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Cliff
07-19-2009, 04:52 AM
Howdy-

Much balyhoo has been made in recent days about the upcoming QDR and the change in strategy to drop 2 Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) sized force and instead go to hybrid war.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/americas/23military.html?ref=world

While not explicitly stated as a 1 MRC force size, the new strategy has been used in recent debate as justification for buying less F-22s, recently by the USAF Chief of Staff in a speech at Elmendorf AFB:

http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157910

The question then becomes how we fulfill our commitments to allies in multiple theaters with a 1 MRC force?

In other words, will our allies (and our enemies) still see our promises as being credible if our forces can be tied up by just one conflict?

We have treaties with the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea, ANZUS... and commitments in the Persian Gulf as well as in Afghanistan. While clearly our nuclear capability is one of the most important parts of these promises, are they alone enough to make our commitments credible?

It seems that we need to have the capability to have a credible conventional deterrent in multiple theaters, otherwise we end up potentially constraining ourselves as we did in the late '50s when there weren't many options between small interventions and massive nuclear attacks...

While small wars and interventions need to be a part of our strategy, how they fit in with the other end of the spectrum seems to be the challenge to me. I'm curious to hear your opinions on the strategy change...

Ken White
07-19-2009, 02:36 PM
I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced.

The Two MRC label, just as the "We'll move ten Divisions to Europe in ten days" during the Cold War was pure myth. This when we only had ten active Divs and we knew that calling up the ArNG Divs, filling them and training them up for combat would take two to three months.

The CSAF comment was only boilerplate -- He, you or I cannot state that any specific number is 'adequate' to fight a war the dimensions of which are unknown. If you define 'war' down as 'contingency,' what does that mean? If Afghanistan and Iraq are 'contingencies, ' they've pretty well kept a lot of the total force / all services moderately occupied. Any further effort in the ME would've maxed out a lot of things -- and the Far East would've had to wait...

Someone in DC just decided to get real. No big thing.

Bob's World
07-19-2009, 03:23 PM
To designate how many of what type of conflict one is willing to resource to is NOT STRATEGY. More policy based on what we are willing to spend; vice strategy to do what we need to do

But then QDR has little to do with strategy and far more to do with buying stuff also.

Sad, on both counts.

Entropy
07-19-2009, 04:15 PM
I think Ken and Bob have it about right. I increasingly wonder why we bother with QDR's in the first place since they haven't really had much impact since they were instituted.

John T. Fishel
07-19-2009, 04:23 PM
a strategy in itself but it is a strategy document. The US military strategy is the National Military Strategy (unclas) plus the Joint Planning Document (JPD - all the classified annexes) All of this is part of the Joint Strategic Planning System and the other strategic planning systems. We used to teach this stuff in C 500 at Army CGSC.:D

Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

Bob's World
07-19-2009, 04:25 PM
QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio. It is the vehicle that allows the new class of policy types to roll out their policies and get to meet the Service equity guarders.

It also is the field of battle that the services trot out their various schemes for maintaining what they think is important from their own perspectives while attempting to camouflage it as the latest flavor of policy.

There may not be much accomplished, but there is much to be learned; that is there is for one who understands this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.

Ken White
07-19-2009, 05:09 PM
QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio...this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.It's also a function where squeaking wheels get oiled...

Never mind something else may need more oil. :mad:

Cliff
07-19-2009, 06:43 PM
Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy. In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy... pragmatically (and as discussed recently in the Strategic Compression section by Rob Thorton and others) the means available can (whether you think they should or not) constrain the strategies available to us. Ergo, the QDR matters to strategy. I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record.

I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?

Cliff
07-19-2009, 07:10 PM
Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT


JohnT-

I have to disagree on the F-22, sir. It is certainly not a single-role aircraft... it is capable of performing ISR, DEAD, and Strategic Attack. The Raptor actually practices doing TST and CAS as well... although not optomized for either, all it is really lacking is a targetting pod... which could be added fairly easily. Just as the Eagle spawned the Strike Eagle, so will the Air-to-Ground capes of the Raptor build as it matures. If we had a few more Raptors, we would have enough to cover our other commitments and deploy some for OIF/OEF support, and I think you would see them actually being used.

The F-15C always has been and remains a single-mission fighter - Air to Air being the only role.

I laugh when folks claim that the F-22 doesn't represent a joint capability (it is a single service solution) and therefore we should move on to F-35. The Navy, Marines, and most of the USAF are out of the Air Supremacy business- as you mention, the Navy quit back when it turned the Tomcat into the Bombcat around 1993 or so. The entire US military depends on the F-15C and F-22 for Air Superiority. If you look at the results of any big exercise (Red Flag, Northern Edge, etc) on the 1-2 goes per exercise that the other fighters take the air to air hammer, you'll see that you can get the job done but it's going to cost you about like 66-68 in Vietnam did in terms of exchange ratios (2-1 or 1-1, at times worse...). Aegis and Patriot are at best local solutions, which can keep your FOB or CVBG from being attacked, but can't protect a theater.

I'm not saying the Navy or Marines or anyone else can't do it... I'm saying no one practices it because they are focusing on the current fights in OIF/OEF. They can do this and not have excessive risk because someone is practicing it. The F-15C and F-22 allow them to do this. Cut them, and either you accept losing a lot of folks or you make all the air to ground folks practice air to air enough to be viable... which means they will suck at supporting the folks on the ground. So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.

The risk of losing air superiority isn't great right now... but it's a lot higher than folks think. 187 F-22s isn't a viable community... oh by the way, when you deploy your Raptors (you'd have to send almost all of them, expecially since DOD is cutting most of the F-15Cs) who is left at home to train, or do Homeland Defense? Once you get there, all your adversary needs is 60-100 flankers and some double digit SAMs, and presto, no ISR, no airlift, no CAS... The F-22 exists to enable the rest of the military to do its job and not have to worry about getting bombed. Folks don't realize how good they have it... What happens when your drones get shot down, and you have no air support, oh yeah, and you can't get medevaced or re-supplied by air because the airlifters and helos got themselves shot down?

The F-35 doesn't have the same ordnance or capabilities in the air to air arena the F-22 has. It is stealthy, but it is speed limited... which means it is more vulnerable, especially to SAMs. The F-15C/F-16 hi-lo split worked well... and that seems like what the F-22/F-35 should be... unfortunately you need a minimum number of F-22s to make the force viable, otherwise you have too few to even do one war.

I don't think asking for 2-3 more years of F-22s (60 ish more) to bridge the gap between now and the F-35 reaching full rate production is asking for the moon. The military requirement for the F-22 is 384.... 240 is the moderate risk force.

I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
07-19-2009, 07:45 PM
Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy...In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy...I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record. That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more.
I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.
So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate?
I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

Bob's World
07-19-2009, 08:35 PM
There's nothing about the F-22 that makes me laugh. This is one deadly serious piece of air to air kit.

It also represents:
- a techonology we should probably develop and not buy, wait for the next generation. No need for the Aircraft now, and the next gen will be even better.

-a major distraction for the airforce; helping them keep their eyes off the ball we really need them to hit now and for the foreseeable future.

- an expense we can't afford.

- a Moby Dick of an objective for an Ahab--like AF senior leadership. Mortgaging the entire service on the gamble that what they want is more important that what the nation needs. They may be right, but I have my doubts.

A Sergeant Major and good friend got a tour of a hanger of F-22's by the NCO responsible for maintaining them. I won't elaborate, but if half of what that seriously concerned NCO shared with another is true, showing him phyisical examples of each concern he raised, people should be brought up on charges.

Cliff
07-20-2009, 01:32 AM
That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more. Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.

Valid points sir. My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.


Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate? Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

Unfortunately this thread has veered off onto the Raptor, which is a valid example of how our ways-ends-means discussion is a little off track at times it seems, but wasn't my objective in starting this thread.

I think the opponents potentially include Iran, North Korea (though this is more doable for the aircraft we have), some part of China, Venezuala, or any number of wildcards. Not to mention that the design life doesn't really mean much - the F-15Cs were supposed to be gone 10 years ago originally, they'll be flying (and falling apart) for at least 15-20 more years. We have been historically horrible at predicting the next war - hence the F-22 as a hedge.

MX costs and FMC (OR) rates for the F-22 are about where they should be for a fighter of its age. If you think it's bad now, wait till F-35... especially the V/STOL version. The WaPost article and some of the stuff put out by Sen McCain and Levin on the F-22 is false - they cherry picked data from 2-3 years ago, and spun it as facts. Senator Chambliss asked the AF to look at the claims made (purportedly based on AF data), they are refuted here (http://chambliss.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsCenter.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=75f55ca9-802a-23ad-410e-6b1c6e0dbff9&Region_id=&Issue_id=e654cf02-c7a9-4619-9f8b-3f59c5035f63&CFID=7649375&CFTOKEN=76813362).

Even Obama's pet AF 4-Star, Merrill McPeak, has said it is "real mistake". Article here (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/17/obama-backer-warns-ending-f-production-real-mistake/).

FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here (http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123154629). Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.


One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

I agree training is most important, and if I have to choose I'll choose adequate flying hours over buying a new plane. I don't think we should have to choose- OBTW all the training in the world doesn't change physics- if they have SAMs and AAMs that can shoot me at/outside of the ranges I can employ at, all the training in the world won't help. We need new jets, period.

Again, the Raptor is not single mission. It already has air to ground capability and these capes are increasing, not being minimized.

I think some of the folks on Hawaii, Midway, Wake and the Philippines would disagree with the loss of air superiority. Much of our problem in both theaters was logistical, but it also stemmed from the fact that our frontline fighters (P-40, P-39 for the Air Corps, F4F for the Navy) were outclassed by their opponents. We eventually got there, but only later in the war. Our enemies now are at parity or better... and the last quick-acquisition fighter we made was the F-117 in 1982- that still took 5 years to field 59 of them....

Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

V/R,

Cliff

Ron Humphrey
07-20-2009, 01:53 AM
Waaaay down there somewhere beneath the totem pole, but

Even accepting that the SecDef has some major political impetus placed upon them in reference to what the administration would want, I find it very hard to imagine or accept that this particular one would not have tried to keep the line at least open "if" he felt that it was necessary for our security.

If one where to accept that premise then for me the larger question is why others who absolutely do not know or see everything he does wouldn't feel compelled to share their concerns with him and then move on to work with their partner forces to ensure that areas they feel will be a risk are addressed through "other means" (NOTE) This is said as in a choice that they make not something that should have to be thrust upon them from above

Am I mistaken in my perception that our current SecDef has been more than open to constructive feedback from all quarters?

Ken White
07-20-2009, 02:43 AM
Valid points sir. My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.But I'm unsure what promises you mean? NATO and other treaties; yes, I think so.
I think the opponents potentially include Iran, North Korea (though this is more doable for the aircraft we have), some part of China, Venezuala, or any number of wildcards. Not to mention that the design life doesn't really mean much - the F-15Cs were supposed to be gone 10 years ago originally, they'll be flying (and falling apart) for at least 15-20 more years. We have been historically horrible at predicting the next war - hence the F-22 as a hedge.For the next 20 years or so, none of those can outmatch the number Block 50-52 F16s much less the 100 or so F22 and anything else that can be fielded. Which is obviously why I asked.
MX costs and FMC (OR) rates for the F-22 are about where they should be for a fighter of its age. If you think it's bad now, wait till F-35I don't think it's bad but people i talk to in the AF do.
Senator Chambliss asked the AF to look at the claims made (purportedly based on AF data), they are refuted hereThat would be Senator Chambliss from Georgia? Ah, yes.
Even Obama's pet AF 4-Star, Merrill McPeak, has said it is "real mistake".Had his 37th TFS flying CAS back in the day. That a retired USAF Fighter Pilot supports buying more fighters is not a surprise.
I agree training is most important, and if I have to choose I'll choose adequate flying hours over buying a new plane. I don't think we should have to chooseI suspect you'll not only not get more of your new birds, you'll also get fewer flying hours. Apparently many involved in this have not lived through major financial downturns and their knock on effect on the DoD budget. Trust me, having lived through several, it hurts in many ways. it's going to get worse before it gets better.
all the training in the world doesn't change physics- if they have SAMs and AAMs that can shoot me at/outside of the ranges I can employ at, all the training in the world won't help. We need new jets, period.Oh? Based on what I just quoted from you and me being a dumb grunt, I'd say you need new Radar and missiles for your older jets...
I think some of the folks on Hawaii, Midway, Wake and the Philippines would disagree with the loss of air superiority...also stemmed from the fact that our frontline fighters...We eventually got there, but only later in the war.Which is probably why I specifically exempted WW II and addressed only Korea and Viet Nam.
Our enemies now are at parity or better...I keep reading that but but as I mentioned, I can count and I have some vague idea of reliability factors, particularly engines, fuel factors and OR rates plus training levels so I'm apparently less concerned about that than some.
Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.Good plan on getting back on thread since I suspect most non-AF persons aren't going to agree on the need for more F-22s -- and what we say here will have no affect on the buy in any event.

Are you talking about the unclassified NMS or the classified version? Either way, good luck with that. I spent 45 years in DoD, military and civilian and I've been watching them closely for an additional 15 and the Department has been over funded more years than not. Good years or bad, the problem is not that DoD is under resourced; the problem is that Congress dictates the spending to a too finite degree AND that DoD misallocates money badly. That is a function of our governmental system and is unlikely to change. the good news is that adequate money trickles down; we get to buy more really good stuff than most anyone else and we have good people using it so it all generally turns out fairly well. :wry:

I've lived and worked under several 'strategies.' None of them were ever fully resourced. Not one. It'll work out.

Perils of living in a democracy that is uncomfortable with things militaire. Pain in the tail often but all things considered, I wouldn't change it... :cool:

Surferbeetle
07-20-2009, 03:03 AM
My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.


Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

Having spent some time wandering around the globe it’s my opinion that most folks in other countries have a pretty good understanding of who our allies are and what we can bring to the fight. Being an AF brat sensitized me to the importance and associated costs of the strategic mission the USAF covers down on. Having done the unthinkable and joined the Army I have been sensitized to what it takes to gain and hold ground. I have spent a few years working for the Navy as well and have an appreciation for their contributions to the strategic and sea-lanes fight. Not to leave anyone out, I have enjoyed all of my time spent working with Marines. My take away from these experiences is that DOD is a huge organization, with substantial redundancies in its various abilities to wage war. The safety factors built into our organization truly impress this engineer, just as they do our allies and opponents.

The system is indeed in need of re-balancing. If we can accept that people are more important than hardware, if we can acknowledge that we have substantial redundancies built into both the workforce and the equipment of the whole of DOD, and if we understand that most forecasts predict ongoing and substantial changes to our financial system (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=77388&postcount=363) then perhaps Mr. Gate’s recommendations can be seen as being not just reasonable and prudent but also as a shrewd way forward which will help to ensure that our enemies and allies alike continue to believe our promises.

Cliff
07-20-2009, 05:32 AM
Waaaay down there somewhere beneath the totem pole, but

Even accepting that the SecDef has some major political impetus placed upon them in reference to what the administration would want, I find it very hard to imagine or accept that this particular one would not have tried to keep the line at least open "if" he felt that it was necessary for our security.

Am I mistaken in my perception that our current SecDef has been more than open to constructive feedback from all quarters?

Sir-

I'm also low on the totem pole, so I don't know either. I do know that the commander of Air Combat Command thinks that 187 F-22s isn't enough to meet the national military strategy - see article here (http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics/AP/story/1120109.html).

According to testimony by Sen Orrin Hatch, the "study" that Sec Gates used to justify cutting the F-22 don't exist. Testimony is here (http://www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Reports/2009/July%202009/Day17/Hatch_floor_071609.pdf).

As I understand, congress is a little miffed as they don't think the language passed in 2007 requiring a comprehensive TACAIR study be accomplished was complied with.

V/R,

Cliff

William F. Owen
07-20-2009, 06:57 AM
FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here (http://www.elmendorf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123154629). Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.


I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.


Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

Cliff
07-20-2009, 02:25 PM
I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.


Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

Sir-

Anytime I post here about the F-22 I know what is going to happen, and probably I am not convincing anyone.

Have to respectfully disagree, though - since the facts on the F-22 have been muddled lately due to a lot of yellow journalism.

Why do you say there is "a lack of any real theory" - what do you mean by that?

While I can't go into specifics, your first 3 points on F-22 performance do not reflect the actual capabilities. One of the big arguements for the F-22 over the F-35 is it actual can defeat most enemy missiles due to being faster.

What is your justification for 80% and 20%? A brand new F-15C (IE buying a new airframe with the same avionics) would cost $90-100 million.... (singapore payed $1B for 12 F-15SG) an F-22 costs about $140 million... about 40% more, not 80%. Generally the F-22 can handle about 2x as many adversaries as an F-15C... 100% improvement. Pretty good investment if you ask me. OBTW we cannot continue to upgrade F-15Cs and F-16s... the airframes are literally falling apart- and not just the Eagle that broke in half.

Finally, on your last point, why does the F-22 case rest on this? The case for the F-22 is one of A. Economics- see my point above and B. capabilities, which is what you are arguing.

I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference. While training is important, like I said before no amount of training can overcome physics. And no amount of training can overcome your airplane falling apart.

Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s? Because that is what you are proposing...

V/R,

Cliff

Steve Blair
07-20-2009, 03:27 PM
I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

Ken White
07-20-2009, 03:54 PM
I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference.The Buff and the Bone did good work. :D
Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s?No. Though they did ask the Army for many years to go up against hordes of T-72s with a few old M-60s and M-48s. Bad allegory, I think. Regardless is anyone asking the USAF to go up against anyone with anything? Only the Indians have enough new aircraft on order to be remotely problematic. The Chinese are getting there but they have other problems. I doubt either of them will appear as an adversary in the near future, they have other things to do. The only serious challenger could be the EU and that is not terribly likely at this time.

Back to the farce of the QDR and NMS; This was your question:
While small wars and interventions need to be a part of our strategy, how they fit in with the other end of the spectrum seems to be the challenge to me. I'm curious to hear your opinions on the strategy change...I initially responded with "I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced." I used the post '92 period to resonate with the current era but FWIW, we have never since 1944 (or other than during WW II, before, for that matter) resourced our nominal strategy of the time. There is nothing new except that the unclassified variant will be modified to reflect reality to an extent. Welcome to life in an essentially un-militaristic democracy. Note that our nominal allies all have the same problem except most of them have it far worse than us.

Not only the current QDR but the F-22 topic (as well as FCS, the Zumwalt class and other things) also are indicative of a shift from a realistically unsupportable strategy of buying not Silver but Platinum Bullets and having a quasi-conscription based large armed force in being to a more realistic smaller and hopefully far more professional force that has limitations, recognizes them and does not gloss over them by promising more than it can deliver. I anticipate significant pressure to avoid Platinum Bullet purchases, downgrading to mere Silver, in the near future (see the F-35). Be happy it will not go back to the 1950s with Lead Bullets in inadequate quantities.

The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.

Entropy
07-20-2009, 06:54 PM
I'm not going to get into this thread because arguing about the F-22 is now like arguing about abortion - no one's mind is getting changed. Besides, at this point I'm pretty ambivalent about it.

However, I thought this anti-F-22 video was hilarious. Only a program this controversial could result in something like this:

slaPIUJeUCs

Cliff
07-21-2009, 04:51 AM
I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

The F-22 is the only aircraft we'd send into such an environment... The F-117 was old enough that it was not survivable, hence why it got shot down. The F-22 actually has a number of survivability enhancements as well.

The F-22 is not a "bridge" to the F-35... the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.

And yes, I know, I should follow Entropy's lead and just accept that I am not changing anyone's mind. Guess I'm just too stubborn to give up. :wry:

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
07-21-2009, 04:55 AM
The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.

Sir-

Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out. F-35 can't get the job done, and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all. Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
07-21-2009, 05:50 AM
Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out.A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...
F-35 can't get the job doneAgainst what?
and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all.True -- that last. At all. highly possible.
Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.I doubt it but we'll certainly have to wait and see who's correct. :D
We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes. Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_losses_of_the_Vietnam_War). Note the sheer number of aircraft types.
the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread. :rolleyes:

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more... :wry:

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth. :cool:

Steve Blair
07-21-2009, 01:41 PM
We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.

I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.:)

John T. Fishel
07-21-2009, 08:40 PM
I know when I'm out of my depth:confused:

Been wondering though, Cliff, are you an F 22 driver perchance?

Cheers

JohnT

Cliff
07-22-2009, 05:36 AM
Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.

I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.:)

Sir-

I agree that politics had a lot to do with the less than optimum execution of the air war in Vietnam.

SAC's micro-management of the BUFF tactics definitely had a lot to do with their losses in LBII.

However, I was referring to the pre-1968 bombing halt loss rates.

The SA-2 and the MiG-21 combined had a huge impact on our loss rates until we developed effective SEAD aircraft and jammers, as well as tactics.

We started Vietnam with poorly trained crews flying 15-20 year old tactics, with missiles that didn't work, and jets not designed for the roles they were fulfilling. Not knocking the F-4, but it was originally designed to shoot non-manuevring bombers prior to them attacking the carrier... not for OCA/DCA against fighters and SAMs...

What turned it around? Training was huge... Top Gun, USAF FWS, Red Flag all had a huge impact. Improved F-4s with systems and missiles that worked a lot better made a huge difference as well. EA pods, PGMs, etc were big for the A-G folks.

The new double digit SAMs and Flankers with EA are the equivalent of the SA-2 and MiG-21 of Vietnam. I don't think the F-22 is perfect... but it is the only airplane we have that will be able to go up against advanced SAMs.

There's a reason why the F-15C was 104-0... and it wasn't just training. Training was definitely a huge part of it, but superior airplanes with better training are even better.

It seems like all of this is going to be a moot point anyway... see here (http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/21/senate.f22/).

I sincerely hope that the folks on SWJ are right about the future of war in the next 20-30 years...

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
07-22-2009, 06:09 AM
A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...

The sad fact is that the lifetime of a fighter is probably going to be 30-40 years... our newest F-15Cs are 1986 models, most are 83-84 jets... 26 years old. So yes, the F-22 will do a good job in 2030. So the solution to this problem is to just not buy new fighters, and let anyone who wants to buy better ones from the Chinese or Russians?

F-22 squadrons are actually 18 PAA right now... supposed to be 24. What folks don't realize is the additional 60 F-22s would give each squadron 24 jets... OBTW, the MC (mission capable) rate is about 68%... which is about where it should be for a new jet. There will typically be 12-14 available per squadron.



You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes.

Unfortunately, I am talking A-A and SAM loss rates as well... because the main reason we need the F-22 over improved F-15Cs or the F-35 is the SAMs. Double digit SAMs are cheap, and fairly effective... and the F-15C can't go up against them. The F-35 isn't as effective against them either. Trust me, the SAMs worry the folks flying air-to-air fighters a lot more than the Flankers do.

So, the SAM loss rate has to be there. The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?

You make my point for me by illustrating how the F-4 wasn't suited to the role we had to use it for... just like the F-35 isn't suitable for air to air.

Anyway, I don't think looking at the effect of a new surface to air system on air-to-air combat is comparing apples and mangoes at all.



Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_losses_of_the_Vietnam_War). Note the sheer number of aircraft types.

Valid. Then again, we were restricted ourselves to not flying over the most heavily defended areas... How many sorties in WWII were considered "Combat" when flown over (essentially) friendly territory?


Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

The F-35 has much of the same avionics as the F-22 does. The F-35 does not have the same speed capability as the F-22... which is huge against SAMs. The F-22's DEAD capability is based on the JDAM... I think we've proven that JDAM is pretty effective. Or do you think the JDAM doesn't work?



Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread. :rolleyes:

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more... :wry:

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth. :cool:

Sorry for replying, no I didn't want this thread to be about the F-22... but I still feel the need to clear the air since there's a lot of misconceptions. I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...

I appreciate everyone here at least listening to the AF guy's comments. I look forward to learning more from all of you.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
07-22-2009, 04:46 PM
I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.
The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.

The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.

That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.

That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...

Entropy
07-22-2009, 05:34 PM
Cliff,

I hear what you're saying, but every procurement/force structure decision carries risk, especially since we have no real idea what the future holds in terms of conflicts (and anyone who claims to know is probably pushing an agenda). Rumsfeld, for all the criticism he got for it, was essentially correct when he said you go to war with the military you have. Certainly if we could set the wayback machine and make different decisions we could have better prepared for OIF and OEF - more ground forces, better vehicles, a lot more rotary-wing, satellite bandwidth, ISR, etc.

So yes, it's conceivable the F-22 decision could come back to bite us in the ass, but I think we have enough redundancy and other capabilities that the risk is not catastrophic. As one who participated in a lot of air planning, I'm confident that future leaders will be able to tailor the assets they have to the mission, even if they might not have as many assets as they'd like. Who knows, maybe Patriot will get the opportunity to shoot down an enemy aircraft for a change instead of friendly. Ok, I'm teasing, Patriot folks!

Anyway, at this point, after the recent senate vote, this is all OBE. Let's all hope the F-35 delivers as now our collective tactical aircraft eggs are in that basket. The Air Force will deal with the decision and adjust accordingly. The Air Force had originally planned to put one F-22 squadron in each of its AEF's, which is partly what drove the 381 number. Now the AF has to decide if/how to integrate fewer airframes into its force structure and how it will bridge the gap between the end of F-22 production and the beginning of F-35 production.

Surferbeetle
07-22-2009, 06:41 PM
From today's FP by David J. Rothkopf: Great powers aren't what they used to be... (http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/21/great_powers_arent_what_they_used_to_be_0)


The United States is certainly at the moment a great power by any definition. We are the only country on earth capable of projecting force anywhere at any time. The U.S. GDP is almost three times that of the next biggest country, Japan and is roughly the equivalent of the next four added up (Japan, China, Germany and France.) To get a different perspective on the size of the U.S. economy relative to that of the world, take a look at this two-year old map (http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2007/01/countries_gdp_a.html) comparing the size of the economies of U.S. states to those of other countries.


Are these "great" powers nonetheless still greater powers than the others of the world? Certainly. Most of the countries of the world are virtually powerless. Only 25 countries have the ability to field active armed services in excess of 200,000. Of these perhaps 17 would be considered very economically constrained and all but a tiny handful would be useless too far beyond their own borders. Only 25 countries have GDP's larger than the annual sales of the each of the world's 3 largest companies. (Not an apples to apples comparison, I know...but I offer it primarily to underscore the relative smallness of the rest of the world's economies. The 100th largest company in the world in sales, Target, has sales that total more than the GDPs of all but the 60 largest.) Most countries have precious little political influence and that influence tends to be diluted when it is channeled through low-functioning multilateral institutions. It is amplified via effective alliances but precious few of these exist on any global scale.

That said, as striking as the weaknesses of great powers may be, a parallel trend is that which gives the weakest access to powerful technologies (of mass destruction or political persuasion) that enable them to gain previously unavailable global stature and leverage. Twenty five countries are reportedly considering or planning nuclear power programs. Some of these will lead to nuclear weapons programs. Some of these will contribute to proliferation and making new threats available to weak states and non-state actors. And some of those big companies I mentioned earlier are now weighing in, using their global economic clout to influence everything from tax codes to trade regimes to who wins or loses big elections. So the ends are converging on the middle and the terms we are used to, great and small, powerful and weak, are coming to mean something entirely new.

Cliff
07-23-2009, 06:31 AM
So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.

Sir-

Agreed, I was referring to recent media coverage. There have been some suggestions here that F-35 is a follow on or more advanced than the F-22 as well.


The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The Thud was designed in 1955, entered service in 1958... what was the "wrong war"? Are you saying that the Cold War was the right war to be fighting in 1958... I'm not sure I understand. If you're talking about Vietnam, I agree that the Thud was not right for that... see my point on focusing on only one end of the spectrum.


The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.

Not true! If I was arguing that we should not fund the increase in the size of the Army, or that we shouldn't buy MRAPs, etc, then I think you could say I was arguing for buying for only one type of war. I am saying that we need to have a minimum of MODERATE RISK force across the spectrum... IE, I believe this nation can afford to buy enough forces to allow us to have a moderate level of risk regardless of the level of conflict.

My point is that only the low end of conflict is being funded in the current budget... the USAF in particular is eliminating about about 10% of its fighters to get more ISR assets... while not buying enough new fighters. I think we can do both.


That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.

I'm not saying it focuses on only one type of war... I am simply saying that I think we are accepting a lot more risk than people think we are, and I think if folks truly understood the risks involved they would make different decisions. I don't think that while we are involved in two conflicts we should have an essentially flat topline, leading to what basically amounts to across the board cuts. Trying to pay for the entire war out of our regular budgets is crushing not only procurement, but the training that I think everyone here agrees is important.


That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...

The net cost to the US is not going to be that much lower for the F-35.... OBTW it is not anywhere near done with testing, and will almost certainly have many of the same problems the F-22 did. I'm not saying to not buy the F-35... we need it too. I am saying that we need both.

I think we are mostly in violent agreement, with the one exception being that I think we can afford to fund a moderate risk force at the high end of the spectrum.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
07-23-2009, 04:05 PM
I'm not sure what you mean by this. The Thud was designed in 1955, entered service in 1958... what was the "wrong war"? Are you saying that the Cold War was the right war to be fighting in 1958... I'm not sure I understand. If you're talking about Vietnam, I agree that the Thud was not right for that... see my point on focusing on only one end of the spectrum.I meant that the Thud (and the Fox 4) were bought to fight one war -- that with the USSR -- and did not adapt well to fighting another very different war. My point being that the F-22 is designed to fight one type of war and the probability is that particular type of combat will not be an issue for a good many years. History repeating...

Hopefully, we can approach air to air combat in the post 2040 period with an aircraft not designed in the early 90s. If the response to that is it takes 15+ years to field an advanced aircraft, my reply would be that is a systemic fault that can and should be rectified and that I believe we've long recognized that but are finally doing something to correct the problem. We'll see.
IE, I believe this nation can afford to buy enough forces to allow us to have a moderate level of risk regardless of the level of conflict.I agree with that. Our difference is that I believe that is a goal of the apparent new NMS and this QDR while you seem to disagree -- at least with respect to one item. I understand your point, we just don't agree on that bird. I'd like to see more C-17s and the entire C-5 fleet re-engined; I'd re-engine the Buff fleet as well. I also agree with you that it would be nice to have more F-22s. I'm not getting any of that. That's the way it goes. :(
My point is that only the low end of conflict is being funded in the current budget... the USAF in particular is eliminating about about 10% of its fighters to get more ISR assets... while not buying enough new fighters. I think we can do both.Er, not really, new SSNs and a development contract for a new SSBN aren't low end. There's a fair amount of high end stuff in there, only the fighter element takes a whack. You disagree as do others but apparently most of DoD doesn't think the added F-22 buy is a good option. I'm an old cynic, I do not accept what comes out of that five sided funny farm as being brilliant or even marginally good in most cases so I'm not saying they know best; they usually do not -- however, in the case of that bird, I suspect there's more to it than is published. :wry:
I think we are mostly in violent agreement, with the one exception being that I think we can afford to fund a moderate risk force at the high end of the spectrum.True dat. We don't even disagree on what would comprise a 'moderate risk' force, just on whether the announced force is 'marginally acceptable' if not the one we'd design or even like to see.

Based on visiting China, fighting Chinese and North Koreans among others plus many years of being trained and being prepared to fight the USSR and dealing with the technology of those nations, none of them ever worried me much if it were to come to a fight, land, sea or air. They still don't -- at this time and for a good many years ahead. They have, ummm -- issues...:cool:

John T. Fishel
07-23-2009, 09:44 PM
Ken, issues???? Now that is a new version of an intel estimate if I ever saw one!:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
07-24-2009, 12:08 AM
Of course, in Oklahoma, you may not be aware of the latest trends... ;)

(Actually, too lazy to spell out RAM/MQC and go into training problems. :D)

Entropy
07-24-2009, 04:18 AM
Oh boy, it gets better and better (http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=5&docID=news-000003175295). Excuse me while I get more popcorn:


The White House and some lawmakers who favor halting the production of any new F-22 warplanes say the F-35 will fill the gap and meet the nation’s combat aircraft needs.

Senators and aides now lament that the Pentagon oversight panel’s more pessimistic view on the F-35 program was not publicly released during the F-22 debate. They are calling for more open disclosure of the problems with the development of the F-35.

The Pentagon’s Joint Estimate Team (JET), which was established to independently evaluate the F-35 program, is at odds with the Joint Program Office, which runs the F-35 program, the aides said. The oversight panel’s calculations determined that the fighter won’t be able to move out of the development phase and into full production until 2016, rather than 2014, as the program office has said.

and this:


“They bet too much on the F-35. It’s too big to fail,” Bond said. “It’s like Citigroup.”

The procurement state of affairs is pretty sad and pathetic considering there are two wars going on. Ken, I suspect you will say that it's always been like this, but I wonder.

Ken White
07-24-2009, 05:45 AM
See no sign of any change on the horizon, either... :D

That's all political smoke and mirrors though -- there has been little to no notice of the slippage in the mainstream media because they ain't too bright and stories like that won't sell ad space or time. For once the Pendragon spokes-squirrel is correct, that article is all old news and the Cabal -- that's what they are -- of affected Senators is simply trying to get traction because while the Authorization wallahs have spoken and said no more Raptures (bad choice for a fighter name, BTW, AF...), the Appropriation wallahs have not yet done so plus the conference to reconcile both Bills still offers hope. We can persuade 'em, think they. The Fat Lady has not yet warbled. :rolleyes:

The Aviation and specialist press has been full of it for over two years. Aviation Week (I feared poor Bill Sweetman was gonna have a coronary over it...) and Flight as well as the defense pubs have all reported it. My Jane's Defence Weekly and IDR have something on it in almost every issue. So if those idiot Congroids say it was hidden and they didn't know it, they have just proven they pay no attention to reality and focus only on the pork aspects. I don't belong to the AFA and don't check Air Force very often but I'd be amazed if they had not covered the issue copiously. All that, BTW is easily Googled, I'm sure.

One of the comments on your linked article has words to the effect that the F35 program is filled with graft and corruption and lies. Possibly true. As was the F-22 program, the LPD-17 and LCS programs, the EEV, the various MRAP purchases similarly filled. Yet, all those are really pretty good and not so crooked programs. For far worse, see the The A-12, the various CGN Classes of nuke propelled cruisers, the P6M, MBT-70 / M1 debacle (GM had the better tank but Chrysler was going bankrupt after all...). There are more that are even worse. Even something as simple as the M-16 / M-4 has a sordid history. :mad:

This is just business as usual in our nation's capital.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
07-24-2009, 11:55 PM
DoD doesn't produce the QDR because they want to, they do it because they have to. Title 10, Section 118 of the United States Code specifies: “The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a " quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

QDR legislation was amended by the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, which stipulated that the due date for the report is “in the year following the year in which the review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress…”

The QDR acts not as a substitute for the UCP, NMS, GDF, GEF, and other strategic guidance documents. It is a statutorily mandated report to Congress, and thus it is viewed in that light. :cool:

Ken White
07-25-2009, 01:11 AM
it's here; 10 USC §118 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000118----000-.html).

It starts:
(a) Review Required.— The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a “quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Note the time period to be forecast.

Here's Congresses big issue:
. . .
(3) to identify
(A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and
(B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and
(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31. (emphasis added / kw)The first highlight is their notice that they aren't going to fund everything everyone wants and 'they' are willing to accept some risk (nice of them...). The second highlighted item is their notice they're going to fund what they want...:rolleyes:

The QDR sprang from the post Cold War Dividend mentality in the mind of then SecDef Les Aspin (not as bad as Louis Johnson but bad enough to make Rumsfeld look like a gentle genius) and his Bottom Up Review (BUR) looking for that peace dividend. The BUR was the first appearance of the idea that the US should be able to fight two “nearly simultaneous major theater wars,” a riff on the the two-big-war standard of the Cold War. The bottom line of the idea was to justify major defense spending and force structure cuts. The BUR was seized upon by Congress as a way to get more spending clout than they already had so the QDR was born. It is essentially a waste of money though some good comes of it. Not much, some. I'll also note that as I said before; they never funded DoD to fight two wars (the mid-Reagan years came close).

It's all DC smoke and mirrors...