Is an insurgent an insurgent? [Archive]

Bob's World

08-03-2009, 12:55 PM

I am working in northern Afghanistan and have encountered bit of a problem.

Describing the different actors on the ground has proven difficult using the term "insurgent". Is someone who is not seeking to overthrow the central government, but seeking to establish and consolidate a local powerbase that competes with local government structures an insurgent? Is he a "local insurgent"? Will the sum of all these local actors still qualify as an insurgency?

Any views on this?

The right question in my opinion is not whether or not this actor is an insurgent, it is whether or not YOU are a Counterinsurgent.

Current definitions and policy not withstanding; there are arguably three types of insurgency; Revolutionary that seeks to change the overall governance; Separatist that seeks to break away from the existing state/governance; and Resistance that seeks to defeat an imposed foreign presence/influence over the governance.

COIN is what the existing governance does to address these problems and their underlying conditions.

If you are not a member of the Afghan populace; but are a foreigner helping the Afghans to resolve its insurgency challenges, in US doctrine, you are conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The biggest distiction being of course, not what is being down about what; but who is doing it. Always good to have a constant reminder of what your place is when inserting yourself into the middle of someone elses drama.

Saifullah

08-03-2009, 01:06 PM

Ken White

08-03-2009, 01:15 PM

The 'COIN' mantra folks may not like it -- but no war is as simple as they wish to make it, conversely, waging warfare against crooks, dissidents, gangbangers, guerrillas, insurgents, smugglers and battlefield strays is less complex than they seem to wish it to be.

There are always actors on any battlefield that are not doing what everyone else is doing. If you think everyone in opposition is the same and proceed to treat them that way, you are highly likely to create incidental insurgents -- or something. :D

Trying to apply a one-size fits all model to fighting a war is sort of like taking an Ibuprofen instead of Acetylsalicylic Acid. Both relieve swelling but other than that, they do very different things. I'm beginning to believe the COIN devotees object to reality. :wry:

In any event, it's FID, not COIN. Actually, it's FID, Mod 2 in that we are not aiding A government with development; we are attempting to install a Government modeled after our own in an area that is not like us and that has effectively been ungoverned for almost 30 years. Further, we are attempting to impose a strong central government ion an area that has never had such a thing. Not likely to work. This is not standard, base model FID and it certainly isn't COIN (Though some COIN TTP Are appropriate). It is FID to the second or third power -- and there is no rule book.

Is the object to aid the people form a government or or to impose a government the people do not want but that we do? You have to adapt to all the local nuances and aid development. It may well be that the western idea of a strong central government is not the right size. No sense in fashioning one that will only implode when we leave.

I became convinced some time ago that the Afghans were not confused or ignorant about what was happening there; we were. Several events and items over the last few weeks have really reinforced that. We need to figure out what we want. We are doing something not done before so there are no models, no guidebooks; we have to think about it. When you do not know what you really want to do, you're highly likely to do some wrong things...

Ken White

08-03-2009, 01:36 PM

The problem I am facing is that a COIN-strategy will not be implemented if the opposing force is not defined as an insurgent.Then don't implement a 'COIN strategy' -- what ever that means.
If the enemy is not an insurgent because he is not seeking to overthrow the state, what is he then when the result is the same?He may not be your enemy but you'll likely make him one, thus Wilf's Accidental Guerrilla quip.

What State is he trying to overthrow? The Government of Afghansitan that we created without thinking it through? Will the result "be the same" or will it merely be something different than WE envision?

Serious questions: If they are successful, will the result really be the same? Are they trying to overthrow or do they just want more local autonomy? What is their likelihood of success? If it's better than 40% or so, is it possible that we need to relook our goals? What IS our goal?

Let me restate something I said above: "Then don't implement a 'COIN strategy'..." Turn that effort by said locals to assist your goals. Develop an alternative approach that avoids creating more hostiles and instead furthers your goals -- which you may have to modify from earlier designs. That's Plan A.

One should always have a Plan B. Plan B will probably entail fighting them whether you use a 'COIN strategy' or not.

Bob's World

08-03-2009, 01:37 PM

I see the problem the other way around.

The problem I am facing is that a COIN-strategy will not be implemented if the opposing force is not defined as an insurgent.

My challange is not describing, but defining. If the enemy is not an insurgent because he is not seeking to overthrow the state, what is he then when the result is the same?

Sounds like a separtist movement, though perhaps not to form borders and a new government; more to supercede the governments authority over some region and populace within the state.

The government must address why this is happening, as well as who is attempting to do it. That is COIN. If you are assisting the GOVT, that is FID. If you are assisting this informal competitor to the Govt in his efforts to exert this unsanctioned control, that is UW.

Ken White

08-03-2009, 01:47 PM

in describing a potential effort to some politicians who are nervous, then you could extrapolate your comment "If the enemy is not an insurgent because he is not seeking to overthrow the state, what is he then when the result is the same?" as a rationale. The result MAY be the same; whether it will be or not cannot be known but the potential effect is presumed disadvantageous so the result could be the same and therefor it is best resisted.

IMO, that is militarily specious and bad thinking but it's probably politically marginally supportable.

Entropy

08-03-2009, 02:25 PM

Shamal

08-03-2009, 04:17 PM

The answer to the question is definitely yes. An insurgent doesn't have to have national aspirations to be an insurgent - if the group is seeking to (violently) compete or replace local government with his own version of it, he is an insurgent. The extent to which several such groups can be called "one insurgency" depends on the extent to which these directly or indirectly cooperate: if they all share a common interest in weakening the central government, they may work together or mutually support each other in their (local and/or national) goals. Every successful act by a single "local" insurgent de-facto supports all the others, if nothing else then at the level of propaganda.

Northern Afghanistan is a good example, because there seems to be a number of groups and individuals which are not just conducting "local resistance", but are explicitly aligning themselves with the Taliban cause (even though the exact nature of central support or direction can be unclear in each particular case). This makes sense - alone they will struggle to be more than glorified criminals; aligned with the Taliban they suddenly have an ideological narrative and greater cause with which to bolster and legitimate their claims. Vice versa - that is probably exactly what the central Taliban is trying to exploit to widen its base. There seems to be little reason to see the events in the north as somehow separate from the insurgency as a whole, or indeed as somehow different in nature from what is going on in Helmand or Kandahar. True, due to the different ethnic mix up there, it is much harder to conduct a primarily pashtun-based insurgency, but they are clearly succeeding. Surely, the myth of the north's unique immunity to insurgency must soon die?

jmm99

08-03-2009, 04:55 PM

are you asking for a legal definition or a military definition ?

William F. Owen

08-03-2009, 06:13 PM

The answer to the question is definitely yes. An insurgent doesn't have to have national aspirations to be an insurgent - if the group is seeking to (violently) compete or replace local government with his own version of it, he is an insurgent.

Why so? That makes every irregular military force an insurgent. That's just not true. Competing with or seeking to inoculate yourself against Government policies, or even the activities of another armed group, does not make that party an insurgent or their activity an insurgency. Insurgencies are "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."

Not all irregular armed groups are insurgents.

Bob's World

08-03-2009, 08:06 PM

Why so? That makes every irregular military force an insurgent. That's just not true. Competing with or seeking to inoculate yourself against Government policies, or even the activities of another armed group, does not make that party an insurgent or their activity an insurgency. Insurgencies are "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."

Not all irregular armed groups are insurgents.

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.

Yet both are categories of insurgencies in my book. It sounds like what he is dealing with is a subset of a separatist movement. Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.

IntelTrooper

08-03-2009, 10:59 PM

Describing the different actors on the ground has proven difficult using the term "insurgent". Is someone who is not seeking to overthrow the central government, but seeking to establish and consolidate a local powerbase that competes with local government structures an insurgent? Is he a "local insurgent"? Will the sum of all these local actors still qualify as an insurgency?

I think part of the problem in Afghanistan has been the many terms, "public affairs approved" and otherwise, that Bagram and Kabul have tried to force everyone to use for describing the different groups.

Just off the top of my head, aside from blanket "Taliban" and "insurgents," we've had AAF (Anti-Afghan Forces), ACM (Anti-Coalition Militia), IAG (Illegally Armed Groups), OMF (Other Militant Forces), EoP ("Enemies of Peace"), EoA ("Enemies of Afghanistan"), and "criminals" (I'm sure I missed some).

I'm sure some of the difficulty comes from our historical inability to distinguish between people who self-identify as "Taliban" and other disenfranchised militant groups. I'm not aware of any large-scale efforts to approach the different types of insurgents differently.

I would say, when in doubt, they are "insurgents" for reporting purposes.

Dayuhan

08-04-2009, 07:37 AM

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.

Yet both are categories of insurgencies in my book. It sounds like what he is dealing with is a subset of a separatist movement. Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.

I think there's another type of insurgency, one that gets less attention here than it might. My own familiarity with this comes from an environment far removed from Afghanistan, but it would not surprise me to see the same phenomenon appearing there.

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

We tend to see these things in national terms: a national insurgency fighting a national government. It is said, though, that all politics are local, and this tends to be very true in tribal areas of decentralized states, where national governments (and for that matter nations) may seem very remote. In these environments, if people are fighting there are often immediate, local reasons that may be resolvable, addressable, and even legitimate. Many of my neighbors were insurgents once (they won, one of the rare places where that's happened), and given the way their government treated them, I can't blame them at all: in their shoes I'd have done the same thing.

National insurgencies tend to be aware of these local issues, and often move to exploit them by offering alliances. When these offers are accepted, that may give the impression that the local insurgency is a subset of the national one. That impression may be false: alliances may be a matter of convenience, and if local issues are addressed they may dissolve.

Of course these local issues may not be immediately visible to an outsider, and local government may not be at all eager to see them become visible, especially if the government or its agents have done specific things that provoked a violent response.

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

William F. Owen

08-04-2009, 09:41 AM

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.
Insurgencies aim to overthrow the government ruling over them. Yes separatists are insurgents, but you have to distinguish between the political end states. The IRA wanted a "United Ireland" - they sought to over throw the British and install the existing Irish Govt. Same in Vietnam. Very different from the insurgency in Kenya, Malaya or Aden.

Point being, not all irregular warfare is insurgency, and not all insurgencies are the same, bar the replacing of the Government relevant to the population conducting the insurgency.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.
Again context. What about "Restorationists." In A'Stan the Taliban were the constituted government. Again, this shows the lack of rigour the terminology is held to. Insurgent has specific meaning. I stopped describing Operations or conflicts as insurgencies long ago - well since I came the SWJ!

Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.
Concur, but the irregular forces are the bit you use military force against.

marct

08-04-2009, 03:03 PM

William F. Owen

08-04-2009, 03:28 PM

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

Exactly - BUT that is NOT a type of insurgency. What they want does not even have to be legitimate. Look at Sierra Leone and Colombia.

Based on the idea that what you describe is an Insurgency, the US brands all "Irregular Warfare" as "Insurgency," this COIN! - and out comes the COIN play book and all the associated baggage.

Bob's World

08-04-2009, 04:17 PM

I think there's another type of insurgency, one that gets less attention here than it might. My own familiarity with this comes from an environment far removed from Afghanistan, but it would not surprise me to see the same phenomenon appearing there.

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

We tend to see these things in national terms: a national insurgency fighting a national government. It is said, though, that all politics are local, and this tends to be very true in tribal areas of decentralized states, where national governments (and for that matter nations) may seem very remote. In these environments, if people are fighting there are often immediate, local reasons that may be resolvable, addressable, and even legitimate. Many of my neighbors were insurgents once (they won, one of the rare places where that's happened), and given the way their government treated them, I can't blame them at all: in their shoes I'd have done the same thing.

National insurgencies tend to be aware of these local issues, and often move to exploit them by offering alliances. When these offers are accepted, that may give the impression that the local insurgency is a subset of the national one. That impression may be false: alliances may be a matter of convenience, and if local issues are addressed they may dissolve.

Of course these local issues may not be immediately visible to an outsider, and local government may not be at all eager to see them become visible, especially if the government or its agents have done specific things that provoked a violent response.

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

Perhaps Shay's rebellion and the Whiskey rebellion in our own fromative history are such examples of issue-driven insurrection; both of which served to help the government understand what "good governnace" looked like in the eyes of the populace and to shape a fledgling national government to more effectively serve its populace in a manner they found acceptable.

MikeF

08-04-2009, 04:34 PM

This thread provides a very good discussion highlighting the complexities involved in small wars. Personally, I find it easier to use the old languages of rebellion, insurrection, guerilla, partisan forces, etc...when confronting these types of conflicts. In the current environment, we use terms like Anti-Iraqi Forces, Anti-Coalition Forces, and Anti-Afghan Forces. These buzz words are too Orwellian for me, and they often minimize the issues, grievances, or ideology of each particular group.

Perhaps Shay's rebellion and the Whiskey rebellion in our own fromative history are such examples of issue-driven insurrection; both of which served to help the government understand what "good governnace" looked like in the eyes of the populace and to shape a fledgling national government to more effectively serve its populace in a manner they found acceptable.

COL Jones,

Sir, how would you categorize a nationalist group that does not necessarily support the current government, but mainly fights American/Coalition forces because they are perceived as occupiers? Many Sunni/Shia groups in Iraq fall into that category. I find it difficult to include them in issue-driven insurrection b/c their biggest beef is that a foreign nation is conducting operations in their homeland. I'm not sure what exactly to call them.

v/r

Mike

Bob's World

08-04-2009, 04:44 PM

This thread provides a very good discussion highlighting the complexities involved in small wars. Personally, I find it easier to use the old languages of rebellion, insurrection, guerilla, partisan forces, etc...when confronting these types of conflicts. In the current environment, we use terms like Anti-Iraqi Forces, Anti-Coalition Forces, and Anti-Afghan Forces. These buzz words are too Orwellian for me, and they often minimize the issues, grievances, or ideology of each particular group.

COL Jones,

Sir, how would you categorize a nationalist group that does not necessarily support the current government, but mainly fights American/Coalition forces because they are perceived as occupiers? Many Sunni/Shia groups in Iraq fall into that category. I find it difficult to include them in issue-driven insurrection b/c their biggest beef is that a foreign nation is conducting operations in their homeland. I'm not sure what exactly to call them.

v/r

Mike

in regards to the invader; that may be little more than a minority populace or political party in terms of the nation itself.

Think of if Canada invaded the US to liberate us from Clinton or Bush or Obama. In all cases there would have been nationalist organizations strongly opposed to our sitting government who would have fought to the death to defeat the outside invader. Sure those same Republicans and Democrats go back to slandering each other once the common threat is defeated.

Or like a police officer responding to a domestic dispute. Keep an eye on that oft battered wife, because she may be the one trying club the officer when he cuffs her loser husband.

This is why we need to be slow to simply brand such movements as "Terrorists" as they may well be part of the fabric that will contribute to a strong nation one day. I believe addressing such organizations was a big part of what made the "surge" work in Iraq.

MikeF

08-04-2009, 05:11 PM

in regards to the invader; that may be little more than a minority populace or political party in terms of the nation itself....

This is why we need to be slow to simply brand such movements as "Terrorists" as they may well be part of the fabric that will contribute to a strong nation one day. I believe addressing such organizations was a big part of what made the "surge" work in Iraq.

I used to use the movie "Red Dawn" to describe the resistance mentality, but not too many of the younger O's and NCO's have seen it anymore. I'd prefer to call it a resistance movement rather than an insurgency, but I think that it is important to understand that a big majority of armed forces attacking the US will fall in this category, AND they will have the sympathy of the local populace.

Just ran across this article...

Iraqi Group Renounces Violence (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/world/middleeast/04iraq.html)

Rod Norland
NY Times

BAGHDAD — An extremist Shiite group that has boasted of killing five American soldiers and of kidnapping five British contractors has agreed to renounce violence against fellow Iraqis, after meeting with Iraq’s prime minister.

The prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, met with members of the group, Asa’ib al-Haq, or the League of the Righteous, over the weekend, said Ali al-Dabbagh, a spokesman for the prime minister, confirming reports. “They decided they are no longer using violence, and we welcome them,” he said in a telephone interview.

Mr. Dabbagh first revealed the negotiations in remarks on Monday to Al Iraqiya, the state television network. “We have reached an agreement to resolve all problems, especially regarding detainees who do not have Iraqi blood on their hands,” he said. He did not say anything about British victims of the group.

Asked about that later, he added, “Whether it’s British blood or American blood, it is a violation of the law, and we will treat them no differently.”

Salam al-Maliki, the insurgent group’s liaison to the government, said in a telephone interview that the group had not renounced fighting the Americans. “Of course we want to get into the political process, because circumstances have improved, and the United States is out right now,” said Mr. Maliki, who is not related to the prime minister. “We told the government anyone who has Iraqi blood on their hands, you should keep him in jail. We are only fighting the United States.”

v/r

Mike

marct

08-04-2009, 06:27 PM

Hi Mike,

I used to use the movie "Red Dawn" to describe the resistance mentality, but not too many of the younger O's and NCO's have seen it anymore. I'd prefer to call it a resistance movement rather than an insurgency, but I think that it is important to understand that a big majority of armed forces attacking the US will fall in this category, AND they will have the sympathy of the local populace.

Good movie in the old (paranoid) US vs the World genre ;) - sort of a spec fic version of Independence Day (which the younger crowd has probably seen).

As to the difference between a resistance movement and an insurgency, that's a matter of stance or perception of the legitimacy of the "government". If you accept the government as legitimate, then the group is an insurgent group, if not, they are a resistance movement.

Always remember that semantics are relational ;):D.

Entropy

08-04-2009, 06:54 PM

William F. Owen

08-04-2009, 07:25 PM

jmm99

08-04-2009, 07:27 PM

A good starting point from Wilf:

In A'Stan the Taliban were the constituted government. Again, this shows the lack of rigour the terminology is held to.

During the Taliban "uprising" (ca. 1995 to date), Afghanistan was regarded by all as a nation-state. That does not end the line of inquiry.

Who or what was its government when the Taliban, de facto, held a majority of the country under their control ?

According to Pakistan, for example, the duly recognized government of Astan was the Taliban (the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" as it was unilaterally renamed in October 1997 by the Taliban). According to Russia and Iran, for example, the duly recognized government of Astan was the Rabbani government (allied with the Northern Alliance).

The US position was more complicated, as follows:

1. Rabbani government - recognition ended 15 Aug 1997.

2. No government - 15 Aug 1997 up through 21 Dec 2001.

3. Interim Authority (and successors) - from 22 Dec 2001.

References for all of the above are in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118&page=2).

All of this is more than legal mumbo-jumbo because governmental recognition drives how a group and its members are regarded both diplomatically and militarily. Let's just look at it from a military standpoint.

A Pakistani officer looking across the border would see all forces authorized by the Taliban government (the recognized government by his country), including the AQ 055 Brigade, as being "regular combatants" . He would see the forces of the Northern Alliance as "irregular combatants" (regardless of whether they were authorized or not by the Rabbani government). Also, because Pakistan did not ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

An Iranian officer would see it differently. He would see the forces authorized by the Rabbani government (the recognized government by his country) as being "regular combatants". He would see the Taliban (including its AQ allies) as "irregular combatants". Also because Iran did not ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

A Russian officer would see it the same way as the Iranian officer, except that because Russia did ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could claim the benefits of the APs. API (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument) does bring in the concept of "national liberation" and "self-determination":

PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art 1. General principles and scope of application

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all circumstances.

2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.

3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.

4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

A US officer (from 15 Aug 1997 up through 21 Dec 2001), because the US recognized no Astan government, would see all Taliban and Northern Alliance forces as "irregular combatants". Also because the US did not ratify the Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

Please note that this is not a question of what international law "should be"; or what government in your mind "should be" recognized. The question is what position has your country taken in recognizing or not recognizing a government. The forces of a recognized government are "regular combatants"; all other conflicting forces are "irregular combatants", except for a "Power" to that conflict which has accepted and applies the GCs (Common Article 2 exception **); and of course the forces of nation-states (HCPs to the GCs) who are involved in the conflict.

The term "insurgency" (as also the terms "rebellion, insurrection, guerrilla, partisan forces") may well have a defined meaning in domestic law; but those terms are surplusage in the LOAC (except for the extent that they enter into the API definition, for example).

----------------------

"Regular" and "irregular", in a LOAC sense, have little to do with how those combatants fight, but a lot to do with authorization by a recognized government and the chain of command. E.g., the Continental Line would have been "irregulars" to the British, but "regulars" to the French.

[**] I can't think of a group that has met the Common Article 2 exception. An example from long before the GCs was the Confederate States of America, where both sides accepted and applied the laws of war as then generally accepted. Actually, the South was the first to do so. Initially, the North attempted to treat the Southern combatants as traitors (its naval forces as pirates). That led to something of a revolt in the Federal courts. The situation was normalized on the North's side by the Lieber Code.

Bob's World

08-04-2009, 09:04 PM

Question for the council and getting back to the original post for a minute: Is armed opposition to a government which claims authority over that oppostion always considered an insurgency - at least in a broad sense? What are the conditions, if any, where the insurgency label does not apply? What about simply ignoring a government which claims authority but has no power to enforce it, particularly when that government and the claimed authority is new?

I also believe that those current definitions actually hinder the effectiveness of COIN operations. We often find ourselves so mentally constrained by our terminology that we either act too late, or inappropriately to achieve positive COIN effects.

In the broadest sense, I can make the case that EVERY populace and EVERY Government is some stage of Insurgency at ALL times. While many don't like to think about "perpetual insurgency" (any more than they want to deal with the perpetual warfare that IW offers us); I believe it helps in the understanding of the true nature of insurgency and also to highlight that COIN is Civilian business primarily, with the military just surging to assist as needed, and fading into the back ground again.

Consider an x - y Axis; with "Violence" on the y axis; and "poor governance" or "Despotism" on the x axis. Most populaces and governments plot in the lower left corner, not perfect, but with low violence and reasonable satisfaction within the populace of their governance.

As governance begins to fail, the plot moves to right as to governance despotism; and upward for populace violence. This is in the natural state. A dictatorship may exert strong controls on a populace to keep violence low even as the governance trends to the right and despotism; but if that pressure is removed the populace pops straight up on the violence scale (think end of Tito regime in Yugoslavia).

One can then plot parallel vertical lines across this graph and break out into zones, from left to right: Phase 0 Pre-Insurgency; then Phase I "Survival" (Mao's term) insurgency; then Phase II "Strategic Offensive; and if necessary up into Phase III "Decisive."

The goal of effective COIN then is to not just attack the violence and suppress the populace straight down; but to also "attack" the conditions of poor governance so that the populace and the governance move together down the x-y slope to a sustainable state in pre-insurgency.

Some take aways from this perspective:
1. Insurgency happens when governments fail; so it is the fault of the civil government for breaking it, and the responsibility of the civil government to fix it.
2. COIN is continuous and primarily CIVIL and focused on providing good governance to the populace.
3. Any COIN effort focused just on defeating the military arm of the insurgency merely suppresses it.
4. Any effort to target key leaders or ideology without addressing poor governance also merely suppresses the insurgency. New leaders, new movements, new ideology will emerge to lead the populace once again.
5. The goal of insurgency is not to "defeat" the insurgent, but to repair the poor governance and generally move the populace back into the fold. Efforts to "defeat" are highly likely to be counter to your true goal. After all, how much of the populace must one kill to re-earn their support?

When you don't think you have an insurgency until the situation is so failed as to be in open violence, it is like not thinking you have a fire until the flames are visible from the street. Too late. Too damn late.

Entropy

08-04-2009, 09:35 PM

BW,

Thanks for the great comment. I agree with you in a broad sense when you say that every populace and every government is in some stage of "insurgency."

But this...

The goal of effective COIN then is to not just attack the violence and suppress the populace straight down; but to also "attack" the conditions of poor governance so that the populace and the governance move together down the x-y slope to a sustainable state in pre-insurgency.

...is a problem if the "governance" is forcibly extended from the outside to a population that has never had it. That is what we are trying to do in parts of Afghanistan. The locals don't think they need (what they consider) outsiders coming in and giving them "governance." They think their governance is just find as it is and simply would like to be left alone to live as have for generations. It seems to me this is fundamentally different than a case where a disaffected population previously existed under some kind of central authority.

A parallel here might be the European colonization of North America. Did we bring them governance and were native Americans "insurgents" simply because they resided in territory we claimed as our own?

The reason I bring this up is because in Afghanistan it's plausible that attempting to bring governance to autonomous populations will cause pushback that drives them into the waiting arms of the Taliban or another insurgent group, even assuming the Kabul government was capable and free of corruption. If we label these autonomous populations "insurgents" because they reject governance from Kabul, we risk making them into enemies. I'm speculating that perhaps that might be a concern of the original poster given his comments.

marct

08-04-2009, 09:54 PM

Hi Bob,

In the broadest sense, I can make the case that EVERY populace and EVERY Government is some stage of Insurgency at ALL times.

A lot to consider....

On the whole, i would agree with you on that take. "Government" is a recent invention, say 10-12 kya, and one that many people still dislike.

NB: What follows is me playing academic Devil's Advocate

Consider an x - y Axis; with "Violence" on the y axis; and "poor governance" or "Despotism" on the x axis. Most populaces and governments plot in the lower left corner, not perfect, but with low violence and reasonable satisfaction within the populace of their governance.

Hmmm, I think this is too limited in a number of ways.

First, using a scale for "poor - good governance" implies that there is a singular model on which this can be tracked and rated. Not all "poor governance" is despotism and not all despotisms are poorly governed. I don't think there is, and I believe that the assumption that there is has caused a lot of problems in the current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, even if we restrict our definition of "violence" to person on person kinetic conflict, different cultures (not societies) have quite different definitions of acceptable levels and types of violence. We (North Americans) may not consider honour killings as "acceptable violence", but some cultures do. We (Canadians this time) don't accept the level of violence prevalent in most major American cities - does that mean that the US suffers from "despotism" (note, I didn't say "poor governance", especially in light of people's apparent views of Congress :D)?

Basically, I think that your "violence" scale is flawed and your "governance" scale is way too limited.

As governance begins to fail, the plot moves to right as to governance despotism; and upward for populace violence. This is in the natural state. A dictatorship may exert strong controls on a populace to keep violence low even as the governance trends to the right and despotism; but if that pressure is removed the populace pops straight up on the violence scale (think end of Tito regime in Yugoslavia).

How would you account for non-despotic regimes that have a high degree of violence in their populace? This gets back to one of the flaws I see with your scale for governance; there are too many assumptions about what "good governance" means. In particular, you seem to be setting up a situation where any violence is an indicator of poor governance.

This implies, to me at least, that the State as the institution of governance, must be a Total Organization - responsible for the welfare, emotional states and mindset of all of its citizens. Even worse, again to my mind, is the extrapolation that the State is capable of such responsibilities.

The goal of effective COIN then is to not just attack the violence and suppress the populace straight down; but to also "attack" the conditions of poor governance so that the populace and the governance move together down the x-y slope to a sustainable state in pre-insurgency.

Would that include removing the government? If, for example, the activities of militias and gangs in the US reached an unacceptable point, would you feel that the military would be justified in removing Congress and the Executive branch?

NOTE: This is a rhetorical question, I do not expect an answer! I told you I was in Devil's Advocate mode :wry:!

Some take aways from this perspective:
1. Insurgency happens when governments fail; so it is the fault of the civil government for breaking it, and the responsibility of the civil government to fix it.

How about externally engineered insurgencies (e.g. those pushed by the 5th Comintern) designed to first subvert the government, then overthrow it?

2. COIN is continuous and primarily CIVIL and focused on providing good governance to the populace.

Still need a good definition for that.

3. Any COIN effort focused just on defeating the military arm of the insurgency merely suppresses it.

While, at the same time, increasing support for it.

4. Any effort to target key leaders or ideology without addressing poor governance also merely suppresses the insurgency. New leaders, new movements, new ideology will emerge to lead the populace once again.

Um, that would, of course, include the insurgents, wouldn't it?

5. The goal of insurgency is not to "defeat" the insurgent, but to repair the poor governance and generally move the populace back into the fold. Efforts to "defeat" are highly likely to be counter to your true goal. After all, how much of the populace must one kill to re-earn their support?

Sounds like a definition of a disfunctional family to me :wry:.

When you don't think you have an insurgency until the situation is so failed as to be in open violence, it is like not thinking you have a fire until the flames are visible from the street. Too late. Too damn late.

Hmmm, if that is accepted, then any political opposition would automatically be considered as an "insurgency". Sounds totally opposed to any form of democratic ideals I'm familiar with!

[/Devil's Advocate]

Okay, moving out of the DA stance, I happen to agree with a lot of your comments even if it didn't seem like I did ;). I went to the DA position because part of the reason for this thread was the implications of using certain words/understandings, and I wanted to pull out some of the ones in your post.

BTW, I really do think your governance scale is flawed. There are culturally accepted levels and types of "governance" even as there are culturally accepted levels and types of violence. Consider, by way of examples of both, the difference between, say, Texas and New York in how they, as a State, would deal with someone who shot a trespasser on their property (I doubt they'd even be charged in Texas).

I think a better governance scale could be constructed using a combination of cultural expectation of governance and the distance of lived reality from that expectation. Both of these will change and both are also susceptible to change from external sources. It certainly avoids the single implied model in your current scale. In effect, it would ask "What do you expect your government to do?" rather than ask "How well is your government doing X, Y and Z" (which may be culturally not the role of a government).

kingo1rtr

08-04-2009, 10:38 PM

I am working in northern Afghanistan and have encountered bit of a problem.

Describing the different actors on the ground has proven difficult using the term "insurgent". Is someone who is not seeking to overthrow the central government, but seeking to establish and consolidate a local powerbase that competes with local government structures an insurgent? Is he a "local insurgent"? Will the sum of all these local actors still qualify as an insurgency?

Any views on this?

Saifullah - I dare say you don't have a library close by (if you do then alls the better) but if you can get hold of Frank Kitson's 'Low Intensity Operations' he offers a very good set of perspectives on various actors in these types of situations.

Some of those who you describe might be in a class that Kitson calls 'subversives'. He describes subversion as 'all measures short of the use of armed force taken by by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing....it can involve the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches and propoganda, and can also include the use of small cale violence...' He goes on to distinguish insurgency as 'the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government..'.

He also highlights Sir Robert Thomson (of Malaya fame) who observed that 'naturally, subversion and insurgency can take place in the same country at the same time...'.

Kitson goes on to observe that 'if subversion fails to achieve its aim, it merges imperceptibly into insurrection...'.

I hope these mild ramblings are of some help.

Bob's World

08-04-2009, 11:02 PM

Hi Bob,

A lot to consider....

On the whole, i would agree with you on that take. "Government" is a recent invention, say 10-12 kya, and one that many people still dislike.

NB: What follows is me playing academic Devil's Advocate

Hmmm, I think this is too limited in a number of ways.

First, using a scale for "poor - good governance" implies that there is a singular model on which this can be tracked and rated. Not all "poor governance" is despotism and not all despotisms are poorly governed. I don't think there is, and I believe that the assumption that there is has caused a lot of problems in the current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, even if we restrict our definition of "violence" to person on person kinetic conflict, different cultures (not societies) have quite different definitions of acceptable levels and types of violence. We (North Americans) may not consider honour killings as "acceptable violence", but some cultures do. We (Canadians this time) don't accept the level of violence prevalent in most major American cities - does that mean that the US suffers from "despotism" (note, I didn't say "poor governance", especially in light of people's apparent views of Congress :D)?

Basically, I think that your "violence" scale is flawed and your "governance" scale is way too limited.

How would you account for non-despotic regimes that have a high degree of violence in their populace? This gets back to one of the flaws I see with your scale for governance; there are too many assumptions about what "good governance" means. In particular, you seem to be setting up a situation where any violence is an indicator of poor governance.

This implies, to me at least, that the State as the institution of governance, must be a Total Organization - responsible for the welfare, emotional states and mindset of all of its citizens. Even worse, again to my mind, is the extrapolation that the State is capable of such responsibilities.

Would that include removing the government? If, for example, the activities of militias and gangs in the US reached an unacceptable point, would you feel that the military would be justified in removing Congress and the Executive branch?

NOTE: This is a rhetorical question, I do not expect an answer! I told you I was in Devil's Advocate mode :wry:!

How about externally engineered insurgencies (e.g. those pushed by the 5th Comintern) designed to first subvert the government, then overthrow it?

Still need a good definition for that.

While, at the same time, increasing support for it.

Um, that would, of course, include the insurgents, wouldn't it?

Sounds like a definition of a disfunctional family to me :wry:.

Hmmm, if that is accepted, then any political opposition would automatically be considered as an "insurgency". Sounds totally opposed to any form of democratic ideals I'm familiar with!

[/Devil's Advocate]

Okay, moving out of the DA stance, I happen to agree with a lot of your comments even if it didn't seem like I did ;). I went to the DA position because part of the reason for this thread was the implications of using certain words/understandings, and I wanted to pull out some of the ones in your post.

BTW, I really do think your governance scale is flawed. There are culturally accepted levels and types of "governance" even as there are culturally accepted levels and types of violence. Consider, by way of examples of both, the difference between, say, Texas and New York in how they, as a State, would deal with someone who shot a trespasser on their property (I doubt they'd even be charged in Texas).

I think a better governance scale could be constructed using a combination of cultural expectation of governance and the distance of lived reality from that expectation. Both of these will change and both are also susceptible to change from external sources. It certainly avoids the single implied model in your current scale. In effect, it would ask "What do you expect your government to do?" rather than ask "How well is your government doing X, Y and Z" (which may be culturally not the role of a government).

While I do believe that their is a common model or dynamic to insurgency; I also equally firmly believe that each populace-governance dynamic is unique unto themselves. So what may be very peaceful phase 0 conditions in one may be causation for Ph II insugency in another. Similarly, engagement what may well move one populace down from PH I in one, may have no effect on another.

This is why I think much intel is misguided, and virtually all "effectiveness" metrics are just a waste of toner on powerpoint. Good polling is your best source of "goodness" and "badness" of governance. You don't have to achieve perfection to "win", and you certainly don't have to acheive effectiveness of governance.

Entropy

08-04-2009, 11:06 PM

This is why I think much intel is misguided, and virtually all "effectiveness" metrics are just a waste of toner on powerpoint. Good polling is your best source of "goodness" and "badness" of governance. You don't have to achieve perfection to "win", and you certainly don't have to acheive effectiveness of governance.

Is it intel that is misguided, or is the intel function being asked the wrong questions?

Bob's World

08-04-2009, 11:17 PM

Is it intel that is misguided, or is the intel function being asked the wrong questions?

The fact is that our intel community is all about threats. Threats, Threats, Threats.

Now, did the planners write "defeat" in the plan? yes. So, that just enables intel to justify their focus.

Do the ops guys want to go find and kill bad guys? Yes...but there is a chicken or egg argument beginning, because

Commanders get that damn threat brief every morning. Here are the same High Value Individuals; here are the latest organizations to join the AQ franchise (though the organization has not changed and is still very much a nationalist insurgency); etc. So the command turns to his Ops guys and demands that he does something about these HVIs the intel guy keeps telling him about.

This is how we started; and change comes hard. Intel still resists changing its focus even though the strategic picture has cleared up considerably.

I admit, I am very hard on the intel community. But only becuase they deserve it. There is a growing insurgency of sorts within the community though, as junior members try to evolve to provide analysis of the broader problem, but in large, their leadership keeps them firmly on task studying "bad guys."

Entropy

08-04-2009, 11:20 PM

I think a better governance scale could be constructed using a combination of cultural expectation of governance and the distance of lived reality from that expectation. Both of these will change and both are also susceptible to change from external sources. It certainly avoids the single implied model in your current scale. In effect, it would ask "What do you expect your government to do?" rather than ask "How well is your government doing X, Y and Z" (which may be culturally not the role of a government).

I really like that Marc. A central government may be good at doing X, but maybe a population, for cultural reasons, believes "X" needs to be controlled at the local level. In that case, governing capability isn't an issue - both the central government and the local government are capable of providing for "x." Forcing the locals to get "x" centrally does not, in my view, promote "governance."

Entropy

08-04-2009, 11:45 PM

The fact is that our intel community is all about threats. Threats, Threats, Threats.

Now, did the planners write "defeat" in the plan? yes. So, that just enables intel to justify their focus.

Do the ops guys want to go find and kill bad guys? Yes...but there is a chicken or egg argument beginning, because

Commanders get that damn threat brief every morning. Here are the same High Value Individuals; here are the latest organizations to join the AQ franchise (though the organization has not changed and is still very much a nationalist insurgency); etc. So the command turns to his Ops guys and demands that he does something about these HVIs the intel guy keeps telling him about.

This is how we started; and change comes hard. Intel still resists changing its focus even though the strategic picture has cleared up considerably.

I admit, I am very hard on the intel community. But only becuase they deserve it. There is a growing insurgency of sorts within the community though, as junior members try to evolve to provide analysis of the broader problem, but in large, their leadership keeps them firmly on task studying "bad guys."

Those are good points. Intel people, especially those in uniform, focus on threats because that is how they are trained. I wrote a little bit about that in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76610&postcount=14).

Commanders need to realize that intel works for them. A Commander does not need to get that "damn threat brief" every morning if it's not valuable or doesn't inform decisions they must make. If Commanders want something else, they can provide intel guidance, even if that guidance is a good ass-chewing. I understand what you're saying, but IMO much of the time intel people assume what they brief is what is wanted since there is often little or no feedback from many Commanders, at least in my experience. I've learned through experience that I usually need to hound my Commander before I can get a good handle on exactly what information he/she wants.

IntelTrooper

08-05-2009, 12:24 AM

Commanders need to realize that intel works for them. A Commander does not need to get that "damn threat brief" every morning if it's not valuable or doesn't inform decisions they must make. If Commanders want something else, they can provide intel guidance, even if that guidance is a good ass-chewing. I understand what you're saying, but IMO much of the time intel people assume what they brief is what is wanted since there is often little or no feedback from many Commanders, at least in my experience. I've learned through experience that I usually need to hound my Commander before I can get a good handle on exactly what information he/she wants.
If this would fit into my sig line, I would put it there. This bears repeating, big time. And it's partially the fault of passive intel officers who don't teach their commanders what kinds of questions they should be asking. A lot of people got upset when I reported on matters of actual consequence -- corrupt government leaders, public perceptions of government legitimacy, etc. -- and put "Initiative" in the PIR line because no one was asking about those topics. So my team and I quit taking the initiative. If you marginalize us, you'll get a marginal picture of what's going on in your AO.

Dayuhan

08-05-2009, 12:39 AM

Some take aways from this perspective:

1. Insurgency happens when governments fail; so it is the fault of the civil government for breaking it, and the responsibility of the civil government to fix it.
2. COIN is continuous and primarily CIVIL and focused on providing good governance to the populace.
3. Any COIN effort focused just on defeating the military arm of the insurgency merely suppresses it.
4. Any effort to target key leaders or ideology without addressing poor governance also merely suppresses the insurgency. New leaders, new movements, new ideology will emerge to lead the populace once again.
5. The goal of insurgency is not to "defeat" the insurgent, but to repair the poor governance and generally move the populace back into the fold. Efforts to "defeat" are highly likely to be counter to your true goal. After all, how much of the populace must one kill to re-earn their support?

Very much a valid analysis, but there's an element that may require more attention.

Much of our discussion of governments and nations assumes functional nationhood, a condition often missing in practice. Many of the "nations" that figure prominently on the lists of troubled and violent states are not really "nations" at all, as most of us understand the concept. What appears to be a failure of government may be evidence that the "nation" as currently constituted is a fictitious construct and effectively ungovernable. In some cases territories arbitrarily designated "nations" can only be held together as such through despotism: if the people have freedom they will inevitably tend to splinter away from a "nation" that they never considered themselves to be part of in the first place. In such cases you can't "bring them back into the fold" because they were forced into the fold in the first place.

Part of the problem in managing these situations is the Western tendency to impose order at the expense of long-term stability. The process by which people move from clan to tribe to nation (ok, vastly oversimplified) is complex and often very messy: it took the ever-so-civilized Europeans many centuries of war to delineate and respect national boundaries. In much of the world this process was aborted by colonialism; it's still thrashing itself out and the process is messy. A system that is trying to move toward equilibrium may appear to be disorderly and unstable, but it is often far more stable than a system where change has been suppressed by the imposition of artificial order.

Change is often disorderly, and disorder often creates threats. Change is also necessary, and if we try to impose order by suppressing change, we will fail. We need to move beyond seeing change - often expressed through phenomena such as insurgency and opposition to national governments - as inherently negative and threatening, and try to manage the process of change, rather than reflexively trying to suppress it.

Edit:

This question from marct may relate in some cases to the issue discussed above:

How would you account for non-despotic regimes that have a high degree of violence in their populace?

One possibility may be that inherent entropy in an artificially constructed "nation" could produce violence whether or not the government is despotic... in some cases, despotism may be the only way to suppress that entropy, though it's not likely to be a permanent solution.

Dayuhan

08-05-2009, 12:59 AM

Three related comments...

From BW:

Perhaps Shay's rebellion and the Whiskey rebellion in our own fromative history are such examples of issue-driven insurrection; both of which served to help the government understand what "good governnace" looked like in the eyes of the populace and to shape a fledgling national government to more effectively serve its populace in a manner they found acceptable.

Very good examples... but because these incidents did not occur against the backdrop of a national insurgency, they were recognized and managed as what they were. Add a national insurgency to the picture, and things get muddier.

From Wilf:

Exactly - BUT that is NOT a type of insurgency. What they want does not even have to be legitimate. Look at Sierra Leone and Colombia.

Based on the idea that what you describe is an Insurgency, the US brands all "Irregular Warfare" as "Insurgency," this COIN! - and out comes the COIN play book and all the associated baggage.

Very true... but when issue-driven insurrections overlap a national insurgency, they are often classified as insurgency and treated as such. The point I'm trying to make (possibly not very well) is that in any given local scenario, it's worth asking whether this "insurgent" is really an insurgent, as in trying to overthrow a government, or whether the primary motivation is a local issue that might be resolved.

From Entropy...

This…...is a problem if the "governance" is forcibly extended from the outside to a population that has never had it. That is what we are trying to do in parts of Afghanistan. The locals don't think they need (what they consider) outsiders coming in and giving them "governance." They think their governance is just find as it is and simply would like to be left alone to live as have for generations. It seems to me this is fundamentally different than a case where a disaffected population previously existed under some kind of central authority.

Thank you for making the point I was trying to make, and doing a better job at it.

Let me try to rephrase:

The conditions of governance (or lack thereof) that generate insurgency are also likely to generate or exacerbate local issue-driven conflict between citizens and government.

Insurgent groups will try to exploit these local rebellions: if they can absorb them into the insurgency they will, if they cannot they will try to encourage and support the local rebellion as a means to drain the resources of the government.

Governments are likely to respond by classifying the local rebellion as a subset of the insurgency and trying to forcibly suppress it.

The question, then, for anyone engaged in COIN or FID in support of COIN (I'm picking up the acronyms, slowly) on a local level is whether the "insurgents" you face in the field are actually part of a national insurgency, pursuing the goals of that insurgency, or whether they are primarily driven by local issues with government and working with the insurgency on an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" basis. In the latter case, it may be possible to address and resolve the motivating local issue (this may be as simple as leaving people alone and trying to govern them less), thereby re-establishing the legitimacy of government and denying support to the national insurgency.

Infanteer

08-05-2009, 03:40 AM

This is how we started; and change comes hard. Intel still resists changing its focus even though the strategic picture has cleared up considerably.

...to quote one of the guys in our S2 shop - "if it ain't enemies or terrain, I don't do it!"....

Interesting thread - I guess an insurgent is one who insurges, no?

If anything, the thread highlights how mainstream military "buzz-ism" takes words or concepts, which as Bob's World highlights have very specific meanings, and stretches them in the name of the "military innovation" or just plain trying to sound smart. Every few years, this bug hits military journals and service schools and if you have the right buzzwords, your paper is "current" and you know how to win wars. It was maneuver warfare that was the key to victory, then it was Revolution in Military Affairs, then - for a quick spell - it looked to be 4th Generation Warfare which quickly lost to "COIN".

Now I see proposals for "COIN forces" and "COIN Aircraft" and organizing for "COIN" - as if shooting a rifle or dropping bombs on bad guys constitues COIN or "not-COIN" (I'm sure an antithesis will be derived shortly).

Is labeling everyone in Afghanistan who isn't on the side of the Karzai government an insurgent similar to the past search for "communist bandits" or other such broad brush strokes? Are we guilty, as a profession, of reducing what is (and should) be something complex to a fad with its manual and trends?

Ken White

08-05-2009, 04:28 AM

To your last paragraph. :wry:

slapout9

08-05-2009, 05:15 AM

Interesting thread - I guess an insurgent is one who insurges, no?

You Sir are destined for greatness;)

Infanteer

08-05-2009, 05:32 AM

You Sir are destined for greatness;)

I guess I too am guilty of reducing this complex thread to simplicity - one must aspire to something.

MikeF

08-05-2009, 07:20 AM

is another man's terrorist...

To paraphrase Dr. Tyrell, words mean things...semantics matter...

In my own thought, in deep practice outside theory, I disregarded defining the common environment, human terrain, and COIN dogma to simply talking to people, understanding who they are, where they come from, and what they represent...

For example...

1. Sheik A supported the gov't but controlled militia to attack Sheik B b/c they had a long-standing feud. Additionally, his militia would attack coalition forces as a target of opportunity even though they were cautioned not to harm me. His cousin was the governor so he garnered a bit of support from the national gov't...

2. Sheik B was an opportunist that swayed back and forth from the gov't support to AQ. He was mostly concerned about his economic trade and the benefits of gov't contracts. He disliked sheik A over his political connections.

3. Sheik C hated the occupation, and he could not accept the current gov't.
'
4. Sheik D was a die-hard wahhabist that supported AQ.

Everyone fell along the lines of each sheik...I solved the scenario my own way- I became the greatest sheik w/ a $10,000 bounty on my head...

60% of all my operations were spent on intelligence collection (recon, surveillaince, etc) to continually update the problem set.

How would you define the problem set???

v/r

Mike

William F. Owen

08-05-2009, 09:04 AM

I disregarded defining the common environment, human terrain, and COIN dogma to simply talking to people, understanding who they are, where they come from, and what they represent...

60% of all my operations were spent on intelligence collection (recon, surveillaince, etc) to continually update the problem set.

If you could only teach those two things to the rest of the US Army, you'd have achieved far more than many, many other people.

marct

08-05-2009, 12:45 PM

Hi Mike,

Everyone fell along the lines of each sheik...I solved the scenario my own way- I became the greatest sheik w/ a $10,000 bounty on my head...

60% of all my operations were spent on intelligence collection (recon, surveillaince, etc) to continually update the problem set.

How would you define the problem set???

Nicely done!

One of the things I really like about this thread (and a couple of related ones), is that we are starting to get into the issue of why semantics matters and, at the same time, some of the pragmatic implications of semantics.

Semantics is really about systems of sense making and meaning, usually embedded in language and cultural narratives. A lot of current operations - COIN, FID, SFA, etc. - require that people operate in a cultural landscape (a semantic environment) that they don't "know" at a gut level. This means that we have to be able to construct some type of semantic "translation matrix", although there are rarely 1:1 correspondences in meaning.

Basically, what you did was to "translate" your position in the human terrain (Gods, I hate that phrase!), into something that "they" could understand at a gut level. "They" now "knew" how to make sense of you and predict your future actions.

One of the things I see as causing a lot of problems is when the "translation" either makes no "sense" to the population or has an inverted emotional connotation (i.e. X is a "good thing" for us and a "bad thing" for them). For example, my suggestion to Bob's World on how to reconfigure his "governance axis" is based on that problem.

Take the idea of a central government providing "security". I would suggest that it is "obvious", at least to most Afghans, that this is "impossible": if it was the case, then they would be living under a regime that they could not stand and, historically, have never accepted. It is also "impossible" because their everyday life experience has shown that it cannot be done (NB: even the Taliban never tried to do this). So any claims made that "security" is "of course" a government responsibility will have both a negative emotional connotation ("a tyranny? No way, we've fought them before and always won!"), are rejected by life experience (which re-inforces the tyranny image), and influence how other messages produced by the same group will be received (a "bleed-over" effect).

Bob's World

08-05-2009, 12:56 PM

While all insurgents by any definition are the illegal actor; they are not always the wrong actor.

Meaning that sometimes the government has failed in some significant way and lost the support of the populace and is being sustained in power over them by either their own use of the state's power or the power of some protector state.

As Americans we must never forget that our founding cornerstone document as a nation, our Declaration of American Independence, boldly recoginzes both the RIGHT and the DUTY of any populace, not just ours, to rise up in insurgency when government fails. Powerful stuff. We like to think that the American Rebels were the good guys in that one. I suspect others might see it differently.

It is when we let a relationship with some particular government that over time has slipped away from supporting its populace outweigh our commitment to our populace -based principles as a nation that we get into trouble. When said failed or failing government is perceived to draw its legitimacy not from the governed, but from US; this is the ripe field where AQ reaps its harvest. Conducting UW to convince these populaces that the path to good governance at home requires that they first break this source of external legitimacy over their dysfunctional goverment.

Mark O'Neill

08-05-2009, 01:26 PM

Saifullah - I dare say you don't have a library close by (if you do then alls the better) but if you can get hold of Frank Kitson's 'Low Intensity Operations' he offers a very good set of perspectives on various actors in these types of situations.

Some of those who you describe might be in a class that Kitson calls 'subversives'. He describes subversion as 'all measures short of the use of armed force taken by by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing....it can involve the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches and propoganda, and can also include the use of small cale violence...' He goes on to distinguish insurgency as 'the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government..'.

He also highlights Sir Robert Thomson (of Malaya fame) who observed that 'naturally, subversion and insurgency can take place in the same country at the same time...'.

Kitson goes on to observe that 'if subversion fails to achieve its aim, it merges imperceptibly into insurrection...'.

I hope these mild ramblings are of some help.

I think that maybe a few folks were too busy talking past each other.

As usual, Sir Frank K gets close to the mark. One of the best military minds to publish last century in my estimation,

Cheers

Mark

marct

08-05-2009, 01:36 PM

Hi Bob,

While all insurgents by any definition are the illegal actor; they are not always the wrong actor.

And not always and for everyone illegal either :wry: - JMM's listing of this a while back is a really good point to keep in mind.

As a related note, and one worth following up, many of the "insurgent" groups (and I'm using that term from our legal definitions) we are currently fighting have their own problems keeping their legal status. Remember all of the problems AQ had after 9/11 because they broke Sharia law by attacking civilians?

One of the things most people don't realize is that Sunni Islam is an extremely legalist religion, where "law" is the analog of Christian "theology" (not of Cannon law). "Jihad" can only be legally waged under certain specific conditions, and what actions may be taken during it are also subject to legal acceptance. Illegal acts can end with the perpetrator being declared as a "heretic" and cast out of the community, in effect destroying their source of legitimacy and their ability to hide in the population.

Meaning that sometimes the government has failed in some significant way and lost the support of the populace and is being sustained in power over them by either their own use of the state's power or the power of some protector state.

If by "failed" you include a failure to adapt to the changing culture of their citizens, then I would agree with you.

As Americans we must never forget that our founding cornerstone document as a nation, our Declaration of American Independence, boldly recoginzes both the RIGHT and the DUTY of any populace, not just ours, to rise up in insurgency when government fails. Powerful stuff. We like to think that the American Rebels were the good guys in that one. I suspect others might see it differently.

What can I say? As the descendent of United Empire Loyalists who fought against your rebel ancestors, that's never far from my mind :D!

It is when we let a relationship with some particular government that over time has slipped away from supporting its populace outweigh our commitment to our populace -based principles as a nation that we get into trouble.

Agreed. It gets even worse when you add in the morale effect of supporting a government that you philosophically oppose.

When said failed or failing government is perceived to draw its legitimacy not from the governed, but from US; this is the ripe field where AQ reaps its harvest. Conducting UW to convince these populaces that the path to good governance at home requires that they first break this source of external legitimacy over their dysfunctional goverment.

Not only AQ. Go back to the Wars of National Liberation and you see the same effect happening. It's a much better tactic to shift the diplomatic stance towards that government as a way of reducing the probability of that perception being accepted. That, however, can be quite difficult in some countries (e.g. Nigeria).

Entropy

08-05-2009, 02:14 PM

While all insurgents by any definition are the illegal actor; they are not always the wrong actor.

Great point

Meaning that sometimes the government has failed in some significant way and lost the support of the populace and is being sustained in power over them by either their own use of the state's power or the power of some protector state.

And sometimes the populace has always had "their own use of the state's power" and so support was never lost because it never really existed in the first place. What is it, then, when a government comes in and attempts to provide that support and there is resistance?

As Americans we must never forget that our founding cornerstone document as a nation, our Declaration of American Independence, boldly recoginzes both the RIGHT and the DUTY of any populace, not just ours, to rise up in insurgency when government fails. Powerful stuff. We like to think that the American Rebels were the good guys in that one. I suspect others might see it differently.

Definitely. I think it also says that people have the right to reject a government forced upon them.

This is what I worry about with Afghanistan. I worry we are forcing a uniform notion of what we think is governance on people who don't want what we or the kleptocracy in Kabul are providing. Populations in Afghanistan differ tremendously in what they want in terms of governance from the outside (by outside I mean outside their local, long-standing power structures). Some want no interference from outsiders at all be they Taliban or Karzai's government or the US or those in the valley next door. Some simply want dispute resolution and a system of justice to prevent blood fueds. Some want to become part of a "nation" called Afghanistan. Some want that only if their particular group has enough power in such a government to defend and promote the group's interests. Those are only a few examples - there is no consensus in Afghanistan on what government should provide.

Does our policy of governance-promotion take this diversity into account? Is it able to adjust to local conditions to meet local needs, or is it a one-size-fits all approach? I don't know, but there seems to be a lot of smoke indicating the latter. And that's what worries me in addition to the fact that we are poor at delivering on promises.

William F. Owen

08-05-2009, 02:18 PM

As usual, Sir Frank K gets close to the mark. One of the best military minds to publish last century in my estimation.

Apparently, still with us I believe. His LIC book is excellent, but hardly read outside the UK, and very rarely read today. Solid, simple stuff.

slapout9

08-05-2009, 03:27 PM

I think that maybe a few folks were too busy talking past each other.

As usual, Sir Frank K gets close to the mark. One of the best military minds to publish last century in my estimation,

Cheers

Mark

Absolutely!

kingo1rtr

08-05-2009, 08:55 PM

Apparently, still with us I believe. His LIC book is excellent, but hardly read outside the UK, and very rarely read today. Solid, simple stuff.

Still very much with us. I'm hopeful that it might be possible to persuade a wee publisher to consider a bio of him while it is still possible to get first hand accounts with him.
I would say 'watch this space' but I suspect you all ahve better things top do.

Thanks for your comments Mark.

davidbfpo

08-05-2009, 09:10 PM

I'd overlooked Frank Kitson's writings, in fact I'm surprised his name has not featured before - or as I'm aging failed to notice before. Many years ago I purchased 'Low Intensity Operations' and 'Bunch of Five'. Bravo for resurrecting the books!

davidbfpo

Dayuhan

08-05-2009, 09:39 PM

While all insurgents by any definition are the illegal actor; they are not always the wrong actor.

Meaning that sometimes the government has failed in some significant way and lost the support of the populace and is being sustained in power over them by either their own use of the state's power or the power of some protector state.

As Americans we must never forget that our founding cornerstone document as a nation, our Declaration of American Independence, boldly recoginzes both the RIGHT and the DUTY of any populace, not just ours, to rise up in insurgency when government fails. Powerful stuff. We like to think that the American Rebels were the good guys in that one. I suspect others might see it differently.

Very true, and very much worth remembering. All too often in the cold war we passively let our antagonists seize the moral high ground of opposition to fading colonial regimes and tinpot dictators, leaving us to respond with support for governments that were neither defensible nor sustainable. I'd hate to see that pattern repeated.

Mark O'Neill

08-06-2009, 11:58 AM

Still very much with us. I'm hopeful that it might be possible to persuade a wee publisher to consider a bio of him while it is still possible to get first hand accounts with him.
I would say 'watch this space' but I suspect you all ahve better things top do.

Thanks for your comments Mark.

One or two of us have discussed the idea of attempting to contact him (perhaps through the Rifles' association) for a number of reasons:

1. A much discussed (late at night after the port has gone around) edited work / biography about COIN leadership;

2. A new monograph about his influence on COIN doctrine; and

3. (purely selfish) to interview him for one of the case studies in my dissertation...

Anyway, I digress, pound for pound I will take LIC and 'Bunch of Five' over any work by Galula. Any day.

Cheers

Mark

William F. Owen

08-06-2009, 01:04 PM

Anyway, I digress, pound for pound I will take LIC and 'Bunch of Five' over any work by Galula. Any day.

Got to agree. Given Kitson's track record, it's a bit of a mystery as to where and why Galula crept into the picture.

George L. Singleton

08-06-2009, 01:28 PM

MarkT and Dayuhan:

In particular I like Mark's overall summary, and I like this comment by our Philippines based friend Dayuhan, but everyone's inputs are very insightful and helpful individually and in total:

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

In Northern Pakistan the media, all their media, in genral use the terms "miscreants" and sometimes "extremists"

Based on several years now of reading, studying and writing in the Pak media myself, where I use the terms terrorists, Taliban, and al Qaida, I will create some confusion I suppose by nothing that the terrorists (my choice of words) have to rob, steal, and extort money nowadays to keep their fighting up and going. We are harming their main source of income whenever we taken on the poppy growers who will do business with anyone who can pay them hard currency, anyone, that includes us.

Shifting to remarks to me circa 2002/2003 from the Greatgrandson of a two times prior, based on the last King's tenure, of Afghanistan, who is retired from the Pakistani Foreign Service and was a protege of the late (executed) PM Bhutto (father of Mrs. Bhutto who was murdered by the Taliban agents it now seems clear to some of the world media in that the UN is formally invetigating now her murder/assassination)...the Afghans tribally are just that, tribes, loose confederations with a weak overall central governance system "until" the Taliban came long.

Thus I think the PsyOps folks using VOA and related channels of communications should pound away at the past and future intentions of the Taliban, and AQ, to "take away" local tribes initiatives and freedom of local governance, to create the in fact true picture that if you think you have got it rough now (remember, these tribe folks have never, ever known nor do they understand democracy or western style governance) just wait until the Taliban and AQ should get back in power and first thing that happens is "off with your heads" as you immediately are a threat to "their" soverignty that would take away the budding system of local governance we are fighting to give back to you.

How is that for another point of view without hanging up on technical military dictionary operating terms?

Simple is always better to me, at least.

Ken White

08-06-2009, 04:50 PM

Got to agree. Given Kitson's track record, it's a bit of a mystery as to where and why Galula crept into the picture.Because Kitson advocated things that he had seen work but some were 'harsh.' Galula advocated unproven theory and opposed 'harsh.'

Not that many Americans like nice theories as opposed to harsh reality or are inclined to try their damndest to take the easy way out, you understand... :rolleyes:

William F. Owen

08-06-2009, 07:40 PM

Because Kitson advocated things that he had seen work but some were 'harsh.' Galula advocated unproven theory and opposed 'harsh.'

Not that many Americans like nice theories as opposed to harsh reality or are inclined to try their damndest to take the easy way out, you understand... :rolleyes:

Harsh, but true Ken! Actually when it comes to harsh, Roger Trinquier is the guy. A bit too full on for my taste, but his book, "Modern Warfare" should be more widely read than it is.

Bob's World

08-08-2009, 11:50 AM

Ok, so because of this talk of Kitson, you all sent me on a bit of a quest.

First to Amazon: WAY too spendy to pick up anything from Kitson there.

Then on to the SOCOM Library. No luck initially, but finally did find a dusty hardbound copy of "Low Intensity Operations." (The librarian pulled out a well worn photocopy of an article on British COIN that a former SOCOM Commander had brought to him years ago with the task to "Acquire all of the works listed in this bibliography!" Well, he hasn't found them all yet, but he still has the list. "It's nice to see guys reading these old books," he commented as I was heading out with my copy of Kitson in hand. "Well, in my experience, not everything worth knowing was discovered yesterday (Thinking of Ken, of course), and headed back to work.

It took about 5 pages worth of the Introduction to make a few quick assessments:

1. This explains so much about WILF. (Though I think you may soften your firm position on "Subversion" vs "Insurgency" when you go back and review the quite rational approach that Kitson lays on on page 2-3 for the terms and definitions he decided to use and how he came to his position, as he recognized that this is definitely an area where reasonable minds can differ)
2. This is very clear and forthright and should be an enjoyable read that will provide some very usable insights.
3. Very British (with the typical blind spot in otherwise clear thought for the provocative role British actions had in creating the conditions that he had spent a career dealing with. I find the same blind spot today in American perspectives on the challenges we face.)
4. I expect it to be based more about "Knowledge" than "Understanding." To me, knowledge is interesting, but real value comes from understanding. I realize many get uncomfortable when stepping from the firm intellectual terrain of what one can measure, weigh, taste, feel, or see; but one must be able to follow the sign from the facts of what happened to the understanding of why it happened to be able to really apply the lessons appropriately when faced with a new factual situation. This is why I like Galula very much. And Jomini as well for that matter.

So, this weekend, Brigadier Kitson and I will get to know each other a bit. I look forward to it.

William F. Owen

08-08-2009, 01:36 PM

1. This explains so much about WILF. (Though I think you may soften your firm position on "Subversion" vs "Insurgency" when you go back and review the quite rational approach that Kitson lays on on page 2-3 for the terms and definitions he decided to use and how he came to his position, as he recognized that this is definitely an area where reasonable minds can differ)
I'll read that as a compliment, and yes, it's all true! Read Julian Paget next!

3. Very British (with the typical blind spot in otherwise clear thought for the provocative role British actions had in creating the conditions that he had spent a career dealing with. I find the same blind spot today in American perspectives on the challenges we face.)
I merely set forth the policy. Don't care too much what the policy is, as long as it is within my legal and moral compass.

And Jomini as well for that matter.
Apparently I have been very remiss in not reading Jomini. Sat down with IDF's "Operational Art" guru the other day, and he basically told me, that I had no hope of getting my head around why people thought the way they currently did, unless I understood the source of the language and the meaning, and that, apparently comes from Jomini. - so fixing that shortly!

Ken White

08-08-2009, 04:19 PM

With apologies to Robert Fulghum.
"Well, in my experience, not everything worth knowing was discovered yesterday (Thinking of Ken, of course), and headed back to work.Like Wilf, I'll take that as a compliment, at least I'm making you think and that's the idea. :D

If you kids have come up with anything new, I've yet to see it. Seriously. Though I did like your latest slide...
This is why I like Galula very much. And Jomini as well for that matter.1. This explains so much about BOB'S WORLD. (If you liked those mediocrities you'll love Kitson)...;)
2. I long ago bought and read and have reread but really have little use for Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice and while Jomini has had perhaps more influence than Clausewitz (thus making Wilf's comment quite correct), the Jomini approach to strategy is way too rigid IMO and I believe that neither has many, much less all, the answers today. Proving that even old dogs know there are new tricks -- even if many of them are not worth much. :wry:
3. Better, I think, of the older gentlemen (even older than I...) is Moritz Graf von Sachsen -- Maurice, Comte de Saxe -- his Reveries (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/Reveries-Art-War-Maurice-Saxe/dp/0486461505/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1249747043&sr=1-1)should be in the SOCOM library.

Does CentCom have a Library too? Does MacDill AFB also have a Library?

* Korea, 1950...:D

Bob's World

08-08-2009, 09:01 PM

With apologies to Robert Fulghum.Like Wilf, I'll take that as a compliment, at least I'm making you think and that's the idea. :D

If you kids have come up with anything new, I've yet to see it. Seriously. Though I did like your latest slide...1. This explains so much about BOB'S WORLD. (If you liked those mediocrities you'll love Kitson)...;)
2. I long ago bought and read and have reread but really have little use for Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice and while Jomini has had perhaps more influence than Clausewitz (thus making Wilf's comment quite correct), the Jomini approach to strategy is way too rigid IMO and I believe that neither has many, much less all, the answers today. Proving that even old dogs know there are new tricks -- even if many of them are not worth much. :wry:
3. Better, I think, of the older gentlemen (even older than I...) is Moritz Graf von Sachsen -- Maurice, Comte de Saxe -- his Reveries (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/Reveries-Art-War-Maurice-Saxe/dp/0486461505/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1249747043&sr=1-1)should be in the SOCOM library.

Does CentCom have a Library too? Does MacDill AFB also have a Library?

* Korea, 1950...:D

MacDill does have a library, though I confess I've never really gone there looking for substantive books, so can't vouch for what they have on hand.

As to CENTCOM, it is about 400 yards, and several light years from SOCOM; so I have never had reason to grace their doorstep with my presence. Silly, but there just isn't much cross-pollination.

SOCOM has a pretty nice collection though of materials you'd find interesting, and the librarian (whose name escapes me) is a tremendous gentleman who with alacrity will find or buy what one needs if he does not have it on hand. If you ever want to stop in, drop me a note and I will happily smuggle you through security and buy you lunch as well.

Oh, and as to Jomini; I've never really thought of him as a strategist; but have found the principles of war derived from his work to be terrific tools to keep in mind in virtually any tactical planning. Clean, simple, timeless. CvC is undoubtedly the better strategic resource, but I really don't need to muddle through 100 pages of his thinking out loud to then try to sort out the golden nugget that all the experts say is there (reminds me far too much of my Law School experience...). A 10-20 page exsum of CvC would be just about perfect, and would probably actually get read by those who need to read him.

slapout9

08-08-2009, 10:36 PM

Ok, so because of this talk of Kitson, you all sent me on a bit of a quest.

It took about 5 pages worth of the Introduction to make a few quick assessments:

1. This explains so much about WILF. (Though I think you may soften your firm position on "Subversion" vs "Insurgency" when you go back and review the quite rational approach that Kitson lays on on page 2-3 for the terms and definitions he decided to use and how he came to his position, as he recognized that this is definitely an area where reasonable minds can differ)
2. This is very clear and forthright and should be an enjoyable read that will provide some very usable insights.
3. Very British (with the typical blind spot in otherwise clear thought for the provocative role British actions had in creating the conditions that he had spent a career dealing with. I find the same blind spot today in American perspectives on the challenges we face.)
4. I expect it to be based more about "Knowledge" than "Understanding." To me, knowledge is interesting, but real value comes from understanding. I realize many get uncomfortable when stepping from the firm intellectual terrain of what one can measure, weigh, taste, feel, or see; but one must be able to follow the sign from the facts of what happened to the understanding of why it happened to be able to really apply the lessons appropriately when faced with a new factual situation. This is why I like Galula very much. And Jomini as well for that matter.

So, this weekend, Brigadier Kitson and I will get to know each other a bit. I look forward to it.

Bob, you may want to wait until you read the book....Kitson is Anti-Clausewitz and he Anti-Wilf (sorry Wilf but he contradicts much of what you say)! He understands the power of Subversion and Nonviolence in overthrowing a government. And to be successfully at COIN you must integrate counter propaganda,counter economic,counter insurgency - not separation of the them. Also Hailer publishing in St. Pete,Fl. has a Kitson reprint of LIC at reasonable price.

Ken White

08-08-2009, 10:50 PM

As to CENTCOM, it is about 400 yards, and several light years from SOCOM; so I have never had reason to grace their doorstep with my presence. Silly, but there just isn't much cross-pollination.Having long and not terribly happy experience with CentCom and its predecessors there, I'll forego comment and just say you're wise.

Asked the Library question out of idle curiousity; we -- DoD -- have so many that it would seem some consolidation might be effected. I understand the difference between school / command and MWR. Still...
If you ever want to stop in, drop me a note and I will happily smuggle you through security and buy you lunch as well.Thanks. I'd like that. We've got some old friends down in Tampa and Clearwater we keep threatening to run down and see 'em so if I can ever get my wife cranked up, I'll drop you a PM.
...A 10-20 page exsum of CvC would be just about perfect, and would probably actually get read by those who need to read him.I can agree with that, too much wading for me.

I'm excessively voluble on-line in an attempt to preclude angst, anger, ado and abashment but I can whip out a single paged tree sourced Exsum that'll knock your socks off (learned how to do that when I discovered the average GOs attention span... :wry:). For CvC, I could do it but would need at least a 10 page attachment. :D

Ken White

08-08-2009, 10:56 PM

Just ordered it. Read it years ago, need a refresher...

slapout9

08-09-2009, 01:32 AM

Just ordered it. Read it years ago, need a refresher...

I was reluctant to put it up here, I have been a long time fan of Kitson and much of SBW comes from there:D So now I cain't write my book on SBW and make a million dollars....and buy an island....and start my own country.....based on Beaches,Beer,Bikinis,and Bar-B-Que....oh well

Kitson makes reference to this guy in his book. Here is free pdf file on Non-Violent means enjoy.
http://www.patrir.ro/london/september/Nonviolent%20Action%20&%20Strategy/There%20Are%20Realistic%20Alternatives.Gene%20Shar p.pdf

Ken White

08-09-2009, 02:01 AM

but I know why you provided that last link. Forget it. I am not gonna arm rassle you over the water from the Chatahoochee! :D

jmm99

08-09-2009, 02:21 AM

Here's the link for $19.99 (http://www.hailerpublishing.com/lo_intense.html) - they take only Paypal. Since I just got back from a steak fry with my pool team, I'll not even try to write anything intelligent.

Quite a number of interesting reprints in their catalog (http://www.hailerpublishing.com/biglist.html) - e.g., One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800- 1934 by Captain Harry Alanson Ellsworth, USMC, pub. in 1934 - for $9.99 (http://www.hailerpublishing.com/usmc.html) !

Have to take a better look in the cold reality of tomorrow morning. :D

slapout9

08-09-2009, 05:17 AM

but I know why you provided that last link. Forget it. I am not gonna arm rassle you over the water from the Chatahoochee! :D

That's OK Ken, looks like sooner or later we will have a small war with Georgia over it....bunch a Rednecks tryin to steal our water:eek:....I don't think so!

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 05:30 AM

Bob, you may want to wait until you read the book....Kitson is Anti-Clausewitz and he Anti-Wilf (sorry Wilf but he contradicts much of what you say)! He understands the power of Subversion and Nonviolence in overthrowing a government.
So do I and so does Clausewitz. Non-violence sometimes works. Carl (and I) never said otherwise. Look at Ghandi. He just chose to put forth policy without violence. - BUT THAT IS NOT WAR! It is not the realm of military art. It is part of the policy which you have the option to use violence. - Subversion against your enemies is not done by armies. (CIA-SIS, The Office, etc.)
Medieval Warfare frequently saw bribery used to get armies to change side and even go home.
However, how many cases of pure subversion can we demonstrate that have not included some violent means?

And to be successfully a COIN must integrate counter propaganda,counter economic,counter insurgency not separation of the them.
Again, I have never said otherwise. COUNTER-propaganda is not necessarily woolly old "information ops". It is the countering of specific activity. -Rebuttal in media speak. Also, that it occurs does not mean it's decisive.

slapout9

08-09-2009, 05:38 AM

So do I and so does Clausewitz. Non-violence sometimes works. Carl (and I) never said otherwise. Look at Ghandi. He just chose to put forth policy without violence. - BUT THAT IS NOT WAR! It is not the realm of military art.

We must have have read a different book, because Kitson certainly thought it was all of it is part of War, and he certainly thought it was part of the Military's responsibility.

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 05:42 AM

Kitson makes reference to this guy in his book. Here is free pdf file on Non-Violent means enjoy.
http://www.patrir.ro/london/september/Nonviolent%20Action%20&%20Strategy/There%20Are%20Realistic%20Alternatives.Gene%20Shar p.pdf
Kitson refers to Sharp as part of the Non-violent phase - precursor to the violent phase?

This is pure CvC. "War = the support of a political agenda, using violence." That is NO way detracts from the effectiveness of politics without violence. Politics without violence is merely politics/diplomacy. It is not war or conflict.

If you write about trying to change a political condition without using violence, you are writing about the use of politics. The fact that these acts may be illegal is irrelevant, as the legality is a political construct to begin with.

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 05:51 AM

We must have have read a different book, because Kitson certainly thought it was all of it is part of War, and he certainly thought it was part of the Military's responsibility.

Well I have the 1991 Faber re-print of the 1972 Edition, with a new introduction. I am pretty sure this is the last edition Kitson wrote personally - and while he was still serving.

....but, the British Army have almost always, operated in "Support of the Civil Power," in COIN/CRW etc. Yes, counter-subversion was part of the effort, but it was done by Special Branch, not the Army. The Army supported Special Branch. Kitson, to my mind, is merely laying out the "all instruments of power," - which is how we ruled the Empire.

slapout9

08-09-2009, 06:07 AM

....but, the British Army have almost always, operated in "Support of the Civil Power," in COIN/CRW etc. Yes, counter-subversion was part of the effort, but it was done by Special Branch, not the Army. The Army supported Special Branch. Kitson, to my mind, is merely laying out the "all instruments of power," - which is how we ruled the Empire.

That ain't what the book says. The whole point is for the Army to be prepared to do it because there may not be anyone else who can or will do it. He lays it out in every chapter exactly what he believes the Army should do.

slapout9

08-09-2009, 06:58 AM

Link to book review of Low Intensity Conflict by Frank Kitson

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27/054.html

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 07:17 AM

That ain't what the book says. The whole point is for the Army to be prepared to do it because there may not be anyone else who can or will do it. He lays it out in every chapter exactly what he believes the Army should do.

Does your edition include the diagram of the committee system, Figure 2, Chapter 3? - The PIO, for example, is almost certainly special branch.
I'd also refer you to the last paragraph of Chapter 5. "In conclusion..." Yes he states Army officers should be able to advise and assist, but in the non-violent phase, the Army are supporting the Police - Northern Ireland saw some 28+ years of "policy Primacy."

In fact the more I read and re-read Kitson, Paget, and even Samay Ram (Indian Army's Kitson) the more I believe the "80% political, 20% military" is merely a re-statement of Clausewitian observation.

slapout9

08-09-2009, 08:07 AM

Does your edition include the diagram of the committee system, Figure 2, Chapter 3? - The PIO, for example, is almost certainly special branch.
I'd also refer you to the last paragraph of Chapter 5. "In conclusion..." Yes he states Army officers should be able to advise and assist, but in the non-violent phase, the Army are supporting the Police - Northern Ireland saw some 28+ years of "policy Primacy."

In fact the more I read and re-read Kitson, Paget, and even Samay Ram (Indian Army's Kitson) the more I believe the "80% political, 20% military" is merely a re-statement of Clausewitian observation.

Yep got it.....dosen't say special branch on my diagram.....also slide across the diagram....it says single commander system...means military commander does it not? now read page 92 which references chapter 3 and how the military has to be trained to do it because the regular government forces may not be able to do it. I forget the page numbers but he also says they (soldiers) should build schools and teach school and run clinics and build roads,etc. also check page 87 for "Drowning the revolution in babies milk".

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 11:58 AM

[QUOTE]Yep got it.....dosen't say special branch on my diagram.....also slide across the diagram....it says single commander system...means military commander does it not?
Page 55 says under the single commander case, the commander may be a military "though this need not necessarily be the case."
The provincial intelligence officer, is (under the British System, either Special Branch, or the Security Services. It is not military).
Morever he goes on to stress, that where a military officer IS in Command, his right hand man "might be a police officer."
Additionally, both these diagrams refer to "Provincial" Command levels, not National. Page 110 actually uses the example of a Police inspector running the intelligence cell at the District level. This is all classic UK COIN/CRW.
Yes, the Army runs or may help run intelligence operations, especially rurally, to enable police operations. It is Aid to the civil power, not substitution for it

now read page 92 which references chapter 3 and how the military has to be trained to do it because the regular government forces may not be able to do it.
That the Army sets up the C2 for the committee system, does not mean you have soldiers running schools or doing anything non-military, apart from standard security tasks. The summary on Page 81 is pretty good.

I forget the page numbers but he also says they (soldiers) should build schools and teach school and run clinics and build roads,etc. also check page 87 for "Drowning the revolution in babies milk".
Teaching school? Can't find it.
The Baby Milk thing reference someone else's work, not Kitson's, and is talking about co-option. In fact it merely means rewarding the behaviour your policy has sought to induce. EG: "You, the population, are responsible for helping keeping the peace."

davidbfpo

08-09-2009, 12:24 PM

Wilf,

Well I have the 1991 Faber re-print of the 1972 Edition, with a new introduction.

Just checked I have the 1972 edition; which rather ages me now. Actually I purchased the book before university and when the UK was in such a state some thought the army would mount a coup.

Slap,

I think your linked review: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27/054.html reflects the liberal / left view that the military wanted to play a far more active role internally. His writings were certainly controversial - in the UK - when written; note the context then was Northern Ireland primarily, plus the Miners Strike and more.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen

08-09-2009, 01:10 PM

His writings were certainly controversial - in the UK - when written; note the context then was Northern Ireland primarily, plus the Miners Strike and more.

Can't forget all the "Executive Actions" clowns, like Goldsmith and the Mayfair set. Something Margaret Thatcher put an end to. Army these days is actually quite liberal! Certainly not as right wing as it was when I joined.
Well I remember the Summer Riots and discussion of the Army's role in suppressing them. Problem with the Minors strike was there were quite a few son's of Minors in the army.

slapout9

08-10-2009, 04:52 AM

[QUOTE=slapout9;79583]
Page 55 says under the single commander case, the commander may be a military "though this need not necessarily be the case."
The provincial intelligence officer, is (under the British System, either Special Branch, or the Security Services. It is not military).
Morever he goes on to stress, that where a military officer IS in Command, his right hand man "might be a police officer."
Additionally, both these diagrams refer to "Provincial" Command levels, not National. Page 110 actually uses the example of a Police inspector running the intelligence cell at the District level. This is all classic UK COIN/CRW.
Yes, the Army runs or may help run intelligence operations, especially rurally, to enable police operations. It is Aid to the civil power, not substitution for it

That the Army sets up the C2 for the committee system, does not mean you have soldiers running schools or doing anything non-military, apart from standard security tasks. The summary on Page 81 is pretty good.

Teaching school? Can't find it.
The Baby Milk thing reference someone else's work, not Kitson's, and is talking about co-option. In fact it merely means rewarding the behaviour your policy has sought to induce. EG: "You, the population, are responsible for helping keeping the peace."

1-Page 79 covers teaching,setting up clinics,construction,and agricultural. As for the rest of your comments it just proves my point that Kitson said the Army must be trained and prepared to do everything, if civilian assets are available great to use them but you can not depend on that because of the unknown or deteriorating situation you may face. Which is why he wrote the book in the first place to help prepare the Army for such situations.
2- The Baby Milk reference is Kitson, since he was using it to demonstrate a point about how one might co-opt the enemy by using non-violent means.
3-But his best suggestions are perhaps found in his conclusion chapter. On page 199 where the he recommends that priority be given to training armies in the use of persuasion on a large scale and providing the psychological Operations specialists and units required.
4-And then page 200 "Those who are not capable of developing these characteristics are inclined to retreat into their Military shells and try not to notice what is going on around them. They adopt the 'fit soldier with a rifle theory', and long for the days when they can get back to 'proper soldiering' by which they mean preparing for the next-or last-war,as opposed to fighting the current one"

As I said there is no CvC in this book. CvC's definition or "War as the use of violence to impose one's will" is not compatible with the modern low intensity conflicts where subversion (mental violence) is so prevalent.

William F. Owen

08-10-2009, 06:27 AM

1-Page 79 covers teaching,setting up clinics,construction,and agricultural. As for the rest of your comments it just proves my point that Kitson said the Army must be trained and prepared to do everything, if civilian assets are available great to use them but you can not depend on that because of the unknown or deteriorating situation you may face. Which is why he wrote the book in the first place to help prepare the Army for such situations.
All this refers to the "preparatory phase." Nothing wrong with soldiers doing that, the same way you use soldiers for hurricane relief. It is a putting forth of policy - my beef with massive social programs, and not some remedial action, is that you are providing targets for the insurgent. If the bad guys burn down the school, where are you then. The social programs have got to run in context of the violence. They will not stop it, and they only might prevent it starting.

2- The Baby Milk reference is Kitson, since he was using it to demonstrate a point about how one might co-opt the enemy by using non-violent means. Look at the context. If you can, then there is no problem. What about the die hard jihadist?

"Those who are not capable of developing these characteristics are inclined to retreat into their Military shells and try not to notice what is going on around them. They adopt the 'fit soldier with a rifle theory', and long for the days when they can get back to 'proper soldiering' by which they mean preparing for the next-or last-war,as opposed to fighting the current one" Absolutely agree with that.

As I said there is no CvC in this book. CvC's definition or "War as the use of violence to impose one's will" is not compatible with the modern low intensity conflicts where subversion (mental violence) is so prevalent.
It's all CvC. That is exactly the point he is trying to put across. The political dimension to conflict. Subversion is the use of non-violent means (mostly). So what? Subversion is politics.