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SWJED
01-03-2006, 03:45 AM
2 Jan. Associated Press - Commander Says Terror at Bay in E. Africa (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/02/AR2006010201102.html).


Al-Qaida is active in Somalia, but U.S. counterterrorism forces are succeeding in keeping its influence from spreading in East Africa _ using shovels as their weapons, a commander said Monday.

Maj. Gen. Tim Ghormley, who assumed command of the task force in May, said his troops are focusing on humanitarian projects including drilling wells and refurbishing schools and clinics to improve the lives of residents in the region and keep them away from the terror network.


"We know that al-Qaida al-Itihaad is in Somalia," Ghormley told reporters in an interview at his base in the impoverished nation of Djibouti. "They'd like to export that ... if we weren't there they would be."

While the al-Qaida linked group al-Itihaad was largely destroyed or disbanded by Ethiopian troops fighting inside Somalia by 1997, some of its members have regrouped under new guises and have begun to grow in strength, according to an International Crisis Group report released in July.

Somalia, divided into warring fiefdoms and with no central government, remains fertile ground for terrorists.

The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, set up in this former French colony in June 2002, is responsible for fighting terrorism in nine countries around the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Somalia in Africa and Yemen on the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula.

"I believe we're winning," Ghormley said, sitting on a wicker sofa under ceiling fans in a reception hall. "You can't contain them (al-Qaida), but we can take away their recruiting pool and deny them access and that's what we're trying to do."...

SWJED
01-09-2006, 12:13 AM
9 Jan. Christian Science Monitor - To Fight Al Qaeda, U.S. Troops in Africa Build Schools Instead (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0109/p01s04-woaf.html).


... In 2002, more than 1,500 US troops were sent to this former French colony in East Africa to hunt followers of Al Qaeda throughout the region. Now, under General Ghormley, their mission has evolved to preempt the broader growth of Islamic militancy among the area's largely Muslim population.

"We are trying to dry up the recruiting pool for Al Qaeda by showing people the way ahead. We are doing this one village, one person at a time," says Ghormley, commander of the joint task force based in Djibouti. "We're waging peace just as hard as we can."

Previously East Africa has hosted an array of Islamic militant groups. In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 220 people. The group has also tried to shoot down an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya, and sink oil tankers and US navy vessels in the Red Sea.

Now many analysts worry that trouble is again brewing as rising poverty combines with the anti-Western ideologies of hard-line Islamic missionaries in a region already dogged by porous borders, plentiful weapons, and poor governance...

Unable to find or strike at any visible Al Qaeda members, US forces based in Camp Lemonier - Djibouti's former French Foreign Legion base - have instead begun to work to tackle the factors that might contribute to the growth of extremism in the future.

Ghormley's men have so far built more than 30 schools and 25 clinics, as well as new wells and bridges. They are focusing particularly on the mainly Muslim areas close to the porous Somali border where poverty and dissatisfaction with pro-Western central governments might make many receptive to extremist teachings...

SWJED
05-19-2006, 05:46 AM
19 May London Times - Is U.S. Using Enemy to Fight a Proxy War? (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2187524,00.html).


... in Somalia, where rising turmoil has killed 150 in the past month, the interim government has accused the US of sliding quietly back into the fray on the warlords’ side, more than a decade after they drove out US forces.

The Somali government claims that the US is backing the kind of warlords who were its old enemy, and who make the country ungovernable, to keep al-Qaeda, its worse enemy, at bay.

This week two senior spokesmen from the Bush Administration refused to answer direct questions about US backing, but acknowledged fears that al-Qaeda would profit from the chaos. “In an environment of instability, al-Qaeda may take root. We want to make sure that al-Qaeda does not establish a beachhead in Somalia,” Tony Snow, White House spokesman, said...

To credit Somalia with a “government” is stretching a point; it has only a United Nations-backed gesture of hope. For 15 years, since the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre, the long-time dictator, Somalia has had no central rule.

The interim government, headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, clings to the shadow of power, but must meet in neighbouring Kenya or in the southern town of Baidoa, as Mogadishu is too dangerous...

SWJED
05-29-2006, 03:16 PM
29 May Boston Globe editorial - Fester in Africa's Horn (http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2006/05/29/fester_in_africas_horn/).


The war that killed 70,000 people between 1998 and 2000 has stopped, but the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has not ended. The UN Security Council would encourage resumption of fighting if it reduced the 3,000-man peacekeeping force on the border.

Council members, led by the United States, are irked that the dispute hasn't been resolved. An international commission decided that a sliver of land claimed by Ethiopia should be part of Eritrea, and that demarcation was to have been the cornerstone of a peace settlement, but Ethiopia has refused to cede the land. The United States and other nations need to persuade the government to accept the ruling.

At the same time, Eritrea needs to end its estrangement from its neighbor. It should normalize relations by giving Ethiopia every opportunity to use the port at Assab and by safeguarding the rights of Ethiopian expatriates...

Jedburgh
05-29-2006, 03:34 PM
Good background on the situation, from ICG, published last December:

Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War (http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ethiopia/2005/1222preventing.pdf)

The 1998-2000 war has frequently been described by pundits as being as pointless as “two bald men fighting over a comb”, but for the belligerents the issues are deadly serious. Ironically, it is the peace process itself that has produced a stalemate from which renewed fighting is now feared.

The disputed border was the proximate cause of the war. Arguably, however, the root causes went deeper, including to the legacy of friction between the two former allies from their struggle against the regime (1977-1991) of Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam and the overdependence on relations between leaders and parties rather than institutions in managing bilateral relations.

Many differences arose between the neighbours over migration, labour, and trade. Particularly controversial was Eritrea’s introduction of its own currency in November 1997, despite Ethiopia’s strong protest. Tension also developed over the use of the port of Assab, which Ethiopia had ceded to Eritrea at independence. Its loss cost a suddenly landlocked Ethiopia significant revenues, and resentment smouldered.

On both sides, however, the dusty border village of Badme, where the war began, has now acquired a symbolic importance entirely out of proportion to its size and population...

SWJED
05-29-2006, 04:58 PM
Africa should be on our radar screen... Asia also...

Jedburgh
06-05-2006, 02:27 AM
Jamestown Foundation, 31 May: Warlords or Counter-Terrorists: U.S. Intervention in Somalia (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=182)

As the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to dominate headlines, a new front in the war on terrorism has opened in Somalia. At a brutal cost to Mogadishu's civilian population, once-discredited warlords have reinvented themselves as "counter-terrorists," seeking and apparently gaining U.S. support by characterizing their Islamist opponents as agents of al-Qaeda. The warlords have grouped together as the Anti-Terrorism Alliance (ATA) and insist they are dedicated to expelling foreign al-Qaeda members they allege are sheltered by the Islamic Court Union (ICU). Although nearly all the ATA warlords are cabinet ministers in the new Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) located in Baidoa, they have abandoned the TFG to pursue an unauthorized war against their Islamist rivals in Mogadishu. Allegations of U.S. funding for the unpopular ATA leaders are undermining U.S. efforts to stabilize the region...

Jedburgh
06-15-2006, 10:26 PM
...another one from the Jamestown Foundation, dated 13 June:

Leadership Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=184)

The crisis in Somalia may be entering a new phase. A union of Islamic courts has taken control of the lawless capital, Mogadishu. On June 4, after months of intense fighting, militiamen loyal to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, expelled the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) from Mogadishu. Last week, after pushing the ARPCT warlords out of the capital, the ICU asserted its authority by establishing three new Islamic courts in Mogadishu in areas previously controlled by warlords (Somaliland Times, June 6). They also advanced toward the warlord stronghold of Jowhar, a town 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu, sending fears that Somalia was headed for extremist Muslim leadership...

Jedburgh
06-16-2006, 12:53 PM
From the Swiss-based ISN, 16 June: Washington's tactical error in Somalia (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16201)

After 15 years of relative anarchy - with warlords controlling much of the country and an impotent-at-best interim government that was forced to hide itself away 250 kilometers from the capital city - the Islamic militias have won control of Mogadishu and the last key warlord strongholds.

This has come to fruition despite US backing for the warlords' opportunistically named "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism" - an alliance the majority of the population has grown to loathe for being synonymous with violence, complete lawlessness, and chaos.

Aside from stoking the fires of anti-American sentiment and creating enemies out of potential allies in a geostrategically significant location, Washington is being blamed by African and Western diplomats for the four months of bloodshed that ended in the Islamic militias' victory and claimed the lives of some 350 people, mostly civilians...

Jedburgh
06-20-2006, 01:16 PM
...and again from ISN: A High-Stakes Game in Somalia (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16223)

...With allegations and denials abounding that Ethiopian army regulars crossed into Somalia on 17 June, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) -Islamic Court Union (ICU) talks scheduled for Yemen this week will take on added bite.

And with a UN official suggesting that arms are flowing into Somalia in contravention of an embargo, security in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region could be set to deteriorate in the coming days and weeks...

SWJED
06-25-2006, 11:32 AM
25 June Stars and Stripes - Djibouti Mission Fights Terror at its Source (http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=38182).


... “Doing goodness for goodness’ sake is OK, but what we’re really trying to do is ameliorate the conditions that give rise to terrorism,” says U.S. Navy Capt. Stephen Johnson, chief of staff of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

“We are investing a relatively small amount of resources in order to help African nations build peace and stability throughout the region. If we’re successful, we may just be able to avoid expending the huge amounts of resources that we have in Afghanistan.”

Or Iraq. Indeed, U.S. military officials openly call the Horn of Africa mission one of avoidance and pre-emption — keeping a low profile, providing small-scale community projects and training local militaries.

The task force was formed in late 2002 and has operated from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti since May 2003. The force’s area of responsibility includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the Seychelles, Sudan, Yemen and, technically, Somalia....

The task force has some 1,500 military and civilian personnel working in an area covering more than 2 million square miles with more than three times the population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. More than half of the region’s population live in extreme poverty; there are 3.3 million refugees from war and famine; there are 10 million internally displaced persons; and 26 million people have HIV.

Jedburgh
06-25-2006, 01:54 PM
For those who have access, there are two older reports that provide good background on CJTF-HOA:

CALL IIR 04-28, CJTF-HOA (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/4361675) (AKO Log-in Required)

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is tasked with conducting operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region to defeat transnational terrorists, their networks, to stimulate and assist in the long-term effort to develop a stable environment that is non-conducive to extremist ideologies. This region is large, covering 167,000,000 square miles, roughly two-thirds of the area of the continental United States. This region contains six countries and one failed state as well as numerous ethnic and religious groups that straddle borders. The HOA area if responsibility (AOR) is over three times larger than Afghanistan and Iraq combined, yet it has only slightly more than 1,300 CJTF-HOA personnel. As one of the fronts on the global war on terror (GWOT), HOA provides an effective capability for a relatively modest sized organization. CJTF-HOA has a lower priority for resources than either Iraq or Afghanistan. This presents an overarching problem for the task force in the GWOT. The often used mantra “Do more with less” may not be truer anywhere than with the CJTF-HOA.

The CJTF-HOA mission has evolved into a mission centered on civil affairs (CA) operations. Many non-CA officers from other staff elements agree the centerpiece of the CJTF is the CA effort. CA is a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism. CJTF-HOA views CA as a method to shape the battlespace and create favorable conditions to enhance stability. To do this, CA assesses areas for projects, hires locals, while involving and publicizing host nation (HN) support for projects. The key is to gain access, establish presence, and in the process empower HN government and non-government organizations. The CA effort in HOA is a good template for the future; it is important the HN takes those steps seen in its national interests. The end-state is to establish a CJTF with sustainable HN capability.
MCCLL, AAR - Visit to CJTF-HOA, Mar-Apr 05 (http://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/AARs/HOA%20Report.doc) (MCCLL Registration/Log-in Required)

...The non-kinetic and preventative nature of this mission lends it some unusual characteristics. For instance, an important aspect of the task force itself is simply its presence in what is potentially a highly volatile region. Although the task force consists of about 1200 personnel in Camp Lemonier, at the “pointy end of the spear” are, at any given time, less than one hundred US military personnel forming civil affairs and mobile training teams. These teams are primarily involved in building relationships with both the militaries and the civilian population of adjacent countries, namely, Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen (the task force has a liaison element in the embassy in Sudan but has not yet initiated any engagements in that country). There are no clearly tangible measures of effectiveness for this type of operation, no body counts, weapons caches or captured insurgents to provide physical evidence of success. However, the personnel involved are, from my observations, having a very positive effect on the local populace’s perception of the US military in the regions where they are operating. This, in turn, undoubtedly has beneficial effects on US relations with countries in the region – constituting what is essentially a strategic information operation...

SWJED
06-26-2006, 08:55 PM
... of the Stars and Stripes CJTF-HOA article series:

Building Projects Part of Race to Win Over Horn of Africa (http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=38206)

Battle for Beliefs Fought in Slums of Djibouti City (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?article=38222&section=104)

Jedburgh
07-03-2006, 08:07 PM
...keeping the Somalia thread alive:

Joint Hearing: Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa

J. Peter Pham of the Nelson Institute: Background, Challenges, and Opportunities
of an Islamist Takeover (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/pha062906.pdf)

Ted Dagne, CRS: The Current Crisis in Somalia and Threat of Terrorism (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/dag062906.pdf)

John Prendergast from ICG: More than Counter-Terrorism: Rethinking U.S. Policy toward Somalia (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/pre062906.pdf)

Jedburgh
08-12-2006, 03:30 PM
From ICG, 10 Aug 06: Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained? (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/116_can_the_somalia_crisis_be_contained.pdf)

...The Islamic Courts’ success, and the rise to prominence of hard-line jihadi Islamists within them, has alarmed neighbours and sent shock waves through the broader international community. Ethiopia, which suffered terrorist attacks by al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) in the mid-1990s, considers the Courts a direct threat. Kenya is alarmed by links between key figures within the Courts and individuals of concern within its own borders. The U.S. believes jihadi Islamists within the Courts shield al-Qaeda operatives responsible for bombing two of its embassies in 1998. All share determination not to allow Somalia to evolve into an African version of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Transitional Federal Government is increasingly perceived within Somalia as a faction rather than a national authority and is so wracked by internal dissent and the accelerating defections of cabinet ministers that it threatens to fall apart.

The TFG and Ethiopia paint the Islamic Courts – far too simplistically – as a terrorist umbrella, backed by thousands of foreign jihadi fighters, and Ethiopia has threatened to “crush” them if they move against the TFG. The Courts have responded to Ethiopian deployments in Somalia by calling for a defensive jihad and breaking off peace talks under Arab League auspices. Skirmishes between TFG and Islamic Court forces south of Mogadishu in late July were widely perceived as the first exchanges of a coming conflict. Unless the crisis is contained, it threatens to draw in a widening array of state actors, foreign jihadi Islamists and al-Qaeda. Moreover, Eritrean assistance to the Courts has made Somalia an increasingly likely proxy battlefield between long-feuding Eritrea and Ethiopia...

Jedburgh
11-02-2006, 10:25 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 31 Oct 06:

Somalia Hostilities Threaten Outbreak of Regional War (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370187)

After years of mutual hostility, the armed forces of two states and the armed militias of one failed state are poised to unleash a potentially devastating war in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia are each moving troops up to their borders in preparation. All parties have agreed to a third round of Arab League-brokered peace talks in Khartoum this week. The negotiations may represent the last opportunity to avoid the outbreak of a general war in the turbulent and highly strategic Horn region. The importance of these talks is reflected in the decision to invite the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to join mediation efforts (Shabelle Media Network, October 22). IGAD is an important regional assembly of seven East African countries that negotiated the formation of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. The TFG is now isolated in the Somali town of Baidoa, where its existence relies on the support of Ethiopian troops and various Somali militias. Soldiers of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Somalia's coalition of militant Islamists, are now poised for an attack on the makeshift capital where TFG leaders are engaged in bitter disputes with each other. Fighting has already broken out between the Islamists and combined TFG/Ethiopian forces for control of the approaches to Baidoa...

Jedburgh
11-27-2006, 02:34 PM
ICG Somalia Conflict Risk Alert (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4520&l=1), 27 Nov 06:

The draft resolution the U.S. intends to present to the UN Security Council on 29 November could trigger all-out war in Somalia and destabilise the entire Horn of Africa region by escalating the proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea to dangerous new levels...

...The proposed resolution, which has the backing of African members of the Security Council, would authorise deployment of a regional military force (IGASOM) in support of the TFG and exempt that entity and troop contributing countries – Ethiopia, Uganda and possibly Kenya, amongst others – from the existing UN arms embargo. While its objectives are to strengthen the TFG, deter the CSIC from further expansion and avert the threat of full-scale war, it is likely to backfire on all three counts...

...As so often in Somalia, the consequence of an ill-considered intervention is likely to be more conflict, not less. Military measures must remain a weapon of last resort.

Jedburgh
12-04-2006, 10:18 PM
The Economist, 30 Nov 06: The Rumbling Rumours of War (http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8355008)

Fighters loyal to Somalia's Islamic courts last week took positions along the border with Ethiopia; this week they pushed further north than ever before, consolidating their grip on Bandiradley (see map). Tinny loudspeakers in Somali towns under Islamist control blared out holy war against Ethiopia. Those on the front line professed themselves ready to die fighting the “forces of the devil”—Ethiopia, that is. Businessmen in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, were told to hand over their weapons for the cause; many did. Intelligence sources say the Islamists are still getting more arms from their allies, especially Eritrea, which may now have 2,000 of its own soldiers inside Somalia.

Meanwhile, 6,000-plus Ethiopian troops continue to mass on their own side of the border, with some commando, infantry and air force units already inside Somalia. A convoy of around 130 Ethiopian military lorries got past Islamist positions last week to reach the central Somali town of Baidoa, seat of Somalia's internationally recognised but powerless transitional government. Locals said the many Ethiopian troops in the town were busy digging trenches. Skirmishes, mostly won by Islamists, are taking place across the country every day. Ethiopia would probably overrun the Islamist positions in a conventional war. The question is whether Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, will order his army to attack....

tequila
12-20-2006, 09:20 PM
Looks like major fighting (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6195863.stm)has broken out between Ethiopian regulars and the Islamic Courts Union:


Islamic commander Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal told AFP news agency: "I can confirm to you that heavy fighting has already started around several front line areas."

Government commander Ibrahim Batari accused the Islamists of mounting the attack. "There is shelling everywhere... our forces are facing Islamists, hell is going on," he said.


Islamic militias have attacked us and the fighting is continuing

Salad Ali Jelle
Deputy defence minister


Q&A: Islamist advance
Peacekeeping conundrum

"I can hear sounds of bullets, rockets from the side where the defence lines of the Islamic courts and the government are," a resident in the government's military base in Daynunay, southeast of Baidoa, told Reuters news agency.

Islamist spokesman Abdirahin Ali Mudey says the base is now in UIC hands, which residents talking to the BBC confirm.

...

But the BBC's Adam Mynott says that as he drove to the airport in Baidoa, he was stopped by a huge convoy of Ethiopian military armour.

There were about 10 large artillery cannons, several vehicles - clearly marked with Ethiopian insignia - loaded with ammunition and many hundreds of soldiers.


He was detained for about an hour by Ethiopian soldiers who appeared on edge and very nervous.

SWJED
12-20-2006, 11:20 PM
Fighting Breaks Out in Somalia During Envoy Visit (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/world/africa/20cnd-somalia.html?hp&ex=1166677200&en=0cec41650ce8d9b8&ei=5094&partner=homepage) - NY Times. Heavy fighting broke out near the base of the transitional government of Somalia Wednesday, just as European diplomats were shuttling between rival leaders in yet another effort to avert an all-out war. According to United Nations officials, the Islamist clerics who control Mogadishu, Somalia’s battle-scarred seaside capital, launched an offensive on two fronts against the transitional government’s forces.

E.U. Envoy: Somali Government, Islamists Agree to New Peace Talks (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-12-20-voa57.cfm) - VOA. A European Union envoy says Somalia's interim government and the rival Islamist movement have agreed to a new round of peace talks. The announcement by E.U. official Louis Michel came as the two sides' fighters traded gunfire and mortar shells near the government's home base of Baidoa.

Diplomat Pushes Peace Talks in Somalia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/20/AR2006122000282.html) - AP. Somali fighters clashed with artillery, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns Wednesday, even as a European diplomat persuaded both the government and a rival Islamic movement to resume peace talks. The heavy fighting outside the only town the government controls dragged on into the evening and underlined the difficulties of securing peace in this desperately poor country in the Horn of Africa.

Heavy Fighting Spreads in Somalia (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-12-20-voa31.cfm) - VOA. In Somalia, heavy fighting has broken out between Islamists and interim government forces in several towns near the government's outpost of Baidoa. The fighting comes in the wake of an Islamist threat to launch a major attack if Ethiopian troops did not leave Somalia by Tuesday. The fighting on Wednesday flared in the towns of Bur Hakaba and Daynunay, where large numbers of Islamist fighters and government forces have been massing in recent weeks.

Bill Moore
12-21-2006, 04:00 AM
This reminds me of an article I saw a couple days back by a former CIA member who was knowledgeable on the region. He predicted that the conflict in Somalia would turn into a rapidly escalating regional conflict involving a number of countries in the horn of Africa. Interesting, it seems everything we touch turns into a mess.

Tom Odom
12-21-2006, 01:23 PM
This is one we need to contain and watch; we have been on both sides in the Ethiopian-Somali feud. More importantly we have never picked a "winner" because there are no winners.

As for getting into internecine Somali clan wars, you might as well have unprotected sex with an AIDs ridden prostitute. The moment of pleasure will soon be forgotten in the agony of the aftermath. If you are lucky, you might just get shot.

Just say no...

Tom

tequila
12-21-2006, 01:26 PM
Quickie interview with a Somalia expert from Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3654):

Most relevant takeaway for me:


FP: Are the Courts controlled by al Qaeda?

KM: No. Absolutely not. There is a legitimate debate over whether a small number of leaders in the Islamic Courts have linkages with a small number of leaders from al Qaeda. That’s not the same as saying that the two are in a deeply intrinsic partnership. The problem that the Courts face is that they are not by any stretch a unified movement. It’s an umbrella group that includes moderates, hard-line salafists, and jihadists. And a small number of jihadists can do an enormous amount of damage and can bring in elements from outside that create a whole new level of security problems.

marct
12-21-2006, 01:43 PM
Hi Tom,


This is one we need to contain and watch; we have been on both sides in the Ethiopian-Somali feud. More importantly we have never picked a "winner" because there are no winners.

As for getting into internecine Somali clan wars, you might as well have unprotected sex with an AIDs ridden prostitute. The moment of pleasure will soon be forgotten in the agony of the aftermath. If you are lucky, you might just get shot.

Just say no...

Tom

Years ago, a friend of mine did his MA on Somalia before it all broke apart. There's actually a large population component that is not part of the clans (and is hated by the clans), so we have to be careful about how we conceive the situation.

I totally agree with you on the "contain and watch" comment BTW. I would suggest that somebody think seriously about country "strengthening" missions into Kenya, especially in the northern and north-eastern borders.

Marc

Jedburgh
12-21-2006, 02:28 PM
...I would suggest that somebody think seriously about country "strengthening" missions into Kenya, especially in the northern and north-eastern borders.
I don't believe this is the type of "strengthening" of the border region that you were implying, but they are attempting to address part of the situation:

ReliefWeb, 21 Dec 06: Commission provides €2 million in humanitarian aid for Somali refugees in Kenya (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6WPJ6T?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=ken)

...Since the beginning of 2006, Kenya has seen a steadily increasing refugee influx from Somalia. Each day around 1,200 Somali refugees arrive currently in Kenya. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has so far registered 32,000 new arrivals this year on top of the 126,000 Somalis already living in refugee camps in Kenya. The aim of the Commission's assistance is to support activities covering the basic needs of the new Somali refugees (shelter, food, basic health services, sanitation).

Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, said: "Somalia's fast-changing political situation and complex internal conflicts are once again in the international spotlight. The Somali people suffering from the consequences deserve the same attention. The effects of several years of drought have increased the humanitarian needs. The European Commission has been a very active donor right from the start. The additional €2 million confirm our continued humanitarian commitment alongside our political engagement to contribute to peace and stabilisation in Somalia." He added: "I also thank Kenya for hosting the Somali refugees at a time when the own population in particular in the north of the country faces economic hardship because of the severe drought in the region....

Tom Odom
12-21-2006, 02:38 PM
Years ago, a friend of mine did his MA on Somalia before it all broke apart. There's actually a large population component that is not part of the clans (and is hated by the clans), so we have to be careful about how we conceive the situation.

Marc

I was aware of that; what I do not have a good fix on is what happened to that "group" after the collapse. Were they a Somali equivalent of the "Wa-Benzi" in other post-colonial African states? Did they survive, leave, or were they washed under the surge of clan warfare?

I am quite happy to say my own time on the ground in Somalia was limited to 2 weeks in 1984. That said, I still left with a dented skull. My associations with other African groups over the years certainly affected my views toward the region. Geography tends to confirm those views: there are no major routes into Somalia other than across country. No one wants to go there and the Somalis like it that way. I realize that is a less than PC viewpoint but it is a very real regional view.

Efforts to buffer and contain are underway; my cautions are that direct or semi-indirect involvement in these conflicts works against containment (or whatever we call it).

Best

Tom

marct
12-21-2006, 02:46 PM
I don't believe this is the type of "strengthening" of the border region that you were implying, but they are attempting to address part of the situation:

Hi Jedburgh,

Actually, that's part of it. Kenya has been getting progressively destablized by trying to deal with too many refugees and having porous borders. Some of the camps in Kenya and Uganda make the Black Hole of Calcutta look like DisneyLand, so, if we are going to think seriously about a GCOIN, then part of that has to be in terms of turning these sink holes into something that at least offers some hope and can be used as a staging ground for them to recapture the areas they have been thrown out of.

I think this is especially important in that particular region, since the main groups that we could be allying with, the Samale, the southern Sudanese, the people of Darfur, are getting the snot kicked out of them. How well will anyone believe promises of Western governments if we don't help them?

Yes, reconstruction is a part of all this, but, as the old adage goes "Give a man a fish and he eats for a day, teach him to fish and he eats for a lifetime." I don't really think that making the refugee camps into lovely places is the answer (I've got more than a few problems with the UN). I do, however, think that the refugee camps need to be shifted from the loss column into the win column. Let's take a page from the old insurgentcy manuals...

Marc

marct
12-21-2006, 02:55 PM
Hi Tom,


I was aware of that; what I do not have a good fix on is what happened to that "group" after the collapse. Were they a Somali equivalent of the "Wa-Benzi" in other post-colonial African states? Did they survive, leave, or were they washed under the surge of clan warfare?

I really don't know what happened to a lot of them, although I believe there is a fairly large group in Kenya. Probably the poeple who would know best are the Mennonite Central Relief Commitee - they are quite active in Kenya and keep an eye on refugee movements.


I am quite happy to say my own time on the ground in Somalia was limited to 2 weeks in 1984. That said, I still left with a dented skull. My associations with other African groups over the years certainly affected my views toward the region. Geography tends to confirm those views: there are no major routes into Somalia other than across country. No one wants to go there and the Somalis like it that way. I realize that is a less than PC viewpoint but it is a very real regional view.

Too true!


Efforts to buffer and contain are underway; my cautions are that direct or semi-indirect involvement in these conflicts works against containment (or whatever we call it).

I can certainly understand those cautions <wry grin>. Getting directly involved in Somalia is a good way to get the snot kicked out of you; at least at the PR level. What I really wisj that we were doing is sending some troops to contain the borders, while trying to upgrade the resource of the refugees so that they can go back in as allies.

Marc

jcustis
12-21-2006, 03:06 PM
Quickie interview with a Somalia expert from Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3654):

Most relevant takeaway for me:

FP: Are the Courts controlled by al Qaeda?

KM: No. Absolutely not. There is a legitimate debate over whether a small number of leaders in the Islamic Courts have linkages with a small number of leaders from al Qaeda. That’s not the same as saying that the two are in a deeply intrinsic partnership. The problem that the Courts face is that they are not by any stretch a unified movement. It’s an umbrella group that includes moderates, hard-line salafists, and jihadists. And a small number of jihadists can do an enormous amount of damage and can bring in elements from outside that create a whole new level of security problems.


I think we have to remember the last sentence of the reply. While the IC may not be aligned with AQ directly, perhaps their Taliban-esque modus operandi will set the stage for jihadist and radical influence.

Who should we support and why? Should we support anyone? Hmmm, I'm torn between Tom and Marc's points. On the one hand, the violence only exacerbates an already precarious situation with regard to food and population displacement, so I feel that there has to be at least some measured response. On the other hand, there seems to be an AQ cloud hanging over the IC that (at least publicly) will prevent us from engaging them directly and influencing a positive outcome.

I haven't paid attention to Kenya enough to know the problems it is having within it's borders, but I can imagine that they are significant. Do we become involved at the risk of drawing ourselves into the Darfur problem as well? While I don't subscribe to an domino theory in the region, masses of people dying in refugee camps is a negative sum game in my opinion. I wonder what JTF-HOA is up to right now?

marct
12-21-2006, 03:15 PM
Who should we support and why? Should we support anyone? Hmmm, I'm torn between Tom and Marc's points. On the one hand, the violence only exacerbates an already precarious situation with regard to food and population displacement, so I feel that there has to be at least some measured response. On the other hand, there seems to be an AQ cloud hanging over the IC that (at least publicly) will prevent us from engaging them directly and influencing a positive outcome.

I don't think Tom and I really disagree. Neither one of us wants to see coalition forces try to go into Somalia and play policemen. Well known comments about reproductive parts and meat grinders are appropriate to that idea <wry grin>.

Likewise, the idea of overtly supporting any particular group currently active in that little family fued (quoth he with way too much sarcasm), is porbably equally futile.


I haven't paid attention to Kenya enough to know the problems it is having within it's borders, but I can imagine that they are significant. Do we become involved at the risk of drawing ourselves into the Darfur problem as well? While I don't subscribe to an domino theory in the region, masses of people dying in refugee camps is a negative sum game in my opinion. I wonder what JTF-HOA is up to right now?

Kenya, is on a tipping point the last I heard. The refugee situation isn't as bad as that in Uganda, but it is still pretty bad. What I am advocating is that instead of sending troops into Somalia, we consider sending "reconstruction teams" into Kenya to help with the refugee situation and, at the same time, start strengthening their borders. If nothing else, there would probably be some European support for that in terms of troop commitments since it isn't, technically, a hot environment.

Marc

jcustis
12-21-2006, 03:47 PM
Do we have to get serious about Darfur as well though? How much of a hit will we take if we don't?

marct
12-21-2006, 03:58 PM
Do we have to get serious about Darfur as well though? How much of a hit will we take if we don't?

Well, personally I think we should have been serious about Darfur several years ago. I was over in Caen for the 60th anniversary of the D-Day landings and there was a display about Darfur in the Catherdral there. I had been hearing about Darfur for about a year or so before that (I was doing some research on Sudanese resettlement in Ontario), but I found it fascinating that it was such a popular cause in Europe. I saw similar displays in Germany the next year.

I think that we have already taken a hit over it, and a bad one. During the mid-term elections, I remember seeing all those ads demanding that President Bush "do something", so I would guess that it is already a US internal football. There have also been 60 minutes specials on it as well.

Let's face it - Darfur is an ethnic (and religious) cleansing move on the part of the Sudanese "government". It doesn't really help anyone's image to stand by and watch it happen. At the same time, it just strengthens the Safalists hold on the Sudan.

Marc

AdamG
12-28-2006, 04:36 AM
http://allafrica.com/stories/200612270574.html

Note - this link will go stale in two weeks. I think someone's helping the Ethiopian Chief of Staff with his homework. :cool:

Ethiopia: Ethiopian, TFG Forces Routing Int'l Terrorist Forces in And Around Baidoa - Premier
The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa)
December 27, 2006

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that Ethiopian forces and the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia have broken the back of international terrorist forces in and around Baidoa, and the latter are now in full retreat.

"Our commanders have got the list of international terrorists, people outside of Somalia who were wounded and being treated at a hospital in the town of Diinsoor when the town was occupied," Meles said.

"Not only did we get the names of those Eritreans, but the list of names of people who carry British passports. So, when we talk about international terrorists, we mean international. Not just Middle East," he added. Meles said that something like 290 non-Somalis, who were wounded, were being treated at a hospital in Diinsoor. "The whole of Middle Somalia is now free from these terrorist groups, and Baidoa is not under threat any more," Meles said. (Now would be a good time to trot them out in front of the press, but the Ethiopians have been paranoid about reporters in the past).

Meles said, so far Ethiopian troops have not entered any town, and it is only the TFG forces that have gone into towns. "Liberating towns is not Ethiopia's agenda. Our army has avoided even the small towns that have been liberated so far." He added: "There are no specific towns that we target to liberate. We have no specific agenda of targeting Mogadishu or any other specific town. We are not after towns, we are after the terrorist groups." (Bypassing MOUT tarbabies.)

"Only senior commanders of our army have entered into these liberated towns, and they did so solely for the purpose of talking to traditional leaders in these towns," Meles said.
<snip>

jcustis
12-28-2006, 01:41 PM
As the united anti-IC forces drive on Mogadishu, where are the Islamic Court cats headed? Will they fade away like the Taliban, waiting to rear up down the road?

It almost seems as though Ethiopia will have to invest itself in Somali affairs akin to Syria, IOT gain any semblance of order. I haven't had the time to read through the background references posted in the earlier parts of this thread (to better understand what the IC factions are all about), but we have got to make something stick in the Horn or we will deal with these guys again.

I mean, the IC didn't come to prominence because a few thugs got together and said, "Let's start running a country." If they were filling a vacuum, then we have got to work engagement hard and be the power that fills the void and helps that nation drive forward with better options for governance. It all goes back to attacking the root causes, and although folks can wave the flag and say the Ethiopians did a good job at helping to roll the IC back, my question is "So what?" Where does that leave us now and what is the way ahead?

It looks like just another finger stuck in the dike, without any true analysis of why the dike's foundation is rotting away, or a plan to fix it permanently.

AdamG
12-28-2006, 02:28 PM
Well, the Islamists have abandoned Mogadishu, ditched their 'uniforms' and faded into the population. The militias loyal to the Transitional government have taken over the docks. Looks like the locals just don't want their huts burned down, no matter who's in charge.

Elders and foresighted people in the capital called on the transitional government to do something about the escalating insecurity in Mogadishu. Somali premier Ali Mohammed Gedi told elders and scholars in Mogadishu that they should fortify the security in the capital until the government forces reach Mogadishu.

The State Department was trying to convince the Ugandans to get into the fight (probably to deal with Kismayu), but Kampala wasn't willing to play.

Islamists lost all their strongholds in central and southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu, with the exception of the port city of Kismayu, 500 km south of Mogadishu.
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200612280149.html

An AU stability force to help the Transitionals maintain order in Mogadishu would be nice, but that won't happen with Darfur still on the front pages.

jcustis
12-28-2006, 02:35 PM
An AU stability force to help the Transitionals maintain order in Mogadishu would be nice, but that won't happen with Darfur still on the front pages.

Sadly, that's been tried before, but only made small gains in very discreet areas (like temporary food security). Order is a very relative term in that country.

Which think tank is on point with analysis of the situation right now? I need to read up on some of the stuff.

Uboat509
12-28-2006, 02:49 PM
Where does everyone get the idea that Ethiopia did this because of the US or that Ethiopia cares about the war on terror? This has nothing to do with US Jingoism because it has little to do with the US, neither does it have anything to do with a desire by the Ethiopian government to be part of the GWOT. This has actually been going on for years to greater or lesser degrees and has WAY more to to with tribal politics than religion. Most of Ethiopia's government, and its population for that matter, is Muslim. Do some digging and you will find the tribal roots to pretty much every conflict in this region.

jcustis
12-28-2006, 03:02 PM
Welcome to the thread Uboat. I was thinking the same thing when I saw the thread title a while back, because I had a hard time following the argument made in the original article that the warlords were the enemy. That article turns out to be pretty speculative.

The only warlord that comes to mind as being the enemy was Aidid, and he's taking a dirt nap now. All the others were in bed with us at some point or another during the '92-'95 timeframe, so to call them enemies smack of Malkinism.

Regional border strife, yes. Partnership in the Global War on Terror, no. You're dead on Uboat509.

AdamG
12-31-2006, 06:22 PM
Forces close in on Islamists' last stronghold
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/12/31/wsomalia31.xml
Mike Pflanz, East Africa Correspondent, Sunday Telegraph
Last Updated: 11:45pm GMT 30/12/2006

Ethiopian tanks were rolling south yesterday through Somalia for a final showdown with the hardline Islamists driven from power in a 10-day military offensive.

As the army convoy headed towards the southern port of Kismayo, the last stronghold of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Ethiopian fighter jets flew overhead. The Somali interim government and its Ethiopian allies have stated that they aim to crush the Islamic movement, which took control of much of southern Somalia.

Already they have said their flight from Mogadishu, which they had controlled since May, was merely a "tactical retreat" before "the next phase of our struggle".
***snip

"You think that Islamic courts have failed and the Ethiopian invaders have won in Somalia? I tell you within days everything will be changed," Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal, the Islamist commander, said. "I assure you that the Islamic forces are everywhere in the country and you will see the forces operating within days. What we will do is hit and run. We will ambush their convoys everywhere in Somalia."

JKM4767
01-08-2007, 02:20 PM
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6234167.stm

Anyone think this is going to happen?
Are we (NATO) getting involved?

Never been to the AO...I think some of you have...would this be tougher than Iraq????

jcustis
01-08-2007, 03:19 PM
Never been to the AO...I think some of you have...would this be tougher than Iraq????

I doubt we could be the lead, while Iraq is ongoing. It would make it somewhat easier to identify the muj if they aren't of African descent though...

marct
01-08-2007, 09:12 PM
I doubt we could be the lead, while Iraq is ongoing. It would make it somewhat easier to identify the muj if they aren't of African descent though...

Ummm, not really I'm afraid. Most Somalis, excepting the Samale, are practically indistinguishable from Yemeni's and many others from The Arabian penninsula. The various families and clans have been intermarrying for several thousand years. In fact, the nine major Somali clans all claim descent from the Prophet...

Marc

tequila
01-09-2007, 12:29 AM
I wouldn't say that they are indistinguishable. I have several friends of Somali descent and they certainly would never claim to be Arab. There are quite a few Yemenis with African bloodlines, and indeed there has been millenia of trade and intermarriage between clans on the continent and the Yemeni side --- Axum ruled parts of Yemen for awhile, and some of the first Muslims escaped Meccan persecution in Axum. But most Somalis remain quite distinguishable from the majority population of Yemen.

Now Darfur "Arabs" vs. Darfur "Africans", on the other hand ... not so much.

AdamG
01-09-2007, 12:31 AM
CBS: U.S. Attacks Al Qaeda In Somalia
Jan. 8, 2007(CBS/AP) A U.S. Air Force gunship has conducted a strike against suspected members of al Qaeda in Somalia, CBS News national security correspondent David Martin reports exclusively.

The targets included the senior al Qaeda leader in East Africa and an al Qaeda operative wanted for his involvement in the 1998 bombings of two American embassies in Africa, Martin reports. Those terror attacks killed more than 200 people.

The AC-130 gunship is capable of firing thousands of rounds per second, and sources say a lot of bodies were seen on the ground after the strike, but there is as yet, no confirmation of the identities.

The gunship flew from its base in Dijibouti down to the southern tip of Somalia, Martin reports, where the al Qaeda operatives had fled after being chased out of the capital of Mogadishu by Ethiopian troops backed by the United States.

Once they started moving, the al Qaeda operatives became easier to track, and the U.S. military started preparing for an air strike, using unmanned aerial drones to keep them under surveillance and moving the aircraft carrier Eisenhower out of the Persian Gulf toward Somalia. But when the order was given, the mission was assigned to the AC-130 gunship operated by the U.S. Special Operations command.

If the attack got the operatives it was aimed at, reports Martin, it would deal a major blow to al Qaeda in East Africa.

Meanwhile, a jungle hideout used by Islamic militants that is believed to be an al Qaeda base was on the verge of falling to Ethiopian and Somali troops, the defense minister said Monday.

While a lawmaker had earlier told The Associated Press that the base was captured, Somalia's Defense Minister Col. Barre "Hirale" Aden Shire said troops had yet to enter it and that limited skirmishes were still ongoing, though troops were poised to take the base.

Ethiopian soldiers, tanks and warplanes were involved in the two-day attack, a government military commander told the AP on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

Shire said there had been heavy fighting with high numbers of casualties.

"There are a lot of casualties from both sides," he said, declining to give details.

Residents in the coastal seaport of Kismayo, some 90 miles northeast of Ras Kamboni, said they saw wounded Ethiopian soldiers being loaded onto military helicopters for evacuation.

"I have seen about 50 injured Ethiopian troops being loaded onto a military chopper," said Farhiya Yusuf. She said 12 Ethiopian helicopters were stationed at the Kismayo airport.

Somali officials said the Islamic movement's main force is bottled up at Ras Kamboni, the southernmost tip of the country, cut off from escape at sea by patrolling U.S. warships and across the Kenyan border by the Kenyan military.

In Mogadishu, Somalia's president made his first visit to the capital since taking office in 2004. During the unannounced visit, President Abdullahi Yusuf was expected to meet with traditional Somali elders and stay at the former presidential palace that has been occupied by warlords for 15 years, government spokesman Abdirahman Dinari said.

U.S. officials warned after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that extremists with ties to al Qaeda operated a training camp at Ras Kamboni and that al Qaeda members are believed to have visited it.

Three al Qaeda suspects wanted in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa are believed to be leaders of the Islamic movement. The Islamists deny having any links to al Qaeda.

Somalia's government had struggled to survive since forming with backing from the United Nations two years ago, and was under attack by the Islamic militia when Ethiopia's military intervened on Dec. 24 and turned the tide.

But many in predominantly Muslim Somalia resent the presence of troops from neighboring Ethiopia, which has a large Christian population. The countries fought two brutal wars, the last in 1977.

On Sunday, gunmen attacked Ethiopian troops, witnesses said, sparking a firefight in the second straight day of violence in the capital, Mogadishu.

marct
01-09-2007, 03:00 AM
I wouldn't say that they are indistinguishable. I have several friends of Somali descent and they certainly would never claim to be Arab. There are quite a few Yemenis with African bloodlines, and indeed there has been millenia of trade and intermarriage between clans on the continent and the Yemeni side --- Axum ruled parts of Yemen for awhile, and some of the first Muslims escaped Meccan persecution in Axum. But most Somalis remain quite distinguishable from the majority population of Yemen.

Now Darfur "Arabs" vs. Darfur "Africans", on the other hand ... not so much.

Some good points, Tequila. What I was really trying to get at was that it would be hard, with a second or two glance, to tell if someone was Somali or "foreign". You are certainly right about the Axumite connection <g>.

Marc

SWJED
01-09-2007, 03:43 AM
8 January NY Times - U.S. Airstrike Aims at Qaeda Cell in Somalia (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/world/africa/09somalia.html?hp&ex=1168318800&en=52ea9442973ba86c&ei=5094&partner=homepage) by David Cloud.


A United States Air Force gunship carried out a strike Sunday night against suspected operatives of Al Qaeda in southern Somalia, a senior Pentagon official said Monday night.

The attack by an AC-130 gunship, which is operated by the Special Forces Command, is believed to have produced multiple casualties, the official said. It was not known Monday night whether the casualties included members of a Qaeda cell that American officials have long suspected was hiding in Somalia.

Special Forces units operating from an American base in Djibouti are conducting a hunt for Qaeda operatives who have been forced to flee Mogadishu, the Somali capital, since Islamic militants were driven from there by an Ethiopian military offensive last month...

Jedburgh
01-09-2007, 01:31 PM
ISN, 8 Jan 07: After Islamists defeat, Somalia in catch-22 (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17086)

...Ethiopian and TFG troops much assert control rapidly, before Islamists regroup or are rearmed by the Hawiye, as a means of curbing renewed warlord chaos. The Ethiopian presence may radicalize a greater proportion of Somali Muslims. The early signs are not propitious with recent fighting in Mogadishu between unidentified gunmen and Ethiopian soldiers. A TFG deadline for weapons to be handed in was ignored by secular warlords and Islamists. And while the latter suffered a comprehensive defeat in the face of one of Africa’s largest standing armies, 3000 CSIC fighters have reportedly melted into Mogadishu's civilian population. With warlords reasserting their presence across the city through the use of roadblocks and renewed extortion and intimidation of the civilian population, the Somali capital is a tinderbox....

...Somalia will likely remain mired in factional fighting. Stability means having the capacity to control warlords - as the CSIC did during 2006 - and co-opt pragmatists in the CSIC. However, the unpopular Ethiopian garrisons are the chief source of the TFGs military capacity. Without quickly replacing Ethiopian troops with a multinational force, in tandem with providing the TFG with resources to build its own capacity, Yusuf will not bring about a restoration of effective sovereignty in Somalia, while the region’s western-allied nations may now be vulnerable to random terrorist attacks.

Tom Odom
01-09-2007, 02:48 PM
Where does everyone get the idea that Ethiopia did this because of the US or that Ethiopia cares about the war on terror? This has nothing to do with US Jingoism because it has little to do with the US, neither does it have anything to do with a desire by the Ethiopian government to be part of the GWOT. This has actually been going on for years to greater or lesser degrees and has WAY more to to with tribal politics than religion. Most of Ethiopia's government, and its population for that matter, is Muslim. Do some digging and you will find the tribal roots to pretty much every conflict in this region.

I have made my concerns over the Horn clear (I think) in ths same post; that said, I would not go so far as to say the Ethiopian concern is purely "tribal," because the Muslim majority in Ethiopia is balanced by 37% Christian and 12 % Indigenous religions. Somalia is 100% Sunni Muslim and the combination of a pure Sunni area with a warrior culture makes it a natural for Al Queda; what ways against an AQ takover is the complexity and competiveness of the Somali clan structure.

But I my opinion you are correct when you state that US interests and Ethiopian interests are hardly in geosynchrous alignment. If that were the case, we would not have been in 1984 when I visited Mogadishu for a couple of weeks trying to renovate a Soviet tank factory to help contain the "Ethiopian threat" under Mengistu and the Derg.

Best

Tom

wm
01-10-2007, 03:15 AM
Tom,
I believe that the real issues that had you in Mogadishu in 84 were more about containment of the Cubans, who were quite numerous in Ethiopia and Angola at the time. I seem to remember concerns about Communists gaining control of strategic metals supplies (titanium, chrome, vanadium, and uranium for example) and sea lanes (like the Suez-Red Sea Route).
As someone else noted, Somalia and Ethopia have been at it for quite a long time. Each of them seems willing to sign up with whatever major power can re-arm them well enough to have another crack at the other. And that of course cause the other side to go shopping for a new arms source as well.
That at least was the case in the 70's and 80's. They both jump ship as needed. I believe the Derg took over in Ethopia because The Lion of Judah wasn't keeping the Somali threat at bay with a big enough military to suit the Derg's tastes.
What all this has to do with the current situation is that it seems the Somalis may have finally chosen the wrong partner to re-arm them against the Ethiopians. AQ didn't quite deliver enough to keep the Ethiopians out. This could make great IO fodder for our side, provided of course that the Chrisitian element of the Ethopian society can be downplayed. We definitely need not to have another Crusader state bullying the Moslems as grist for the AQ propaganda mill.

120mm
01-10-2007, 12:16 PM
Reading this thread, I was suddenly struck by what I seriously believe is our "secret weapon" in any COIN battle.

The Apathy and Ignorance of the American People.

As long as we don't blow our horn too loudly, we can fight whoever we want, and ally ourselves with anyone, and the American People just don't care that much. While this condition of eternal bliss usually is associated with negative outcomes, why couldn't we exploit it to fight and win Small Wars?

Perhaps our biggest mistake in Iraq was raising to the an "above the table" war.

SWJED
01-10-2007, 12:42 PM
U.S. Takes Hunt for Al Qaeda to Somalia (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0110/p01s02-woaf.html) - 10 January Christian Science Monitor.


... U.S. military officials say that Somalia's lawless state had become a safe haven for Al Qaeda activists, including possibly those responsible for the embassy bomb attacks in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998.

This week's attacks illustrate how much US military policy has changed since Sept. 11, 2001. As the U.S. closes or downsizes massive cold war-era bases in Germany and South Korea, its presence is expanding in Uganda, Djibouti, Senegal, and São Tomé and Príncipe, African nations once seen as far beyond American interests. Today, African bases serve both as "jumping off" points for the war in Iraq and also as bulwarks against new threats in volatile regions of Africa...

goesh
01-10-2007, 01:22 PM
Yeah, who would have thought it possible for the US military to act so efficiently and brilliantly in light of all the bad press coming out of Iraq? This one really caught the Liberals and anti-Bush people off guard. I note a mother of 5 from Somalia was quoted in MSN as saying in affect that the US presence in Africa was not wanted. LOL! With attribution like that as a justification for not killing al qaidah lads, we all better beware and toe the politically correct line despite the obvious indicators that many Blacks in Africa don't want muslim fundamentalists running the show. Don't you just love snoopy? Ooops, I'm behind the times here - there's some new name and nomenclature for the new saddle and bridle on that old war horse ain't there?

Tom Odom
01-10-2007, 02:41 PM
On Cubans in 84, perhaps, the Addis regime celebrated its 10 year anniversary that year as well; I went through there on the way back from South Africa just to look at the decorations. The real "the Cubans Are Coming" surge took place earlier commencing with our support of Holden Roberto (another stellar figure) and our sponsorship and advisory effort for the invasion of Angola. It later came back to bite us in 1977 and 1978 with sequential Shaba Wars.

Mog in 84 was just in another cycle of greater Cold War politics as played out in Africa; that play finally ended in 1990 or there abouts. The sequels, however, go on. my Ambassador in Rwanda had been DCM in Mog around this time. We never met then, only became fast friends after Kigali. he had some interesting views on power games on the Horn.

The Derg was a clear case in Africa where an communist takeover really took over. Mengistu was on a plane with Idi Amin when it came to ruthlessness. And in the Cold War game, we supported Salassie as Emporer because he was anti-communist. The Soviets supported the Somalis because they threatened Ethipioan hegemony on the Horn and threatened the entry into the Red Sea. When the Derg took over and draped itself in Communist dogma, decorations, and NKVD-style bloodletting, the Somali-Soviet Alliance fell apart and both Cold War sides switched sides.

Whether or not the Somalis (more accurately some of the Somalis) have chosen the "wrong side" in AQ remains to be seen--they can square dance away from them at any moment.

The point being that it is not simply a case of Somali-Ethiopia side changing; we have done it as well. My problem with that is every time we pick a side then we start justifying it as a moral imperative versus a move on the strategic chessboard. That hurts our use of IO before we even get started.

Tom

Jedburgh
01-19-2007, 02:34 PM
CSIS, USIP, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and CFR hosted a conference on 17 Jan 07 titled "Securing Somalia's Future: Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, and Security Engagement" (http://www.usip.org/events/2007/somalia_agenda.pdf). Here are transcripts of the remarks by the keynote speakers:

Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), chair, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa (http://www.csis.org/images/stories/070117_somalia_feingold.pdf)

Ambassador Jendayi Frazer, assistant secretary for African affairs, U.S. Department of State (http://www.csis.org/images/stories/070117_somalia_frazer.pdf)

Jedburgh
01-26-2007, 01:31 PM
ICG, 26 Jan 07: Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b45_somalia___the_tough_part_is_ahead.pdf)

Somalia’s Islamic Courts fell even more dramatically than they rose. In little more than a week in December 2006, Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces killed hundreds of Islamist fighters and scattered the rest in a lightning offensive. On 27 December, the Council of Somali Islamic Courts in effect dissolved itself, surrendering political leadership to clan leaders. This was a major success for Ethiopia and the U.S. who feared emergence of a Taliban-style haven for al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremists, but it is too early to declare an end to Somalia’s woes. There is now a political vacuum across much of southern Somalia, which the ineffectual TFG is unable to fill. Elements of the Courts, including Shabaab militants and their al-Qaeda associates, are largely intact and threaten guerrilla war. Peace requires the TFG to be reconstituted as a genuine government of national unity but the signs of its willingness are discouraging. Sustained international pressure is needed....

SWJED
01-28-2007, 01:07 PM
28 January Virginia Pilot - The Quiet War in the Horn of Africa (http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=118297&ran=90135) by Kate Wiltrout.


A curious crowd of women and men in billowing skirts streamed toward the landing zone as two U.S. Marine helicopters touched down on rocky African desert.

The Marines had pistols strapped to their legs, but the choppers from New River Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina were doves, not hawks.

Inside were an Air Force doctor and a team of Army civil affairs specialists on a mission to bring help – and hope – to 12,000 Somali refugees.

The forbidding landscape is a 20-minute flight – but seems a world apart – from Djibouti’s capital city, where the U.S. military has established a base, Camp Lemonier.

U.S. air strikes on suspected terrorists in Somalia this month called the world’s attention to the region.

However, the U.S. military has been quietly engaged in the Horn of Africa since 2002, using about 1,500 troops to build schools and medical clinics, dig wells, treat sick people and inoculate livestock. Dozens of Navy sailors and officers from Hampton Roads are part of the force, and more are preparing to head to Djibouti in early February.

With its mission to win hearts and minds through goodwill, this unorthodox military operation looks more like the Peace Corps than the Marine Corps. But the effort is primarily to deter al-Qaida and Muslim extremists from spreading throughout a region rife with poverty and despair...

AFlynn
02-06-2007, 03:00 AM
In the pattern of postcolonial states, Prime Minister Zenawi and President Afeworki came to embody the image of their nations. In stamping their personalities and leadership styles on to otherwise weak national and bilateral institutions; however, they guaranteed that the resurgence of conflicts over identity and stature would have enormous consequences on the stability of the entire relationship. It is in this respect that the border conflict (posed in populist terms as a war among "brothers" and "cousins") exhibits an inability to structure rule in impersonal institutions. Soon after the border hostilities broke out in May 1998, Afeworki suggested that settlement would be elusive because of concerns "about pride, integrity, respect, trust, confidence and all those kinds of things. When you lose them, it becomes a big problem for us in this region; it is not always money or resources."

(Gilbert Khadiagala, “Reflections on the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Conflict” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 1999)

I wrote a paper on this war this fall, mostly on its causes as a factor of flaws in bilateral relations and the papering-over of longstanding issues with the rhetoric of revolutionary solidarity.

The Eritrea-Ethiopian war was kind of weird compared to most wars in Africa; both sides took out about a billion dollars of loans from the world bank, and then partook of the great fire sale that was the late 90s arms market. As it was fought, it was essentially a big 20th-century style conventional conflict with massive static defenses opposed by armored spearheads, etc, even a small air war providing a product demonstration of sorts for the Sukhoi-27 and Mig-29. The border dispute that started the war really hasn't been resolved to any degree (it really seems to be more a prestige thing than a concrete dispute). Both leaders have gotten worse on civil liberties and human rights since 2000. Anyway, eritrea has generally worked to try and frustrate ethiopian ambitions in somalia, etc. Also, the war cut off secure and easy port access for ethiopia, which the new somali gov't may try to provide instead.


Robert D. Kaplan has a dynamite book on the horn circa mid 1980s.

tequila
02-06-2007, 11:14 AM
See Kaplan's fawning tribute to Eritrea and its dictator here (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/kaplan/2). The Eritrean authorities know just what beats to hit with Kaplan - praise for former European imperialists and nice words about Israel and the U.S.

jcustis
03-06-2007, 02:15 PM
From a CNN article today:

Around 400 Ugandan forces flew into the airport on Monday as the first contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia -- AMISOM -- charged with helping the war-torn country rebuild.

Around 1,100 further troops are expected to arrive in the next 24 hours. The mission, organized by the African Union, consists of more than 7,600 ground troops, plus police training teams and air and maritime security patrols.


You have to love these quotes :wry: :

"We are very happy to be the first African Union peacekeepers to Somalia. We are welcomed here," Paddy Akunda, the Ugandan forces' spokesman, said prior to the attack.

"We are not imposing anything on Somalis. We know our mandate; we will work toward restoring law and order in Somalia without targeting anybody."


I wonder why I am rolling my eyes right now...Oh yeah, therre were also reports of a mortar attack on the airport during the arrival ceremony. Why the pomp and circumstance? It's not a media show they are headed to - it is the octagon, and they'd better get there stuff squared away quick or they'll spend the tour hunkered down behind barriers and white-washed walls.

I'd actually like to go back to Mogadishu, just to see what has or hasn't changed in 13 years.

jcustis
03-09-2007, 02:49 AM
MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) -- An attack on African Union peacekeepers and an ensuing gunbattle killed at least 10 civilians in the Somali capital, witnesses and hospital officials said Thursday.

Wednesday evening's ambush of the peacekeepers -- the first to arrive in Mogadishu in more than a decade -- happened at a main intersection in the capital, one of the most dangerous and gun-infested cities in the world.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/03/08/somalia.peacekeepers.ap/index.html

I'm going to go out on a limb and say that the AU force is in for a rude awakening.

Jedburgh
03-09-2007, 03:12 AM
ISN, 8 Mar 07: War on Terror Thwarts Somali Peace (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17334)

...Section 5 of the last UN Security Council 1744 did not explicitly demand a full Ethiopian withdrawal but "urges member States of the African Union to contribute to the above [AU] mission in order to create the conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somalia."

Many in Somalia feel the need for peacekeepers but the involvement of a country seen as an enemy taints the peace mission and jeopardizes a unique opportunity to end 15 years of violent chaos in Somalia....

...The international community seems either unable or unwilling to discern the effect of the Ethiopian presence on the AU peace mission in Somalia. And the US, with its war on terror agenda in the Horn of Africa, has found a convenient partner in Ethiopia - regardless of the negative consequences for Somalia.

Unless both the US and the UN not only refrain from condoning the Ethiopian presence in Somalia but are seen to be actively doing so, the UN-sponsored AU peacekeeping mission will have little chance of bringing stability to Somalia.

TROUFION
03-09-2007, 04:46 AM
NPR, Discovery Channel and Ted Koppel have put together a series of prgrams discussing this 'proxy war' idea it begins tomorrow. I caught the add to quickly to get specifics and don't have the time right now to look it up, my apology, but I bet the discussions will be interesting, I believe the first segment will air via Morning Edition on NPR on Mar 9th but local programing is all different.

goesh
03-09-2007, 01:24 PM
"Ali Saeed, chairman of the Mogadishu-based Center for Peace and Democracy (CPD) think tank" - I was sort of dumbfounded when I read that. I bet Mr. Saeed has relatives who know hunger and there isn't a thing he can do about it. Rabies, that's what comes to mind when I think of Somalia. I think Somalia is so ruptured and impoverished, almost pre-stone age, that it isn't even a vaible pawn for AQ, let alone any Western interests.

Tom Odom
03-09-2007, 02:33 PM
ISN, 8 Mar 07: War on Terror Thwarts Somali Peace (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17334)

From the same article:

Ethiopia has ignored a UN Security Council resolution banning it (albeit rather vaguely) - along with Djibouti and Kenya - from sending troops into Somalia, saying its national security was threatened by the Islamists who had taken over much of the country last year.

Somalia's neighbors have a vested interested in the war-torn nation. Ethiopia and Somalia have fought two wars over territorial and ethnic disputes which have not been officially resolved.

The historic rift is even symbolized by the white five-pointed star of the Somali flag. According to Somali tradition, one of the star's points represents the disputed Ogaden region in western Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian government had earlier said it would withdraw its troops from Somalia in compliance with the Security Council resolution and "in respect of the sensitivity between the two nations." However, Ethiopia was emboldened to stay on when US and UN officials clearly backed its involvement, stating that Ethiopian troops could help root out Islamists, accused by the US of harboring members of al-Qaida. That charge has never been officially substantiated.

This is exactly why I always stress agenda agenda agenda in one-on-one or state-on-state relations. We--the US and especially those in the US with distinctly neocon tendencies--have been saluting the valour and martial effectiveness of the Ethiopians in driving out Islamic radicals. Some of that is true; what is critical is understanding the Ethiopian agenda in those actions.


I'm going to go out on a limb and say that the AU force is in for a rude awakening.

Not at all JC--you are dead on target with that prediction.

Tom

Jedburgh
05-01-2007, 01:35 PM
CTC, 1 May 07: Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp)

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to present the report, Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa. Based on a collection of al-Qa’ida documents recently released from the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database, this report provides an analysis of al-Qa’ida’s early operations in the Horn of Africa. These documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror, have never before been available to the academic and policy community. Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa includes a theoretically informed analysis of al-Qa’ida’s successes and failures while operating in Somalia between 1992 and 1994. Case studies on Somalia (http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_somaliaII.asp) and Kenya (http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_kenyaII.asp) provide a historical and current analysis of al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn. Our theoretical analysis and case studies inform policy recommendations on how the U.S. and its coalition partners might address the threat of terrorism in failed and weak states within the Horn of Africa and globally. We have provided brief summaries of each of the released documents with full text translations in English and the original document in Arabic. We hope this report will serve as a useful resource in our collective efforts to better understand and combat al-Qa’ida and its affiliated movements.

SWJED
05-06-2007, 03:03 PM
May 2007 edition of Armed Forces Journal - Horn Hotbed (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2670146) by Peter Brookes.


Since the early 1990s, the Horn of Africa — the descriptive name for the East African countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan — has been considered by many a major source of Islamic terrorism, radicalism and political instability. Unfortunately, that conclusion is accurate...

SWJED
05-06-2007, 03:17 PM
I just uploaded the document to the SWJ - Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (1 May 2007) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/aqinhoa.pdf)

jcustis
05-06-2007, 06:30 PM
I've followed the development of "affairs" in the Horn (and specificaly Somalia) since I left in 1994. This is an important piece of work on a scale that I honestly have a hard time describing. This leads me to wonder, why the transparency, and why now?

What are the differences between the 229 page and 557 page versions? I am glossing over both right now, and honestly there is too much stuff to be able to tell.

Tom Odom
05-07-2007, 01:33 PM
Our most important new finding is that al-Qa’ida failed to gain traction in Somalia in the early 1990s because: (1) its members were perceived as foreigners; (2) it significantly underestimated the costs of operating in a failed state environment; and (3) its African vanguard did not understand the salience of either local power structures or local Islamic traditions. In a region dominated by clanbased authority structures and moderate Sufi Islam, the benefits of joining a foreign Salafi terrorist organization paled next to the costs of leaving one’s clan.

I started reading this paper this morning and actually started laughing....it seems that AQ ran into the reality of Somalia where the non-Somali is essentially a target. I also especially like the cautions against over-playing a US or Western hand in such areas.


After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism forces. Effective and efficient counterterrorism efforts in the Horn require tailored strategies that exacerbate the endemic challenges that al-Qa’ida encounters in this inhospitable region and minimize friendly government vulnerabilities.

Or as above, it is refreshing that someone actually pointed out that a geographic feature like the "Horn" does not define the social or cultural divisions within that feature. Basically this is a modern caution against a colonial tendency, saying "be careful drawing borders or boundaries, White Man."


More later after I finish looking at this one.

Best
Tom

Tom Odom
05-07-2007, 03:22 PM
Alright, I did an admittedly fast and equally surface read of this paper but having said that, I will still say it is very informative, especially to those not initiated to the Horn, Somalia, and Kenya.

The bad news is that it is a long read at 557 pages if you are so inclined. The good news is reading the executive summary will give you what you need with some greater depth spot reading in the first 81 pages.

The paper's key point is that failed states like Somalia may not be the key battleground against terrorism. Instead weak states like Kenya--especially coastal kenya--offer greater opportunities for organizations like AQ.

The paper also offers key points that apply to foreign assistance in larger terms, such as the presence of terrorist activity as a stimulus for assistance promotes the preservation of such activity to continue the flow of assistance. This is not surprising to anyone who has worked refugee or other assistance venues, especially when dealing with a weak/corrupt government. We used to say, "refugees are big business." This report says "so are terrorists" when it comes to prompting assistance.

My concern with this paper is that in itself it presents an equally simplistic view on the issues of failed states and weak states, especially in Africa. I say that with the Congo--never a real state to begin with--in mind. Everything that is played out in this paper as indicative of either a failed state like Somalia or a weak state like Kenya takes place in the Congo everyday. The key is understanding the region, the "country," and the peoples involved before making "big hand, little map" assessments like "Somalia is a breeding ground for Islamists" or "they will see us as liberators in Iraq."

Overall a very good paper and I recommend at least reading the EXSUM.

Tom

LawVol
06-28-2007, 08:04 PM
"The Americans Have Landed" by Thomas Barnett http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Americans_Landed_Africa.html


America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa? Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities.

So as the Middle East middle-ages over the next three decades and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for both youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved.

The U.S., through its invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, the United States military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver.

non-kinetic effects in action...

Beelzebubalicious
07-20-2007, 10:02 PM
Yes, it's easy to be impressed with Afewerki. I was for awhile and so were so many Eritreans, but time has shown something different. This was written in 2003, when optimism was high and Afewerki did walk around w/out bodyguards.

Anyway, I've been thinking this little border skirmish is going to blow up again at any moment. Each time it doesn't. It feels like it's just a matter of time, though. Perhaps it's Ethiopia's other problems or it's Sudan that keeps this just below boiling.

Though Afewerki is not as well supported as he was in the past and life is getting worse in Eritrea, he doesn't seem like he's going anywhere soon. On the other hand, I'm not sure how Meles hangs on. Perhaps it's the age-old conflict distraction.

What's new out there? Anybody know anyone in the soup?

Beelzebubalicious
07-28-2007, 12:12 PM
I also wanted to add this article that provides some more background on the border dispute and current issues. Terence Lyons wrote a piece for the Council on Foreign Relations titled, "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy Towards Ethiopia and Eritrea"

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Ethiopia_EritreaCSR21.pdf

Beelzebubalicious
10-23-2007, 01:18 PM
the Sudan Tribune is the only news source to report this. Anyone have any information to support or deny this info?

Eritrea deploying 25000 troops into Ethiopia border - opposition
Tuesday 23 October 2007.

October 22, 2007 (MEKELLE, Ethiopia) — The opposition Eritrean People Democratic Front (EPDF) today said, Eritrea recently has deployed over 25000 troops toward Ethiopia border.

“Eritrean 19 and 13 military division forces fully armed are deployed at the temporary security zone where UN peace keepers are deployed.” The opposition group said.

According to the EPDF’s statement Eritrea has break into the buffer zone, Temporary Security Zone, (TSZ) between the Eritrea and Ethiopia forces; and heavily started massing its troop

Ethiopia and Eritrea forces are now in less than 25 kms away from each other and recent tensions could break out in to a full war any time.

The group further said the government of Eritrea has imposed curfew in Senafe town and around.

’’The curfew imposed since last week and which the group said lasts from dusk to down aimed to control its fleeing citizens to Ethiopia in the cover of darkness.” The group added.

International observers say Eritrea violated the Alger agreement by sending troops to the demilitarized zone. Also the UN urged Eritrea to remove the restrictions placed by Eritrea upon UN mission forces between the two countries.

At the end of October 2005, Eritrea ordered the U.N. mission in Eritrea to "confine its land vehicle movements to the main roads" in the 25-kilometer wide demilitarized buffer zone.

The move was seen as a pressure from Eritrea intending to force the international community into taking action against Ethiopia, which has refused to accept an international ruling on the border made in 2002.

In 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea ended a 2 1/2-year border war that killed 70,000 people and cost two of the poorest countries in the world an estimated $1 million a day each.

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24373

tequila
10-23-2007, 02:09 PM
Ethiopia says may call off Eritrea border pact (http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKL25458183._CH_.242020070925)- Reuters 25 Sep. Possibly related if the above opposition group is telling the truth?


Ethiopia said on Tuesday it may terminate the pact ending its border war with Eritrea, accusing its smaller neighbour of breaching the deal on several fronts including coordinating "terrorist activity".

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin in a letter to his Eritrean counterpart said Addis Ababa would be forced "to consider its peaceful and legal options under international law" if Eritrea continued.

Those options include terminating the pact or suspending part or all of it, Mesfin wrote ...

Beelzebubalicious
10-23-2007, 02:32 PM
It's probably nothing. Maybe they are there to pick crops, like they were in 2006 and 2003...

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6057352.stm
and
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3244204.stm

Of course, if anyone has been on that border, you'd have to wonder what crops they're picking....especially in the TSZ

Beelzebubalicious
10-26-2007, 12:42 PM
This is an interesting article by Michela Wrong on how the deadline for the Algiers Agreement signed by Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 expires at the end of November and the implications for the future.

By the way, Small Wars Forum readers might appreciate Michela Wrong's book, "I Didn't Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation", about Eritrea, especially Chapter 10, titled "Blowjobs, Bugging and Beer" about U.S. Military base called Kagnew Station in Eritrea. For more info from one of her sources of that article, go to http://www.geozazz.com/wrongreview.htm


War brews on the new frontier
Michela Wrong

Published 25 October 2007

Michela Wrong reports on the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the war brewing on the new frontier

A grim deadline expires in a few weeks' time. It will pass unnoticed by the British public, but that doesn't make it any less important, not just for the two nations involved, but for Africa as a whole. For it sets the seal on an abject failure by the west to ensure that a vital African ally respects international law. And the act of defiance our governments have chosen to ignore will undermine peacemaking on the continent for decades to come.

At the end of November, the frontier separating Eritrea from Ethiopia becomes officially demarcated, in the teeth of Ethiopian opposition. For five years, Addis Ababa has done its best to prevent cement pillars being placed along a line designated by the international Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission in April 2002, a ruling that both states originally agreed was to be final and binding. The exasperated commission chairman, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, announced last November that if the stalemate continued, the border would automatically count as legally demarcated a year hence, pillars or no.

http://www.newstatesman.com/200710250023

Also see:

Ethiopia, Eritrea Trade Blame on Boundary Dispute (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-25-voa48.cfm)

and

Algiers Agreement (http://www.unmeeonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=50)

tequila
10-26-2007, 01:02 PM
Thanks for the links.

I'm in the middle of Wrong's book now, and it's definitely a great read and interesting stuff.

Beelzebubalicious
11-05-2007, 02:46 PM
Report calls on the UN to enforce the border demarcation and the US to send a clear message to both sides that war will not be tolerated. I've seen nothing from either the UN or the US in the public. Anyone know if there's been any diplomatic dialogue on this subject from the US side?


Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War


Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 5 November 2007: The international community must act urgently to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from resuming their war and potentially throwing the entire Horn of Africa into new turmoil.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War,* the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, warns of the real risk of renewed conflict and calls on the international community to move fast to stop it. The UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular must give both sides the clearest message that no destabilising unilateral action will be tolerated, and that the parties must comply with their obligations under international law, disengage on the ground and restore the demilitarised Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).

“The military build-up on both sides has reached alarming proportions, and war could break out again within weeks,” says Gareth Evans, Crisis Group President. “There will be no easy military solution if that happens: we are looking at a protracted conflict on Eritrean soil, destabilisation of Ethiopia and a horrible new humanitarian crisis”.

Both sides had agreed in Algiers in 2000 to submit their border dispute to the Boundary Commission and accept its decision as final and binding. However, since its ruling in April 2002, Ethiopia has blocked physical demarcation of the border; Eritrea, with legal right on its side, then alienated many of its supporters by blocking the work of the UN peacekeepers. The issue will come to a decisive head – with a real risk of fighting breaking out – at the end of November, when the Boundary Commission has indicated it will close down unless it is allowed to proceed to demarcation.

The UN Security Council and the U.S. must urgently make it clear to both sides that no use of force will be tolerated and that a party that resorts to it will be held accountable. Specifically, the U.S. should send a firm message to Ethiopia, that it will take diplomatic and economic measures against it if it attacks Eritrea. The Security Council should pass a resolution reiterating its support for the Boundary Commission decision and requesting it to remain beyond the end of November.

The UN should also stress the requirements on Ethiopia to accept the Boundary Commission ruling and on Eritrea to withdraw its army from the TSZ. Members of the Security Council and other key international players should discuss economic incentives and disincentives that would likely be required to obtain cooperation in de-escalating the situation on the ground and implementing the Commission decision.

“In the next weeks, urgent outside assistance is needed to ensure that the shooting does not resume,” says Don Steinberg, Crisis Group Vice President for Multilateral Affairs. “International indifference or mistaken confidence could cost the people of the Horn of Africa dearly and lead to a new protracted conflict in the region”.


http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5136&l=1

Beelzebubalicious
11-07-2007, 02:17 PM
This report was posted on November 1st. Gives some pretty clear evidence (at least so it appears to me) of preparations for war. Or, at least, both sides are trying real heard to make it appear as if they are.


Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea (S/2007/645)
I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1320 (2000) of 15 September 2000, and provides an update on developments in the Mission area since my previous report, dated 18 July 2007 (S/2007/440). The report also describes the activities of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/KHII-78Q2VJ?OpenDocument

Beelzebubalicious
11-26-2007, 11:18 AM
It appears as if the USG's diplomatic efforts with Ethiopia are of the carrot variety. USAID administrator, Henrietta Fore met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to discuss tensions on the border with Eritrea and additional food aid to the Ogaden ($19 million to $45 million).

Regarding the potential conflict with Eritrea, Fore said "It is always easier to help a country at peace. It is because you can move around the country. People have more hope and more chance of having a little business, going to school, building a clinic," she added. "People always have more hope if there is stability and security in a country."

US Embassador to Ethiopia added that the two countries needed to resolve the disput themselves, but that a number of high level officials, including Rice herself, will be traveling to Ethiopia soon to impress on them the importance of preventing war.

Full story at http://voanews.com/english/2007-11-25-voa8.cfm

Presley Cannady
01-22-2008, 04:12 PM
Looks like they moved most of this stuff

Harmony Project main page: http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp

(Mis)Adventures: http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp

AdamG
01-25-2008, 01:06 AM
Eritrea: TPLF Regime Placing Newly Recruited Soldiers in the Frontline, Say Defecting Ethiopian Soldiers
Shabait.com (Asmara)
12 January 2008
Posted to the web 14 January 2008

Asmara

Five Ethiopian soldiers who recently arrived in Eritrea opposing the TPLF regime's war-mongering policy disclosed that the regime is placing newly recruited soldiers in the frontline and has given orders to veteran ones to shoot them whenever they try to escape backward.

They also indicated that at present the TPLF regime's Army is engaged in intensive military training.

The rest of the article elaborates on the deserters names, origins and claims of Ethiopian depredations.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200801140280.html

Beelzebubalicious
01-25-2008, 07:22 AM
Ethiopia used these tactics during the 30-year civil war ("recruiting" civilians and putting them on the front lines and then shooting them if they tried to flee).

Both sides continue to build up and prepare on both sides of the "border". See the UN Security Council's latest report at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MUMA-7B74D6?OpenDocument. Unfortunately, Eritrea has cut off diesel fuel supplies to UNMEE and UNMEE is saying they'll have to pull out of the TSZ. Once that happens, it'll just be the Ethiopians and the Eritreans and some itchy trigger fingers. W/out a clear border demarcated on the ground, it will be easy for either side to claim the other has violated the border....

If UNMEE does pull out, it will be interesting to see what or if the international community responds.

Rob Thornton
01-25-2008, 12:01 PM
I remember when I was in Addis in 1988 - Mengistu was still in power and there was still a 2400 curfew on the streets - we were coming back from a trip out to Langano and the government had the buses lined up in the square as a marshaling point - troops were out rounding up children (I was told 12-14 years old) to go North - there they would receive a weapon.

The regime was pretty hard up at that point. Most of their Soviet equipment was either destroyed, captured or in disrepair - Hinds and Hips sat onthe airfield being canibalized to keep a few things flying.

There was an attempted coup that year (88/89) - Mengistu had left town and the other leaders (military and cabinet) got together and decided they'd had enough I guess. Anyway, the story goes that one of the invitees was a relative of Mengistu - and things went down hill from there.

Its sad to see that area still at war. I knew some Eritreans, and I knew many Ethipians, they were good people, with an incredible history and culture. Makes you wonder if we'd have done things different in 1975 (I think that was the year we left - Eric is that right?) if things would be at least a little different now - I don't know.
Best, Rob

Beelzebubalicious
01-25-2008, 03:08 PM
I believe the US closed Kagnew Station in '77. After Mengistu was ousted, there were a lot of kids on the streets with guns. Not a pretty scene.

I heard stories from the Eritrean side about how the Ethiopians would send wave after wave of farmer/civilians towards them, some just armed with sticks and knives. The Eritreans would engage them in hand-to-hand combat to save ammunition.

I was a teacher in Eritrea and many of my students joined the military after they graduated. Most of them will probably be on the front lines of a new war. I hate to even think about it and it makes me crazy to think that it can and should be avoided.

Rob, did you ever get up to Kagnew Station? Did you know some of those guys? I've just heard and read stories....

Rob Thornton
01-25-2008, 03:26 PM
Hi Eric - know as far as I made it out was Langano, the Blue Nile Gorge and upt to MT Zuquala - mostly day trip sorts - part of it was the schedul we worked in the MSG DET there. I lost a couple of friends on the A/C that Congessman Leeland was on when they were out for humanitarian purposes and went down.

Lots of HN folks on the compound, as well as the expat type friends and family of the Italian girl (her family had been there for some time) I dated lamented that the Americans had ever left.

Quite a collection of folks in Addis - some great NGO/IO types.
Best, Rob

JJackson
01-26-2008, 02:20 AM
Langano, it is a long time since I have heard that name. My father kept a dingy on the lake and I sailed there as a child. Mind you it was Emperor Haile Selassie at that time and Eritrea did not exist.

AdamG
01-30-2008, 02:44 PM
UN’s Ethiopia-Eritrea force at risk
By Harvey Morris at the United Nations
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d909f26-ce98-11dc-877a-000077b07658.html
Published: January 29 2008 22:49 | Last updated: January 29 2008 22:49

The United Nations might be forced to evacuate its peacekeepers next month from the tense border zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, removing the most visible deterrent to renewed warfare between the east African neighbours.

The UN Security Council was due on Wednesday to renew the mandate of the 1,700 peacekeepers for a further six months, despite the news that Eritrean restrictions on fuel supplies to the UN force made its situation untenable beyond February. Azouz Ennifar, UN special representative in the region, said last week the force would soon have only enough diesel stocks to stage a retreat.

Beelzebubalicious
01-30-2008, 06:17 PM
They're negotiating a 6 month extension. Whatever. The UN Security Council is a bunch of Nancies.

AdamG
02-07-2008, 08:50 PM
A new conflict could break out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UN says, as it prepares to withdraw its troops.
The UN gave a Wednesday deadline for Eritrea to restore fuel supplies to the peacekeepers on its side of the border, or it said they would have to withdraw.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7232140.stm

UNITED NATIONS, Feb 7 (Reuters) - Eritrea has ignored a U.N. deadline to grant peacekeepers on its border with Ethiopia access to badly needed fuel, but U.N. troops fear war could break out and have not begun leaving, a U.N. official said.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set a Wednesday deadline for Eritrea to allow the U.N. peacekeepers to refuel, saying they faced a fuel crisis. But the U.N. official said on Thursday that Eritrea had ignored the deadline.

http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnN07383114.html

Beelzebubalicious
02-08-2008, 07:39 PM
Oooh, you'd better give us that diesel or we're gonna, we're gonna,... put our tails between our legs and bug out of here...bluff called. Now what?

Stan
02-08-2008, 07:51 PM
Well, still no diesel, but looks like we'll hang out just a tad longer.


UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) (http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN825463.html) - Eritrea has ignored a U.N. deadline to grant peacekeepers on its border with Ethiopia access to badly needed fuel, but despite the shortfall, a U.N. official said U.N. troops are reluctant to leave because they fear war could erupt.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set a Wednesday deadline for Eritrea to allow the U.N. peacekeepers to refuel, saying they faced a fuel crisis. But the U.N. official said on Thursday that Eritrea had ignored the deadline.

"The U.N. cannot afford to leave because it would create the conditions for a resumption of the conflict," a U.N. official told Reuters on condition of anonymity. "Abandoning our positions would sanctify a resumption of the conflict."

Rex Brynen
02-08-2008, 08:15 PM
Oooh, you'd better give us that diesel or we're gonna, we're gonna,... put our tails between our legs and bug out of here...bluff called. Now what?

I really don't think "tail between our legs" is quite fair here--it is a Chapter 6 monitor and verify mission, so UNMEE really has very limited leverage. The "we'll go if we don't get fuel" threat was partly a warning of impending operational necessity, partly a bluff intended to get the Eritreans to back down, but was also partly a wake-up call to the AU, UNSC, and others to get more engaged on the issue.

The bluff part failed, the other part may not have.

The UNMEE websites are here (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/) and here (http://www.unmeeonline.org/).

JJackson
02-08-2008, 08:21 PM
I have not seen anything to indicate that Eritrea are going to allow the force on their side of the boarder exit across the boarder. Earlier reports seemed to indicate the UN force were at a point where they only had fuel for a withdrawal at that time and if they stay on - presumably - will only be able to withdraw if Eritrea either permit on of three things - fuel supplies, crossing the boarder or helicopters in their air space.

Stan
02-08-2008, 08:29 PM
Their mandate was recently extended and their mission far from over.

However, bluffing Africans has never resulted in a favorable outcome (at least not where I was stationed). A threat must sadly be carried out, or not used at all. The wake up call was a necessity and perhaps even a little late.

Beelzebubalicious
02-09-2008, 07:30 PM
Last I read, they were reading, though one UN official was quoted as saying, "Abandoning our positions would sanctify a resumption of the conflict." Note the words "abandon" and "sanctify".

I would love to see UNMEE fly in the fuel anyway. What's Eritrea going to do, shoot them down? I know they would never do that, but it would be interesting to see...

Rex Brynen
02-09-2008, 07:54 PM
I would love to see UNMEE fly in the fuel anyway. What's Eritrea going to do, shoot them down? I know they would never do that, but it would be interesting to see...

Agreed. The UNSC could authorize it too (and in so doing signal their resolve on the broader border issues).

I hope this isn't another case where the PKO in the field is left high and dry because UN member states avoid the diplomatic heavy lifting necessary to support their mission.

The last war resulted in tens of thousands of casualties (and even more if one factors in the indirect cost of redirecting scarce resources from development to warfighting in two very poor countries). It would be nice to avoid another one, and UNMEE is a potentially important part of that.

(Incidentally, the DPKO website suggests at least a few US personnel are assigned to the mission.)

Beelzebubalicious
02-10-2008, 07:32 AM
I know this potential war probably doesn't even rank in the top 10 foreign policy issues in the USG, but damn, it should. If Ethiopia and Eritrea go to war, then there's not even one single stable state in the horn.

I would expect some behind the scenes communication and arm twisting from the USG and/or European countries, but then again, there could also be nothing happening.

I tend to agree with Eritrea on the border demarcation. It's been demarcated and Ethiopia wants to contest. Ethiopia stands to lose from the border being physically demarcated b/c then they really lose the opportunity to reclaim land and perhaps make a play for the port of Asseb. Frazer seems to be pandering to Ethiopia and letting them stall and drag this out.

What I don't understand is what Eritrea stands to gain from kicking out UNMEE. Of couse, I know many Eritreans are spoiling to get back at Ethiopia for the last war and are this time, better prepared. Ethiopia is stretched and vulnerable and really can't manage an intensive war. So, perhaps that's it.

JJackson
02-16-2008, 05:27 PM
UN troops 'trapped' in Eritrea
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7248085.stm

It would appear Eritrea is going to try and exploit the situation the UN force have got themselves into.

Beelzebubalicious
02-27-2008, 09:00 AM
Bush missed Ethiopia during his Africa road trip (nice dancing, though...), but I hope his policy advisors are awake and taking note. Or perhaps, awareness isn't the problem. It's a mindset and blindness to bigger issues. What I'm saying is that it's time to take Ethiopia behind the woodshed. Enough is enough.

See Ethiopia's war on its own (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-farrow25feb25,0,6030515.story) by Ronald Farrow in LA Times, february 25, 2008

AdamG
03-03-2008, 08:41 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/africa/04somalia.html?hp

NAIROBI, Kenya — American naval forces fired missiles into southern Somalia on Monday, aiming at what the Defense Department called terrorist targets.
Residents reached by telephone said the only casualties were three wounded civilians, three dead cows, one dead donkey and a partly destroyed house.

Beelzebubalicious
05-06-2008, 05:03 PM
I heard a few stories from Eritreans describing atrocities committed by Ethiopian troops in Eritrea. That was in the 30 year civil war. Ethiopian troops behavior during the 1999 border war was also apprehensible. I don't think Ethiopia has a leg to stand on in terms of tradition or history.

JJackson
05-07-2008, 05:58 PM
Eritrea army 'entered Djibouti' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7385690.stm)


Djibouti has accused Eritrea of violating its border by sending troops into its territory.

"The two armies are facing each other. The situation is explosive," said Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its soldiers had dug trenches on the Djibouti side of the border.

As geographic locations go I think Djibouti has a strong case for holding the shortest straw. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia with Yemen across the gulf - rather them than me.

Beelzebubalicious
05-07-2008, 06:06 PM
I don't get this. Djibouti president says two armies are facing each other. Is he implying that Eritrea is digging in and preparing to fight Djibouti? We know they've been preparing for Ethiopia, but why would they want to pick a fight with Djibouti?

JJackson
05-07-2008, 06:38 PM
The news article talks about an old boarder dispute. The US and France have military bases but otherwise I would assume their interest may have more todo with the fact Ethiopia is landlocked and Djibouti was - and I assume still is - their main port. There is a railway from Addis and Djibouti was heavily dependent on this as source of income. With the US position currently favouring Ethiopia over Eritrea I am not sure why they are pushing here.

Beelzebubalicious
05-08-2008, 04:13 AM
Ethiopia definitely wants port/sea access (free and open) and that's what the 99 border war was largely about. They made a big play for Asseb and failed. Afterwards, I thought Ethiopia made a deal with Djibouti to use their port. I still see no reason for Eritrea to attack Djibouti. I imagine they were digging in against perceived future Ethiopian attacks and perhaps made a mistake in terms of the geography. Hard to imagine, but possible I suppose.

JJackson
05-10-2008, 10:12 AM
Eritrea denies Djibouti war claim (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7390945.stm)


Eritrea has denied that it has any problems with Djibouti, which accuses it of amassing troops on their border.

Earlier this week, Djibouti appealed to the UN Security Council to intervene in order to prevent a conflict over the border village of Doumeira.

I had a quick look in the CIA fact book to see how the armies stack-up and as expected - in numbers - Eritrea is an order of magnitude large it also stated that 85% of the ports container traffic is Ethiopian.

Beelzebubalicious
05-10-2008, 03:05 PM
Apparently, Djibouti is trying to build a bridge across the red sea to Yemen and have aspirations to be the next Dubai...

http://www.economist.com/world/afri...ory_id=10881652
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8qZd_ELHLU
http://www.veracifier.com/post/2421...dle-east-africa

Beelzebubalicious
05-25-2008, 04:17 AM
News on this topic has been posted in other threads, but it probably deserves its own thread. I don't think anybody really knows what's going on here. Only explanation I can come up with is that Eritrea is just agitating. It needs action and attention on border and other issues. this will certainly get some attention.

See today's NY Times article titled, In Horn of Africa, Djibouti and Eritrea in Face-Off Over Border (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/africa/25djibouti.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

Lostcomm
06-03-2008, 11:55 PM
Gentlemen-
If one had to choose the top ten things a person might attempt to accomplish in a relatively short tour to HOA, what does the collective brain think they might be?

Just wondering...

Lostcomm

davidbfpo
06-04-2008, 08:57 PM
The Horn of Africa; I had to ask as abbreviations are not always readily known.

I would have a look at Aidan Hartley's writings / reporting from Somalia recently; one of the few Western journalists to visit there and a white African too (a Kenyan national living on a farm in North East Kenya).

Understand clans and tribes. Be respectful and offer the hand of friendship / respect in meetings; Somalis appreciate this in my limited experience here in the UK.

Consider low tech, alternative technologies; check www.practicalaction.org

All from an armchair and quite possibly not the suggestions sought!

davidbfpo

jcustis
06-04-2008, 09:33 PM
in a relatively short tour to HOA

In what capacity, armed or unarmed...peace-making/keeping, security assistance, or humanitarian assistance?

Beelzebubalicious
06-10-2008, 09:30 PM
Hmmm, this isn't good. Anyone out there listening?

http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSHUL069633

Steve Blair
06-10-2008, 09:32 PM
Watching with interest. Also been bogged down with the Mugabi whackjob circus...

Jedburgh
06-13-2008, 08:06 PM
HRW, 12 Jun 08: Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Region (http://hrw.org/reports/2008/ethiopia0608/ethiopia0608webwcover.pdf)

.....Tens of thousands of ethnic Somali civilians (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370221) living in eastern Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State are experiencing serious abuses and a looming humanitarian crisis in the context of a little-known conflict between the Ethiopian government and an Ethiopian Somali rebel movement (http://www.cfr.org/publication/13208). The situation is critical. Since mid-2007, thousands of people have fled, seeking refuge in neighboring Somalia and Kenya from widespread Ethiopian military attacks (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373849) on civilians and villages that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity....

.....Although the conflict has been simmering for years with intermittent allegations of abuses, it took on dramatic new momentum after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF (http://www.onlf.org/)) attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in Somali Region in April 2007, killing more than 70 Chinese and Ethiopian civilians. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, responded by launching a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in the five zones of Somali Region primarily affected by the conflict: Fiiq, Korahe, Gode, Wardheer, and Dhagahbur. In these zones the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have deliberately and repeatedly attacked civilian populations in an effort to root out the insurgency.....

Jedburgh
06-17-2008, 08:31 PM
ICG, 17 Jun 08: Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/nd_the_fragile_peace_between_ethiopia_and_eritrea_ averting_a_new_war.pdf)

The Ethiopia-Eritrea impasse carries serious risk of a new war and is a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa, most critically for Somalia. Following Ethiopia’s refusal to accept virtual demarcation of the border by the now disbanded Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), Asmara unilaterally implemented it and forced out the UN peacekeepers (UNMEE), significantly raising the stakes and shattering the status quo. Its insistence on recovering territory the Commission awarded it – Badme in particular – could lead to unilateral military action by either side but is only one of several war scenarios. The Security Council and key individual states (the U.S., in particular) must recognise the dangers of their inaction and advance a reconfigured political process with new determination if there is to be a change in the calculations of the parties, who appear to be dangerously content with trying to maintain a level of simmering but unpredictable hostility......

Jedburgh
06-23-2008, 03:50 PM
Chatham House, Jun 08:

Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/630/file/11681_0608hornafrica.pdf)

This report is a study of three peace processes in the Horn of Africa, a region of Africa distinguished by the prevalence and persistence of armed conflict. It deals with the Algiers Agreement of December 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Somalia National Peace and Reconciliation Process concluded in October 2004 and the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005.

It examines in turn the background and historical context of the conflicts that these peace agreements were intended to resolve. It charts the developments since the agreements were signed, seeking to assess how far they have achieved successful outcomes for peace and stability. The results are very mixed.....

Beelzebubalicious
08-14-2008, 11:34 PM
Horn of where? Ethi-what? Bueller?

Ethiopia/Eritrea: "Unfinished Peace in the Horn of Africa (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5618&l=1)",
Daniela Kroslak in The Daily Star
August 8, 2008

franksforum
12-01-2008, 02:51 PM
This paper is from the UK House of Commons. Similar to the Congressional Research Service.

This paper looks at recent developments in the Horn of Africa, where there are a number of protracted and interlocking crises at work, and briefly discusses some of the main factors that have been described as ‘root causes’ of conflict in the region. The insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces in Somalia is rapidly gathering momentum as efforts continue to form a more inclusive and viable government. There is a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, with about 40 per cent of the population needing assistance. Almost unnoticed, there are ongoing tensions between neighbouring Somaliland and Puntland over disputed border areas. Meanwhile, the possibility remains of a resumption of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their long-running border dispute. In the Ogaden, which is part of Ethiopia’s Somali regional state, there has also been a humanitarian crisis as a consequence of ongoing fighting between Ethiopian troops and insurgents. Finally, earlier this year Eritrea launched an incursion into Djibouti and is yet to withdraw its forces.

Piracy is not covered in this paper. For a discussion of piracy issues, including with regard to Somalia, see House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/BT/3794, Shipping: piracy .

http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-086.pdf

Tom Odom
12-04-2008, 06:46 PM
I saw this one today on the Ebird and wanted to post it here. Mr, Salopek's article in this gets a thumbs up. Rendition is controversial. I personally question its effectiveness when balanced on the classic scale of risk versus gain. Large scale proxy rendition, especially when the proxy has a dubious human rights record, is asking for the scale to plop solidly on the risk side with little hope for gain. This is very much a case of creating more enemies than you catch.

Tom


Renditions fuel anger against U.S. (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-shadow_war3dec04,0,3217360.story)
By Paul Salopek | Tribune correspondent
December 4, 2008

NAIROBI, Kenya—Clement Ibrahim Muhibitabo is one of the forgotten ones.

So is Ines Chine. So is Abdul Hamid Moosa.

Rwandan, Tunisian and South African citizens respectively, the three Africans are among the victims of one of the largest if most obscure rendition programs in the global war on terror: the mass arrest, deportation and secret imprisonment of some 100 people who fled an invasion of Somalia last year—a roundup that even included women and small children.

The snatch-and-jail operation was carried out by U.S. allies Kenya and Ethiopia but involved CIA and FBI interrogators, say European diplomats, human-rights groups and the program's many detainees.

William F. Owen
12-05-2008, 05:40 PM
Rendition is controversial. I personally question its effectiveness when balanced on the classic scale of risk versus gain. Large scale proxy rendition, especially when the proxy has a dubious human rights record, is asking for the scale to plop solidly on the risk side with little hope for gain. This is very much a case of creating more enemies than you catch.


...and what of a "proxy" with a good human rights record? Other than that, I concur. Rendition is not good, but I have a very strong suspicion that the popular version of events may lack some critical detail.

Tom Odom
12-05-2008, 05:44 PM
...and what of a "proxy" with a good human rights record? Other than that, I concur. Rendition is not good, but I have a very strong suspicion that the popular version of events may lack some critical detail.

No disagreement on the wider defintion of proxy; just in this case, a more limited one applied

And no doubt the devil is in the details. But in the world of IO (I knew you would love that Wilf), the popular version wins and I believe that is what Mr. Salopek was reporting.

Tom

William F. Owen
12-05-2008, 05:50 PM
But in the world of IO (I knew you would love that Wilf), the popular version wins and I believe that is what Mr. Salopek was reporting.



OK, I'll patch this flesh wound to my genitals and get back to you.. :D

jmm99
12-06-2008, 02:45 AM
Tom Odom
Rendition is controversial. I personally question its effectiveness when balanced on the classic scale of risk versus gain. Large scale proxy rendition, especially when the proxy has a dubious human rights record, is asking for the scale to plop solidly on the risk side with little hope for gain.

In this case, the US received bad PR simply because FBI and CIA officers allegedly interviewed some of the detainees. We don't read that US involvement, in the Kenyan-Ethiopian "sweep rendition", is "unclear" until the last sentence of the article - and that, only after we are reminded of an individual 2002 rendition from Kenya to Gitmo.


(from article)

Rwandan, Tunisian and South African citizens respectively, the three Africans are among the victims of one of the largest if most obscure rendition programs in the global war on terror: the mass arrest, deportation and secret imprisonment of some 100 people who fled an invasion of Somalia last year - a roundup that even included women and small children.
.............
At least 150 suspects from more than 18 countries ended up being shunted into Kenyan jails, says Human Rights Watch, an international humanitarian group. More than 100 were later loaded, handcuffed and blindfolded, onto chartered airliners and flown secretly to Ethiopia for months of further questioning.

"We had no access to lawyers, no contact with embassies, no phone calls," said Moosa, 42, a South African accountant who says he traveled to Somalia to look into the possibility of charity work for the country's Islamic movement.

"I was kept in solitary for a month, shackled ankle and feet, night and day," said Moosa, who spent almost five months in Ethiopian custody. "The Ethiopians would come collect me, blindfold me and drive me to some apartment in Addis. And the Americans would be there waiting behind a desk, asking me over and over about my terrorist connections."
............
The most high-profile case to emerge from the clandestine African renditions was Mohammed Abdul Malik, a Kenyan accused of participating in the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in the Kenyan port city of Mombasa in 2002. Abdul Malik was caught after fleeing from Somalia. Deemed too important for jail in Ethiopia, he was secretly expelled to Guantanamo Bay.

"The police handed him over to the Americans without giving him a single hour in a court," said Mariam Mohammed, the suspect's sister. "We still don't know the evidence against him."

How much Washington actually steered the sprawling arrest and deportation operation - a covert counterterrorism sweep second in scope only to the deportation of more than 200 terror suspects out of Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taliban - remains unclear.

What we have here is really "Extraordinary Rendition", rather than Ordinary Rendition as practiced before we got into 9/11, Gitmo and "War Crimes".

Ordinary rendition was simply a convenience where law enforcement officials in one country, if permitted by their interpretation of their domestic law, would hand over a criminal in their custody without requiring the requesting country to petition for formal extradition.

Like any good thing, it can be abused and turned into a bad thing.

The 2005 Report for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, which is here (http://www.chrgj.org/docs/APPG-NYU%20Briefing%20Paper.pdf), succinctly lays out the I Law standard.

Tom Odom
12-06-2008, 03:43 PM
Agreed on the abuse thing and thanks for the legal definitions


But I will repeat what I first said to Wilf, if Mr Salopek got it right on the local perspectives--that is that the US was involved in transferring South African, Tunisian, and Rwandan Muslims to Ethiopia for interrogation--then the legal perspectives as we discuss them here are largely irrelevant to the effcts from such a program.


In this case, the US received bad PR simply because FBI and CIA officers allegedly interviewed some of the detainees. We don't read that US involvement, in the Kenyan-Ethiopian "sweep rendition", is "unclear" until the last sentence of the article - and that, only after we are reminded of an individual 2002 rendition from Kenya to Gitmo.

Nope. The unclear is near the bottom if the first page. Here is the last paragraph


In October, Ethiopia freed eight Kenyans held in custody for more than a year. Meanwhile, all those released without explanation are trying to get on with their lives.

"I still have some anxiety leaving my apartment," said Moosa, the South African. "I'm a bit paranoid. I will never leave South Africa again."

In between the "unclear" and that last paragraph, there is more discussion including the bit about the CIA and FBI types at the Sheraton in Addis. That part was sourced to HRW and the diplomatic crowd. Addis is not that big--having lived in several African gold fish bowls --new folks at the local ritz that is usually a watering hole get noticed quickly.

But in any case, my point is simply that if the US and AFRICOM are to invest so heavily in buidling rapport on the continent, then it has to be a fuly coordinated effort. That much of this happened before AFRICOM's watch matters not a whit; JTFHOA was in full swing as were ops in Somalia. In any case, to the Africans we--AFRICOM, JTFHOA, FBI, CIA or Sgt Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band--all look the same or are at least looked at from a common suspicious perspective.

Tom

jmm99
12-07-2008, 01:37 AM
being temporarily stupid is not an issue - being permanetly stupid, is.

So, there is a bit of meat to the story. But, even if there weren't, I expect it would still find a receptive audience. E.g., Soapy Williams' 1964 Congo letter, forged by the Czechs. I expect we could find more than one GWOT operation that, even though arguably legal, resulted in a PR blowback.

Bill Moore
12-07-2008, 06:47 AM
Among those captured was Daniel Joseph Maldonado, an American who is now serving a 10-year sentence in federal prison in Houston for undergoing military training at a camp in Somalia. Canadians, Swedes, Eritreans and Syrians also were detained.


While the operation netted a handful of hard-core Islamist militants who were training at jihadist camps in Somalia—an American among them—the vast majority of the detainees have been released without charges.

Tom,

Truth in lending, the only information I have on these allegations is the article you posted, so we're all making assumptions and forming opinions with little to no facts; however, you still bring up some good points:

Risk versus gain? The two paras I "selectively" cut and paste above indicate that the actual risk may have been very high to our national interests and even the Europeans. The author admits, yet simply glances over it, that some were hard core Islamist militants. Only speculaton, but if they were planning another major attack on western embassies somewhere in Africa, or to possibly hijack a plane, or execute a Mumbai type attack, then the renditions in theory could have prevented hundreds of innocent deaths.

You wrote,
But in any case, my point is simply that if the US and AFRICOM are to invest so heavily in buidling rapport on the continent, then it has to be a fuly coordinated effort. That much of this happened before AFRICOM's watch matters not a whit; JTFHOA was in full swing as were ops in Somalia. In any case, to the Africans we--AFRICOM, JTFHOA, FBI, CIA or Sgt Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band--all look the same or are at least looked at from a common suspicious perspective.

I agree 100%, and I hope that risk factor was taken into the analysis process, and I further hope that if the decision to execute was in some way influenced by us, there was a "deliberate" decision making process that weighed the costs versus benefits and that the right decision based on the information available at the time was made.

I'm not a big fan of the current administration, but I do agree strongly with the President's statement that this is a different type of war. If this unorthodox operation saved American and other innocent lives then that should also be considered in the calculus.

Final argument, "if" the American people found out we had intelligence of an impending attack and we didn't act to prevent it by all means necessary, what would their judgment be? Would they accept that we thought it was more important to enable AFRICOM strategic communication and gain access to Africa?

I only throw these what-if thoughts out for consideration. I would like to hear jmm99's thoughts from the legal perspective.

davidbfpo
12-07-2008, 12:11 PM
I accept the point made by Bill Moore that US and other publics would ask questions if intelligence showed a real threat of attack and nothing was done.

What is missing INHO is that neither policy-makers or those with an IO mandate explain why pre-emption, detention without trial etc are used - when no-one is charged to appear in court.

Here in the UK much has been made of the number of successful prosecutions in terrorism cases, often with guilty pleas and sometimes admissions. Those cases account for around 10% of all those arrested for terrorism.

There is a clear need to explain why, to our own publics and those communities where suspects / terrorists hide. Alongside considering how our enemies and their "soft" supporters will react. In the UK they are too often left un-challenged.

Bob's World
12-07-2008, 12:32 PM
Just a couple of observations:

First, in the law this would be described as "the slippery slope..." Once one starts waging CT ops in sovereign nations around the world, and detaining suspects, what starts off as fairly clean can get messy...

Second is that intel guys are great at first order effects: "this is a bad guy, stop him and you will stop or disrupt this bad thing." What they do not look at, and even often do not consider to part of their job, is what are the second and third order effects to our larger scheme of engagement in the area.

I experienced personally where the intel community continually listed one particular individual as one of the top 2-3 "High Value Individuals" and briefed the senior leadership to this effect for months. Finally the host nation rolled the guy up. When we went back to the intel community a few months later to get facts to put into an update brief for that same senior leadership, the assessment from those very same intel officers was that his removal had made the organization stronger.

Somehow, I suspect that with a different approach to our analysis we could have predicted that and taken a different course. So my question is that while it looks like there may be some great first order effects from some of these grabs...what are the deeper effects on the bigger picture???

Tom Odom
12-07-2008, 01:52 PM
All good points from all posters.

JMM and the forged Congo Letter Good point and it could be that some of that is going on. In referring to the Congo, you bring to mind the Congo 64 rescue that the US and Belgium with other Western handnolders in the background agonized over for nearly 3 months, When it was finally done and several thousand hostages were rescued, the USIA Library in Cairo was burned to the ground in the backlash.


Bill Moore Understand that some of the round ups were valuable and we will probably not hear the gains. Hopefully there were real calculations involved. This takes me to

[Bob's World Essentially you describe intel target fixation and as leadership gets worse and in some cases the IO effort gets into the same cycle, we get into the mindset "if we only get this guy, we will unhinge them."

Secondary effects are slower to mount but often larger and of longer duration. Most targeteers on the intel side--especially other agencies--that I have met get caught up in the "shoot first" mentality unless someone is there to guide them through a longer target appreciation.

Last David You make the greatest point in response to the strategic needs generated by such programs. When it comes to extraordiary rendition, you had better be prepared to explain why someone was targeted and turned over to another country's apparatus--especially if you or the country holding them are going to release them.

Tom

jmm99
12-07-2008, 07:57 PM
Tons of ink on multi-tons of paper have addressed "extraordinary rendition".

The 2005 Report for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (cite in post # 5 above) sums it:


(p.13)
International law on responsibility of a State with regard to unlawful acts of other States:

*Prohibits the knowing aid or assistance in the practice of Extraordinary Rendition;

*Requires a State to assert jurisdiction over Extraordinary Rendition in defined circumstances; and

*Requires a State to take into custody, investigate and then extradite or prosecute an alleged offender when that offender is on its territory.

and (same page)


To what extent does international law apply in the “War on Terror”?

International law prohibits both torture and complicity to torture in the context of terrorism and national security emergencies. The absolute nature of this prohibition in CAT Article 2(2) was specifically included in CAT to distinguish freedom from torture as one right from which no derogation is permitted under international law, even in times of war or other emergency. Unlike CAT, the ICCPR (Article 4(1)) and the European Convention (Article 15) contains provisions permitting certain derogations from human rights obligations in specific circumstances. Each of these conventions is clear, however, that certain rights are always non-derogable. Paradigmatic among these is the prohibition against torture. Like CAT’s non-derogability provision, the Geneva Conventions’ obligation to investigate and prosecute individuals who are alleged to have committed “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions is not derogable. Thus Geneva III’s prohibition against torture and inhumane treatment of POWs and Geneva IV’s prohibition against torture, inhumane treatment and unlawful transfers of civilians to States where they may be subject to Geneva Convention violations apply during war.

International and regional law uniformly provides that regardless of whether the transfer of a person occurs as part of an extradition request and regardless of any exceptional circumstances such as efforts to combat terrorism or another threat against national security, the anti-torture and non-refoulement principles would be violated if, as a result of such transfer, the person is at risk of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment.

So, what I call Ordinary Rendition, a process which (if allowed by domestic law) permits some dispensation from formal extradition procedures, still seems viable. But, morphing that process into what we call Extraordinary Rendition has always been questionable. As Bob correctly says (both as lawyer and SF COL, I presume), this is a very slippery slope - both in terms of legal and non-legal coinsiderations.

Interrogations, interviews, whatever you want to call them, are not necessarily in violation of anything (assuming they meet legal standards); but, they can be tainted by the rest of the process. Much of this is wisdom applied - not law.

-------------------------
Since I have to assume that these problems are long-term (for the rest of my life), a comprehensive set of standards have to be developed (intel, military, diplomatic, judicial) to handle not only hardcore types (Jack Bauer & 24 ?, which I have never watched, so I can't judge), but also the lesser goats and sheep who are caught up in the net.

IMO: The present "War Crimes" cases are a bloody mess (with some exceptions) and should be "lessons learned" on how not to do it - as David correctly alluded because he has been following the UK component of one of the messier cases (which may or may not continue here under the Obama DoJ).

Bill Moore
12-08-2008, 12:56 AM
Bob and JMM thanks for your posts,


Since I have to assume that these problems are long-term (for the rest of my life), a comprehensive set of standards have to be developed (intel, military, diplomatic, judicial) to handle not only hardcore types (Jack Bauer & 24 ?, which I have never watched, so I can't judge), but also the lesser goats and sheep who are caught up in the net.

I'm strictly a knuckle dragger, which in some respects means I can speak many of your average six pack Joes. The six-pack Joe crowd is the crowd of guys and gals who get frustrated when a criminal goes free on a legal technicality, or gets equally frustrated when we have no viable "legal" recourse to take tougher action against certain organized criminal groups in the U.S. and foreign lands (to include those pesty pirates in Somalia). On one hand we have great respect for and fully understand the need for the law. We also realize that we personally benefit greatly from our body of civilized laws. On the other hand, we don't want to see the hardcore terrorists and criminals protected by these same laws, yet realise that it is almost impossible to have one condition without the other. While I prefer to live in a land governed by laws if it came to a decision today, but I also think we do to a reality check on our legal system for situations like this and make the appropriate changes. I think you captured the key problem that I quoted above.

O.K., who is going to take this for action?

jmm99
12-09-2008, 04:21 AM
Here are the problems - combined with some answers: The law by JMM as it should be. :)

1. Revisit GC III and seriously look at the interplay between Art. 2 (common to all GCs), Art. 3 (also common to all GCs), and Art. 4 (PW/POW status) for detainees, whether in a "battlefield" situation such as Astan or in a "non-battlefield" situation. On these provisions, hinges the status of detainees. See here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118) (posts ## 13-20) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118&page=2) (post # 33) for some discussion re: AQ and Taliban in Astan.

2. Once the rules to determine status are set - these will be the same whether one is in the Law of War (military) or the Rule of Law (domestic), we have to set the rules for separating the wolves (in sheep's clothing), the goats and the sheep. Note that rarely will we be dealing with a genuine GC III, Art. 4 detainee (a PW/POW) - in the case of such as AQ and Taliban, Art. 2 will flow to Art. 3. When we get there, we find that armed combatants have the right to be tried by a competent tribunal before execution, for example. Other provisons of GC III and IV also require a similar trial if the detainee claims PW/POW status or civilian status.

3. What is a competent tribunal is basically a least common denominator test based on the standards of civilized nations. Let us assume arguendo that the UN members are civilized nations; and then determine the procedure that is common to all of them - tossing out those aspects of due process that are NOT shared by all. We will then have a minimum standard.

4. Then, we should examine the alternatives, which could range from: (a) an immediate hearing before a board of competent persons (the old-fashioned field officers board comes to mind) with no appeal; to (b) a full blown adversarial, judicial process (such as the UCMJ or the Euro criminal system).

5. Collect and preserve all the evidence concerning each detainee in one dossier with a back-up copy in a different place. Sounds simple, but it has been a problem. At least one of the "War Crimes" cases I've reported will probably be tubed because the initial evidence (definitely collected by the military, probably admissible, and quite possibly enough to convict) has been lost in the process.

6. Revisit the application of formal extradition to persons who flunk GC III, Art. 2 and fall into Art. 3. If they have limited rights under Art. 3, no logic exists to grant them greater rights just because they have to be rendered from one country to another. However, even here, a preliminary hearing seems required (under GCs) to establish "probable cause" of their status. Again, we can go to a least common denominator test based on the standards of civilized nations.

7. Admissibility of evidence is also not going to be a problem since our (US) exclusionary, privilege and hearsay rules are not common to all civilized nations - in fact, we are in the definite minority there. The general rule for admissibility of evidence is the "totality of circumstances" - evidence is presumed admissible with objections going more to the weight that will be given it. The other side of the coin is that all evidence (inculpatory and exculpatory) must be disclosed - our (US) Brady doctrine, which is fundamental due process because it prevents innocent persons from being convicted.

8. All these bets are off if US citizens are concerned - both JJ. Roberts and Scalia have made that clear enough in several cases.

PS: - if all else fails, simply shoot the buzzards as propounded by Gary Berntsen in his new book, which is reviewed here (http://www.amazon.com/Human-Intelligence-Counterterrorism-National-Leadership/dp/1597972541).

Having taken the bit in teeth, you all can now bite me in the ass or other parts of the equine anatomy.

slapout9
12-09-2008, 06:30 AM
We need some type of expanded "Exigent Circumstances" rule. Fighting terrorists organizations can be very different because of the extreme and unusual threat they pose. What the final version would end up being I don't know but we need one IMO.

Tom Odom
12-09-2008, 12:49 PM
JMMPS: - if all else fails, simply shoot the buzzards as propounded by Gary Berntsen in his new book, which is reviewed here.

A reviewer wrote:


This is a publisher's idea of a quick buck. The author did what he could within the constipated formula. It is recommended for anyone who knows very little about intelligence and wants a useful overview that avoids the nitty-gritty. Indeed, this is a very fine companion to Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy(3rd Edition), which is deficient in the very areas where this book offers a rather gross-level overview to the student new to the intelligence discipline. The price is reasonable, one reason I was tempted.

jmm99
12-09-2008, 06:50 PM
Tom - have and have read the book, as well as Mr. Steele's review. The book is not a primer for Intel 101, much less Intel Calculus 617. It is an edited version of Mr. Berntsen's speeches - and would be better titled "A Long Open Letter to the Next President". The PS was a bit tongue in cheek, since as all know I subscribe to a "try 'em, convict 'em" and then "shoot 'em" strategy.

Slap - please provide us with an outline of what you mean by an "expanded 'Exigent Circumstances' rule". Just bullet points.

slapout9
12-09-2008, 11:45 PM
JMM, it was more thinking out loud but to expand on this. In an emergency situation regular LE does have to comply with the regular routine such as Miranda before interviewing and or search warrants. This usually involves situations where there is an immediate threat to life. Example would be kidnapping and you have a suspect who has time sensitive information.

Expanded to a Terrorist would be something like expanded detention say 7 days because the information he/she may have could effect not just one life but conceivably thousands. The Standard would be reduced to reasonable suspicion as opposed to having to establish probable cause. At the end of 7 days either you have probable cause to file formal arrest charges or they walk.

jmm99
12-10-2008, 03:12 AM
In an emergency situation regular LE does [NOT] have to comply with the regular routine such as Miranda before interviewing and or search warrants.

As to this:


Expanded to a Terrorist would be something like expanded detention say 7 days because the information he/she may have could effect not just one life but conceivably thousands. The Standard would be reduced to reasonable suspicion as opposed to having to establish probable cause. At the end of 7 days either you have probable cause to file formal arrest charges or they walk.

Back when I was a little boy in law school (which was just before Miranda), a serious proposal was made (IIRC by Fred Inbow and others) to allow US police interrogation for a limited period of time before arraignment, under some conditions - one was audio recording the entire interrogation. Today, we have video.

The idea was to allow cops some leeway to cement probable cause and, frankly, develop actionable intelligence to other perps. Since the entire interrogation would eventually be before the trial court, the judge would be in as perfect position as possible to decide admissibility (and fruit of the poisoned tree) based on the "totality of circumstances".

I had NO issues with that proposal then, or now. Miranda put end to what were some innovative concepts in juxtaposing police TTPs, the judicial process and the rights of the accused.

I think we are thinking along the same lines. Make it point 1A in my outline.

PS: My God - at least part of my memory still remains (except for spelling "Inbau" as "Inbow"). Fred E. Inbau et al, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, which is here (http://www.amazon.com/Criminal-Interrogation-Confessions-Fred-Inbau/dp/0763747211/ref=pd_sim_b_njs_3).

This is a more recent version of the 1962 version, which was my reference above.


Product Description

The fourth edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions presents the Reid Technique of interviewing and interrogation, and is the standard used in the field. The Fourth Edition presents interviewing and interrogation techniques, based on actual criminal cases, which have been used successfully by thousands of criminal investigators. This practical text is built around simple psychological principles and examines interrogation as a nine-step process that is easily understood by students.

I think my profs (Kamisar & Israel)'s case book may have some excerpts from Inbau's plan. I'll look.

--------------------
PS #2 - did talk with Circuit Judge re: the Astan HTT case. His nephew is assigned to one of them - so, he knew the drill. Chuck was a defense attorney before going on the bench. Bottom line. "Boy, handcuffed - that's a tough case. Come on, Chuck, you can do better than that. Boy, those handcuffs, - that's a real tough case." We then got off into Anatomy of a Murder and John Voelker, who tried the real Anatomy case, but who only talked fly fishing in his fairly often bar room conversations with Chuck when Chuck was a rookie lawyer. He then had to go onto the bench and put someone in Jackson or Marquette - I didn't stick around for the sentencing.

slapout9
12-10-2008, 03:49 AM
jmm, yes does NOT is what I meant. Also covers search warrants. There was an interesting case in Florida that supposedly had some bearing on this from the early 1960's Barbara Jane Mackle was buried alive and either died or nearly died because LE had to fool around to long with getting a search warrant. Have not researched this to confirm it been have been told this. I am familiar with the taping procedures of interrogations you are talking about and yes it was and still is used for Intel purposes can't use it in court anymore, but we just wanted the Intel anyway for further investigation.

PS. I have some Reid books.

Brian Scott
04-17-2010, 06:56 PM
.
hey.
I hope to get some discussion going on our next "war," the one in Somalia.

I consider our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to be military successes, but overall failures. Reason: we divorced politics from the martial, and lost sight of Mission, Vision, Values. Our Prussian patron would disapprove.

I've collaborated with two sanctioned authors, TX and Janine, before she became Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, on the Global Strategic Assessment 2009 published by INSS, NDU.
Infantryman. SF. Constitutionalist. Perhaps best known for suing the Army in Federal Court to stop the employment of Mercenaries.
Loser.

I don't like the term "long war;" these aren't really wars in the historical sense. But our next one, whatever we call it, will be in the Lower Shabelle, and Garacaad.
Maybe instead of focusing exclusively on explaining why, despite the evidence, we haven't lost the first two, we can shape strategy so that #3 is actually winnable.
.

Ken White
04-17-2010, 08:01 PM
Hammes or losing a suit. I won't even argue that we will not go to Somalia.. I will state that we should not simply because there is no important US interest at stake that cannot be better sorted in other ways.

We 'lost' the first two in one sense because we decided to stay; as to whether we really lost -- way too early to tell. Check back in 2030 or so. Even that may be too soon...

So rather than going directly to shaping the "... strategy so that #3 is actually winnable" why not tell us why we should commit forces there and should have a strategy element that says that's necessary, much less a good idea?

Rex Brynen
04-17-2010, 09:22 PM
I won't even argue that we will not go to Somalia.. I will state that we should not simply because there is no important US interest at stake that cannot be better sorted in other ways.

Agreed. In fact, it is rather hard to think of a US interest that wouldn't be undermined by any substantial, extended deployment to Somalia in the present context.

Colin Robinson
04-17-2010, 11:13 PM
Well, the European Union Training Mission is training 2,000 Somalis in northern Uganda, and experts drawn from the EU are deploying to Somalia to assess SFA related conditions.

But is clan engagement the best way to do this? One Tribe At A Time? Light footprint tribal militias instead of badly executed clones of Western armies?

Just my thoughts.

William F. Owen
04-18-2010, 04:11 AM
Perhaps someone could explain the political imperative to send US troops to Somalia?
Basically, what is the Policy? Please do not tell me the Strategy.

M-A Lagrange
04-18-2010, 08:16 AM
Could that have something to see with the Uganda Oil exports?
But I do not see the US securing Somalia to allow China to build a large port in Kenya for their Sudan oil exports...
Or may be with weapon conrol in the area. If it's the case, invading Erithera could be easier. Ethiopia would love it!

By the way, the UN supported Somali government does control at the best 2 or 3 streets around the presidential palace and not even the Moga port or airport...
Sound crazy, can be funny!:cool:

Brian Scott
04-18-2010, 07:35 PM
why not tell us why we should commit forces there and should have a strategy element that says that's necessary, much less a good idea?

I guess I left that wide open.
I do not think we should commit forces there. Absolutely not. I just anticipate that invading Somalia will be the next knee-jerk reaction war that we start in order to help a sitting President get reelected.

C'mon, we are spending about $60 Million per month on patrolling the waters off Somalia with a Nuclear Carrier Task Force, using $30 Million aircraft to look for barefoot teenagers in skiffs high on khat. Meanwhile, piracy is on the rise.

Our CIA is spending about $40 Million per month (WAG) buying the loyalties of a dozen militias, some of whom are then using that money to fight each other.

Folks expect it to be a "cakewalk," and for the locals to shower our troops with ... do they have chocolates or flowers there ?

The only solution to the high seas piracy is taking action ashore, and we don't trust any locals with that responsibility. A year ago, President Farole of Puntland (who we do not even officially recognize) said he could stamp out piracy with $8 Million in aid, and I believe him. We declined to give it to him, even after he groveled in a Congressional hearing.

But what I find most persuasive are the accusations coming out of State and DOD that AQAP has relocated there. The militias that the CIA is paying are having no impact: Islamic radical groups continue to consolidate power.

It will start as a training mission, with advisors only. Remember Southeast Asia ?
I am pretty sure that there are indigenous leaders in Somaliland and Puntland who could fight both of these fights more effectively than we ever could, but our foreign policy is not so flexible as to be able to accord respect to any Somali leaders.
.

Ken White
04-18-2010, 08:53 PM
...I just anticipate that invading Somalia will be the next knee-jerk reaction war that we start in order to help a sitting President get reelected.I didn't say we wouldn't do that... :rolleyes:
C'mon, we are spending about $60 Million...looking for barefoot teenagers in skiffs high on khat. Meanwhile, piracy is on the rise.In reverse order; of course it is -- we've done little or nothing seriously aimed at stopping it. We just throw money at things, whether it make any sense or not. Better than getting Congress involved -- then it REALLY gets screwed up. That's a serious comment and that factor does drive some trains.

As for the high tech, high value 'efforts' -- when all one has is a hammer...
Our CIA is spending about $40 Million per month (WAG) buying the loyalties of a dozen militias, some of whom are then using that money to fight each other.Yeah. I remember Laos. Quite well; way, way too well, in fact...:wry:
Folks expect it to be a "cakewalk," and for the locals to shower our troops with ... do they have chocolates or flowers there ?Getting serious for a second, I suppose there are some in high places who believe that -- they're idiots (unfortunately, the inmates are sometimes in charge) but most people know better. The broader American polity has a lot more collective sense than do its elected Pols.
The only solution to the high seas piracy is taking action ashore, and we don't trust any locals with that responsibility.Don't trust any locals or have other, mostly US domestic and political reasons to want to be there? That aspect regrettably drives too much of our interventionist stupidity -- and the majority of it has been stupid; either stupid from the outset or stupidly executed. We do not have the right tools to preclude such idiocy or to properly execute those that cannot be avoided. That not because we're stupid or incapable but because a venal Congress (or, more correctly, a succession of them) will not provide those tools lest it erode their power. They're willing to provide Hammers but not fine cabinetmaking tools...

The problem with Somalia is its location, not AQ et.al. Anyplace with ability to significantly constrict maritime flow through Bab-el-Mandeb is going to attract and hold our attention. Probably should. I just wish we'd do it right.

Still,you're correct that the answer lies ashore -- and we're both correct in saying that any US military intervention there would be probably the least good thing we could do.
I am pretty sure that there are indigenous leaders in Somaliland and Puntland who could fight both of these fights more effectively than we ever could, but our foreign policy is not so flexible as to be able to accord respect to any Somali leaders.With that I agree. :cool:

I could argue that we effectively have no foreign policy -- but you've hit our 'problem' smack on the head:

"We" (the broader US political and governing crowd) believe that only "we" can do things correctly. Since that "we" is insanely fragmented on methods and goals, it is terribly incoherent. That leads to, as I said elsewhere about another area, discombobulated, almost incoherent actions that effectively result in a mess and: "I'm inclined to fault us ... admitting that the locals are, as usual, manipulating us. We're egotistical, arrogant, rich -- and dumb -- really bad combination." :mad:

Dayuhan
04-20-2010, 11:20 AM
I just anticipate that invading Somalia will be the next knee-jerk reaction war that we start in order to help a sitting President get reelected.

How would starting a war in Somalia help to get the sitting President reelected?


I guess I left that wide open.
Folks expect it to be a "cakewalk," and for the locals to shower our troops with ... do they have chocolates or flowers there ?

And which "folks" are expecting this? It's not something I've heard.


A year ago, President Farole of Puntland (who we do not even officially recognize) said he could stamp out piracy with $8 Million in aid, and I believe him.

Why do you believe him? Did he say exactly how he could stamp out piracy with $8 million? Where the money would be spent? It seems an unlikely proposition at best.



It will start as a training mission, with advisors only. Remember Southeast Asia ?

I am pretty sure that there are indigenous leaders in Somaliland and Puntland who could fight both of these fights more effectively than we ever could, but our foreign policy is not so flexible as to be able to accord respect to any Somali leaders.


Now I'm confused. If we aren't able to trust or respect any Somali leaders, who exactly will we be training and advising? If you want us to work with indigenous leaders, isn't training and advising what we should be doing?

OfTheTroops
04-20-2010, 05:45 PM
Wouldn't a knee-jerk into Mexico be more probable? Remember the Maine!

Brian Scott
04-22-2010, 01:43 AM
.
Dayuhan,
just as the strike on Iraq in December 1998 was calculated to distract Americans from the Impeachment proceedings,
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched to bolster partisan reelection prospects the next year. This sort of thing happens so often that it has its own special name: "rally around the flag."
The main lesson Bush II learned from Bush I was to not let a war end too quickly.

Bush 41 suckered Saddam into invading Kuwait (through his emissary April Glaspie) just so he could launch a war to kick him out again. The War wrapped up in early 1991. By November 1992, American voters had forgotten who had led them to victory only 18 months earlier, because the "no new taxes" pledge had been broken.

Except for the Civil War and the two "World Wars," every American war appears to have been started as a way to help a President get elected to a second term. I could be wrong, though.

When the USA is at war, voters like to keep the sitting President in office until the war is over. This too has a name: "don't change horses in mid-stream."

.

What folks think an invasion of Somalia would be a cakewalk ? Mostly folks who never served in the military, but are now deciding the foreign policy of the USA. The Obama team in the Pentagon is no better grounded in military reality than the previous Administration. A big reason for that is because President Obama retained so many of the poor performers from the Bush Team.

.

President Farole spelled out a lot in his Congressional testimony in January 2009. In April 2009 he issued a "100 Days' Report" explaining where he wanted to take to country
http://somalitalkradio.com/2009/april/farole_100_days.pdf.
He was also involved in some confidential negotiations with the CIA, DOD, State and USAID, to which I'm certainly not privy. An associate of mine is a former Minister in the government of President Muse, and he confirmed to me reports in the news site GaroweOnline.com that President Farole laid out a very specific plan for how to spend that money, promising specific results.
A dollar goes a lot further in Puntland than in Luzon.

.

I'm new here. I don't know what you know about the US police action in sunny Southeast Asia 40-some years ago. But that started as a training mission, advisors only, and American soldiers were training indigenous forces that the Americans mostly held in contempt. American officers mostly had no respect for Vietnamese officers or civilian leaders. I never went. I sat that one out on the Green Ramp at Pope AFB. But most of my NCO's and officers served over there.

.

This thread is not going at all like I wanted. I am 100% certain that our Sneaky Petes on the ground in Somalia are gonna get a lot of backup from conventional ground forces, and I'm pretty sure that will happen by this Summer. I was hoping this community could help them from screwing that up. I've hung out with some of the geniuses who designed our two current wars, and the crowd on this website is smarter than those OSD policy wonks. Not as pretentious, either. But y'all seem to think that good ideas can only be found in a white paper or an article in a professional journal. You don't give yourselves enough credit.

I think that our entree to Iraq and our escalation in Afghanistan were a huge error of judgement.
The signal image of the Iraq invasion was a US platoon putting a US flag on the statue of Saddam, capping the "Thunder Run" into Baghdad. After weeks of declaring that we were coming to liberate and help the Iraqi people, we claimed with that photo op to have conquered and defeated them. So much for "hearts and minds."
Likewise, in Operation Enduring Freedom II, we lost track of who attacked us in 2001, and for reasons I cannot understand, turned our guns on the civilian population. The Taliban is a lot like the French Resistance in WW II, fighting against foreign occupation by the Nazis.
The smartest US military leader in Afghanistan today is the USMC Brigadier who led the fight for Marjah. BG Nicholson says that Taliban is not our enemy, and we shouldn't be fighting them, because they ARE the local population.
In my opinion, we fought and won OEF I in 2002/03; abandoned that fight from 2003 to about 2007; and ramped up OEF II in 2007/08. I say that they are two separate campaigns: the first was to get revenge against al-Qaeda, and the second to punish the Afghani people because we didn't satisfy our bloodlust in the first campaign.
If our coming misadventure into Somalia is as badly led as the two current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this blog community doesn't lift a finger to prevent that, well, why even blog here ? Certainly not simply to recount how well you performed when you were knee deep in hand grenade pins.
.

Dayuhan
04-22-2010, 02:19 AM
.
When the USA is at war, voters like to keep the sitting President in office until the war is over.


Possibly you've not noticed, but we're already at war, so there's hardly a need to start another. At this point entry into Somalia (or almost anywhere else) would be more a liability than an asset in any rational political calculation.

All of the examples you cite are open to multiple interpretations, and those you provide are neither self-evident nor adequately supported.


.
Bush 41 suckered Saddam into invading Kuwait (through his emissary April Glaspie)


I'm sorry, but this is completely wrong, and in fact complete BS. If you read the full text of Glaspie's comment's, instead of the tiny out-of-context slice that is widely circulated on the Internet, you'll see why. You may need to expand your sources just a wee bit.

Brian Scott
04-22-2010, 02:46 AM
.
Sir,

Americans are pretty darn comfortable with, even ignoring, the current wars. In 2004, we were a nation at war. In 2010, its the Army and USMC that are at war.
Wouldn't it be great if starting wars that end up making us less secure actually was a liability ?

I do not know the "full text of Glaspie's comments" to which you refer. I assume that you refer to some post facto rationalization she wrote. Her comments directly to President Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti in July 1990 were made orally, IIRC.
.

Dayuhan
04-22-2010, 03:12 AM
I see no evidence that Americans are ignoring the current war (in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq I would no longer classify as war), and any American capable of ignoring it would be equally capable of ignoring an incursion into Somalia, which would necessarily be of a much smaller scale.

As far as I know two transcripts of the Glaspie/Hussein interview have emerged, both from Iraqi sources. They are similar but of course authenticity cannot be verified. There is nothing in either, or in any other account of the interviews that I've seen, that could be interpreted as communicating US approval for an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Glaspie did say, as any diplomat would have to, that the US has no opinion on the substance of the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, a comment that has been pulled out of context and misinterpreted. She also made it quite clear that the US wanted the dispute solved peacefully, and even suggested possible mediators.

While it's clear that the US underestimated both the seriousness and the imminence of the Iraqi plan to invade, it's also clear that the plan was in place well before the Glaspie-Hussein meetings, and that there was no US encouragement of the invasion. Whether a more aggressive statement from Glaspie would have convinced Hussein not to invade is of course unknown and unknowable; I'm inclined to think he'd have done it anyway.

Conspiracy theorists have made a great deal of it, but they've long been able to make something of nothing and pitch the output coherently enough to convince those predisposed to believe.

Dayuhan
04-22-2010, 03:38 AM
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What folks think an invasion of Somalia would be a cakewalk ? Mostly folks who never served in the military, but are now deciding the foreign policy of the USA.


Who is saying that an invasion of Somaila would be a cakewalk, and where are they saying it? Specifically, please. A citation would help.


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GaroweOnline.com that President Farole laid out a very specific plan for how to spend that money, promising specific results.
A dollar goes a lot further in Puntland than in Luzon.


It's difficult to comment on - or believe in - a plan one hasn't seen. A dollar goes a fair way on Luzon, but probably farther in Puntland. However, it's difficult to see how a meagre 8 million in aid money is going to convince people to abandon an enterprise that brings in many more millions every year, or how the Puntland government intends to compel the same people to abandon that business. They have to either convince or compel, and $8m seems unlikely to do either.


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I'm new here. I don't know what you know about the US police action in sunny Southeast Asia 40-some years ago.


Not everything, but enough.


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This thread is not going at all like I wanted. I am 100% certain that our Sneaky Petes on the ground in Somalia are gonna get a lot of backup from conventional ground forces, and I'm pretty sure that will happen by this Summer.


If you want the community here to discuss that prediction seriously, you might want to support it a bit more thoroughly. Why exactly do you think this is going to happen?


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I was hoping this community could help them from screwing that up....
If our coming misadventure into Somalia is as badly led as the two current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this blog community doesn't lift a finger to prevent that, well, why even blog here ?


I could lift my full complement of fingers and toes several times over and have not one iota of influence over whatever the US intends or does not intend to do in Somalia. I personally don't think there's any intention to commit ground forces to Somalia in the near future, but if it happens we'll discuss it here, and those of us here will benefit from the discussion, and the US Government at large will either be unaware of the discussion or will ignore it. I suspect that you overestimate our influence by several orders of magnitude.

Ken White
04-22-2010, 04:08 AM
...just as the strike on Iraq in December 1998 was calculated to distract Americans from the Impeachment proceedings.Possibly but far from proven.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched to bolster partisan reelection prospects the next year.Doubtful. An alternative is that Bush did it because it needed to be done as his four predecessors had failed miserably at responding anywhere near properly to a series of probes and pricks originating in the ME. Add the fact that he was not at the time convinced he would be reelected and the fact that, were he not, his successor would likely not respond forcefully.
The main lesson Bush II learned from Bush I was to not let a war end too quickly.Probably true.
Bush 41 suckered Saddam into invading Kuwait (through his emissary April Glaspie) just so he could launch a war to kick him out again.Speculation, possible but not probable -- Hanlon's razor; When Glaspie told Saddam that the US wasn't concerned with his claim to Kuwait, she almost certainly did not understand the implications of taarof in her response.
Except for the Civil War and the two "World Wars," every American war appears to have been started as a way to help a President get elected to a second term. I could be wrong, though.Some truth in that. Domestic politics always play a large part. More true is the fact that almost all our wars including those you omit began because someone thought the Americans wouldn't fight over an issue.
...the US police action in sunny Southeast Asia 40-some years ago. But that started as a training mission, advisors only, and American soldiers were training indigenous forces that the Americans mostly held in contempt.The brothers Kennedy wanted a 'Small War' to prove their toughness and, more importantly by far, to boost the economy. It got outa hand. Hanlon's razor again...
American officers mostly had no respect for Vietnamese officers or civilian leaders.Depends on who you talk to and what Viet Namese units or elements they worked with. When they were there also palys a huge part in that assessment.
This thread is not going at all like I wanted. I am 100% certain that our Sneaky Petes on the ground in Somalia are gonna get a lot of backup from conventional ground forces, and I'm pretty sure that will happen by this Summer.Don't you hate it when others don't see your wisdom -- I know I do. :wry:

You may be 100% sure, obviously others are less certain.
I was hoping this community could help them from screwing that up.Other than saying we should not go, we should not send advisers and the idea of going is dumb, what else would you have this community do? Taking your tack; saying 'It's gonna happen' would put it on autopilot -- saying it would be really dumb would seem to me to do more to keep that screwup from occurring.
the crowd on this website is smarter than those OSD policy wonks.Having worked with some of their predecessors, I'm inclined to think you're probably correct in that.
But y'all seem to think that good ideas can only be found in a white paper or an article in a professional journal. You don't give yourselves enough credit.Can't speak for others but most white papers I've read have been froth and all the professional journals spout the party line -- they'll publish a little racy material on occasion to establish some street cred but they immediately hop back into hull defilade. My observation in several years here is that you aren't correct in that assessment.
I think that our entree to Iraq and our escalation in Afghanistan were abortions.I agree to an extent on Iraq but can excuse it a bit as the force did what it was (poorly) trained to do, civilian policy makers excluded. It was a good strategic ploy, poorly executed, initially a cluster but pulled out of the trash can by some hard work by the troops. I agree on Afghanistan, OEF 2 should have been it.
I say that they are two separate campaigns: the first was to get revenge against al-Qaeda, and the second to punish the Afghani people because we didn't satisfy our bloodlust in the first campaign.I don't believe that is so. I don't think bloodlust had a thing to do with it. I know a bunch of folks that have been there, from Privates to Colonels. No bloodlust in any of them -- nor, I believe was there any in the civilian heirarchy. A stupid idea that we could make things better, yeah -- bloodlust, no.

As a minor aside, they are Afghans, the Afghani is the currency.
If our coming misadventure into Somalia is as badly led as the two current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this blog community doesn't lift a finger to prevent that, well, why even blog here ? Certainly not simply to recount how well you performed when you were knee deep in hand grenade pins.Badly led is a relative term. The leadership of the forces in both countries the past few years represented the society from which they came. They were products of an institution that is largely shaped by those societal inputs and the next most significant factor, the Congress. So I'd suggest your argument may be with that society and / or that Congress.

Been my observation that any command, any unit has good and bad elements. Some do good, some do not and that varies over time as commanders and units change. I've seen or heard nothing that makes that factor in the current wars a bit different from performance in WW II, Korea or Viet Nam.

As to this community not deigning to "lift a finger to prevent that..." It seems to me that the bulk of those who've bothered to post on this thread do not share your apparent absolute certainty about a commitment to Somalia; most seem to think it's possible but not probable. Thus, there's little need -- in my view, at least -- to raise a finger. Unless saying it would be dumber than dirt to do that at all is not raising the finger high enough...:D

Re: your question, why even Blog here. That's up to those who write Blog Posts that get on the Blog. This is a Discussion Board not the Blog, though it is an adjunct of the Blog. In both cases, participation is voluntary. No one is forced to Blog or comment here. Dissenting views are welcome as are out of the old box comments but there is no guarantee that everyone posting a response will agree with one who posits an idea or thoughts

For those that do post here, we ask that they be civil and not egregiously insult other poster. Attack the argument, not the person(s) who do not agree with you. Your snarky comment about hand grenade pins was unnecessary and does not aid your position -- though I've seen Green Ramp when there were beaucoup pins and grenades about...;)

Dayuhan
04-22-2010, 04:27 AM
When Glaspie told Saddam that the US wasn't concerned with his claim to Kuwait, she almost certainly did not understand the implications of taarof in her response.Some truth in that.

Possible but I think perhaps overestimated. The discussions were not over Iraq's claim to Kuwait but over more specific issues: the allegations that Kuwait was drilling into Iraqi oil reserves and the refusal of Kuwait and the UAE, among others, to write off loans made to Iraq during the Iraq/Iran war.

William F. Owen
04-22-2010, 05:02 AM
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The Taliban is a lot like the French Resistance in WW II, fighting against foreign occupation by the Nazis.
More accurately they are Nothing like the French Resistance. They are a lot like the Nazis.

The smartest US military leader in Afghanistan today is the USMC Brigadier who led the fight for Marjah. BG Nicholson says that Taliban is not our enemy, and we shouldn't be fighting them, because they ARE the local population.

So if the US left, the country would be at peace and Al Qeda would not come back? So what if the Taliban are the local population? If they use armed force that get armed force used against them.

Ken White
04-22-2010, 05:09 AM
Possible but I think perhaps overestimated.of Taarof. The tradition is understood by few westerners and is endemic throughout the old Persian Empire territory. Iraq was a part of several Persian Empires far longer than the 400 or so years it was in the Ottoman empire.

The rules are arcane and very elaborate, the relative military, political or social ranks of the parties involved and the character of the issue at hand can make a difference.

Basically, if you tell me you want my watch, I'm supposed to immediately take it off my wrist and offer it to you. Whether you take it or not depends on the resulting conversation; you may really want it, may not and actually want something else -- or you may just want me in your debt, in which case you do not take the watch -- but we both know I owe you. there are subtle changes based on our relative positions and we would both be very aware of that. Rules for two equals as opposed to a senior / less senior relationship differ.

I'm fairly sure that Glaspie's "you two need to work this out" was taken in a Taarof spirit and thus Saddam did not expect the US response he actually got. I know he had plans to do the attack regardless and I do not suggest the Bush (or Glaspie) in any way encouraged him. I very much believe he used Taarof rules and took the Glaspie comment in a way that was not intended

Dayuhan
04-22-2010, 06:00 AM
Both Taarof and diplomacy have their own arcane and circuitous rules and conventions, and where they overlap all kinds of confusions are possible. Saddam was no novice, though, and I suspect he knew what was going on. For example, this comment in diplomatese:


I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions.

Translates, in plain English, to "what the %$#@ do you think you're doing"... and I don't think anyone who had been in the game as long as Saddam had would fail to realize that.

I've always thouight the Americans read the initial military buildup wrong, and thought that Saddam was bluffing, waving his stick as an adjunct to the rather acrimonious discussion of the war-era loans. If you look later in the transcript, using this version from the NYT:

http://dvmx.com/glaspie.html

You find this exchange:


GLASPIE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they have achieved anything.

HUSSEIN: On this subject, we agreed with President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with us, aided by President Mubarak's efforts. He just telephoned me a short while ago to say the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.

GLASPIE: Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: A protocol meeting will be held in Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.

GLASPIE: May I ask you when you expect Sheik Saad to come to Baghdad?

HUSSEIN: I suppose it would be on Saturday or Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak's visits have always been a good omen.

GLASPIE: This is good news. Congratulations.

In this Saddam is clearly suggesting that negotiations had been organized and would be taking place, though in retrospect it is clear that there was never any intention to negotiate, which makes that exchange a clear effort at deception. The US might easily be faulted for falling for that deception, but if they were assuming from the start that a bluff was on, it could easily have fallen into the category of seeing what they expected to see.

Ken White
04-22-2010, 01:30 PM
Both Taarof and diplomacy have their own arcane and circuitous rules and conventions, and where they overlap all kinds of confusions are possible...but if they were assuming from the start that a bluff was on, it could easily have fallen into the category of seeing what they expected to see.Misapprehensions on both sides due to both Diplomatese and Taarof are more than probable (which is why both create many problems...). No question, as I said, that Saddam was going in regardless. We'll likely never know what was in Glaspie's or Saddam's mind. Pretty much irrelevant in any event.

What I did learn in the ME is that little is as it seems, far more so than is the case in Asia and still more than in the west which is not blameless in that regard.

Entropy
04-22-2010, 03:57 PM
When did Saddam need a green light for anything? I'm surprised - maybe I shouldn't be - that this Glaspie angle still has legs after all these years. We know that Saddam intended to take Kuwait from the beginning and we know he implemented a successful deception campaign to fool regional leadership and US policymakers, despite the clear warnings that were given (http://cryptome.org/allen-wiik.htm).

Ken White
04-22-2010, 04:58 PM
of Taarof in the ME keeps it going there and thus worldwide by those not disposed to love America or Americans as an excuse / apologia and a way to espouse a conspiracy theory or two and blame the US for gross malfeasance (or dumb incompetence...).

I thought that was obvious but apparently not...:o

Dayuhan
04-23-2010, 02:16 AM
I'm surprised - maybe I shouldn't be - that this Glaspie angle still has legs after all these years.

If your default approach is to assume a conspiracy, and to assume that all things are directed by and manipulated by the US (or the Jews, the Vatican, the Templars, the Trilateral Commission, the Illuminati, etc), the Glaspie charges make perfect sense, and are in fact necessary for the sustenance of the illusion. We know, after all that as a mere Arab Saddam could only respond to manipulation or provocation from the West, and could not possibly initiate action of his own accord in pursuit of his own goals...

...yeah, right.

Another curious bit...


The main lesson Bush II learned from Bush I was to not let a war end too quickly.

That suggests rather strongly that the war was artificially extended for domestic political purposes, a conclusion not supported by any evidence I'm aware of. Seems to me that Bush II was all too eager to have the war end quickly, even to the extent of prematurely declaring it over (who can forget "mission accomplished"). The war was sustained not because anyone in the US didn't want it to end, but because the other parties failed to cooperate... funny how that happens sometimes.

SWJ Blog
05-10-2010, 11:40 PM
Winning Hearts and Minds in Kenya? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/winning-hearts-and-minds/)

Entry Excerpt:

"Winning Hearts and Minds?" Understanding the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224) - Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, Feinstein International Center.


This case study on Kenya, researched and written by Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, is the first in a series of publications presenting the findings of a two-year FIC comparative study on the relationship between aid and security in northeastern Kenya and in five provinces of Afghanistan. The overall study has focused in particular on trying to determine the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives, including by helping to "win hearts and minds" of local populations. (For more information and links to publications related to the study see the Aid and Security project page (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958).)
Since the late 1990's Kenya's large and thinly populated northeastern region bordering Somalia has become a focus for US government efforts in Africa to counter terrorism, mitigate violent extremism and promote stability and governance. This paper examines the effectiveness of one aspect of those efforts, namely the aid projects implemented by US Civil Affairs teams deployed from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Garissa and Wajir districts in North Eastern province, and Lamu district in Coast province. The paper argues that these activities were useful at a tactical level in terms of facilitating the US military's entry into regions of potential concern, and in helping them to acquire local knowledge and connections. However, it also highlights some of the limitations at a strategic level of using foreign aid as a tool for countering terrorism or insurgencies and promoting stability and security. For example, the research found that these small-scale and scattered projects did little to win hearts and minds or change perceptions of the US in the communities where the projects were implemented. There was also little evidence that the projects had contributed to improved security by addressing some of the perceived underlying causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the region.Read the entire report at the Feinstein International Center (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224).



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/winning-hearts-and-minds/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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