Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[Bob's World]

(Moved here from another thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7935&page=2 as the author has brought IMHO a new theme for discussion)

A couple points to consider that may help:

First, GWOT is not COIN; and really isn't GWOT either. We know that, yet struggle to devise a smarter approach the new range of security challenges we face today.

When President Bush left office he stated as his one metric of success that "we have not been attacked." Two comments on that:
1. A very poor metric of success, as one's opponents have their own agenda and schedules for how they pursue their ends, and if no attacks are necessary, why launch them and risk messing with success? So I don't credit it much as to our larger effectiveness in the GWOT. It may or may not mean our efforts are working.
2. HOWEVER: It does clearly indicate that the Commander in Chief saw the primary purpose of the GWOT campaign under his watch as one of Deterring such terrorist attacks from happening again.
This got me thinking, as I have been discussing Deterrence with a broader conventional community and attempting to highlight some of the new challenges in deterrence today than back in the good old days when all we had to worry about was MAD.

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

Many diverse organizations will employ terrorism as a tactic, and all require unique approaches. Weak(er) states; failed states (like Somalia); Quasi-state actors (like Hezbollah), non-state actors (like AQ), nationalist insurgencies (LET, MILF, etc etc etc), and the odd dissident individual (such as Mr. McVeigh). To lump them by their tacics leads to a dangerous conflation that contributes to approaches that are as likely to provoke some groups as they are to deter others. But by focusing on deterrence it forces one to break down the problem set and conduct a more sophisticated analysis and to better balance potential cost/benefit analysis by each category and major actors within those categories to various courses of deterrence or engagement that we plan to set out upon.

It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

Now, before the "kill them all" gang gets too fired up, yes, any good deterrence campaign incorporates a balanced and appropriate LOO directed at bringing to justice those needing the same. Most will be in a court of the own HN; others will simply wake up knowing they are dead, yet wondering where all the virgins are. Such things are best done in low key fashion as a capable and certain supporting effort to a much larger and holistic campaign of deterrence.

[davidbfpo]

(From Robert Jones)The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

I wonder if the Spanish people and state are thinking along such lines with the apparent return of ETA, with two attacks on a Guardia Civil barracks in Burgos: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8173727.stm and a device that killed two Guardia Civil on Majorca: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8176601.stm . Note the BBC referred to five ETA leaders had been arrested this year and IIRC extensive co-operation with France: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7732678.stm. Spain has seen the campaign against ETA use a variety of methods, including mass public demonstrations.

Deterrence of Irregular Threats - a new thread there?

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

Oh, and for those who would like me to begin a thread to further explore the concept of employing "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" as a new and more effective focus for the "Son of GWOT," I will gladly do so, but am busy tuning that same concept up to set on the SOCOM J5's desk and to inject into the QDR.

[rborum]

Oh, and for those who would like me to begin a thread to further explore the concept of employing "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" as a new and more effective focus for the "Son of GWOT," I will gladly do so, but am busy tuning that same concept up to set on the SOCOM J5's desk and to inject into the QDR.

Bob - I think it's terrific that you're thinking about and working on that facet of the problem. It would be spectacular - IMO - to see it highlighted in the QDR. Though I'm sure there will be a plurality of opinion about "how" such efforts might be accomplished, but working from the assumption that we should is definitely a step in the right direction. Thoughtful people on both sides of the current debate about contemporary COIN doctrine seem to agree (going out on a limb here) that the best approach for dealing with insurgency-like conflicts is to avoid/prevent them (or our involvement in them) in the first place. That premise, it seems to me, is a strong platform for strategic planning moving forward. (BTW, Bob, I sent a quick note to your Inbox here).

[Bob's World]

All,

I have been thinking a great deal recently about the concept of deterrence. In various forums that I participate I get a chance to listen to senior people from a variety of backgrounds discuss deterrence, and it always strikes me that for the most part we are so bound to what we know to work, that we cannot seem to grasp either how, or why it is not working now.

I believe this observation made in regard to President Obama's approach to nuclear deterrence sheds some light on this quandry:

“There are four different categories of nuclear deterrence that need to be addressed to make nuclear disarmament more feasible.
i)*** Deterrence between “old” nuclear powers and the recognition that a NPT entails both horizontal as well as vertical coordination;
ii)** Deterrence between “old” and “new” nuclear powers;
iii)* Deterrence between nuclear and non nuclear states;
iv)* Finally, deterrence of other non-state actors.”
In a discussion organized by ELIAMEP on “The Obama administration, deterrence and disarmament”, on Thursday, 9 July 2009, Dr. T.V. Paul, Professor of International Relations at McGill University, Montreal, Canada (Link added: http://www.eliamep.gr/en/transatlantic-relations/events-transatlantic-relations/the-obama-administration-deterrence-and-disarmament/ )


So the question is, how has deterrence changed as new actors, empowered in new ways, come onto the scene? Not only in how we deter these new actors, but how by their very presence we must recalulate how we deter the old ones.

[Bob's World]

No powerpoint ranger, but here is an attempt to visualize the problem; and a first cut at defining these characters.

Non-Nuke States: (Canada, Japan, etc)
Sovereign States that do not possess nuclear weapons
Primary Goal: Promote Nationalist goals without burden of Nuke status, but necessarily somewhat subjugated to a Nuke State protector.
Sanctuary: State status and protective treaties with Nuke State(s)

Nuke States: (Russia, Israel, etc)
Sovereign States that possess, or are believed to possess, nuclear weapons
Primary Goal: Promote Nationalist goals without excessive interference by Nuke States
Sanctuary: State status and threat of nuclear retaliation

Failed State: (Somalia, Yemen, etc)
Semi-Sovereign State that has reverted to tribalism or control by a Quasi or Non-State Actor
Primary Goal: Survival
Sanctuary: Lack of recognized state bodies and willingness to operate outside of accepted state system

Quasi-State Actor: (Hezbollah, Hamas, etc)
Organizations that have a direct link to the legitimacy of a sovereign state, but that also maintain operations outside that status
Primary Goal: Nationalist; with links to legitimacy but operating primarily outside the system of states
Sanctuary: Mix of State Status and Non-state Status played to maximize both

Non-State Actor: (Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, etc)
Organizations with no linkage to any legitimacy derived from a sovereign state, but that operate in state-like ways to conduct UW
Primary Goal: Regional or Global; effect change for some distinct cause
Sanctuary: Non-state status enhanced by supportive populaces experiencing conditions of poor governance and the borders of the states those populaces live within; or protection of a sympathetic state’s borders and sovereign status

Insurgent Populaces: (FARC, NPA, LTTE, etc)
Organizations made up of citizens of a state to wage a nationalist insurgent movement (Revolutionary, Separatist or Resistance)
Primary goal: Nationalist, address poor governance at home, create a separate state, or defeat an invader
Sanctuary: non-state status and a supportive populace experiencing conditions of poor governance

Disgruntled Individuals: (Kaczynski, McVeigh, etc)
Disgruntled individuals who believe so strongly about some cause that they are motivated to conduct acts of terror
Primary goal: Personal; draw attention to their agenda / cause
Sanctuary: Laws of their respective states until such time as they violate the same

[William F. Owen]

I'm getting a little lost here. How is deterrence different from suppression? - suppression, meaning a failure to act through fear of harm.

In order to deter, you merely have to present a credible and lethal threat (capability plus an intent). The perception of that threat means the other side is either suppressed from action or not.

What am I missing here?

[Bob's World]

I'm getting a little lost here. How is deterrence different from suppression? - suppression, meaning a failure to act through fear of harm.

In order to deter, you merely have to present a credible and lethal threat (capability plus an intent). The perception of that threat means the other side is either suppressed from action or not.

What am I missing here?

I think it comes up short. How do I make a quasi-state actor like Hezbollah "fear" me if I have constrained myself by granting them an artificial sanctuary based upon their status? Do I violate the soveriegnty of Lebannon to do so? To what potential provocation of other actors? Do I punish the populace of Lebanon? Again, to what potential provocation of others?

This recalculation of the deterrent and provocative effect across the spectrum is the essence, in my mind of shaping more holistic and effective schemes of both deterrence, but also COAs of responses.

How does one deter a non-state like AQ? Do I violate the soverignty of the state they take sanctuary within to attack AQ? Do I attack the state? Do I attack the members whereever I might find them? Again, to what second and third order effects of provocation across this expanded list of actors?

Old think of simply making the cost exceed the benefit for one particular actor or category of actor falls far short these days.

Similarly how does one deter an insurgent Saudi populace that perceives that they must first break the protective support of the US Govt to their own before they can achieve change at home? Fire missiles into their homes in Mecca? In this case I believe these groups are best deterred indirectly by addressing the perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy over their government at a minimum, and by also enabling evolution of better governance in these important states where we do have critical national interests that require our presence.

I don't have the answers, but do believe that the old model is dangerously lacking for the current environment.

[Old Eagle]

To be effective, deterrence must be focused on the target. What deters one country/group might not be effective against another. The deterrent must also be credible, which was the inherent failure of "massive retaliation" in the 50s. The US was not going to massively retaliate against some pissant annoyance.

This brings me to the challenge of deterrence, as opposed to prevention, in the current operational environment (and with Wilf's lethal requirement). If the target of your deterrence is unfazed by or even welcomes death, what other mechanisms are available to sway it?

[William F. Owen]

I think it comes up short. How do I make a quasi-state actor like Hezbollah "fear" me if I have constrained myself by granting them an artificial sanctuary based upon their status? Do I violate the soveriegnty of Lebannon to do so? To what potential provocation of other actors? Do I punish the populace of Lebanon? Again, to what potential provocation of others?

Well you've already painted yourself into a corner, with all those highly contextual assumptions presented as questions. If Hezbollah believes you are constrained by those assumptions, they simply will not take you seriously. Very simply, if you cannot make them physically fearful for their lives and all they love, you cannot deter them.

I suspect that the recalculation of the deterrent your leadership will opt for is bargaining, and diplomacy because the political will to deter, does not actually exist, despite the language.

[Entropy]

In this case I believe these groups are best deterred indirectly by addressing the perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy over their government at a minimum, and by also enabling evolution of better governance in these important states where we do have critical national interests that require our presence.

This would seem to change the traditional notion of deterrence significantly. A primary component of deterrence is fear - either the fear of repercussions of an action, or fear of failure or whatever. It seems to me if one takes the fear out then it's not deterrence anymore, but something else.

BTW, you are probably familiar with this (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/nagyOct04ppt.pdf):



Deterrence (Old View)-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)


vs.

Strategic Deterrence (New View) --The prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

Again, while I don't think that "new view" is invalid as a concept, I don't think it's "deterrence." Perhaps "strategic influence" is a better term or something else.

[Entropy]

Wilf raises an excellent point that deterrence is dependent upon credibility and if the adversary believes you are constrained (for any number of reasons) from acting, then deterrence has failed.

[William F. Owen]

If the target of your deterrence is unfazed by or even welcomes death, what other mechanisms are available to sway it?
Like Japan in WW2? Osama Bin Laden puts lot of money and effort into staying alive. If an entire terrorist organisation wants to be suicide bombers, it is a very temporary threat. War is politics. Politics requires someone to be alive at the end.

Clausewitian Trinity? People, Leadership, and military? There's always something to squeeze.

[Bob's World]

Like Japan in WW2? Osama Bin Laden puts lot of money and effort into staying alive. If an entire terrorist organisation wants to be suicide bombers, it is a very temporary threat. War is politics. Politics requires someone to be alive at the end.

Clausewitian Trinity? People, Leadership, and military? There's always something to squeeze.

CvC only has one oar in the water in today's environment. A good solid oar, but incomplete all the same; so don't pull on it too hard or you'll just go around and around.

So you squeeze Hezbollah good and hard by invading the sovereign country of Lebanon and waging war among their populace. Perhaps you have deterred Hezbollah, but who have you outraged and provoked in the process? Where did the air go when you squeezed that balloon?

When our media and government refuse to recognize Hezbollah as part of the Lebanese government we in effect grant them a sanctuary of status. In this category, where an organization chooses to play this game, I think a good first step is to officially recognize them as part of the state. Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon. Take them out of their quasi-state status and place them into a full state status. Now our state tools work. If the government or populace thinks that is unfair, well then they need to police their own problem; and if they can't then it is proven true by their inability to do so.

This is just one category though, and again, all must be viewed holistically and relative provocation and deterrence effects must be wargamed across the spectrum when considering COAs.

[William F. Owen]

CvC only has one oar in the water in today's environment. A good solid oar, but incomplete all the same; so don't pull on it too hard or you'll just go around and around.
What oar is missing?

, I think a good first step is to officially recognize them as part of the state. Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon.
That is exactly the mistake Olmert and Halutz made in 2006. Against the existing plan and advice, they went after "Lebanon" as well as "Hezbollah." Do not target the people you don't need to target.

Once the proper plan was "partly" enacted, Hezbollah began to suffer. They haven't fired a single rocket or conduct any actual military action since the ceasefire, in 2006.

[Bob's World]

The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.

And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.

[Entropy]

Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon. Take them out of their quasi-state status and place them into a full state status. Now our state tools work. If the government or populace thinks that is unfair, well then they need to police their own problem; and if they can't then it is proven true by their inability to do so.

Everyone knows the state of Lebanon cannot control HA or "police their own problem." They do not have that capability, so how can our "state tools" work in that case?

Should we use that logic for the AQAM sanctuary in Pakistan, despite the fact that we know Pakistan is incapable of controlling its territory?

[Bob's World]

Everyone knows the state of Lebanon cannot control HA or "police their own problem." They do not have that capability, so how can our "state tools" work in that case?

Should we use that logic for the AQAM sanctuary in Pakistan, despite the fact that we know Pakistan is incapable of controlling its territory?

The distinctions between these groups is critical. This is arguably the greatest failing of the GWOT approach is that it conflated threats by lumping them all under a terrorist banner by judging them by their tactics and their affiliations rather than by their true natures and individual goals.

AQ does not claim to be part of Pakistan; they just take advantange of the sanctuary of a poorly governed populace and a legal border.

We have trampled down the border to go after them, but what effect that on the populace? Any less poorly governed or likely to lend sanctuary? No, the opposite, in fact.

A "quasi-state" is not equal to a "non-state," is not equal to an "insurgency".

We talk about "separating the insurgent from the populace," yet we cannot even differentiate effectively between the various groups employing "terrorist" tactics.

If we are to deter, we must first understand and and respect the differences.


Oh, and if the master cannot control the servant, then who really is the master after all?? This actually supports my case. If lebanon cannot control LH, the LH is in fact Lebanon.

[George L. Singleton]

Various governments including Lebanon and now Syria don't have the means, sometimes the will, but definately lack the means, to overcome terrorists operating on and through their soil.

"Deterrance" is to me a useless term here. Suppression, permanently, via NATO forces replaced ASAP by native local troops we are supposed to be training up, for permanent maintenance of law and order, long term suppression by force of arms, concurrently by a jobs and construction program that generates economic benefits never before available to the locals.

[Bob's World]

What is a "terrorist organization?" This is an intentioally emotion-laced term that is used to cast a negative light, yet does nothing to truly identify the nature and purpose of one you impose it upon. Not unlike racial name calling, it is intended to dehumanize ones opponent and generate charged emotions.

Every current "terrorist" organizatoin currently on the Department of State roster would have to put in a hell of a lot of over time to match the body-count produced by the U.S. Airforce in what could arguably be called "terrorist" tactics as well. Purpose for action is critical, becasue if it is just action alone that condems one, then we are in big trouble. It is time to get a little more sophisticated and less biased in our thinking.

We have to get past name calling if we are going to move forward. Means and Will are two very different things as well.

If a state lack the means to control an informal organization, then it has become ineffective and illigitimate. It is no longer really "the state." If LH is the majority, then recognize them as such and hold them accountable.

If a state lacks the "will", then perhaps they simply have no real incentive to place your interests and desires above their own. By holding them accountable you may very well provide them with such will. I seriously doubt the government of Syria is unable to control the elements of Hezbollah within their borders; they just have no reason to.


The COA you propose is the COA that brought us here. Excessive exercise of US legitimacy over the govermments of the region in order to produce conditions favorable to the U.S.

We can still work to shape conditions favorable to the pursuit of US interests in the region, but we need to adopt new COAs that better recognize and respect the interests of others; and that does not co-opt the legitimacy of others in favor of that imposed by us.

Harder and Faster won't get us there. Smarter will.

[Entropy]

BW,

I understand the difference between AQ and HA, but I could just as easily substitute any number of "Pakistani" groups for AQ. The area where AQ has sanctuary is not "ungoverned" as there are local governing structures and peoples which pre-date the creating of the Pakistani state. That "state" of Pakistan has never had control of these areas, nor did the British before them. They are still largely "administered" under the same system used by the British and are quasi-colonies.

Regardless, in Lebanon, I think "Master and Servant" is a poor analogy. HA is a remnant of a civil war, so one can argue that the civil war is still ongoing even though there isn't a lot of fighting anymore. Holding one side in a civil war accountable for the actions of the other side doesn't make a lot of sense to me as the Lebanese government cannot compel/coerce HA.

Now, the US could certainly "incentivize" the Lebanese government and HA to resolve their longstanding differences, but that strikes me as something different from what you're suggesting.

[Entropy]

If a state lack the means to control an informal organization, then it has become ineffective and illigitimate. It is no longer really "the state." If LH is the majority, then recognize them as such and hold them accountable.

Recognize HA as the legitimate government of Lebanon, or recognize them as a new state, seperate from the rest of Lebanon? What US interest is served by pursuing either one of those COA's? Neither one seems wise, IMO.

[William F. Owen]

The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.
Huh? What spectrum? He didn't mention drug gangs, or organised crime, but his observation are all still highly relevant. Pablo Escobar was defeated exactly in line with CvC observations.


And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.
So let me get this right. You are suggesting that Deterrence is demonstrated by something other than action? Deterrence means "failure to ACT, through fear of harm." No action means deterrence is working. Deterrence by virtue of it's meaning relates to specific conditions within a specific time. Change any of the factors effecting the level of deterrence and it's effectiveness alters.

[Bob's World]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

What one sees in the initial responses and comments above is a great example of the challenges to getting from where we are, and what we are doing currently, as we are all mired in what we have been taught and currently believe. We must step back, take a deep breath, and look at the entire problem set from a fresh perspective. Many changes may be subtle, some may be substantial.

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

CT leads to an Intel driven, reactive chasing of whoever they label as "threat" and conducting a very similar family of engagement against those threats regardless of their actual nature or purpose. Many argue that such an approach has eroded our national credibility globally, and though we have not been attacked, may in fact havecontributed to an even broader range of those who would do us harm today than we had in 2001.

Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.

[Dayuhan]

No action means deterrence is working.

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.

[William F. Owen]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austr ia), the "Gun Powder Plot" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunpowder_Plot) hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

[William F. Owen]

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary.

Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austr ia), the "Gun Powder Plot" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunpowder_Plot) hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

[Bob's World]

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.

Too often we focus on the wrong indicators and draw the wrong conclusions. Usually because we look at them based upon an understanding built from our experience and colored by what we want to see.

Certainly in politics perspectives may sometimes be cast in a light most favorable to the politician and shaped to tell his constituency what they want to hear.

[William F. Owen]

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

[Dayuhan]

Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.

If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, that does not necessarily mean that the action didn't occur because of something you did to deter it. I would think that to declare a policy of deterrence "successful" there would be have to be some evidence to suggest that our actions deriving from the policy of deterrence were the cause of the inaction.

If there was an intention to carry out more attacks on the US, and those attacks were not carried out because our actions left the enemy unable to proceed with their intention, the policy of deterrence was successful. If there was no intention to carry out further attacks, the policy of deterrence was irrelevant. If a riot policeman holds up a shield when the people throwing rocks have already moved on to other targets, it's hard to declare that the shield was what protected the policeman.

The question is whether no further attacks were made because we prevented them, or because, having achieved the desired goal, the enemy had no further need or desire to attack. Of course we don't know which is the case, but there's enough uncertainty there that I wouldn't want to claim success for a policy of deterrence.

[William F. Owen]

If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, that does not necessarily mean that the action didn't occur because of something you did to deter it. I would think that to declare a policy of deterrence "successful" there would be have to be some evidence to suggest that our actions deriving from the policy of deterrence were the cause of the inaction.
Agreed. You'll never know, but that in no way negates threatening people with greater harm, if they harm you. You may deter threats you never knew existed, just because of reputation.
It's having the reputation which is key, and reputations are built on clear and unambiguous threats (capability and intent) of the use force.

[Bob's World]

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

No argument that most tactics produce very similar results at the tactical level; though just as the rifled musket forced modification of tactics to take into account a formation receiving 6-10 aimed volleys as it closed with the enemy vice the 1-2 they had received over the few hundred years preceding; so to do many advances like UAVs, guided munitions, etc; shape tactics today. But that is not what I am talking about at all.

What i am talking about is the strategic effect expected based on historical experience from COIN tactics simply is far less likely to be achieved due to the enhanced communications tools available to populaces (and therefore insurgents) everywhere.

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

The fact that it still only takes one bullet to kill one man is immaterial and moot to this discussion.

[Entropy]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.


I don't have any real disagreements with that, but I don't see how you get from there to a policy holding governments accountable for peoples they have no control over - ie. HA and various tribes along the AF-PAK border.

I also "get" that new communication tools do have powerful effects though maybe not to the extent that you think they do. Technology certainly has made demagoguery easier than it's probably ever been and governments have pretty much lost the ability to significantly control negative information. That is a powerful combination.

BTW, I also like your slide.

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

Someone upthread said that "terrorists" cannot be deterred because they are not afraid to die for their cause. In some cases that is true, but fear of failure is universal. For example, all the additional security measures protecting airplanes are deterring those who'd like to blow them up or fly them into buildings because their chances of success are greatly diminished.

[Bob's World]

Here are some concepts that I believe demand fresh attention and new perspectives if we are to have a holistic family of deterrence across the range of all actors that facilitates the peace we seek:

Balance
Balancing the relative deterrent and provocative effects of actions across a complex span of actors.

Sanctuary
(God save us from the cliche' "sanctuary of ungoverned spaces")
We must understand and address organizations that have "sanctuary" currently from the traditional elements of national power.

Glib cliche's parroted without thought just don't cut it. True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them. Both of these can be addressed if recognized as important, and then understood for their true nature.

Empowered Populaces
Deterrence of people is fundamentally different than deterrence of states.

Legitimacy
When an insurgent populace perceives that an outside power has an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government they are dissatisfied with, they will target that inappropriate source of legitimacy in the pursuit of their aims. This is the central component to AQ's strategy to conduct UW to get these many diverse, nationalist efforts to support their cause. They make the case that the US is the obstacle to achieving good governance, and due to that widely held perception, it works. Address the legitimacy and you both disempower Bin Laden's message; and you also get these nationalist insurgencies to focus on the home front as the obstacle has been removed. (This is why the vast majority of foreign fighters and "terrorists" come from the populaces of our friends, rather than the populaces of our foes - No Iranian believes that the US is responsible for the poor governance they suffer under. Many Saudis do.

Holistic Approaches
We have a mono-focus on deterrence. Cost/benefit analysis aimed at states; differentiated primarily by only if they have, or don't have, nukes. Anyone else we criminalize by labeling them "terrorist". We look through two tubes and neither tube is particularly focused for the realities of today's environment.

What I suggest is that we look at the entire span of actors holistically, and then with that broader perspective look at the deterrence problem with fresh eyes and fresh thinking to address the whole more effectively, by more effectively addressing the individuals.

[William F. Owen]

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.
Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

[Bob's World]

So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.

So all positions are welcome and helpful. Seriously. I'd far rather debate a wise man with whom I disagree, than to talk to a sycophant who nods dutifully at my every syllable.

However, I will say that while your position is both quite rationale and widely held among those who shape policy; I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.

But I have no path to take, as there have not been that many who have gone before me to make one on this particular journey. That's ok, I enjoy a little intellectual exploration and am happy to provide the sweat and bear the scars that come with breaking new trail...

Like most explorers, I may not find what I seek, but in the course of the journey I will learn much of value.

[William F. Owen]

I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.
OK, so what is that? What does this tragedy look like?

[slapout9]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).




Couple of points.

1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

[Entropy]

Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

We can use HA as an example. To what can/should we attribute their lack of attacks against Israel since 2006? From your earlier comments in this thread it appears you believe that the cause of their inaction is the deterrent effect from the 2006 campaign. There may be something to that, but there are other causes that are probably just as important if not more so. After all, Nasrallah publicly said the event that precipitated that conflict was a mistake and that HA did not expect the Israeli response. IOW, it was miscalculation that caused that conflict and not any failure of deterrence. Deterrence has limited power over miscalculation.

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

[William F. Owen]

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

So what is proof that deterrence has worked?

Deterrence is obviously dynamic, and not an absolute state. It is predicated on deterring certain actions. Yes, you will never know if the effect you sought was actually achieved. - so what?
Wars start because the credible deterrence breaks down. - again - so what?
We know all this.
What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

[Bob's World]

Slap,

Agree completely that the far right end of the spectrum, the individual who is committed to some deadly course, cannot be deterred. I list him only because he is part of the fabric, and when he acts, it will be criminal in nature must be accounted for by those who will respond to that act. Part of effective, holistic deterrence is understanding what one can and cannot influence; and responding appropriately when sh#* happens.

I do think it is more complex though. More actors, more distinct statuses, all having to be considered collectively in a balanced program of deterrence is complex.

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953; it would creates far different set of ramifications across this new spectrum of actors today than a much more limited spectrum then.

Images would be immediately blasted around the world; those Iranian citizens at the epicenter of events would text the word through out both the populace at home, and Shia everywhere. Most likely the Shah would have not lasted a week and the re-established Iranian government would have reached out to the Soviets to prevent this from happening again. Or an insurgency would have been born at home, but with a regional or global base of support; with attacks not just launched at the Shah but at the US and England to attempt to break our support for him. Hezbollah would weigh in on behalf of their Iranian ally and target the US and England and their allies as well; most likely attacking Israel. Bin Laden, who has no love for Shia, would recognize the Strat Com potential to engage all Muslims; and would turn this into a PR event to boost his own support by highlighting how by our actions the West validates his claims against us; using this to encourage and incite nationalist insurgent movements in Muslim states who have governments shaped by or overly influenced by the West....and so it spirals out.

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

In 1953 the Iranians complained, it was news for a while, and then the world got on with life, accepting the new construct. Then when some 25 years later the Iranians were finally able to break out from under this construct imposed upon them, we acted like we were the victims. The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

So, to deter the Iranians from such an action today would require a much more sophisticated approach, as it is not just the state actors one must consider, but a much more empowered and connected set of populace-based organizations as well.

[Entropy]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

[Entropy]

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953

That was not deterring Iran. Forcing an actor (in this case, Iran) to conform to your will through force is not deterrence.

[Bob's World]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

At the end of the day, the US is still the most powerful nation in the world, with all of the associated benefits, duties, and responsibilities associated with that status.

We just need to recognize that the favorable status quo that emerged from the Cold War was a snapshot in time, and that the world is ever changing; and that we too must embrace change in order to remain relevant.

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

[William F. Owen]

I think this is complex. But that's just me.


It's not complex. It's fiction with mixture of unlikely and totally unrealistic strategic contexts, that make as much sense as trying to predict the out come of the French Revolution set in 1999. None of that is evidence!

The only evidence you can have that modern conflict and conditions are more complex is to say you do not understand them. That's the evidence.
I think history shows us that all warfare and conflict has always been infinitely complex.
Men today are not more capable of understanding the conditions that created WW1, than they were at the time.

Let's face it. Everyone is wittering on about the "Tribes" - which are just about the oldest political system on earth, and apparently, the men of today, do not understand them. Not a good indicator that life today is "more complex."

[Entropy]

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.

[Entropy]

What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

[Bob's World]

Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.

Nations have much to lose, so fear works. Those with little to lose, perhaps not so much. Again, balance our approach, not abandon it.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.
Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

[Ken White]

Bob's World:
1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.On Item 1. I strongly doubt that it is possible to deter all irregular threats. I believe that an effort to disrupt potential irregular threats is vastly preferable to the rather to passive effort of deterring. Particularly when such deterring is going to be in a mostly now unidentifiable form.

Re: item 2, disruption is also preferable -- and cheaper -- the disadvantage is that it requires knowledge and action early on; areas in which the US does not excel...:mad:
Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.I very much agree; I'd agree even more if it read 'Deterrence and disruption..." :D
This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.True -- thus disruption has to be an alternative.

Entropy:
In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.I'm not sure that's always correct. I can understand your motives and still fail to deter you because I attempted to counter a feint -- or because you were deflected enroute to your target and selected another. It's also quite possible that my selected mode of deterrence was poorly chosen or just flat wrong...

Slapout, as always, applies some common sense and realiistic thinking and makes two statements with which I strongly agree
1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.The first is I believe the crux of the matter -- we make this harder than it is and we do have a global reach and thus we have simply increased the problem quantitatively, not qualitatively.

Given the American penchant for over-control and centralization, we need distributed thinking; the NSC and State should have regional super-Ambassadors and Desks with real clout. DoD should defer to the CoComs and SOCOM to their regional commands. You cannot run the World from Pennsylvania Avenue; the Armed Forces from E-Ring; all of the SO stuff from MacDill. As long as we continue to do that, we'll keep having the same old problems and the sheer number will overwhelm attempts at sensible decision making.

Slap's absolutely right that some types cannot be deterred -- and I'll add or disrupted for long -- IOW, we're going to have to live with a degree of risk. We always have, we just communicate more quickly and widely now so folks are more aware more rapidly and this allows minor panics to (wrongly) influence government into taking foolish actions.

Strategies and policies need to take those things into account.

Lastly,Bob's World again, he sums up the root of the whole problem:
The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.True. That factor is prevalent in much of our history. Even given the 1953 coup and some -- not many -- Iranians being quite angry over that, what happened later was totally preventable. We ignored it -- and then came up with the WRONG reaction when there was an eruption. Those failures and the cults of centralization and "I am in charge, here, now..." control are part and parcel of our current situation.

We cannot undo our history, we are where we are and that has to be accepted, not apologized for going forward. We need to look to the future. So we aim to deter and disrupt.

That requires adequate and effective early warning or knowledge -- and there still is no guarantee we will take the correct action... ;)

Wilf said it well and we'd be far better off as a nation if we paid heed:
In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.Ran across this gem in the NYT today:
TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.

For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.

“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.” (LINK) (http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/01memo.html).(emphasis added /kw)That about sums it up... :cool:

[Entropy]

Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

Unless your adversary is willing to tell you directly, then there isn't any way of knowing for sure. Obviously, the better one studies and understands an opponent, the better one is able to estimate their motivations and use all the policy tools available to affect those motivations, not just deterrence. That's why good intelligence is critical to policymaking.

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove. Other examples include "x" policy has worked or GWB is a great President because there hasn't been another attack since 9/11. Or, more recently, my own government leaders have claimed that if it hadn't been for the stimulus package, the economy/unemployment would be much worse. It's impossible to disprove or quantify such assertions when they are framed that way.

Maybe it's misperception on my part, but ISTM many elites and policymakers have too much faith in "deterrence" over other forms of influence and have drawn false conclusions based on the "success" of deterrence during the Cold War. For example, the idea that deterrence will prevent a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran (should it acquire nuclear weapons) is dangerously naive. People miscalculate. Nations miscalculate. We got lucky at several times during the Cold War and our intelligence was able to tell us when our attempts at projecting a deterrent posture had the opposite effect. That happens more that people realize.

In short, putting too much faith in deterrence as a strategy provides a false sense of security.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

No arguements about the "disrupt" component. Hanging onto the "disrupt" task; and dumping the "defeat" task (which is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable, by the way if you really think about it) and replacing it with "deter."

This gives us the foundation for a new framework for the GWOT plan that we can build upon and that won't by its very terms alienate our allies and our own interagency community.

So what I am really looking at is two different things here. One is an overall review and revision of how we approach deterrence as a whole to more accurately and completely address the many actors on today's scene. Second is to then Re-write the GWOT plan in the context of detering (and yes, exactly right Ken,)Disrupting Irregular Threats.

[Taiko]

www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc

DO JOC v2 might be a good start to look at how the US approaches deterrence now. There has been a considerable shift from the Cold War approach. Keith Payne and Colin Gray would be two good academics/policymakers to read. They have had considerable influence in how we should understand deterrence post-9/11. I'm in the middle of finishing a paper so I can't extrapolate much more. However, if you need any more sources I would be glad to forward you a reading list Bob's World, I have been studying this for two years so I have most of what has been written on it. Send me a PM if you need any resources about a specific subject area on deterrence.

I'll just put forth a couple of points:

1. In the p-9/11 security environment the US needs to deter more actors from taking different sets of actions. During the Cold War the US faced a single risk adverse actor, in the current security environment there a number of risk taking actors. Game theory works well when there are only two actors, once you have a n+ situation the theory becomes more problematic.

2. Prospect theory has had the most influence on how policymakers view deterrence p-Cold War. Specifically, it argues that the an actor may view the cost of inaction to be higher than any benefit of inaction, making deterrence both unstable and harder. There is a lot more to it than that, suffice to say the theory itself resulted in DO JOC V2.

3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.

4. In terms of 'irregular threats' how do you deter a individual or group with no fixed address?

5. How do you deter a individual or group if they perceive that the cost of inaction is higher than the benefit of inaction, or if death is seen as a reward/benefit in itself?

4 and 5 are the most common questions on deterrence p-9/11, so if you can answer then you will have a number of people interested.

From what I can work out the Airforce has been working on deterrence p-CW so make sure to read DO JOC V2., if you haven't already, otherwise they might pick your propositions to pieces.

[Bill Moore]

While deterrence of irregular threats is exponentially better than GWOT for visualizing the scope of the threat and how we should respond (strategy), but as stated above, even by Bob's W, it is not feasible to deter the irregular threats we are dealing with today. I’m still forming by thoughts on this, but it seems that deterrence in many respects requires some degree of symmetry between two or more potential foes. For instance in a state versus state scenarios conventional warfare deterred due to anticipated costs, based on perceived parity (not necessarily equal in strength, but regardless the superior strength is marginalized somehow) of conventional forces. Of course we had mutual assured destruction (nuclear symmetry) policy that worked because in the end the USSR and the U.S. shared the same value of protecting their homeland/nation. Irregular threats are entirely different, we’re talking about deterring criminals, super empowered individuals, terrorists, insurgents, etc. In all fairness each should be viewed individually within their own context, but in general there are few feasible options to deter them. We haven’t been effective in deterring illegal migration, illegal drug use, the spread of nuclear weapons/technology, or organized crimes as just a few examples of failed deterrence strategies. If 9/11 and our response should have taught us anything, it is the limits of American (and the West) power.

I recommend we further investigate using a combination of approaches to build a more comprehensive strategy against the wide range of irregular threats we are faced with. One approach is “countering” irregular threats, which includes active measures against existing threats and inoculating vulnerable populations to the extent possible against the influence of these bad actors. Recognizing the sad truth that we won't be 100% successful, it is critically important to also focus a parallel approach for developing the “resilience” to ensure we can weather successful irregular attacks ranging from 9/11 style attacks to attacks on economic infrastructure. Maybe “deterrence” can be the third leg of strategy, but I need to be convinced on the feasibility of just how we would implement this. I’m not sure we can wield a bigger stick than we wield now and we are deterring the threat. I hope your definition of deterrence doesn’t mean reaching out to the enemy and compromising. In the end our alternative views (the threat and us) are not compatible. Thus I offer two legs for a strategy “countering irregular threats” and “developing resilience” to weather successful attacks.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Good thoughts, as always. I just don't like countering though, primarily because it leads us to approaches too tied to the intel guys sending us around to violate the sovereignty of a variety of nations to attack organizations and individuals within those states. It just tends to get out of control in ways that I believe have more of a "provoke" effect across the spectrum of actors, even if it may very well have a "disrupt" effect on the particular target of the engagement.

The main thought in getting more focused on "deter" as a baseline (besides the fact that our President and SECDEF are very much focused on deter and IMO not getting a lot of fresh ideas from their advisers to date as to how to think about this today), is that it changes the perspective from which one plans his operations.

The problem facing the US today is not that there are insurgent organizations in many of the Muslim states of the world. The problem facing the US is that those nationalist insurgencies believe that they must first break the support of the US to their governments at home before there can be reform of government that addresses their grievances and gives them a government whose legitimacy they recognize. Any effort to defeat these insurgencies will only serve to reinforce their belief that they must break the will of the US to meddle in the region.

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

This isn't how intel people think. They focus on the "threat" and rail on and on about how evil these people are, etc, etc. Not helpful. What we need to focus on is sadly outdated foreign policies that we have with this region; a top down review focus not on "fixing" others, but instead on "fixing" our self.

I've always felt it was a cop-out when someone blames their shortcomings on others. I think our current approach for GWOT is just such a cop-out. I say Fix ourselves, and then with clear conscience swing the big stick at any who dare to oppose us. If we have our act straight first, such actions won't have the negative, provocative effect they have today.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World
So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

I like this line of thought, because it is a unique way of reframing the problem. Framing the problem correctly seems to be the origin of most of our failure. I second your thoughts on the intell community and their narrow view of the problem set. Whe we say we use intelligence to drive operations that simply reinforces your point, because now instead of executing a strategy we're simply trying to catch mice.

I'm goint to try to rain on your parade a little. While I agree with many of your points, I'l focus on the one I quoted above. For the global islamist movement to maintain wind in its sails it "must' paint the U.S. as the bad actor. It uses that narrative to mobilize the people against the great satan. I think you clearly identified the center of gravity. Unfortunately, the islamist narrative doesn't have to be acccurate, just perceived to be true, and unfortunately we have history that will hard to shake. The point is I think this is another infeasible objective, but if we could make it work it would be very powerful. There is another parallel in the Saudi issue, that is the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Who has given more aid to the Palestinians than any other nation? I read that the U.S. has, but obviously our information/influence activities are not in synch with this cash handout effort, since we still get slaughtered in the media as simply siding with Israel. The U.S. has "always" put a lot of pressure on Israel to back off on their hard right wing policies, but again it shows the limits of U.S. power, because we can only influence either of them to a small extent. This location is the grave yard of good intentions for many U.S. administrations.

[Ron Humphrey]

trying to keep up with and take in the major issues and process them in such a way as to really develop an understanding for them.

a couple of points of interest-

Bob's World the focus on deterrence in the form you've described seems viable if and only if we can both do as you suggested in your last post and find some common requirements among both ourselves and those whom we seek to deter.

By this I mean areas, capabilities, life stuff that both they and we would rather not be without because those are probably the only areas we could count on being a constant during and after a given state of conflict.

I guess the best example I could give would be something like the Internet
(Big I) although most actors would be likely to attack networks or connectivity for an opponent it's hard to imagine that many either state or non-state would attempt to take down The Internet because they depend on it as much if not more than we. Leaving Slaps individuals out of that equation what other things, capabilities, requirements are there which might fall in the same category's

Maybe by actually clarifying those which are least likely to be the way someone decides to act up may help to point out more clearly those areas where deterrence would not only be doable but perhaps beneficial not only militarily but politically as well(mainly in the Foreign policy arena).

The one other thing I wondered about would be whose job it is to develop understanding of the various ideologically based strategies out there which are most likely to precipitate what we would consider potentially in need of "deterrence" This seems pertinent due to the fact that even though we might not like talking or thinking about it much of the risk of conflict in many areas is pretty clearly tied to policies in governance based off them or lack of populaces to entertain them.

Not sure that made sense:confused:

[Bob's World]

Posted by Bob's World

I like this line of thought, because it is a unique way of reframing the problem. Framing the problem correctly seems to be the origin of most of our failure. I second your thoughts on the intell community and their narrow view of the problem set. Whe we say we use intelligence to drive operations that simply reinforces your point, because now instead of executing a strategy we're simply trying to catch mice.

I'm goint to try to rain on your parade a little. While I agree with many of your points, I'l focus on the one I quoted above. For the global islamist movement to maintain wind in its sails it "must' paint the U.S. as the bad actor. It uses that narrative to mobilize the people against the great satan. I think you clearly identified the center of gravity. Unfortunately, the islamist narrative doesn't have to be acccurate, just perceived to be true, and unfortunately we have history that will hard to shake. The point is I think this is another infeasible objective, but if we could make it work it would be very powerful. There is another parallel in the Saudi issue, that is the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Who has given more aid to the Palestinians than any other nation? I read that the U.S. has, but obviously our information/influence activities are not in synch with this cash handout effort, since we still get slaughtered in the media as simply siding with Israel. The U.S. has "always" put a lot of pressure on Israel to back off on their hard right wing policies, but again it shows the limits of U.S. power, because we can only influence either of them to a small extent. This location is the grave yard of good intentions for many U.S. administrations.

While you are right that we cannot escape our history, that is, IMO, more of a benefit than a hindrance to turning this around.

First being that we have a very short history; second being that most of that history we were the little guy our self working to get out from under the big guy's control. We build a national ideology around our belief that we had a right to be free from that control, and we succeeded in achieving that vision. I believe that oppressed populaces around the world still look to that example, still look to the "idea" of America as the first colony of western Europe to stand up and be free.

It is only a relatively short history (though longer than my life) that we have stepped from the role as an example of achieving freedom and slid (through the controlling efforts necessary to contain the Soviets) through our Cold War engagement into a place where we are now more of an obstacle than we would like to admit. Like when I look in the mirror and see that I look more like I think of my dad, and my sons look more like I picture myself. We have grown up and become our parent. It happens; but unlike for us as humans, for us as a nation it is a reversible condition.

But you have to stop doing what you're doing and start a new approach. Doing the same old thing in the same old ways rarely leads to much change.

De Oppresso Liber, brother, De Oppresson Liber

[Dayuhan]

True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them.


That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

[Bob's World]

That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

It never has to be the entire populace to do anything, and certainly not to provide sanctuary. There is very little that could be described as "ungoverned space" in Western Europe, but you are very correct that there appears to be growing sanctuary within pockets of populaces who feel excluded from the full benefits of that governance. This is exactly what I mean by "sanctuary within a poorly governed populace."

As to the complexity issue, it is the combination of "regular" and the newer "irregular" aspects that I have laid out on the slide I provided that make the new complexity. We need new ways to deal with the new actors, reformed ways to deal with the old; and then an overall review and synch of the entire system in a holistic manner that recognizes that nothing happens in isolation. Pull this here and something moves there. Deter this guy, provoke that guy. We can absolutely do this.

[Ken White]

Taiko:
3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.Quite true. I have difficulty convincing people the Cold War wasn't nearly as clear cut as popular culture and out incompetent media allege it to be. It was nuanced and constantly adjusted, sometimes well, sometimes not so well. It wasn't nearly as monolithic as many like to think..

Also agree that Gray approaches a 'must read' on the topic.

The problem today, of course, is that the artificiality of the Cold War and effectively having to deal with only one threat has been replaced by many threats, some a significant and dangerous as the one once was...

Welcome to 1935 redux. :D

Bill Moore:
In all fairness each should be viewed individually within their own context, but in general there are few feasible options to deter them. We haven’t been effective in deterring illegal migration, illegal drug use, the spread of nuclear weapons/technology, or organized crimes as just a few examples of failed deterrence strategies. If 9/11 and our response should have taught us anything, it is the limits of American (and the West) power.Absolutely...

Your recommendations:
Thus I offer two legs for a strategy “countering irregular threats” and “developing resilience” to weather successful attacks.are on target though I'm not at all sure we've got the willingness in our political system to be that focused...

I agree with much of Bob's World thought but I keep trying to tell him the US political system not only won't allow long term thinking and strategies, it actively eats them. We have the problem that many in Congress are truly afraid of (1) A strong and highly capable set of Armed forces; (2) A truly effective Intelligence community; (3) A forward looking and capable Diplomatic machine; and (4) Exercising the political will necessary.

I suspect, given that, we will continue to try to deter, be only partly successful and then have to disrupt, sometimes with Intel, Diplomacy, USAid and SF, occasionally adding the GPF in the mix. Heck of a job, USG... :(

[jcustis]

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

There are a majority of folks (granted, this is just my observation), unfortunately, within the ranks of our military who believe we will never be able to change these perceptions if they have taken root in the Muslim mind.

Kinda difficult to root out the excesses of our own folks if we don't have their mind in line with our larger aims.

Awesome thread, BW. You've sent me on a theoretical binge today that left my head hurting a bit.

[slapout9]

I agree with much of Bob's World thought but I keep trying to tell him the US political system not only won't allow long term thinking and strategies, it actively eats them. We have the problem that many in Congress are truly afraid of (1) A strong and highly capable set of Armed forces; (2) A truly effective Intelligence community; (3) A forward looking and capable Diplomatic machine; and (4) Exercising the political will necessary.

I suspect, given that, we will continue to try to deter, be only partly successful and then have to disrupt, sometimes with Intel, Diplomacy, USAid and SF, occasionally adding the GPF in the mix. Heck of a job, USG... :(

That about sums it up. We can not deter all but we could deter many and disrupt a few others and then finally be well prepared to mitigate and recovery from the ones will get through......but we are close to having no leadership at all in this country. And that is our greatest vulnerability!

[William F. Owen]

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove.
Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

[Taiko]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:


So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.

[Bob's World]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:



How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.


Beyond the fact that IO is a mess of half a dozen vaguely related disciplines all strapped together under one all inclusive definition; and then the entire bundle left sitting out on the doorstep by the "real" ops guys who are too busy planning action to worry too much about what the IO guys do to support them....

It is more accurately the Strategic Communication aspect of IO, and even then, not the "here is what I say" take on Strat Comm, but the perspective that I share wholeheartedly with my boss that "Strat Comm is 80% what one does, and 20% what one says."

We must change what we say to be more in line with our professed principles as a nation, we must extend to other states and populaces the same sovereignty and dignity we demand for ourselves; and then we must design and implement our engagement to state by our actions the very message that is coming from our mouths.

Sad fact is that in the Middle East in particular, long before GWOT, we had let our principles, words, and actions diverge. I think we just need to bring them all back on azimuth and move out as one.

[Bob's World]

A thought for the day, as we look at not just the deterrence of Irregular Threats, but as importantly how this fits into the larger collective of a comprehensive scheme of deterrence: Nuke states; Non-Nuke States; and the sticky issue of proliferation.


Premise: The US treats those states who possess nuclear weapons with a greater degree of respect for their national sovereignty than those states that do not possess such weapons. Thus providing a powerful provocative motivation to gain such weapons in the very states that we are working the hardest to prevent from doing that very thing.

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Similarly, would a shift in focus with those states that are routinely held up as potential "threats" (by those who are desperate to find some way to make our current threat-based strategy hanging over from the Cold War valid once again) from the points where our National Interests diverge, to points of convergence instead. We will always have competitors, and we need to compete. But do we really need to make others into "threats"?

[Entropy]

Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

Agree, except I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.

[Bob's World]

men carried clubs, cities built walls; not because they had identified necessarily some specific threat they wished to deter, but simply because they wanted whatever threat that might come along to be deterred; and also to be better able to deal with those who were not.

Some deterrence is general in nature, some specific; most provocative as well as deterrent. But not being attacked by any particular threat is never a full measure of how well one's scheme of deterrence worked.

[Entropy]

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184/)I read a couple of years ago for a class:


U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. This report attempts to help these decisionmakers see the potential use of influence campaigns in the war on terrorism. To do this, the authors gauge the lessons learned from past U.S. operations, analyzing the “de-Nazification” efforts of postwar Germany, the psychological operations conducted during the Vietnam War, and the support of anticommunist movements and resources in Poland throughout the Cold War. Although stipulating that influence campaigns are highly sensitive to their respective operational environments, the authors arrive at the following general guidelines for the use of persuasion in the struggle against terrorism: match objectives, message, and delivery to the audience; incorporate feedback mechanisms in the planning stage; and set realistic expectations. They then apply these guidelines to three different types of audiences in the Muslim world-Yemen, Indonesia, and diaspora communities in Germany. The authors note that the use of strategic influence is not and probably never will be a “silver bullet” to removing the threat of terrorism; however, the research herein should help bring U.S. decisionmakers closer in refining how and in what circumstances such campaigns can best be applied.

Thoughts on this?

BW,


Premise: The US treats those states who possess nuclear weapons with a greater degree of respect for their national sovereignty than those states that do not possess such weapons. Thus providing a powerful provocative motivation to gain such weapons in the very states that we are working the hardest to prevent from doing that very thing.

I'm not sure I agree with your premise. To begin with, all the nuclear powers but three are allies of the United States. For the exceptions - North Korea, China and Russia - there are many factors besides nuclear weapons for us to show greater respect for their sovereignty. Additionally, I don't think those three would argue the US shows their sovereignty much respect (Missile Defense, NATO expansion, Taiwan, human rights, proliferation security initiative, etc.)

Then, if you look at Iran, the perception that it seeks to develop weapons has increased calls to violate is sovereignty through military or covert action including regime change. One might therefore argue that pursuit of such weapons is more likely to result in violations of sovereignty.


Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?


Those states have told us directly where we are hypocritical: We actively oppose non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) acquiring legal dual-use technology while failing to take sufficient measures to abide by article VI of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). We are attempting to get states to implement the additional protocol to the NPT, yet we are receiving significant pushback from the NNWS because of this perception of hypocrisy. Then there is our bilateral nuclear deal with India, which greatly damaged our credibility on nonproliferation and is arguably a violation of the spirit of the NPT.

So rather than make a declaration on the equality of sovereignty, it might be better for the US to make more efforts toward disarmament and at least rhetorically end the policy that the NNWS should not be blocked from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology.

[William F. Owen]

I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.
Your a fan of using Intelligence on which to base your policy?? ME TOO!! :D

[Entropy]

Your a fan of using Intelligence on which to base your policy?? ME TOO!! :D

Yeah, it's a pretty radical concept! :D

[Bob's World]

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184/)I read a couple of years ago for a class:



Thoughts on this?

BW,



I'm not sure I agree with your premise. To begin with, all the nuclear powers but three are allies of the United States. For the exceptions - North Korea, China and Russia - there are many factors besides nuclear weapons for us to show greater respect for their sovereignty. Additionally, I don't think those three would argue the US shows their sovereignty much respect (Missile Defense, NATO expansion, Taiwan, human rights, proliferation security initiative, etc.)

Then, if you look at Iran, the perception that it seeks to develop weapons has increased calls to violate is sovereignty through military or covert action including regime change. One might therefore argue that pursuit of such weapons is more likely to result in violations of sovereignty.



Those states have told us directly where we are hypocritical: We actively oppose non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) acquiring legal dual-use technology while failing to take sufficient measures to abide by article VI of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). We are attempting to get states to implement the additional protocol to the NPT, yet we are receiving significant pushback from the NNWS because of this perception of hypocrisy. Then there is our bilateral nuclear deal with India, which greatly damaged our credibility on nonproliferation and is arguably a violation of the spirit of the NPT.

So rather than make a declaration on the equality of sovereignty, it might be better for the US to make more efforts toward disarmament and at least rhetorically end the policy that the NNWS should not be blocked from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology.

One of all of the nuclear states we have bombed or invaded in the past 20 years; and one of all of the non-nuclear states we have bombed or invaded.

Then explain to me once again how we treat everyone with the same respect to their sovereignty.

[Bill Moore]

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Perhaps, but to date efforts to extend an olive branch to Iran and North Korea haven't been productive, and one can make strong arguments they have been counterproductive. North Korea and Iran are not seeking nuclear weapons only to counter U.S. power, they also have regional interests, other actors they want to influence (or deter if you will) by acquiring these weapons. I do refer to them as threats based on their activities and their stated intentions. Other countries are developing nuclear weapons that are competitors versus threats, but when we have a threat we must recognize it and not play see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.

I think the underlying theme in the deterence argument is a failure to address the limits of U.S. government power (power defined as the ability to influence). As the world becomes ever more connected we're becoming just another player on the field, versus "the" player, and individual actors are gaining more power with ever increasng connectiveness which allows them to form their own coalitions ranging from Islamist violent extremist groups, environmentalists, tea-party groups, anti-globalists, transnational criminal organizations, etc. BW's discussed the civil rights movement in another thread. Martin Luther King had the power to influence the most powerful nation in the world. That type of movement can no longer be constrained by modern states with democratic values, and we see more of those states emerging around the world. Unfortunately not all movements will be as altruistic as the civil rights movement, some movements will be focused on restricted rights and imposing shari'a law.

While we are unquestionably the greatest military power, we have witnessed the limits of military power aganst people power. People power is not vulnerable to our type of military power (powerful, high tech western militaries constrained by our western values). What other forms of power do we have? Diplomacy? How do we employ diplomacy to influence non-state actors? Our diplomacy is in as great of need for reformation/transformation as our miltary. Our current use of diplomacy is to build coalitions of like minded partners to do more of the same, economic sanctions (although we can't control the black economy, and it is growing larger day by day), build a conventional military coalition to respond ineffectively to an irregular threat? Or extend olive branches to bad actors when all else fails? Our information power has been subverted by grass roots activists who build schools and establish websites to indoctrinate (and in the case of Islamists radicalize) people receptive to their message. Our message doesn't promise paradise, nor does provide answers to the questions people ask in developing nations, nor does it provide a sense of belonging, and rarely does it touch the populace it needs to. We have a narrative based on capitalistic values that is all too often turned against us by so-called spiritual leaders. Spiritual leaders touch emotion, while we try to reason with people based on "our" values. Emotion has always had more impact than reason. The same is true of our economic power, it is misdirected at large projects, while our foes effectively use their money to organize at the grass roots level (building schools/madrass's as mentioned above), again to mobilize the people to support them.

I know many will disagree, but the more I think about our SECDEF's efforts to focus our military on irregular warfare, the more I realize just how far we are from optimizing our government to address to these threats.

[marct]

Interesting discussion, Bob. Back to your slides for a minute - why are you excluding non-state actors from well governed states? I'm not referring to the issue of Islamist radicals in Europe (or Canada, the US, Australia, etc.) - I'm talking about multinational corporations, transnational organizations and supra-national bodies regardless of whether or not they are capable of overt military action.

[Entropy]

One of all of the nuclear states we have bombed or invaded in the past 20 years; and one of all of the non-nuclear states we have bombed or invaded.

Then explain to me once again how we treat everyone with the same respect to their sovereignty.

I never said we treated everyone equally. What I said was that factors other than nuclear status account for the different treatment. Being an ally of most nuclear weapons states is a pretty big reason we haven't bombed or invaded them. If Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons disappeared tomorrow it is still pretty unlikely we would bomb or invade them.

[Bob's World]

Interesting discussion, Bob. Back to your slides for a minute - why are you excluding non-state actors from well governed states? I'm not referring to the issue of Islamist radicals in Europe (or Canada, the US, Australia, etc.) - I'm talking about multinational corporations, transnational organizations and supra-national bodies regardless of whether or not they are capable of overt military action.

I very specifically used the term "actor" for the non-state category as they do not represent nor have a direct official link to any state. Could a corporation be a "non-state actor", absolutely. Now, most corporations have to operate primarily within the law, so we have strings on them that work quite well. My main concern then are those non-state actors with no such compulsion to be constrained by law. I am also more focused on those with political agenda, vice profit agendas.

If, however, a corporation chose to act outside the law to pursue a political agenda they would fall in this group; but again, we can always yank them back by fact that they must operate primarily within the law.

The poster child for the category of non-state actors I describe here is AQ. Not the many nationalist insurgency movements who have put on AQ T-shirts for cool points and "corporate" sponsoring; but the core AQ ran by Mr. bin Laden. As to those nationalist insurgencies I would refuse to recoginze their claim to being AQ and call them by their original name, and certainly prescribe engagement based upon their primary nationalist purpose.

[Bob's World]

I never said we treated everyone equally. What I said was that factors other than nuclear status account for the different treatment. Being an ally of most nuclear weapons states is a pretty big reason we haven't bombed or invaded them. If Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons disappeared tomorrow it is still pretty unlikely we would bomb or invade them.

If you were a state leader, and your state had an agenda and interests that ran counter to the US; and you had no desire to subjugate yourself to the US, nor to back off from what you saw as your duty to pursue in support of your populace, what are your options?

1. Form an alliance and subjugate yourself to some nuclear state willing to rebuff the US. or

2. Gain your own nuclear weapon so that the US would back off a bit.

I think this is the perception our policy projects; and I believe that addressing that perception would help us tremendously in our very reasonable interest in promoting non-proliferation.

[slapout9]

Could a corporation be a "non-state actor", absolutely. Now, most corporations have to operate primarily within the law, so we have strings on them that work quite well. My main concern then are those non-state actors with no such compulsion to be constrained by law. I am also more focused on those with political agenda, vice profit agendas.

If, however, a corporation chose to act outside the law to pursue a political agenda they would fall in this group; but again, we can always yank them back by fact that they must operate primarily within the law.


Flat out the most dangerous opponent out there....I am convinced we will fight a rogue corporation in the future and the military may not win:eek: they invent the hardware and know how to turn it off, the military could be a total sitting duck. A Trans National Corporation is nothing but a Criminal (RICO) organization.

[Entropy]

BW,

There is that perception in some cases, but there's also the realization that pursuit of nuclear weapons (as opposed to actually possessing them) is going to increase one's chances of getting bombed by the US. The US has demonstrated and clearly stated its willingness to use force to prevent that.

I also think the history of nuclear proliferation shows that governments are willing to risk those consequences if they perceive an existential threat. That was the case with Brazil/Argentina, Iran/Iraq, Israel/Arab World, and India/Pakistan. The case of Brazil and Argentina is particularly instructive since it demonstrates how reduced tensions and bilateral transparency can lead to states deciding that nuclear weapons are no longer in their interest.

On Iran, my analysis indicates that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons during the 1980's and 1990's because of Iraq, not the US or Israel. Now that Iraq is no longer a threat to Iran, Iran's strategic rationale for nuclear weapons is gone. The policy problem I see is that most policymakers and analysts believe Iran's program is independent of its strategic position and that Iran is "bent" on acquiring weapons regardless. To me that is a dangerous and ahistorical view that will lead to self-fulfilling policymaking.

For most of the rest of the world, however, I think the bigger issue is the perception (and often the reality) that the US works to deny nations the benefits of nuclear technology while failing to live up to its disarmament obligations under the NPT. A big reason the NNWS originally agreed to the limits imposed on them by the NPT was access to nuclear technology.

Personally, I think unless things change, the NPT's days are numbered. The NNWS are not going to collectively adhere to the NPT when they believe the US and other NWS are breaking the spirit and letter of the agreement.

[marct]

Hi Bob,


I very specifically used the term "actor" for the non-state category as they do not represent nor have a direct official link to any state. Could a corporation be a "non-state actor", absolutely.

I suspected that was the case, but it was important for me to check :D.


Now, most corporations have to operate primarily within the law, so we have strings on them that work quite well. My main concern then are those non-state actors with no such compulsion to be constrained by law. I am also more focused on those with political agenda, vice profit agendas. If, however, a corporation chose to act outside the law to pursue a political agenda they would fall in this group; but again, we can always yank them back by fact that they must operate primarily within the law.

Here's where I suspect we disagree. Which law controls multi-national corporations actions? It certainly isn't US law that controls their actions outside of US jurisidiction. International law? Tricky, especially when numerous states don't follow it or, if they do, they often have different, and sometimes contradictory, interpretations of it.

As far as "strings" are concerned, we, like most good analogies, they work both ways. As an example, consider the prevalence of corporate strings into various governments and their ability to manipulate and/or outright construct the "law" (legislation).

I'll also note that, historically, we have seen a lot of wars and other conflicts start as a direct result of corporate actions.


Flat out the most dangerous opponent out there....I am convinced we will fight a rouge corporation in the future and the military may not win:eek: they invent the hardware and know how to turn it off, the military could be a total sitting duck. A Trans National Corporation is nothing but a Criminal(RICO)organization.

More importantly, Slap, they control the politicians who control the military :wry:.

[slapout9]

More importantly, Slap, they control the politicians who control the military :wry:.

YEP!


The Law/Treaties have a lot to do with why we will NEVER be able to deter attacks against the US. Except for Ken probably nobody remembers that before the SALT 1 treaty EVERY city in the US (above 200,000 I think) was protected by an ARMY ADA (air defense artillery battalion)..... that was given away during the SALT treaty......we completely disarmed ourselves against a basic Air Strike:mad::mad: did you ever hear of a single Guvmint 911 investigation into that.....don't think so.


Bob's World..... Tampa had one of the largest if I remember. You should see if you can find some of the history of the unit down there.....I guarantee they had a protocol on what to do if a civilian aircraft was used to attack Tampa(Mafia Town protects their own). Many of these threats and responses were figured out in the late 50 and 60's when I was growing up. What we are calling non-state actors were called Sub-National threats back then. Dealing with those threats is part of the reason why we have an Interstate highway system.....which was actually called the Strategic Interstate highway system .....these threats also led the Army to spur the development of............THE INTERNET so they could communicate if the regular communications system were attacked. And then there was CONELRAD ahhh the good old days.

[Bill Moore]

There are numerous academic books and books along the lines of tabloid exposes on the challenges that multinationals pose to the nation state. I'm pulling this from memory, so it is only approximate at best. Out of the 100 largest economies in the world, MN corporations compose around 60 of them. Walmart and Exxon being among the largest have larger economies than many (perhaps most) nations. That is power, because they have the freedom to wield that power without going through Congress or being restricted by a mature bureaucracy that limits what the government can and can't spend money on.

There are at least a couple of so-whats to this. First, they wield considerable influence with their spending power. As Marc eluded to they can buy politicians, they can also buy lobbyists, and wage well funded media campaigns to support their objectives. A corporation within a State falls under that State's laws (though they can buy protection from the law in many instances). A multinational falls under international law which is interpreted differently in different countries, and of course if you're getting off and your a corrupt third world politician you're probably going to look the other way at human rights abuses, environmental violations, etc., other wise the MN will move to another country where they can get the legal environment they want.

Several people and organizations, NGOs and governments alike, are calling for international cooperation through the EU and UN in an attempt to reel in some of the MN's power by establishing international rules that will be enforced. The concern is that MN's are run by CEO's who are not democratically elected and their loyalty is to their investors, not the people or the State. This simply reinforces my point (and many others) that the nation-state (to include the U.S.) is becoming less powerful and more and more just another player on the global stage. The world is being reshaped, we're not reshaping it.

I'm not aware of any MN directly starting a conflict, but they likely have influenced political leaders to some extent to either get involved or stay away from a conflict due to risk or gain to their business interests. Perhaps a more subtle example of a MN corporation influencing policy is CNN. Arguments have been made that the CNN effect at least weighed in on the decision criteria of the Clinton administration to get involved in Somalia. On the other hand, the media (especially CNN) attempted to drag us into Sudan over the Dafur issue and failed, so there are limits, but still they are a non-state actor that is defnitely a player on the world stage.

What concerns me is the unrealized potential to date that MN's have to influence global events beyond the control of any government for less than altruistic purposes. I suspect that Pandora's box hasn't been fully opened yet in this regard. I suspect it will be easier (not easy) to deter a MN than a fanatical group.

[Dayuhan]

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184/)I read a couple of years ago for a class:


I agree on the definition (or perceived definition) of deterrence, which is why I think "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" is probably not the best start for a discussion of the full range of tactics available to counter these threats.

Deterrence based on physical retaliation is part of the toolbox, but it can't be the only part. Retaliation against an enemy that has no discrete geographical base is often difficult, and a predictable policy of retaliation can actually be used against us. Islamist radicals in particular would like to see overt US intervention in as many places as possible; that strains our resources, tires our populace, and feeds their propaganda mill. If our response to attack or threat becomes predictable, this allows our antagonists to effectively manipulate us. We need deterrence, but it has to be unpredictable deterrence: the last thing we need is to back ourselves into a corner where our own deterrence policy can be used to drag us into an ever-increasing number of extended conflicts.

Influence, disincentive, and dissuasion will have little impact on the hard core of committed true believers at the core of most irregular threats, but they can play an important role is isolating that core from its sources of support and sanctuary.

There's also a wide range of possible preemptive measures. These involve using the widest possible range of intelligence methods to identify who is plotting against us and what they are plotting, then using military or LE resources to neutralize the plotters before they are able to execute their plans.

We need to work the financial end of the picture as well: we may never make it impossible to finance irregular threats, but we can certainly make it more difficult and more dangerous.

We have protective measures to consider: defending vulnerable targets, improving screening at key immigration points, monitoring incoming cargo, etc. In itself insufficient of course, but a component of an overall strategy.

All of these components, and others, need to be involved in the effort to counter irregular threats. That's why I don't like to talk about "deterrence of irregular threats": it emphasizes threat-based deterrence over the other equally important elements of a comprehensive strategy to counter irregular threats.

One of the stark realities of the irregular threat is that no matter how effectively we plan and execute our counter-strategy, we will still be vulnerable. A small group of committed extremists is very difficult to preempt, deter, or dissuade, and there will never be any assurance that we will be 100% effective. That's certainly no reason not to try.

[Dayuhan]

Which law controls multi-national corporations actions? It certainly isn't US law that controls their actions outside of US jurisidiction. International law? Tricky, especially when numerous states don't follow it or, if they do, they often have different, and sometimes contradictory, interpretations of it.


Very simple answer: operations of a multinational corporation are subject to the laws of the country in which the operation in question is located. Has to be that way, really. If operations of company x in country y were governed by US law, international law, or some sort of supranational body, country y would effectively be relinquishing its right to determine its own internal policies, and no sovereign state is ever going to relinquish that right to a multilateral body, still less to a foreign government.

I personally think the threat of multinational corporations is somewhat overrated, and largely influenced by legions of movies and novels. I'm not saying they are benevolent, but neither are thy malevolent. Most governments do nurture and cultivate their business ectors, including corporations, but that's not because they are controlled by big business, its because no matter how good a scapegoat "the corporations" make and no matter how much politicians love to rail against them, at the end of the day every country needs them and depends on them. Even those who most love to hate them need them: without multinationals and their products the Naomi Kleins and Noam Chomskys of the world would be reduced to writing out their screeds in manuscript and nailing them to church doors.

[slapout9]

Link to 1979 article "Principles Of Deterrence" by John M. Collins, Colonel USA,ret.



http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/nov-dec/jcollins.html

[Bob's World]

Slap, I have to take back some of the bad things I say about the AF. This is a pretty good piece, and surprisingly comprehensive and balanced. I see a few sound bytes I can use as I package this up.

My (modest) intent is to make the case that:

1. Our overall concept of how we deter must be reassessed to more fully and accurately take into account these new actors;

2. To make the case that "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" is a worthy concept to consider to replace the largely unpalatable one of "Irregular Warfare;" and

3. That Deterrence of Irregular Threats makes a better umbrella than Counterterrorism for the next revision of our GWOT plans.

I appreciate all the thoughtful comments and input over the weekend from everyone.

[William F. Owen]

1. Our overall concept of how we deter must be reassessed to more fully and accurately take into account these new actors;

What new Actors? Do you mean, "new" as in new group, or do you mean "new political aims and means"?

[marct]

Hi Bill,


There are at least a couple of so-whats to this. First, they wield considerable influence with their spending power. As Marc eluded to they can buy politicians, they can also buy lobbyists, and wage well funded media campaigns to support their objectives. A corporation within a State falls under that State's laws (though they can buy protection from the law in many instances). A multinational falls under international law which is interpreted differently in different countries, and of course if you're getting off and your a corrupt third world politician you're probably going to look the other way at human rights abuses, environmental violations, etc., other wise the MN will move to another country where they can get the legal environment they want.

That's a good listing of the "so what's", thanks Bill! Let me add in a few others that, I believe, are directly relevant to Bob's model.

1. MNC's have the ability to manipulate the economies of nation states via changes in employment (opening or closing local organizations), by "investment", and via changes in import / export markets. The largest group doing this, at least in the 1980's, were the auto manufacturers and the oil companies. The ability to manipulate the economy can lead to either a stabilization of a regime or a destabilization of it.

2. Some MNCs have the ability to control information flow in a society (both access and message). While we would notmally think of media companies such as CNN or Al Jezzera, it also includes telecom companies such as Alcatel, Shanghai telephone and Telegraph, Nokia, Seimans, Cisco, etc. This gives these companies the potential to manipulate both messages and communications channels.


Several people and organizations, NGOs and governments alike, are calling for international cooperation through the EU and UN in an attempt to reel in some of the MN's power by establishing international rules that will be enforced. The concern is that MN's are run by CEO's who are not democratically elected and their loyalty is to their investors, not the people or the State. This simply reinforces my point (and many others) that the nation-state (to include the U.S.) is becoming less powerful and more and more just another player on the global stage. The world is being reshaped, we're not reshaping it.

Yup. In really condensed, academic shorthand, "globalization" is about the destruction of national sovereignties and the creation of a form of techno-feudalism with MNCs as the "fiefs".


I'm not aware of any MN directly starting a conflict, but they likely have influenced political leaders to some extent to either get involved or stay away from a conflict due to risk or gain to their business interests.

The Opium Wars, roughly 50% of the wars in India during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the conquest of Rhodesia are all older examples. The modern ones are much more complex, but include the entry of Japan into WW II (it had to do with Japanesse access to oil) and the "Banana Wars". In general, what would happen would be that a state-based MNC would "convince" the state that their freedom of operation was in the "national interest" and, hence, military action was neccessary.


Perhaps a more subtle example of a MN corporation influencing policy is CNN. Arguments have been made that the CNN effect at least weighed in on the decision criteria of the Clinton administration to get involved in Somalia. On the other hand, the media (especially CNN) attempted to drag us into Sudan over the Dafur issue and failed, so there are limits, but still they are a non-state actor that is defnitely a player on the world stage.

Yup and what with the Chinesse playing a major role in Sudan (oil again), it's a good think in some ways that the US wasn't dragged in :wry:. At the same time, getting the AU involved just showed how poor they were.


What concerns me is the unrealized potential to date that MN's have to influence global events beyond the control of any government for less than altruistic purposes. I suspect that Pandora's box hasn't been fully opened yet in this regard. I suspect it will be easier (not easy) to deter a MN than a fanatical group.

I agree, it should be easier, but it is getting less easy that it used to be.

[Bob's World]

What new Actors? Do you mean, "new" as in new group, or do you mean "new political aims and means"?

We have broadly painted a range of newly empowered actors as "terrorists" that tends to conflate what is acutally a very diverse group, both in nature as well as actual aims and means. To additionally call all of this a "global insurgency" clouds the water even more.

Goal here is to attempt to lend greater clarity to understanding these organizations and then designing more effective means of deterring not just these actors from threating the US and our interests; but also to update our deterrence of traditional actors (states) to better account for the full spectrum of engagement.

[slapout9]

:)
Slap, I have to take back some of the bad things I say about the AF. This is a pretty good piece, and surprisingly comprehensive and balanced. I see a few sound bytes I can use as I package this up.

My (modest) intent is to make the case that:

1. Our overall concept of how we deter must be reassessed to more fully and accurately take into account these new actors;

2. To make the case that "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" is a worthy concept to consider to replace the largely unpalatable one of "Irregular Warfare;" and

3. That Deterrence of Irregular Threats makes a better umbrella than Counterterrorism for the next revision of our GWOT plans.

I appreciate all the thoughtful comments and input over the weekend from everyone.

Thought you would like it. The author is an ARMY Colonel:) Also the time period was not to far from when the Army and Air Force still talked to each other a fair amount. I have been trying to remember stuff that may help you because this has been hashed out in pretty fair detail by the ARMY in the late 50's and 60's the ARMY had much more to do with winning the Cuban Missile crisis then they were ever given credit for, I lived through it and watched it happen at very close range.....some of these history experts that make documentaries about what really happend:cool: often have know idea what they are talking about. Good luck. Show us the end product if you can. Roger Dodger.... Over and Out.

[Bob's World]

:)

Thought you would like it. The author is an ARMY Colonel:) Also the time period was not to far from when the Army and Air Force still talked to each other a fair amount. I have been trying to remember stuff that may help you because this has been hashed out in pretty fair detail by the ARMY in the late 50's and 60's the ARMY had much more to do with winning the Cuban Missile crisis then they were ever given credit for, I lived through it and watched it happen at very close range.....some of these history experts that make documentaries about what really happend:cool: often have know idea what they are talking about. Good luck. Show us the end product if you can. Roger Dodger.... Over and Out.

...particularly when one spouse got all of the good real estate and most of the money! But I stand by my apology to my AF brothers.

A couple of nuggets (written in 79; but both based on a variety of writings frm the 50s and 60s) that I particularly liked and am using in my pitch:

“Deterrence is a strategy for peace, not war, designed primarily to persuade
opponents that aggression of any kind is the least attractive of all alternative.”

and

“Deterrence induces powers to dissuade, not coerce or compel. Psychological pressure is its prime property; opposing intentions are its principal target. Rival capabilities remain physically untouched.”


I stand by the position that we are not currently at war, merely in a very dangerous complex peace. To look at what we are is as war leads to war-like approaches to problems. To look at it as peace lends it self to applying the principles of deterrence instead. The former muddles along far too much in the realm of the "unacceptable, unsuitable and infeasible"...yet if it is war it must be right. In the construct of deterrence I believe it is easier to see that certain actions cannot acieve the result being sought.

[marct]

Hi Bob,


We have broadly painted a range of newly empowered actors as "terrorists" that tends to conflate what is acutally a very diverse group, both in nature as well as actual aims and means. To additionally call all of this a "global insurgency" clouds the water even more.

A good point, and that type of broad-brush mis-terming has been a serious problem IMO. One problem that comes out of it is that by calling it a "global insurgency" there is an implication that the US claims global sovereignty - a point not lost on many people outside of the US :wry:.


Goal here is to attempt to lend greater clarity to understanding these organizations and then designing more effective means of deterring not just these actors from threating the US and our interests; but also to update our deterrence of traditional actors (states) to better account for the full spectrum of engagement.

So, in effect, you are seeking a perceptual model that will allow for the development of a new "convention" for conflict (broadly construed). Is that correct?

[Ken White]

I stand by the position that we are not currently at war, merely in a very dangerous complex peace.I agree we, the US of A, are not at war -- though some folks in the US Armed Forces sure are in one or more.

I'm not at all sure that the peace is a bit more complex than was that before WWI, WWII or the Cold War. I'd also submit it only seems more dangerous than it need be -- and we made it that way...
To look at it as peace lends it self to applying the principles of deterrence instead... In the construct of deterrence I believe it is easier to see that certain actions cannot acieve the result being sought.Totally agree on that.

[Bob's World]

Hi Bob,



A good point, and that type of broad-brush mis-terming has been a serious problem IMO. One problem that comes out of it is that by calling it a "global insurgency" there is an implication that the US claims global sovereignty - a point not lost on many people outside of the US :wry:.



So, in effect, you are seeking a perceptual model that will allow for the development of a new "convention" for conflict (broadly construed). Is that correct?
Just a new convention for the deterrence of conflict.

This is the irony of current guidance, essentially: "Win the war we're in, then deter future conflicts across the spectrum and be prepared to fight and win if deterrence fails." OK, but what if the current "Defeat" task you are employing against one threat is having such a provocative effect on others that you are making things worse by trying to "win;” when what you really want is simply to be able to go about the pursuit of your national interests without being attacked?

By recognizing what we are actually doing is not warfare but aggressive deterrence; it is easier to tone down the aggression to a more effective brand of deterrence. Winning is not the last AQ guy sitting in Gitmo. Winning is AQ's customers no longer believing that the US is standing between the populaces of their respective countries and good governance in their respective countries. Once that trend is set, AQ fades away because we will have robbed them of their purpose.

[Dayuhan]

The Opium Wars, roughly 50% of the wars in India during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the conquest of Rhodesia are all older examples. The modern ones are much more complex, but include the entry of Japan into WW II (it had to do with Japanesse access to oil) and the "Banana Wars". In general, what would happen would be that a state-based MNC would "convince" the state that their freedom of operation was in the "national interest" and, hence, military action was neccessary.


The colonial-era companies in your earlier examples were arguably "multinational corporations", but bore little resemblance to what we see in the multinational arena today. These entities had government charters allowing them to directly govern large areas; they had their own military forces and the unquestioned ability to call on government military support. They had the ability to initiate and wage war. How many of today's corporations can say the same?

Saying that Japan's entry into WW2 was over access to oil is a stretch, it would be more accurate to say that it was over resources in general: the Japanese needed more than oil. I don't see, though, how corporations played a causative role here. The entire trade structure of the colonial/mercantilist era was built around trade between colonies and mother countries; the companies were only one element in that picture. The mercantilist structure created a closed trading loop, and the only way a latecomer to the colonial table could acquire resources was to conquer them.

It was fashionable at one time to declare that Latin American interventions were "war for United Fruit", just as it was more recently fashionable to call the Iraq intervention "war for Exxon/Mobil". In both cases, there was a little more in the picture than that, though some companies, and many dictators, were quick to exploit the knee-jerk reaction that could be evoked by calling one's opponents "communist".

Deterring corporations is not difficult: you can delist their shares, seize their assets, arrest their executives. It's easier to just pass laws against the things you don't want them to do. Laws aren't always followed, but for the most part companies do try: anyone who has ever watched a company's compliance division trying to steer through mountains of incomprehensible, overlapping, and often contradictory multi-jurisdictional law and regulation knows just how difficult it can be. Laws do have direct and measurable impact: if you want to see the impact of laws barring western corporations from bribery, look at oil deals in Africa. Why do you think Chinese companies are making all the deals? Does anyone really think CNPC is offering deals that better suit the national interest?

If one is setting up a hierarchy of threat, I'd have to put multinational corporations way down the list. There are much more dangerous and much more immediate thrats to manage.

[Surferbeetle]

Deterring corporations is not difficult: you can delist their shares, seize their assets, arrest their executives. It's easier to just pass laws against the things you don't want them to do. Laws aren't always followed, but for the most part companies do try: anyone who has ever watched a company's compliance division trying to steer through mountains of incomprehensible, overlapping, and often contradictory multi-jurisdictional law and regulation knows just how difficult it can be. Laws do have direct and measurable impact: if you want to see the impact of laws barring western corporations from bribery, look at oil deals in Africa. Why do you think Chinese companies are making all the deals? Does anyone really think CNPC is offering deals that better suit the national interest?

(Dr.?)Steve,

As you know CNPC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_National_Petroleum_Corporation) is not the first to be involved with 'outside of the box' business models...

From Frontline: At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/at-siemens-bribery-was-just-a-line-item.html)


To understand how Siemens, one of the world's biggest companies, last week ended up paying $1.6 billion in the largest fine for bribery in modern corporate history, it's worth delving into Mr. Siekaczek's unusual journey.

A former midlevel executive at Siemens, he was one of several people who arranged a torrent of payments that eventually streamed to well-placed officials around the globe, from Vietnam to Venezuela and from Italy to Israel, according to interviews with Mr. Siekaczek and court records in Germany and the United States.

What is striking about Mr. Siekaczek's and prosecutors' accounts of those dealings, which flowed through a web of secret bank accounts and shadowy consultants, is how entrenched corruption had become at a sprawling, sophisticated corporation that externally embraced the nostrums of a transparent global marketplace built on legitimate transactions.

Mr. Siekaczek (pronounced SEE-kah-chek) says that from 2002 to 2006 he oversaw an annual bribery budget of about $40 million to $50 million at Siemens. Company managers and sales staff used the slush fund to cozy up to corrupt government officials worldwide.

From Wikipedia: The Dutch East India Company (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_East_India_Company)


The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC in Dutch, literally "United East Indian Company") was a trading company, which was established in 1602, when the States-General of the Netherlands granted it a 21-year monopoly to carry out colonial activities in Asia. It was the first multinational corporation in the world and the first company to issue stock.[1] It was also arguably the world's first megacorporation, possessing quasi-governmental powers, including the ability to wage war, negotiate treaties, coin money, and establish colonies.[2]

From Wikipedia: The City-State of Venice (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venice)


The Republic of Venice was a major maritime power during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, and a staging area for the Crusades and the Battle of Lepanto, as well as a very important center of commerce (especially silk, grain and spice trade) and art in the 13th century up to the end of the 17th century.

Steve

[slapout9]

And lets not forget the Templar Knights.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_Templar

What type of attack capability does Boeing Aircraft Corporation have if they really got pissed off?

[TheCurmudgeon]

The old adage is that Democracies do not go to war with each other. This is because democracies are slow and stupid – I mean it is because they value what they have and are reluctant to risk their hard fought gains. I don’t believe that is true, I believe that Democracies will go to war with each other, but WHAT they will fight over will be different from what monarchies went to war over. In any case, the democratic or quasi-democratic governments do not easily engage in direct action. Similarly, small states with inadequate militaries will not engage in direct action since they will be easily defeated.

But tensions still exist, and as another person here pointed out, if you squeeze a balloon it just bulges elsewhere. Since states won’t act or won’t act directly, others will. The result is that conflict moves from the realm of direct state-on-state engagement to state surrogates and non-state actors. Where a state surrogate exists it may still be possible to threaten direct action against the state, but probably not because of the collateral effect on the state’s population may make any direct threat counterproductive. The tools of deterrence therefore start to move away from direct military action (although never far away) to attacking the root causes of the tensions. You must preempt you’re enemy by directly addressing their issues, taking away their power over the people.

That is a F*&#ing tall order, particularly if your enemy is an ideological zealot. I don’t claim to have the answer to it. I think the Theater Security Cooperation Programs the COCOMs have is a start, but it needs to be more focused and tied into not only USAID but other international players. The farther you separate the population from the ideology of the zealot the more likely you are to remove the power base the zealot gains his resources from. In effect, you are cutting his supply lines, either by traditional deterrance targeted at the state sponsor or by removing the support of the local population. The latter requires an understanding of the indigenous population in a fashion probably only traditional SF forces are capable of. Therefore, you would have to have a two pronged approach, a carrot and a stick. (Guess which one is the stick)

All this seems a lot more like statecraft than military actions. Maybe it is. Maybe it is just recognition that we are part of Clausewitz’s trilogy just as our potential adversary is.

Anyway, thought I would throw in my 2-cents. All this may seem very basic, but sometimes I think the basics get lost in the minutia.

In case you were wondering, I am not a peacenik. I cringe every time I get a Christmas card that reads “Peace on Earth” as that would put me out of a job.:D

[Dayuhan]

(Dr.?)Steve,

As you know CNPC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_National_Petroleum_Corporation) is not the first to be involved with 'outside of the box' business models...

From Frontline: At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/at-siemens-bribery-was-just-a-line-item.html)


Dr??? Lord, no, far from it.

Certainly neither CNPC nor Siemens is the first or the last to be involvbed with bribery. The difference, of course, is that Siemens got caught, and slapped with a $1.6 billion fine. I don't think you'll see CNPC paying any fines.

Never invest in a market where there are no scandals. Somebody will always push the envelope: if there are no scandals, that just means nobody's getting caught, and if nobody's getting caught that there is no incentive to stay in the envelope, which means there is no envelope. Yes, corporations and there executives get up to all kinds of monkey business, which is why we routinely see them getting hauled into the courts. How many government officials do we see getting hauled into court? Is that number low because they are all fearfully well behaved and nobody is doing anything wrong?

I'm not sure how analogous the various East India Companies, the State of Venice, and the Templars are to modern corporations. Not that trade and business are not potential sources of friction: they are, and always will be. I don't expect to see a Corporation going to war any time soon.


What type of attack capability does Boeing Aircraft Corporation have if they really got pissed off?

Who do you figure they'd bomb, Airbus Industrie? What do you think that would do to their share price?

If we want to see what Boeing would do when pissed off, all we have to do is look at recent events. Not long ago Boeing lost out on a $35 billion USAF contract for tanker aircraft, a contract they were widely expected to win. Not only that, they lost out to a European-dominated consortium. That had to piss them off, but nobody got bombed. Instead, they howled to their Congresspeople, and encouraged their subcontractors - strategically distributed over key legislative districts - to do the same, and the contract award was rescinded and sent back for review. That's a good deal more than bombing anyone (not a tactic likely to sell airplanes, to the Government or to airlines) would have accomplished.

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.

[William F. Owen]

All this seems a lot more like statecraft than military actions. Maybe it is. Maybe it is just recognition that we are part of Clausewitz’s trilogy just as our potential adversary is.


Concur. It seems to me that US posters in particular write about, discuss and attempt to inform "the policy" - which to me is entirely political. The military should not muck about with the policy. The policy is what they enforce, not create, and even then, the politicians place constraints in your path, meaning it may actually be impossible.

[Ken White]

...Never invest in a market where there are no scandals. Somebody will always push the envelope: if there are no scandals, that just means nobody's getting caught, and if nobody's getting caught that there is no incentive to stay in the envelope, which means there is no envelope...

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.Verily on the first item. On the second; the Big Guys like peace and tranquility, better for their market share. They may do bad stuff, no question, unless checked by governments or competitors but mass violence is not in their interest.

[marct]

Hi Ken,


On the second; the Big Guys like peace and tranquility, better for their market share. They may do bad stuff, no question, unless checked by governments or competitors but mass violence is not in their interest.

Well, I'd agree with that if you limited it to their market area ;). Mass violence has proven to be quite lucrative for a number of corporations as long as it took place outside their major bases.

From Dayuhan

I'm not sure how analogous the various East India Companies, the State of Venice, and the Templars are to modern corporations. Not that trade and business are not potential sources of friction: they are, and always will be. I don't expect to see a Corporation going to war any time soon.

The various Charter companies are somewhat analogous to the larger resource and manufacturing companies, albeit without much sovereignty... although, now that I think of it, didn't one of the German companies have a limited form of sovereignty in Katanga province?

Venice was a classic Port of Trade type society (cf Karl Polanyi in various places such as Trade and Market in early Empires (http://www.amazon.com/Market-Empires-Arensberg-Pearson-Polanyi/dp/B000OMKBQM/ref=sr_1_28?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1249400063&sr=1-28)). Few of them project much actual kinetic "power" - Venice, Carthage, Tyre and Sidon are early city state examples. Today, about the only major one left is Singapore (Hong Kong used to be one, but...). It think they are relevant as a model because it would be quite possible for a group of corporations to get together, "buy" a country and turn it into a Port of Trade.

As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.

On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes).

[Bob's World]

"Some people you just can't deter" or stated another way "Some people you just have to kill"

I won't argue with either statement, but I would attempt to offer perhaps a little to consider in the application of my model of actors to add some perspectives:

1. Agreed that certain individuals can not be deterred, as such they fall into that far right box of actor on my model. And certainly AQ and Greenpeace (non-state actors) and 1945 Japan (State Actor) are or were full of such individuals. Interesting, true, and largely immaterial to our larger mission of deterrence.

2. While even the majority of individuals within an organization may be undeterable individually, rare is the organization that cannot be deterred if addressed appropriately.

Japanese were willing to die to the last man, woman and child to preserve the Nation, but once the death of the nation was threatened through the use of nuclear weapons they surrendered to preserve Japan.

The zealot member of Greenpeace will likely remain zealots no matter what, but the nature of the organization can be shaped through a well designed scheme of encouraging and preventive measures designed to deter them from acting in a way that is unacceptable.

Same with AQ. Many members will never change; but AQ can be disempowered by both engaging them appropriately and by targeting the motivation of the many nationalist insurgencies that they franchise under their banner that currently perceive the US to be the obstacle to achieving good governance in their respective states. Certainly good messaging and the surgical removal of key rabble rousers is appropriate (low provocative) ways helps.

Bottom line is that everything is related; and certainly in the deterrence of irregular threats one must recognize that how we engage any of these actors affects popular perceptions; how we engage AQ will have positive, neutral, or negative effects on support to various insurgent movements and vice versa. Balance across the spectrum, think before we speak or act, and recognize provocative and deterrent effects differ by audience.

The military has a key role in all of this. All of this is also policy. You cannot separate. Military does not and should not craft policy; but we certainly must inform it, as we will be a major component of its implementation.

Perhaps this is uniquely American. We speak up where other may remain silent. Brash, you know. Probably, like most Americans, when I read the "Charge of the Light Brigade" I don't get inspired. I respect the hell out of those poor bastards, but I don't wish I was there with them. The American soldier is more likely to say "Why not call in some arty first sir, and then hit that open flank?"

[William F. Owen]

As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.

On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes).
The Templars were De-facto actors for the Pope. They were an executive military arm, of Roman Catholic political power, - when they became a competing political entity, they had to be destroyed? (maybe)
Regardless of the conspiracy theories, Machiavelli warns about the use of Mercenaries for exactly this reason.

Not so different from Executive Outcomes who were contractors to create "stability" so as resources exploitation could take place, and thus enforce the policy of the government. The world is getting more Medieval (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Hawkwood) everyday!

- thus more Clausewitian!! :D

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


The Templars were De-facto actors for the Pope. They were an executive military arm, of Roman Catholic political power, - when they became a competing political entity, they had to be destroyed? (maybe)
Regardless of the conspiracy theories, Machiavelli warns about the use of Mercenaries for exactly this reason.

That's why they went underground :D!

Yeah, Machiavelli warned against the use of mercenaries and, IMO, for good reason. Of course, that was in the Prince which was him sucking up so that he could get out of exile - note that the prince involved was descended from mercenaries too :cool:.


Not so different from Executive Outcomes who were contractors to create "stability" so as resources exploitation could take place, and thus enforce the policy of the government. The world is getting more Medieval (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Hawkwood) everyday!

- thus more Clausewitian!! :D

Hawkwood was always one of my favorites ;). And, yes, I think we are getting more medieval....

[slapout9]

If we want to see what Boeing would do when pissed off, all we have to do is look at recent events. Not long ago Boeing lost out on a $35 billion USAF contract for tanker aircraft, a contract they were widely expected to win. Not only that, they lost out to a European-dominated consortium. That had to piss them off, but nobody got bombed. Instead, they howled to their Congresspeople, and encouraged their subcontractors - strategically distributed over key legislative districts - to do the same, and the contract award was rescinded and sent back for review. That's a good deal more than bombing anyone (not a tactic likely to sell airplanes, to the Government or to airlines) would have accomplished.

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.


I never said anything about bombing anybody! I said attack which is exactly what they did. Your account of their behavior proves my point. Living in Alabama and having legally WON the contract for the tanker TWICE just shows how MNC do not respect any rules or laws, if they don't get their way they will engage in Irregular Warfare until they get it.

Better defention of war than the one commonly used.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war

[slapout9]

2. While even the majority of individuals within an organization may be undeterable individually, rare is the organization that cannot be deterred if addressed appropriately.



That is the key....The Enemy is a system! and if you understand the system properly it can generally be deterred.

[slapout9]

Bob, here is some good Air Force stuff on what to do.
So what kind of organization do we need to deter irregular threats?Colonel Warden's suggestion from a long time ago. Stop thinking like the dead Prussian Guy.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/fal99/vorfal99.html


Start thinking like Americans and we will be alright.... for your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement ELO-Calling America
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uE6RqGgmPZA&feature=fvst

[Ken White]

and just reread it.

Interesting thing is I had many of the same thoughts he expresses some 30 or more years before he wrote that. He was a Retired Colonel, so he wrote his thoughts down and got 'em published. About the time a lot of that stuff gelled for me, I was a Platoon Sergeant and, had I written it, no one would've paid an ounce of attention.

Warden and I have one other thing in common -- neither of our thoughts on that line are going to happen because to do those things would upset the system. The 'system' hates risk and innovation...

[Dayuhan]

You must preempt you’re enemy by directly addressing their issues, taking away their power over the people.

That is a F*&#ing tall order, particularly if your enemy is an ideological zealot.

This is true... you will not convert ideological zealots by addressing their issues. You can, however, isolate that ideological zealot from his sources of recruits, money, and sanctuary, and simultaneously pursue him with military or LE tools, as appropriate to the environment.

[Dayuhan]

Slap...


I never said anything about bombing anybody! I said attack which is exactly what they did. Your account of their behavior proves my point. Living in Alabama and having legally WON the contract for the tanker TWICE just shows how MNC do not respect any rules or laws, if they don't get their way they will engage in Irregular Warfare until they get it.

Yes, politicians will go to bat for major employers in their districts, and these issues are often settled by political influence. Welcome to America.

Does that happen because politicians are corrupt, or because they are representing the interests of their districts... or a little of both? Is this "irregular warfare", or simply a less savory side of democracy?

Seems to me there's abundant room for discussion of how to manage the influence of special interests on government (corporate, labor, religious, ideological, etc), but that seems more of a political reform discussion than a small wars discussion. I doubt that we're likely to see anything from the corporate side that would constitute an "irregular threat" that needs to be deterred.



Well, I'd agree with that if you limited it to their market area ;). Mass violence has proven to be quite lucrative for a number of corporations as long as it took place outside their major bases...

The various Charter companies are somewhat analogous to the larger resource and manufacturing companies, albeit without much sovereignty... although, now that I think of it, didn't one of the German companies have a limited form of sovereignty in Katanga province?

Venice was a classic Port of Trade type society (cf Karl Polanyi in various places such as Trade and Market in early Empires (http://www.amazon.com/Market-Empires-Arensberg-Pearson-Polanyi/dp/B000OMKBQM/ref=sr_1_28?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1249400063&sr=1-28)). Few of them project much actual kinetic "power" - Venice, Carthage, Tyre and Sidon are early city state examples. Today, about the only major one left is Singapore (Hong Kong used to be one, but...). It think they are relevant as a model because it would be quite possible for a group of corporations to get together, "buy" a country and turn it into a Port of Trade.


Dubai might be classed as a Port of Trade, and arguably the Netherlands. Hong Kong is still pretty close, they just changed nominal sovereigns. The Chinese have messed a bit with HK politics, but they don't want to mess too much with the revenue stream.

Much of the discourse on this subject ignores the adaptive changes we've seen in corporate investment practices over the last 30 years.

Once upon a time a fruit packer would own plantations and hire employees in developing nations. That's very rare now: they are more likely to deal with contract growers in as many supply areas as possible, letting the local contractor own, employ, and finance production. They risk less and gain more by simply buying product, branding and promoting it, and reselling it at a higher price.

We see a similar trend with oil companies. Once upon a time they sought to own and develop resources; if nationalization was threatened they howled for the marines. Nowadays they are perfectly willing to make deals with national oil companies. In areas with high political and conflict risks, companies don't want to own: they would rather have a national company borrow a few billion to develop, then make money on service contracts, limiting their risk if things go sour. They know the marines won't come. If the Dutch East India Company was threatened by a local rebellion their own armed forces couldn't handle, they knew they could call on government forces. If Shell gets thrown out of Nigeria, what armed forces do they have? Will the Dutch government send gunboats and marines? Figure the odds...

Same deal if a computer company wants to assemble motherboards in Thailand. They don't build their own factory, they subcontract to a locally owned supplier, who borrows money, builds his own factory, and sells the product on.

None of this is about altruism, or about restoring sovereignty to developing nations. It's risk mitigation, pure and simple. This is why a group of multinationals are not going to get together and buy a Port of Trade: it's too risky. People don't always stay bought. You could easily "buy" your place, invest a few tens of billions, and the locals decide to take it back. If that happens, who you gonna call?

If we're going to assess the irregular threat posed my MNCs, we have to look at the way they operate today, not the way they operated 30 or 150 or 500 years ago: things change. I would still maintain that the threat is pretty far down the list.



As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.


If we expand the definition of MNC to that point, the term really doesn't mean much.



On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes).

I'm of course familiar with EO. I can't say I'm entirely comfortable with the business model, but you could argue that if we must have mercenaries, better to have the process organized and to some extent controlled than to have it going on under the table. One could imagine a scenario where a company like EO would start a conflict to create a market for its services, but while this would make a good plot for a movie or novel, in the real world the consequences and probability of exposure would probably outweigh the benefits.

[Surferbeetle]

Max Boot's The Savage Wars of Peace (http://www.amazon.com/Savage-Wars-Peace-Small-American/dp/0465007201) had some interesting things to say about dollar diplomacy. Boot classified America as a commercial power during 1801-1899, a great power during 1900-1941, and a superpower thereafter. It's an interesting book and helped to bring back some echo's from my 'enriched' history classes back when.

My copy of the May 2009 edition of The Atlantic had an article that is still reverberating as well. It gives some insights into how things are changing. The Quiet Coup (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice) by Simon Johnson (http://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/detail.php?in_spseqno=198&co_list=F).


One thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.

The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed.


Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.


In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.

But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.

[William F. Owen]

.
So what kind of organization do we need to deter irregular threats?Colonel Warden's suggestion from a long time ago. Stop thinking like the dead Prussian Guy.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/fal99/vorfal99.html

Stop thinking? Very very few US Officers have ever heeded CvCs advice, read or understood his work, or understand the nature of his observations. The US, and USAF in particular have never had a Clausewitian understanding of war.


In short, the Newtonian, Clausewitzian concept of the battlefield itself has become an anachronism.
Interesting statement. Where's the evidence?

The Anti-CvC always make the same errors.
They ascribe meanings and statements to CvC, which he never made or they don't understand.
They say, the "solution is X" and invariably, if it actually makes sense, repeat something Clausewitz said.

[Dayuhan]

I read the Atlantic article... some things I can agree with, but there are some real distortions. Popular distortions in the mode du jour, and thus largely immune to criticism, but still distortions. From your citations...


Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets.

I can't agree with this. Developing countries where a government/elite nexus has managed the country "like a profit-making company" have often taken risks and gotten into trouble, but in general the money they have used has been invested in sustainable enterprise (examples might be South Korea or Singapore), and in the long run they have gotten out of trouble and done fairly well. The perennial basket cases are the ones where the government/elite nexus has NOT managed the country like a "profit making company", but treated it as a pure milking cow, borrowing as much as possible and, instead of investing the money in profitable enterprise, spending it or stealing it. The Philippines is a good example, or take your pick among many in Africa and Latin America. Management in these countries has no resemblance at all to that of a profit making company... any company run along these lines would be unprofitable and would soon be out of business.


But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse.

It has become very fashionable to attribute the recent financial crisis to "wall street" or "the financiers", but this ignores a long chain of perverse incentives and appallingly bad policy decisions that spans the Clinton and Bush II administrations. This is why both Republicans and Democrats would rather point to Wall Street: they can't confront the causative role played by Government without pointing out the ostrich egg on their own faces.

I could say a whole lot more, but I fear we veer way off the thread topic... perhaps another thread is in order.

[slapout9]

Slap...



Yes, politicians will go to bat for major employers in their districts, and these issues are often settled by political influence. Welcome to America.

Does that happen because politicians are corrupt, or because they are representing the interests of their districts... or a little of both? Is this "irregular warfare", or simply a less savory side of democracy?

Seems to me there's abundant room for discussion of how to manage the influence of special interests on government (corporate, labor, religious, ideological, etc), but that seems more of a political reform discussion than a small wars discussion. I doubt that we're likely to see anything from the corporate side that would constitute an "irregular threat" that needs to be deterred.




It is out and out Fraud. And it is a threat to the National Security of the US. Many of the great COIN theorist talked about and warned about governments failing to recognize insurgencies until it was to late, largely because they failed to deal with subversion and fraud...they did little until it became an armed rebellion. And because you doubt it could happen so much is exactly the reason that I believe it will, our enemies understand the value of surprise.

[slapout9]

Stop thinking? Very very few US Officers have ever heeded CvCs advice, read or understood his work, or understand the nature of his observations. The US, and USAF in particular have never had a Clausewitian understanding of war.


Interesting statement. Where's the evidence?

The Anti-CvC always make the same errors.
They ascribe meanings and statements to CvC, which he never made or they don't understand.
They say, the "solution is X" and invariably, if it actually makes sense, repeat something Clausewitz said.

Hi Wilf, don't know...just know what he wrote. My personal opinion of where I think CvC is wrong and this goes with the post I just did for Doyuan was his fundamental definition of War. It is not just the use of violence.... it is Violence and/or Fraud (mental violence)used to impose your will on your opponent. That is why we think COIN/Irregular War is so deferent from Regular war because of the massive use Fraud against your opponent.

[Dayuhan]

It is out and out Fraud. And it is a threat to the National Security of the US. Many of the great COIN theorist talked about and warned about governments failing to recognize insurgencies until it was to late, largely because they failed to deal with subversion and fraud...they did little until it became an armed rebellion. And because you doubt it could happen so much is exactly the reason that I believe it will, our enemies understand the value of surprise.

Fraud, or business as usual? Not that the two are mutually exclusive...

This sort of thing has been going on a long, long time, and if people were going to insurge over it they'd have done it already. I wouldn't call it great policy or good governance, but it's a long way from the level of bad government that inspires insurrection. I'm not sure which enemies you see as are looking to surprise us, or how...



As long as we put the production and distribution of goods and services in private hands (state-owned enterprise hasn't worked so well) we are going to have to deal with large private enterprises: mom and pop shops don't do commercial aircraft, computers, you name it. When you run government up against large private enterprise you get an uneasy interface, always. Regulate too much and you stifle the productive part of your economy; regulate too little and it eats you. It's a search for equilibrium and it's never 100% right.

No system is perfect. You draw the rules as well as you can and enforce therm as well as you can, and people evade them, so you redraw them, and people evade them again... people break the rules, you prosecute, people get around the rules, you modify the rules, and they still get around them...

It never ends and it's never gonna be perfect, or even close. It's the continuing process of trying to make a nation work... and while it pisses me off too at times (less so than most, as it's all very far away), I don't see it anywhere near the point of generating insurrection.

[Ken White]

Not that far away from me so I probably gripe more -- but there's still no really viable alternative. People will be people... :wry:

[Dayuhan]

where I think CvC is wrong and this goes with the post I just did for Doyuan was his fundamental definition of War. It is not just the use of violence.... it is Violence and/or Fraud (mental violence)used to impose your will on your opponent.

I'd call fraud more financial violence than mental violence... but either way, isn't it more an LE problem than an irregular threat/warfare problem?

[Surferbeetle]

I read the Atlantic article... some things I can agree with, but there are some real distortions. Popular distortions in the mode du jour, and thus largely immune to criticism, but still distortions. From your citations...


It has become very fashionable to attribute the recent financial crisis to "wall street" or "the financiers", but this ignores a long chain of perverse incentives and appallingly bad policy decisions that spans the Clinton and Bush II administrations. This is why both Republicans and Democrats would rather point to Wall Street: they can't confront the causative role played by Government without pointing out the ostrich egg on their own faces.


I could say a whole lot more, but I fear we veer way off the thread topic... perhaps another thread is in order.

In the mil-speak du-jour Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats is about much more than just kinetic operations; it also requires a robust, concurrent, and effective non-kinetic component.

On a macro level the intersection between basic human nature and the just allocation of necessary resources, aka politics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics), can be a very messy and high stakes business. Taking a Western-Centric viewpoint I have a few questions. Will British MEP Sharon Bowles be able to convince the European Parliament’s Committee on Financial Regulation that since 80% of Europe’s Hedge funds are in London that it’s best for EU Regulations to follow the voice of experience? Will, or should, George Osborn be able to abolish the British Financial Services Authority and beef up the Bank of England’s regulatory portfolio? Will helicopter Ben be able to shape and define the appropriate roles for the US Federal Reserve and Securities Exchange Commission? Where do Sovereign Wealth Funds fit into all of this? Depending upon how these questions are resolved will determine whether or not society’s capital will be efficiently applied in order to Deter Irregular Threats so that we may continue to enjoy our shared prosperity.

On a decidedly more micro-level when things are quiet, security is good, and electricity & clean water are plentiful it's fun to slowly build binomial asset pricing models, continuous time models, monte carlo models, and quasi monte carlo models using Excel spreadsheets (thank you Steven E. Shreve (http://www.springer.com/math/quantitative+finance/book/978-0-387-24968-1) and Simon Benninga (http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~benninga/fm3/fm3.html)) and dream about having the time to use Mathematica (chill out Stephen Wolfram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Wolfram)) in order to fully exercise that one semester of differential equations while exploring some of the boundary conditions that are discussed in the Black-Scholes equation...all this effort so that one day I too might enter the ranks of the leisure class. While wearing cammo, carrying a rifle & pistol, and wading through the waters of backed up combined sewer systems in foreign lands I sometimes wonder more about applied economics: What are today’s tax revenues, what does the capital budget need to look like in order to fix this particular situation, what percent of the project budget will be lost due to corruption, how are the salaries of the sewer department employees holding up in relation to the local economy, how many local engineers are left in the department, how many people will get sick due to cross contamination in this particular neighborhood and not contribute to the local economy for the next few weeks, and of course what's the current bounty on an American going for these days anyway? Civilian work has some differences, no uniform, better security, much less corruption, bigger projects, but its still very much about gaining a through understanding of what’s needed versus what’s desired. :wry:

It’s getting late, but it appears to me that at both the macro and micro levels effective Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats require the efficient use of capital. This is why I feel that it is important to examine how and why capital is being used by various actors. Another thread is always welcome, but I don’t think we will be able to ever separate money from war.

[slapout9]

I'd call fraud more financial violence than mental violence... but either way, isn't it more an LE problem than an irregular threat/warfare problem?

No,not at all. An example of mental violence is telling someone to strap on a bomb vest and go kill as many people as possible so you can get to haven and get 72 virgins. That is a mental act of war of an irregular nature.

I am a big fan of Frank Kitson who I think was far superior in his understanding of irregular war (Low Intensity Operations) He divided them into 3 categories: Subversion,Insurgency,Peace Keeping. Subversion always turns into an armed insurgency if it is not checked. Subversion is nothing but mental violence/fraud. According to his resume he has the most experience of anyone that ever wrote a book about it and I never understood why he didn't receive more attention for it. He certainly understood the oblique angles that can be taken by groups or individuals to achieve their war aims.


The threatening MNC to the US.....Goldman Sachs.

[slapout9]

In the mil-speak du-jour Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats is about much more than just kinetic operations; it also requires a robust, concurrent, and effective non-kinetic component.

On a macro level the intersection between basic human nature and the just allocation of necessary resources, aka politics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics), can be a very messy and high stakes business. Taking a Western-Centric viewpoint I have a few questions. Will British MEP Sharon Bowles be able to convince the European Parliament’s Committee on Financial Regulation that since 80% of Europe’s Hedge funds are in London that it’s best for EU Regulations to follow the voice of experience? Will, or should, George Osborn be able to abolish the British Financial Services Authority and beef up the Bank of England’s regulatory portfolio? Will helicopter Ben be able to shape and define the appropriate roles for the US Federal Reserve and Securities Exchange Commission? Where do Sovereign Wealth Funds fit into all of this? Depending upon how these questions are resolved will determine whether or not society’s capital will be efficiently applied in order to Deter Irregular Threats so that we may continue to enjoy our shared prosperity.

On a decidedly more micro-level when things are quiet, security is good, and electricity & clean water are plentiful it's fun to slowly build binomial asset pricing models, continuous time models, monte carlo models, and quasi monte carlo models using Excel spreadsheets (thank you Steven E. Shreve (http://www.springer.com/math/quantitative+finance/book/978-0-387-24968-1) and Simon Benninga (http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~benninga/fm3/fm3.html)) and dream about having the time to use Mathematica (chill out Stephen Wolfram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Wolfram)) in order to fully exercise that one semester of differential equations while exploring some of the boundary conditions that are discussed in the Black-Scholes equation...all this effort so that one day I too might enter the ranks of the leisure class. While wearing cammo, carrying a rifle & pistol, and wading through the waters of backed up combined sewer systems in foreign lands I sometimes wonder more about applied economics: What are today’s tax revenues, what does the capital budget need to look like in order to fix this particular situation, what percent of the project budget will be lost due to corruption, how are the salaries of the sewer department employees holding up in relation to the local economy, how many local engineers are left in the department, how many people will get sick due to cross contamination in this particular neighborhood and not contribute to the local economy for the next few weeks, and of course what's the current bounty on an American going for these days anyway? Civilian work has some differences, no uniform, better security, much less corruption, bigger projects, but its still very much about gaining a through understanding of what’s needed versus what’s desired. :wry:

It’s getting late, but it appears to me that at both the macro and micro levels effective Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats require the efficient use of capital. This is why I feel that it is important to examine how and why capital is being used by various actors. Another thread is always welcome, but I don’t think we will be able to ever separate money from war.



Out Fugging Standing!

[Dayuhan]

In the mil-speak du-jour Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats is about much more than just kinetic operations; it also requires a robust, concurrent, and effective non-kinetic component.


I'll let you know what I think of that when I figure out what it means. Might take a while.

I'll try not to rant, but one point:

I do not think regulation is the answer to these financial upheavals. Regulators are almost always looking backward and trying to solve yesterdays problem. They work piecemeal, they are too slow, and they are just not smart enough. The speculator is always at least 2 steps ahead of the regulator, usually a lot more. Intelligent management of macro incentives accomplishes much more.

We did not need new laws or new regulations to avoid the recent financial crisis. We needed the political will to use the tools we had at our disposal. We didn't have it. What we've done is like standing on the accelerator of a car and driving into a wall, then demanding a whole new brake system instead of asking why you didn't use the brakes you had. Good brakes, and effective fiscal management tools, are wonderful things, but they don't mean squat if you don't use them.

Granted, it's tough for a politician to take on a bubble. It's not fun to stand up and tell Americans that their homes or stock portfolios are worth too damned much and we need to take decisive steps to make them worth less. It's even less fun to say what GB2 needed to say in 2001: we've been stupid and profligate and we need to eat a major recession now, because if we don't eat it now we will eat it X10 down the line.

Not fun, but some stuff needs to be done. Unfortunately the right thing is not always the popular thing, and political will is not a strong suit of the American politician.

[William F. Owen]

I think CvC is wrong and this goes with the post I just did for Doyuan was his fundamental definition of War. It is not just the use of violence.... it is Violence and/or Fraud (mental violence)used to impose your will on your opponent. That is why we think COIN/Irregular War is so deferent from Regular war because of the massive use Fraud against your opponent.
Fraud? OK, so does this mean deception? Surely everything that is not physical violence, resides in the realm of politics (diplomacy, religion etc). Subversion, without violence is a purely political act.

What am I missing?

[William F. Owen]

In the mil-speak du-jour Deterrence/Application of Irregular Threats is about much more than just kinetic operations; it also requires a robust, concurrent, and effective non-kinetic component.

So as CvC would say, it requires a "setting forth of policy." Once the non-kinetic means have failed, you use kinetic. Deterrence requires making people fear you. I you don't threaten them, but persuade them some other way, you have Alliance.

[Taiko]

CvC on the actors who conduct war:

"The aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will conform to the spirit of the age and its general character".

The belligerent themselves are particular to the spirit of the age, be they non-state actors, MNC, insert actor of choice.

Again, "a more general and theoretical treatment of the subject may become feasible if we consider the nature of the states and societies as they are determined by their times and prevailing conditions".

The most common error I have come across is attributing CvC work to state Vs state conflict only. He was applying his theory of war to the conflicts of his time to test its validity, which so happened to be state Vs state conflict. He never claimed that state Vs state conflict was, will, or would be the only type of war. To say he made such a claim is a fundamental misinterpretation of his work. He knew enough of strategic history to know that the actors in war were dependent on "the nature of the state and society" as determined by their time and prevailing conditions.


Slapout 9: I think CvC is wrong and this goes with the post I just did for Doyuan was his fundamental definition of War. It is not just the use of violence.... it is Violence and/or Fraud (mental violence)used to impose your will on your opponent. That is why we think COIN/Irregular War is so deferent from Regular war because of the massive use Fraud against your opponent.

CvC clearly stated that "military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated". He was the first theorist to argue that understanding the psychology of those who apply force is just as important as understanding the material application of force. This statement can be just as easily interpreted to include deterrence.

Deterrence is the threatened application of force. Without force you will not have deterrence. Deterrence is subject to the effective communication of the threat of force, and a clearly credible commitment to use that force. It is the policymaker not the military who communicate and make that commitment, it is the policymaker who makes that commitment credible. Just as importantly, as Gray always points out, it is the opponent who is being deterred who decides whether or not the communication of that deterrence is credible. Lets introduce a little bit of history to recap and better understand how depending on deterrence has its own inherent risks. After Somalia, how credible was the US conventional military as a deterrent threat to A'Q? Has that credibility changed since Iraq? I propose that it is the government of the day who makes the threat of the use of force, as a deterrent, credible via its perceived commitment to use that force. Can any of the opponents of the US now assume, or calculate, that killing a handful of US soldiers will deter the US from committing itself to following through with a threat? How the policymaker reacts will determine this. One wonders if the British foreign secretary understand this concept. Indeed, I wonder if the west understands this when it comes to A'Q, Iran and North Korea.

How credible is International Law as a deterrent when Saddam continually defied it? How credible a deterrent is a countries legislation if MNC's defy them without recourse to punishment or sanction? Deterrence boils down to credibility and commitment. If you have neither of those then you can have the best military in the world, you can have the best laws in the world, and it will mean nothing to your opponent. As Machiavelli said "without good arms there can be no good laws".

[slapout9]

Fraud? OK, so does this mean deception? Surely everything that is not physical violence, resides in the realm of politics (diplomacy, religion etc). Subversion, without violence is a purely political act.

What am I missing?

Subversion is illegitimate/illegal and is not honest politics, it is irregular war. It is War by deception used to overthrow the Guvmint.

[William F. Owen]

Subversion is illegitimate/illegal and is not honest politics, it is irregular war. It is War by deception used to overthrow the Guvmint.

Honest politics? OK, I'll go with that for now.....
So bribery, theft and inciting sedition, are all non- violent, but you say they are war? So non-violent protest (which may well be illegal) is "irregular war?"

Really?

[Bob's World]

Unlike other non-states; Corporations must defend physical terrain (infrastructure), and retain the majority of their operation within the rule of law. These are chains that keep them (largely) in check. Those non-states with no such baggage, such as AQ, require a different approach.

This is one reason why I don't loose sleep when certain western ideologues run around yelling: "The Caliphate is coming, the Caliphate is coming..."

As a non-state AQ befuddles our current system of deterrence. Ahh, but once they were ever so foolish as to take on a physical state...then they must sit at the big table as it is currently set by the West. Same is true for the Quasi-States. They know full well that to go fully legitimate makes them a part of just one more weak state, so they intentionally avoid that situation.



I will post a new, fuller spectrum chart that looks at both ends of the equation of full spectrum deterrence. Across the full range of actors in width; and across the full depth of engagement designed to either "Prevent" bad behavior, or "Encourage" good behavior.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Deterrence is the threatened application of force. Without force you will not have deterrence. Deterrence is subject to the effective communication of the threat of force, and a clearly credible commitment to use that force.

I am not really sure you want to limit yourself in that way. You can deter someone’s actions by more than just threats. You can deter an action by offering an alternative to that action that is less costly or more beneficial. But I don't think militaries should be in the business of making those decisions. You can also eliminate his ability to carry out whatever action you are trying to deter. Consider that preemptive deterance.



It is the policymaker not the military who communicate and make that commitment, it is the policymaker who makes that commitment credible.

I totally agree with you when either referring to military deterrence OR when referring to holistic solutions. Policymakers have to be clear and credible.

From a military perspective you may be accurate to say that deterance is based on force or the threat of force but we have wondered far afield of pure military actions. For years terrorists were simply criminals and were treated as such. Same with financial fruad and organized criminal gangs.

Recent conflicts have forced us down those roads in a big way. I think sometimes we forget how we got here. In Afghanistan we are in Phase IV operations and we are arguably in Phase V in Iraq. Deterrence is a Phase II and III threat. Maybe we are losing perspective as to what a military can and should do in regards to deterrence of non-traditional threats.

OR - maybe we need to acknowledge the change in the world and change our military to adapt to the new threat. If we take that route then deterant options open up that were not available to us under the traditional military model. Maybe that is where we are headed.

[slapout9]

Honest politics? OK, I'll go with that for now.....
So bribery, theft and inciting sedition, are all non- violent, but you say they are war? So non-violent protest (which may well be illegal) is "irregular war?"

Really?

If they are used in the service of overthrowing a legitimate government yes.

[slapout9]

Unlike other non-states; Corporations must defend physical terrain (infrastructure), and retain the majority of their operation within the rule of law. These are chains that keep them (largely) in check.


I understand you point Bob, but a criminal organization (so could a non-state actor) can infiltrate a legitimate corparation and use for its own purposes and then leave the infrastructure in a heartbeat.

[Bob's World]

Ok,

As I continue to flesh this out...


Any scheme for Deterrence of Irregular Threats must fit within a Holistic, or Full-Spectrum scheme of deterrence. Such a scheme must include both positive (carrots) engagement and negative (sticks) engagement; and all engagement must be balanced across the entire spectrum to wargame and assess potential intended and unintended deterrent and provocative effects across the spectrum.

Still working to craft specific definitions for each term as applied to this concept; but the lay definitions apply in the general sense.

[slapout9]

Bob, how do you make it bigger so old folks can see the little letters and stuff?

[jmm99]

Attached is at 3'' width and 200 dpi (rather than 72). Still blurred cuz it's just a blowup. The letters would be clearer if done at 200 dpi in original.

[Bob's World]

Bob, how do you make it bigger so old folks can see the little letters and stuff?

...they generally take a little blue pill!!:)

[Bob's World]

Attached is at 3'' width and 200 dpi (rather than 72). Still blurred cuz it's just a blowup. The letters would be clearer if done at 200 dpi in original.

I'll see if I can save it bigger. I was pretty pleased that I was able to post it at all!

[Bob's World]

Tried it as a JPEG

[Dayuhan]

I like it that "deter" is one of three items on the negative side, which addresses my earlier objection to the dominance of the term "deterrence".

Have you considered adding "accept" to the list of positive actions? For example, accepting that an existing state is not viable as currently constituted and that division or secession may be inevitable and even necessary? Or do you see this included in existing categories?

[Bob's World]

I like it that "deter" is one of three items on the negative side, which addresses my earlier objection to the dominance of the term "deterrence".

Have you considered adding "accept" to the list of positive actions? For example, accepting that an existing state is not viable as currently constituted and that division or secession may be inevitable and even necessary? Or do you see this included in existing categories?

Personally, I do not believe that any state has the standing to determine whether or not another state is viable or not. That Right, that Duty, belongs to the populace of every state.

Now, not every populace can get the boot off of their neck long enough to look around and see how bad they have it, yet alone do anything about it. To that end, I think it is very much in synch with the American perception of ourselves, and our values; that we should use carrots and sticks to enable the dialog between such populaces and their governments, to promote good governance on the terms they devine for themselves and to hold the wolves at bay while they learn to walk for themselvs as a fledgling country of self-determined governance that draws its legitimacy from a source recognized and approved by that same populace.

[slapout9]

Bob, the Viagra edition looks really good:) have you filled in the rest of the matrix yet or is this the 1st prototype?

[Dayuhan]

Personally, I do not believe that any state has the standing to determine whether or not another state is viable or not. That Right, that Duty, belongs to the populace of every state.


Very true... but if we are making a decision about whether or not to commit our resources to sustain a state or assist it in suppressing an insurgency, it is our right and our duty to take a close look at such issues before diving in.

[Taiko]

How does the political objectives that both actors are seeking to achieve fit in? I can see it in the positive actions, but not in the negative actions. In negative actions you use 'act of war' and 'criminal act'. An act of war is undertaken for many political reason, so how will you account for the various political objectives that give rise to an act of war? Will not the political objective at stake determine what level of force/incentive will be needed to deter/induce? Traditionally, deterrence can buy you time, but it is the resolution of the underlying political motives that brought the use of the deterrent threat into being that is the main goal. As such, deterrence itself will not resolve the political motives for taking action, it can only stop an actor from taking action over time. For example, deterrence (the threat of force) was only one operational arm of the US containment strategy against the USSR. Deterrence was a military aim, containment was the political objective. This is were I depart with how some members are trying to broaden the concept of deterrence. Deterring some one through the threat of force from taking action is different to inducing some one with incentives from taking action. Both can be operationalized in order to achieve a political objective, but they are different concepts using different ways and means.

Deterrence, traditionally the threat of force, is specifically used to influence the opponents calculation of the probability of the costs of taking action.

Inducement, the use of economic incentives, is specifically used to influence the opponents calculation of the probability of the benefits of inaction.

You need an arrow at the bottom with spectrum of political objectives (acts of war) and/or motivation (criminal act). Just my two cents :D


To that end, I think it is very much in synch with the American perception of ourselves, and our values; that we should use carrots and sticks to enable the dialog between such populaces and their governments, to promote good governance on the terms they devine for themselves and to hold the wolves at bay while they learn to walk for themselvs as a fledgling country of self-determined governance that draws its legitimacy from a source recognized and approved by that same populace.

It does not matter what liberal rhetoric you use in order to try and legitimize this approach, states like Iran, North Korea or China, will consider this political interference and an attempt to erode the sovereignty of their country. They will use it against you, to drum up popular support, by manipulating the nationalist sentiments of the general population in order to maintain power.

[Bob's World]

It does not matter what liberal rhetoric you use in order to try and legitimize this approach, states like Iran, North Korea or China, will consider this political interference and an attempt to erode the sovereignty of their country. They will use it against you, to drum up popular support, by manipulating the nationalist sentiments of the general population in order to maintain power.

"Liberal Rhetoric" good one. Totally non-sequitur, but whatever. Set your CvC down for a minute, it doesn't provide answers to every form of conflict.

As to the states you list, they are not ones that this would apply to, as these are states that have no perceptions of US legitimacy over them. There populaces have no illusions that we have somehow imposed these governments over them. They will resolve themselves, they will not feel compelled to attack us in order to do so.

The greatest threat to the US today is not these states that the intel community attempts to cast in the role of "opponent" to validate our bi-polar strategy. No, the greatest threat to the US is the populaces of those states that we consider as "allies" where we have imposed ourselves over the years to shape governance favorable to US interests; governance that has both drifted away from the interests of their own populace and that the populace believes or perceives also draws its legitimacy more from the U.S. than from themselves, their God, or whatever they believe is a valid source of Governmental legitimacy.

We have no reason to meddle in the government of Iran, China or N. Korea. We have TREMENDOUS reason to meddle in the Govt of Saudi Arabia, and every other state that is a major supplier of foreign fighters to places like Iraq that take on the US under an AQ banner in efforts motivated primarily to advance their nationalists objectives at home. We are already meddled in these states. It is time to change the tenor of the meddling, from one where we are an obstacle to good governance to one where we are an enabler of good governance. In so doing we begin to disempower AQ and lend stability to the region.

[Bob's World]

Bob, the Viagra edition looks really good:) have you filled in the rest of the matrix yet or is this the 1st prototype?

I see this more as a worksheet, or tool, to help work through all of the potential players and effects of any planned engagement; and also to use to help shape appropriate responses as well.

This is a work in progress by every measure. Actually the first use will be to help talk various audiences through some of the concepts that we are developing and to explore how they can apply to various problems.

Sometimes understanding the question is more important than coming up with an answer.

[slapout9]

I see this more as a worksheet, or tool, to help work through all of the potential players and effects of any planned engagement; and also to use to help shape appropriate responses as well.

This is a work in progress by every measure. Actually the first use will be to help talk various audiences through some of the concepts that we are developing and to explore how they can apply to various problems.

Sometimes understanding the question is more important than coming up with an answer.

Worksheet... that is a good idea because my next question was going to be what if the standard matrix answers are different from situation to situation, but looks like you have that covered.

Who all will get to see this?

[William F. Owen]

Set your CvC down for a minute, it doesn't provide answers to every form of conflict.
So which ones does he not? I agree the CvC is redundant when applied against non-violent actors, but everyone admits that, and it falls outside the scope of his work.
Do not confuse stupidly or poorly applied military power with the notion that armed force is redundant or less relevant today. It is not. "There has to be a better way" is almost always born of poor understanding of the existing way in the first place.


We have no reason to meddle in the government of Iran, China or N. Korea. We have TREMENDOUS reason to meddle in the Govt of Saudi Arabia, and every other state that is a major supplier of foreign fighters to places like Iraq that take on the US under an AQ banner in efforts motivated primarily to advance their nationalists objectives at home. We are already meddled in these states.
So is the US going to use force against Saudi Arabia to set forth it's foreign policy? Seems very unlikely.
Might the US have to use force against Iran, China or N. Korea to set forth policy? Seem more likely.

More over Bob, 90% of your arguments seem non-military and you seem locked into the higher end of US Foreign Policy. All this is the realm of the elected politician. Do I take it, that your points are actually political?

[William F. Owen]

Tried it as a JPEG

So this is advice for whom? The President?

[Bob's World]

So which ones does he not? I agree the CvC is redundant when applied against non-violent actors, but everyone admits that, and it falls outside the scope of his work.
Do not confuse stupidly or poorly applied military power with the notion that armed force is redundant or less relevant today. It is not. "There has to be a better way" is almost always born of poor understanding of the existing way in the first place.


So is the US going to use force against Saudi Arabia to set forth it's foreign policy? Seems very unlikely.
Might the US have to use force against Iran, China or N. Korea to set forth policy? Seem more likely.

More over Bob, 90% of your arguments seem non-military and you seem locked into the higher end of US Foreign Policy. All this is the realm of the elected politician. Do I take it, that your points are actually political?

But my big take-away is that warfare and policy are inextricably linked. When policy inadvertently begins to create conflict in ways that the policy makers do not understand, it not outside the duties of military to seek to understand the nature of those conflicts and the propose holistic solution sets; that will by there very nature not only inform the design of military operations; but also the design of policy.

To simply exert greater military effort against a growing threat born or resistance to current Policy is in my mind professional malpractice.

Would this perspective be valuable to the President's staff? Absolutely.

But also to all of the Commanders and Senior DoD leadership at the level that I am currently supporting as a SOF strategist. Many may use "duty" to rationalize their lack of moral courage to stand up and provide the boss the information he needs to have for fear of how it might impact them personally.

But my duty is to not just have knowledge (plenty of that around), but to apply it to seek understanding (always in short supply); and to provide candid, honest product designed address entire problem sets. There are guys in the Ops shop who focus on solving specific tactical military problems.

[William F. Owen]

But my big take-away is that warfare and policy are inextricably linked. When policy inadvertently begins to create conflict in ways that the policy makers do not understand, it not outside the duties of military to seek to understand the nature of those conflicts and the propose holistic solution sets; that will by there very nature not only inform the design of military operations; but also the design of policy.
Clausewitz would certainly agree that policies cause wars.
The problem is that you cannot, with any certainty predict which policies cause war, unless it is your intention to cause one. What US policy caused 911? You can't predict the future.
Did the US really think there wasn't going to be an insurgency after the invasion. The opinion that there would not be was POLITICAL, in nature. That was the policy. Look how long Rumsfeld refused to accept it as fact.
In 2006, Ehud Olmert vetoed the IDF plans already prepared to deal with exactly the situations he found himself in! Why? Politics.


To simply exert greater military effort against a growing threat born or resistance to current Policy is in my mind professional malpractice. So give me something specific? Withdraw from Saudi Arabia?


Would this perspective be valuable to the President's staff? Absolutely. You'd think so, wouldn't you. Kinda depends on the issue does it not?

[Ron Humphrey]

Would you say that a policy decision which changes the overall structure of a given military body in such a way as to reverse or even just recalibrate it's strengths/weaknesses would not have given and easily foreseen consequences on the strategic calculus of probable competitors and any actions they may or may not take?

[marct]

Bob,

Thanks for putting up the "viagra" version :D.

One thing has been bugging me, and that is your actors list. It strikes me that what you have there is a mixing of characteristics that may cause problems. As a specific example, Pakistan is a "nuke state" and, also (at least partially) a "failed state". I know why you are separating nuke states out, but it might be better to think of some other way to differentiate between nuclear capability and state stability.

One other note on the actor list: why, when most of them are states or para-states, do you list dissidents, who are individual actors? It strikes me that this can be potentially confusing.

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

I sort of wondered at the 'Nuke' bit but figured it was Bob'sWorld's Chart and had he wanted to use Pomegranate Producing Satate, that would've been okay. Still...

I personally believe way too much froth is generated over the nuke aspect.

[Bob's World]

I sort of wondered at the 'Nuke' bit but figured it was Bob'sWorld's Chart and had he wanted to use Pomegranate Producing Satate, that would've been okay. Still...

I personally believe way too much froth is generated over the nuke aspect.

You have one toe in BW, you might as well get wet.

The reason I broke them out between Nuke and Non-Nuke is because we treat them differently; it drives a different deterrence and response calculus.

As to the dissidents, this is important to one key point I hope to make with the "Some people can't be deterred crowd," that point being that when one takes into account the full complexity, you may well be able to sort out indirect ways to acheive the effects you seek.

For Example:

Bin Laden is a Dissident Individual,
Leading a Non-State Actor,
Taking sanctuary among an Insurgent Populace,
In a Nuclear State
That is trending toward being a Failed State
Recruiting other Dissident Individuals
From Non-Nuke, Nuke and Failed States and
Conducting UW to incite Insurgencies
Among Insurgent Populaces
In those same Non-Nuke, Nuke and Failed States
While building a base of support among less Dissident Populaces
In those same Non-Nuke, Nuke and Failed States
Applying an Ideology specifically tailored to speak to all of those audiences and also
Run counter to long-held U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East


So, while I cannot, perhaps, deter Mr. bin Laden; as I look at my full range of options carefully balanced accross this full range of actors for potential deterrent and provocative effect; I suspect I can render him largely irrelevant and impotent.

And for the U.S.; creating an Impotent bin Laden is far superior to putting his head on a pike.

[Bob's World]

Also important, is that I see this as a tool that aids in Response as much as it aids in Prevent.

[jmm99]

on Nuke States, Failed States and Non-State Actors - in the light of Bob's apparent guidance, which presently is a broad-brushed outline. As such, let us not overload the outline with too much detail.

An example is Nuke States. Right now, there are two states (US and Russia) that have global delivery systems that could do huge damage (extermination); and possibly China. The UK and France are in the next tier (I'm not sure of how much reach their delivery systems have). The delivery systems for India and Pakistan are regional (perhaps also, Israel). In any event, an Act of War by one Nuke State vs another Nuke State is much more significant than the same act by a Non-Nuke State vs another Non-Nuke State (or against a Nuke State, for that matter). The greater significance comes from the probability of escalation in the Nuke vs Nuke context.

As to "Failed" States, we have a spectrum which could again be subdivided (a Strong Failed State down to a Weak Failed State). From an I Law standpoint, a State (national boundaries and population) still exists, even though the writ of its government may run for only a few blocks in its capitol city. Now, it may come to pass that even that goverment ceases to exist; or the world diplomatic community ceases to recognize it as the government of the that State.

It is quite possible for a State to have no recognized government. Astan 1997-2001 was exactly that in the eyes of the US government. So, what were the Taliban and Northern Alliance ? In Bob's chart, they would be Quasi-States - which I do not believe is a recognized I Law term, as such. However, Common Article 2 recognizes Powers to a conflict that are not nation states (the "accept and apply" clause). My own view is that the Quasi-States or GC CA2 Powers are also Non-State Actors, but of a special kind. If successful, a new State might result via separation (e.g., if the South had won our Civil War) or a new recognized government for the existing State. In either case, the resulting situation is not necessarily a bad thing.

Non-State Actors really encompass the rest of the Actor boxes after Quasi-States. Note that Non-State Actors are not necessarily bad - in fact, more are good than bad (UN, Red Cross, NGOs, MNCs, etc. are Non-State Actors; and in fact are Transnational Non-State Actors).

Our focus here is usually on Violent Non-State Actors, which is understandable; but, should not blind us to the fact that Non-State Actors are a very broad category - going beyond Bob's box titled that.

If I were doing that box ("Non-State Actor") and the next box ("Insurgent Populace"), I would label them "Transnational Non-State Actor" and "Domestic Non-State Actor" - understanding, no matter which label is used, that groups of actors are being defined.

As to the "Dissident Individual", he too is a "Non-State Actor". Normally, we think of those folks as subjects for the Criminal Law - and not as irregular combatants in an armed conflict. But, place a destructive device in his hands, and the capacity to deliver it (e.g., a fusion device in a building off Times Square, where the Mad Bomber has his finger on the trigger), and we can see where an "Act of War" is also appropriate terminology.

As a more general picture, I see a twinning of the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle (with reference to either the Rule of Law or Laws of War, as appropriate - essentially this is the same as Bob's "Criminal Act" and "Act of War" box, but a bit more sophisticated), as in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=79216&postcount=11) - the chart is descriptive and qualitative (and definitely not quantative).

I'll post tonite some references (mostly non-legal) re: Non-State Actors, which are on my home computer.

[William F. Owen]

Would you say that a policy decision which changes the overall structure of a given military body in such a way as to reverse or even just recalibrate it's strengths/weaknesses would not have given and easily foreseen consequences on the strategic calculus of probable competitors and any actions they may or may not take?

In democracies, militaries are controlled by politicians. If your politicians re-structure your forces in a way that means they are less able to be used as military instruments, then you should point this out, and explain the problem they are creating, based on the Policy they have set forth.

The UK did this in the 1970's when they made the Falklands Islands "indefensible." The Government explained they had no money. The Army and Navy pointed out the risks, and then carried out the order. The rest is history.

[Ken White]

Minor points:

You, as I should have and did not, make the point that a Nuke States capability is the determinant, not whether they are 'nuke' or not. Pakistan is nuclear. For several reasons, strategically, I'm not sure that's a concern.

Good diffrentiation also on the Failed States and Non-State Actors...

[slapout9]

Bob, where would you put a Nuclear Non-State Actor we have a lot of those. Example MNC that control Nuclear technologies.

[Bob's World]

Bob, where would you put a Nuclear Non-State Actor we have a lot of those. Example MNC that control Nuclear technologies.

...would be somewhere in Alabama. :)

[slapout9]

Bob,I am sure we have one somewhere but looks like Michigan has the lead. Where would it go on your chart?


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSg2neElOTw&feature=PlayList&p=4FA4AD614687F257&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=38

[jmm99]

First off, a thank you to Ken for the kind words - from one Non-Violent NSA to another. :)

Second, how can I ignore our Michikinder who tried to put together a fusion device. Note that he, like Charlie Manson, didn't come close. But, a fission device or dirty bomb is well within the realm of probability.

As Ken pointed out, the capability (delivery system) must be taken into account. If someone managed to put together a 1 MT device and blew it from the highest radio tower on Quincy Hill (a couple of miles from my house), the blast radius (pretty much complete destruction) would be perhaps 4 miles. Impact on US - minimal, except for panic attacks. Blowing the same device in midtown NY is another story.

PS: Our congressional district was still (earlier this week) in the running for the Gitmo transfers (Standish Max in the SE corner of the district). My own preference would be to transfer all the prisoners from Baraga Max (about 30 miles from here) to Standish (the Baraga ones are more dangerous than anything at Gitmo), and transfer the Gitmo ones to Baraga Max. Probably cruel and unusual punishment. :D

---------------------------
Some VNSA references

First, its Wiki, Violent non-state actor (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violent_non-state_actor), which is a brief overview. However, it does give a checklist of data that should be explored for each VNSA:


How do they legitimize themselves? (by political ideology, ethnicity, nationality, religion, functionality)

Which societal gaps does a VNSA fill? (safety/security, (economic) stability, social participation, public services)

To what extent do they have support from outside? (local, regional, national, international)

What is the scope of influence? (local, regional, national, international)

Among which population groups or what indicators they recrute on? (age, religious, political, class, ethnicity)

Where do they recruit? (local, regional, national, international)

How do they recruit? (ideological i.e. empowerment, bribery, intimidation and violence, kidnapping)

To what extent are they infiltrated in (local or national) government and business (corruption)?

Are they involved in organized crime? (weapons trade, drug trade, trade in humans, money-laundering)

How is the organisation structured? (hierarchical or democratic, central or diffused network)

How has their focus and strategy changed over time (generations)? (more violent or more diplomatic, more international)

Here are a number of articles spanning 2002-2008:

2002 Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in the New Millenium (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec02/terrorism2.pdf)

2002 Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/OCP43.pdf)

2004 Modeling Violent Non-State Actors (http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/iita/Documents/VNSA%20Final.pdf) - A Summary of Concepts and Methods

2004 Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/casebeerMar04.pdf)

2004 Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority (http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf)

2008 Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ISN_ViolentNon-StateActors.pdf)

2008 Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/88-compton.pdf)
and the associated Powerpoint for 2008 VNSAME (http://mcsgroup.org/Presentation_VNSAME.ppt).

Max G. Manwaring has dealt with the problems caused by Non-State Actors (using that terminology) in about a dozen articles from 2002-2009 - mostly re: Latin America and its gangs. John P. Sullivan has had about the same number of articles about the same problems (using 1 GEN, 2 GEN, 3 GEN Gangs as basic terminology) from 2007-2009. Most of them, you can find linked here at SWJ - hint, search the two authors (Journal & Ref Library).

The literature dealing with Transnational VNSAs (expressly using that term) is fairly sparse - the existence of TVNSAs, of course, runs through all of the linked articles (e.g., AQ is a TVNSA). Compton (2008 VNSAME) uses the term.

For what they are worth, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=69007&postcount=19) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=69023&postcount=23) are a couple of my posts on TVNSAs. After just re-reading them, they are still my best shot on the issues surrounding TVNSAs.

[Bob's World]

Bob,I am sure we have one somewhere but looks like Michigan has the lead. Where would it go on your chart?


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSg2neElOTw&feature=PlayList&p=4FA4AD614687F257&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=38

and not just a dirty bomb, they would need their own category. A non-state requires a very different apporach than a state in general; but as I was telling ken, the fact is we treat people who have nukes with way more respect than we do those who don't.

So if a non-state had a nuke we would have to apply a "non-state approach" (whatever that would turn out to be), but it would be done with much more caution and respect than what we apply otherwise.

[selil]

I've been trying to find a court decision or something other than punditry that says through all the constitutional rules the United States could write a full declaration of war against an individual. I think the UN Charter on Human Rights would keep that from happening. LIC as instantiated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986(?) seems to have been a stop gap measure that was created and then institutionalized to get around irregular/COIN/LIC type threats.

I simply don't know if a non-state actor could have war declared on them (other than colloquially). I've been reading but it just doesn't seem to fit anywhere.

[slapout9]

What about an AQ Khan (can't spell the guy from Pakistan) type who ran a couple of MNC selling Nuclear parts,information and engineering expertise all over the world. Even after he was busted we still don't for sure how much of his stuff was disbursed around the world.

[slapout9]

I've been trying to find a court decision or something other than punditry that says through all the constitutional rules the United States could write a full declaration of war against an individual. I think the UN Charter on Human Rights would keep that from happening. LIC as instantiated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986(?) seems to have been a stop gap measure that was created and then institutionalized to get around irregular/COIN/LIC type threats.

I simply don't know if a non-state actor could have war declared on them (other than colloquially). I've been reading but it just doesn't seem to fit anywhere.

An individual.... I don't know, thats a JMM99 question.... but an Organization??? I think maybe you could. UBL did it to us.

[selil]

Flat out the most dangerous opponent out there....I am convinced we will fight a rogue corporation in the future and the military may not win:eek: they invent the hardware and know how to turn it off, the military could be a total sitting duck. A Trans National Corporation is nothing but a Criminal (RICO) organization.

Slap, this isn't going to get much play here or consideration.

Regardless of the US history where corporations have subverted the national government of the United States like the Cripple Creek mine strikes (http://books.google.com/books?id=WrF-AAAAMAAJ&pg=PA318&lpg=PA318&dq=Cripple+Creek+Riots&source=bl&ots=oOE3xmqFY6&sig=StnXSdPvFMDbiYJHuKwZdindHPQ&hl=en&ei=RKF7SsqCFoqENPKlldkC&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3#v=onepage&q=&f=false). Though corporate conflict abounds through out history the cultural obstacle of western world to view corporate malevolence is blinded by the capitalist shield of invincibility.

It isn't politically correct in polite company to point out things like companies can do evil.

The entire LIC/COIN narrative is based around cultural and civil obstacles to nation building or winning hearts and minds. Graft, corruption, corporate boosting, RICO activities are not part of the LIC/COIN narrative.

Corporate actors cannot be malevolent non-state actors because it is not politically expedient to do so.. Even though Disney (http://www.noahshachtman.com/archives/002199.html), WalMart, and various other multi-nationals maintain extensive intelligence and force protection teams (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/04/walmart_hires_f/) that rival governments.

I'm not worried about the government military contractors as much as the huge multi-national production/supply corporations like WalMart. History suggests food supply is a bigger risk than arms shipments. Government has a good handle on the arms merchants, but doesn't take such good care of the commissary.

Look at Small Wars Journal the most rigorous lens of current thinking on COIN in existence. How many articles are there on countering corporate non-state actors? On the micro level it could be simply the small businesses using violence in the bazaar for economic gain. On the large it is oil companies using political disruption to profit in the Iraq oil fields. Those topics are against the rules and I'm sure considered childish by many readers. If COIN is a spectrum from law enforcement through military engagement corporate warfare easily makes the grade based on labor disputes alone. Pinkerton men (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinkerton_National_Detective_Agency) were infamous for their actions internationally. The East India Company (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Company) is a great example of a monopolistic company nearing and surpassing nation-state powers as a supposed vassal corporation with it's own army. Blackwater? Nyaaah.

In the large HIC nation-state v. nation-state corporate warfare is likely of no consequence. Though that is exactly what allowed The East india Company to grow larger when it was being eroded. In the small though where LIC/COIN is found it should be a concern because it comes sneaking in as war profiteering in the political upheaval and market positioning in reconstruction. Corporate warfare is in the realm of LIC (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/spr96/bunker.pdf) as companies engage in IO campaigns against political entities. You find corporate warfare in the lawfare and political obstruction operations. It is sneaky and messy just like all LIC/COIN is sneaky and messy.

With the current of COIN/LIC education and thought corporate warfare won't be considered in depth. We are all about the soft mushy stuff and cultural nannyism. Nobody is thinking about the profit motives in current conflicts (other than to ignore them) or that corporations are currently waging a pretty good form of international low intensity conflict (as in espionage through terrorism) against each other. However, the reason I am interested is that cyber warfare and corporate warfare (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30735.pdf) are colliding directly in the LIC/COIN battlespace.

I don't think corporate warfare will get much play, but I figure it won't be long until I read about multi-national companies hiring their own armies (http://frontlineclub.com/blogs/nataliaviana/2009/07/from-colombia-multinational-mining-company-accused-of-hiring-paramilitaries.html).

[TheCurmudgeon]

The easy answer is the motivation behind the threat. Corporations (at least those NOT governmental fronts ala Air America) are motivated by profit not political gain. They would only involve themselves in governmental activities where it behooves them, as they do with lobbyists. Arguably the same could be said for criminal organizations.

Both would prefer pliable but functioning governments. Pushing any government to the point of instability would not generally be in their best interest (especially NOT the US, still the worlds largest consumer country). The old “Wild Geese” scenarios are less and less likely as we build a global economy.

Can’t say that I have an answer to the food issue. You head down that path you can add environmental concerns. This is where the carrot of building functioning stable (but not necessarily democratic) governments comes into play. As long as thousands of your citizens aren’t streaming across my boarder because they are hungry and scared or your country is not the home of some non-state actor I am happy.

The further down the rabbit hole you go the more it appears that global stability is the ultimate aim. Instability anywhere has the potential to threaten America as long as America has a global economy and global military (I believe we are the ONLY country in the world that has Geographical Commanders already assigned). Holistically we have to consider everything. Logistically the military alone can only do so much.

With Deterrence being the goal and instability being the threat, I think the Viagra version of the slide is conceptually correct. Implementation … well that is another matter.

[slapout9]

Slap, this isn't going to get much play here or consideration.

I'm not worried about the government military contractors as much as the huge multi-national production/supply corporations like WalMart. History suggests food supply is a bigger risk than arms shipments. Government has a good handle on the arms merchants, but doesn't take such good care of the commissary.



Hi Sam, funny you should mention food;)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCIfD45eqnA&feature=rec-HM-r2

[jmm99]

as to a group (AQ) and as to individuals (e.g., UBL & Zawahiri). Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), §2(a), 115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U. S. C.§1541 (2000 ed., Supp. V), the President is authorized:


“to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

Don't get too hung up on a technical declaration of war by Congress.

Formal declarations of war were going out of style when the Constitution was drafted. James Kent (a noted NY judge, as well as a scholar), in Kent's Commentaries (http://www.constitution.org/jk/jk_000.htm) from 1826, was clear that the Constitution did not require a formal declaration of war; but did require a joint act of Congress:


LECTURE III. OF THE DECLARATION, AND OTHER ABLY MEASURES OF A STATE OF WAR.
....
2. Declaration of War.
....
But though a solemn declaration, or previous notice to the enemy, be now laid aside, it is essential that some formal public act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should announce to the people at home their new relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which should equally apprise neutral nations of the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to the rights belonging to the new state of things. War, says Vattel, is at present published and declared by manifestoes. Such an official act operates from its date to legalize all hostile acts, in like manner as a treaty of peace operates from its date to annul them. As war cannot lawfully be commenced on the part of the United States without an act of Congress, such an act is, of course, a formal official notice to all the world, and equivalent to the most solemn declaration.

Thus, there must be an AUMF act by Congress, which may be short of a formal declaration of war - as Kent points out by examples from the times before and after the Constitution was adopted (footnotes omitted below - see full text at link above for context):


Since the time of Bynkershoek, it has become settled by the practice of Europe that war may lawfully exist by a declaration which is unilateral only, or without a declaration on either side. It may begin with mutual hostilities. After the peace of Versailles, in 1763, formal declarations of war of any kind seem to have been discontinued, and all the necessary and legitimate consequences of war flow at once from a state of public hostilities, duly recognized and explicitly announced by a domestic manifesto or state paper.

In the war between England and France, in 1T78, the first public act on the part of the English government was recalling its minister; and that single act was considered by France as a breach of the peace between the two countries. There was no other declaration of war, though each government afterwards published a manifesto in vindication of its claims and conduct. The same thing may be said of the war which broke out in 1793, and again in 1803; and, indeed, in the war of 1756, though a solemn and formal declaration of war, in the ancient style, was made in June, 1756, vigorous hostilities had been carried on between England and France for a year preceding.

In the war declared by the United States against England, in 1812, hostilities were immediately commenced on our part as soon as the act of Congress was passed, without waiting to communicate to the English government any notice of our intentions.

Formal declarations of war were somewhat revived by the Hague Conventions; but again fell into disuse after WWII.

So, war may be "declared" against an individual (or more pedantically, a state of armed conflict may exist between the US and an individual).

The closest we came to declaring war on an individual, in express terms, was during the Pancho Villa dustup. Newton Baker, Secretary of War, drafted an order (in accord with President Wilson's public statement) for the Army to pursue Villa with the single object of capturing him. MG Hugh Scott (Army Chief of Staff) asked Baker if he planned to go after Villa if he skipped to South America. Baker said "no". Scott suggested that what Baker really wanted was Villa's band captured or destroyed. Baker agreed; the order was phrased in that manner; and Congress approved the expedition on that basis - after it had already started - by joint resolution (not a formal war declaration) on 17 Mar 1916. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (2002), at pp.189-190 & 371n.190.

[Bob's World]

I've been trying to find a court decision or something other than punditry that says through all the constitutional rules the United States could write a full declaration of war against an individual. I think the UN Charter on Human Rights would keep that from happening. LIC as instantiated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986(?) seems to have been a stop gap measure that was created and then institutionalized to get around irregular/COIN/LIC type threats.

I simply don't know if a non-state actor could have war declared on them (other than colloquially). I've been reading but it just doesn't seem to fit anywhere.

AQ is the poster child for the new brand of empowered non-state Actor (perhaps I should use "organization" instead of "actor" to make clear this refers to type of group instead of a type of individual)

But you raise an excellent point; we declare a war on a tactic, and then focus our operation on what is essentially a club. I really don't know where that fits into the realm of legalities, but I suspect where ever it does, it fits loosely.

That is part of the rationale behind this effort. What is war? Is this war simply becasue we have men in combat, or iis it really what we do when we are not at war (deterrence) and the men in combat are one aspect of a comprehensive scheme of deterrence across all threats.??

Either way, it appears that we are out of balance as we are not properly and fully considering all of the potential 2nd and 3rd order effects, both positive and negative, across this full range of catagories that we really must take into account.

[Entropy]

but as I was telling ken, the fact is we treat people who have nukes with way more respect than we do those who don't.


I feel obligated to question that assumption. Let's look at some recent history:

1. Russia. We pretty much ignored them and did as we pleased through the 1990's with NATO expansion and now missile defense. I don't see how Russia's nukes have constrained us. Despite having a capable and credible nuclear force, we were able to exploit Russian political, economic and conventional military weakness for over a decade and push our sphere of influence deep into theirs.

2. North Korea. I don't see a substantial change in our policy or attitude to North Korea since they acquired nuclear weapons.

3. Pakistan. Pakistan tested their nukes in 1998 and relations with them suffered as a result. After 9/11 we reversed by presenting them with an ultimatum to assist our efforts against AQ.

Nukes didn't seem to cause us to grant "way more respect" in those cases. Most of the other nuclear powers are US allies and already have our respect. Is there any empirical evidence to show that we treat people with nukes with more respect?

[Bob's World]

I feel obligated to question that assumption. Let's look at some recent history:

1. Russia. We pretty much ignored them and did as we pleased through the 1990's with NATO expansion and now missile defense. I don't see how Russia's nukes have constrained us. Despite having a capable and credible nuclear force, we were able to exploit Russian political, economic and conventional military weakness for over a decade and push our sphere of influence deep into theirs.

2. North Korea. I don't see a substantial change in our policy or attitude to North Korea since they acquired nuclear weapons.

3. Pakistan. Pakistan tested their nukes in 1998 and relations with them suffered as a result. After 9/11 we reversed by presenting them with an ultimatum to assist our efforts against AQ.

Nukes didn't seem to cause us to grant "way more respect" in those cases. Most of the other nuclear powers are US allies and already have our respect. Is there any empirical evidence to show that we treat people with nukes with more respect?

Have you considered in the alternative how we would have treated these same countries if they did not have Nukes?

Would we have invaded Iraq if we knew they had a nuclear device? I somehow doubt we would have.

Would we have held at the Pakistan border for several years like we did if they did not have Nukes? Again, I suspect not.

So, I guess I question your question. I have no insights into any policies or official positions behind any of decisions, but like people everywhere, I form perceptions, and it is the perceptions that matter.

Right now I believe we create the perception that if you are not willing to get on board "team USA", you better have a nuke or prepare to be boarded.


This is not unique in history, as my "prepare to be boarded" comment sparked my memory of that period of time between our two wars with England, when it was British policy to stop and board US merchants at will to search and seize American citizens to press into the British Navy. They did not do this, I suspect to French vessels. So we went out and built a Navy so that we could have some respect on the high seas.

[marct]

The easy answer is the motivation behind the threat. Corporations (at least those NOT governmental fronts ala Air America) are motivated by profit not political gain. They would only involve themselves in governmental activities where it behooves them, as they do with lobbyists. Arguably the same could be said for criminal organizations.

I think you may be missing out on other motivations that might be at play. "Profit", as an end goal, is certainly a major motive, the but strategy to achieve profit changes based on the environment. For example, "profit" can be achieved either by making a better widget and gaining more market share, or by influencing/controlling the market to exclude better widgets. You can also better predict market fluctuations if you have a highly predictable (and manipulable) market population, so to get this, you control the education system and the media. Neither of these examples is without historical precedent (check out the actions of the interlocking directorates of the Money Trust group at the start of the 20th century).

In Weberian, ideal typical terms, you can innovate in an adaptive market place or you can domesticate your market population.

[Entropy]

If by "respect" you mean "deterrence against invasion" then I would agree. I interpreted your use of respect much more broadly which was my mistake.

Personally, I don't think our treatment of those countries I mentioned would have been much different, but of course it's impossible to know either way for certain.

[marct]

Hi Bob,


Have you considered in the alternative how we would have treated these same countries if they did not have Nukes?

Would we have invaded Iraq if we knew they had a nuclear device? I somehow doubt we would have.

I suspect you're quite correct on both of these. I am, however, a touch concerned about the exclusive focus on having nuclear bombs; there are other forms of nuclear weapons that are equally destructive.


Right now I believe we create the perception that if you are not willing to get on board "team USA", you better have a nuke or prepare to be boarded.

Again, I would say that is pretty accurate - of course, we (Canada) have our own, special form of "deterrence" from US aggression :cool::

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b04RzmSJyJE


This is not unique in history, as my "prepare to be boarded" comment sparked my memory of that period of time between our two wars with England, when it was British policy to stop and board US merchants at will to search and seize American citizens to press into the British Navy. They did not do this, I suspect to French vessels. So we went out and built a Navy so that we could have some respect on the high seas.

Not really analogous legally. Many Americans, at the time, were still considered to be British subject "in rebellion". If I remember correctly, and I'm sure that JMM will correct me ;), only people who had been born before the peace treaty with the US were subject to impressment.

[Bob's World]

I will not argue that there is a "democratization" of WMD. This is the frightening reality of our times. It is also true that anyone on the spectrum I propose could develop and employ such a device. All the more reason to take more of a deterrence approach than a war approach to addressing our national fears over such.

At the end of the day you have to draw a cut line, and I drew mine at nuclear weapons. Certainly it could be drawn differently, and this input will help in later discussions that I am sure will happen on this topic.

Ohhhh, and no analogy is perfect, but my point on the Navy was that British policy had the unintended consequence of giving birth to the American Navy. The question we should ask ourselves is what seemingly benign bit of policy are we implementing to thump some little country in the chest today that might be giving rise some similar capacity development and change of roles in the future??

[marct]

Ohhhh, and no analogy is perfect, but my point on the Navy was that British policy had the unintended consequence of giving birth to the American Navy. The question we should ask ourselves is what seemingly benign bit of policy are we implementing to thump some little country in the chest today that might be giving rise some similar capacity development and change of roles in the future??

Granted, although I certainly wouldn't restrict it to "benign bit[s] of policy" :D. But, if your interested in one possibility, take a look at the effects that copyright law as accepted and pushed by the US is having on computer security / hacking technologies in Asia (esp. China and Thailand) and, at the same time, on its negative effects in the US. If you want another, more military, example, i remember hearing the German Ambassador to Canada mentioning that one of the main reasons for their current ROE in Afghanistan was the past 60 years of being told not to militarize.

[Ken White]

Have you considered in the alternative how we would have treated these same countries if they did not have Nukes?

Would we have invaded Iraq if we knew they had a nuclear device? I somehow doubt we would have.

Would we have held at the Pakistan border for several years like we did if they did not have Nukes? Again, I suspect not.What's happened has happened so there si no way to prove either of us right or wrong but I pretty strongly believe that Iraq would have been a target regardless and I suspect that the size, population and location (thus its resupply routes) of Pakistan has far more to do with the 'holding at the border' -- everything but the UAVs holding, that is...
Right now I believe we create the perception that if you are not willing to get on board "team USA", you better have a nuke or prepare to be boarded.Nor do I agree with that; while I do not question there are paranoids who believe that, I doubt most nations do
...They did not do this, I suspect to French vessels. So we went out and built a Navy so that we could have some respect on the high seas.Actually, we built that Navy because New England shipowners were screaming about losses to Pirates in the Caribbean and off the US coast and because the French were having a tiff with the British and the French, not the British were capturing -- not stopping and impressing from -- US ships. The British were not at that time a problem -- that came later in the British / French war and after we had finished the Quasi-War, or the Naval War With France.

Need to keep your history straight or your future may go off on a tangent... ;)

[slapout9]

Bob, I was thinking....what about a scale somewhere on the chart showing the most deterable to the least deterable entities, Start with Nuke Nation States as most deterable and go down to a clandestine terrorist as least deterable?

[Bob's World]

What's happened has happened so there si no way to prove either of us right or wrong but I pretty strongly believe that Iraq would have been a target regardless and I suspect that the size, population and location (thus its resupply routes) of Pakistan has far more to do with the 'holding at the border' -- everything but the UAVs holding, that is...Nor do I agree with that; while I do not question there are paranoids who believe that, I doubt most nations doActually, we built that Navy because New England shipowners were screaming about losses to Pirates in the Caribbean and off the US coast and because the French were having a tiff with the British and the French, not the British were capturing -- not stopping and impressing from -- US ships. The British were not at that time a problem -- that came later in the British / French war and after we had finished the Quasi-War, or the Naval War With France.

Need to keep your history straight or your future may go off on a tangent... ;)

Since you were there, and I wasn't ;)

However, as to the others, I stand by my assessment; and suspect many around the globe have the same perception. Certainly the leadership of NK and Iran had that take-away.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I was thinking....what about a scale somewhere on the chart showing the most deterable to the least deterable entities, Start with Nuke Nation States as most deterable and go down to a clandestine terrorist as least deterable?

I think it is fairly intuitive once you lay out the players which are easier to deter than others; but right now as we don't (IMO) do this and take into account all of the potential cause and effects across the span, we get out of balance and inadvertently , and unnecessarily, provoke many that we don't need to.

My goal was simply to try to make the case that those on the right end of the scale are more important (can hurt you more) today than before and must be taken into account more fully. However, they are also not "undeterable" as many are quick to state. It just may require more direct deterrence with states, but more indirect deterrence with those in the middle by robbing them of their base of support by facilitating good gov (or not being perceived as blocking good gov) by those on the right end of the scale.


Also, while I am thinking about it, I made a goof on the last chart i posted. The up and down arrows on the right should read "Encourage" and "Prevent" not positive and negative.

[Ken White]

Since you were there, and I wasn't ;)Indeed -- you shoulda been in the Old Corps. :D
However, as to the others, I stand by my assessment; and suspect many around the globe have the same perception. Certainly the leadership of NK and Iran had that take-away.I'm not at all sure of that but I am quite sure they knew what would rattle western cages. :wry:

India and Pakistan are self fulfilling prophecies. I'm still unconvinced that North Korea really has an operational nuke and the open source evidence is mixed at best. Iran is Iran and the Persian Empire cannot be restored unless they have at least the potential for a nuke. Lotta gray out there... :cool:

[TheCurmudgeon]

In Weberian, ideal typical terms, you can innovate in an adaptive market place or you can domesticate your market population.

I guess what I was in-artfully arguing for was a clean edge for where Deterrence as a foreign policy tool ends and either internal regulation and laws or external purely humanitarian concerns begin. If the point to the exercise was to define what activities we want to deter then we have to define what the objective of the deterrence was. To me, that objective was deterring externally based threats to the political and economic stability of the United States. If you are looking to rid the world of all its evils then you probably need to start a new religion since good and evil are normally their purview.

At the corporate level, where the aim is profit, if they work to manipulate the population for profit, as in the American preference for “Branded” products like McDonalds rather than the local mom and pop hamburger joint or diner (if you can even find one anymore) then I think you are stretching the concept a bit. Where corporations involve themselves in the internal matters of other countries we arguably have a greater interest.

Taking the “why should I care” argument to the extreme we have the Nuclear power. Taking the example of Pakistan the question is, why should I care if Pakistan has nuclear weapons UNLESS they have a delivery method that threatens the US. If they are just a regional threat, what are the United States’ regional interests? If my concern is the weapons falling in the wrong hands, then I offer assistance in securing them or I keep my ISR assets on them prepared to destroy them should they move (Yeah, I know, tall order). But again, it has to come down to “why should I care – what is the threat to me?” I understand that there are always second and third order effects, many of them unforeseeable, but you have to have a focus. Otherwise we really do become Team America – World Police. And we cannot afford that. The weight of it on our budget will destroy us.

[TheCurmudgeon]

My goal was simply to try to make the case that those on the right end of the scale are more important (can hurt you more) today than before and must be taken into account more fully. However, they are also not "undeterable" as many are quick to state. It just may require more direct deterrence with states, but more indirect deterrence with those in the middle by robbing them of their base of support by facilitating good gov (or not being perceived as blocking good gov) by those on the right end of the scale.


Despite my "Why Should I Care" attitude Bob's statement I totally agree with. In large part for me this is a cost/benefit winner. Much cheaper now in both blood and treasure to encourage good governance and support fledgling democracies (or even stable, non-threatening monarchies or theocracies) or to otherwise deter/dissuade/preempt less-than-state organizations/actors ability to gain and maintain power then it is to deal with the consequences when they arrive on our shores.

[Entropy]

My goal was simply to try to make the case that those on the right end of the scale are more important (can hurt you more) today than before and must be taken into account more fully. However, they are also not "undeterable" as many are quick to state. It just may require more direct deterrence with states, but more indirect deterrence with those in the middle by robbing them of their base of support by facilitating good gov (or not being perceived as blocking good gov) by those on the right end of the scale.
.

That makes sense. You can add that to your chart with a double-sided arrow showing something like "indirect approach" on one end and "direct approach" on the other.

[Bob's World]

That makes sense. You can add that to your chart with a double-sided arrow showing something like "indirect approach" on one end and "direct approach" on the other.

I just don't think its that clean, and that any good scheme will always blend a mix of both indirect and direct methods. I do believe that engagement toward the right end by necessity must be more heavily weighted toward indirect methods; and that engagement toward the left end must similarly be more weighted toward Direct. I guess I could apply a graphic similar to what I did for War/Crime and Good Gov/L-L & PofH. Hmmm. Ok, you may be on to something there.

[marct]

I guess what I was in-artfully arguing for was a clean edge for where Deterrence as a foreign policy tool ends and either internal regulation and laws or external purely humanitarian concerns begin. If the point to the exercise was to define what activities we want to deter then we have to define what the objective of the deterrence was. To me, that objective was deterring externally based threats to the political and economic stability of the United States.

Hmmm, let me see if I can pull it apart a touch more and show you why it concerns mean. I think I'll use a utilitarian argument....

US economic wealth is based on three things: successful competition in international markets (aka exports), successful technological innovation (new products), and fairly widespread, high paying jobs (disposible income / tax base).

Starting in the 1960's / 70's, large numbers of manufacturing companies started to move their operations outside of the US, led mainly by the automotive industry. By 1985 or so (sorry, I'm doing this by memory :wry:), large amounts of the automotive export market had been lost and wages had decreased (in absolute terms) thereby lowering tax revenues.

The 1980's also say the emergence of increasing use of outsources employment in data processing, software, hardware, etc., thereby also reducing the number of high paying jobs and, hence, taxable income and domestic spending power. The "shortfall" in domestic spending power was made up for by increasingly loosening credit requirements, and we are now going through the readjustment on that.

Now some of this was brought about by a profit motive - lower labour costs, lower taxes, lower environmental standards, etc., but the net result has been to seriously damage the US economy; if these actions had been taken at the instigation of a foreign government, it would have been a causus belli.

With the decrease in domestic spending (despite the credit bubble), the overall market in the US has shrunk. One thing we know about companies operating in shrinking or unstable markets is that they try and stabilize that market with their own market share as a priority. This led to political action such as the Medicare bill you folks passed a couple of years back that guarenteed US (?) pharaceutical companies a hefty profit out of tax revenue (we [Canadians] pay about half the total cost for the same drugs). This is the type of thing I mean by "domestication of the market". It reduces competition, innovation and, ultimately, the ability to produce new products.


If you are looking to rid the world of all its evils then you probably need to start a new religion since good and evil are normally their purview.

Been there, done that and all you get is the same silliness as ever :D.


Where corporations involve themselves in the internal matters of other countries we arguably have a greater interest.

How about when corporations use other nations as a testing ground for new drugs or sources of raw material with no concern for the people living there? That, BTW, is not a question coming out of a bleading heart, left wing position - it's coming out of the simple observation that if your family is hurt by a US company, you will be anti-US.

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

...the net result has been to seriously damage the US economy; if these actions had been taken at the instigation of a foreign government, it would have been a causus belliTrue. It really is. Sad, too...
This is the type of thing I mean by "domestication of the market". It reduces competition, innovation and, ultimately, the ability to produce new products.Again true and sad -- the really sad thing about it is more than adequate historical record of this basic fact -- and still we continue. :mad:
Been there, done that and all you get is the same silliness as ever :D.Yes -- and the US as religion is no better than the others, as this aptly illustrates:
How about when corporations use other nations as a testing ground for new drugs or sources of raw material with no concern for the people living there? ... it's...the simple observation that if your family is hurt by a US company, you will be anti-US.

[Surferbeetle]

From this month's HBR (this is the executive summary) by Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih: Restoring American Competitiveness: (http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2009/07/Restoring-American-Competitiveness/ib)


• Thanks to destructive outsourcing and faltering investment in research, the U.S. has lost or is on the verge of losing its ability to develop and manufacture a slew of high-tech products.

• To address this crisis, government and business must work together to rebuild the country’s industrial commons —the collective R&D, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities that sustain innovation. Both must step up their funding of research and encourage collaborative R&D initiatives to tackle society’s big problems. And companies must overhaul the management practices and governance structures that have caused them to make destructive outsourcing decisions.

• Only by rejuvenating its high-tech sector can the U.S. hope to return to the path of sustained growth needed to pay down its huge deficits and raise its citizens’ standard of living.

From page 117:

The section heading is
The World is Not Flat


More often than not, a particular industrial commons will be geographically rooted. For instance, northern Italy is home to a design commons that feeds, and is fed by several design-intensive businesses, including automobiles, furniture, apparel, and household products. The mechanical engineering commons in Germany is tightly coupled to the country's automobile and machine tool industries. The geographic character of industrial commons helps to explain why companions in certain industries tend to cluster in particular regions-a phenomenon noted by Michael Porter and other scholars. Being geographically close to the commons is a source of competitive advantage.

[marct]

Nice post, SFB!


Being geographically close to the commons is a source of competitive advantage.

Quite true, and I've been watching that particular one in Ottawa's high tech sector. Even though Nortel is a remnant, currently being dismembered, of its former self, it acted as the locus point for years of our HT commons. One of the effects was to encourage a strong education system in the area, as well as to influence the local politicians to act proactively when the tech crunch came. Even today, in our post-Nortel era, we still have a world class HT commons.

**************
(slightly) shifting topics back to Bob's original [Viagra] model, I think that a pretty solid argument can be made for including MNCs as non-state actors. they may (may be :confused:) controllable through legislation in some areas, but they do need to be held accountable when they damage the long-term national interest.

At the same time (quoth he switching gears), there are some serious legislative difficulties with running cutting edge companies right now - that was one of the major environmental factors that pushed the "associates" model (you know, no one is an employee, and the "company" really is just a financial nexus). Analogically, it would be like raising a regiment from Blackwater and branding it USA. I found it particularly disturbing when I found out that the "Made in USA" stamp could be put on products that had been assembled there even if none of them were manufactured there :mad:.

[Dayuhan]

How about when corporations use other nations as a testing ground for new drugs or sources of raw material with no concern for the people living there? That, BTW, is not a question coming out of a bleading heart, left wing position - it's coming out of the simple observation that if your family is hurt by a US company, you will be anti-US.


How does buying raw materials from a country hurt the people living there? Do you think people in countries that sell raw materials to the US would like us better if we stopped?

By this logic, should not the people who are employed by US companies abroad be supporters of the US? In most of the developing world you will find that jobs with multinationals are much sought after, as they generally provide better compensation and better opportunity for advancement than jobs with local employers. I think overall you'd find that US companies overseas help far more people than they harm, though of course with far less publicity.

Now if you really want to make people hate the US, take the anti-outsourcing routine to its logical extreme and announce that only Americans are good enough to sell their goods and services to the US or to US companies.

The outsourcing threat is much exaggerated, and you have to weigh the negative impact against the benefit of much lower prices. The problem is that the costs are concentrated while the benefits are dispersed, making accurate cost-benefit calculations difficult.

Everybody wants to sell goods or labor in a protected market and to buy in a free market. Unfortunately, that's not possible. Joe Sixpack may think Americans should pay more to protect his job, but will he pay the enormously higher prices needed to protect everybody's? Not likely. Does anyone think that paying subsidies (which protection is) to sustain uncompetitive industries will help us in the long run?

Good treatise on the subject here:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59889/daniel-w-drezner/the-outsourcing-bogeyman

If you really want to see subversion, look at the way the American educational system has delinked itself from the needs of the economy. Look at your local school's "mission statement" (they all have one these days) and you'll likely see nuts and berries instead of nuts and bolts, a lot of fluff about "lifelong learners" and "global citizens" and very little about building competitiveness, pursuing excellence, and training students to gain and hold jobs in a competitive economy.

We have vast numbers of college graduates with degrees that qualify them for nothing but disgruntled complaint, and severe shortages of machinists, precision welders, heavy equipment operators, and many other skilled trades. The average age of an American heavy equipment operator is over 50 - soon we will be importing them because even though the job pays well and requires only high school education, nobody wants to do it... we are all supposed to go to college and work in an office.

We have something like 100 times as many astrologers as astronomers... is this a prescription for competitiveness in the 21st century? Because if we want to prosper we need a lot more than guvvermint protection, we need to compete for real: the rest of the world is in play, they are not stupid and they are prepared to work hard to succeed.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Marc,

First off, let me use one of my boss’s favorite double negatives and say that I don’t disagree with you. Corporate activities, even completely domestic ones, can harm the United States. All I am arguing is that those activities are properly the venue of the legislative branch to dissuade/deter/preempt followed by enforcement through civil law enforcement and court systems.



Now some of this was brought about by a profit motive - lower labour costs, lower taxes, lower environmental standards, etc., but the net result has been to seriously damage the US economy; if these actions had been taken at the instigation of a foreign government, it would have been a causus belli.


If these acts committed by a foreign power are justification for war, if our legislators allowed these events to occur have they committed treason?

I am very cautious here for a reason. I attended CGSC a couple of years ago with a number of fairly disillusioned and disgruntled mid-grade officers. We were reminded of the grievous errors of the Generals who spoke out against policy while we floundered attempting to define what our policy was. Fascinatingly enough it was not a failing of military tactics that was the heart of the problem, it was a failing of understanding how to run a government (in this case, the Iraqi government) that was the central problem. The insurgency was the result of that failing not the cause. It took a military officer to “fix” the problem. And little by little the military became intertwined with governance in Iraq. And we learned. And we adapted and changed to be able to provide essential services, law enforcement and security, financial services, and even support courts systems. Granted this had been done before in Bosnia, but not on this scale and not with the political backdrop and the undercurrents of distrust between the military and the civilian government.

Since the election much of that has faded into the past but the officers who were in the thick of it still remember.

What worries me is when security policy starts to look into purely civilian matters, like corporations. It is not a large leap from that to looking into radical political groups who may be working inside the system but are working for change that “threatens” the “American way of life”. We have been down this path before too. I would rather not go there.

I also don’t relish the thought of the US military becoming the insurer of democracy in the same way the Turkish military tries to be the insurer of secularism.

We have taught our military how to govern in a crisis. We have also taught them how to recognize when a government is failing its people. If we encourage them to delve into our system's perceived failings, our system's inabilities to protect itself, what will they do with what they find. Again I ask the question - If these acts committed by a foreign power are justification for war, if our legislators allowed these events to occur have they committed treason? What do we do when we determine the answer is yes?

All this may seem like a prelude to “Starship Troopers”. Maybe I am being silly. But if you told me ten years ago that we would invade both Afghanistan and Iraq at the same time in the next five years I would have thought you mad.

I am only cautioning that there should be a legitimate “why should I care” along with a “is this my lane” question asked when determining what goes into a Defense Review.

[Taiko]

So US power is build on alliances. This is a fact. We would all do well to read Thucydides 'Peloponnesian Wars' to put foreign policy and international politics into perspective here.

South Korea does not perceive North Korea to be less of a threat than a non-state organisation? Simple maths really. In less than an hour North Korea can reduce Seoul to rubble and in the process kill in excess of one million people. Please enlighten me, which non-state organisation can do that?

Taiwan does not perceive China to be less of a threat than a non-state organisation? Once again, simple maths. China has the capability of turning Taiwan into one big parking lot, killing millions in the process. Which non-state organisation has the same capability?

Israel does not perceive Iran to be less of a threat than a non-state organisation? Iran has the capability to do a lot more damage to Israel than any non-state actor.

Where does this leave Eastern European states and Russia? Lets also not forget that Russia has recently bought itself a new naval base in Iceland. It does not take a geo-strategic mastermind to understand the wider implications of that purchase for the US and its European allies.

How do you explain your concept of deterrence to them? After all, they are your allies are they not? Do you tell Japan to go its own way because you think that non-state actors pose a bigger threat to US interests than China or North Korea? Come to think of it name one non-state actor who has the capability to do serious harm to the US? By serious I mean the same level of violence and destruction that North Korea, China or Iran could do to your allies and US troops stationed in some of those countries.

I agree with your concept of deterrence in principle and the need to address non-state actors. This is a forum dedicated to small wars and much of what you have written makes perfect sense. Having said that, I do not agree with how some of you read the lay of the land in terms of international politics or foreign policy. Like it or not the US is the guarantor of international order. It is a burden that is not in doubt. Some allies can do more to share the load that is a fact. However, don't loss sight of the big picture chasing after the various poisonous snakes in the jungle least you run, ill prepared, head long into a dragon.

[William F. Owen]

Having said that, I do not agree with how some of you read the lay of the land in terms of international politics or foreign policy. Like it or not the US is the guarantor of international order. It is a burden that is not in doubt. Some allies can do more to share the load that is a fact.
The belief that the US should have a role of the guarantor of international order, is purely optional. It is one the US chose, for political reasons. It is not one the whole world thrust upon it. Point being, the US could easily give it up.


However, don't loss sight of the big picture chasing after the various poisonous snakes in the jungle least you run, ill prepared, head long into a dragon.
:eek:

[marct]

Hi Dayuhan,

I'm going to respond to some of this in my next post, so this will be a touch "spotty".


How does buying raw materials from a country hurt the people living there? Do you think people in countries that sell raw materials to the US would like us better if we stopped?

That is a very good question. I am not saying that it automatically hurts the people living there, just that in some cases it does. The "hurt" inflicted should be split into short term (e.g. strip mining, child labour, excessive pollution, etc.) and long term social problems. I want to concentrate on the latter, since they are more damaging.

First off, many of the ex-colonies in, say, Africa have what can be termed a plantation or cash crop economy. This is a situation where a significant portion of economic power is concentrated in the production of a single (or few) resource. Historically, if that cash crop was an agricultural product, it meant that the economic livelihood of that economy became dependent upon a single crop which is highly susceptible to both market fluctuations and, at the same time, environmental dangers (e.g. rusts, molds, blights, etc.). Monocropping, the technical term for this, is also pretty dangerous in more recent years because the actual ownership of the seed crops may not be held by the people producing it. The economic effect of this is to extract capital from that nation and export it in vast quantities.

A second type of "cash crop" shows up with raw materials such as old, copper, bauxite, manganese, diamonds, etc. Often, access to these resources are auctioned off by their governments and the payment for them goes back to those governments. The people who actually live in the area effected by the resource extraction process don't see much of the benefits of the resource sales. As an example of this, take a look at the simmering insurgency in the Niger delta.

The long term danger here is two-fold: economies that are based on a few, primary sector exports and the concentration of capital in the hands of a) foreign corporations and b) local "elites". Consider, by way of analogic example, how much "development" or "humanitarian aid" money gets funnelled into the pockets of the same local "elites".

Having said that, I also noted earlier that this doesn't have to be a problem. Several nations have been in this situation and developed some very innovative options to avoid the long term effects: Dubai and the Sultinate of Brunei come to mind. Botswana also was aware of this problem and, when they were developing their tourism strategy in the late 60's early '70's, the retention of capital was a central concern.

Would these people be happier not selling to the US? Probably they wouldn't care if they can sell their materials somewhere. But, in national economies where you have a highly skewed Lorenz Curve (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_curve), the perception will increasingly be that the US (or whoever is buying) is supporting the elites - this makes for a potentially fruitfull recruitment ground for insurgents.


The outsourcing threat is much exaggerated, and you have to weigh the negative impact against the benefit of much lower prices. The problem is that the costs are concentrated while the benefits are dispersed, making accurate cost-benefit calculations difficult.

If by "much exagerated" you mean the lumping together of technological change with outsourcing in the current rhetoric, then I would agree. I also agree that the calculation of costs-benefits is quite difficult. As an interesting case in point, it is worth looking at what factors are actually included in both "costs" and "benefits".


Everybody wants to sell goods or labor in a protected market and to buy in a free market. Unfortunately, that's not possible. Joe Sixpack may think Americans should pay more to protect his job, but will he pay the enormously higher prices needed to protect everybody's? Not likely. Does anyone think that paying subsidies (which protection is) to sustain uncompetitive industries will help us in the long run?

The issue of lower prices is also a key one, as you so rightly note. It is, when all is said and done, however, an extremely short term issue. Anyone with two neurons to rub together is probably aware of the loss leader tactics used by some companies to destroy their competition and gain market control (doesn't mean that we don't fall for the same trick over and over again).

Market protectionism is, I agree, a from of subsidy: it trades guarenteed access to a marketplace in return for higher prices and POing your trading partners. And, whether or not it will help the US in the long run, it certainly did historically (vide the development of your steel industry) and you are still using it in both the steel and lumber industries (to name a few).



If you really want to see subversion, look at the way the American educational system has delinked itself from the needs of the economy. Look at your local school's "mission statement" (they all have one these days) and you'll likely see nuts and berries instead of nuts and bolts, a lot of fluff about "lifelong learners" and "global citizens" and very little about building competitiveness, pursuing excellence, and training students to gain and hold jobs in a competitive economy.

Well, my local schools mission statement wouldn't help much - I'm a Canadian :D. We actually have totally different historical roots for our education systems - ours comes out of the British system of universities as sites of scholarship and not job preparation, while much of the US system comes out of the reformulation in the 1870's - '80's of producing industrial workers (thanks Dewey!).

Having said that, our universities have been moving increasingly towards the American model - a move I decry both as an academic and as someone who knows a lot about getting jobs (the field site for my PhD research was a career transition firm, and I spent 3 years working as a career transition counsellor in the high tech sector during 2000 - 2003).


We have vast numbers of college graduates with degrees that qualify them for nothing but disgruntled complaint, and severe shortages of machinists, precision welders, heavy equipment operators, and many other skilled trades. The average age of an American heavy equipment operator is over 50 - soon we will be importing them because even though the job pays well and requires only high school education, nobody wants to do it... we are all supposed to go to college and work in an office.

I agree - if you want to measure the educational disfunction in a society, take a look at the number of totally useless graduates produced. I have met people with BAs and, occassionally, MAs who are functionally illiterate and are incapable of thinking outside of their programming.

In Canada, as I mentioned, our education system has different roots from the US. We concentrate our Trades training in "community colleges" and, to a lessor degree, in Polytechnical Schools. As a result, we actually have a fairly decent system of educating machinists, technicians, equipment operators, etc. I have also had students at my university who have taken BAs and also got Trades qualifications - it's pretty common up here. Personally, I think that if the US was serious about Trades training, it would look at the German model; it's expensive (more so than ours), but produces top quality people.

re: "nobody wants to do it... we are all supposed to go to college and work in an office", that's a cultural problem tied into your social status system. The education system in the US may support it, but it certainly didn't create it. The status system is indoctrinated into kids really early on (e.g. television, stories, etc. - think "cultural narratives") and, by the time they get to school, it's already there ("my dad's better than your dad - he makes more money!").


We have something like 100 times as many astrologers as astronomers... is this a prescription for competitiveness in the 21st century? Because if we want to prosper we need a lot more than guvvermint protection, we need to compete for real: the rest of the world is in play, they are not stupid and they are prepared to work hard to succeed.

Yup. It's one of the reasons why some people have said that the US is the only culture to go from youthful vigour to decadence with no intervening period of civilization :D. But, hey, astrology pays better than astronomy, so it must be right :eek:!

Is it a prescription for competitiveness in the 21st century? Well, only in the astrology market. Seriously, though, I agree that you do need a lot more than market protectionism; you need a solid educational system that doesn't reward whining; you need a status system that reflects your desired cultural end states, and you need a system of governance that acts to reinforce that status system.

It's so easy seeing other countries problems :D.

Cheers,

Marc

[marct]

Hi Curmudgeon,


First off, let me use one of my boss’s favorite double negatives and say that I don’t disagree with you. Corporate activities, even completely domestic ones, can harm the United States. All I am arguing is that those activities are properly the venue of the legislative branch to dissuade/deter/preempt followed by enforcement through civil law enforcement and court systems.

I love that type of double negative :D! I don't disagree that governments should do what you note, I am merely pointing out that a) they don't always do so and b) corporations often act in venues that are outside of specific governmental jurisdictions.


If these acts committed by a foreign power are justification for war, if our legislators allowed these events to occur have they committed treason?

Interesting question - in the Canadian context, I would argue that they had and should be held accountable for their actions as servants of the Crown. I'll leave the US answer to JMM.....


I am very cautious here for a reason. I attended CGSC a couple of years ago with a number of fairly disillusioned and disgruntled mid-grade officers. We were reminded of the grievous errors of the Generals who spoke out against policy while we floundered attempting to define what our policy was. Fascinatingly enough it was not a failing of military tactics that was the heart of the problem, it was a failing of understanding how to run a government (in this case, the Iraqi government) that was the central problem. The insurgency was the result of that failing not the cause. It took a military officer to “fix” the problem. And little by little the military became intertwined with governance in Iraq. And we learned. And we adapted and changed to be able to provide essential services, law enforcement and security, financial services, and even support courts systems. Granted this had been done before in Bosnia, but not on this scale and not with the political backdrop and the undercurrents of distrust between the military and the civilian government.

As an historical note, it had also been done in post-WW II Germany and Japan, so the precedent was there along with a whole body of knowledge. I must say that I have certainly been impressed with a lot of the re-learning that has happened (there are some excellent examples and first hand accounts in the Mosul Case Study).


What worries me is when security policy starts to look into purely civilian matters, like corporations. It is not a large leap from that to looking into radical political groups who may be working inside the system but are working for change that “threatens” the “American way of life”. We have been down this path before too. I would rather not go there.

There's no question in my mind that it is a slippery slope. I'm afraid that the potential internal outcome you are talking about, e.g. a return to the House un-American Activities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_Un-American_Activities_Committee)Committee (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_Un-American_Activities_Committee), is a distinct possibility. It's a classic Witch Hunt process and I've seen a number of signs indicating that it is already happening in some segments of US society (the Ward Churchill case (http://marctyrrell.com/2009/07/10/rule-of-law/) comes to mind as does the series of attacks on Montgomery McFate (http://marctyrrell.com/2008/08/19/the-night-battles-in-the-21st-century/)). For some reason, the US is more susceptible to them than Canada is (it might be geographic / environmental, but it's really hard to know).

Honestly, I don't have any out of the box solutions to it in the US context.


I also don’t relish the thought of the US military becoming the insurer of democracy in the same way the Turkish military tries to be the insurer of secularism.

I think Wilf's answer to taiko on a similar point works here, too.


The belief that the US should have a role of the guarantor of international order, is purely optional. It is one the US chose, for political reasons. It is not one the whole world thrust upon it. Point being, the US could easily give it up.


We have taught our military how to govern in a crisis. We have also taught them how to recognize when a government is failing its people. If we encourage them to delve into our system's perceived failings, our system's inabilities to protect itself, what will they do with what they find. Again I ask the question - If these acts committed by a foreign power are justification for war, if our legislators allowed these events to occur have they committed treason? What do we do when we determine the answer is yes?

Become involved in the democratic process. Okay, sounds banal, but it certainly beats the Turkish alternative! Your Republic was based originally on the concept that the citizenry must constantly watch the State for signs of it becomming a tyranny - or taken over by a buncha slobs who are in it for the money :wry:. Go back to your roots and use the systems you developed to guard against these possibilities. If you then find that you can make no changes and are blocked by entrenched elites who tax without representation, well, doesn't your cultural foundation myth provide an answer to that?

I don't think that you (the US) are anywhere near such a situation myself, but the primary guarentor of your freedoms is not the soldier manning the ramparts, it is the informed and socially active citizen who monitors the government.


All this may seem like a prelude to “Starship Troopers”. Maybe I am being silly. But if you told me ten years ago that we would invade both Afghanistan and Iraq at the same time in the next five years I would have thought you mad.

One of the folk sayings that my grandmother loved to quote was "there's naught so strange as folk". Personally, I would be all in favour of H&MP being taught in schools - it would make a welcome change from some of the junk that passes for "education" :wry:.

At the same time, you have to remember that Heilinein's predicate for the development of that society was a total collapse of government functioning, massive anarchy and a global war. Could it happen? Yup. Don't ask me to give you a probability of it happening, though (my guess is less than 2% based on current trends).


I am only cautioning that there should be a legitimate “why should I care” along with a “is this my lane” question asked when determining what goes into a Defense Review.

If it were to be included in a Defense Review, it should, IMO, be listed as "for action" by some agency other than DoD. I would argue that it is crucial for some commands, e.g. AFICOM, to monitor corporate activity since that will affect the stability / instability of their AO, but it should be sent to another arm of government for action. I would also suggest that something along the lines of corporate monitoring should be built into the planning process, in much the same continengy manner as "what if group X decided to use violence in situation Y". If a corporation did engage in kinetic operations, then it moves closer to the military purview.

Cheers,

Marc

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't think that you (the US) are anywhere near such a situation myself, but the primary guarentor of your freedoms is not the soldier manning the ramparts, it is the informed and socially active citizen who monitors the government.


Ohhhhh, I feel SO much better now!

You have been to America, right?:D

[Taiko]

The belief that the US should have a role of the guarantor of international order, is purely optional. It is one the US chose, for political reasons. It is not one the whole world thrust upon it. Point being, the US could easily give it up.

Agreed, but the cost of giving up the role may far outweight the benefits. Having said that, the US did, in my interpretation, have the role trust on it by no other reason than it had the capability to play a pivitol role as a balancer in both Eutrope and Asia. In addition, it had no other choice than to become the ballwalk against communist expansion. It had to remain engaged internationally after the second world war, and not return to isolationism, because it needed a stable foreign market. Thats my POV anyway.

MarcT: maintaining international order is different to enforcing democracries on totalitarian states?

[marct]

You have been to America, right?:D

Okay, so I was on a rhetorical soap box :D!

[marct]

MarcT: maintaining international order is different to enforcing democracries on totalitarian states?

Depends on how you define things but, regardless of definitional quibbles, Wilf's answer still works ;).

[davidbfpo]

Awhile back on this thread multi-national corporations (MNC) appeared and this article links: Rio-Tinto Zinc, PR China and Australia - with the PRC claiming RTZ has spied on the and impacted their economy: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/6001852/Chinese-website-slams-Rio-Tinto-espionage.html

davidbfpo

[Dayuhan]

That is a very good question. I am not saying that it automatically hurts the people living there, just that in some cases it does. The "hurt" inflicted should be split into short term (e.g. strip mining, child labour, excessive pollution, etc.) and long term social problems.


Certainly these problems exist in much of the world... but the degree to which they can be attributed to multinational corporations in general and US-based multinationals specifically is highly debatable. If you wade past the politically motivated rhetoric and get out into the field in the developing world you very quickly find that the real trouble spots in the pollution and child labor are locally owned enterprises churning out ultra-cheap no-brand goods, not multinationals. The unbranded cheap sneakers that activists wear to show they are not attached to brands are likely to be made in factories sporting conditions far worse than anything a MNC ever dreamed of.



A second type of "cash crop" shows up with raw materials such as old, copper, bauxite, manganese, diamonds, etc. Often, access to these resources are auctioned off by their governments and the payment for them goes back to those governments. The people who actually live in the area effected by the resource extraction process don't see much of the benefits of the resource sales. As an example of this, take a look at the simmering insurgency in the Niger delta.


The Niger Delta is a good example of how an astonishingly corrupt national government can shift blame onto a corporation. Of course Shell has to deal with the Nigerian Government: that's what the law says in Nigeria, and Shell has to follow the law. Taking care of the people in the Delta is the responsibility of the Nigerian Government, and Shell pays them more than enough to do it. Of course they don't... but is Shell supposed to enforce Nigeria's derisory anti-corruption laws? Remove the Nigerian Government?

Mining has been an issue, but it's certainly not primarily a US MNC issue... how many US Companies are among the top dozen? Of 44 major mining companies surveyed in KPMGs mining review, all of 7 are US-based. If you really want to see mining companies making a mess, look at the operations of Chinese companies in Africa, running up a record of bribery, environmental destruction, and labor abuse that makes BHP Billiton look like the Sierra Club.



The long term danger here is two-fold: economies that are based on a few, primary sector exports and the concentration of capital in the hands of a) foreign corporations and b) local "elites". Consider, by way of analogic example, how much "development" or "humanitarian aid" money gets funnelled into the pockets of the same local "elites".


Very true... but do we expect MNCs to change the way these countries are run? In what developing nations is capital really concentrated in the hands of foreign corporations? It's worth noting that the corporations actually have productive operations that hire people, while the local elites tend to salt their money away outside the country.



Having said that, I also noted earlier that this doesn't have to be a problem. Several nations have been in this situation and developed some very innovative options to avoid the long term effects: Dubai and the Sultinate of Brunei come to mind.

Dubai doesn't export resources, as it has none. You mean Abu Dhabi perhaps, or the UAE? Overasll I'd say the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait do pretty well, and even the Saudis have made huge steps forward in the last 5-6 years, not that you'd know it from the US media. Of course they have the advantage of small indigenous populations and very valuable resources. Still, American companies do not run these countries... neither do they run Nigeria, Angola, or the Congo.



Would these people be happier not selling to the US? Probably they wouldn't care if they can sell their materials somewhere. But, in national economies where you have a highly skewed Lorenz Curve (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_curve), the perception will increasingly be that the US (or whoever is buying) is supporting the elites - this makes for a potentially fruitfull recruitment ground for insurgents.


As I mentioned above, "whoever is buying" is muich less likely to be the US than many realize... as we've lost heavy industry, we've also reduced our buying of primary materials. One wonders if this formulation will apply to the Chinese...



The issue of lower prices is also a key one, as you so rightly note. It is, when all is said and done, however, an extremely short term issue. Anyone with two neurons to rub together is probably aware of the loss leader tactics used by some companies to destroy their competition and gain market control (doesn't mean that we don't fall for the same trick over and over again).


That would be a concern in a single-supplier situation... but how many of those do you see around? The world is a very competitive place these days.



Market protectionism is, I agree, a from of subsidy: it trades guarenteed access to a marketplace in return for higher prices and POing your trading partners. And, whether or not it will help the US in the long run, it certainly did historically (vide the development of your steel industry) and you are still using it in both the steel and lumber industries (to name a few).


We do it in agriculture more than anywhere, and if we really wanted to help the developing world we'd scrap agricultural subsidies and demand that Europe do the same (which would have the added benefit of pissing off the French). Wherever we do it is not good for us, in the long run. Possibly necessary at the early stages of industrialization, but for a mature industrial state it is counterproductive.

On education I think we mostly agree... though I suspect that astrology does not pay better than astronony, the appeal lies in much lower entry barriers.

While the world has many problems and blaming them on multinational corporations is popular, I'd say the reality is far more complex, and "subversion" by corporations is hardly a significant security problem. I don't see much there that can't be managed by the traditional tools of legislation and regulation. Of course the US, Canada, or the UK cannot legislate for Angola, Vietnam, or Mexico... but is that a bad thing? At the end of the day, if that power existed, would it be used for their benefit, or for ours?

[marct]

Hi Dayuhan,

Actually, we aren't that far apart. I tend to talk about issues as adaptive processes inside of and acting upon cultural matrices, which can lead to some confusion.


Certainly these problems exist in much of the world... but the degree to which they can be attributed to multinational corporations in general and US-based multinationals specifically is highly debatable.

Quite true at the present time. The era of US corporations dominating the world in that sense was, pretty much, from about 1945 - 1970 or so. Culturally, that is enough to create an emotional connotation that skews perceptions.


The Niger Delta is a good example of how an astonishingly corrupt national government can shift blame onto a corporation. Of course Shell has to deal with the Nigerian Government: that's what the law says in Nigeria, and Shell has to follow the law. Taking care of the people in the Delta is the responsibility of the Nigerian Government, and Shell pays them more than enough to do it. Of course they don't... but is Shell supposed to enforce Nigeria's derisory anti-corruption laws? Remove the Nigerian Government?

Is it the result of the Nigerian government? Sure, some of it is, but there are also other options that are available. For example, Shell can go beyond the legal requirements of Nigeria and engage in local development work (which they do a bit of). Done properly, the effect would be to shift local resentment towards the government and away from the corporation. This tactic has been used by several MNCs over the past couple of decades, and it works pretty well.


Very true... but do we expect MNCs to change the way these countries are run? In what developing nations is capital really concentrated in the hands of foreign corporations? It's worth noting that the corporations actually have productive operations that hire people, while the local elites tend to salt their money away outside the country.

Do you seriously expect them not to :wry:? As to their "productive operations", you might want to check out how the auto industry started to operate in the mid-1980's. Basically, what they would do is move in capital, work with local elites to establish production plants, and recoup their entire investment, with a decent profit (~20% or so) over 5 years. After that, they could walk away from the plants. The trick was that they were using a floating pool of capital and retaining control over distribution of the final product (i.e. market access). So, yes, the locals would have jobs for 5-6 years, but the auto companies also had major political leverage after that.


Dubai doesn't export resources, as it has none.


Economically, Dubai is most famous for its oil and gas production, which only makes up less than 6% of the state's economy, and only 2% of the UAE's economy. Dubai contributes 82.2% of the UAE's non-oil exports.

The non-oil exports that come from Dubai are mainly traditional products and commodities and manufactured items. The traditional producs include things such as dried and frozen fish, dates, hides, and scrap metals. Most of these exports go to other Gulf States, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This sector is minor compared to the manufacturing exports.
The manufactured products that Dubai exports include liquefied gase, clothing, cement, electric cables and aluminum ingots. The majority of the importers of these goods are Japan, India, China, Taiwan, and the United States.
Source (http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/dubai/export-import.html)



As I mentioned above, "whoever is buying" is muich less likely to be the US than many realize... as we've lost heavy industry, we've also reduced our buying of primary materials. One wonders if this formulation will apply to the Chinese...

Sure, this is all about a process influencing local cultural perceptions.


That would be a concern in a single-supplier situation... but how many of those do you see around? The world is a very competitive place these days.

Doesn't have to be; it is about the process that creates single-supplier situations and then turns around and controls the regulation of that situation.


We do it in agriculture more than anywhere, and if we really wanted to help the developing world we'd scrap agricultural subsidies and demand that Europe do the same (which would have the added benefit of pissing off the French).

I'd forgotten about that when I was posting earlier :wry:. As a Canadian, I tend to be more aware of the areas that we are in conflict with you on in protectionist terms.


Wherever we do it is not good for us, in the long run. Possibly necessary at the early stages of industrialization, but for a mature industrial state it is counterproductive.

Economically, I tend to agree. When it comes to politics, that is another thing all together :wry:. It is very easy to sell protectionism in the US political arena. Of course, the same politicos who sell it then yell the loudest when the retaliation hits....


On education I think we mostly agree... though I suspect that astrology does not pay better than astronony, the appeal lies in much lower entry barriers.

Definitely part of the appeal, but the payout potential is perceived as being better in astrology. Consider how many famous astronomers there are verses how many famous astrologers. Also I would note that pretty much every daily newspaper carries astrology sections, while almost none seem to carry astronomy sections. And, as an added bonus, the general market place is much larger (~60% of the US population last I heard) and the capital costs are much lower :D.


While the world has many problems and blaming them on multinational corporations is popular, I'd say the reality is far more complex, and "subversion" by corporations is hardly a significant security problem.

This is where our different backgrounds turn around and cause confusion. I agree that blaming the MNCs is quite popular (and, also, less accurate), but that was, in part, my point: they are easy targets with a long history. Is it a significant security problem? I suspect we'll have to agree to disagree on this one.


I don't see much there that can't be managed by the traditional tools of legislation and regulation. Of course the US, Canada, or the UK cannot legislate for Angola, Vietnam, or Mexico... but is that a bad thing? At the end of the day, if that power existed, would it be used for their benefit, or for ours?

Hunh! Both the US and Canada (don't know about the UK) have for the past while been legislation for the actions of their citizens in foreign countries (1997 in Canada I believe; it came out of the FGM debates here). While we can't legislate for other countries, we have already established legal precedent for legislating for the actions of our citizens and agents in other countries.

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

Hi Dayuhan,
Actually, we aren't that far apart. I tend to talk about issues as adaptive processes inside of and acting upon cultural matrices, which can lead to some confusion.


I see that... and I tend to ask "what exactly do you propose that we do about it?" Both legitimate perspectives, of course...



Quite true at the present time. The era of US corporations dominating the world in that sense was, pretty much, from about 1945 - 1970 or so. Culturally, that is enough to create an emotional connotation that skews perceptions.


I agree... but given that the past is not amenable to revision, what are we supposed to do about it? Are we trying to solve yesterday's problem, or tomorrow's?



Is it the result of the Nigerian government? Sure, some of it is, but there are also other options that are available. For example, Shell can go beyond the legal requirements of Nigeria and engage in local development work (which they do a bit of). Done properly, the effect would be to shift local resentment towards the government and away from the corporation. This tactic has been used by several MNCs over the past couple of decades, and it works pretty well.


Not a bad idea, and I don't entirely disgree... one must be aware, though, that poorly calculated development work can do as much harm as good, and that Shell's expertise is in producing oil, not development work. Another factor is that any development work that succeeds in empowering local communities in the Niger Delta is likely to be seen as a threat in Abuja. There are often political and social complications when companies step outside what they know and dabble in what they don't. In any event Shell's activities in Nigeria shouldn't be raising anti-US sentiment... are the Nigerians pissed off at the Brits and the Dutch?



As to their "productive operations", you might want to check out how the auto industry started to operate in the mid-1980's. Basically, what they would do is move in capital, work with local elites to establish production plants, and recoup their entire investment, with a decent profit (~20% or so) over 5 years. After that, they could walk away from the plants. The trick was that they were using a floating pool of capital and retaining control over distribution of the final product (i.e. market access). So, yes, the locals would have jobs for 5-6 years, but the auto companies also had major political leverage after that.


Are you saying that after 5 years they would close the plants? Why? They still need the product (unless of course they're going out of business, in wh, and if a plant is productive and economical, what's the gain in closing it and opening somewhere else?



Doesn't have to be; it is about the process that creates single-supplier situations and then turns around and controls the regulation of that situation.


How does sourcing components from other countries create a single-supplier situation? We buy lots of things from Chinese companies, but how many of them can we not buy elsewhere if we get a better deal?



Economically, I tend to agree. When it comes to politics, that is another thing all together :wry:. It is very easy to sell protectionism in the US political arena. Of course, the same politicos who sell it then yell the loudest when the retaliation hits....


Given that sound economic policies are often unpopular, how do you maintain sound economic policies in a democracy? Hard question, and nobody's come up with a fully convincing solution yet. Much of our current economic dislocation could have been avoided if politicians were willing to bite the bullet and take steps that were necessary but unpopular. Hard thing to do, in a democracy.



Is it a significant security problem? I suspect we'll have to agree to disagree on this one.


Is there a security problem there that cannot be managed by the existing tools of legislation and regulation. Certainly deterrence should not be difficult to manage, given that the shares of MNCs trade on public exchanges and their headquarters are located in Western cities. We're not likely to need Predator drones or covert ops to deal with the threat of renegade law-breaking CEOs. A warrant and a few policemen will suffice.



Hunh! Both the US and Canada (don't know about the UK) have for the past while been legislation for the actions of their citizens in foreign countries (1997 in Canada I believe; it came out of the FGM debates here). While we can't legislate for other countries, we have already established legal precedent for legislating for the actions of our citizens and agents in other countries.

We can, to sopme extent, legislate the actions of our citizens in other countries. We cannot legislate for those countries. African leaders want to be bribed, we tell our companies not to bribe them, they make deals with the Chinese instead. Whether this benefits the average African (or, in the long run, the Chinese) remains to be seen.

[marct]

OP259 Corporations and Counterinsurgency. August 24, 2009. William Rosenau, Peter Chalk, Renny McPherson, Michelle Parker, Austin Long

Like nongovernmental organizations and private military companies, large multinational corporations (MNCs) can play significant roles in zones of violent conflict. Any comprehensive conflict analysis needs to understand these roles, especially as they relate to counterinsurgency. Using a set of three case studies, the authors explore MNC operations in Liberia, Papua New Guinea, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The case studies highlight the activities of the MNCs that were intended to shape their violent environment and protect their infrastructure and personnel. Policymakers may be tempted to leverage corporate activities. However, corporate actions, no matter how well intentioned, can have less-than-benign consequences. Moreover, any potential “subcontracting” to MNCs would raise questions about accountability, legitimacy, and state responsibilities.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP259/I haven't had a chance to go through it yet, but I thought it was worth posting.

[slapout9]

I haven't had a chance to go through it yet, but I thought it was worth posting.

Part of the problem about MNC'c is that they can create the "Effects of War" without firing a shot. And because they are not directly shooting at somebody the Western logical-compartmental-mentality thinks that it is not War until it is to late. Much like the older COIN writers talk about the Guvmint not realizing that an insurgency exists until it is well underway. Armed Capitalist vs. Armed Social Workers:D yea, I just invented that.

[Bob's World]

Thanks to everyone for all of the insights shared on this thread. Since I posted this I completed a presentation to flesh out the idea, and have sparked the interest of both the planners at Strategic Command; as well as getting my own boss to open his mind to the possibility that his mantra of "AQ cannot be deterred" may not be quite as absolute as he once believed.

I am framing up a couple of articles this weekend. The first with my boss's name attached that lays out the concept of Full-Spectrum Deterrence as a new way at looking at the comprehensive deterrence mission; with minor treatment of deterrence of irregular threats. The second will be with just my byline (I'm comfortable with being a bit more provocative) that takes on head to head the premise that an over-all campaign that is focused more on deterring AQ rather than defeating them is far more likely to produce the global strategic effects that we seek, and that in fact the defeat approach has actually made the strategic environment worse over the past 7 years of engagement.

As I flesh out key concepts I will chum the intellectual waters of the SWJ community with them to see what the sharks think.

[Ken White]

On both articles. Looking forward to them...

[Surferbeetle]

From the BBC: Venice: Majesty and melancholy (http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8226000/8226901.stm)


Until the building in the mid-nineteenth century of the road and railway bridge linking the mainland with the islands on which Venice rose from the waters, the city was a natural fortress.

It was the bastion of a small, but powerful seafaring merchant nation which for many centuries dominated trade in the Mediterranean.

Venice is the adoptive home of the Evangelist Saint Mark, his body stolen from Alexandria and brought North by a bunch of merchant adventurers to embellish the gilded basilica which now bears his name, in order to provide Holy protection for their city.

The Venetian Lion, the symbol of Saint Mark, is portrayed all over the city.

The Victorians loved Venice. The poet Robert Browning died there, so did Richard Wagner. John Ruskin found inspiration from its stones.

[Entropy]

On both articles. Looking forward to them...

What Ken said.

[slapout9]

What Ken said.

What Entroy said.

[William F. Owen]

What Ken said.


What Entroy said.

In on the guns. Switches on. Cleared in hot. FAC in sight.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Taiko,
How do you explain your concept of deterrence to them? After all, they are your allies are they not? Do you tell Japan to go its own way because you think that non-state actors pose a bigger threat to US interests than China or North Korea?

Taiko, I'm not sure where you're going with your argument, so pardon me if I take it out of the intended context, but I don't think anyone is implying that irregular threats are a greater threat than potentially hostile nation-states. So called traditional (nation states) and irregular threats have been a reality for at least a couple hundred of years and will continue to be a threat for the foreseeable future.

I guess the level of the threat depends on where you sit. Since there is no nation state that I'm aware that desires to invade China or the United States, the most probable threat to their homeland is the irregular threat. The Chinese have to deal with a range of ethnic identity groups in western China that challenges their sovreignty, while the U.S. must contend with Al Qaeda and related groups, environmental extremists, narcoterrorists from Mexico, and the list goes on. That is what we deal with on a day to day basis, but obviously a North Korean attack on South Korea would change the priority "if" it happened.


Come to think of it name one non-state actor who has the capability to do serious harm to the US? By serious I mean the same level of violence and destruction that North Korea, China or Iran could do to your allies and US troops stationed in some of those countries.

Let's face it, Al Qaeda created a lot of damage on 9/11 and the damage went beyond the number of casualties and physical infrastructure damage created. It clearly was an attack that changed the world in many ways. As severe as a North Korean attack on South Korea may be (though the North would quickly be beat back), and although the repercussions from such an attack would be global (at least economically), I don't think it would have the same impact as the 9/11 attack. The 9/11 attack was an attack on globalism, modernization, the West, etc., not just an attack on one country as an attack on Seoul would be. Which group can inflict grave damage? My guess is it is the group that obtains a weapon of mass destruction, probably a biological weapon and the group is willing to use it. What's more dangerous? Since we have mechanisms in place to deter or respond effectively to an attack from State, I'll argue an attack from a non-state actor is more dangerous, because it can come from any number of wacko groups that we don't currently have the ability to deter, thus I think an attack from the non-state actor is more probable and harder to prevent, thus more dangerous.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

Bill,

I'm temporally embarressed at the moment, so possibly not at 100% but help me reconcile your comments...

"I don't think anyone is implying that irregular threats are a greater threat than potentially hostile nation-states."

...with...

"I'll argue an attack from a non-state actor is more dangerous, because it can come from...groups that we don't currently have the ability to deter...attack from the non-state actor is more probable and harder to prevent, thus more dangerous"

And which non-state actors are more capable than a state? Few. And of those who is a direct threat to, say, the USA? None.

[TheLapsedPacifist]

Bob,

Firstly, thanks for the chum quote - that's a keeper.

Deter...in your paper will you cover an analysis of the alternatives to Deterrence? To me Deter implies a kind of symmetry: they threaten us, we threaten them, but with a bigger stick. They are deterred. Is that a workable, sustainable, achievable strategy for a State to employ against a Non-State Actor? Deterrence would assume (I guess) some identifiable asset (could be non-corporeal, e.g. their ideology) that we can threaten with destruction/harm. What would this be?

I think that in an analysis, Deterrence becomes an attrition-based strategy – in which we have to repeatedly demonstrate our capability to deter – by destroying things/people – because each NSA would either not care to be deterred, or who believe itself to be immune to our deterrent capabilities (either rightly or wrongly).

Your thoughts on this would be interesting and most welcome.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

Firstly, thanks for the chum quote - that's a keeper.

Deter...in your paper will you cover an analysis of the alternatives to Deterrence? To me Deter implies a kind of symmetry: they threaten us, we threaten them, but with a bigger stick. They are deterred. Is that a workable, sustainable, achievable strategy for a State to employ against a Non-State Actor? Deterrence would assume (I guess) some identifiable asset (could be non-corporeal, e.g. their ideology) that we can threaten with destruction/harm. What would this be?

I think that in an analysis, Deterrence becomes an attrition-based strategy – in which we have to repeatedly demonstrate our capability to deter – by destroying things/people – because each NSA would either not care to be deterred, or who believe itself to be immune to our deterrent capabilities (either rightly or wrongly).

Your thoughts on this would be interesting and most welcome.

Deterrence between states is largely a Cost/Benefit problem, that is summed up in "Credible Response." If you have both the capability and the credibility to make the cost of an action higher than the benefit, you will most often "deter."

But what of these new empowered actors that are not encumbered by states, and that take advantage of new forms of sanctuary from state power? The Hezbollah that is what I call a "quasi-state actor," who affiliates and participates in a state, but who also remains outside the state context to act independently; or a non-state actor like AQ with no such affiliations? Clearly what works on a state will not work on a non or quasi-state actor in the same way.

Like dealing with Home owners, Home renters, and Home guests, Squatters, and homeless. Clearly one program designed to create desired behavior in home owners is hardly likely to be effective with those in the other categories. Similarly, an effort to wipe out squatters that destroys property belonging to owners and that provokes other squatters and homeless people to unite to do harm back to the state is a bad program. The idea is to balance engagement across a span of actors by recognizing broad, but distinct categories and tailoring a balance of "prevent" and "encourage" engagement across the spectrum to achieve the desired effect.

One may have began with a COA of "Defeat squatters," but after say 7 years of focused energy on that one category finally woke up and realized that while there were less squatters, that things were actually worse in varying degrees in every other category. Balance. Some things are best engaged directly, others indirectly. Perhaps a program that enables owners to develop low-cost housing is more effective in preventing homelessness than rounding up homeless people and busing them to the next town; as an example.

Or, as I described it on my Facebook page:

"If the entire Muslim populace of the Middle East is an Elephant, and Al Qaeda is its balls; we are kicking holy hell out of the balls with little regard how "defeating" this one part might be "provoking" the rest."

[TheLapsedPacifist]

Sorry Bob, I may have missed your point - hotel room still not available - so still no sleep and so my thoughts are as fragged as they were earlier!

I think that the state - non-state deter thing was my point. Yet, I thought that you were writing a paper on how to deter non-state-actors. Your last comment seems to suggest to me that deter is a reasonable COA against a state - because they make a cost-benefit decision and hopefully we have stacked the odds in our favour.

Whereas a NSA has a different worldview and therefore unresponsive - either because they are deluded or immune (e.g. different value set). And even if they are responsive - we have to demonstrate the lesson frequently because of the myriad of NSAs - which leads to my attritional point.

So what’s the secret?

And if I might modify your elephant metaphor - what we are doing is swinging at the balls, sometimes we hit them, but mostly we don't – when we miss we sometimes kick the elephant – which is big and strong. I mean there's no real evidence that places AQ at the centre of Muslim interest - whereas being male, my balls are most definitely at the centre of my interest – especially if someone is trying to kick them.

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, I may have missed your point - hotel room still not available - so still no sleep and so my thoughts are as fragged as they were earlier!

I think that the state - non-state deter thing was my point. Yet, I thought that you were writing a paper on how to deter non-state-actors. Your last comment seems to suggest to me that deter is a reasonable COA against a state - because they make a cost-benefit decision and hopefully we have stacked the odds in our favour.

Whereas a NSA has a different worldview and therefore unresponsive - either because they are deluded or immune (e.g. different value set). And even if they are responsive - we have to demonstrate the lesson frequently because of the myriad of NSAs - which leads to my attritional point.

So what’s the secret?

And if I might modify your elephant metaphor - what we are doing is swinging at the balls, sometimes we hit them, but mostly we don't – when we miss we sometimes kick the elephant – which is big and strong. I mean there's no real evidence that places AQ at the centre of Muslim interest - whereas being male, my balls are most definitely at the centre of my interest – especially if someone is trying to kick them.

You will have to be willing to step away from what you believe to be true and attempt to see things from my perspective if you hope to understand. Actually, I see that a lot on here, people talking past each other because they are not curious about differing positions, so much as challenged by them. So they seek to defend what they already "know" rather than seek to understand something that does not fit within that comfortable circle.

I could take this elephant things several directions, but I will try to focus a bit myself. The balls by themselves won't cause much trouble, nor frankly, will the elephant without the balls. They are a team. We should not be trying to separate them from each other, nor should we be trying to help the rider (government) control the elephant, particularly if the rider was placed in his position by us.

But as you said, the elephant is getting powerful motivational messages from the balls and is likely to listen if not constrained by a steady hand on the reins by a caring rider, and a set of fair rules enforced by just rewards and punishment.

To deter the balls then, I do not target them directly except in a worse case situation where all else has failed. I focus on periphery. First the rider. Ensure the elephant knows that he is a rider of their choosing and work with the rider to ensure that he cares well for his charge, has just rewards and punishments and fair rules of law. Then the elephant himself. Treat him with respect and give him the space he needs and the opportunity to do those things that bring a sense of accomplishment to an elephant. For the most part, ignore his damn balls. They'll always be there, but he will not act out inappropriately often if these other factors are in place; and as the elephant matures and the rider becomes more comfortable and experienced in his role, the elephant will listen to the balls less and less every day.

So don't worry about trying to deter Bin Laden himself. Waste of time, kill the bastard. Don't try to rationalize with AQ directly either, they will think you are weak and pathetic and draw strength from your efforts. Seek to understand why the organization really exists (and to spread Islamism around the world and create a mighty Caliphate is NOT IT). This is indirect approach business. Focus on the needs of these long suppressed populaces, and on the poor governance that rules over them, and on the inappropriate influence the West has in this region. Create conditions that render AQ irrelevant and they are "deterred."

Or, you can just go kick the elphant in the Jimmy. Your call.

[William F. Owen]

You will have to be willing to step away from what you believe to be true and attempt to see things from my perspective if you hope to understand. Actually, I see that a lot on here, people talking past each other because they are not curious about differing positions, so much as challenged by them. So they seek to defend what they already "know" rather than seek to understand something that does not fit within that comfortable circle.
So basically to understand a certain argument, you will just have to believe that the earth is flat, or that gravity pushes, not pulls?

While I understand the spirit of enquiry and open minded thinking you are trying to impart, I have to say that does not translate well into discussion based on empirical evidence. I am immensely curious about the way you think, because I disagree with a lot of your basic assumptions.

EG: Bob's World teaches that insurgencies are caused by bad governments. I do not believe that to be true, because no government is perfect. What degree of imperfection causes an insurgency? Plus very many very bad Governments are very secure.

Giving up what people actually know to be true, or have evidence to support, is how you get faith based arguments like EBO, MW and 4GW. To understand them, you just have to "free your ass" from the facts.

[Bill Moore]

TheLapsedPacifist


I'm temporally embarressed at the moment, so possibly not at 100% but help me reconcile your comments...

"I don't think anyone is implying that irregular threats are a greater threat than potentially hostile nation-states."

...with...

"I'll argue an attack from a non-state actor is more dangerous, because it can come from...groups that we don't currently have the ability to deter...attack from the non-state actor is more probable and harder to prevent, thus more dangerous"

Fair enough, I must have changed my mind "after" I started writing (must have been a powerful argument :D). Change that second paragraph to read an attack from a non-state actor is more likely, harder to detect, harder to deter, etc. I'll leave it to the reader to determine whether it is more dangerous based on their own criteria.


And which non-state actors are more capable than a state? Few. And of those who is a direct threat to, say, the USA? None.

If I wrote this, I'm not sure when and in what thread (I'm sleep deprived also :wry:). In this discussion I wrote:


My guess is it is the group that obtains a weapon of mass destruction, probably a biological weapon and the group is willing to use it.

I don't think any of us know if that group exists now or will exist tomorrow, but we have to remain prepared and vigilant for that potential (and of course that is the rub, are we preparing for imaginary threat versus dealing with real threats? Since imaginary threats are limitless which ones should we prepare for).

What non-state actors are more capable than a State? What State? More capable at what? States have fallen to non-state actors throughout history, so it is important to understand the context.

[Bob's World]

So basically to understand a certain argument, you will just have to believe that the earth is flat, or that gravity pushes, not pulls?

While I understand the spirit of enquiry and open minded thinking you are trying to impart, I have to say that does not translate well into discussion based on empirical evidence. I am immensely curious about the way you think, because I disagree with a lot of your basic assumptions.

EG: Bob's World teaches that insurgencies are caused by bad governments. I do not believe that to be true, because no government is perfect. What degree of imperfection causes an insurgency? Plus very many very bad Governments are very secure.

Giving up what people actually know to be true, or have evidence to support, is how you get faith based arguments like EBO, MW and 4GW. To understand them, you just have to "free your ass" from the facts.

Ok, you have my position close, but not quite, and this is definitely an area where small nuances are incredibly important.

I do believe that "Insurgency happens when Government Fails," but that is a bumper sticker intended to state a general case and gain the attention of the majority of "new to insurgency" individuals and let them know that if they are focused on defeating the insurgent they are looking in the wrong direction.

Now, I do not say though that this is cause by "bad" or "failed" governments; often they are quite well intentioned and effectively functional. Often it is a fairly small segment of the populace that feels that it is experiencing "poor" governance.

So what is "poor" governance? It can be anything really, and it may only be a strongly believed perception and not actually true. Almost always it is considered to be quite irrational to the counterinsurgent. Usually it is something that falls in the "respect" tier of Maslow's hierarchy. (Too many focus on the lower tier issues of hunger, shelter, security, etc. These do influence the masses to join, but the movement itself is typically about ones mind and not their stomach). But "PG" is a two-part equation. The first part is this condition. The second part is the widely held perception that there is no means in legitimate channels to address the condition. So to target PG one must:
1. Believe that it is important to address PG to resolve the Insurgency,
2. Conduct polling to gain a sense of what the PG issues really are from the perspective of those who either participate in or support the movement,
3. Develop a program of engagement to address the PG issue,
4. Develop a companion program of engagement to address the exclusion (real or perceived) of the disenfranchised group from legitimate resolution channels.
5. Provide enhanced security measures for the rest of the populace coupled with increased efforts to bring key wrong-doers to justice.
6. Bundle all of this into a cogent narrative that describes what you are doing, why you are doing it, and that also matches what you are actually doing. (The insurgent's message will fall of its own weight if you do this, so focus on your own, not his).

I see this as a universal construct to every insurgency that I have studied. I don't believe that the nature of warfare has changed recently, nor do I believe the nature of insurgency has changed recently either. I do, however, believe that many populaces, primarily in the Middle East, were held static with governments that were more the choosing of others than themselves, and that the end of the Cold War set these populaces into motion to seek change (much as the end of WWII set populaces in South and Southeast Asian into motion) and that the new information tools not only render many time-proven tactics fairly ineffective, they also make the insurgent movement itself much harder to simply extinguish through force of arms as they are less likely to lose hope for success. These same info tools allow AQ, which is essentially a club, to act like a state to conduct UW to incite and fuel these many discrete insurgencies to support common causes in addition to their primary nationalist base causes.

Another area we differ is that I see these dynamics on a continuum (as does Kitson by the way, pg 2-3 of LIC) from a satisfied populace, to one that has a subversive movement, to one that has an insurgent movement. The key being, that the causation is the same for the subversion as it is for the insurgency; and it is far more helpful to deriving and implementing a solution to focus on the causation of the problem rather than to focus on if the organization has resorted to violence or not. To focus on the use of violence leads to confusing a populace acting out due to poor governance with other types of violence. It puts the focus on ending the violence rather than resolving the cause for the violence.

Most counterinsurgencies struggle because the counterinsurgent is unwilling to recognize and admit his own shortcomings, after all, he is in the right. Far easier to focus on the insurgent, who is by definition a criminal.

So the BW approach is rooted in what I believe to be the underlying principles of human dynamics, group dynamics, and governance that I see at work in these types of conflicts. This is very different than the dynamics that lead to conflicts between states.

The dynamics that drive insurgency are the same ones that drive neighborhood and family disputes. They are deeply personal and not about what "side" you are on; because at the end of the day you are on the same side, you just have an issue that is intolerable to some, and those same few don't feel they have a legitimate venue to resolve it.

This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.

[jmm99]

your viewers in the peanut gallery are not losing interest. ;)

Just to keep the constructs in some sort of order, I'm looking at the positions (in this thread and several other current threads) as basically three:

1. Classic (conventional, establishment) counterinsurgency - e.g., Wilf as its proponent, joined by others.

2. Reformist counterinsurgency (the huge middle ground - which has its "conservative" and "liberal" wings, framing its own middle ground) - possibly most here at SWC ?

3. Revolutionary counterinsurgency - e.g., COL Jones seems to point in that direction (not quite Cord Meyer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cord_Meyer) in his younger days (http://www.umsl.edu/~thomaskp/cm.htm) - first three paragraphs in the last link are relevant to what I mean - but close IMO).

You are really not talking past each other; but are presenting very different constructs. Good work, all. :)

[William F. Owen]

This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.

Well I only see Insurgencies as using "military means." Anything peaceful is politics in it's broadest sense. This is why I view military power as instrumental. It's the difference between a GP (the Government) and a Surgeon ( the Military). If you don't have resort to military power to combat military means, it simply fails to make my radar as a military problem.

This is Small Wars, is it not? :wry:

[MikeF]

Well I only see Insurgencies as using "military means." Anything peaceful is politics in it's broadest sense. This is why I view military power as instrumental. It's the difference between a GP (the Government) and a Surgeon ( the Military). If you don't have resort to military power to combat military means, it simply fails to make my radar as a military problem.

This is Small Wars, is it not? :wry:

so who's the psychiatrist or priest to mend the emotional wounds?

[William F. Owen]

so who's the psychiatrist or priest to mend the emotional wounds?
I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

[MikeF]

I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

Wilf, I would suggest that is the flaw in your argument. That transcends the notional explanation of the Westphalian nation-state solution. Using the gunshot wound analogy, the surgeon (military) can only operate. They cannot heal the emotional divide (the seperation in most areas between nation and state).

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

I've long believed that who you go to with your problem will shape remedy you are told to apply.

Go to a Priest, and he will recommend you pray.

Go to a bartender, and he will pour you a drink.

Go to your lawyer, and he will recommend you sue.

Go to a surgeon, and he will recommend surgery.

So, you are the head of a small country and you have been very focused on watching the balance grow in your Swiss accounts, but not so much on the concerns and needs of your populace. Western Governments have been very helpful in your endeavors, and extraction operations are in full swing. One day you look out your window and see that those malcontents in Provence X have taken up arms and are beginning to act out violently. You task your own security chief to do something about it, but not much changes and you suspect strongly that he has made some sort of "non-confrontation" pact with the rebels.

Meanwhile, the corporate heads of the western companies running the extraction operations have been lobbying hard back to their own governments about their concerns of potential disruption of vital resources (ok, their real concern is disruption of profits, but they know to shape their argument for the target audience). Ambassadors call on you and offer their assistance in your COIN efforts, and a Military coalition is formed and flown into your country to deal with the problem.

Now, if you ask a military officer what the solution to your problem is, what do you think he will suggest? After all, this is just a Small War, right?


Point being it is not the size of the war that determines the cause or solution to the problems that gave rise to the conflict. You must, as CvC warned, first understand what type of war you are in, not what size.


It reminds me of a significant emotional experience I had as an undergrad. I was studying forestry at Oregon State University, and was on an engineering track. Until I got to integration calculus, that is. My professor was a genius who would fill 5-6 blackboards with complex equations while he rapidly explained what he was doing. He would not, however explain steps based in Algebra or Geometry, as those were self-evident, and only focus on the calculus aspects of the problems. Now, those who have studied Calculus know that there are dozens of reducing formulas that must be memorized, and that there are a few basic types of problems. To solve an equation requires that one recognize first what type of problem it is, then set up the equation properly, and then simply apply the correct reducing formulae in the right manner to ultimately get to the correct answer. Simple, no?

Meanwhile, I was still trying to figure out the Algebra or Geometry step the prof had skipped. I was overwhelmed with data, and my circular thinking was causing me to think about options I didn't understand, and was preventing me from grasping the basics first and building from there. I earned a D+, but Dr. Stacey gave me an F so that I would have to take the course again.

Next term, I had a far less skilled TA, but my brain had time to finally commit the reducing formulae to memory, get up to speed on algebra and geometry, and then one day, like a curtain lifted, I could suddenly look at the problems and immediately recognize what type they were and apply the correct reducing process. I earned the highest score in the class.


This is why I am adamant (as is Galula) that COIN is civil government business. They own both the cause and the solution, and should never be absolved of that fact. Then, when the military comes in, I suggest highly that you call a specialist in this type of conflict to shape and implement the proper cure. These are big jobs, and there will be plenty of work for the total force, but use the right guys to scope the problem. SOF within the military are much like specialists within the Medical profession. Sure, you can have a general practitioner operate on your daughter's brain tumor, or, you can hire a specialist who focuses on that type of operation. The specialist if far more likely to be able to ID exactly what type of tumor he is dealing with and apply the correct treatment. The general practitioner may focus on surface issues, such as the size of the tumor, and prescribe the wrong approach based on that incomplete analysis of the problem.

Truth be told "Small Wars Journal" is a misnomer; but it has a nicer ring to it than "Populace-based Wars Journal."

So:
1. Be careful who you bring your problems to,
2. Size matters, but it does not determine the nature of the problem,
3. Causation is more important than Motivation, and that is more important than the tactics being employed, as one assesses a populace-based conflict and is shaping a program of engagement.
4. Never, ever, get in front of the Civil Government or the Host Nation when you assist them. You are there help fix them, not help them fix their populace.

[William F. Owen]

I've long believed that who you go to with your problem will shape remedy you are told to apply.

Go to a Priest, and he will recommend you pray.

Go to a bartender, and he will pour you a drink.

Go to your lawyer, and he will recommend you sue.

Go to a surgeon, and he will recommend surgery.


Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions. :wry:

[Bob's World]

Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions. :wry:

Ahh, but if you are used to one particular solution working for you for a particular problem, you are likely to call that provider even though the situation has changed.

Do you keep taking your car to the corner gas station for a tune up now that it is far more a computer issue than a mechanical one? After all, it is still just a car and just a tune up...

Times change, we must change as well. Some changes are significant, others not so much, key is to understand which ones are. I think we've largely missed the boat on that particular aspect of our current problem set.

[Entropy]

BW,

When are policmakers ever so enlightened? I think your theory is mostly sound but, as is often the case, people (politicians in particular) don't conform well to theories.

Secondly, one shouldn't assume there is only one solution to a problem and governance may not be the best. So I wonder if you are replacing one set of blinders with another since it seems you are arguing that, once deconstructed, these conflicts are always about governance.

Third, the US, as a third party in these conflicts, must operate within the constraints set by the host government or take our ball and go home. That latter option usually isn't feasible, so we end up with the nasty sausage-making business of trying to help and reform the host government at the same time. Take Afghanistan. For better or worse, our strategy is wedded to that government and, by extension, the governance it can potentially provide.

Fourth, as I've said before, there are limits to what "governance" can do. You may have the best government in history and there will still be people and groups who would rather go their own way and don't want any part. What do you do then? In Afghanistan, for example, this isn't uncommon.

Finally, and this is a point I've brought up before (and related to my third point), the nature of governance matters. What is it when one tries to impose an alien form of governance upon a populace? Is that governance or imperialism? That is happening in Afghanistan too. The West operates from a mindset that "Afghanistan" is a single nation with the clearly defined borders shown on a map. It has never been thus and there are many populations within that border who aren't interested in ceding authority to Kabul. How does your theory deal with populaces that are largely self-governing and neither need nor desire any "national" form of governance? These populations are not rebelling against "poor governance" since governance (outside their group) never really existed.

You see, I'm skeptical of this whole "governance" thing when it comes to Afghanistan. Our attempts to extend governance fail miserably because we don't understand the local conditions and we operate with a Western concept of what governance is supposed to be. We are wedded to the idea of a strong central government which can "control" the entire "nation" of Afghanistan and your theory would seem to argue that all we need is more governance in order to bring this to pass. It seems likely that Afghanistan, a Frankenstein colonial creation, may be an inherently unviable state. If that's the case, then it seems to me that less "governance" is required, not more.

Wilf,


Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions.

Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

[William F. Owen]

Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

Wow! Thanks. Never knew that. As my wife frequently tells people, "Sure, he can talk about Clausewitz, but can he cook?" :D

[Bob's World]

BW,

When are policmakers ever so enlightened? I think your theory is mostly sound but, as is often the case, people (politicians in particular) don't conform well to theories.

Secondly, one shouldn't assume there is only one solution to a problem and governance may not be the best. So I wonder if you are replacing one set of blinders with another since it seems you are arguing that, once deconstructed, these conflicts are always about governance.

Third, the US, as a third party in these conflicts, must operate within the constraints set by the host government or take our ball and go home. That latter option usually isn't feasible, so we end up with the nasty sausage-making business of trying to help and reform the host government at the same time. Take Afghanistan. For better or worse, our strategy is wedded to that government and, by extension, the governance it can potentially provide.

Fourth, as I've said before, there are limits to what "governance" can do. You may have the best government in history and there will still be people and groups who would rather go their own way and don't want any part. What do you do then? In Afghanistan, for example, this isn't uncommon.

Finally, and this is a point I've brought up before (and related to my third point), the nature of governance matters. What is it when one tries to impose an alien form of governance upon a populace? Is that governance or imperialism? That is happening in Afghanistan too. The West operates from a mindset that "Afghanistan" is a single nation with the clearly defined borders shown on a map. It has never been thus and there are many populations within that border who aren't interested in ceding authority to Kabul. How does your theory deal with populaces that are largely self-governing and neither need nor desire any "national" form of governance? These populations are not rebelling against "poor governance" since governance (outside their group) never really existed.

You see, I'm skeptical of this whole "governance" thing when it comes to Afghanistan. Our attempts to extend governance fail miserably because we don't understand the local conditions and we operate with a Western concept of what governance is supposed to be. We are wedded to the idea of a strong central government which can "control" the entire "nation" of Afghanistan and your theory would seem to argue that all we need is more governance in order to bring this to pass. It seems likely that Afghanistan, a Frankenstein colonial creation, may be an inherently unviable state. If that's the case, then it seems to me that less "governance" is required, not more.

Wilf,



Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

I would never suggest to impose ones governance on another. Rarely will it be proper, and never will it be apprciated.

And while I say that it is the failure of governance that leads to insurgency, often it may well be LESS governance that provides the solution. Particularly in a strongly tribal culture such as the Middle East and Africa.

This reminds me of how America almost destroyed our forests. Obviously our unregulated "cut out and get out" approach to the first 1/3 of the country was not sustainable, so we turned to the Germans who were experts on managing forests. They had cut down all of their wild forest years earlier, and had in place a very orderly, logical system of managed stands. This is the technology they brought to America and that we accepted as the "right answer."

So, step one to an orderly, managed, sustainable forest was to cut down all of the wild forests. And this is what we set out to do. Can't have disorder, you know, it is too difficult to manage.

I think westernrs take a similar approach to governance. First you must take out all of the "wild" governance and replace it with an orderly, managed, sustainable system.

I don't think this approach is any more proper for the governance of people than it is for the management of forests. Those who know forests understand the importance of bio-diversity, and the incredible inter-related order that exists within what looks like chaos and wilderness to an outsider.

Less is more.


As to WILF's pipes, instead of calling a plumber every 20 years when they go out, and looking at the 20 good years as success; I suggest that you consider what it is about your actions that may well be contributing to this regular failure? Is it some destructive mix you regularly dump into the system? Is it a failure to conduct proper regular maintenance? Are you perhaps using that handy pipe in the basement as a pull-up bar?

These things are systems, and our input to the system is major component to how that system operates. Perhaps you will still need to call that plumber, but if you understand your role in the problem more completely you will be less likely to blame the pipes or the last plumber for the problem. Human nature is to avoid blame. We must overcome our nature.

[Entropy]

Wow! Thanks. Never knew that. As my wife frequently tells people, "Sure, he can talk about Clausewitz, but can he cook?" :D

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be sarcastic! The only point I was trying to make is that problems can quickly explode past easily defined solutions.

[marct]

Hi Bob,


I do believe that "Insurgency happens when Government Fails," but that is a bumper sticker intended to state a general case and gain the attention of the majority of "new to insurgency" individuals and let them know that if they are focused on defeating the insurgent they are looking in the wrong direction.

Now, I do not say though that this is cause by "bad" or "failed" governments; often they are quite well intentioned and effectively functional. Often it is a fairly small segment of the populace that feels that it is experiencing "poor" governance.

So what is "poor" governance? It can be anything really, and it may only be a strongly believed perception and not actually true.

Are you drawing on RK Merton's work on criminology (http://books.google.ca/books?id=JDw-r78WC_MC&pg=PA96&lpg=PA96&dq=merton+typology+criminology&source=bl&ots=385RnAw3Hf&sig=_5jzL6whSquDSlw8M2WS7Jm7lEs&hl=en&ei=9dSbSvvTHOed8QbRkbCeBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false)? I'm just getting the feeling that, if you aren't, you should take a look at it since it seems to be paralleling your argument.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be sarcastic! The only point I was trying to make is that problems can quickly explode past easily defined solutions.

No sarcasm detected. It was a good point on the limit of my analogy! :wry:

[Bob's World]

Hi Bob,



Are you drawing on RK Merton's work on criminology (http://books.google.ca/books?id=JDw-r78WC_MC&pg=PA96&lpg=PA96&dq=merton+typology+criminology&source=bl&ots=385RnAw3Hf&sig=_5jzL6whSquDSlw8M2WS7Jm7lEs&hl=en&ei=9dSbSvvTHOed8QbRkbCeBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false)? I'm just getting the feeling that, if you aren't, you should take a look at it since it seems to be paralleling your argument.

I suspect as we scratch into this we will find many parallels in many walks of life, as what we are discussing is not warfare so much as human nature; and human nature affects everything we do when we gather in groups.

As a former prosecutor I got a pretty good dose of dealing with three groups that I did not have much contact with prevously:
1. Criminals
2. Addicts
3. mentally ill

(And that was just the Defense Bar!!)

Clearly this experience contributed to how I look at things. Being an SF officer made me a more effective prosecutor (I love a good jury trial! The combination of mission, populace, opponent, strategy and tactics, etc. Each trial was like a mini-campaign); and having been a prosecutor makes me a more effective SOF strategist. We are all shaped by our experiences, and I recognize that mine are fairly unique.

[marct]

Clearly this experience contributed to how I look at things. Being an SF officer made me a more effective prosecutor (I love a good jury trial! The combination of mission, populace, opponent, strategy and tactics, etc. Each trial was like a mini-campaign); and having been a prosecutor makes me a more effective SOF strategist. We are all shaped by our experiences, and I recognize that mine are fairly unique.

I can see that :D. I think that Merton's Adaptive Typology would help you to formulate your argument, although the descriptors would have to be recast.

Mode of
Adaptation Cultural Goal Institutionalized Means

Conformity + +
Innovation + -
Ritualism - +
Retreatism - -
Rebellion ± ±

The nice thing about using this is that a lot of the work has already been done in Criminology and Psychology on identifying motivations and socialization factors. There's another bonus as well - it is a bottom up model that does not rely on some supposedly objective definition of good (or bad) giovernance.

[Bob's World]

I can see that :D. I think that Merton's Adaptive Typology would help you to formulate your argument, although the descriptors would have to be recast.

Mode of
Adaptation Cultural Goal Institutionalized Means

Conformity + +
Innovation + -
Ritualism - +
Retreatism - -
Rebellion ± ±

The nice thing about using this is that a lot of the work has already been done in Criminology and Psychology on identifying motivations and socialization factors. There's another bonus as well - it is a bottom up model that does not rely on some supposedly objective definition of good (or bad) giovernance.

We ask juries every day in thousands of courtrooms around the nation to determine if objective criteria of proof and guilt/liabiliity have been met through a process of wholly sujective inputs and analysis. And it works.

Engineers and Metrics gurus are desperate to reduce such subjective inputs to x's and o's; 1's and 0's; etc to produce a "Precise" answer that enables their comfort zone of thinking. We confuse precision and detail for accuracy and validity. Would you trust your lawsuit or crimial trial to any of these hokey, multi-million dollar "easy button" systems?? Not I. Yet we trust the security of our nation to them.

A single 12-person jury of average citizens would probaby tell any commander that the brief he just got from his metrics guys and probalby his intel guys as well, left them riddled with reasonable doubt, and that they could not approve their recommendations.

We need to trust our instincts. Tell the engineers and computer studs to take a knee, and bring in our moms, 3rd grade teachers, the guy at the local mill, the UPS driver, the local banker, etc.

Quite literally, this is not rocket science. This is common sense.

[marct]

Engineers and Metrics gurus are desperate to reduce such subjective inputs to x's and o's; 1's and 0's; etc to produce a "Precise" answer that enables their comfort zone of thinking. We confuse precision and detail for accuracy and validity. Would you trust your lawsuit or crimial trial to any of these hokey, multi-million dollar "easy button" systems?? Not I. Yet we trust the security of our nation to them.

To say nothing about national intel services :wry:. I've been teaching a course in applied epistemology for the past 5 years, and one of the hardest things I have to deal with is the interface between qualitative and quantitative across the disciplines. Standards of evidence, validity of logic systems, situational application of analytic techniques, etc., ad nauseum.

Sigh

There's a great paper I usually assign students to read by Carlo Ginzburg from History Workshop - Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method (http://hwj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/pdf_extract/9/1/5). I've noticed that students from a highly quantitative background usually end up going crazy trying to read it :D. I'd recommend it for anyone trying to think outside the box....

[Surferbeetle]

...free your mind and your ass will follow...still laughing over that one today.

Anyway, as I sit here enjoying the goodness of air-conditioning (ME (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanical_engineering)), in a lighted (EE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_engineering)), office (CE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_engineering)) I wonder if verbal or quantitative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosystem_model) models can ever precisely and accurately (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accuracy_and_precision), or even consistently, describe/predict/represent portions of the world as I strive to be both precise and accurate while target practicing...tight shot group in the bullseye and it's time to reward myself with a beer (damn hillbilly) or when I build a spreadsheet model to represent forces or costs (geek)...

When people tell me they have a simple problem and it's not rocket science damn it, I just try to be patient and listen. Usually I try and find the guys on the ground who have to deal with the situation everyday and see what I can add, if anything. Sometimes my job is just to listen to them because the involved parties already know what needs to be done. Othertimes if it really was simple it would already be fixed, and there is a reason why I am getting the call to come and see if I can do anything to help.

One of the nice things about engineering is that the discipline for the most part uses terms & concepts that we all agree upon and that we are able to bring unity of command to a problem across cultural & geographical distance as well as over time (centuries in some cases)...no small feat as we all know from bitter experience. :wry: Fortunately after we get done with the we are sooo cool geek celebration many of us admit that we are not as strong/cool as our calculator, computer, or geek uniform and that indeed we are just people with clay feet who need to get help from many different people and places to try and fix/build something useful...

Hey Marc,

Is this that (chnm.gmu.edu/courses/omalley/610/ginsberg.rtf) paper? Your link got me started but I don't have a password to read the whole thing....it looks interesting

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Hey Marc,

Is this that (http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/omalley/610/ginsberg.rtf) paper? Your link got me started but I don't have a password to read the whole thing....it looks interesting

Yupper, that's it. You know, maybe I should have reworded my rant about quant stuff - it doesn't apply to most of the material world, but it certainly does apply to the pesky humans that live in it :D!

[slapout9]

A single 12-person jury of average citizens would probaby tell any commander that the brief he just got from his metrics guys and probalby his intel guys as well, left them riddled with reasonable doubt, and that they could not approve their recommendations.

We need to trust our instincts. Tell the engineers and computer studs to take a knee, and bring in our moms, 3rd grade teachers, the guy at the local mill, the UPS driver, the local banker, etc.

Quite literally, this is not rocket science. This is common sense.

There is some Strategic Stuff there. If Strategic plans were written by UPS drivers, 3rd grade Teachers and the guy at the local Mill (what few are left) we would WIN every time.:) Like I have said before in SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) the greatest metric is this...the side that has the most Ph'D's advising them will LOSE! Exception to this appears to be Ph'D's from Canada....you know like Marct,John Kenneth Galbraith,etc....:wry:


Forgot Moms always bring in the Moms.....the female of the species is the most dangerous of all when threatened and they know the difference between fake threats and real threats.

[marct]

Hi Slap,


There is some Strategic Stuff there. If Strategic plans were written by UPS drivers, 3rd grade Teachers and the guy at the local Mill (what few are left) we would WIN every time.:) Like I have said before in SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) the greatest metric is this...the side that has the most Ph'D's advising them will LOOSE! Exception to this appears to be Ph'D's from Canada....you know like Marct,John Kenneth Galbraith,etc....:wry:

Thanks for the exception :wry:! Then again, look at how many PhD's are supporting the Taliban and AQ - gives me hope for the future :D!

[slapout9]

Hi Slap,



Thanks for the exception :wry:! Then again, look at how many PhD's are supporting the Taliban and AQ - gives me hope for the future :D!

Don't fall for it marc...it's enemy propaganda:D:D They do have a very sophisticated intellectual movement, don't they.

[Dayuhan]

Well I only see Insurgencies as using "military means." Anything peaceful is politics in it's broadest sense. This is why I view military power as instrumental. It's the difference between a GP (the Government) and a Surgeon ( the Military). If you don't have resort to military power to combat military means, it simply fails to make my radar as a military problem.

This is Small Wars, is it not? :wry:

I think the weakness of this argument lies not in the assumption that military force is necessary to resolve an insurgency, but in what seems to be a conviction that military force alone is sufficient to resolve an insurgency.

I'd say BW is correct in his assessment that poor governance is a key factor in the development of insurgencies. I think it's also true that at the core of many, perhaps most, insurgencies there is a relatively small group of committed ideologues that may be motivated by factors well outside the problem of poor governance. Poor governance provides the lever by which the ideological core builds support and recruits new ideologues among the populace.

Military force will almost always be necessary to deal with the core ideologues. At the same time, reforms in governance are essential to isolate that core from their base of support and recruitment in the community.

We often hear talk of protecting the populace from the insurgents. That narrative is based on our assumption that the populace sees the insurgents as a threat. If the populace actually sees the government as a greater threat than the insurgents, there is a great deal of work to be done, and it might be time to ask ourselves whether that government deserves our support at all. As a nation founded on a successful insurgency, Americans should be willing to accept the possibility that in some cases the insurgents may have some valid arguments.

If I had to distill an opinion into one sentence, I'd say that successful counter-insurgency would most often depend on a balance between military force carefully targeting the ideological core of the insurgency and governmental reform aimed at isolating that ideological core from its base of community support - and that the most effective balance in any case is likely to be unique to that case. In other words, we need some Wilfs and some BWs on the team at the same time.

[Dayuhan]

I see this as a universal construct to every insurgency that I have studied. I don't believe that the nature of warfare has changed recently, nor do I believe the nature of insurgency has changed recently either. I do, however, believe that many populaces, primarily in the Middle East, were held static with governments that were more the choosing of others than themselves, and that the end of the Cold War set these populaces into motion to seek change (much as the end of WWII set populaces in South and Southeast Asian into motion) and that the new information tools not only render many time-proven tactics fairly ineffective, they also make the insurgent movement itself much harder to simply extinguish through force of arms as they are less likely to lose hope for success. These same info tools allow AQ, which is essentially a club, to act like a state to conduct UW to incite and fuel these many discrete insurgencies to support common causes in addition to their primary nationalist base causes.


I'm curious... where in the Middle East do you see this scenario? I ask because it often seems to me that the post-colonial history of the Middle East has seen this phenomenon less than many other areas, particularly Latin America and Asia.

I'd place the insurrection against the Shah of Iran in this category, certainly. Maybe with a severe stretch the Israel/Palestine mess would fit. Possibly the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups in Egypt, though this seems less a case of a populace seeking to remove a Government imposed by others than of a minority attempting to impose a government that suits a particular and extreme religious perspective. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are usually cited as examples of Governments dominated by the West (though that perspective is very much arguable), but none of them host anything approaching a significant insurgency.

There's certainly no shortage of violence in the Middle East, but I can't see much of it fitting the paradigm of popular resistance to governments chosen by others.

I should note in addition that I do not consider Al Qaeda to be an insurgency, and that I disapprove of the notion that Islamic extremism is a "global insurgency", which seems to me to stretch the definition of insurgency well beyond the breaking point.