it themselves more.

Yup, it can work that way, especially when there is a concerted effort to "blame the Yanks" for, say, 40 years or so while extolling your own "virtues"... as everyone stands in line for 6 month old bread :cool:.

Where the inverse you point to fails is when there is a constant re-inforcement of real world examples where everyone can "see" it's the Yanks fault. Things like constantly harping on the Palestinian problem and the absolute windfall, from an IO point of view, of the invasion of Iraq. When we were back in the Cold War, people had a hard time pointing to specific, empirical (in the sense that people can perceive them even if those perceptions are interpreted by others), acts.

[MikeF]

Interesting responses, and I appreciate the comments...If taken holistically, many of the finer points of this discussion and Wilf's debate on violence in COIN may one day add to the overall benefit on US Foreign Policy...

I waited a bit to share my own thoughts so others could provide theirs...Before I share my comments, I want to clarify a couple of issues...

1. Kuwait- Not a free capitalistic democracy. I've spent some time there, Kuwait is basically a city ran by an Islamic-monarchy. The majority of its residents are not citizens. They are aliens- Phillipinoes and Egyptians working 9-5 jobs to support their families abroad.

2. Korea. Excellent example of a thriving nation-state that embraces democracy and capitalism after U.S. intervention; however, the Korean war is still not officially over, and they cannot yet defend their own borders...So, I'm at a crossroads with this one.

Okay, with that said, to the meat of the issue. I assumed that COL Jones (Bob's World) and others would suggest the Phillipines and Colombia as successess. In many ways, I concur, but it is essential to determine our effects AND our limitations and constraints in these operations over the past nine years.

1. Colombia. The Clinton Administration authorized Plan Columbia in the late 1990's to assist the Colombian government in its efforts to defeat the FARC. At the time, the FARC was a narco-terrorist organization focused on drug-trafficking. It is important to understand that it was not an insurgency bent on overrunning the government. After 9/11, the Bush Administration provided additional support to Plan Colombia, and the results have been rather effective...More on that later.

2. Phillipines. Every mom and their dad loves to promote 1st Group's success in Mindanou and Basilan in the Southern Phillipines. It is classic FID, and it worked. The mission of OEF-P was to assist the Phillipino government in defeating Abu Sayef- Under the GWOT, Abu Sayef was categorized as terrorist organization aligned with al Qaeda. I differ. I would suggest that Abu Sayef was simply another criminal organization akin to the FARC. OEF-P was highly successful in defeating Abu Sayef; however, the Phillipines still faces an insurgency (Communist) and a seperatist group (Islamist).

So what?

Positives:

1. We helped two governments confront internal threats.

Constraints:

1. Both governments are still facing issues to the sovereignty and legitimacy to the rule of law.

Lessons Learned:

1. The host nations had been in conflict with both enemy groups for some time (20-30 years) before they asked us to help.
2. In both cases, military advisors were constrained by Congress or the HN on what they could and could not do.
3. Both operations were highlighted by majority State Dept involvement focused on the rule of law and goveranance...US Military action was minimal.
4. As Dr. Tyrell states, the final results will take years.

On the other hand, we can examine what I would propose as three of the US worst interventions in the past fifty years.

1. Iran (1959-1976).
2. Guatemala (1960-2000).
3. Afghanistan (1980-2000).

Each case study is worth at least an essay not simply a post on a blog...It's just something to think about while we try and determine best measures of policy.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

Define intervention, please. With respect to Iran during the dates you mention I'm confused. To me, the word intervention used with respect to the affairs of nations implies this:
a. To involve oneself in a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or development
b. To interfere, usually through force or threat of force, in the affairs of another nation.

[George L. Singleton]

I know the Philippines politically and their economy. A former, long term dictatorship, their entire economy is weak, depend on Western and Japanese bank roll overs forever of national lines of credit to the Government of the Philippines. Huc Communist rebels have existed in far eastern part of the Philippine Islands since the end of WW II, communist guerillas now several generations "deep", a guerilla way of life, so to speak.

But, there actually are Muslims native to the Philippines and they are infected by the radical dogma of extremist Sunni Islam as being promoted worldwide by Saudi's Wahabbi Sunni terrorist style of so-called theology.

The US still runs a VA Hospital in Manila for the few WW II Filipino vets still living, dating back to WW II when these islands were still a US Territory.

In short, the world's central banks, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund carry the entire Philippine national economy perpetually...otherwise they would become a dictatorship or go communist for sure.

Kicking out US bases was one the dumbest things, cost thousands of jobs never found as effectively elsewhere in the Philippine economy.

[Bob's World]

To clarify:

I would never say that OEF-P is either a "victory", nor that it in of itself could ever resolve the Insurgency in the Southern Philippines. The first isn't true, and the second isn't possible.

Why?

The Philippines is a collection of thousands of islands, with diverse cultures and backgrounds, bundled neatly under one flag by the King of Spain. I doubt he consulted the locals first. As Spain grew old and feeble, and the US strong and ambitious, with the continental US fimly under control, looked outward for our own opportunities to be a real world (defined then as "colonial") power. A maritime nation, we understood the sea and the value of sea power, so set out to establish a string of US Coaling stations and harbors across the Pacific. Hawaii we simply claimed; Guam and the Philippines we took easily (both flags taken by a handful of Oregon Volunteers) from a feeble Spain. Grab Cuba while we're at it.

BL is that US interests in the Philippines have never had much to do with making the Philippines a stable populace, with strong governance and a robust economy. It has been a major power projection platform first and foremost; and strong governments are a pain to deal with, as George mentions above. They sometimes don't allow you to simply do whatever you want from their ports and airfields.


So, what is it that I think is the successful lesson people should take from our engagement in the Philippines?

1. We asked their permission to come in, and we followed their rules while we were there; subjugating our interests to those of the HN government.

2. We carefully avoided taking on enhanced perceptions of US legitimacy over the government of the Philippines; and have in fact enhanced the perceptions of legitimacy of the Philippine government in the South through our careful mentoring and support.

3. While JI still finds sanctuary in the area (concurrently, with little US help, the Malaysian and Indonesian security forces have done a TREMENDOUS job of enhancing the security of their populaces, so as one squeezed the balloon, the air goes somewhere...and the Southern Philippines is still the best bet due to the relationship between the Muslim poulace of the region and the Catholic government of the nation.); as does the largely criminal, but clinging to Jihad for legitimacy, ASG; among the primarily political MILF and MNLF communities: there is greater stability and security now than there used to be. (This is tenuous though, and really must be met with real action from the government in Manila if it is to be sustained or really develop).

3. We do this with 500 people. Not 5,000. Not 50,000. Not 500,000. 500. In this business less is more. But they have to be the right people, with the right leadership, executing the right mission, in the right manner. This is complex, and it is not warfare. The worst thing we could do (and many smart military guys waaay more senior than I have grown frustrated with the "lack of progress") and clammored to "just go in and whack those guys!" So far we have held the hawks in check, as such actions would destroy everything acomplished to date; make us liars and damage tremendously our national credibility, not just in the Philippines, but across the region and the world. Operations in Columbia were even smaller.

[Surferbeetle]

Americans live the Stone Soup (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone_soup) parable every day. We have all been that traveler living on his wits who walks into a town with a stone and walks out with a meal. Part of the reason we do it so well is that our collective family histories pull from every nation on earth where everybody makes soup differently. DOD took a page from this type of thinking when it configured our military forces. Unfortunately things within DOD having gotten out of balance and our problems are compounded by a general systemic failure to practice making stone soup with other government agencies. Fortunately there are still localized exceptions within DOD that believe in and practice the parable.

We are all thinking about what Full Spectrum Warfare/Unrestricted Warfare (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/unresw2.htm) is.


The multiplication of the means of waging war has expanded the scope of military activities, amended the idea that "war is bloody politics" and of "war as the final means for settling disputes." The object of war is no longer just to "use military force to force the enemy to accept one’s will" but now is "use any method, including military and non-military means, lethal and non-lethal means to force the enemy to satisfy one’s own interest". [p. 55]


Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.

Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it

My point exactly; it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner. The reflexive counter argument that is often heard is that things are just fine the way they are.

Unlike the reflexive counter argument your well thought out and nuanced counter argument provides some opportunities to examine how we can cost effectively integrate the non-kinetic portion into the warfare spectrum ;)


If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars.

This is the crux of things right here Ken. It is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round.

Consider the headcount that exists solely in USG personnel who are presently resident in funded positions in USAID, DOS, USPHS, DOJ, USACE, Marine CAG/ENG/MC/NC (AC & RC), Army SF/CA/PSYOP/JAG/MP/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, & ARNG), USN Seals/JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC & RC), and USAF JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, AFNG).

Let’s sum that headcount number and assign it the variable X. Let's then assign the ideal number of people needed to accomplish our overseas non-kinetic mission the variable Y (and yes I am very aware that some of these folks are already multiskilled and can also do kinetic work).

It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.

Tying nonkinetic USG civilian slots to an equivalent number of nonkinetic reserve/national guard slots (this force needs to be rebalanced -Advisors~SF/CA/PSYOP/ENG/JAG/MP/MC/NC/MSC) stretches our scarce taxpayer dollars, brings in valuable insights & methodologies not common to the US Military, and as a method of ‘Democracy in Action’ it keeps us out of unnecessary wars…


You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.

Again my point exactly; non-kinetic skills are practiced daily in the civilian world and are best fielded by reserve/national guard types who have and practice the needed skill sets. Serving in the guard and reserve will expand your experience base, to include that of the concept of turnover as taught in the active component. Due to pesky fiscal (and other) constraints it is not uncommon to find people who will serve 20 or 30 years in their state or even a unit. Unit cohesiveness benefits as a result.


We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree.

Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War. ;)


Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.

We are in violent agreement here….

[Ken White]

some minor obstacles...
...it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner.That is true and is unlikely to change; we have the ability but Congressional desire is required. They may do the right thing. That would be different...
It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.Possibly true but don't forget to decrement those doing other things that cannot be deployed because they're deployed elsewhere -- also, do not forget a rotation stack, ideally that means four of everything; three could work, so could two in a pinch but not for long.
Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War. ;)True dat...

[carl]

In post #37, Bob's World states that the German Army was never defeated in battle in WWI. I misread things at times so I am wondering if that is stated as a fact or an example of Nazi propaganda and post WWI German wishful thinking?

[George L. Singleton]

I had hoped someone would have answered the question I asked over a week ago about who was the Navy Air Commander in, bases, in the Philippines from end of WW II to 1947.

So, I will attempt to guess at the answer myself, since no one else has.

I think the overall 45-47 Naval Air Commander was Admiral Spruance, while the Navy on the ground air bases throughout the Philippines was commanded by Commodore Arthur Gavin, USN.

Now, can anyone else elaborate or correct me on the Navy air structure, who was in command, etc. at end of WW II in and on the Philippines. I may be either wrong or incomplete in these guessed at answers. Thanks.

[Surferbeetle]

...and no one walked away unscathed.


In post #37, Bob's World states that the German Army was never defeated in battle in WWI. I misread things at times so I am wondering if that is stated as a fact or an example of Nazi propaganda and post WWI German wishful thinking?


The Battle of the Marne (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_the_Marne) is but one example.


The Battle of the Marne (also known as the Miracle of the Marne) was a First World War battle fought between the 5th and 12th of September 1914. It resulted in a Franco-British victory against the German Army under Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The battle effectively ended the month-long German offensive that opened the war and reached the outskirts of Paris. The counter-attack of Allied forces during the First Battle of the Marne ensured that a quick German victory was impossible, and set the stage for four years of trench warfare on the Western Front.[1]

[Ken White]

Here are two big defeats, there are others.

LINK (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_aisne_marne.html).

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Amiens_%281918%29).

And here's how it wrapped up: LINK (http://www.historyofwar.org/scripts/fluffy/fcp.pl?words=Amiens+Offensive&submit=Site+Search&d=/wars_hundred_days.html).