PDA

View Full Version : Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations



rborum
07-24-2009, 09:42 PM
Too Soft, Too Hard, or "Just Right"?

Ralph Peters certainly has a way with words. Many SWJ-ers have probably read his recent indictment (http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/peters.php) of US operations in Afghanistan (and elsewhere). He argues that we are walking on eggshells - tactically and strategically - because we worry too much about offending the adversary's religion and killing civilians and that our moral weakness is causing us to lose the war. Peters says:


As our enemies’ view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties—hostile, civilian and our own—continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.


Peters' analysis - consistent with arguments he has made a number of times before - raises two questions about which I would welcome the thoughtful input and feedback of SWCouncil Members (and other readers).

The first question is to what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)

On one hand we have the view that high-power kinetic activity is necessary to "win" and that winning trumps all other mission objectives. The "butcher's bill" philosophy is that once a nation has decided to go to war, it should "go hard or go home." Peters' observes, for example, that:


The paradox is that our humane approach to warfare results in unnecessary bloodshed. Had we been ruthless in the use of our overwhelming power in the early days of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the ultimate human toll—on all sides—would have been far lower. In warfare of every kind, there is an immutable law: If you are unwilling to pay the butcher’s bill up front, you will pay it with compound interest in the end. Iraq was not hard; we made it so.

On the other hand, we have the view that civilian casualties actually weaken our strategic objectives and amplify battlespace friction. Some have argued (http://www.civicworldwide.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=250&Itemid=136)that the rising number of civil causalities in Afghanistan is a major cause of the declining Afghan support for the ISAF. Andrew Exum (http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/07/killing-civilians.html), a member of GEN McChrystal's advisory team, argues that humanitarian considerations notwithstanding, civilians casualties impede the military mission - at least in Afghanistan:


The reason we do not drop compounds in Afghanistan has more to do with operational considerations than it does with some high-minded moral code or the laws of land warfare. Opponents of COIN doctrine who claim the U.S. Army has gone "soft" would best remember that. If dropping compounds helped us to advance the ball down the field in terms of mission success, we might be more tolerant of civilian casualties and "collateral damage." But the evidence suggests that killing civilians and destroying their property actually harms the mission more than it helps.


The second question is to what extent - and how - our enemy's religion, in this case Islam, is or should be a focus of our war effort (kinetic and nonkinetic)?


One point of view is that Islam itself poses an ideological, existential threat (even if its adherents do not) to democracy and to freedom. The arguments - such as thse made in Robert Spencer's book "stealth Jihad" suggest that core Islamic texts and teachings mandate subjugation of and warfare against non-Muslims (unbelievers), and advocate for Sharia law be globally imposed as the only legitimate source of social and political authority. Accordingly, they argue, there is no such thing as a “moderate Muslim.”

Proponents of this position acknowledge than many Muslims – particularly American Muslims – do not adhere to those tenets in practice, but maintain that these anti-Democratic principles are precisely what the doctrine commands. They see no distinction between the separatist, anti-Democratic, violence-inciting doctrine of those labeled as “violent extremists” or Islamists and the core doctrine of Islam. They believe that their arguments cannot be openly discussed without their being accused of bigotry and labeled as Islamophobes, and that their position is easily dismissed by most of the American public because others are uninformed about Islamic doctrine. Peters, for example, states starkly:



The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to. They insist, publicly, that their goal is our destruction (or, in their mildest moods, our conversion) in their god’s name. We contort ourselves to insist that their religious rhetoric is all a sham, that they are merely cynics exploiting the superstitions of the masses. Setting aside the point that a devout believer can behave cynically in his mundane actions, our phony, one-dimensional analysis of al-Qaeda and its ilk has precious little to do with the nature of our enemies —which we are desperate to deny—and everything to do with us.

A contrasting view - as both Presidents Bush and Obama have asserted - is that the U.S. is not (and presumably should not be) at war with Islam or with Muslims generally. The explanation for this position is that Islam is a religion, but that Islamism (or some other variant on this ideological term), refers not to a religion, but to a radical political ideology driven by a strong anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment. The argument is that militant leaders – particularly since the late 1980s – have been able to use Islam (the religion) very effectively as a platform or vehicle to transport and deliver this extremist ideology. As evidence of this distinction, they point to the fact that most adherents of the religion do not subscribe to the violent ideology, and that many proponents of the militant ideology are not particularly religious” or pious.

I appreciate you considering these questions and look forward to learning from your insights and responses. This is the first substantive thread I have started here, so please forgive any clumsiness in protocol - and let me know if this question/discussion would be better placed elsewhere.

IntelTrooper
07-24-2009, 10:06 PM
My attention span is too short so I kind of just scanned your post. We are walking on eggshells. We do try to respect the unique Afghan incarnation of Islam. These are not bad things. We could go in like a juggernaut and piss more people off. It's been tried in the past, though, and didn't work out too well for those conducting the operation.

davidbfpo
07-24-2009, 10:12 PM
I am sure your questions have appeared before, albeit within different threads, mainly in the Afghan context recently on civilian casualties and the campaign. Religion I'm not so sure, as Inteltrooper says 'eggshells'. Have you checked through RFI and used the advanced search option?

davidbfpo

rborum
07-25-2009, 03:29 AM
IntelTrooper-Sorry for the long post. I get your point. May I take the inquiry just another step? What I am trying to better understand is why there is this divergence of opinion on a basic tenet of strategy. You point out that going in like a juggernaut has been tried before and didn't work for the counterinsurgents. Yet, there are still those saying we should, and that the reason we are losing and are destined to lose is because we didn't/don't. Do people disagree on this history (would they say the juggernaut strategy DID work for the counterinsurgent)? Or is this difference of opinion simply driven by personal worldviews and ideologies of the observers?

rborum
07-25-2009, 03:40 AM
davidbfpo - I will search further. Perhaps my search strategy is deficient. As I noted in my reply to IntelTrooper, I am trying to understand the source of the divergence of opinion. The issue where religion/Islam fits in all this is more often talked around than addressed directly. People assert positions, but I have not seen much discussion of why/whether the role of Islam matters to strategy or operations, nor have I seen thoughtful attempts to develop a rapproachment or resolve the debate. That's why I was bringing the issue to the real expert on this forum. Thanks for engaging.

IntelTrooper
07-25-2009, 03:50 AM
Yet, there are still those saying we should, and that the reason we are losing and are destined to lose is because we didn't/don't. Do people disagree on this history (would they say the juggernaut strategy DID work for the counterinsurgent)? Or is this difference of opinion simply driven by personal worldviews and ideologies of the observers?
Sure, people may say that. I would venture that the people crying for less cultural/religious sensitivity and avoidance of civilian casualties have spent little to no time in the country and don't have responsibility for troops or the success of any effort there.

I sincerely doubt that anyone would argue that the particular operation I have in mind was a success, since I have the Soviets in mind.

Tom Odom
07-25-2009, 05:26 AM
Too Soft, Too Hard, or "Just Right"?

Ralph Peters certainly has a way with words. Many SWJ-ers have probably read his recent indictment (http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/peters.php) of US operations in Afghanistan (and elsewhere). He argues that we are walking on eggshells - tactically and strategically - because we worry too much about offending the adversary's religion and killing civilians and that our moral weakness is causing us to lose the war. Peters says:


As our enemies’ view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties—hostile, civilian and our own—continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.


Peters' analysis - consistent with arguments he has made a number of times before - raises two questions about which I would welcome the thoughtful input and feedback of SWCouncil Members (and other readers)...

I appreciate you considering these questions and look forward to learning from your insights and responses. This is the first substantive thread I have started here, so please forgive any clumsiness in protocol - and let me know if this question/discussion would be better placed elsewhere.

First of all we have discussed these things in great detail, a fact that does not necessarily lessen the value of looking at them again.

But I will also say that Ralph Peter's use of language is not the same as analysis. He is given to seeking base instinct over thought and he writes and speaks to that effect.

Tom

Ron Humphrey
07-25-2009, 05:39 AM
Threads where this type of thing has come up so the search will help.

That said it may be a simple as recognizing the preponderance of evidence that Dead people tend not to fight back thus throughout history that seems to have been a favorite option.

As Intel indicated though things are somewhat more complicated in societies where death of one's family/Tribe/guest requires a blood for blood action against the offender due to not only cultural but generally historic practice. That and the many other factors such as need to be able to focus on finding bad guys vs having to look everywhere since you never know who might have died let alone who might feel they need to make it right.

Thus "eggshells"

William F. Owen
07-25-2009, 09:25 AM
So Andrew Exum says...

The reason we do not drop compounds in Afghanistan has more to do with operational considerations than it does with some high-minded moral code or the laws of land warfare. Opponents of COIN doctrine who claim the U.S. Army has gone "soft" would best remember that. If dropping compounds helped us to advance the ball down the field in terms of mission success, we might be more tolerant of civilian casualties and "collateral damage." But the evidence suggests that killing civilians and destroying their property actually harms the mission more than it helps.

Any student of Clausewitz (about the best COIN advice there is) will tell you that the problems associated with killing civilians are the political consequences of such actions. It's little to do with operational conduct, other than why would you kill people you don't need to kill?

The negative consequence maybe the loss of political support within the target population. That is only negative if their support is integral to your strategy. The population can only share your political aim. They can't share your military aim. So talking about "operational considerations" in that context is simplistic and possibly misleading.

Dropping the right compounds and killing the right people, will generally benefit your operational considerations! It's Core functions! It's how you defeat any enemy in any environment.

Now, I am not A COIN OPPONENTS I'm an opponent of the "Nouveau COIN" which somehow wants to focus on tangential issues and to celebrate form over function., instead of the Elephant in the corner (carrying the AKM) - as far as I can tell "Nouveau COIN" is completely devoid of any reference to Core Functions.

rborum
07-25-2009, 03:54 PM
William - you noted "The population can only share your political aim. They can't share your military aim." That's a useful point, though distinguishing among them, I suppose can be a bit tricky.

I understand the arguments for cultural sensitivity and against promiscuous killing. I am trying to understand, though, whether - and if so how - the "utility of force" (as Clausewitz puts it) is variable not only across conflicts, but also across different COIN campaigns as well.

Stephen Biddle insightfully (I think) observes that the character of Maoist-type "wars of the people" may differ from conflicts where the counterinsurgency is driven by a third party nation. Rupert Smith describes many post-Cold War conflicts as "Wars amongst the people."

Is the reason for disagreement about the proper role/degree/utility of force in Afghanistan, for example, because of differences in how we view the nature of the conflict? Differences in how we view the nature of the adversary? Differences in how we view our role as counterinsurgents? Some combination of the above?

rborum
07-25-2009, 04:00 PM
First of all we have discussed these things in great detail, a fact that does not necessarily lessen the value of looking at them again.

But I will also say that Ralph Peter's use of language is not the same as analysis. He is given to seeking base instinct over thought and he writes and speaks to that effect.

Tom

Tom - Thanks for indulging me. I'm not necessarily looking to rehash old arguments, but rather to understand the source and reasons - among thoughtful and experienced people - for wide divergence of opinion on the nature/role/degree/utility of force in our current conflicts. I understand and concur that eloquence does not substitute for rigorous analysis. -RB

William F. Owen
07-25-2009, 06:05 PM
William - you noted "The population can only share your political aim. They can't share your military aim." That's a useful point, though distinguishing among them, I suppose can be a bit tricky.
The political aim is the outcome as in who will be in authority over them. The French didn't worry too much about the 1,000's of French civilians killed by the Allies, because it meant a French Government.

I understand the arguments for cultural sensitivity and against promiscuous killing. I am trying to understand, though, whether - and if so how - the "utility of force" (as Clausewitz puts it) is variable not only across conflicts, but also across different COIN campaigns as well.
What's the difference between conflicts and COIN? None as far as I can tell.

Stephen Biddle insightfully (I think) observes that the character of Maoist-type "wars of the people" may differ from conflicts where the counterinsurgency is driven by a third party nation. Rupert Smith describes many post-Cold War conflicts as "Wars amongst the people."
Much as I like him personally, Rupert Smith is not on my reading list. Again, forget the "war amongst the people." That's just a condition, which may or may not be present. It's nothing to do with the end state.

Is the reason for disagreement about the proper role/degree/utility of force in Afghanistan, for example, because of differences in how we view the nature of the conflict? Differences in how we view the nature of the adversary? Differences in how we view our role as counterinsurgents? Some combination of the above?
In my opinion the disagreements are because we don't agree on how to apply military force to gain a political objective.

rborum
07-25-2009, 07:50 PM
What's the difference between conflicts and COIN? None as far as I can tell.

My point here was not really to argue that conflicts are different than counterinsurgencies, but to clarify my interest in learning what factors would make the "utility of force" vary in different COIN campaigns (as well as perhaps in different non-COIN conflicts).


In my opinion the disagreements are because we don't agree on how to apply military force to gain a political objective.

That's insightful, I think. So if I understand your point - there is consensus that the political objective in any COIN campaign is to establish the control by the counterinsurgent's government (CG). But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.

While other believe that the only/best way to establish CG control is to use force selectively so as not to risk alienating the population. CG control - in this model - is a function of political legitimacy.

Does that fairly characterize the positions or am I off base?

Ken White
07-25-2009, 08:30 PM
My point here was not really to argue that conflicts are different than counterinsurgencies, but to clarify my interest in learning what factors would make the "utility of force" vary in different COIN campaigns (as well as perhaps in different non-COIN conflicts).Wilf can of course answer for himself but to me, the simplistic answer -- which is not at all simple -- is 'the adversary' and, of course, one's goal. Either of those can be a thread unto themselves. Goes back to Bob's World's analogy; Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people.
there is consensus that the political objective in any COIN campaign is to establish the control by the counterinsurgent's government (CG).That is possibly true, perhaps even probably so but it is not universal. In Afghanistan for example, some of the Talibs want that, others do not, the AQ and foreign fighters there mostly are just desirous of fighting Americans and / or Westerners. Few wars are simple.
But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.I think very few military people would espouse that view other than in the very rare circumstances where that might be a viable option. Kenya in the mid 50s come close, the Boer Wars are perhaps a better example. Both would be proscribed due to popular opinion today. Thus, there are likely few occasions where anyone could or would seriously consider that approach.
While other believe that the only/best way to establish CG control is to use force selectively so as not to risk alienating the population. CG control - in this model - is a function of political legitimacy...Does that fairly characterize the positions or am I off base?That view is correct, I think, I'd only throw in the caveat that CG control may not be an issue.

I do not believe the 'devastating force' option is subscribed to by many. The issue is the degree of force that constitutes 'minimal' or 'selectively' and the determining factor on that for most is own casualties. Some believe those must be accepted for the greater good or 'accomplishing the mission.' Others believe they should be minimized for own good or there will be public clamor leading tor no troops to complete the mission. The issue becomes far more significant when the forces involved are third parties -- e.g. the US and UK as well as other in either Afghanistan or Iraq (or Viet Nam, Malaya, Algeria...). Third party nation citizens can and will strongly question the merit of a 'softly' approach if it increases their casualties. They tend, mostly, to be less concerned with other casualties.

rborum
07-25-2009, 10:37 PM
Ken - That's helpful. Thanks. I don't disagree with your analogy point:

"Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people."

I had not been thinking of the COIN problem in quite that way. That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.

The notion that the "adversary" is what would determine nature/degree/utility of force raises some potentially interesting questions for COIN Ops because insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.

Thinking how this relates to the motivations or tolerance for civilian (non-US) casualties, I was really struck by some comments Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).

Thanks again for your insights.

jmm99
07-25-2009, 10:53 PM
"Afghanistan ROE Change (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7639)" (9 pages) for a discussion of the military, political and legal issues in the specific context of Astan civilian casualties - good case study.

PS: I don't see where or how religious considerations enter into our (US) developmemt of ROE/RUFs, and other military law issues.

With respect to AQ, their merger of religion and law has had an impact on their view of non-combatant casualties. See, 2008 SWJ, "The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf)" - abstract:


Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps.

Good article, which I don't think I've discussed at any length.

Ken White
07-26-2009, 12:11 AM
That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.It focuses on the adversary -- he or it should be the determinant on the degree, type and methodology of force -- if any. Force is simply a tool, nothing more. Like any tool it must be used sensibly or you'll damage something you didn't mean to harm. Adversaries do not always require force for containment. In fact, I believe most do not; prompt and early response without force or with very minimal force can stop many such internal conflicts before they escalate to major confrontations.

The point is, once you commit any military elements to the effort, you are committing to use force or will be perceived as being prepared to do so; sometimes the same thing in the minds of many.
... insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.It should not since frequently the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents. Most people know this, a few tend to forget it when angry or driven by inane directives or orders from people in faraway places.
...Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).I'm dubious -- and that supposition BTW long precedes their study. It is true when force is applied indiscriminately but that rarely occurs. What more often occurs is that force is applied selectively and innocents are caught in the fight. Most people understand the difference and rarely go flocking to either side after such an event. They really just want both sides to go away and leave them alone.

Either way, unmeant or unnecessary killings and woundings will drive some -- but not most or even many -- to the insurgents and of those that go, other than a small number for whom the episode was particularly searing, most will drift away soon as time does its healing magic and the tough life of an insurgent takes its toll.

There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

rborum
07-26-2009, 03:15 AM
Force is simply a tool, nothing more.

Understood. I concur.


the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents.

Right. That's what I understand to be the conventional wisdom.


that supposition BTW long precedes their study.

You're right, of course. It is always of interest to me, however, to see data - even with all it's caveats and limitations - that addresses (whether findings support or refute) the suppositions that guide our policies.


There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

Concur. The notion of "matrix" never even blipped on my radar. Though as a social/behavioral scientist, I quite often bump up against the "matrix mentality" among my engineering colleagues. I know there is no cookie cutter approach to the strategy of kinetic force in COIN, but I hope there are dynamic factors that are (or could be) systematically considered in strategic planning and ongoing assessments of the mission. There is no matrix, but it seems - though perhaps this is naive on my part - that it might be useful to have some method to guide that dimension of decisionmaking. I'm not asking for one here, just wondering aloud about what the foundations or contours of such a method or decision framework might look like.

Thanks again.

slapout9
07-26-2009, 03:30 AM
So Randy here is my question. You have heard all the theories are they right wrong? What would you change about them?

Ken White
07-26-2009, 04:00 AM
That's what I understand to be the conventional wisdom.It's a little more than that, it's pretty much a hard learned fact. It has also been written by some erstwhile insurgents and allied creatures.
You're right, of course. It is always of interest to me, however, to see data - even with all it's caveats and limitations - that addresses (whether findings support or refute) the suppositions that guide our policies.They can be beneficial. Even if they point in the wrong direction and that is discovered through a bad experience, something is learned.
I know there is no cookie cutter approach to the strategy of kinetic force in COIN...it seems...that it might be useful to have some method to guide that dimension of decisionmaking. I'm not asking for one here, just wondering aloud about what the foundations or contours of such a method or decision framework might look like.The Army has tried for many years with varying success to do that. The intent was to come up with a methodology or set of best practices that would allow future operations to be better planned and executed. I'm sure you've checked or have access to all the ARI and RAND etc. studies from the 1950-1980 period wherein that was attempted. The effort seemed to have dropped off by the time I retired in '95. Good luck.

William F. Owen
07-26-2009, 04:51 AM
That's insightful, I think.
Thanks, but that's Clausewitz! :wry:


But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.
The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

Ron Humphrey
07-26-2009, 06:03 AM
Thanks, but that's Clausewitz! :wry:


The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

Some Nouveau COIN guys just might, that said It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims.

Then again I could be mistaken. Wouldn't be the first time nor likely to be the last

Ken White
07-26-2009, 06:31 AM
"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.

Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...

rborum
07-26-2009, 12:29 PM
So Randy here is my question. You have heard all the theories are they right wrong? What would you change about them?

slapout9 - There are many SWC folks who have thought about these problems much longer and much better, I'm sure, than I have. It is a privilege to learn from them and I appreciate the gracious engagement.

I began here with two questions - most of our discussion has focused on/around the first: To what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)

I posed the question - which I do understand has been the topic of prior threads and discussion - because I was a bit puzzled and struggling to understand why some analysts seemed to be pushing back against McChrystal's ROE shift to make protecting the population (and minimizing civilian casualties), not increasing militant body count to be the mission's prime directive and metric of success.

Ralph Peters is not the only one to bitch-slap US COIN doctrine and strategy as being too soft and "effete," and its military leaders as being hand-wringers, driven by political correctness. It is a recurringly strident voice, but I can't get a good read on whether it is coming from a very small but shrill fringe minority, or whether this is significant, substantive debate.

My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.

1. I generally agree with GEN McChrystal's recent imperatives (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090831_art020.pdf) for success in Afghanistan, and I specifically believe that intelligence-driven kinetic selectivity and concerted efforts to minimize civilian casualties (particularly by a third-party counterinsurgent) should be primary, rather than tertiary, considerations, that serve our longer-term strategic and operational interests in a COIN campaign.

2. Insurgencies are wars. They are different, to be sure, from conventional military battles, but they are wars nonetheless. Insurgent forces kill people, often brutally, and force is often necessary to extinguish their brutality. But targeting and kinetic force deployment should be parts of a strategy, just as information gathering and engendering population security should be part of a strategy.

3. COIN objectives are multidimensional and dynamic. In any operational environment we need to be simultaneously thinking about both adversary and population - The focus is a continuous variable, not a dichotomous one. The nature, degree and scope of that focus is fluid, changing over time, and it both affects and is affected by our intervention. That is, what we do (and where we focus) now, will affect what we do (and where we focus) a month from now. And how we handle adversary/militant engagement will affect the population, just as the way we engage the population will affect the adversary/militants.

4. In the current era of "effects-based operations," we should be explicitly anticipating, measuring, and weighing the moral (in the Clausewitizian sense) costs and benefits of our kinetic strategies and collateral/civilian casualties as part of operational planning.

5. We should better understand the impact of civilian casualties on mission objectives and population perceptions to guide our strategic planning, not just to assume causality. For example, it may be that the negative effects (declining population support for ISAF), arise primarily from how the attacks are portrayed (the "narrative"), rather than whether and how often they occur and to whom they are directed. Whether a particular tactic or kinetic operation does or does not provoke antipathy toward the counterinsurgent might be productively viewed as "effects-based" questions, and we might do well to understand them. The fog of war may be inevitable, but that should not mean that we do not seek clarity.

Or not......

davidbfpo
07-26-2009, 12:34 PM
Randy,

Check this thread where the issues are shown: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2299

Note comments are by on the ground SWC members.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-26-2009, 12:44 PM
Randy,

Two immediate comments on your questions.

The urban rioting in the USA, for examples Detroit '67 & Watts, LA '65 and much later in LA '92, all had IMHO a significant impact and some even speculated they were signs of an insurgency. How would those local communities reacted if the nation-state's response had been mainly foriegn troops, say the RCMP in Detroit or Mexico in LA? Would people like Ralph Peters be so "hardline" on the supposed 'effete' action taken? I doubt it.

David Kilcullen in his talks (see previous threads) makes this point, cannot immediately find the thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7592&highlight=chicago

You have a burglary / crime problem in your community, the local (US) police cannot cope and reinforcements are called for - imagine - the Iraqi police arrive. A police that follows different rules, operating styles - maybe less minimum use of force - and cannot speak English. My variation would be to have the Saudi religious police arrive on your campus and impose their rules.

My point is if you'd not do 'X' at home, why do it abroad?

A current, similar thread on these questions is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776

Michael C
07-26-2009, 01:28 PM
Mr. Borum,

As for your first question, about whether we should avoid civilian casualties, in my experience avoiding civilian casualties was always the best option. We would be having great success in our AO as a battalion, and as soon as we had civilian casualties, across the AO intelligence reporting would plummet and our Key Leader Engagements would grind to halts and we would gain nothing. This was Afghanistan and the death of one innocent seemed roughly proportional to the death of several dozen "bad guys."

I don't know enough about Islam to answer my thoughts on your questions about whether Islam is engaged through non-kinetic means. I know it isn't really in Afghanistan, just respected and allowed to be. Whether or not we should address Islam more explicitly I cannot speak to because I do not know enough.



The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.


As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

slapout9
07-26-2009, 01:48 PM
My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.



Randy,I think you will find your opinion has a lot of value and merit here.;)

William F. Owen
07-26-2009, 02:32 PM
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.
For practical examples, read history or look at current operational analysis. You are spoilt for choice.

Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.

... and let's differentiate between the general and the particular. Given a specific circumstance, we can discuss specific guidance, but do you really want advice as to how to find the bad guys in 100 x 100km patch of jungle, and/or 10,000 person town somewhere in the Middle East? I think not!

I'm sure FM3-24 can provide guidance.... or maybe not.

Ron Humphrey
07-26-2009, 06:39 PM
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.




"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.


It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims

I was rather clumsily trying to make the point that in any given conflict which seeks as its end state to leave a standing, stable form of political governance upon whom the requirement will be placed to maintain said end state; it seems only wise that we recognize the fact that human beings and thus societies as a whole absolutely do not exist sans some sort of standards (be they Moral/judicious/social-norms, etc). This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.


I would probably liken this to when CVC was giving feedback to several officers trying to develop strategy in relation to possible enemy actions.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
(well aware it ain't perfect but I'll try to look it up to get the wording more accurately, still pretty sure the point remains valid)

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.[/QUOTE]

Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?




Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...
Could not be more in agreement.

I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use

Michael C
07-26-2009, 07:36 PM
Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.


It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.

I am no longer in the warzone. When I was, trust me we shot at the enemy when we could get PID. Trust me, we designed missions to catch the enemy and kill him. We also did constant hearts and minds. What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN? If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.

As for a scenario, take the Helmand Province and the current Marine operation there. What is the better option then avoiding civilian casualties as they are right now? Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?

Ken White
07-26-2009, 07:48 PM
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.My "You're kidding" was because I suspect you know the answer to the question. It is a fair question. What follows is not snark or smart aleck comment but my best if overlong answer to your question:

[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...:(

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...

As for TTP, METT-TC applies ( * As it does for the asterisked item above) . For distinguishing between categories of persons on the battle field, my experience was that Cat 1, Cat 3 and Cat 4 were easy while for Cat 2, the majority of people to be seen on any FID battlefield, it was difficult if not impossible to diffrentiate. Thus one had to watch them closely, even suspiciously -- all of them -- but also avoid killing them if possible. That possibility must be weighed in your mind at each encounter and the decision must be made based, again, on METT-TC. I suspect you knew and know that, all I can do is affirm it.

As you also know, that unfortunately allows the Cat 2A person to have a chance at becoming a Cat 1 person. This is a disconcerting, even disheartening to some, aspect. It should not be, it just is part of the job, like rain or snow or heat or an 80 pound Ruck.

IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality. FWIW, I suspect Wilf knows as I do that you have a difficult job and are searching for answers. He's likely to provide you a better answer than I did. If he does, I doubt either answer will make a hard job one bit easier, you have to feel your way through it. You'll make mistakes, you'll do some things very well, some days will just be bad days. We all did or do those things and experienced the bad days. Goes with the job. There is no easy way. That's why it's a tough job and a lot of people don't want to do it.

Ken White
07-26-2009, 08:03 PM
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted. Still, leaving that aside and going to this:
This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.Agreed.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.Agreed.
Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?They should not be but often are because the egos of the planners cannot visualize that the affected States may not be like nor want to be like said Planners.
I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to useAgreed -- that was sort my point with the added fillip that anyone who expects Soldiers to do morality or social norms might not like what they get. So by all means, we should decide what we're building before we start pounding nails -- we should also be willing in addition to the hammer(s) to use a drill and some screws to avoid excessive pounding that might weaken parts of the structure... :wry:

rborum
07-26-2009, 08:30 PM
Just read through Wilf's extensive "more killing" thread from a couple of weeks ago. Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.

Got some additional insights, I think, on my "civilian casualties" question .. albeit from an angle different from whence the question was posed.

Reading through this and a few other related threads, the discussions seem typically to begin as a polemic: winning population support OR killing militants.

Then those debating on each side clarify that they understand BOTH dimensions are necessary.

The lingering and ensuing debates - which I think are related to the controversy over whether "war is war" - seem to huddle around a couple of themes. They are certainly not epiphanies, but I share them for your consideration:

Roles: There seems to be agreement that militants need to be killed/suppressed AND that infrastructure should be built with an engaged population - but some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.

Sequencing: In the thread, Wilf (I think I am recalling correctly) summarized the options as - and I am paraphrasing here - (A) Kill the militants, and then secure the hearts and minds of the population ; or (B) Engage the hearts and minds of the population, and leverage that to defeat the insurgency. I'm sure I lost some nuance here, particularly in what causes what. Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.

Strategic Interoperability: Regardless of how one draws the arrows between the kinetic and nonkinetic they each transactively affect the other. Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary. Who we kill, and how and when we kill them (including collateral casualties) does seem to affect how the non-militant population responds - both in relation to the counterinsurgent and in how they embrace their own sovereign identity. Conversely, how the counterinsurgent treats the population, the extent of their contact, and how they instrumentally influence their social infrastructure seems to affect not only their degree of cooperation/engagement/ industriousness, but also the extent and quality of the HUMINT acquired from them that improves the counterinsurgent's ability to selectively find and kill the real bad guys.

I might wish to add explicitly, a dimension that is embedded in each of these: Outcome/effects. People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency. If we assume - and I'm sure this is also debatable - that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law, then both winning population support and killing militants are both just means to an end. Neither are the ultimate objective.

Do any of these make sense? Are there critical contrasting dimensions I missed? Do you wish I would stop writing long posts?

Ken White
07-26-2009, 08:39 PM
It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.Very perceptive. Do you think it does offer such solutions?

If so, and not to be snarky in the least, your questions here and your Blog do not indicate that you've found any answers that really help. I say that only to point out that ALL doctrine is murky and must be applied with large doses of common sense and in accordance with an important acronym I will not repeat... :wry: ...In the end, it's down to bunch of men trying to feel their way in a lonely place with limited information and a population that may be hostile. Been done before.

We who urge caution have watched Armies make doctrinal mistakes by tilting too far to one side or the other; we're simply urging balance -- and, with respect to FID, pointing out there is no golden bullet and every war, every affected populace is different. There is no one size fits all doctrinal answer, never has been, never will be. That really is a good thing, it gives you the latitude to do it in a way that works for you.
What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN?There aren't any and I don't think anyone here has suggested not doing "population centric COIN." What many including me have said is do not think that will dispel all your problems and do not lose sight of the fact you are involved in one war at one place in one time -- the Army, as an institution, must work on a far wider scale of possibilities (and if you decide to stay in, so will you...).
If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.My understanding is that we have a number and they're available on BCKS and AKO. Both Armies tried to disregard it simply because it is messy and debilitating, it grinds down Armies. Unfortunately, Armies do not get to pick who they fight, the Politicians do that, much as Armies hate that and try (usually unsuccessfully) to divert the Pols...
Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?You don't and no one here to my knowledge has suggested otherwise. What has been said is that you will get some but not enough intel, that some will prove invalid due to local jealousies, disinformation and a host of reasons and it is not likely to get any better. It's a tough and dirty job with no pat solutions.

What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.

Ken White
07-26-2009, 09:12 PM
Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.Why, thank you...
some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.In reverse order, true on the sub-optimal. Most acknowledge that the armed forces must do both early on in a FID environment, the issue is how robust and how quickly should the efforts of other USG agencies be committed -- that is a wild card, situation dependent. Some of us contend that the armed forces will never do that well and that security must be insured before major projects can begin therefor security should be the initial emphasis, transitioning as the situation develops.
Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.Again an issue of degree, I think. In FID, one has to do both, the difficulty is that many tend to predicate who does what to who on earlier wars and therein lies the fallacy. Every war, every population is different.
Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary.Therein lie the problem that leads to the quibbles above -- most people want neat, tidy solutions; an 'open the box and break out the strategy' sort of solution. There aren't any. Each war is a separate, non-repeating function and must have differing approaches. A part of our problem is that our ego will not allow us to learn from history and we insist on blundering in, then rapidly researching 'the history' to find solution that worked. What worked then and there may not work here and now. Our penchant for quick fixes is intruded upon by reality -- and different clocks and calendars...
People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency.You cannot win against an insurgent, all you can obtain is an acceptable outcome. There is no victory, no defeat (other than at a tactical level). Those words should be avoided in discussion and pronouncements.
If we assume...that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law...True as stated. I'd only suggest that the outcome you suggest (and with which many agree) is in some cases not probable enough to merit its acceptance as a goal (e.g. Afghanistan); that the 'rule of law' must be appreciative of the locale (i.e. neither Iraq nor Afghanistan will ever meet western norms even at a low level) and that "sustainable governance" is very much beholder -- and local calendar -- dependent.

Expecting ideal solutions in any FID (or COIN) efforts is unwise.

rborum
07-26-2009, 10:38 PM
Thank you Ken.

goesh
07-26-2009, 10:56 PM
".... other than why would you kill people you don't need to kill? " (W.F. Owen)

That pretty much sums it up in my opinion. I think discipline in the ranks is as good as it has ever been historically, maybe better in some respects because of our logistics. Morale can be boosted much faster than before and Officers and senior NCOs are better able to spot bad stress developing in the ranks. My uncle was in N. Africa WW2 and he told me when his outfit was close to civlians, they didn't get to eat much chocolate because they gave most of it to kids. This kind of conduct is not isolated and rare, its pretty much the norm and part of national character - ROE be damned, it has little to do with the number of civilans killed in these modern times of ours.

Brandon Friedman
07-26-2009, 10:57 PM
[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...:(

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...


IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality.

Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground. Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing), I have some questions for you:

Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?

What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed? Are they considered the "enemy?" What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out? And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”

There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.

This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry. But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.

I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:


What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.

Ron Humphrey
07-26-2009, 11:08 PM
For some reason double posted so please del

Ron Humphrey
07-26-2009, 11:25 PM
and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted.

Very sorry for that I shall do my best to more clearly state that which I so enthusiastically attempted early this morn:o

It's about balance.

No govt. will see much peace as long as it is based and led by purely political goals without regard to the human quality amongst its populous that is those things which culturally/ religiously/ or socially are held in high esteem.

Yes you can have a govt that couldn't careless but the point is as long as thats the case there will always be major undercurrents against which they must prepare.

In the same vein no govt can or will find itself at peace if it is purely and wholly directed by a given set of values (take your pick) to the exclusion of any others which may not precisely conform to the govt expectations.

Values may not necessarily define a person but they will always have an effect on how they interact with those in authority over them.

Probably just made it worse but I have at least attempted not to:wry:

(Note: Regarding times of peace the implied long term peace in the above should be seen to refer to multiple decades to centuries and beyond. )

Ron Humphrey
07-27-2009, 01:50 AM
It seems prudent to add a little bit more

Accepting that the statements made are rather absolutist they still seem fairly correct.

It is probably important however to follow with this-

The reality of human variances in manner/thought/ and deed means just about no society ever exists in complete peace but it does seem at least from my studies that those which experience the least amount of violent conflict are those which focus on ensuring that to the greatest extent possible the majority of groups which make up their populous at least feel as though they can live as they believe without having to fight governmental processes to do so.

Ken White
07-27-2009, 01:58 AM
is going to be inaccurate, out of date and will fail to do justice to the nuances.

Any characterization of people in groupings or categories is going to be inaccurate, able to be taken out of context and will fail to do justice to the nuances.

Combine those two thoughts. then go forth...
Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground.I don't underestimate the situation in Afghanistan, the categorizations above may state grossly simplified categories to make a point in a semi light hearted vein they are incapable of underestimating or overestimating or even estimating anything. Aside from having a long ago but still educational peacetime tour in the area, recall I even went out of my way earlier to point out my son had two tours there, a Grandson in law also has two and I know folks there now as well as others who've been. I'm not pulling this stuff out of my back pocket. I have more respect for everyone on this board than that.
Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing),You didn't misread but you seemingly took a simplistic set of points for a scholarly dissertation on population centric operations. Aside from people in general being infinitely more complex than that -- you cannot categorize them other than in generalities. With a tour in the ME and pretty broad travel there, I'm aware of the nuances and the fact that nothing in the ME -- or South Asia -- is as it seems. The national sport in that area is haggling, they're masters at it and no westerner will ever match them -- foolish to try.
I have some questions for you:

Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?Assuming 'you' is GPF acting on intel provided in all cases, in order: No; That's one reason why you don't; No (willingly provided, sold or were coerced or just taken? No way to ever be sure even with a brilliant 'Terp and half an MI Det along); Take the info with a grain of salt and check it out while compensating them in some way thus keeping a possible information source; No; You can't.

Once more, as I said way above: "IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary."
What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed?Did you punish or report the offending US elements and make sure the local tribe knew of the punishment? You must hav known about it if you know that's why they're shooting at you. If not you were wrong and are therefor responsible for your unit being fired upon and you have to make a judgment call. Enjoy.
Are they considered the "enemy?"First thing you need to do is purge the word enemy from your COIN lexicon, that's an MCO construct and is woefully un-population centric; in FID, there is no enemy, there are good guys and bad guys, a few of each. There are a great many in between who will go with the flow. The trick is to kill the bad guys, not kill the good guys and kill as few of the floaters as possible. Bad guys shoot at you; good guys and floaters do not, thus they're easy to tell apart.
What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out?Do not step on or drive over them. Tell the point Squad to start probing, the second and the guns to overwatch and the third to standby to go anywhere and do anything, if you have a 'Terp, tell him to ask them to come out and guide you in to save work, call it in -- wait a minute,why are you asking me this; you should know all that stuff...
And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”Take it with a grain -- no, a truckload -- of salt, write it down, make sure your Company intel guru gets it (you do have one, right?) and logs it, report it, keep it in mind and don't act on it unless you get corroboration unless it poses immediate danger to US troops, then act -- but sensibly and with good judgment.
There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.That may be why I said try to kill anyone who shoots at you and try to avoid killing all the others. Are we not saying the same thing in a different way? The 'at least' BTW is a good touch, inaccurate harassing fire need not be answered -- should not be, really (showing disdain is good); probing fire at night must be answered cautiously if at all and absolutely not with an automatic weapon. As an aside on that count, re: the local who fired on you and may not have lacking an insult by us -- shoot back. In that part of the world to not do so is to appear weak and that's more dangerous than being weak. You should also never relax -- most irregular forces will avoid contact with an obviously tough and ready element and wait for easier pickings if they can.
This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry.That's because all the things learned the hard way before you were born were purged from the system. Speak to several Chiefs of staff Army about that -- I sure tried to tell a bunch of their senior minions and two of them it was a dumb idea. The US Army was doing population centric operations all over the world for a good many years; some us got to be pretty good at it -- good enough to realize we learned something new every day and that no one had all the answers. :wry:
But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.We can disagree on that. You cannot provide security unless you look for fights in the right places and the intel is good enough to tell you that -- and I'll bet big buck few if any GPF units have set up ambushes on the known infiltration / exfiltration trails due to risk aversion. The population will have no confidence in you as long as they get night visitors and you are not the visitor.

Killing people who are trying to kill you is never wrong; killing anyone not actively trying to do that is almost never right. If you re-read my post, you'll note that's what I said. I also pointed out that was true in ANY war, population centric or not, something you also seem to have missed.

We have tons of intel, perhaps too much, the problem is in the distribution and utility; the bottom line is that at Bn level and below, you'll almost never have what you can consider adequate Intel. Fact of life. Nor will there ever be enough good interpreters -- that also is a fact of life. I hear your complaints, heard others voice them in 1950, 52, 61, 65, 66, 68, 70 in more than five countries all while doing the Grunt population centric shtick. I even picked up a first edition Galula from the SWC Bookstore in '64. not a great book IMO. Truly sorry to hear things haven't gotten better -- but sadly not at all surprised. Goes with the territory, I'm afraid.
I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--Found out the hard way on these boards it's better to read a comment and if it raises red flag, leave it and come back and read it again later. Then go answer it point by point to insure you didn't miss or elide an important item. All of us react to adverse stimuli and then tend to miss the thrust for a tree or two.
but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:Yes, we can, we can probably agree on a number of other things as well. We're all products of our experiences and we're all better for sharing an learning. Closer to 80 than I'd like and I'm still learning new stuff every day...

William F. Owen
07-27-2009, 04:41 AM
The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.
It's not quite that simple, but you are mostly right. Now I can speak for my fellow "heretics" - of which Ken and Gian seem the most high profile - but my beef with "Nouveau COIN" is it's wooly social and cultural agendas, which somehow seeks to deflect the military away from being a military instrument. What does "POP-centric" mean anyway?


We also did constant hearts and minds. What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN?
Hearts and Minds is not a definable set of actions. Nor is POP-centric COIN. They are bumper stickers. How you gather intelligence from within a population is a very well worn path. As concerns laying the ground work, obviously not harming the population is pretty crucial, but after that I'd rather spend money on informers, than I would building a school a the village probably doesn't need.


If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.
I can only speak for the UK, but they don't do manuals. There was never any official manuals for Operations in Northern Ireland. None! There was/is massive corporate knowledge found in the minds of various retired officers. yes, someone needs to write it all down. - and yes, something that were/are clearly best practice may not be being done.


As for a scenario, take the Helmand Province and the current Marine operation there. What is the better option then avoiding civilian casualties as they are right now? Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?
Avoiding civilian casualties is the only option and should always have been. To me it's amazing that it wasn't! You don't seek the support of the population. You seek not to do it harm, and to help it, when it asks. "We need food." "My daughter is ill." "My house needs repair." Help, when you can. Medical teams should visit villages, when possible, and when safe.

That is a whole world of difference from giving them things they never had, and never asked for, as part of trying to make them like you. Strangers giving gifts are most likely despised by Pashtuns.

Surferbeetle
07-27-2009, 05:31 AM
Most civilians want nothing to do with war and instead are focused upon raising a family and living life. Effective FID/SFA/COIN recognizes this simplified generalization by sheltering civilians from violence, enabling just governance & associated services, minimizing the generation of additional troublemakers, and hunting down existing troublemakers.

All of us who step onto a battlefield in a professional capacity have forfeited the ‘right’ to reasonably expect to be able to return home. Soldiering is not about trying to avoid spilling your coffee while at a quiet 9 to 5 desk job. For my nickel, Ken has clearly and succinctly shared a way of thinking, with his proposed eight categories, which is worthy of consideration by those who soldier. Much of it jives with my experience that soldiers must accurately anticipate the wide range of behaviors which people exhibit when under stress and have a viable plan of action to capitalize upon those behaviors.

There have been some comments about ‘drawing down’ on our own on other threads. Officers have the additional responsibility of imposing order upon the daily continuum, which ranges from apparently peaceful to very dangerous and during which all participants may be either ready, tired, mad, scared, sick, certain or uncertain or some mix of all of them. We all get paid for our ability to be extremely violent when required however ‘drawing down’ on our own is failure of leadership plain and simple. There are other solutions, you just have to be tough enough to follow through on them.

The question of how to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield is a daily question and it is my observation that effective leadership is central to resolving it. We do what we are trained to do in tough situations. Teaching our troops what we have learned upon the battlefield before we deploy is important because they will try and use what they have been taught (battle tested or not). Part of the answer is clearly articulated ROE that all have been trained upon. Part of it is learning everything that we can about our AO. Part of it is effective unit training and part of it is participating in CTC exercises. Once I am down range part of it may involve putting that wild-eyed kid in my vehicle, and taking him along with me when the situation allows so that I can keep an eye on him while modeling some good behavior. Part of it is asking myself ‘what would my family think of what I am currently doing?’ For me it means recognizing that anything is possible, relying upon my training and experience, recognizing that I don’t have all the answers, and doing what I must do as the situation unfolds.

rborum
07-27-2009, 01:34 PM
You don't seek the support of the population. You seek not to do it harm, and to help it, when it asks. "We need food." "My daughter is ill." "My house needs repair." Help, when you can. Medical teams should visit villages, when possible, and when safe.

Very interesting point, and a much more nuanced view than is typically captured within the polarized "Kill the enemy" vs. "Support the population" debate.

marct
07-27-2009, 02:21 PM
Hi Wilf,


It's not quite that simple, but you are mostly right. Now I can speak for my fellow "heretics" - of which Ken and Gian seem the most high profile - but my beef with "Nouveau COIN" is it's wooly social and cultural agendas, which somehow seeks to deflect the military away from being a military instrument. What does "POP-centric" mean anyway?

Sometimes, you and I are much closer than would appear ;). I have a real problem with the wooly socio-cultural agendas as well, both because they are driven by poor social science and because they stem from a particular cultural position.

What does "pop-centric" mean? Depends on who is talking.... If I am being snarky, then I would say that it is a feel-good piece of rhetoric - along the lines of "Support the Troops, not the War" - used by people who are pathetically psychologically driven to have people "like" them (and vote them back into office!). I really don't think that anyone here holds that position :D.

On a more serious note, it should, IMHO, mean a series of tactics (both carrot and stick) designed to wean the populace away from a particular set of behaviours that have been politically defined as "unacceptable". The problem with this, of course, is that these behaviours are defined by politicians....


Avoiding civilian casualties is the only option and should always have been. To me it's amazing that it wasn't!

Here I have to partly disagree with you, Wilf, although I do agree with the "should". Historically, warfare is about the prcise application of force designed to break the enemy's will to resist and sometimes that means the complete destruction of the enemy's society (Carthage, Assyria, NAZI Germany, Koisan, etc.). One way to do this is to annihilate the enemy; it is a strategy that I find abhorent, but it is one that has been used over and over again and, sometimes, it "works". It is also a very "pop-centric" strategy, at least in the sense that there will be no insurgency if there is no population left. As a stratgey, it is only viable IFF the culture / society that chooses it supports it (it also tends to backfire in that societies that use it tend to have it used on them, but that's another post...).

Tom Odom
07-27-2009, 03:28 PM
What does "pop-centric" mean? Depends on who is talking.... If I am being snarky, then I would say that it is a feel-good piece of rhetoric - along the lines of "Support the Troops, not the War" - used by people who are pathetically psychologically driven to have people "like" them (and vote them back into office!). I really don't think that anyone here holds that position

Hardly feel good and it is useful. Using it here, daily.


On a more serious note, it should, IMHO, mean a series of tactics (both carrot and stick) designed to wean the populace away from a particular set of behaviours that have been politically defined as "unacceptable". The problem with this, of course, is that these behaviours are defined by politicians....

It is already and has been used in that fashion to a degree. That is part and parcel of seeking support of the population.


One way to do this is to annihilate the enemy; it is a strategy that I find abhorent, but it is one that has been used over and over again and, sometimes, it "works". It is also a very "pop-centric" strategy, at least in the sense that there will be no insurgency if there is no population left.

That is a strategy of targeting the population; works sometimes, sometimes it backfires as it did in Rwanda.

Then again to be snarky, I am just someone doing it, rather than using cute phrases like Noveau COIN to label something in simplistic terms.

Tom

William F. Owen
07-28-2009, 05:01 AM
Sometimes, you and I are much closer than would appear ;). I have a real problem with the wooly socio-cultural agendas as well, both because they are driven by poor social science and because they stem from a particular cultural position.
Was never aware that we were not that close! :D


Here I have to partly disagree with you, Wilf, although I do agree with the "should". Historically, warfare is about the prcise application of force designed to break the enemy's will to resist and sometimes that means the complete destruction of the enemy's society (Carthage, Assyria, NAZI Germany, Koisan, etc.).
I was/am only talking about Irregular warfare, where the population concerned is either your own or the one which you want to defer to the Governments authority. Not killing them and taking a lot of care not to, is probably wise. It's a political choice, not a moral one.
When it comes to the population of an actual, or de-facto enemy state, you should do everything to break the enemies will. You should not target civilians, but you should not let civilians prevent you from destroying legitimate targets.

marct
07-28-2009, 10:22 PM
Then again to be snarky, I am just someone doing it, rather than using cute phrases like Noveau COIN to label something in simplistic terms.

One of the reasons we love ya, Tom :D!

Just out of interest, given the current changes over there, how is it being conceived of now? Are Coalition forces moving out of more direct contact with the populace? All I'm getting is media spin stuff.

Cheers,

Marc

marct
07-28-2009, 10:36 PM
Hi Wilf,


I was/am only talking about Irregular warfare, where the population concerned is either your own or the one which you want to defer to the Governments authority. Not killing them and taking a lot of care not to, is probably wise. It's a political choice, not a moral one.
When it comes to the population of an actual, or de-facto enemy state, you should do everything to break the enemies will. You should not target civilians, but you should not let civilians prevent you from destroying legitimate targets.

Just out of interest, where would you draw the zone (or line) between an insurgency and a de facto enemy "state"? I suspect that we would both agree that Hezbollah is a de facto state, but what about, say, Deseret (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Mormon_War), the 2nd Riel Rebellion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North-West_Rebellion) or the Bar Kochba Revolt (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bar_Kokhba%27s_revolt)?

William F. Owen
07-29-2009, 05:18 AM
Just out of interest, where would you draw the zone (or line) between an insurgency and a de facto enemy "state"? I suspect that we would both agree that Hezbollah is a de facto state, but what about, say, Deseret (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Mormon_War), the 2nd Riel Rebellion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North-West_Rebellion) or the Bar Kochba Revolt (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bar_Kokhba%27s_revolt)?

Well obvioulsy I draw the line with regard to the political objective my military action is seeking to achieve!! :D

...but seriously. That's basically it, and it depends whose view is used. The question is really, how do you want to influence the civilians, in regard to the political outcome? Do you even care? Is it your people rejecting your authority or some one else's people rejecting your authority?

In Iraq, and A'Stan, you/we want them to support a Government acceptable to the wider international community, so the aim is to destroy any other entity capable of presenting a political alternative - which is why I don't care what the populations wants. It's irrelevant to the outcome we/you are forcing upon them.

Tom Odom
07-29-2009, 10:51 AM
One of the reasons we love ya, Tom :D!

Just out of interest, given the current changes over there, how is it being conceived of now? Are Coalition forces moving out of more direct contact with the populace? All I'm getting is media spin stuff.

Cheers,

Marc

Marc,

I will have to demur on that. Besides it would be wrong to interject practice into discussions of theory, n'est pas? :cool:

Tom

marct
07-29-2009, 06:17 PM
I will have to demur on that. Besides it would be wrong to interject practice into discussions of theory, n'est pas? :cool:

No worries, Tom. I'll ask again if we ever get to sit down over a couple of pints :D. As for interjecting practice into theory, it should always be there - otherwise we theoreticians end up looking like even bigger idiots than we already are :eek::D.

Cheers,

Marc