Center of Gravity Construct [Archive]

Strickland

05-20-2006, 03:21 PM

Perhaps, I should have stated my opinion in the original posting. I believe that Dr. Strange's COG construct of Critical Capability(s), Critical Requirement(s), and Critical Vulnerability(s) is VERY useful. However, I do not believe that we as planners should be slaves to this construct. The true utility of this construct is in assisting planners conduct conceptual planning and visualize the threat. No, not all adversaries fit neatly into this construct; however, by going through the process, one is capable of finding a 90% solution that will assist in futher detailed planning.

For Iraq, I would argue that there are 2 main adversaries - Sunni Rejectionists and Terrorists/Foreign Fighters. Most would agree that little can be done to positively influence the later except for direct kinetic acts, thus we are left with Sunni Rejectionists. Yes, I recognize that Sadr is not a Sunni Rejectionist; however, I would assert he is a minor threat who has demonstrated a desire to be included in the legitimate political process. In addition, I recognize that there are criminals that continue to destabilize the country, but that is no different than in the US, thus hardly worthy of comparison with rejectionists and terrorists.

Is it possible that the strategic and operational center of gravity for OIF is the Muslim - Sunni perception/feeling of marginalization - victimization? If coalition forces and the Iraqi government could somehow eradicate this perception and feeling, would our troubles not largely disappear? I say largely disappear due to the fact most agree that terrorists represent a small fraction of insurgents in Iraq. It is this feeling of victimization that leads Muslims to strike back. It is this sense of being victims of Israeli or American power that fuels anti-Western hatred. It is this sense of victimization that leads 300,000 former members of the Iraqi Intel, Security, and Military services to contribute to the insurgency.

If we accept this a the COG, then how is it vulnerable. Immediately, we see inclusion as the answer in Iraq, and not as we are currently mandating it through the "democratic" process. I put democratic in quotations due to the fact that any system which mandates 25% female representation regardless of the one man one vote idea is not democratic.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

ps - I have heard compelling arguments that the COG is the enemy's continued ability to destabilize the country, and that the critical requirement necessary for this to continue is our continued presence.

Bill Moore

05-21-2006, 04:41 PM

In resposne to Strickland's post:

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master, yet I still find many of their arguments against EBO illogical, especially when they turn around and embrace the center of gravity theory. While it does have limited application, it also is an extremely limited construct that doesn’t facilitate a strategy for winning a war. In some cases it may allow a strategy to defeat a particular enemy, but that is seldom enough. During phase III of OIF the COG was the Saddam Regime, and as we saw that foucs only provided a worthwhile intermediate objective, but destroying it didn’t allow us to win the war, of which military power is a only a part of.

Getting back to your comments, while thought provoking I think your example is a perfect illustration of the limits of the COG construct. It is a desire to identify a single enabler for a complex problem set, so we can focus our limited assets on a few enabling decisive points around that COG (as close to a silver bullet solution as possible), then we call victory and go home. This is a practice that some have associated with EBO, but I think it is much more prevalent in the COG approach.

The Sunni rejectionist problem you identified must be addressed, but you can’t address it in isolation. Also identifying the Sunni rejectionist as a COG doesn’t give a planner much to work with. You can’t wish away the other problem sets, since they are all interconnected. We can’t fix the Sunni rejectionist problem without establishing a viable economy, you can’t do that without security, you can’t have security within a criminal society with foreign fighters and ethnic hostilities or regional nations that don’t support security, etc.

Little can be done to influence the foreign fighters except kinetic acts? I disagree and this is a problem of trying to find the foreign fighter COG within Iraq. Assuming there is a COG for foreign fighters, maybe it exists outside of Iraq? Foreign fighters can be addressed through a number of indirect means, to include engaging the source nations with information and assisting them with economic development, not to mention swinging the stick when needed. Another indirect approach which is effective in some areas in Iraq is to turn the population against the foreign fighters which denies them sanctuary, and greatly impedes their ability to operate. By the way this is an effects based approach.

I don’t buy into your comparison of Iraqi criminals with U.S. criminals; thereby, disregarding a problem that is equal on scale to the stability of Iraq as the Sunni rejectionists. There is a difference between a criminal and a criminal economy. What we’re really trying to focus on is the underground or informal economy. Let’s face it, at the end of the day the economic system really determines who as the power, so if a tribe makes its wealth (limited as it may be) from emplacing IEDs, kidnapping, or black market fuel sales, then what is the incentive to support a central government in Iraq that at present cannot provide a viable economic alternative to the tribes? The economy and underground economy are the key competing factions regarding the future of Iraq as a stable state. I think that criminals (who are also frequently terrorists and insurgents) are a bigger threat than the Sunni rejectionists, because they are undermining the very concept of the state.

In summary I think an effects based approach is far superior to the center of gravity construct.

Strickland

05-21-2006, 07:30 PM

Unfortunately, I have limited experience with EB planning, and each of those experiences was a poor one. Maybe I am paralyzed by personal experience; however, I believe that EBO requires a level or amount of intelligence that is unreasonable in order to work effectively.

Again, I am not arguing for a single COG; however, am suggesting that in order to get our heads around a complex problem, one must pick something instead of continuously arguing that whatever is selected is wrong.

Larry Dunbar

05-21-2006, 07:41 PM

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master...

I am one guy you don't have to respect. As far as COG goes, I think the best maneuver is a flanking move, EBO to me is the firebombing of Japan during WWII, and I believe the forces in Iraq are composed of remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Arabs, not to mention the forces of the USA. In short, I am completely ignorant. I believe COG keeps our troop alive; EBO only works if the General in charge envisions it, and I believe we are in the middle of wars fought long ago for goals both won and lost. I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

I think it is too late for the Baath party, they should be eliminated from the planet earth. Our strategy should be one of transformation instead of reform. This comes from the visions of our Generals and not through our civilian leadership.

DDilegge

05-21-2006, 07:52 PM

I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

Sometimes I read all the "smart guy" stuff and wonder what planet that conference was held on...

Bill Moore

05-21-2006, 11:53 PM

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop. John Boyd focused on speed when he used the OODA loop model from a fighter pilot perspective, but expanded the OODA loop concept considerably to address what we're now calling 4th generation warfare while he was assigned to Thailand.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table. There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions. OIF is a perfect example where we learned after repeated failures that mass search and sweep operations were not effective at catching or killing bad guys, and they further alienated the local population, which in the end played into the enemy's hands. If you have some sort of effects based approach you'll learn and adapt, but if you're beholden to a COG you'll tend to stay the course regardless.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why? Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

I'm not a big advocate of Effects Based Operations methods that are coming out of OSD and JFCOM, and concur with your comments on EBO, the planning episodes I have witnessed have been disappointing to say the least. We have tech centric leadership at OSD now, and if they keep evolving EBO into an information technology reliant system it will fail, as many of us have already seen, yet there are still some good aspects of using an effects based approach that will enable us to become a learning organization. It won't keep us from making mistakes initially, but it will allow us to steer in the right direction sooner (I think).

The pie in sky dream of an on line, all knowing, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Tool that can lay out every node, predict every effect, etc. is not just a fantasy, but a dangerous one that will make a few contractors rich, and in the end DoD will have wished they spent that money on weapons systems, getting spare parts for helicopters, etc.

GorTex6

05-23-2006, 10:51 PM

speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.
It is the ability to analyze a spectrum of "noise", deduce information, and synthesize a new reality ie. build snowmobiles

Fast thinkers are impulsive, slow thinkers think big

Larry Dunbar

05-24-2006, 04:24 PM

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, ....

My OODA loop is fast because I live in a simple environment, with very few influences trying to get into my orientation and decision-making. I, as all Americans do, have implicit laws that enable me to move quickly from my orientation to decision making.

If I were in Iraqi this would not be the case. I would still have those implicit laws, but I need to know my enemy’s orientation to influence his decision-making. To get up to speed, I would first try to get inside the insurgents OODA loop as outlined in the 28 articles on another post at this site. My speed would then depend on how fast I could understand the situation as it unfolds, I can't imagine it being all that fast.

but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

Exactly true. Trust is the real important quality, without trust you cannot enter your enemy's loop and he can't enter yours. You have to trust your enemy to act like you think he will. If he doesn't he has broken the link (trust) between you. If you act unlike your enemy thinks you will, he will have to adapt to the situation or be destroyed. It seems to me they are adapting. I have no knowledge if this is so, and will gladly concede this point.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table.

“… when they start a conflict [they] are relatively weak at the orientation aspect…” Not true! The orientation aspect was strong (and quick) on both sides. We simply did not know each other’s orientations very well (the US military and the forces (all of them) in Iraq).

The information we needed in the beginning was in the Observation aspect. We had to know exactly what the enemy was doing and at all times. This was the reason for the rush to get information. This is especially true during a high maneuver strategy such as a blitzkrieg.

There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions.

Bill Moore's statement can't be over emphasized. After gathering information to satisfy our observation of the enemy, we needed to know him (28 articles) and ourselves. This new knowledge is what enables an army to plan what the enemy will do. We got into their OODA loop and they enter ours. Whoever reacts quicker wins the battle, but not necessary the war.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why?

One reason might be because that is the system that the enemy knows you will use, and you know you can defeat him with it. According to Boyd, you want to react as your enemy's orientation dictates and not how yours dictate. If the only thing you know about the enemy is that he understands how you move, I guess you have to go with that. I know too little about your COG and EBO, so I really can't be more specific. Even if I did know more, I am a civilian so my overall knowledge on how the military operates is very limited.

Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

War has such a high level of chance and the outcome can be, well... so final, I wouldn't want any "limits", but then I don't know the limiting factors in the military.
Emboldening the front-line troops wins battles, but I am beginning to believe that it takes leaders with vision, and knowledge to win wars. I also believe this vision has to begin at the top. Independent thinking is great for winning battles, but the US military needs to present a unifying strategy to win this war.
If the COG is about installing leadership in the Iraqi government, I would say that sounds about right. If the EBO is directed at influencing that leadership, I would say that sounds about right. Using EBO against the enemy is great if all the effects it causes are known. I am just not sure if it can be known completely in such a complex situation.
If the companies are trying to sell you a system (pie-in-the-sky) that wins every battle, it is too late, you guys already accomplish that. Sounds to me like a bunch of whistles and bells you don’t need.
Your knowledge of the facts of the situation sound spot on. It sounds to me like the discussion for and against COG or EBO needs to be carried forward by qualified guys like you.

Merv Benson

05-24-2006, 06:23 PM

In Iraq the enemy is primarily targeting noncombatants so that the media will say it is another example of the US sides failure to stop them from engaging in mass murder. Our primary response to this has been to concentrate on finding and taking out bomb builders and better intelligence in finding those doing the attacks. What is missing from this loop is an attempt to get inside the news cycle or to challenge the premise of the stories. The enemy has said that 80 percent of his battle space is in the media, yet we have no one in charge of fighting in that battle space. The weekly newsbriefings run as many as seven days behind the news cycle. Too often a charge is thrown out and it takes days and sometimes weeks for a response, by which time the cycle has moved on to a new charge to be investigated. If we took the same approach to a kinetic battle space, we would have a lot of friendly KIA's to deal with.

SWJED

05-24-2006, 07:40 PM

Here is an example of an average day's worth of Iraq reporting (MSM, Official and Blogs):

Iraq and OIF / Telic / Catalyst

Bush Says U.S., Iraq Will Assess Troop Levels - Reuters
Coalition, Iraqi Leaders Meet to Discuss Future of Iraqi Security - AFPS
Talks on Security Continue in Iraq - Los Angeles Times
PM: Iraqi Forces Could Stand Alone in 2007 - Agence France-Presse
Bush to Make Assessment of Iraq's Needs for U.S. Military Help - VOA
Delay in Key Iraqi Ministries Will Affect U.S. Troop Levels - VOA
U.S., Britain to Start Iraq Exit in July - The Australian
Far From Model Army but Iraq's Troops Battle On - London Daily Telegraph
Iraqi Security Forces Leading Operations in More Areas - AFPS
Diggers to Pull Out of Muthanna if Iraqis Take Over - The Australian
Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos - New York Times
Iraqi Insurgent Gives Chilling Confession - Washington Post
30 Iraqis Die in Attacks Across the Nation - New York Times
40 Killed in Iraq, 11 Near Shiite Mosque - Associated Press
Bomb Kills at Least 11 at Baghdad Shi'ite Mosque - Reuters
Hands-Off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq - Los Angeles Times
Rights Under Assault In Iraq, U.N. Unit Says - Washington Post
U.S. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers - Los Angeles Times
Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors - Associated Press
U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters - New York Times
Judging Iraq On Its Own Terms - Christian Science Monitor Editorial
Iraq's Next Giant Step - Seattle Times Editorial
Revisionist History - Wall Street Journal Commentary
For Neocons, the Irony of Iraq - Washington Post Commentary
Iraqi Progress - Washington Times Commentary
Securing Baghdad is a Numbers Game - Los Angeles Times Commentary
Troop Withdrawal To Speed Up: Guardian - Captain's Quarters Blog
U.S. & Great Britain Will Start Iraq Exit in July - Gateway Pundit Blog
Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops - Counterterrorism Blog

The list with the links is here (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/news/060524.htm). I read most of it and post the links every day. I feel many of the same frustrations as Merv in reference to lagging behind the MSM daily news cycle on events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT.

Many of the blogs pick up some of the slack but they do not have the wide exoposure the MSM does. Moreover, many (if not most) of the blog readers tend to be selective and visit blogs that more or less reinforce their particular views on Iraq and other issues.

The official DoD press reporting and transcripts lag behind events and tend towards straight forward script that reads like press releases.

DoD did try to get into the enemy's IO OODA Loop but the program to pay Iraqi reporters was outed and the MSM had a field day with that, to say the least.

Bill Moore

05-25-2006, 03:27 AM

Merv I don't disagree, but I would love to quote your source that the enemy said 80% of their battle space is the media if you can find and share it. I know we have all read and heard a lot over the years, so you may not have it at your fingertips.

From an effects based approach, the information system is definitely the most important, as it has a disproportionate impact on all the other systems such as political, economic, social, military, etc. We can win every kinetic battle and still lose if we can’t effectively influence the info sphere.

Although we discussed at length the failure of our ability to influence the info sphere in previous discussions, this is the first example I have seen where you framed the argument using the OODA loop construct, which is simply brilliant. Obvious in hindsight, but not until you pulled open the curtains.

I think we should run with this a little more. We may be able to convince our public affairs officers to get off their duff and respond quicker, but I don’t think that is the right answer. For those of us in the military, we all know we’re repelled by most commercials, and news on the Armed Forces Network (AFN). It comes across as simpleton in nature and disingenuous, I rather Korean, German, or Japanese television. Instead of having a polished prince presenting the approved official side of the story after the response has been murder boarded a few times, why not let one of our NCOs or younger officers speak directly to the media about what happened right after it happened? It may not be polished, but it will be genuine and from the heart and people will have no choice but to believe it. That is the type of IO that will have an impact.

I won’t even attempt to sugarcoat what we did in Abu Grab, and in my opinion the failure of our leadership to aggressively respond to it, gave the enemy an IO victory of enormous scale. Of course ever so slowly we brought several of the culprits to justice, but it was a behind the scenes show. How do you manage the damage for something like this? You don’t manage it, you stand on principle, what people around the world love us for, and you aggressively respond to the crime. Concurrently, and equally if not more important, we show what the terrorists are doing to the population, to include pictures of the tortured bodies. Hell, I read a depressing story today about a 12 year old Iraqi boy that was tortured to death, why wasn’t that one the front page or headline news? We have to show a clear contrast, which means we admit our mistakes, and in the case of the guilty we punish them. The terrorists are murdering pricks who brag about their atrocities online! Why can’t we get that across to the Arab street? It is a story right there to be told. We wear the white hat, that is obvious to us, but it isn’t all that clear to the Arab world. We can do better, much better.

I don't want to divert too much from the COG versus EBO argument, but this has merit.

Merv Benson

05-25-2006, 02:17 PM

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.

I do not think public affairs offices are set up to respond in a timely way to enemy media campaigns. The best analogy I can think of off hand is a groups of trial lawyers responding in real time to the other side in complex litigation situations. They have the sense of urgency to get their sides position out there and to tear down the assertions of the other side. If properly manged by a skilled attorney they can be devatatingly effective. This is not the same as lawyers giving legal advice on operational matters. It is about presenting a case in an understandable way that ordinary people can understand. Trial lawyers are very different from deal lawyers in terms of their OODA loops. They can't afford to let testimony bad for their case just hang out there without dealing with it while it is still fresh in the minds of the fact finders.

Jones_RE

05-25-2006, 03:26 PM

Experienced trial lawyers tailor their message to the audience. They'll use different approaches depending upon the judge and jurors as they know them.

The Arab mindset seems a bit difficult for westerner's to wrap their heads around - certainly I don't grok it. Heightened concern for social honor, a penchant for paranoia, major concern over person to person relationships as opposed to detail oriented deal making, etc. It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

At the same time, the internet offers an incredible opportunity to insurgents everywhere - untraceable, immediate and virtually impossible to refute (because you can't verify anything online - thus folks believe the stuff they want to and ignore the rest). And for the finale - in Iraq you've got scads of local Imams whose livelihood is dependant upon their popularity and who have far more credibility and authority than any American.

Frankly, I can't think of a more difficult information operations environment.

Larry Dunbar

05-25-2006, 08:58 PM

It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

Not a press secretary, a meme, which I suppose could be a collection of a single conscious (SOF).

Merv Benson

05-26-2006, 12:07 AM

This is a link to a Multi-National Forces-Iraq (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2005/10/media-battle-space-maj.html) press briefing where Maj. Gen. Lynch discusses the Zawahiri leter to Zarqawi.

...

I talk about the Zawahiri letter to the point where you might be tired of me talking about it. But there is something that I have not talked about in the last several press conferences that I want to emphasize. In the letter from Zawahiri, the second in command, if you will, of al Qaeda, he told Zarqawi - he says, "Remember, Zarqawi" - he says, "Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media." Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media. The terrorists will use the media as a combat multiplier to hide their limited capabilities. And let me use an example that you're all very familiar with to highlight that point.

...

This is a link with a link to the text of the letter (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2005/10/text-of-zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi.html) in both English and Arabic.

...

Among the letter's highlights are discussions indicating:

* The centrality of the war in Iraq for the global jihad.

* From al Qa'ida's point of view, the war does not end with an American departure.

* An acknowledgment of the appeal of democracy to the Iraqis.

* The strategic vision of inevitable conflict, with a tacit recognition of current political dynamics in Iraq; with a call by al-Zawahiri for political action equal to military action.

* The need to maintain popular support at least until jihadist rule has been established.

* Admission that more than half the struggle is taking place "in the battlefield of the media."

...

Elsewhere, the 80 percent figure has been used, but in either case the point is the same, we are not really engaged in half or more of the battle space.

I would point out that the Arab audience is not the only one these attacks are suppose to infleunce and probably not the most important. Part of the design is to reduce support for the war in the US. That has been the most successful aspect of the enemy's war strategy, and people who can make the case in the US are certainly important to the continued success of the operation. The enemy's goal is to change our policy even if he can not win militarily.

slapout9

05-26-2006, 01:35 AM

Several of you have just given good explinations of what EBO realy is. Our enemy understands it better then we do. Specifically you are talking about Col. Wardens ring #4 connection to population groups. Which is a COG and if you can manipulate public opinon through population EBO ops and achieve your political objective you can win at a cheap price. When you do EBO ops against all 5 rings at the same time you have what Warden would call parrallel warfare.

Jedburgh

05-26-2006, 02:25 PM

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.
Merv, I agree 100% with you in that we are the IO campaign to date has been a failure. As Bill stated, there is a great deal of potential leverage to bring into play in a properly orchestrated and synched IO campaign. We do have people (not many, and damn sure not enough for all the missions they are in demand for) with the requisite local and cultural knowledge to develop such a campaign. There's been plenty of doctrinal ink spilled, and lots of high-level discussion, regarding effective integration of IO at the tactical and operational levels, but it ain't happening on the ground.

Not that it matters that much, but the 80% figure Merv quoted from Al-Qa'ida is in relation to pre-attack intelligence gathering rather than media battlespace. In the Al-Qa'ida training manual (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf) it states (on page 42 of the pdf file) that ...by using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.

S-2

06-02-2006, 06:42 PM

"...those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."

Lot of smart guys here, so I'll be weighing in with some trepidation. The above is the "official" DoD definition of COG. Most of this conversation has revolved around "effects based oriented" operations (EBO?) relating to our enemy's perception of coalition vulnerabilities and vice versa-in Iraq. Collectively, you guys have seemed to narrow this to the conduct of Info Ops (I.O.), both ours and theirs-and the relative skill which each side brings to the fight.

What about Afghanistan? There, I'd suggest a more tangible COG exists-Opium. When I consider this as a COG, I acknowledge the monetary importance it plays to the Taliban. I see the physical connection opium establishes between our opponent and the community- coercive and corruptive. I consider the correlation between smuggling routes leading to labs outside, and enemy LOCs leading inside to Afghanistan, as I'd bet they are one and the same. Finally, opium connects the interdependance between the drug warlords and the Taliban. Like LOCs, finding one almost certainly means finding the other.

I welcome disagreement, but HERE seems to lie a tangible/material center of gravity in a low intensity/C.I. battlefield. However, while tangible and material, it would also appear elusive, as it seems both insidious and culturally pervasive.

Curious to your thoughts, thanks.

sgmgrumpy

06-05-2006, 08:14 PM

A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight.

COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum.

GorTex6

06-05-2006, 08:21 PM

Ask a psychologist, an anthropologist, a sociologist, and an economist what the center of masses are. Even more important, what are ours?

Tom Odom

06-06-2006, 12:37 PM

Adam,

EBO (strat and opn level) is an extensive process; I won't argue for it or against it.

But an effects based process at tactical level does work and it achieves the magic word "synchronization" of lethal and non-lethal effects. The intel requirements to support such a approach are heavily tactical--that is soldier and small unit; but that is the same in any COIN/stability opns environment.

the key to using an effects process is to modifying it to meet the tactical level; constructs such as COGs must be (and are) adjusted to match the user level.

Best
Tom

Rifleman

09-17-2006, 03:11 AM

"A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

I don't know if 19th century U.S. Army officers were familiar with Clausewitz, but evidently they understood how the concept of COG applied to a non state enemy in their situation.

I believe most senior Army officers encouraged buffalo hunting and pioneer settlement. These two things did more to defeat the Plains Indians than military operations. The Plains Indians needed room to roam and a mobile commissary. When they lost those two things they lost physically, spiritually, and emotionally.

The down side is that we still have a Bureau of Indian Affairs and a reservation system over 100 years later. Even if a COG can be identified in a non state or guerilla enemy is it always wise to strike it? Maybe if total subjugation and dependency is the goal, but otherwise?

Maybe I'm way off base with that last statement. I like military boards for the tactical discussions, my understanding of strategic ideas like COG and EBO are vague at best.

Bill Moore

09-17-2006, 05:00 AM

Ah now you're getting at the key difference between the way we currently use the COG construct and EBO. Most military officers think in terms of directing their forces/efforts against a COG to puncture the enemy's ballon sort of speak. EBO on the other hand allows indirect approaches to achieve desired effects. There is almost always more than one COG, and the type of enemy we're fighting today will adapt to COG based strategies has he has been doing quite effectively in Iraq.

Is opium really a logistical COG for the Taliban? If we took the opium away (somehow) do you believe the second order effect would be that the Taliban would be finished ecomonically? I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

Jimbo

09-24-2006, 11:14 PM

COG's are still relevant, we just have to be mentally agile enough to make the jump from physical space and locations to intangibles such as peopl's will, public opinion, and such. IMO, we do a poor job at IO, it is under-resourced and misunderstood.

Shek

09-25-2006, 03:40 AM

I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

Bill,

The Taliban stopped growing opium to appease the international community and then reaped the profits of selling the previous years bumper crops at increased prices due to the lack of a current crop. However, that being said, opium is a critical piece of the puzzle in Afghanistan for multiple parties, but you correctly identify that whether it would be beneficial to eliminate it immediately on balance is a tough question to answer and hence a tough nut to crack.

Bill Moore

09-25-2006, 04:22 AM

Shek, wrong thread, but I understand and concur. I read the piece that Jedburgh attached and it explained that the Taleban was basically trying to create a shortage to increase the value of their product.

Jimbo, I'll bite, so tell me what "the people's will" means to a military planner as a COG?

I think it is obvious we're always targeting the enemy's will, but I can't focus military efforts on their will unless they're a rational actor. How do I target Al Qaeda's will? (I mean target as lethal and non lethal)

RTK

09-25-2006, 11:50 AM

I think it is obvious we're always targeting the enemy's will, but I can't focus military efforts on their will unless they're a rational actor. How do I target Al Qaeda's will? (I mean target as lethal and non lethal)

I'm not sure that targeting will is necessarily a feasible goal. Targeting and mitigating ideology in a fanatical people isn't going to get you very far. To say that we'll target their will infers that adversarial will is based upon logic and reason. When you're an extremist, no amount of logic or reason is going to allow you to look at the other side of the coin.

However, isolating insurgent groups from their support basin will. One of the only things that seperates the disenfranchised Bubba at the end of your block who hates the government and the insurgent population is the amount of localized support he receives from his neighbors. If Bubba started blowing up mailboxes and putting bombs on the sides of roads, his neighbors will turn him in.

I use the term "support" loosely, as passive support would include those who are so afraid of the reprocussions of action that they do nothing, allowing the insurgent to continue his reign of terror. We need to do a better job, through IO, of debasing the grasp insurgent groups have on the population. Depending on what part of the country we're talking about (Al Anbar having a higher concetration of insurgent supporters), we're only looking at about 5% of the population with an overt support of the insurgency. What we need to worry about is the 80% or so who passively let it happen out of fear of reprocussion to themselves or their families. How do we mitigate this? We show them, through our own actions, that it is more adventageous to them to turn in the wacko down the street than it is to sit by and do nothing.

In this sence, one of the lines of operation in the COIN environment must be Information Operations. By making IO a LOO within the mission development cycle, we're placing as much weight in IO as we would with combat operations. I submit that the four LOOs all units should follow in Iraq are:

1. Combined Combat Operations
2. Development of Security Forces
3. Civil-Military Operations
4. Information Operations

Given we're strangers in a society as unfamiliar with us as we are of them, IO must be an imperitive in COIN operations. Many of the preconceptions Iraqis have of Americans is based upon the information operations that insurgent groups propegate amongst the people of the society. In this sence, the insurgents are winning the IO war. We must make IO as important to us as combat operations are.

One of the most successful IO campaigns I saw in Ninwah province was a series of fliers with pictures of children killed by a homicide car bomber. After that flier went out, tons of tips came in, most actionable. The problem is that after doing this once or twice, we figure that the momentum will continue. Oftentimes we kill our own initiative by resting on our laurels and figuring that one or two fliers is enough, particularly if they produce some sort of temporary action. By constantly reengaging the IO target, we chip away at the base of support the insurgents enjoy until eventually its a moot point.

Certainly there are those whose minds we will not change. They are labled collaborists and must be dealt with appropriately as well. The burden is on individual units to A). Know the enemy their dealing with, B). Determining their base of support, C). Mitigating or neutralizing that support within every means at their availability, and D). constantly pursuing innovative ways to diminish passive support.

As has been written in multiple threads, the only way to do this properly is to understand the culture with which you are working. Obviously, what would be sound logic in the United States doesn't necessarily work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Its up to small unit leaders in both of these areas to get to know their populace, forge relationships with local leaders, and get inside the psyche of those their working around, with, and for.

Tom Odom

09-25-2006, 01:00 PM

The reality is that as we practice tactical effects thinking here, we use COG analysis as a fundamental tool in understanding effects. I would certainly endorse both in this context.

best
Tom

marct

09-25-2006, 01:23 PM

Hi RTK,

You make soem interesting points that I'd like to pull apart a bit.

I'm not sure that targeting will is necessarily a feasible goal. Targeting and mitigating ideology in a fanatical people isn't going to get you very far. To say that we'll target their will infers that adversarial will is based upon logic and reason. When you're an extremist, no amount of logic or reason is going to allow you to look at the other side of the coin.

I have to disagree with you on this - specifically your last sentence. One thing most Anthropologists learn pretty quickly is that "logic" and "reason" are cultural constructs rather than absolutes. What we, in the West, assume to be logic (and it is for us) may not operate in other cultures. This is not because they are not "logical" but, rather, because other cultures use different axiomatic assumptions and different syllogisms of logic.

Given we're strangers in a society as unfamiliar with us as we are of them, IO must be an imperitive in COIN operations. Many of the preconceptions Iraqis have of Americans is based upon the information operations that insurgent groups propegate amongst the people of the society. In this sence, the insurgents are winning the IO war. We must make IO as important to us as combat operations are.

Hmmm, again, I think you may be understating Iraqi sources of information on America. Yes, you are quite correct about the IO from the insurgents, but I don't think that it is a good idea to forget about all of the information comming in from other sources as well. In particular, I am thinking about Internet based sources, family diasporic networks, and IO passed through tribal lines.

There's a model in Anthropology that may be useful for looking at this. "Information" is just a set of sensory perceptions which must then be interpreted for and by individuals. Most of these sensory perceptions are "value neutral" originally and get their valuation during the interpretation stage. This "interpretation stage" is where cultural logics and interpretive schema get added into the mix and, if they run long enough, get converted into "rules of thumb" which, in turn, are passed throughout personal networks. In order to establish something as a "rule of thumb" interpretation (aka a "meme") within a given population, there has to be fairly strong reinforcement in the environment for that interpretation.

One of the most successful IO campaigns I saw in Ninwah province was a series of fliers with pictures of children killed by a homicide car bomber. After that flier went out, tons of tips came in, most actionable. The problem is that after doing this once or twice, we figure that the momentum will continue. Oftentimes we kill our own initiative by resting on our laurels and figuring that one or two fliers is enough, particularly if they produce some sort of temporary action. By constantly reengaging the IO target, we chip away at the base of support the insurgents enjoy until eventually its a moot point.

Yup. In effect, you are doing it by creating your own memes, "rule of thumb" interpretations, and then reinforcing them. Let me take this situation a little further and see how it could have been extended, and please excuse me if I'm unaware of a chunk of the details of this specific situation.

From the sounds of it, right after the car bombing, flyers with pictures of the dead children went out and the tips started coming in. Did any military personelle go to the funerals and show grief over their deaths? If not, they should have.

"Momentum" in most pastoralist societies is based on ongoing personal connections and relationships and, grotesque as it may sound, this was a perfect opportunity to establish this type of personal relationship while, at the same time, clearly showing that Americans value the lives of Iraqi children. More importantly, the people who should have attended would be the ones involved in tracking down the others involved in the car bombing. This action would have been perfectly understandable to the Iraqi people since it would be interpreted as a blood vendetta.

As has been written in multiple threads, the only way to do this properly is to understand the culture with which you are working. Obviously, what would be sound logic in the United States doesn't necessarily work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Its up to small unit leaders in both of these areas to get to know their populace, forge relationships with local leaders, and get inside the psyche of those their working around, with, and for.

I totally agree, and probably the best way to do that is to look at cultural parallels. For example, most Western cultures understand blood feuds even if we don't use them (well, most of the time). Most pastoralist cultures have them as central to their orientation. Most Western cultures say that personal relationships are not as important as legal relationships, but the reality is that they are, in all probability, more important (e.g. "networking"). In most pastoralist cultures, personal ties are crucial to social operations.

If we really want to hammer at the will of the insurgency, then we have to do it by changing the interpretations of action, the memes, of the population such that the commonalities with the Coalition are stronger than the commonalities with the insurgency.

Marc

RTK

09-25-2006, 01:46 PM

Hi RTK,

You make soem interesting points that I'd like to pull apart a bit.

I have to disagree with you on this - specifically your last sentence. One thing most Anthropologists learn pretty quickly is that "logic" and "reason" are cultural constructs rather than absolutes. What we, in the West, assume to be logic (and it is for us) may not operate in other cultures. This is not because they are not "logical" but, rather, because other cultures use different axiomatic assumptions and different syllogisms of logic.

__________________________________________________ ___________

Hmmm, again, I think you may be understating Iraqi sources of information on America. Yes, you are quite correct about the IO from the insurgents, but I don't think that it is a good idea to forget about all of the information comming in from other sources as well. In particular, I am thinking about Internet based sources, family diasporic networks, and IO passed through tribal lines.

Marc

Marc,

I have no hope in going toe to toe with a Ph.d in Anthropology. My undergraduate degree will only get me so far. :)

In the long run, we're essentially saying the same thing, though you're more elloquent than I. I was trying to make the point that what we view as logic and reason doesn't necessarily apply in the same way as it does to your everyday Iraqi. Breaking it into the lowest common denominator, this is difficult for our soldiers to understand.

As for the IO sources available to the citizenry of Iraq; I intentionally focused on one aspect of all their sources. Just as a western citizen has numerous media outlets to choose from, Iraqis have the same. It's a matter of which one they pick. Some are more overt than others. In a society where tribal links are paramount to everything else, obviously this will take a precedence of all else. Depending on the tribe, emphasizing these ties will help or hurt our side of the issue, given our relationship as soldiers with those particular tribe.

After 2 years in Iraq I can tell you that it really depends on where you are. We had success in Al Anbar when I was there in 2003-4 but our success was entirely dependant on the support of tribal leades. My second tour last year in Ninewa Province enjoyed a fantastic relationship with tribal leaders which enhanced our success.

I agree with you and acknowledge all your points. Again, I broke it down to the user level with some fairly specific examples.

marct

09-25-2006, 02:30 PM

Marc,

I have no hope in going toe to toe with a Ph.d in Anthropology. My undergraduate degree will only get me so far. :)

Drat, I certainly wasn't trying to set it up as a fight (wry grin).

In the long run, we're essentially saying the same thing, though you're more elloquent than I. I was trying to make the point that what we view as logic and reason doesn't necessarily apply in the same way as it does to your everyday Iraqi. Breaking it into the lowest common denominator, this is difficult for our soldiers to understand.

I agree, it definately is difficult to understand. Sometimes, I think it is harder for Ph.D's to understand that for the people on the ground ;) .

I think I was reacting to the idea, call it a "sense interpretation", that the extremists are not using logic and reason. I've seen a little too much of that coming from politicians, and all I see it serving to do is to seperate "us" from "them". :o

There's a debate I get into with a lot of my friends about why we need to be really careful about semantics (okay, yeah, it's a soapbox of mine). We use language in a lot of ways to construct our understandings of reality and the habits of speach we use often condition the people who listen to us. So if "we" deny "them" the use of logic, then we are saying that we can never get them to change since their is no basis of communication other than a kinetic strike. I would far rather see us set up a situation where we assume that they do use logic and that we can manipulate that logic to our benefit.

Okay, I'm off my soapbox :)

As for the IO sources available to the citizenry of Iraq; I intentionally focused on one aspect of all their sources. Just as a western citizen has numerous media outlets to choose from, Iraqis have the same. It's a matter of which one they pick. Some are more overt than others. In a society where tribal links are paramount to everything else, obviously this will take a precedence of all else. Depending on the tribe, emphasizing these ties will help or hurt our side of the issue, given our relationship as soldiers with those particular tribe.

I totally agree with you on this, and I certainly understand why you focused on the insurgents as the primary means of information. I have to wonder how more effective the IO operations could be in the immediate situation. Believe me, I'm certainly not faulting anyone in the field - that would be nuts! But, if we have to play catch-up, what can be done to make that more effective?

After 2 years in Iraq I can tell you that it really depends on where you are. We had success in Al Anbar when I was there in 2003-4 but our success was entirely dependant on the support of tribal leades. My second tour last year in Ninewa Province enjoyed a fantastic relationship with tribal leaders which enhanced our success.

So, I have to ask, how were those relationships established and maintained? I'm asking because if you enjoyed good relationships with the tribal leaders, then you were doing something right that needs to be communicated both with other people going into the field and in the international mediaspace.

I agree with you and acknowledge all your points. Again, I broke it down to the user level with some fairly specific examples.

Thanks and, again, I apologize if I appeared to be coming down on you. mea culpa.

Marc

RTK

09-25-2006, 03:31 PM

So, I have to ask, how were those relationships established and maintained? I'm asking because if you enjoyed good relationships with the tribal leaders, then you were doing something right that needs to be communicated both with other people going into the field and in the international mediaspace.
Marc

I'm in the beginnings of a COIN handbook written as little AARs for direct actions, CMO operations, IO, and partnership with local leaders and security forces. Hopefully some of what we did can be highlighted and shared with the force.

In reply to your question, we didn't do anything that we felt was out of the ordinary. Having said that, in retrospect, we did a lot of things that others evidently aren't doing:

We placed one platoon within a restive town and they lived with both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police.

Everything we did was combined with Iraqi Security Forces.

We met with town councils on average of about once a week.

We met with tribal leaders at least once a week, oftentimes more.

We'd stop by the houses of key leaders as a matter of routine to check in on them, much like you might do with a good friend who lives down the block from you.

We never made promises we couldn't keep

In working everything combined, we put an Iraqi face on operations, not an American face. In hanging out in the shadows and only appearing when we had to it also gave the impression (rightly so) that the Iraqis were in charge of their own area, not just being paraded around by us as puppets

We took council of their concerns and worked together to correct them. After we would produce they would tell their tribesmembers what had taken place.

When our leading advocate, a tribal sheik, died suddenly, we attended the wake without body armor or protective gear to pay respects. We left our rifles in our vehicles (we kept our pistols). This may have been ballsy, but it showed the people we were there to mourn with them and were not afraid of what could happen to us. (This was planned for, however, like an operation, with the rest of my troop pulling an observation cordon out of sight and mind, but with the ability to act as a QRF if things got bad).

In essence, we treated them as equals, not as people who didn't know what they were doing. We ate their food, drank their tea, exchanged gifts, and stories. By the end of it, the aforementioned tribe adopted us.

My measuring stick for success was this; when we talked to these people for the last times before we left theater the second time, tears were shed on both sides. I have gifts from them in my office. They have pictures of as all like a family photo on their wall. I worry about them constantly, like I'd worry about a part of my family. I think once you get to that level of understanding then you can stamp the entire experience with the success label.

This may be a stretch, but if you look at Kevin Costner's character in "Dances with Wolves," maybe we need to start looking at that as a model for bilateral engagement progression. In simple terms, that's essentially what we did.

marct

09-25-2006, 04:04 PM

I'm in the beginnings of a COIN handbook written as little AARs for direct actions, CMO operations, IO, and partnership with local leaders and security forces. Hopefully some of what we did can be highlighted and shared with the force.

In reply to your question, we didn't do anything that we felt was out of the ordinary. Having said that, in retrospect, we did a lot of things that others evidently aren't doing:

You know, your list is a really great checklist for how to do it right :). And. leaving out the fact that we usually aren't armed, it's pretty much what Anthropologists do in the field - live with the people you are studying and "become" one of them.

...
When our leading advocate, a tribal sheik, died suddenly, we attended the wake without body armor or protective gear to pay respects. We left our rifles in our vehicles (we kept our pistols). This may have been ballsy, but it showed the people we were there to mourn with them and were not afraid of what could happen to us. (This was planned for, however, like an operation, with the rest of my troop pulling an observation cordon out of sight and mind, but with the ability to act as a QRF if things got bad).

This is just the type of thing that would work, especially the leaving the rifles behind (honouring their ability to protect you) and carrying your side arms (showing your willingness to protect them under guest right in case of an attack). Brilliant:D !!!!

In essence, we treated them as equals, not as people who didn't know what they were doing. We ate their food, drank their tea, exchanged gifts, and stories. By the end of it, the aforementioned tribe adopted us.

My measuring stick for success was this; when we talked to these people for the last times before we left theater the second time, tears were shed on both sides. I have gifts from them in my office. They have pictures of as all like a family photo on their wall. I worry about them constantly, like I'd worry about a part of my family. I think once you get to that level of understanding then you can stamp the entire experience with the success label.

Absolutely! Have you managed to keep in touch with them at all?

This may be a stretch, but if you look at Kevin Costner's character in "Dances with Wolves," maybe we need to start looking at that as a model for bilateral engagement progression. In simple terms, that's essentially what we did.

I've got my own take on Dances with Wolves but, yes, the idea of partially "going native" is something that really needs to be done. It has its own dangers in some ways, but it certainly makes what is happening more comprehensible to everyone and, IMHO, would probably make for a better model of engagement that of occupier and occupied.

I'd love to see that handbook when you get it done, either as a draft or as a final product. I hope you'll be able to share it.

Marc

Bill Moore

09-25-2006, 04:26 PM

Gentlemen, the intent of this thread is to clearly show the superiority of effects based planning versus using the outdated center of gravity construct.

Put your guns down, I'm only joking! Great comments, but I would still like to see how the "people's will" as the center of gravity could be useful in a functional way to a military planner?

Using an effects based approach which is intended to integrate all of our government agencies, and hopefully academia, still seems more appropriate than trying to make centers of gravity work in this situation. Sometimes there are COG's, other times the COGs are unsuitable to facilitate planning, such as the people's will.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track? Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners? What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

marct

09-25-2006, 05:45 PM

Hi Bill,

Gentlemen, the intent of this thread is to clearly show the superiority of effects based planning versus using the outdated center of gravity construct.

Put your guns down, I'm only joking! Great comments, but I would still like to see how the "people's will" as the center of gravity could be useful in a functional way to a military planner?

Okay, I will apologize in advance for sounding like an academic :).

As far as I see it, "centre of gravity" is a concept, a mental schema if you will, that is already embedded in the minds of many military planners. Whether it is a worthwhile concept, or whether EBP would be a "better" concept is, for this point, moot. The short answer is that using the "people's will" as a centre of gravity is useful because it is drawing on a concept that already exists in the minds of the military planner. What tends to be missing from the concept is the operational specification. Still and all, it is always easier to "sell" a modification or "amplification" of an existing idea/concept than it is to sell a "new" or "different" concept. It's really just a matter of changing the referential semantics of the debate.

Can it be useful functionally? Probably, but some modification would be needed. First, I think we would have to change the name of the main focus from "people's will" to something like "people's beliefs". Second, it would probably be useful to "create" new foci for "insurgent's will" and, hmm, "COIN will" (where the popluation of the latter is those people who are actively engaged in COIN operations, both "native" and "non-native").

This allows us to stay in the emotionally "safe" construct of centre of gravity, and to shift the EBP into an operationalization of how these centres interact and how those interactions can be manipulated.

Using an effects based approach which is intended to integrate all of our government agencies, and hopefully academia, still seems more appropriate than trying to make centers of gravity work in this situation. Sometimes there are COG's, other times the COGs are unsuitable to facilitate planning, such as the people's will.

Honestly, I think that you are quite correct here, at least as far as actual operational planning, in the broadest sense of the term, is concerned.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track? Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners? What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

Hmmm, that definately is the "put up or shut up" question, isn't it:cool: . I'm going to have to think about this a lot more, but I will try and take a stab at answering some of the questions.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track?

First off, thanks. As it currently stands, I see myself "fit[ing] into the planning process" primarily in two areas:

As a Canadian academic, I am somewhat constrained in who I have access to talk to. I am truly grateful for the existence of SWJ and for the council in listening to what I have to say, since this is one of the few venues I have to make my ideas heard by people who can actually do something. Certainly, what I have to say will not be heard by many Anthropologists (more on that one later - I'm putting an article together on it).
I think the greatest contribution I can make to the planning process is in working with people to develop adaptive methodologies that integrate culture, media, and actual operations. I think that the advantages I would bring to this are that I am an expert in "systems of meaning" (i.e. how people construct reality via symbols), I have a background in comparative religion as well as Anthropology and, finally, as a Canadian, I view US operations through a different, if friendly, lense.

(Sheesh! I feel like I'm writing a cover letter for a job application :). Still, you asked and honest question, and deserve an honest answer.)

Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners?

I would have to say that two things were crucial at the start of such an operation. First, what is / are the local culture(s)? Most of that material is already available in libraries, but until you know the general structures of a group, their symbol systems don't really make that much sense. Actually, it's more complex than that, but that's the basic part. Then I would have to tie in the symbol systems to those structures.

The second imperative would be to look at the insurgency's propaganda. For any insurgency to succeed, it has to operate using a symbol system that derives from or is cognate with the local symbol system(s). Most of the time, this will be tied in to a crucial, everyday "lived experience" that the vast majority of the general population can experience. By way of example, Guevera's campaign in Bolivia hinged around land distribution and when the land was redistributed by the government, the insurgency collapsed.

The case in Iraq is much more complex than that of Bolivia, unfortunately (sigh). At the absolute minimum, there are four seperate cultures to examine and each of them extends beyond the geographic boundaries of Iraq.

What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

I think that in order to answer that question, it would probably be better to split it into three seperate areas:

Initial planning
Company level "advice"
Ongoing analysis

Initial planning
Most of what could be done in the initial planning stage would be what I was talking about earlier: identifying the structures, symbol systems and propaganda nodes. Once they are identified, then certain initial "suggestions" could be made on how to operate. Honestly, I'd be a fool to say that any advice coming out of this would work 100% of the time. Based on WWII experience in the Pacific theatre, we would be lucky to get about 60%-70%. Still, that would be better than nothing.

Company level advice
Again, initially, it would come out of the initial planning stage. The trick, I think, would be to set up a "cultural intelligence" operation where information from the field is sent back ASAP for analysis and reworking, which brings us to...

Ongoing analysis
To my mind, this is the core "value add" that Antrhopology can bring to the table (not that most of my colleagues would do so :mad: ). We have had a lot of discussions about how much cultural training the strategic corporal and other frontline troops can have. The reality, at least as much as I see it at present, is that the mind set required for someone to be a good combat soldier is quite different from that required to be a good cultural analyst. Having said that, however, I think that it is absolutely imperative that information, analysis and observations flow freely back and forth between the two groups.

Let me return, for a second, to the tangential conversation RTK and I were having. Notice that both of us mentioned showing up at funerals. In my case, I was placing that type of action in a cultural symbolic context. In RTK's case, he was placing it in an operation and personal context. How would this work together? Well, if nothing else, I would hope that when RTK produces his COIN handbook, he includes that "story" along with a recommendation that other people do the same where possible. Why? Because it not only establishes and strengthens individual personal relationships, but also because it honours the local system of tribal honour.

Bill, I don't know if this has answered your questions. I know that I'm not happy with it on the whole, but I wanted to give you a quick answer before taking a week or two to put something more complete together.

Marc

slapout9

09-25-2006, 06:39 PM

Dear RTK,
Bubba wants you to know "he ain't got no neighbors" He don't live on know block neither, he has a trailer like all regular folks does.

Strickland

09-25-2006, 08:34 PM

So back to the original question - what is or are the center(s) of gravity in Iraq? We have been in Iraq for 42 months, so I would imagine someone must have figured it out by now.

RTK

09-25-2006, 09:35 PM

Physical:
- Cities
- Infrastructure (water sources, communications, electricity)
- Line of Communication

Organizational:
- Tribal links
- Religious ideology
- Political parties
- Ethnic factions (Sunna, Shia, Kurd)
- Kurdish political parties
- Iraqi Security Forces

Jimbo

09-25-2006, 09:46 PM

Since Clausewitz would contend that the purpose of war is to make another nation or people submit to your will. I will bring up people's will as a planning construct is important because it is the key terrain in an insurgency. What actions are you going to take make the local population neutral to passively friendly, and break the will of the insurgent. RTK posted alot of "how to" information. The key in using "people's will" as a COG for planning is that it helps drive and synchronize your CMO, IO, and security operations. It is tied to public perception and public opinion. As a military planner it is important because we try to avoid it and pawn it of on other government entities that either don't exist, or they are not resourced for it (state/commerce/IMF,UN,etc). Since the NGO's/PVO's/agencies can't do it, as a militayr planner I have to. I saw the shoulder shrug, hell I shrugged my shoulders, in May and June of 2003 when we had not factored people's will and how to win it as a planning construct in Iraq.

marct

09-25-2006, 09:49 PM

Symbolic

- Communications media
- Symbolic associations between individuals and actions (i.e. "stereotype" expectations)
- Emotional evocations of sensory input (e.g. how do the locals emotionally react to a patrol)
- Interpretations of religious ideology
- Interpretations between religio-legal systems
- A symbolic "repatterning" of basic emotional equations (e.g. value of children)
- Construction of a "safe space" for symbolic discourse

Physical (a few additions)

- Food
- Fuel
- Communications media and programming (e.g. Voice of America style a la WWII & cold war)
- Medical care
- Infrastructure reconstruction, especially at the personal level (e.g. housing, means of livelihood, etc.)

slapout9

09-25-2006, 10:30 PM

What is the defeat mechanism we should use to win?

Strickland

09-25-2006, 10:54 PM

Maybe I misunderstood or misread Clausewitz, but dont COGs have to offer resistance? How does either terrain or infrastructure provide resistance?

RTK

09-26-2006, 12:40 AM

Maybe I misunderstood or misread Clausewitz, but dont COGs have to offer resistance? How does either terrain or infrastructure provide resistance?

Whether Clauswitz said that COGs have to offer resistance, I have no idea. I'm going with the definition in FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A operational Terms and Graphics, which states:

Centers of Gravity – (DOD) Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs.

Additionally, COGs are talked about in FM 3-0, Operations:

5-27. Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, a direct approach may be costly and sometimes futile. Commanders examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.
5-28. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the
commander’s intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the
center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions.
5-29. Commanders not only consider the enemy center of gravity, but also
identify and protect their own center of gravity. During the Gulf War, for example, US Central Command identified the coalition itself as the friendly
center of gravity. The combatant commander took measures to protect it, including deployment of theater missile defense systems.

It was in these terms that infrastructure and terrain can be centers of gravity (think oil fields).

Bill Moore

09-26-2006, 01:43 AM

Read this article carefully, and it will challenge our doctrinal perceptions of what we think Clausewitz meant by centers of gravity. This will expand the conversation and COGs and EBO considerably. Our current doctrinal definition of COGs is wrong and for the most part worthless.

Use the link below to go this excellent article in the "Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, Vol LVI, No. 1"

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art4-w03.htm

I attempted to post the PDF file, but it was too large. If you can't access it let me know and I'll send the PDF file to SWJED.

Bill

Bill Moore

09-26-2006, 01:47 AM

Clausewitz’s center of gravity, then, is a “focal point,” neither a strength (or even a source of one) nor a weakness, per se. Second, CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a substantial degree of unity, like a physical body. Third, a center of gravity exerts a certain centripetal force that tends to hold an entire system or structure together; thus a blow at the center of gravity would throw an enemy off balance or even cause the entire system (or structure) to collapse. Fourth, using the concept necessitates viewing the enemy holistically.

The U.S. military’s various definitions lack entirely Clausewitz’s sense of “unity” or “connectivity.” By overlooking this essential prerequisite, the U.S. military assumes centers of gravity exist where none might—the enemy may not have sufficient connectivity between its parts to have a CoG. In that case the analysis does little more than focus on the most critical of the enemy’s capabilities.

Jimbo

09-26-2006, 03:07 AM

Echevarria still makes my head hurt, as much as when I had him for a history class many, many moons ago. I think that the U.S. military has had a problem with understanding Clausewitz, especially the nuances. The theorist who has had the greatest impact on the U.S. military is Jomini. It plays to U.S. love of formulaic solutions. Sure, parts of Clausewitz have been used, but U.S. military doctrine is still driven by Jomini, more than Clausewitz.

marct

09-26-2006, 04:09 AM

Hi Bill,

Read this article carefully, and it will challenge our doctrinal perceptions of what we think Clausewitz meant by centers of gravity. This will expand the conversation and COGs and EBO considerably. Our current doctrinal definition of COGs is wrong and for the most part worthless.

Good article on the whole. I found his argument on the root of the concept to be pretty much as I had remembered it - basically an analogic use of Newtonian physics. Given Clausewitz's experience and time, I'm not surprised that he used the fairly simple analog of a singular body or interconnected system with a specific centre of gravity (i.e. the Earth-Moon system).

I found his argument about al-Queda's CoG somewhat less persuasive.

For example, al-Qa‘ida cells might operate globally, but they are united by their hatred of apostasy.39 This hatred, not Osama bin Laden, is their CoG. They apparently perceive the United States and its Western values as the enemy CoG (though they do not use the term) in their war against “apostate” Muslim leaders. Decisively defeating al-Qa‘ida will involve neutralizing its CoG, but this will require the use of diplomatic and informational initiatives more than military action.

First of all, I doubt that "hatred of apostacy" is the glue that holds them together. It is certainly our inference drawn from their actions, but I suspect that "love of Islam" is probably more accurate. And before anyone says, "they're the same thing", no, they aren't (and I know you guys wouldn't say they were anyway :)). One can "hate" apostates without killing them, and you are likely to find more people who will answer "yes" to the question "do you love God?" than to the question "do you hate apostates?". What al-Queda and certain other groups have done is to remap the meaning of "loving God" into "killing apostates", and Islam is certainly not the first religion that has done so (check out the Albigensian Crusade or the Maccabean Revolt if you want other examples).

Second, the US is not an apostate nation since it has never been Islamic and was never part of the Caliphate. I do agree that the Muslim Brotherhood, which is one of the main ideological sources for al-Queda, aimed at apostates in Egypt (e.g. Nasser) and has recently extended the call to Jihad to include non-Caliphate areas of the world, but there is an inherent weakness in their argument that can easily be exploited - the rest of the world is not "apostate". This extension has already caused serious problems with al-Queda's support base in the Islamic world, since they had not even followed the basic requirements for war with non-apostates/non-believers - the call to convert (hence the recent calls to convert and all will be fine).

Their CoG is the symbolic technology that allows them to map "love or God" into "hatred of the apostate AND non-believer" and, once that technology is smashed, their unity disappears as does their ability to operate at a large scale. Unfortunately, as Echevarria notes, that doesn't mean that they will disappear...

Marc

RTK

09-26-2006, 10:35 AM

A great position paper on the subject. (http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=216#search=%22%22center%20of%20gravity%20d efinition%22%20%22clausewitz%22%22)

slapout9

09-26-2006, 12:11 PM

RTK, great paper thanks for posting.

marct

09-26-2006, 02:09 PM

Thanks for posting this, RTK. I think I am going to give it to my students to read since it is one of the best examples of a non-deistic, theological epistemology I have ever seen (wry grin).

What I have found most fascinating in this entire discussion is that there hasn't been any examination of the operational assumptions made by Clausewitz in his original work, i.e. no discussion of the assumed concept of "organization" (it's all ideal types) and no formalized discussion of the offensive | defensive | economic system ratio and how it effects the organization of military / ideological force. I think this ties in with Echevarria's comments about Clausewitz originally envisioning the concept as a process rather than a static.

Even if we go back to the Newtonian model of physics, there are certain processual issues that come to the fore. For example, gravity implies mass and some measure of density. Most mass is also moving along some type of a vector, at least in relationship with other units of mass. This vector is changing based on mutual attraction and / or the application of "force", and that rate of change (ΔV/ΔT) is the acceleration.

Okay, let's translate this analogy back into Iraq and the GWOT. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the spread of Wahhabist theology is the initial vector, where the "force" applied to produce an acceleration is primarily socio-cultural (e.g. pan-Islamic nationalism, a revitalization movement a la Wallace, a rejection of secular values, an increase in what Durkheim called anomie, the creation of the State of Israel, etc.). It starts as a fairly small diameter (i.e. small number of poeple), highly "dense" institutional / ideological object and gathers mass along its vector, gathering speed (accelerating) as it goes. So far, it is acting exactly the same as any other social movement in the literature.

Where it starts to change its vector is when certain crucial events happen ("strange attractors" in catastrope theory) - the short lived take-over of the Qa'bah, the Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each of these acts to redirect the vector of the social movement by defining an immediate environment: the core of Islam is under attack, it is possible to run a "pure" Islamic nation state, and the "crusaders" (infidels) have returned and are being aided by apostates exactly the same way as they were during the period of the Crusades.

This parallel to the crusades is crucial for a number of reasons. First, they happened when the Caliphate was internally divided and fighting amongst itself. Second, they happened at a time of a resurgence of non-state Islam based around the Ulama. Third, they were a time when the first serious attempt to reformulate Islam was happening in an integrative manner (cf. al-Ghazali, The Revivification of Religious Sciences; it is also interesting to note that al-Ghazali's work is enjoying a revival in the Sudan and Somalia amongst other places). Fourth, they marked the begining of a period of shame for Islam as the Caliphate disolves and "barbarians" who, while ostensively Muslim do not share the same cultural values (e.g. the Turks, the Mongols, etc.), gain control of large parts of Islamic lands. Fifth, the period produces one of the most reveared "saviour" figures in Islamic history - al-Malik al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (the closest Western figure is probably King Arthur). BTW, this is what I meant by a cultural propoganda node in my earlier posting - it is the "mythic" justification for transforming "love of God" into "hatred of the apostate / non-believer".

So, what does this mean operationally? RTK, you described how you operated and the results you achieved. I was particularly impressed when you said that you had been "adopted". In part, what was going on was a hearkening back to an earlier "story" from the height of the Caliphate where Christians, Jews and Muslims worked together for the good of the community (~8th century ce).

What most people don't think about right now is that, at one time, Islam was the most "tolerant" religion amongst the Peoples of the Book, and the period when that tolerance was operational is the "Golden Age" of Islam. This was the time period when the Western Empire had been replaced by barbarian kingdoms and the Eastern empire was a theocratic / bureaucratic state that made Stalinist Russia look like paradise. The main "progress" of civilization was happening in the Islamic world, and Alexandria, Baghdad and Damascus were amongst the greatest cities in the world in terms of civility, technology, law, the arts and intellectual activity. This Golden Age had already started to fall apart when Alp Arslan destroyed Romanus IV's army at Manzikert (the proximate cause of the 1st Crusade).

Back to operational reality and the CoG debate. If the conecpt of a CoG is going to prove useful, then force needs to be aimed at not only the mass (i.e. the open insurgents) but, also, towards changeing the acceleration factors, which is why, IMHO, a strictly kinetic approach is ridiculous - it actually increases the acceleration as we have all seen. The proper application of "force" is to shift the vector from the perception that the proper "story" is the Crusades to the proper "story" is the Golden Age. And that is what RTK was doing - shifting the story one person at a time.

Marc

Steve Blair

09-26-2006, 03:04 PM

Good post, Marc. I'm not sure why (perhaps it's the fact that I'm a history type as opposed to a physics type) but I always viewed the CoG as a process rather than a static thing.

marct

09-26-2006, 03:11 PM

Thanks, Steve. Actually, we are probably alike that way - I never could understand how it could be static :). 'sides that, even in physics it's a process so if we use it to gain insights, it's probably better to try and use it understanding the context it was written in. I s'pose it all comes out of people looking for a solid "thing" rather than a fluid event ;)

Marc

Bill Moore

09-26-2006, 03:20 PM

Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY. I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate. Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?

RTK, I look forward to reading the paper you attached. In short though, it seems the essence of success is understanding your enemy and understanding yourself, which in some ways it seems that is what we're trying to do with the COG theory (although that use is apparently incorrect). Understanding vulnerabilities, capabilities, motivations, etc. and then taking the appropriate actions. If we understood this up front, e.g. understood our limitations and the enemy's we may have had different objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.

Steve Blair

09-26-2006, 03:28 PM

I suspect you're right about the fluid versus solid thing, Marc. One of the things you learn from history if you study it properly (trying to understand causes and perspectives as opposed to block memorization of dates...:) ) is that most events are very fluid. Based on this, I think of CoGs as shifting targets and areas of importance. By way of illustration, during one phase of a conflict a CoG may be a country's logistics hubs, while at another phase it could well become their power grid, information systems, or ethnic/cultural differences. One could argue that in the US Indian Wars two vital CoGs were the buffalo for the Plains Indians and a variety of tribal differences among the Apache. Two different "theaters of war," if you will, with two different CoGs, but the same overall campaign. There were others within each conflict, including tribal differences among the various Plains Indians (the different relationships with the Whites held by the Sioux peoples as compared to the Crow, for example), showing that there can in fact be multiple CoGs within a single conflict, and that each in turn can be examined and targeted. Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.

RTK

09-26-2006, 03:41 PM

Steve Blair

09-26-2006, 03:47 PM

What if we defined COGs as areas of influence, either physical or theoretical, the control of which by either adversarial party places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage, much like key terrain?

Any thoughts?

I think this comes closer to Clausewitz's original intention, although it should also be considered that CoGs can change over time. A CoG could also be an area of influence that is subject to disruption if not necessarily control.

One of the more interesting CoG discussions came out of Vietnam, and the contention that the North Vietnamese discovered that American public opinion was a vital CoG for their war aims. They never controlled it, but they did manage to disrupt and influence it in a way that helped them achieve victory.

I think the term "Center of Gravity" evokes for many a physical image, much like the axis something physically revolves around. This can be hard to overcome, and may lead to some of the confusion that has grown up around the concept.

On an interesting trivia note, I plugged Center of Gravity into Babel Fish. It translated into German there as Schwerpunkt, which then translated back into Emphasis. Nothing conclusive, but more something I found interesting.

slapout9

09-26-2006, 03:49 PM

What if you defined a COG as a person,place,or thing that can exert power over the system?

Steve Blair

09-26-2006, 03:54 PM

Perhaps influence might be a better term than power, since a CoG can have an indirect yet powerful influence over decisions. But I may also be quibbling over terms. It's more important to remember that a CoG is fluid, and not fixed.

marct

09-26-2006, 03:59 PM

Hi Bill,

Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY.

Thanks :) Just don't mention it to any of my academic colleagues, or I would be drummed out of the academy for "Conduct Unbecoming..." (LOLOL)

I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate.

In all honesty, I suspect that they are a heuristic of somewhat limited value in the type of battlespace we are operating in (i.e. global political, military, economic and symbolic conflict). I think they can be a very useful heuristic at both the interagency level, as you mentioned, and also at the level of Grand Strategy (i.e. the global population is the theatre of operations). Given the prevalence of the concept within the militray, they can also, probably, serve as useful heuristics in more restricted levels of operation.

Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?

And to add to the list, how about other nations agencies and militaries? If this is a Global War on Terror, then where is the Global co-ordination?

It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.

One of the things I dislike most about many of my colleagues is their habit of living in the past without using it to bring meaning to the present and help construct the future. You're perfectly right about playing the "what if" game - it is really counter-productive, especially in democracies where it is likely to be used by short sighted politicians for immediate election gains. We need to look at the past to find the problems, opportunities and patterns of action that can help us to achieve our current and future goals.

On the subject of emplacing democracies, I'm really unsure. On the one hand, there is a certain international perception about the message coming from the Bush administration "Democracy is good, and we'll give it to everyone." The problem I think that many of us have with this idea is that democracy, in the true, philosophical sense of the term, cannot be "given" it must be earned (Thomas Paine had some good things to say about this in Common Sense). At its heart, a democracy relies on an informed and educated citizenry that is both willing to engage in a pluralistuc debate and, at the same time, willing to defend the right of other people to hold contrary opinions.

At the same time, one pattern that has been repeated over and over again historically is the shift from a democracy into either an aristocracy (e.g. Rome) or a mob-ocracy (e.g. Athens). I'm not particularly sanguine about where democracy will go in either Afghanistan or Iraq. On a purely personal level, and, yes, I know I'm am showing my bias here :), I really wish that the old King of Afghanistan had either accepted the throne or let his son do so. Oh, well, that's water under the bridge.

Marc

marct

09-26-2006, 04:05 PM

RTK

09-26-2006, 04:08 PM

I'd second Steve's comments on this. Maybe reformulate it as:

areas of influence, either physical, theoretical or symbolic, the relative influence of which by adversarial parties places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage

Marc

I'll vote for this.

marct

09-26-2006, 04:27 PM

You know, I just had a thought that it would be really interesting to compare the methodologies used to currently determine a CoG with Malinowski's work in Dynamics of Culture Change (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Culture-Change-Inquiry-Relations/dp/0837182166/sr=1-1/qid=1159287665/ref=sr_1_1/104-1149179-5683116?ie=UTF8&s=books). At it's core, this particular piece is laying out a methodology designed to find a culture's CoG, although he doesn't use the term, and figure out plans for changing it.

Marc

slapout9

09-26-2006, 05:00 PM

RTK, maybe change area of influence to point of influence? I think one purpose of defining a COG is to allow concentration, area seems to broad, point seems more focused?? What do you think? Anybody else welcome to comment to.

marct

09-26-2006, 05:26 PM

Hmmm, i can certainly see why that might be better. If we want to keep with the analogy from physics, maybe we should keep "area", but with a "locus" or "focal point" that may shift depending on the actions of all forces in the area? The image running through my mind is the accretion disk on a black hole - the infamous "point of no return" - or that 3D graphic showing gravity wells (the one with warped space-time in noxious green lines).

Marc

Strickland

09-26-2006, 06:25 PM

Instead of expending the limited resource of time in search for COG(s) while planning; wouldnt it be more useful simply to focus on critical vulnerabilities or limitations of our adversary and plan from that point? We all are aware in social systems (such as the Sunni Insurgency) our knowledge of all factors that influence behavior wil be limited and imperfect. Thus, instead of expending countless hours in philosophical debate, why not just focus planning efforts on limitations and vulnerabilities to possibly exploit.

I doubt that most people know what the center of gravity of their own neighborhoods, workplaces, church, or child's school is, let alone the Iraqi or Afghani Insurgency. If we had such knowledge as to how to manipulate or shape the behavior of adversaries so easily, we wouldnt be faced with uncontrolable criminal violence in parts of our urban centers, growing teen drug abuse, etc. here in the US.

Ironhorse

09-26-2006, 06:56 PM

Concur! Have seen all inexperienced staffs, and many experienced ones, die on the CG-CC-CR-CV hill early in mission analysis.

Unfortunately, it is a vulnerability's special relationship to the CG that makes it a CRITICAL vulnerability, rather than just a run-of-the-mill or trivial vulnerability. So can't completely dismiss the topic. Just need to move to it and through it more smartly.

Sometimes that may mean starting in the middle and working in both directions, say from CC or CR. Have seen that employed well. Have also failed miserably myself in attempting to do it, so that is not a panacea.

Bill Moore

09-27-2006, 02:21 AM

Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.

Steve, I'm not convinced that anyone gets it, and there are plenty of smart people on this site that are debating it. Neither the Marines nor Army nor SOF have yet found anything resembling a COG that we can effectively influence to achieve our objectives in our current conflict. The COG normally has little relevance in COIN, except from the stand point of identifying our own and protecting them.

The COG isn't a shifting thing or a process, it is a COG. It only shifts when your objective shifts or you didn't properly identify it in the first place, assuming it even exists. Obviously the COG for phase III in OIF is not the same as phase IV, but phase IV is really a different war, not a different phase.

Our process is MDMP, not COG. Many planners try to use COGs to focus their efforts, and in a strictly kinetic fight that makes perfect sense (it is a form of EBO). Normally, (never say never, and never say always) if you focus your efforts in COIN (e.g. identify the COG and mass your efforts against it), then you're neglecting the the bigger picture, and most likely you'll find what you identified as COG wasn't, such as Fallujah. It was an important battle, but not the COG of the Sunni insurgency that some folks said it was at the time.

Some of you mentioned using multiple COG's, but excessive COGs limit the utility of the concept in the first place. Every COG has decisive points (DPs) that we target/influence to achieve the desired effect on the COG, but DPs are not COGs. It sounds like the Marines use critical vulnerabilities instead of DPs. I wonder if our terminology and thought processes differ so much due to the French influencing the Marines and the Germans the Army in their formative years? (This was before the French were evil :-), if I didn't that the Corp make think I'm making a jab at them).

What is missing in this conflict is clarity of intent and thought and ambiguity leads to chaos. If a COG existed beyond their will, then it would be useful, but if it doesn't (I haven't seen one yet) exist, then lets use other models to figure the problem out. We're defending freedom, so let's not be robotic and defend dinasour concepts to the death. No one is rejecting the COG concept completely, but in many situations the utility of it is questionable at best. If it limits our ability to accurately define and solve the problem, shift to another model.

While I still think EBO has potential, the truth is I haven't seen it effectively integrated into our MDMP, so there is must be alternative models that we can collectively design. That is why this council exists isn't it?

Tom Odom

09-27-2006, 01:03 PM

Bill,

We have in process 2 effects-based process studies at the BCT and battalion level that should be out soon. They represent 4 years of work, practice, and operational use and should be of interest to you.

Best
Tom

RTK

09-27-2006, 01:36 PM

I finally got around to watching the Emerald Express video from the USMC that was linked from another discussion page on this site. They make a point in the conclusion of the video that "the people are the center of gravity in COIN operations." They make a compelling argument.

Bill Moore

09-27-2006, 03:44 PM

Tom,

If the studies are available in draft, please send me a link. I'm very interesting in finding a working model. We're looking at a number of contigencies and we can list objectives and effects all day, and they're valid, but transitioning to task and purpose and worse trying to "measure" them is a nightmare.

We use COG's also, but to be frank that is simply because they're part of doctrine, and in most cases they add very little to the process. I think what I'm discovering that may be a shortfall with Army doctrine is we have basically three category of tasks: decisive, supporting, and sustaining. Normally the kinetic operations are considered decisive, yet in COIN supporting and sustaining may in reality be decisive. You can see that our model doesn't facilitate that type of thinking. I recall one of the CG's in his AAR remarks on OIF mentioning that phase IV was decisive not phase III, which tends to parallel what I'm thinking, and I think that means the kinetic ops in phase III were supporting (set the conditions for decisive COIN supporting and sustaining tasks). Let me know what you think?

RTK, you'll get no argument from me that people are critical and depending on how you define COG (still debatable) they may be a COG. I don't mean this disrespectfully, but so what? In every type of warfare people are the ultimate target. I think using the population as a COG in many ways is a cop out, because it doesn't get us to the appropriate task and purposes to achieve our end state. On further reflection our COG probably needs to be tied to our end state. This is a lame example, but I'm pressed for time, if we decided to invade Libya and do a regieme change instead of conducting a punitive air raid the COG would have differed. Like everything else the military does, it set conditions for something else to happen (maybe a political solution), so the COG simply can't be tied to the people, it needs to be tied to what we want the people to do (how they behave). Marc made a great comment in an earlier post, where he suggested instead of using people's will, how about their beliefs? That makes more sense. Again the challenge is figuring out how to operationalize it. I don't think beliefs is quite there, but it is closer than their will.

I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground. This is by far the best counsil I have found online and I'm awed by the intellectual input into the collective effort. It is a combination of muddy boots experience and education. I'm heading out for a short period, and not sure if I'll have access to a computer, but look forward to reengaging upon return.

Bill

marct

09-27-2006, 04:03 PM

Hi Folks,

Bill mentioed that he would like to see drafts of the work Tom is talking about, and so would I.

You know, I think that we probably are in the process of breaking new ground. I am going to be tied up with other things (teaching, meeting with students, choir practices) until Friday, so I probably won't have much time to make posts. What I am thinking about now is that Bill mentioned that "beliefs" may not quite be there, and I think he's right. The only wording I could put on it now would sound hopelessly theoretical, and I want a chance to mull it over. I think that I will go back to the Malinowski book I mentioned and see if I can get any insights out of how to operationalize "belief change" (as opposed to regime change? :)).

I'll try and put together a cheet sheet on Malinowski's ideas and make it available for everyone.

Marc

RTK

09-27-2006, 04:07 PM

RTK, ... I don't mean this disrespectfully, but so what? ... On further reflection our COG probably needs to be tied to our end state.

No disrespect taken.

THis is exactly the point I've tried to make in other threads, particularly the Strategic Corporal thread. I work off my commander's intent and endstate. I then refine his to develop mine. Endstate drives the train. So I've got all these Iraqis out there. So what? How do they affect me? How do they affect my mission? Where do they tie into my endstate? Looking at things from a purely informational standpoint, you could see these as PIR.

Perhaps COG is nothing more than a prescribed set of CCIR and key tasks driven towards a defined endstate fulfilling the commander's intent.

slapout9

09-27-2006, 04:11 PM

This is little off track but maybe useful. In police world we use the problem/crime or disorder triangle. That is our Holy Trinity. They could also be thought of as centers of gravity. I will try to translate this into COIN ops.

It starts with what is called a problem or crime/disorder triangle.
It has three COG's
1-a motivated offender (insurgent)
2- an accessible target/victim (vulnerable population or physical thing,oil well)
3-a hot spot location(failing or failed state, nobody in charge).

If you are teaching this to Bubba it is called the wolf,the duck and the den. All three must be present to have a crime or disorder problem happen.

To collapse the triangle, you can:
1-arrest the wolf
2- protect the sitting duck
3-clean up the den so it doesn't attract future wolves.
In the worst case you may have to do all three at once but often they can be done one at a time. the COG may shift during your operation depending on how effective you are and the general situation. No one technique works everywhere or all the time. Criminals are very adaptive.

The Iraq parallel:
1-An Bar is a wolf problem or wolves, you have several wolf packs and until you deal with this nothing much will change.
2- Baghdad is a duck problem (sitting ducks) vulnerable population. To fix this you need boots on the ground and eyes in the sky.
3-Iraq in general is a den problem a failing state with valuable targets (oil) that will attract a lot of wolves. To make it worse you have problems with the internal infrastructure (elc.,water,jobs,etc.) poor den keeping.

In summary Iraq is about the worst problem you could have, but it could be solved by applying the outer control triangle, if we wanted to. But that would require a whole other post so I will wait on that.

Jones_RE

09-27-2006, 05:32 PM

Actually, I think that's a great comparison - a lot like the fire triangle (heat+fuel+oxygen=fire).

Personally, I believe that in Iraq and Afghanistan the COG is the people, but a large subset of the people. People fall along a spectrum - some will violently support our cause, more will somewhat support it, most won't support either side, a bunch will support the insurgents and a few will actively and violently do so.

The target of the enemy is, I think, that great mass in the middle. By keeping them cowed they can obtain: intelligence, money, food, water, shelter, clothing, vehicles, weapons, freedom of movement and protection.

My reasoning behind the choice of target is this: they don't need to target themselves, or their immediate supporters, and they can't do much to target those who violently support our side because we make efforts to protect them. So they aim for the middle first - by creating a feeling of danger and the sense that the insurgency is omnipresent and unstoppable.

Successful counterinsurgency strategies don't just try to "win over" people to your side - they also protect those people. If government forces demonstrate that they can keep an individual and his or her family safe, that individual will be able (not necessarily willing) to assist the government. The hearts and minds campaign and addressing the underlying injustice which motivated the insurgency only win information and recruits to our cause if those people are able to help us without committing suicide.

Jedburgh

09-27-2006, 08:34 PM

This is little off track but maybe useful. In police world we use the problem/crime or disorder triangle. That is our Holy Trinity. They could also be thought of as centers of gravity...
Another concept from law enforcement that translates well into the COE is that of displacement. It doesn't really describe a Center of Gravity, but just as crime displacement sometimes makes resolving the crime/disorder triangle nearly impossible, I feel it demonstrates why it is so difficult to pin down a COG for us to exploit. In conducting analysis, there are essentially six types of displacement:

Temporal: Shift in time. The bad guys aren't stupid, and operational patterns tend to be easy to detect. Shaking up those patterns puts a kink in their system - temporarily. Too often what is thought to be "random" is simply an irregular pattern; and once the bad guys pick it up the dynamic starts all over again.

It sounds too simple - everyone knows not to set patterns. But I could relate plenty of true stories of unit commanders doing very stupid things with schedules in the hot zone.

Target: Shift from hard targets to soft targets within the same area. But then again, it isn't always the classic hard vs soft target issue. Once a pattern is set of hitting police recruiting centers, mix it up with a strike on a mosque or increase attacks directed at the coalition. Targets become hard once they are known to be targets; and thus they shift resources away from other potential targets. Hit the other target, a knee-jerk shift in finite security resources occurs, move to a different target set. Short target cycles are very productive for the bad guys.

Spatial: Shift from highly protected areas to less protected areas. This ties in closely with "Target Displacement" and has been discussed at length on SWC. In the end, without enough coalition and indig security forces to saturate the country, the bad guys will always be able to shift their AO.

Tactical: TTPs shift to meet counter-measures. This needs no explaining. We have an excellent lessons-learned system in-place to track and analyze shifting TTPs. It just a damn shame that more of our guys don't use the information provided.

Perpetrator: New bad guys replace the old. The "beheading" strategy doesn't work too well in disrupting the bad guys. Of course, that's a general statement, and there are exceptions. But, as a rule, disruptions are temporary - there always seems to be another ready to take his place. Going back to Kilcullen's article (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf), this is one of the most significant differences between "classic" insurgency and the COE. The strict hierarchies that characterized many revolutionary organizations simply do not exist. There will be no equivalent of what happened to Sendero Luminoso or the PKK when their leaders were captured.

Type of Crime: Bad guys shift to an entirely different MO once the reward-to-risk ratio is against them. In the larger context, this may reflect an organization's shift from using primarily terrorist tactics to fighting as insurgents - or a group reducing their insurgent activity while focusing on narcotics trafficking.

This only provides some very brief tactical/operational examples of the application of displacement. As I'm sure is clear to all of you, the six types don't really stand alone - when you look at the operational environment through the analytic lens of displacement you'll see that there's quite a bit of overlap. You should also be able to see that far too often we are the ones reacting, and the bad guys are doing the exploiting.

Merv Benson

09-27-2006, 11:34 PM

This poll (http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/30289.html) suggest al qaeda has been firmly rejected in Iraq. Judith apter Klinghoffer writes:

Al Qaeda has desicively lost the Iraqi battlefield.

Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very unfavorable view. Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most negative ratings. The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views. The Sunnis are also quite negative, but with less intensity. Seventy-seven percent express an unfavorable view, but only 38 percent are very unfavorable. Twenty-three percent express a favorable view (5% very).

Views of Osama bin Laden are only slightly less negative. Overall 93 percent have an unfavorable view, with 77 percent very unfavorable. Very unfavorable views are expressed by 87 percent of Kurds and 94 percent of Shias. Here again, the Sunnis are negative, but less unequivocally—71 percent have an unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 percent a favorable view (3% very).

Iraqi confidence in Iraqi forces (as opposed to militias) is increasing while its confidence in US forces is decreasing. Given US policies there can be little doubt but that US forces have lost significant Shia support and gained some Sunni support. I suspect increasing number of Shia no longer believe that American forces are capable of protecting them and with increased confidence in their government's capabilities no longer fear the consequences of an American withdrawal.

...

If the people are the COG is it possible that both sides are losing? The poll results on the Americans seems inconsistent with reports coming out of Baghdad on the reception for US troops being brought back into the neighborhoods.

slapout9

09-27-2006, 11:44 PM

Jed, you are dead on it. Displacement may not be a center of gravity, but it is one of, if not the most important concept in LE and COIN. I was going to write about this in the application of the control triangle (to counter the crime triangle) but you have done an excellent job.

There is one part I would like to expand on. Displacement to JAIL or GITMO. They get out!! And they will be meaner then ever. Crime spikes that happen every 5 or 10 years often match prison sentence cycles. They get out and go back to crime, better at it then ever. If and when the prisoners are released from GITMO who knows what will happen,but it want be good.

selil

09-27-2006, 11:51 PM

Can I ask a couple of questions?

Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?

Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.

Maybe it's a balance?

I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.

marct

09-28-2006, 12:43 PM

Hi Selil,

Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?

When I read Clausewitz many years ago, I just assumed he was using it as an anlogy from Neutonian physics. The discussions and information in this thread (and some others) has really made me wonder about that. For me, the position paper by Krieger (http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=216#search=%22%22center%20of%20gravity%20d efinition%22%20%22clausewitz%22%22) was what really changed my thinking on how the concept is actually being used. I've come to the conclusion that the original analogy has been totally reified out of its original context and converted into an institutional formula that is bereft of any anlogic connections.

Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.

Maybe it's a balance?

I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.

I think that Bill hit it on the head when he said that

I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground.

Honestly, I'm not sure if it is a case of breaking "new ground" or breaking through institutionalized mindsets. I'm also wondering what this "new ground" would look like once we start surveying it: a collection of heuristics? an inductive model? a reworked analogy? a formal deductive model?

As the discussion progressed, I certainly started to see it in terms of relinking a useful heuristic (Centre of Gravity) back into a complex system based loosely on analogies from quantum physics. That started me thinking about dimensionality at various operational levels which, in turn, made me think of the Malinowski material since the cultural/symbolic operational level seems to be the one that is least developed in current planning models. I think your suggestion of time, politics and resources is probably a good start at developing a series of dimensional scales, but may be too general.

My current thinking is tending towards the idea of conceptualizing operational levels based on time, information-communications density and format, resources, favoured elementary relational models (http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fiske/relmodov.htm), and environmental feedback loops (e.g. how information gleaned from the operational environment is processed and new models are developed and communicated back to level based actors). I am really looking forward to RTK's COIN handbook because, from what I gather, he has probably put together a really good model of that operational level (post #39 in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=4556&postcount=39)).

Marc

slapout9

09-28-2006, 04:17 PM

Professor vego wrote an article in new JFQ edition that has a bearing on this discussion.

His Opinion COG=Schwerpunkt which= Point of main emphasis.

Here is the link.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i43/14%20JFQ43%20Vego.pdf

TROUFION

06-11-2007, 04:22 PM

What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
Strategic Level? Operational Level? Tactical Level?

Here is an example at Strategic-Operational Levels:

WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.

Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?

I state (it seems obvious) that the global insurgent's COG is his will to fight, this would definetly apply to the levels of war. In this sense, what then is today's guerilla or insurgent, in the global war's, critical vulnerability? This applies to the trans-national insurgent not the local, who would have a different CV all together based on his local conditions.

slapout9

06-11-2007, 04:31 PM

Troufion, agree 100% that is why I said a long time ago before you got here that the LE concept of Motive,Means,and Opportunity is a better way to think about Guerilla warfare Strategy then the standard Ends, Ways and Means. The Motive or Cause or his Will must be addressed some how or it will never be over-IMHO.

06-11-2007, 05:19 PM

What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.

Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?

Let's not confuse the personal resolve of a leader with the CoG of that leader's forces. Had Lettow-Vorbeck been laid low in 1916 or 1917, I am not so sure that the resistance would have continued. The same is true for the Chicoms under Mao.

The CoG for the guerrillas may very well be their leaders , but it may also be an ideal that is just well expressed by their leaders. In the former case, the loss of the leader probably results in the end of guerrilla operations. In the latter case, this is less likely to be true. I think the WWI German East Africa campaign under Lettow-Vorbeck epitomizes the first case. I suspect the force that comprises AQI is more like the second alternative. (And please do not unload on me for putting AQI under the guerrilla rubric; I know they are terrorists.)

Lastdingo

06-11-2007, 05:28 PM

That's greatest misuse of "center of gravity" that I've ever seen. Center of gravity is something 180° different that what's meant here. It has nothing to do with weak spots at all. Ridiculous idea.

And the critical vulnerability of guerillas is definately the support of their base - a certain share of the population.

Identifying will as critical vulnerability is nonsense. No being or force ever does anything intentionally without will. Saying that they stop acting if they lost the will to do so is trivial and completely useless as analysis.

By the way - Lettow-Vorbeck's force was not really a guerilla force. It was something in between guerillas and Xenophon's ten thousand.

TROUFION

06-11-2007, 06:13 PM

Lastdingo perhaps you should read Dr. Strange---

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB363.pdf

http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/cog/art4-w03.pdf

https://www.carlisle.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/Reilly_J_E_02

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm-cog

Will and resolve are considered valid COG.

The question remains what makes up the trans-national guerilla-insurgent-terrorist CV? Based on each level of war. And what would be (genericaly) a local insurgents CV?

It is easy to pick out a counter-insurgents COG and CV. The counterinsurgent is tied to his nation state, or his organization-these are physical. The counter insurgent has to defend physical structures.

Both Lawrence and Vorbeck targeted thier enemies railroad lines-a physical structure. Both gained disproportionate results tieing down large numbers of enemy in static defenses and large amounts of resources in armoring trains etc. Why could they get away with it? Because their 'base' was protected, while the counterinsurgents 'base' was not.

If the 'base' loosely equated to the source of strength, which in turn equates to a COG, is will to resist or resolve to fight then what is the CV?

BTW-I am not stating a fact I am asking a question.

Ski

06-11-2007, 08:37 PM

Will is probably the COG that is most important and most difficult to defeat.

I'd also add:

Funding sources
Equipping sources

They don't destroy the will, but will reduce a group to ineffectiveness quickly.

walrus

06-11-2007, 10:05 PM

With respect I have to agree with Dingo, the use of the term "Centre of gravity" is misleading.

I think what you really mean Troufion, is what the German General Staff called the "Schwerpunkt" - focus point for your attack, even though in German it does mean "Centre of Gravity".

As a student of the same school as Dr. Kilcullen, the "schwerpunkt" in Iraq has to be denying the insurgents the support of the general population. Unfortunately a very large part of our activities until Petraeus and Kilcullen came along were counterproductive in this respect.

TROUFION

06-11-2007, 10:20 PM

The definition for COG that I am using is that put forward by Dr. Joe Strange

Simple version: COG = strength & CV = weakness.

That is very simplifed of course.

The US Joint Pub definition is: COG are characteristics capabilities or locations from which a military force derives freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

Perhaps I should rephrase my question- if the guerilla or insurgents COG is the people (or their support), then what is his critical vulnerability?

Lastdingo

06-11-2007, 11:28 PM

Oh great, two authors more with that silly idea (actually, I saw two of the texts before and skipped them because they were useless).
No, providing links to texts of some middle-ranking officers who cannot even translate Clausewitz quotes correctly* does not help the argument.

They tell their readers that they're right and others are wrong. This proves that at least one party is wrong in this affair acording to their own opinion.
They're wrong.
One's Schwerpunkt has absolutely nothing to do with one's weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

I've seen 'experts' of other branches working together, citing each other, writing acrticles/books/studies and trying to convince others of their weird theories. Such guys don't impress me at all - a couple of guys writing articles doesn't provide a state of the art for a science.
Being able to link some texts of authors which have the same opinion proves nothing - it would only help if the authors made good points. But these write nonsense.

The concept of Schwerpunkt is old, defined and well understood (by anyone who was able to understand the original works) since about 150 years. It's ridiculus to try to interpret the concept differently.

If they invent a new concept that far away from the Schwerpunkt, they shall invent a new name and stick only to it - and not misuse an old, well-defined name.

__________________

*:
“Denn nur durch diese Entscheidung werden
die Schwerpunkte der gegenseitigen Macht
und die von ihnen ausgehenden Kriegstheater
wirksame Dinge” (Vom Kriege, p. 813). Compare:
“It is the decision that changes the
centers of gravity on each side, and the operational
theaters they create, into active agents”
(On War, p. 488).

Wrong, it's not "active" but "effective". There are nine translations for "wirksam" to english (depending on adjective/adverb and context) and "active" is a wrong one in this context. It has too many possible (in this context wrong) significances and leads to a wrong interpretation. If Clausewitz had meant "active", he would have written "aktiv".
Now maybe he copied this from a english translation and didn't tranlate it by himself, but he's nevertheless wrong and obviously unable to comprehend the original text correctly in its details.

__________________

Now to clarify:

Auch in einer Hauptschlacht können Nebenzwecke dem Hauptzweck beigemischt sein, und sie wird manchen besonderen Farbenton von den Verhältnissen annehmen, aus denen sie hervorgeht, denn auch eine Hauptschlacht hängt mit einem größeren Ganzen zusammen, von dem sie nur ein Teil ist; allein man muß, weil das Wesen des Krieges Kampf, und die Hauptschlacht der Kampf der Hauptmacht ist, diese immer als den eigentlichen Schwerpunkt des Krieges betrachten, und es ist daher im ganzen ihr unterscheidender Charakter, daß sie mehr als irgendein anderes Gefecht um ihrer selbst willen da ist." Book 4, Chapter IX. Die Hauptschlacht

This quote tells without doubt that one must consider the main army as the Schwerpunkt. Always. It's there - "immer" = "always" (and = ever, invariably, perennially, throughout, whensoever, at all times...).

In the whole work he repeats (in everytime different words) that the Schwerpunkt is the concentrated power of a warring party.

What those authors misunderstood completely is what shows their superficiality.
Clausewitz repeated many times (influenced by the Napoleonic Wars) that the destruction of the concentrated enemy power (disarmament by destruction of his army) leads to victory (because of the loss of the ability to resist).
It's a thorough misunderstanding to assume that this means that Schwerpunkt means the weak point. It's the strongest thing that can be attacked at all. This is why eventual victory against it shall lead to victory in war - all else is too weak to enable further resistance after the loss of the Schwerpunkt.
It's no recipe at all for an easy victory - if someone wants an easy victory, he should either be very superior from the beginning or he should not use Clausewitz' clash of the concentrated powers/main armies. Clausewitz merely advises to concentrate one's power better and not waste power on secondary and indecisive actions.
Any search of weak points should always avoid the Schwerpunkt as that is the realisation of the enemy's strength, not its weakness.
Defeating an enemy by seeking and hitting his weak points / lifelines is foreign to Clausewitz as Clausewitz and his Schwerpunkt were focused on overpowering.

"Will and resolve are considered valid COG. "
Morale is treated by Clausewitz in Book Three.
http://www.namico.net/non-commerce/literatur/vom_kriege3.php
Original text - have a look. Search for "Schwerpunkt". It's a chapter in "Vom Kriege" without mention of Schwerpunkt.
Sorry, if they want something else than the original meaning, then they should invent something new, with new name. As quoted above, Clausewitz considered the main force (strongest army) of a state or alliance as Schwerpunkt, "immer".
He's the one who invented the Schwerpunkt as military term, so he had the privilege to define it, not some unimportant officers of a foreign army approx. 170 years later.

Van

06-12-2007, 01:32 AM

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one). Traditionally, this would be a geographically contiguous location outside the ability of the opponent to attack, but with the internet and FedEx this is no longer necessarily the case. Yemeni and Indonesian sanctuaries supporting folks in CONUS for example.

If you accept that sanctuaries are a CoG, then it follows that sanctuaries and lines of communication between the sanctuaries and operations would be operational and strategic CVs.

Whether the sanctuary is a 'no-go' area within the borders of the sovereign state in the midst of a Small War, or a balmy tropical island half way around the world, the sanctuary, communication with the sanctuary, and movement of personnel and supplies between the operational areas and the sanctuary are the most important strategic and operational targets. The problem with Islamofascism is the extremely decentralized nature of the sanctuaries and lines of communication. The coward mufsid who practice hirabah and send brave but deluded young people to their deaths from sanctuary should be in the sight picture first, as should the even more reprehensible swine who send them money and other resources without sharing their risks. The challenge is squaring this with political and diplomatic needs as they hide in sovereign territory that hasn't authorized direct action yet.

TROUFION

06-12-2007, 01:55 AM

Lastdingo, thanks for the german lesson. I am as always impressed by individuals who are bi-lingual or multi-lingual. It takes a lot to be able to converse intelligently in two languages. I see your disagreement with Dr. Strange and Col Irons and the folks that followed their lead. I realize that Clausewitz is translated many different ways. Many of varying quality and as in any translation points and concepts are often lost and very often altered.

That said the way I presented COG is based on the Official US Joint definition. You don't have to agree with it, it is what it is. 170 years after Clausewitz's wife published the final version of his unfinished classic the interpretation is bound to change. I imagine Sun Tzu has changed a few million times. The world has changed and warfare has changed. Old Carl would have a hard time fathoming much of what a current battlefield is like just as todays troops would have a hard time marching shoulder to shoulder in line and column with bayonets fixed.

Your critique of the COG definition set currently in use by the US is valid. However, you are not being productive in doing so. Nor are you being gracious in your presentation. What would be more practical would be for you to redefine the argument to suit your classical definition and reset the question. For instance, How would, in your opinion, Clausewitz define the schwerpunkt of the modern insurgent, trans-national and local. I assume you would say it is the people. Then the second part of the origional question, what is the weakness of the insurgent within the people and how would you suggest it be approached. But this is me presenting a hypothetical as to how you might redefine the origional question to fit your definitions.

I am but a simple 'footslogger' meaning I actually have to go out and lead men to battle. Personally I wish we had never borrowed the 'dead german' school to discuss military action. We did and we modified it to fit American arms and the American Way of War. Both are distinctly different from the various European schools. Our definitions of CG and CV may have been born of Clausewitz but they are now ours one hundred percent. I do not claim to be an expert on the definitions but I do know the current ones served me very well in combat, and I think the old guy wouldn't mind that.

-TROUFION

Lastdingo

06-12-2007, 05:45 AM

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one).

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning. Remember Castro in 1959 - he was hunted around for weeks or months, always on the move. Algerian insurgents around 1960 lost most sanctuaries they had due to aggresive paratrooper tactics - but they won because the enemy lost the will to continue (due to the immorality of his own tactics).

Clausewitz did probably plan to include small wars in his works with the revision that he planned. He told someone before his death that not all wars fit his description and he'd need to read and change the books accordingly sometime.
Death prevented such changes to the books.

The closest thing to Schwerpunkt that Guerillas could have would are imho
- an area of particular strength with most guerilla fighters in it
- an assembly of many guerillas before a large battle (like Dien Bien Phu)
In both cases, it needs to present such a large share of their power that a loss would be a disaster.

Clausewitz is not always correct and gives not always the best advice - his works were not intended to fit small wars (although he for sure knew enough about the Spanish insurgents against Napoleon) and some of his concepts are of limited value for small wars. He ws also quite weak on including naval affairs into his works - English Schwerpunkt was always the fleet, French Schwerpunkt was Napoleon (and at the same time the army he commanded). It was impossible to collide for both Schwerpunkte, a case not considered by Clausewitz as Vom Kriege is essentially a work about land warfare between states / state alliances.

Islamofascism
This is a propagada term, made to mark enemies as especially bad people beyond rational reasoning. It's a PR trick to do things like this - who can name a phenomenon can influence how others sense it.
It's better not to use such a term. In fact, there's little resemblance to fascism.

goesh

06-12-2007, 01:02 PM

you always fight for your buddies and your Commander. It is the latter's charisma, his personality, his paternalism, his spiritual power, his personal magnetism that binds the cohesiveness of a unit(s) together. Attached ideologies and goals are extraneous. Guzman from the Shining Path, Boudica of the Iceni and Massoud of the Northern Alliance are classic examples of the cult of personality. On our own land, the 250+ years of Native American insurgency was fueled by strong, competent, inspirational leaders. Seneca, Corn Stalk, Gall, Roman Nose, Geronimo, Quanah Parker, Chief Joseph, Cochise, Louis Rael, Tecumseh, Crazy Horse, 'King' Phillip, Red Cloud, Buffalo Hump, Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Sitting Bull, Little Crow, Victorio, Pontiac and many others were the driving force behind the insurgency. These Indian guerillas didn't rush the cavalry with cries of " let's save the buffalo!" or " This one's for the deer!" - they charged, fought and died in emulation and loyalty to the men in front leading them. I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.

slapout9

06-12-2007, 01:14 PM

TROUFION

06-12-2007, 01:36 PM

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning.

The closest thing to Schwerpunkt that Guerillas could have would are imho
- an area of particular strength with most guerilla fighters in it
- an assembly of many guerillas before a large battle (like Dien Bien Phu)
In both cases, it needs to present such a large share of their power that a loss would be a disaster.

The final phase of a Maoist syle revolution. I see it. What then allows the insurgent teh freedom to Mass even after he has been crushed multiple times? The willing and coerced complicity of the general population? Or something else.

questions:
1) when the insurgents physical base is destroyed what keeps his movement alive? This was what I was trying to address with the Lettow-Vorbeck analogy, (agreed his operation was more of a 'irregular' conventional force action, similiar to Mosby and Forrest in the US Civil War, I'm not trying to get off the track here so Civil War Buffs give me a little slack). Mao is probably the better example, when his physical base was destroyed he went on the lamb, by rights his army and his movement should have disintigrated, but it did not. Al Qeada (the base) similarly were defeated in Afghanistan, and yet they still influence. The base for an insurgent at the strategic level, is what? His will to survive, will to fight or his will to achieve his movements end state? Mao-communist state. Bin Laden-the new caliphate. Ideas are intangible and much harder to attack and defeat. Clausewitz would have seen this phenomena in Spain, Napoleon was used to winning the decisive battle and the state surrendering totally, Spain's uprising had to be frustrating beyond belief for him. (Goesh-Pontiac and the Prophet had the charisma, but they also had a message to build upon, one that resonated with the people, their charisma fueled the latent fire of the desire to resist the whitemans incurssions and to protect their land).

2) when looked at in this light what are the strength and weaknesses (forget the cg-cv vs schwerpunkt argument for now) of the insurgent, what allows him his freedom of action? Is it the complicity of the people or is it the power of an unassailable idea? I would venture (my opinion) that the people represent the medium in which the idea exists. (very maoist here). Though we normally equate it with the temporal not the immaterial. The insugent is free to act so long as his ideaology remains intact. It apears that the islamic insurgent is freer to act becuase he is willing to give his life knowning that his ideaology will survive and he will be rewarded in heaven while his family is honored on earth for his sacrifice.

-TROUFION

tequila

06-12-2007, 01:40 PM

I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.

Let's not romanticize. Native Americans did not hesitate to do any of the above against civilian populations, either from rival tribes or against European colonists. Such attacks were much more common than battles against other warriors or armies, similar to the ravaging that made up so much of medieval and early modern warfare. European armies did not hesitate to pay them back in full and more.

What made the Native American COIN experience different was that it was also a struggle over territory, where control of the civilian population did not constitute the main objective.

TROUFION: I see kind of where you are going, but it is important to note that Mao and the Communists were Long Marching somewhere - another secure base, in this case. OBL and AQ decamped from Afghanistan to another secure base, this time in Pakistan. Ideas are critically important, but every fighter needs someplace to rearm and rest to sustain the fight.

06-12-2007, 02:10 PM

[W]hat are the strength and weaknesses (forget the cg-cv vs schwerpunkt argument for now) of the insurgent, what allows him his freedom of action? Is it the complicity of the people or is it the power of an unassailable idea? I would venture (my opinion) that the people represent the medium in which the idea exists. (very maoist here). . . . The insugent is free to act so long as his ideaology remains intact. It apears that the islamic insurgent is freer to act becuase he is willing to give his life knowning that his ideaology will survive and he will be rewarded in heaven while his family is honored on earth for his sacrifice.

Perhaps it is not a question of the strengths/weaknesses of the insurgent. Perhaps it is, instead, the feelings of the indigenous population (the fish among whom the guerrillas swim). I suspect that the average folks would prefer jnust to be left alone. As long as the guerrillas do not disturb the locals' life style too much, they are alllowed to do pretty much as they see fit. Once they start to disrupt the locals' lives too much, then things start happening.

I doubt we are looking at local complicity with the insurgents. Rather, I think we are looking at local apathy, especially in cultural milieus marked by Inshallah and other fatalistic world views (such as those espoused by many east Asian religions). I would submit that we are dealing with inertia here--inertia of rest. Let the guerrillas or the COIN forces disturb that local inertia at their peril. Apathy would be replaced with antipathy. The Islamic insurgent in an Islamic country may be freer to act simply because he is less likely to disturb the cultural status quo (what I just described as inertia of rest).

To return to one of Troufion's original example, Lettow-Vorbeck was able to operate in East Africa simply because he was leading a group of locals who understood the culture of the area in which the operated. The British (with their West African carriers) and Belgian forces were complete outlanders, even more so when they brought in troops from their Indian and South African forces.

TROUFION

06-12-2007, 02:42 PM

Tequila, very true, Mao had to occupy a physical space as does UBL. What I was looking at is that the actual space is not important, he could set up in the south or the north, so long as he could live.

I'm going to extemporize a bit here, because I'm not clear as to what the answer is. When I read about Lettow-Vorbeck I asked myself how could he survive, how could he keep his men together against the overwhelming odds. Also I was looking at Lawrence and comparing his actions to Lettow, both took small forces and targeted the enemies bases and lines of communication, in this case railroads and supply dumps, physical in nature. The destruction of these caused reaction in great disproportion to the efforts expended by both Lawerence and Lettow. Further the Turks and Brits could not gain the same reaction from Lawerence or Lettow, respectively, by doing the same thing. The loss of physical bases hurt them but did not demoralize them to the point of giving in. They fought on, perhaps it is the underdog mentality?

In the American Revolution the British took Manhatten and Philadelphia, it was a crushing blow, in a European war at the time it would have been all over. Yet Washington retires to Valley Forge then crosses the Deleware and wins a stunning small victory and suddenly the cause is reborn.

Also in the American Revolution, when the Indian raids got out of hand on the frontier. Washington sent General Sullivan to destroy the Iroquis Nation. He ran straight into their base and burned it down, they never recovered. Yet as goesh points out the native american resistance lasted a long time beyond that, ever pushing their bases further west until they ran out of physical space in which to allow their ideology/way of life to exist.

What I am seeing is that an insurgent unlike the counter-insurgent can move his physical base freely to any location where his ideaology base can exist without direct attack from the government. From this base he can strike in small groups at will destroying fixed bases of the government.

I think of Che at this point, in Bolivia, he was unable to develop the physical base to allow himself the freedom of action, eventually being pinned and killed.

How would this twin bases -physical and ideological- concept equate to trans-nationals or to local insurgents? What are the weaknesses?

Jimbo

06-12-2007, 02:46 PM

A guerilla's COG is his ability to legitimize himself/cause among the "fence sitters" of the population, while simultaneously delegitimizing the government.

His critcal vulnerabilities vary by phase. Throughout the phases of guerilla conflict his requirement for sanctuary remains pretty constant (I have had the opportunity to listen to many different former guerillas, and they all said without sanctuary you fail).

In the incipient phases, leadership is definately a critical vulnerability, but as the insurgency matures, leaders are more easily replaced, thus making leadership less of critical vulnerability.

His message is also a critical vulnerability. Most guerillas don't really explain the details of their message. They often promise some type of economic promise to the population that can be easily coopted by the government.

Tacitus

06-12-2007, 02:50 PM

Gentlemen,

Jimbo sort of beat me to this, but here goes.

Isn't the guerilla's war primarily political in nature, with an aim to overthrow the government or change its policies? The ambushes and assassinations are just tools to that end. What allows him to survive and thrive is the political support (either actve, passive, or coerced) he enjoys among the population.

His strength? The legitimacy he receives due to representing the people he moves amongst. If the government was already following these policies, the guerilla movement would have no reason to exist.

You can try to hunt down and kill or capture the guerillas. You can even kick down some doors trying to catch him napping or intimidate the population into talking. I’ll leave it to you to judge how well that strategy has worked out in Iraq, and elsewhere.

If you come to the decision that you can’t defeat him militarily, it seems to me that you would seek to come to some sort of accommodation to the guerilla group. Address his grievances. It is noteworthy that some of the insurgencies we are seeing these days are not monolithic, like what emerged in China under Mao and Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. The insurgents are sometimes a loose alliance of different groups. Meeting whatever economic, social, or cultural causes he advocates may splinter the movement and isolate those who are hellbent on seizing power, no matter what. The homegrown “regime changers” then may be possible to defeat, without their allies who had more limited grievances. Unwillingness to implement reforms invites revolution.

Van

06-12-2007, 02:59 PM

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning. Remember Castro in 1959 - he was hunted around for weeks or months, always on the move. Algerian insurgents around 1960 lost most sanctuaries they had due to aggresive paratrooper tactics - but they won because the enemy lost the will to continue (due to the immorality of his own tactics).

Mao relocated his sanctuary with the Long March, and never lost his sanctuary in the Soviet Union, a source of support through out the revolution. Castro launched from Mexico and preserved his sanctuaries in the hills of Cuba. Yes, the Algerians lost most, but not all sancuaries, and preserved the ones outside the borders of Algier. Sanctuaries can be dynamic and can be numerous, and this is the greatest single issue of the GWOT.

I would accept the argument that disruption of a guerrilla sanctuary starts a countdown for the movement, but that countdown can be reset with the establishment of a new sanctuary. More important than the sanctuaries within the area of operations are the ones the established government can't reach (like Cambodia and China in Vietnam, like Iran in Iraq today, like the USSR for so many small movements through the Cold War).

And thank you Jimbo, for your support.

Islamofascism -This is a propagada term, made to mark enemies as especially bad people beyond rational reasoning. It's a PR trick to do things like this - who can name a phenomenon can influence how others sense it. It's better not to use such a term. In fact, there's little resemblance to fascism.

PR term, yes, but we're in an IO war, and Al Qaeda and affiliates certainly won't reason or negotiate with the West in good faith. If you posit that the Taliban in Afghanistan was the Islamofacsist vision for the world (and a good Salifi will confirm this), it was a totalitarian government with constant threats of punishment (fascism-from the Latin fasces, a symbol of government authority to punish) based on Sharia law, Islamic law.

Nope, I'm not buying your argument, this shoe fits, and it supports efforts directed against one of these guerrillas' CoG.

tequila

06-12-2007, 03:30 PM

Don't think the shoe fits at all (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/mussolini-fascism.html).

The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State. The conception of the Liberal State is not that of a directing force, guiding the play and development, both material and spiritual, of a collective body, but merely a force limited to the function of recording results: on the other hand, the Fascist State is itself conscious and has itself a will and a personality -- thus it may be called the "ethic" State....

"Islamofascism" is primarily an IO term aimed at a domestic audience, intending to conflate Islamic violent extremism with the threats of the past, i.e. Nazism or Communism. People who dispute its usefulness can be accused of Chamberlainian weakness and failure to recognize the "grave and gathering" threat. Conversely advocates of the term can pose as Churchill reincarnated.

It has absolutely zero use, and is possibly harmful, as IO directed outside of the United States' political context.

06-12-2007, 03:49 PM

As Jimbo and Tacitus have noted, insurgencies move through phases, depending on the general population's degree of support for the principles of the insurrectionists.

Although others would dispute this, I think old Dead Carl was on top of this as well:

We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence
pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other,
there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to
an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme
with which we meet (FIRST RECIPROCAL ACTION). (On War ,Book, Chap, sec 3--Gutenberg Project version of the 1873 J.J. Graham translation)

The point to draw from von C is that warfare goes through a process of move and countermove, escalating in violence. In an insurgency, as in any other military campaign, what counts as a strength or weakness will change over time for each party to the conflict. I suggest that trying to identify a single strength or vulnerability is a mistake. I proposed on a different thread that in insurgencies,we are looking at multicausal events, not something like the old fire triangle that we were taught about as children during Fire Prevention Week.

Tacitus

06-12-2007, 04:13 PM

A number of Islamic parties and political groups have called for the restoration of Caliphate. It is a clearly and often repeated stated goal of al-Qaida. It would have an elected or appointed Caliph and a Parliament (Majilis al-Shura).

The Caliphate does not call for some kind of supreme dictator, with total authority, demanding slavish obendience from the people in service of the state. There are provisions for accountability of rulers in the Caliphate.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate
Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting public responsibilities obliged upon them under Islam.

Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public, the people must obey their laws, but if they become either unjust or severely ineffective then the Caliph or ruler must be impeached via the Majlis al-Shura. Similarly Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should give warning to them, and if unheeded then the Caliph can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal of the ummah, so any ruler that deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is enough for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani obliged rebellion upon the people if the caliph began to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is haraam, and those who cannot revolt inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Quran to justify this:

“...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'...”[33:67-68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down via successful impeachment through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority agree they have the option to launch a revolution against them. Many noted that this option is only exercised after factoring in the potential cost of life.

The way they imagine the Caliphate doesn't sound much like either of the fascist systems headed by Hitler or Mussolini to me.

"Islamofascist" seems to more or less mean, by those who use the term, "any Muslim who we are fighting." Whether this enemy envisions forming a state based on fascism, or not, seems to be irrelevant. There is considerable stigma attached to the name and to the concept, and it is not uncommon for people to label their political opponents (or authority figures in general) pejoratively as "fascists".

06-12-2007, 04:30 PM

The way they imagine the Caliphate doesn't sound much like either of the fascist systems headed by Hitler or Mussolini to me.

"Islamofascist" seems to more or less mean, by those who use the term, "any Muslim who we are fighting." Whether this enemy envisions forming a state based on fascism, or not, seems to be irrelevant. There is considerable stigma attached to the name and to the concept, and it is not uncommon for people to label their political opponents (or authority figures in general) pejoratively as "fascists".

From George Orwell's 1944 essay "What is Fascism"

It will be seen that, as used, the word ‘Fascism’ is almost entirely meaningless. In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley's broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.

Yet underneath all this mess there does lie a kind of buried meaning. To begin with, it is clear that there are very great differences, some of them easy to point out and not easy to explain away, between the régimes called Fascist and those called democratic. Secondly, if ‘Fascist’ means ‘in sympathy with Hitler’, some of the accusations I have listed above are obviously very much more justified than others. Thirdly, even the people who recklessly fling the word ‘Fascist’ in every direction attach at any rate an emotional significance to it. By ‘Fascism’ they mean, roughly speaking, something cruel, unscrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and anti-working-class. Except for the relatively small number of Fascist sympathizers, almost any English person would accept ‘bully’ as a synonym for ‘Fascist’. That is about as near to a definition as this much-abused word has come.

You may reasd the whole thing here (http://orwell.ru/library/articles/As_I_Please/english/efasc)

goesh

06-12-2007, 04:46 PM

Control of the people, control of terrain.....what difference is there really in an expanse of jungle and steppe and woods and prairie V the congestion of say Sadr City or Cairo or Mexico City for that matter? Thousands of troops within a day's time of Sadr City exert no more control than did a cavarly regiment on the Indian frontier 200 miles from the enemy encampments. To argue comparisons and facts to the contrary is to ignore the fact that for 250+ years, the better minds of the time were working on the problem, just as for the past 50 years the better minds in Israel and admist the palestinians have been working on resolving that insurgency. There are elements in the dominant groups and the insurgent groups that simply want no part of the other, no compromise, no sharing of culture - the nuke 'em/behead 'em all club of conquest and domination. For some there is no war of ideas and ideology because there is only one right side that must prevail at all costs. The clash of cultures paradigm is perhaps more deeply entrenched than we care to admit. How does the military address this issue on the home front and connect it to the pacification of insurgents?

Lastdingo

06-12-2007, 05:57 PM

Lastdingo, didn't Clausewitz talk about war of limited objectives? Do you think he was talking about small wars in that context. Briefly I remember sections where he talks about seizing a vital province of the enemy or doing him damage in a general way without his complete overthrow? Your comments on this?

I don't think so. The wars with limited objectives that he meant were rather the cabinet wars of 18th century (not the seven years war) than what we call small wars today.

The versions that he mentioned were a war waged to disarm and therefore break the enemy and a war that merely consisted of favorable maneuvers to improve the position for peace talks (no decisive, grand battle). Serious peace talks aren't necessary in the more total version of war that ended in the defenselessness of one warring party.

So his less intense version of war fits many modern small wars, but doesn't even remotely describe them. It's like saying water is blue - the relevant properties and consequences are not mentioned, yet the description is sort of correct.

Both types of war could - as history shows - also be present in a single conflict. Look at the Second Boer War. The British wanted to break the Boers and make them defenseless, achieving total victory in a small war (a challenging one, as it turned out).
The Boers practiced the limited war version - they merely wanted a status quo ante peace treaty.

Van

Mao relocated his sanctuary with the Long March, and never lost his sanctuary in the Soviet Union, a source of support through out the revolution. Castro launched from Mexico and preserved his sanctuaries in the hills of Cuba. Yes, the Algerians lost most, but not all sancuaries, and preserved the ones outside the borders of Algier. Sanctuaries can be dynamic and can be numerous, and this is the greatest single issue of the GWOT.

I would accept the argument that disruption of a guerrilla sanctuary starts a countdown for the movement, but that countdown can be reset with the establishment of a new sanctuary. More important than the sanctuaries within the area of operations are the ones the established government can't reach (like Cambodia and China in Vietnam, like Iran in Iraq today, like the USSR for so many small movements through the Cold War).

If the loss of a sanctuary is so easily compensated for, then it's most likely not a critical loss. The interesting weak point needs to be searched somewhere else than in something that's so easily replaced. Supporting states can hardly count as sanctuary unless they act as operations base as in the similar Hezbollah example.

By the way, I don't believe that in the so-called GWOT (another term not easily agreed on) it's important at all what the military can do. Most of AQ, for example, is/was rather a third world private army than a group of persons actually able to execute intelligent strikes in the west. Killing them helps little if at all. Several thousand persons were AQ personnel at some time, but only a small fraction of them were the right kind of people for complex strikes. Most were simply using AQ as a kind of travel & logistics agency to Jihad inside of a muslim country.
If I was tasked to fight AQ based on my current open source knowledge, I would concentrate on the hard core and make recruiting of more hard core fighter (actual terrorists, not just jihadists) as tough as possible to dry the pool out over time. But my information on AQ is certainly very inferior to that of our government agencies.

TROUFION

06-12-2007, 08:10 PM

, it seems to me that you would seek to come to some sort of accommodation to the guerilla group. Address his grievances. It is noteworthy that some of the insurgencies we are seeing these days are not monolithic, like what emerged in China under Mao and Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh.

Distinction can be made between the trans-national AQ type insurgent-terrorist and the local insurgent.

Trans-national-The AQ type foriegn nationals with an ideological drive to create a large scale multi-state or possibly world wide regime change, ruthless and the greatest threat (as in most potentially damaging, active seekers of wmd etc). It is also technically the weaker of the two types. Weaker as its physical bases are harder to maintian, they are outsiders-foriegners dependent on indigenous support. It is also harder to address their 'grievances', nearly impossible infact probably pointless, to negotiate with them.

The local-homegrown insurgents, classic these guys can be influenced by the trans-nationals but they can also be negotiated with. Here you can address the local grievances to some extent. In a traditonal intra-state insurgency it is the insurgent vs the government and they odds of success are generally in the favor of the government. It has been shown in Malaya and it appears in Iraq that local insurgents can be influenced negatively by the excessive use of force by foriegn insurgents. This provides leverage for the gov't against them.

The mix- inter-state insurgents and foriegn governmental intervention into a intra-state conflict. Complex to say the least. The foriegn insurgent fights a different battle than the local, the foriegner is far more likely to utilize excessive force as he cares little for the local conditions, they are quite likely to utilize heavy coercive means to keep themselves protected. Of course similiar statements could be made for the foriegn governments intervention forces. In this their is a competition in state building- the local gov't vs the local insurgent leadership and the foriegners are competeing for influence over both.

Steve Blair

06-12-2007, 08:22 PM

I think it's especially important to make some distinctions between classic insurgencies (the Mao/Castro/Ho Chi Minh variety), trans-national insurgencies (AQ, some of the environmental and anti-globalization groups), and the terrorist hangers-on.

Loss of a sanctuary can be very serious, but I think some people misunderstand what an in-country sanctuary actually is. For a classic insurgency, I think the sanctuary really comes down to contact with the local population. Most groups are small enough that they don't need a major supply dump or logistical tail, but they do need food, recruits, and information. If you can cut that off, you've eliminated their main sanctuary. Taking down base areas can disrupt activity, but it's not getting at the heart of the matter.

Most insurgencies, no matter the type, have an ideological basis. Be it rights for a certain group, land, or what have you, the ideological drive exists. If you can somehow target that, you've hit a main COG. As goesh pointed out, thought, this isn't easy. And it won't work with the terrorist elements within any insurgency (and over time they will develop).

Van

06-12-2007, 08:39 PM

If the loss of a sanctuary is so easily compensated for, then it's most likely not a critical loss. The interesting weak point needs to be searched somewhere else than in something that's so easily replaced. Supporting states can hardly count as sanctuary unless they act as operations base as in the similar Hezbollah example.

A planned transition of sanctuaries is not the same as an unplanned loss. Systematic denial of sanctuaries is historically a successful strategy in counter-guerrilla ops, going all the way back to the English versus the Welsh centuries ago.

Supporting states can represent a form of sanctuary, especially in a highly decentralized system like AQ when enabled by modern communications and transportation.

Tacitus nailed it with the observation that AQ is not monolithic. Al Qaeda, The Base, is just that; a finacial, training, and philosophical/religious base for Sunni extremism. Traditional patterns of guerrilla organization resemble a old fashioned computer network with one node setting the clock and the other nodes falling in on it, and occasionally there would be a guerrilla organization like more modern networks where the nodes would be more autonomous. AQ is more like a petri dish for a highly contagious disease. AQ feeds the disease, but the spores spread the disease and cause the damage. Please, please, please don't read too much into the analogy, it's just an attempt to describe the high degree of autonomy of cells supported by AQ, and the way it propogates.

The strategic solution is "immunizing hosts"; changing conditions in countries that provide sanctuary so that they will stop providing sanctuary. And the cornerstone of this is twofold; education and economies. Military operations can only provide time and space for the diplomatic/informational/economic facets of the solution.

The challenge presented by the organization (or lack of organization) of AQ is that it makes some very ugly solutions sound viable. The attitudes and beliefs of these coward mufsid who practice hirabah create a situation where the West's willingness to negotiate is frustrated at every turn. As the incidents of violence add up, the options appear to be reduced. The unwillingness of AQ and affiliates to negotiate or consider compromise, combined with it's invasive and, for lack of a better word, contagious nature invites the use of words like "extermination" and "annihilation".

Tacitus

06-12-2007, 09:15 PM

Distinction can be made between the trans-national AQ type insurgent-terrorist and the local insurgent.

The local-homegrown insurgents, classic these guys can be influenced by the trans-nationals but they can also be negotiated with. Here you can address the local grievances to some extent.

The foriegn insurgent fights a different battle than the local, the foriegner is far more likely to utilize excessive force as he cares little for the local conditions, they are quite likely to utilize heavy coercive means to keep themselves protected.

I'll buy that distinction, TROUFION. Doesn't that call for a political strategy to draw a bright line in the minds of the population between the competing goals and methods of the local and international insurgents? What we need is a political surge.

I don't know what all the different local insurgent groups really want. Heck, I can't keep track of who is who and who they speak for over there. Do the groups want some kind of local autonomy? Is it about getting their fair share of whatever money there is? Or are they just jockeying for position in the real civil war when we leave. I'd like to hear from some of the men who've been over there on this subject.

Divide et impera
Divide and conquer

TROUFION

06-12-2007, 10:31 PM

Just some food for thought, Van mentioned "AQ is more like a petri dish for a highly contagious disease." Made me think I know I 've heard this before, I don't know who mentioned it but the idea of trans-national insurgency as a virus or more to the point being sold along the same lines as viral marketing. I've included below a summary of viral marketing as a guide for discussion. When you read it replace viral marketing with viral insurgency and reread it, I found that interesting: (enjoy)

"you have to admire the virus. He has a way of living in secrecy until he is so numerous that he wins by sheer weight of numbers. He piggybacks on other hosts and uses their resources to increase his tribe. And in the right environment, he grows exponentially. A virus don't even have to mate -- he just replicates, again and again with geometrically increasing power, doubling with each iteration:

1
11
1111
11111111
1111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111

In a few short generations, a virus population can explode.

Viral Marketing Defined:
What does a virus have to do with marketing? Viral marketing describes any strategy that encourages individuals to pass on a marketing message to others, creating the potential for exponential growth in the message's exposure and influence. Like viruses, such strategies take advantage of rapid multiplication to explode the message to thousands, to millions.

The Classic Hotmail.com Example
The classic example of viral marketing is Hotmail.com, one of the first free Web-based e-mail services. The strategy is simple:

Give away free e-mail addresses and services,
Attach a simple tag at the bottom of every free message sent out: "Get your private, free email at http://www.hotmail.com" and,
Then stand back while people e-mail to their own network of friends and associates,
Who see the message,
Sign up for their own free e-mail service, and then
Propel the message still wider to their own ever-increasing circles of friends and associates.
Like tiny waves spreading ever farther from a single pebble dropped into a pond, a carefully designed viral marketing strategy ripples outward extremely rapidly.

Elements of a Viral Marketing Strategy
Accept this fact. Some viral marketing strategies work better than others, and few work as well as the simple Hotmail.com strategy. But below are the six basic elements you hope to include in your strategy. A viral marketing strategy need not contain ALL these elements, but the more elements it embraces, the more powerful the results are likely to be. An effective viral marketing strategy:

Gives away products or services
Provides for effortless transfer to others
Scales easily from small to very large
Exploits common motivations and behaviors
Utilizes existing communication networks
Takes advantage of others' resources

Jedburgh

07-04-2007, 12:51 PM

Military Review, Jul-Aug 07: We The People Are Not The Center of Gravity in an Insurgency (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug07/Krieger.pdf)

...Military thinkers and planners often identify the people as the COG in an insurgency because the people represent a tangible target against which the elements of national power, particularly military power, can be applied and their effectiveness measured. While this seems acceptable on the surface, it represents a misunderstanding of the COG concept, a limited perception of the COG analysis process, and a targeting methodology that is stuck in the Cold-War era and does not recognize the importance and effectiveness of intangible variables....

slapout9

07-04-2007, 01:42 PM

Jed, what are your thoghts on this article? For that matter anybody else that would like to jump in here?

Tom Odom

07-04-2007, 02:14 PM

Slap

For starters, many--myself included--see the people as the objective not as a COG. We seek to secure and win over the population, undermining the insurgents' links with them. In such a case, the linkages between the insurgent and the population could be called a COG, especially linkages built on causes. But this article is built on a fundamental misinterpretation of the very ideas the author disputes. In any case, I see insurgency and counter insurgency to be entirely too complex to be a case of finding/identfying a COG, proclaiming a Guiness "Brilliant!", and winning the war.

Best

Tom

Bill Moore

07-04-2007, 02:57 PM

slapout if you do a search on this site you'll find numerous debates on the COG, and I for one think the concept applied to irregular warfare as the author described it is deeply flawed. Our officers would be better served at CGSC if they spent their intellectual energy on understanding the multiple dynamics of an insurgency, instead of trying to dumb the problem down to one COG each at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

I think the only point I agree on with the author is that the people are not a COG; however, I do not think the "cause" is a COG either. The author falls under the school that there is only one COG at the strategic level, one at the operational level, and one at the tactical level (this is a school of thought that somehow has become perceived to be fact by many CGSC students, which makes me wonder if they're getting educated or indoctrinated).

For argument's sake let's assume there is only one COG at each level.

The author's claim that the cause is the COG at the strategic level only applies to revolutionary type insurgencies. There are several causes for each insurgent group in Iraq, and there are several different insurgent groups. Exactly what cause is the COG? And if the COG's are diametrically opposed, doesn't addressing one inflame the other? I think this concept is of little value in most modern insurgencies.

If we use mirror analysis (assume the enemy is like us), you can almost make the COG theory work, but it doesn't account for Black Swans, which I owe some examples of later. The fact of the matter is that you can't dumb down complex problems to one COG. I also think it is a mistake to break down the levels of war to strategic, operational, and tactical in irregular warfare. The enemy is always fighting at the strategic level, they're not trying to win battles, but to win the war. I won't rant anymore, I think you know where I stand. :)

slapout9

07-04-2007, 03:23 PM

Lastdingo

07-04-2007, 04:30 PM

Bill,Tom, I have read Galula and unless my memory is that bad he stated that there were 4! primary factors.
1-A cause
2-Weak government.
3-Terrain
4-Outside help.
That would indicate at least four COG's right from the start, but the author writes as if the other 3 do not exist. I thought that was rather mis-leading.
I definitely agree that the enemy fights at the strategic level and he is damn good at it.
External help is nto really necessary, the rest of what you write just reminds us of how poorly the concept is applicable to the problem.
Schwerpunkt/CoG was defined and developed for other applications and should not be raped into completely ill-suited areas.

ilots

07-04-2007, 05:17 PM

Slap

For starters, many--myself included--see the people as the objective not as a COG. We seek to secure and win over the population, undermining the insurgents' links with them.
My 2-cents:

If asked the question, and forced to offer a simple, quip of an answer, I would have offered "legitimacy and relevance" as the primary CoG. However, your point of no simple answer is spot on. Many groups continue to struggle (though with diminished effectiveness) with only waning legitimacy.

Bill,Tom, I have read Galula and unless my memory is that bad he stated that there were 4! primary factors.
1-A cause
2-Weak government.
3-Terrain
4-Outside help.
That would indicate at least four COG's right from the start, but the author writes as if the other 3 do not exist. I thought that was rather mis-leading.
I definitely agree that the enemy fights at the strategic level and he is damn good at it.
Rather reminds me of the Leites/Wolf COIN model, circa 1970 (or so).

Jedburgh

09-13-2007, 12:56 PM

Military Review, Sep-Oct 07: Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/mansoorengseptoct07.pdf)

Just as there is no one weapon that guarantees superiority in conventional warfare, there is no silver bullet when it comes to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides a firm doctrinal foundation, as corroborated in Battle Command Knowledge System chat rooms, training at the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center and the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence, and field experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even so, there is still a gap between doctrine and tactical results in COIN warfare. This article seeks to fill that gap by introducing what we believe is a useful planning tool: the COIN center of gravity (COG) analysis, integrated as the culminating step of COIN intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). COIN COG analysis translates theory into practice from the bottom up, exposing insurgent lines of operation (LOOs) and suggesting possible counters to them. Rather than thrusting objectives from the top down that may or may not apply to a given situation, it balances counterinsurgent efforts and provides metrics. Links between COIN IPB and the root causes of a conflict, and between COIN COG analysis and tactical actions, are analyzed to figure out how to preempt insurgent activity instead of merely reacting to it. The process approaches COIN from the dual perspective of the nature of the population and the nature of the insurgent, not from the perspective of the counterinsurgent.....

Jedburgh

09-13-2007, 01:01 PM

Second COG Article, same issue of Military Review:

A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/eikmeierengseptoct07.pdf)

Largely due to its enigmatic nature, the center of gravity (COG) determination process has always been considered more of an art than a science. But even art has rules and structures that can turn chaotic sounds into language and language into poetry. Currently, the COG determination process described in joint doctrine lacks the clear rules and structure that might rationalize, discipline, and therefore improve campaign planning. Joint doctrine only describes the COG construct and its utility to military planning. This is unfortunate because the value of this conceptual tool cannot be overstated. Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, clearly states the critical role of COG analysis: “One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s [joint force commander’s] staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary COGs.” It is the “most important task” because “a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as [impairing] the ability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.”

This paper explores using the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means; a validation test; and a clear COG terminology to provide a logical and disciplined method for COG determination. In military planning, determining the center of gravity is too important to leave to guesswork; therefore, any technique or method that improves COG determination is certainly worth exploring. My experience as an instructor at the School of Advanced Military Studies and the U.S. Army War College, combined with recent operational experience as a strategist with U.S. Central Command and Multi-national Forces-Iraq, has convinced me that there must be a better process for determining a center of gravity than the current guess-and-debate method....

TROUFION

09-13-2007, 02:01 PM

A QUICK SEARCH OF THE THREADS SHOWS THE COG HAS CROSSED INTO ALMOST EVERY DISCUSSION LINE IN THE SWC. JUST AS THE DISCUSSION OF COG HAS PERMEATED US MILITARY SCHOOL HOUSES.

Social Contagion theory ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 12 Hours Ago
by Tom OC 33 1,084 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Sticky: Tell Us About You #2... ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWCAdmin 13 Hours Ago
by sgmgrumpy 285 8,047 Tell Us About You
U.S. Africa Command? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Tom Odom 1 Day Ago
by kwtusn 106 7,365 Africa
In COIN how do we describe the relationship of the levels of war? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 2 Days Ago
by slapout9 76 1,376 Futurists & Theorists
What would you do/say? ( 1 2 3)
Strategic LT 3 Days Ago
by redbullets 25 781 Media & Information Warriors
Groups: Bin Laden plans video on 9/11 ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Sarajevo071 3 Days Ago
by Ken White 31 579 Adversary / Threat
Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures' ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 2 Weeks Ago
by jonSlack 238 14,263 Military - Other
Memetics in the battle of ideas? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
JD 2 Weeks Ago
by JD 38 862 Media & Information Warriors
Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War ( 1 2 3)
Jedburgh 07-26-2007
by marct 22 821 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Is time really on the side of Insurgents? ( 1 2)
Brian Gellman 07-12-2007
by Abu Buckwheat 16 487 Futurists & Theorists
Who Will Sound The Call to Service? ( 1 2)
SWJED 07-05-2007
by 120mm 14 831 Politics In the Rear
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
TROUFION 07-04-2007
by ilots 38 1,133 Futurists & Theorists
Do we require a victory or a Triumph? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 06-28-2007
by Ray 47 1,001 International Politics
Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour... ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 06-24-2007
by Tom Odom 92 5,056 Middle East
Iraq - the Modern Equivalent of the Spanish Civil War ( 1 2)
SWJED 06-20-2007
by goesh 16 282 Brave New War Roundtable
A Thin Blue Line in the Sand ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 06-18-2007
by Doug Ollivant 35 775 US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Ralph Peters on Dreams & Islam
Rob Thornton 06-14-2007
by Steve Blair 3 320 Global Issues & Threats
Kinetic vs Empathetic Warfare ( 1 2)
TROUFION 06-13-2007
by TROUFION 18 769 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Googleing COIN in Iraq
Rob Thornton 06-07-2007
by goesh 5 347 The Information War
Future Peer Competitor? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Granite_State 06-07-2007
by goesh 48 1,194 Global Issues & Threats
Strategic Directions in Iraq - and the idea of Cultural Identity as a CoG ( 1 2 3)
Rob Thornton 06-07-2007
by wm 21 568 US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Theoretical Constructs
Martin 10-18-2006
by Martin 7 3 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious

pvebber

09-13-2007, 02:41 PM

One of the biggest problems with COG related analysis at the deckplates level is the misunderstanding or COG and Critical vulnerability among a lot of planners. Even "decision makers". Several times I've heard Flad level commanders criticize plans for "not directly attacking the COG". Then he gets back a COA that attacks a CV, but has no discussion of the COG.

COGs are leverged or exploited, CV's are attacked or defended. COGs increasingly exist in the moral and cognitive domains, CVs in the physical - where our prefered kinetic capabilities reside.

Even when you find a true COG there is often a "so now what do I do with it" since the leveraging and exploiting of COGs tend to be in the strategic domain, vice tactical.

This is an important educational issue - you can't get too much practice doing the planning analysis of COGs CV, etc, and a little bit can give you a false sense of expertise...

slapout9

09-13-2007, 02:53 PM

COGs are leverged or exploited, CV's are attacked or defended. COGs increasingly exist in the moral and cognitive domains, CVs in the physical - where our prefered kinetic capabilities reside.

Absolutely agree..Col. Warden defined them as the point of GREATEST leverage on the system.

Ski

09-13-2007, 03:14 PM

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).

2. COG's, I think, must transcend physical/kinetic operations. Almost a no-brainer.

3. I think this also applies to OODA Loops/Decision cycles. One group can act so slowly while another spins so quickly that we do not see the trees for the forest. Requires superb SA, OPSEC and patience.

4. The more diverse the group of people within the boundaries of a nation-state, the more potential COG's. Agree that many COG's enter the strategic/political level very quickly.

5. Strategic and tactical levels must be integrated - been reading LTG Chiarelli's article this morning at great length, and agree 100% that the traditional "prepare two levels up and down" is obselete. Would also perhaps take this to the grand strategic level - people must fight for something that they believe in.

Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

slapout9

09-13-2007, 03:26 PM

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).

Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

Outstanding!!! This is exactly why I believe EBO is more applicable to COIN warfare than most people give it credit for.
1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.

Have to leave now and go conduct EBO on my lawn mower.

Ski

09-13-2007, 03:58 PM

Well, I don't know a great deal about EBO, but I would say that any kind of "effects based operations" seems to me to be a stretch when dealing with people.

You are basically dealing with human psychology, culture, mores, ethics, traditions and the like. Trying to change any of them by force, coercion or any other method will alienate some percentage of them because they simply won't change. And trying to force them to change seems to be some what dictatorial in my mind.

It becomes even more difficult when you have a different set of culture, mores, ethics, traditions and the like from the society you are working in. You become seen as an intruder at best.

This is why I thought the whole line of "bringing democracy" to Iraq was going to fail. Change has to come from within the different societies that have lived and existed in the area for generations.

Now - we can try and change them slowly, and with very subtle nuances, but having 160,000 troops in the country makes the job that much more difficult. But in the end run, it doesn't really matter if "effects based operations" or any other method of warfare is conducted - the people themselves must want to change.

Outstanding!!! This is exactly why I believe EBO is more applicable to COIN warfare than most people give it credit for.
1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.

Have to leave now and go conduct EBO on my lawn mower.

pvebber

09-13-2007, 04:25 PM

1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

Can you create a COG in an enemy system? Or is this a case of you recognising and exploiting the enemy COG when he may not have done his homework to figure out how to leverage it himself?...

(aside: Something I fear we suffer from far more than our adversaries...Where do we articulate our COGs and promote an understanding of them publically? Does it make sense for an open society to keep them secret? Particularly if they tend to relate to the openness of our society?)

...Or is this represenative of that desire to "directly attack the COG?"

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.

Not to be too pedantic (but likely anyway ;)...) The targets are not the COG, but nodes that make up a CV, the attack of which can change a system which affects the adversary's ability to exploit his COG. I'm not sure a "System can be a COG" - I have to think about that...

Also, Only when you are dealing with a "complicated" but fundamentally "Simple" physical domain systems.

(Aside: As opposed to a complex system in the adative, emergent behavior sense - simple systems can be extremely complicated systems of physical componants - even with some "comples" subsystem behaviors concealed in "black boxes", but don't exhibit adaptive emergent behaviors at the macro scale - like power grids - they have a "black box" of repair capbility that is somewhat emergent and adaptive, but the overall power grid is a physically grounded, very complicated "simple system".)

The 5 -rings model applies to hierarchical "nation-state" type adversaries with predominantly physical CVs organized in "simple" system domains (the rings). Targets in the sense you use are the result of a functional analysis or a particular rings CVs into discrete people, places, or things - a physical domain focused view of the problem.

Are AQ-like entities amenable to "5-rings analysis"? - I would argue not in the strict sense, but may have a different "N-rings analysis" we may not have synthsized yet. Though likely not as phyiscial-domain centric as we would like.

An interesting related papaper: "Five Rings or a Loop in 4GW" (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/studer_boyd_warden.pdf)

slapout9

09-13-2007, 06:07 PM

Ski, Ring #4 Population groups deals with just the subject you are talking about, how to effect groups with non-lethal means. Largely through what we are calling IO operations. Also Col. Warden was on TV when we were just talking invading Iraq when he made the suggestion that we use "Madison Avenue" to conduct IO operations because they would probably be better at it as far as figuring out an Islamic response.

[B]pvebber,[/B
1- I would offer that an insurgency is a prime example of creating a COG within a system. From their viewpoint the countries government would be an enemy system and they are creating an insurgency or COG within that system.

2-I agree with you about the terminology which is becoming more confusing than ever, targets are also persons,places,or things and so are COG's. When the new Joint Publication on an Effects Based approach came out they it made it more complicated by calling targets "Nodes" both have the same definition.

Also I just heard on the news that AQI has killed the main Sheik that was helping us in An bar province. That is a ring #1 Leadership target. Not a good day for our side.

Ski

09-13-2007, 06:17 PM

I don't think IO amounts to a hill of beans for the most part. Trying to change other's people cultures is a Sysphian task and wars have been fought over much less.

I read some of the Checkmate stuff for a Master's degree paper I wrote a few weeks ago. I think the most successful part of that particular "EBO" was the fact that it played right to the USAF's founding myth - that it is a strategic bombing force. IIRC, the #5 ring was the enemy troop concentrations...so we ignored TACAIR, in the hope that the Iraqi people would get pissed off and rise against Saddam. Obviously, it didn't, and history would have shown that the strategic bombing campaigns almost always result in the people being bombed having more anger and resolve than the if they were left alone. Outside of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and maybe Kosovo (there were other factors at play there), strategic bombing has never brought a country to submission, regime change, etc...

I remain skeptical of EBO in the physical realm of warfare, and I think (again, I realize my limitations with little in depth study of EBO) it would very hazardous to one's health if we tried to use it to change human behavior.

[QUOTE=slapout9;25815]Ski, Ring #4 Population groups deals with just the subject you are talking about, how to effect groups with non-lethal means. Largely through what we are calling IO operations. Also Col. Warden was on TV when we were just talking invading Iraq when he made the suggestion that we use "Madison Avenue" to conduct IO operations because they would probably be better at it as far as figuring out an Islamic response.

QUOTE]

slapout9

09-13-2007, 10:55 PM

Ski I would agree with you about how IO operations are currently being conducted, but that doesn't mean we should not be learning how to use them. Are enemies are very good at it, and I think we could be if we work on it. This doesn't mean changing a culture but it dose mean changing the IO environment to allow us to achieve our objective.

EBO has nothing to do with bombing (I agree that the Air Force thinks that it does) EBO as it was first conceived was a process used to develop a strategy to win, this is the part that is forgotten and has been poorly applied in many ways especially as you point out when used by people with a bomber mentality.

I was part of how this process was used in Law Enforcement and although I can not talk about most of it(it was repeated in several cities across the US) I think it shows how flexible and adaptable the process is when it is used how it was meant to be used and not just as some type of bombing theory.

I am trying to get permission to post some things about the early Warden models of EBO which would help show the differance and how it has little to do with Startegic Bombing as it is most often associated.

Old Eagle

09-14-2007, 01:24 PM

Cavguy

09-14-2007, 01:41 PM

COGs always exist. Issue is defining them correctly. Haven't digested the new Military Review referenced on SWJ homepage, but it contains at least two articles on identifying COGs. I've heard Mark Ullrich's pitch before and it bears close examination.

Mark's piece isn't on COG in the traditional sense, although it is similar. We're really describing it as a new way of doing COIN IPB. I'll see if I can get Mark on to discuss his article.

slapout9

09-14-2007, 01:48 PM

In 1997 the USAWC published a study by retired Col.'s Mendel and Munger which had broad impact in LE circles called Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB318.pdf). In the study they teach a framework for LE to write Strategic Plans and OP plans/orders basic 5 paragraph style. In the paper they define the COG as this (page 92 of the study, 102 of the pdf file)

"Main concentration of an opponents power which can interpose itself between us and our strategic objective causing our campaign to fail."

Jedburgh

10-10-2007, 02:00 PM

SSI, 9 Oct 07: A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB805.pdf)

.....As good as the military is at winning decisive battles, it now finds itself paying the penalty for incomplete thinking. The highly effective decisive operations that made fugitives of the Taliban and removed Saddam Hussein from power have each evolved into a prolonged struggle to provide stability to transforming societies and legitimacy to new broad-based governments. Decisive operations, the military is rediscovering, do not necessarily win wars. The current strategic landscape and the nature of what has come to be known as The Long War suggests that the time is ripe for a renaissance in military thinking. A more holistic approach to war, extending well beyond the realm of major decisive operations, is currently mandated, which in turn calls for a corresponding recalibration of the military mindset. Such change, among other things, necessitates adjustments to doctrine, thus bringing a discussion of the COG’s relevance to the forefront. Can the COG concept be useful in ways lying beyond the context of decisive operations, should it be applied in that broader context, and, if so, how? These are the central questions of this paper.

After briefly examining the COG concept‘s evolution, its present doctrinal form, and some suggestions for its future, this paper proposes that the COG’s role in American military thinking must be radically reconsidered. In this regard, the paper briefly discusses three options for evolving the COG concept from its present form. It then narrows discussion to the most promising one of these options, specifically concluding that the COG can realize its fullest potential in facilitating the successful prosecution of war if it is regarded as a broad, abstract principle for focusing the total national effort in theater rather than simply a practical formula for selecting battlefield targets and objectives.....

Firn

09-22-2009, 07:05 PM

I agree with the intent and the conclusion of paper. The word Schwerpunkt or CoG is used more broadly by CvC, sometimes as part of a metaphor drawn from physics, sometimes in a way similar to US doctrine and sometimes just to mark the main or most important point(s). If accepted as a broad principle - from which much can extracted, see the (CC, CR, CV theory) - it is a very fruitful way of thinking, especially with the two other simple guidelines.

In conformity with all that has been said on the subject up to the present, two fundamental principles reign throughout the whole plan of the war, and serve as a guide for everything else.

The first is: to reduce the weight of the enemy's power into as few centres of gravity as possible, into one if it can be done; again, to confine the attack against these centres of force to as few principal undertakings as possible, to one if possible; lastly, to keep all secondary undertakings as subordinate as possible. In a word, the first principle is, to act concentrated as much as possible.

The second principle runs thus—to act as swiftly as possible; therefore, to allow of no delay or detour without sufficient reason.

Book 8, Chapter 9

Bob's World

09-23-2009, 01:38 AM

Tukhachevskii

02-18-2013, 06:07 PM

A new publication from the Combat Studies Institute regarding COG. Personally I never liked the whole CV-CR-CC addition (what is it with the American mania to operationalise everything?)

The Fog of COG (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/COG.pdf)

TheCurmudgeon

02-23-2013, 09:46 PM

The one thing that I think is most significantly unique about COIN COG, at least revolutionary COIN COG (as opposed to resistance or separatist COIN) anyway, as compared to the traditional state vs state warfare that CvC studied, is that in COIN, the COG is something that both sides are competing for the support of, so there is just one prize to be won; whereas in conventional both sides have their own COG that the other side wants to defeat, and that they must protect.

That COG that the government and the insurgent are competing for the support of is the populace. Whichever side gains this will ultimately win.

Similarly the CRs and CVs are not then subsets to be identified and defeated, but rather supporting tasks that must be identified and accomplished.

Perhaps, but there are two sides to this coin. In Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars (http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Mack%20WP%201975%20Asymm%20Conf.pdf) Andrew Mack points out that it is total war for the insurgency, and limited war for the large power - yet both are fighting to break the will of the other. The counterinsurgency (large nation) fighting to gain legitimacy for the Host Nation government while the Insurgency is trying to break the political will of the large nation by undermining its population's opinion that the war is a legitimate affair.

Dayuhan

02-23-2013, 10:31 PM

Perhaps, but there are two sides to this coin. In Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars (http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Mack%20WP%201975%20Asymm%20Conf.pdf) Andrew Mack points out that it is total war for the insurgency, and limited war for the large power - yet both are fighting to break the will of the other. The counterinsurgency (large nation) fighting to gain legitimacy for the Host Nation government while the Insurgency is trying to break the political will of the large nation by undermining its population's opinion that the war is a legitimate affair.

That seems to assume that "counterinsurgency" is by definition fought by a large power against insurgents in another country. Where does the host nation government fit in? Aren't they fighting for survival, and shouldn't they be just as motivated as the insurgents?

Seems to be that insurgency/counterinsurgency is essentially about a government threatened by insurgency. There may or may not be a great power or other nation in the picture supporting either or both sides.

Bob's World

02-24-2013, 11:19 AM

Our definitions of insurgency and the related operations of COIN and UW trap us in ways that are very confining. These definitions create small boxes with high walls that prevent our minds from seeing answers that otherwise are near at hand.

I personally believe that the only healthy way to think about COIN is as a domestic operation, one that is in truth the vast majority of the time the day to day business of any system of governance to operate in a manner consistent with the will and expectations of the entire populace affected by their actions. That is always a difficult balancing act, and when governments begin to get that wrong - by intent or accident - the difficulties begin to build. Such a society then becomes vulnerable to both internal and external forces seeking to leverage the energy contained in such a populace toward their own goals and interests of the organizer. Often these are self-serving. They are not the insurgency, they are merely the exploiters of conditions of insurgency.

Our definitions tell us foreigners do COIN to, and that all insurgency is "violent." Little wonder we show up in foreign countries where we believe we have interests and begin to act in ways that are so destructive of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the governance in those places in the name of "COIN." Equally that we think we have "won" when we make the violence go away for some short period of time or in some small place. After all, with no violence, it is no longer an insurgency, right?

No, insurgency and COIN are two sides of the same domestic...coin. UW and FID are foreign injects into that internal system, depending on which side the foreign intruder thinks their interests are best represented by. Certainly we employ both as it suits us. Historically we have picked one. I believe in the future we will increasingly see where we are better served by some combination of both or neither. That is something we should think on.

But first we need to scrub large sections of our doctrine. It is dangerously biased and short-sighted. It focuses on tactical criteria we think are important, rather than upon the fundamental nature of such things that truly are. Important, that is.