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MikeF
08-09-2009, 09:43 PM
After re-reading and thinking through the practical application of the complex problems a commander must deal with on the ground, I chose four exercises for discussion. I have either dealt with directly or been involved with each type of problem set, and there is no immediate solution. Additionally, from what I've read in past literature, there is not much guidance towards these issues. The intent is for council members to explain how they would deal with each problem. If there is interest, I will explain my solutions down the road.

Examples:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

Further explained...

1. Corrupt governance...As introduced by MarcT


Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?

2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The majority of literature suggests that one should bypass or ignore these areas during the initial clearance phases. I used to agree; however, after my last tour working mostly in these types of areas, I found the secondary and tertiary effects to be overwhelming towards the greater goal of resurrecting governance and building support for the host nation. For example, if the enemy ventures on a coercion campaign of beheadings, they are likely to kill the key sheiks, religious leaders, and other spheres of influence. Furthermore, the educated middle class typically chooses to flee. What is left is a headless society. So what do you do? If you attack early on into an enemy's stronghold, then you will likely take high casualties. If you wait, then the society could be significantly traumatized and take years or generations to mend.

3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.

If you're counterparts are part of the problem (i.e. Shias seeking revenge towards Sunnis or vice-versa), then your actions are extremely limited and there may be a negative reaction for every action you take (one step foward and two steps back). What do you do?

4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?

I hope these are helpful, and I look foward to y'alls discussion:D

v/r

Mike

jmm99
08-10-2009, 04:06 AM
Mike,

Great sequence of four questions, but which of the following four roles should we play:

1. Political officer of the incumbant goverenment, focused on the Political Struggle.

2. Military officer of the incumbant goverenment, focused on the Military Struggle.

3. Political officer of the assisting goverenment, focused on the Political Struggle.

4. Military officer of the assisting goverenment, focused on the Military Struggle.

How one deals with a problem could differ significantly based on Where am I ? and What am I ?

So, is this really a 16-sided exercise set ?

Regards

Mike

marct
08-10-2009, 02:29 PM
So, is this really a 16-sided exercise set ?

Why limit it? What about the insurgent groups? What about civilian, sub-state groups such as a tribal lineage?

I'm not trying to be difficult here, well, more than I usually am ;), but one of the dangers of dealing with simulations lies in the rules of the game / problem-set that define who may and may not be actors.

George L. Singleton
08-10-2009, 02:40 PM
Mike:

In Afghanistan and Pakistan,where in years past I lived and served, the practice of "backshees" [my phonetic spelling???] is that all, everyone, gets pay offs and kick backs for and from whatever they do vocationally.

This said, and it is true, how do you or we differentiate between everyday grassroots corruption and high level corruption, which corruption is true on all sides, the non-Taliban governance officials as well as the Taliban?

More critique, disagreement, whatever on this topic could be helpful to one and all as the advertised effort to clean up corruption to me seems highly unlikely to be achievable due to these folks hundreds of years of precedent of instutitionalized corruption, corruption as defined by a Westerner, job security and old age pension set asides as defined by locals over there from bottom to top.


After re-reading and thinking through the practical application of the complex problems a commander must deal with on the ground, I chose four exercises for discussion. I have either dealt with directly or been involved with each type of problem set, and there is no immediate solution. Additionally, from what I've read in past literature, there is not much guidance towards these issues. The intent is for council members to explain how they would deal with each problem. If there is interest, I will explain my solutions down the road.

Examples:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

Further explained...

1. Corrupt governance...As introduced by MarcT



2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The majority of literature suggests that one should bypass or ignore these areas during the initial clearance phases. I used to agree; however, after my last tour working mostly in these types of areas, I found the secondary and tertiary effects to be overwhelming towards the greater goal of resurrecting governance and building support for the host nation. For example, if the enemy ventures on a coercion campaign of beheadings, they are likely to kill the key sheiks, religious leaders, and other spheres of influence. Furthermore, the educated middle class typically chooses to flee. What is left is a headless society. So what do you do? If you attack early on into an enemy's stronghold, then you will likely take high casualties. If you wait, then the society could be significantly traumatized and take years or generations to mend.

3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.

If you're counterparts are part of the problem (i.e. Shias seeking revenge towards Sunnis or vice-versa), then your actions are extremely limited and there may be a negative reaction for every action you take (one step foward and two steps back). What do you do?

4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?

I hope these are helpful, and I look foward to y'alls discussion:D

v/r

Mike

marct
08-10-2009, 02:43 PM
Really good problem-sets, Mike.


So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?

Okay, very rough stab at the simplest one.

First, assume that you cannot resolve / reconcile the grievances.

Second, assume that there is some cultural recognized and accepted form of reconciliation and resolution.

Third, ask what it is.

Or, in other words, and to modify a core US Army meme - "Ask, don't tell" :D!

Why is this simple?

(NB: I didn't say "easy" ;))

All cultures have some form of reconciliation mechanism which involves the use or threat of violence and some form of ritualized pattern of action / event to stop violence. Sometimes there are multiple ritualized event sequences fighting for cultural dominance.

Because these conflict / grievance resolution forms vary significantly from culture to culture (and often within cultures), you need to find one or two that match with the vast majority of the current players, whether or not they match with your perception of how to do it. This latter point is the key - you cannot impose a solution on "them", they have to evolve one that meets your minimal requirements. This can lead to some pretty strange mechanisms (e.g. cricket games were used in the Trobriands as a substitute for raid / counter-raid, i.e. clan feud, events).

Now comes the truly hard part: once you have worked with them to establish a local solution, you have to sell it on three fronts:


MNF forces have to be convinced that it will "work";
Local groups have to agree to enforce it; and
The HN government has to at least officially tolerate it.

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
08-10-2009, 06:38 PM
Thanks for the initial responses. I'll provide a bit more of my train of thought on this thread. I've spent some time this summer travelling and talking to junior leaders with little or no combat experience. I was struck by the gap between what I've seen in combat and their perceptions of combat from training.

I enjoyed reading The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa: With E. D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift" (Paperback) (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226080935/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_1/183-0265765-2897402?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_r=16V3EXNVDWPHPCZDH316&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_p=304485901&pf_rd_i=0895293234). IMO, it can serve as a good primer for a leader preparing for deployment, however, it is simply a book about the different ways to do a raid. It does not cover the more difficult, "wicked" problems that many face on the ground.

So, I thought I'd try this out and see if it is helpful. If so, then I may consolidate it into an essay for SWJ. I would like council members to respond from their vantage point- this is not a simulation :eek:. If you're an academic (cough, cough Marc ;)) tell us what you would recommend to a ground commander as a SME advisor. If you are military, tell us how you handled these scenarios in the past.

Obviously, there are no right answers. The initial post from Marc and George Singleton reflect that. In the end, a commander will use his intuition and METT-TC, but I'm hoping that some of the answers here may help a young commander on the ground sorting through the business.

During my time at NPS, one of the best exercises I joined in had a small group of military and academic professionals. The military included SF, Seals, Navy EOD, and Regular Army with combat experience in Iraq, Afghan, Phillipines, Colombia, and Central America. The Academics ranged from various fields in social sciences plus a couple computer and Operations Research dudes. Sometimes our individual experiences blinded us towards finding an appropriate solution, and sometimes our unique experiences allowed us to provide the best solution, but overall, the discussions led to better insight for everyone involved.

So with that, I'll be quiet and let y'all speak.

v/r

Mike

jmm99
08-10-2009, 09:07 PM
Being a descendant of simple thinking CFM types, I thought 16 sides were enough - that using up the fingers and most of the toes.

I admit to thinking about Vietnam, where a mirror image could have been built up - if one accepts that NLF was autonomous from GNV (not I), you would have had NLF (as host) and GNV (as assisting) - not an insurgency in their eyes, but unconventional warfare (NLF as guerrilla force in occupied area) in a Resistence War (their term).

And, there, you could throw in the paramilitary Saigon gangsters; and the two paramilitary religious groups; and the Buddists and Generals for a bit of extra political flavor. So, yeh, reality is very complicated, but let's do the basic drills first.

So, now I have to pick a role (note there are no lawyers in my four roles) - and see if I have anything intelligent to say.

Remember the Windmill, where we kept it simple; as opposed to the Plaines where we made it complicated for ourselves. :)

MikeF
08-11-2009, 04:34 AM
Mike:

In Afghanistan and Pakistan,where in years past I lived and served, the practice of "backshees" [my phonetic spelling???] is that all, everyone, gets pay offs and kick backs for and from whatever they do vocationally.

This said, and it is true, how do you or we differentiate between everyday grassroots corruption and high level corruption, which corruption is true on all sides, the non-Taliban governance officials as well as the Taliban?

More critique, disagreement, whatever on this topic could be helpful to one and all as the advertised effort to clean up corruption to me seems highly unlikely to be achievable due to these folks hundreds of years of precedent of instutitionalized corruption, corruption as defined by a Westerner, job security and old age pension set asides as defined by locals over there from bottom to top.

George,

It took four tours to the Middle East to absorb what you are saying and comprehend the true limits of my own abilities as a ground force commander. My initial questions were intentionally weighted to encourage response and debate amoung other members of the council. I'm pretty sure that I'm not the only one that has been in such a dilemma:o.

With that said, on the ground level, when one is supposed to "control" their environment while working within the constraints of indigenous culture, to include bribery, pay-offs, kick-backs, and simple corruption, I would suspect that a commander must determine an appropriate acceptable level.

When the local government surpasses the norm, actions must be taken. For example, in Diyala, Iraq (circa 2006-2007) Iraqi Army and local police units were being used by the elected government to cleanse the Sunni populace. Simultaneously, the Sunnis sided with al Qaeda as to check the government. Both sides were wrong- they were embattled in a civil war.

We were simply trying to maintain the peace.

I suppose that is what makes these examples interesting- Americans intervening in internal affairs trying to provide a least-bad solution.

I'm not sure if this applies to Afghanistan, but my intuition tells me that many of the issues in Afghan are Mullah Omar v/s Harmad Karzai.

With that, I'll wait for y'alls response.

v/r

Mike

MikeF
08-11-2009, 06:48 AM
I've struggled during the past two years to accurately describe our small portion during the "Surge." I'm finally starting to tell the story....This is the beginning of my entrance into the realm of wicked, irregular, or undefined problems..... Telling this tale has been extremely difficult for me.

I hope others will continue to share their experiences and answer the first set of questions so that we can all learn a bit...

v/r

Mike

Boss, what do you want me to do now?

Late May 2007, Zaganiyah, Diyala River Valley, Iraq

We watched the video over and over again. Today should have been a day of relief. After sixty days of siege, fighting through twelve attacks a day, sorting through hundreds of deep-buried improved explosive devices (DBIEDs), houses rigged to blow (HBIEDs), and suicide bombers, our persistance paid off. Last night, we killed the primary bomb-maker in the Diyala River Valley.

Intuitively, we knew violence would go down. The enemy's ability to disrupt or block the roads would be severly hampered by this kill. Soon, I could reopen the only ground line of commucation (LOC) leading back to the outside world. We would no longer have to rely solely on air assets for mobility and resupply. I would continue to put the squeeze on Ali Latif al Zuharie, the regional al Qaeda leader of this end of the Diyala River Valley. Killing his sole bomb-maker is the equivilent of taking out his star quarterback.

The siege was working. Continued pressure on the remaining insurgents would result in their destruction, surrender, or eggressing into safer areas. My area of operations was quickly becoming a non-safe area for those that continued to rebel or revolt violently from the elected government. The Islamic State of Iraq would soon dissolve from this area. Reading off the COIN playbook, I would begin restoring local indigenious security, essential services, governance, resettling displaced families, and arbitrating tribal, clan, and family reconciliation.

Today should have been a good day, but my boss and I sat transfixed at the images playing out on the computer screen. Frame by frame, I pointed out terrain features verifying the location. LTC Poppas, my squadron commander, would take a copy back to show the Brigade and Division Commanders. They would offer assets, support, and guidance, but at the end of the day, I would be responsible for determine the appropriate course of action and execution.

I thought that I had seen it all, but for some reason, during this deployment, every time you solved one problem, two more popped up. The situation became messier, more confusing, and more wicked every time I pulled back a layer of the onion. During the Thunder Runs, I sped through the Republican Guards last stand brilliantly firing tank rounds and machine gun fire to dissolve any resistance. This time, we fought through the trenches in Turki Village throwing grenades back and forth to neutralize an al Qaeda training camp. We fought through villages abadoned from al Qaeda's ethnic cleansing. We dealt with regular war, irregular war, and everything in between. I thought that I had seen it all, but it all hit home when we watched this video.

Maybe I observed too many deaths. Maybe I lost too many of my own men. Maybe not.

During this time in Iraq, everyone became numb to death. I remember back in 2003 when we first saw the beheadings of Daniel Pearl. I felt sick, but now, the beheading videos seemed normal. This time was different.

After we killed the bomb-maker, during the sensitive site exploitation, we uncovered numerous videos of his accomplishments. First, we found the pornography. Pornography may seem a paradox to your purist beliefs of al Qaeda, but he was no Islamist. Honestly, in my four tours, I've only met three true Muslims. This man was a former Ba'athest explosive expert under Saddam currently working for the highest bidder. We watched hours of him and his wife on tape trying to emulate the sexual exploits of Pamela Anderson's epic ventures. So much for the purity of the Jihad. Next, we found the attacks overrunning the Zaganiyah security forces from 10 November 2006- ten days to the day when Alpha troop left Zag. Finally, we watch the video. This video was different.

It started with the capture of one of our local Iraqi Army brothers. He was a Shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town trapped in a zero-sum perpetual feud with the Sunnis from Zaganiyah. The soldier was beaten and drug into the town's square: the cemetary 100 meters from my current patrol base. The entire town of Zaganiyah crowded the area to watch the spectacle. Protected by a black mask covering his face, Ali Latif al Zuharie served as the prosecutor, judge, and jury.

"For crimes against humanity, for disobeying Allah and supporting the infidel backed government, this man is sentenced to death." demanded Ali Latif.

"Allah Achbar, Allah Achbar (God is Great, God is Great)," the crowd cheered.

Ali Latif presented his sword and beheaded the soldier, and the crowd succombed in ecstacy declaring how great god was as the soldier's head flopped to the ground.

I stopped the video. I could no longer take watching my neighbors engage in such tragedy. I knew these people. I spent time with them. I drank tea and smoked cigarettes with them. I cried and laughed with them. I thought I knew them. I no longer knew anything.

"Boss, what do you want me to do now" I asked my squadron commander.

"Mike, I don't know." he replied.

It was the first time that I ever found LTC Andrew Poppas indecisive.

Ron Humphrey
08-11-2009, 07:23 AM
A,B,C,Z :confused:

Honestly the truth is you may find few aside from the august (said old guys:D) who feel even marginally up to the task of giving you the type of directions which you would go in the given areas. It's rather difficult to truly face the tasks we (the American people) have asked you guys to undertake although perhaps that's the point. If we're not ready to accept and give greater consideration to the facts as they may well be on the ground before you are sent in then there will likely be quite a few important questions which have to be answered on the ground at a much higher price than might have been otherwise.

So for now I like others will wait to absorb the wisdom of others in helping to direct you down the path and hopefully learn quite a bit in the process.

ps: in reference to your last post

Did you confront any of those you recognized from the video and when(if) they answered was there a notable shame or was it more like someone talking about a dream they had?

MikeF
08-11-2009, 08:04 AM
Thanks for taking the time to read the thread Ron.


ps: in reference to your last post

Did you confront any of those you recognized from the video and when(if) they answered was there a notable shame or was it more like someone talking about a dream they had?

Eventually, I'll tell the whole story. My initial reaction was that everyone in that town was simply evil and needed to die. After I let the anger pass, I tried a tactic that would typically be frowned upon in a cultural awareness class on Iraq- I used shame.

I brought every leader from that town into our patrol base, and I forced them to watch the video. I hovered over them as they cried and swore "Wallah, Wallah (I swear, I swear)." After the video ended, I told them that I was disgusted to be around them, they were not true Muslims, and they would probably burn in hell.

Then, I told them that they had no right to be around me or my men, and I kicked them out...

I suppose that is probably a politically incorrect answer, but it worked. I was able to gain more wasta (power) over them in subsequent talks.


A,B,C,Z :confused:

Honestly the truth is you may find few aside from the august (said old guys:D) who feel even marginally up to the task of giving you the type of directions which you would go in the given areas. It's rather difficult to truly face the tasks we (the American people) have asked you guys to undertake although perhaps that's the point. If we're not ready to accept and give greater consideration to the facts as they may well be on the ground before you are sent in then there will likely be quite a few important questions which have to be answered on the ground at a much higher price than might have been otherwise.

So for now I like others will wait to absorb the wisdom of others in helping to direct you down the path and hopefully learn quite a bit in the process.

That is the point. It is important to remember that my company was only a small player during the "Surge" working as a supporting effort in denied areas. This thread is not supposed to be about our deeds; I was simply able to start telling the story. Some commanders have told their story (Neil Smith pops to the top of my head), and I'm hoping that others will share their experiences so that we can all learn.

I'm sure that my brothers in Afghanistan are currently facing similar situations or worse, and the least I can do from my armchair is discuss how I worked through my issues.

SWJ is one forum where we can discuss relevant issues in a non-partisan manner. The only issue surfaces when some try to replace theory with practice. Every think tank wannabe has an opinion until you talk facts. I hope to avoid that.

v/r

Mike

davidbfpo
08-11-2009, 10:09 AM
Mike F,

Thanks for those posts on the dilemmas and one way to move ahead.

Similar, less violent dilemma in Afghanistan the other day: http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/08/10/u-s-paratroopers-face-afghan-mob/

Faced by rioters, curiously with the ANP giving support, 82nd Airborne exit a village instead of conducting searches. One wonders what the patrol commander did when he got back to the FOB - with the eight ANP.

davidbfpo

marct
08-11-2009, 03:18 PM
Hi Mike,

Thanks for sharing that story. As to your solution being politically incorrect, it probably is but, you know what? I would have done the same thing. Not to have done something on that order would have been taken as a sign of both weakness and lack of, hmmm, "constancy in service" (or to a goal) is probably the best phrase. There is a concept of what almost might be called "Fate" that runs through much of the region - as in one if fated to do X, Y and Z. This tends to move those so touched to act outside of the everyday cultural expectations and touch the "sacred". BTW, it's also what a lot of the AQ crowd have been drawing on. You tagged into that cultural narrative.

Back to your earlier question of what advice I'd give, really my previous post contained it. I can't really give more specific advice without actually being there and seeing the situation :wry:.

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
08-11-2009, 05:48 PM
As to your solution being politically incorrect, it probably is but, you know what? I would have done the same thing. Not to have done something on that order would have been taken as a sign of both weakness and lack of, hmmm, "constancy in service" (or to a goal) is probably the best phrase. There is a concept of what almost might be called "Fate" that runs through much of the region - as in one if fated to do X, Y and Z. This tends to move those so touched to act outside of the everyday cultural expectations and touch the "sacred". BTW, it's also what a lot of the AQ crowd have been drawing on. You tagged into that cultural narrative.

1. From the feedback that I've received from various junior leaders across the board, it seems that many are confusing being nice for being respectful. The damn phrase of "winning the hearts and minds" is being translated into never upset anyone. That is simply wrong, and I've seen too many soldiers get killed from those mistakes.

2. Never say never. We soldiers, not anthropologist. We use our understanding of cultural awareness to accomplish our mission not write an extensive ethonography on that nation's culture. Many times I learned through blunt trauma, but I did learn that you should never rule out any tools in your kitbag.

3. Relationship building. We operated in and around Zaganiyah for nearly nine months before this incident. I developed extensive relationships with both the Sunni and Shia tribes. I never took sides. Right before we entered Zaganiyah, I had the local IA commander arrested b/c he was commiting his own autrocities and feuling the local civil war (he was a shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town). I tried my best to stay neutral and only take action when necessary. Plus, I rarely raised my voice. So, when the appropriate time came to do so and show anger and disgust, it was respected.

4. In reality, at least in Diyala Province, yelling is the first part of any negotiation. It usually works like this...

1/3- Offended parties yell at each other in heated, exaggerated shows of emotion.
1/3- Arbitrator (Typically sheik or imam) calms everyone down and the discuss a reasonable solution
1/3 - Hugs, Man kisses, chai, and cigarettes. Everyone celebrates.

It is an odd way to do business, but it works for them.

v/r

Mike

marct
08-11-2009, 06:13 PM
Hi Mike,


1. From the feedback that I've received from various junior leaders across the board, it seems that many are confusing being nice for being respectful. The damn phrase of "winning the hearts and minds" is being translated into never upset anyone. That is simply wrong, and I've seen too many soldiers get killed from those mistakes.

I've seen grad students sent to mental institutions trying to "never upset anyone" and worrying about the "inherent power imbalance between the ethnographer and the informant" :wry:.


2. Never say never. We soldiers, not anthropologist. We use our understanding of cultural awareness to accomplish our mission not write an extensive ethonography on that nation's culture. Many times I learned through blunt trauma, but I did learn that you should never rule out any tools in your kitbag.

Agreed and, BTW, that holds for doing good ethnographies as well. Even though our (Anthropologists) mission is to write ethnographies, never say never is a damn good motto for us, too, and too few use it :mad:.


3. Relationship building. We operated in and around Zaganiyah for nearly nine months before this incident. I developed extensive relationships with both the Sunni and Shia tribes. I never took sides. Right before we entered Zaganiyah, I had the local IA commander arrested b/c he was commiting his own autrocities and feuling the local civil war (he was a shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town). I tried my best to stay neutral and only take action when necessary. Plus, I rarely raised my voice. So, when the appropriate time came to do so and show anger and disgust, it was respected.

Yup. I've seen wanna-be ethnographers (some with tenure) go into areas and tell the locals what they "should" be doing. Thankfully, I've never had to work under any of these twits, but they are there. Most cultures recognize everything that we would call a "relationship" (there actually aren't that many different forms), even though they rate them differently. Sounds like you tagged into one that they recognized pretty well.


4. In reality, at least in Diyala Province, yelling is the first part of any negotiation. It usually works like this...

1/3- Offended parties yell at each other in heated, exaggerated shows of emotion.
1/3- Arbitrator (Typically sheik or imam) calms everyone down and the discuss a reasonable solution
1/3 - Hugs, Man kisses, chai, and cigarettes. Everyone celebrates.

Sounds like my wife's version of conflict resolution :D! So, the key, then, lies in the arbitrator position. It sounds like you put yourself in the place of the arbitrator in a way they weren't expecting.

Cheers,

Marc

Greyhawk
08-11-2009, 08:20 PM
Mike F,

Thanks for those posts on the dilemmas and one way to move ahead.

Similar, less violent dilemma in Afghanistan the other day: http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/08/10/u-s-paratroopers-face-afghan-mob/

Faced by rioters, curiously with the ANP giving support, 82nd Airborne exit a village instead of conducting searches. One wonders what the patrol commander did when he got back to the FOB - with the eight ANP.

davidbfpoI submit the 'on the bright side' explanation that "As ugly as it was, we were able to confirm there is anti-coalition sentiment in Tokchi'' as one of the great military quotes of all time.

Less off-topic, MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

Kiwigrunt
08-11-2009, 11:48 PM
...MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

I'd buy it.

MikeF
08-12-2009, 03:57 PM
Less off-topic, MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

Eventually, I'd like to write a book, but it'll probably take several years. I'm going to allow some more time and space to allow me to get it right. For now, I'll publish an occasional paper on SWJ and comment on threads to try and provide some assistance to the younger guys out actually doing the fighting.

Additionally, I send most of my writings to my former O's and NCO's. We were very close (Band of Brothers like), and they fact check my work to make sure I get the details and sequence of events correct. Plus, they keep reminded me of how awesome they were and want their story told:D. In fact, that will probably be the best part of the story- the people involved to include our final IA Company.


I'd buy it.

Thanks KiwiGrunt.

Back to this thread, I'm still hoping some of the other military guys will comment on how they have tackled these problems in the past.

v/r

Mike

MikeF
08-12-2009, 08:49 PM
I've seen grad students sent to mental institutions trying to "never upset anyone" and worrying about the "inherent power imbalance between the ethnographer and the informant" :wry:.

Agreed and, BTW, that holds for doing good ethnographies as well. Even though our (Anthropologists) mission is to write ethnographies, never say never is a damn good motto for us, too, and too few use it

Yup. I've seen wanna-be ethnographers (some with tenure) go into areas and tell the locals what they "should" be doing. Thankfully, I've never had to work under any of these twits, but they are there. Most cultures recognize everything that we would call a "relationship" (there actually aren't that many different forms), even though they rate them differently. Sounds like you tagged into one that they recognized pretty well.

Hi Marc,

In grad school, I was fascinated by the subject of anthropology, but I always thought it a bit presumptious that one could believe that they could penetrate a society without making waves:confused:.

It reminds me of all the times that we had embedded reporters within our unit. Guys would put on all their tricked out "kits" around the photographers and pose hoping to get the "GI Joe" photo-shot. I imagine that it is the same for villagers when an anthropologist comes to town. Some will posture, others will exaggerate....In the end, the visitor becomes a bit of amusement outside their normal day to day life.



Sounds like my wife's version of conflict resolution :D! So, the key, then, lies in the arbitrator position. It sounds like you put yourself in the place of the arbitrator in a way they weren't expecting.

Good analogy. I only wish that dealing with wives was as simple as dealing with tribal sheiks. At least the locals are from earth. Women are from Venus:D

Best,

Mike

Ron Humphrey
08-12-2009, 09:04 PM
Good analogy. I only wish that dealing with wives was as simple as dealing with tribal sheiks. At least the locals are from earth. Women are from Venus:D

Best,

Mike

Good thing they are too
If we could figure them out then we have to go back to arguing with neighbors to keep from getting bored. :D

marct
08-12-2009, 09:45 PM
Hi Mike,


In grad school, I was fascinated by the subject of anthropology, but I always thought it a bit presumptious that one could believe that they could penetrate a society without making waves:confused:.

Any Anthropologist who says that is lying through his/her teeth :D! Of course we're going to make wave - the question is are they big ones or small ones? Personally, I'm in favour of really, really small ones. Basically, the best tactic once you are in the field that I've found is find an analog and learn to act in a very roughly similar manner. The people we're studying may or may not know what we do (they should, but that's another story...), but as long as they have a pretty good idea of why we are there, how we are going to operate and what we are going to do in return for the information we get, I'm pretty cool with it.

We do, if we are doing a lot of fieldwork with the same group over a long time, end up more as members (often absent) of that community - in effect, we go more native than most others, but that keeps all of us sane.


It reminds me of all the times that we had embedded reporters within our unit. Guys would put on all their tricked out "kits" around the photographers and pose hoping to get the "GI Joe" photo-shot. I imagine that it is the same for villagers when an anthropologist comes to town. Some will posture, others will exaggerate....In the end, the visitor becomes a bit of amusement outside their normal day to day life.

I've seen that when some of the sociologists I've run across try to do ethnographic fieldwork. Probably the best analog would be a DoS dweeb who flies in for a couple of two day staged tours and then "knows all about the situation". Pathetic! I actually ahd one guy tell me he could get a complete social structural model of organizations by spending no more than 15 hours actually in them :rolleyes:!


Good analogy. I only wish that dealing with wives was as simple as dealing with tribal sheiks. At least the locals are from earth. Women are from Venus

Having said that, I won't repeat what my wife said when she found out :D!

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
08-12-2009, 10:32 PM
Hi Marc,



Having said that, I won't repeat what my wife said when she found out :D!
Marc

Time to buy flowers, jewelry, chocolate, and find a baby-sitter so you can take her out this weekend:D.

Back to small wars stuff...

One form of infiltration that may even surpass the ability to speak the language is mannerisms..

If you can learn to sit the way locals sit, hold your cigarette the way the locals do it, etc...In essence, learn to mimick your counterparts, then everyone feels comfortable. Form is often as important as function. Fortunately, this revelation works just as well in visiting local bars in new cities:D.

Back to your dillema...

Just blame all your issues on the SWJ Council-we're a bad influence. Tell your wife that you have to deal with us for your job, we're a bunch of unrefined thugs, and you just wish that you could spend every moment with her:cool: Good luck with that one.


v/r

Mike

marct
08-12-2009, 10:54 PM
Hi Mike,


One form of infiltration that may even surpass the ability to speak the language is manuerisms..

If you can learn to sit the way locals sit, hold your cigarette the way the locals do it, etc...In essence, learn to mimick your counterparts, then everyone feels comfortable. Form is often as important as function. Fortunately, this revelation works just as well in visiting local bars in new cities:D.

Yupper, works every time. It's one of the reasons why I recommend to my students that they take some acting classes :D! As to bars, we used to send our students out to bars and clubs all the time to do observational work (less now, they're younger than they used to be :wry:).


Back to your dillema...

Just blame all your issues on the SWJ Council-we're a bad influence. Tell your wife that you have to deal with us for your job, we're a bunch of unrefined thugs, and you just wish that you could spend every moment with her:cool: Good luck with that one.

Hmmm, well, I'm cooking dinner tonight, so that will have to do.....

Cheers,

Marc

Dayuhan
08-13-2009, 03:25 AM
Any Anthropologist who says that is lying through his/her teeth :D! Of course we're going to make wave - the question is are they big ones or small ones? Personally, I'm in favour of really, really small ones. Basically, the best tactic once you are in the field that I've found is find an analog and learn to act in a very roughly similar manner. The people we're studying may or may not know what we do (they should, but that's another story...), but as long as they have a pretty good idea of why we are there, how we are going to operate and what we are going to do in return for the information we get, I'm pretty cool with it.

We do, if we are doing a lot of fieldwork with the same group over a long time, end up more as members (often absent) of that community - in effect, we go more native than most others, but that keeps all of us sane.


We could probably trade some amusing stories on this score. I live in an indigenous community that is very heavily studied; we always seem to have anthropologists and other social scientists in residence or passing through. In many cases one wonders why they come, as they seem to know what they will conclude before they even arrive! The community, of course, has its own ways of coping with being studied, and in many cases there are some truly hilarious comparative discussions of the methods, personalities, and assumptions of various researchers... is there a field of study in which those studied study those who study them?

marct
08-13-2009, 12:40 PM
Hi Dayuhan,


We could probably trade some amusing stories on this score. I live in an indigenous community that is very heavily studied; we always seem to have anthropologists and other social scientists in residence or passing through. In many cases one wonders why they come, as they seem to know what they will conclude before they even arrive!

I suspect we could trade some truly humourous stories :D!

As to why they come, there are some interesting structures operating in academic Anthropology. For example, certain universities "own" certain regions (that's the term I've heard!), and send their students there. Those are mainly the larger/richer universities, so the smaller ones have to make do with studying "sub-cultures" :wry:.


The community, of course, has its own ways of coping with being studied, and in many cases there are some truly hilarious comparative discussions of the methods, personalities, and assumptions of various researchers... is there a field of study in which those studied study those who study them?

Yup, although there really isn't a name for it. You might want to talk with the local community and see if they would be interested in publishing a book about it :D!

Cheers,

Marc

marct
08-13-2009, 01:31 PM
One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

1. Corrupt governance

Governance, at least the forms and functions of it, are not universal. The example Mike quoted from me was set up in a very particular way, specifically that the form and functions of local governance did not meet local idealized expectations or satisficing levels (they're different, but that example was set to not meet either).

Now a lot of COIN / SFA / FID doctrine is based around an axiomatic assumption that actions taken in the field need to reinforce the "legitimacy" of the HN government. This "legitimacy" was under attack in the example not because of foreign or insurgent actions, but because of the actions of a legally appointed governor.

Now, I put legitimacy in quotes, because what makes actions legitimate is culture bound (even in the simplistic FM 3-24 definition of culture). Elections, "snout counting" to quote one of my favorite alternate history authors, is one particular form of legitimacy, but only one. It relies on the pre-existence of a number of factors including, but not limited to, literacy (at least amongst those holding the franchise), a "belief in the system", and an economic structure that allows people to have the leisure time to actually think about the issues.

A lot of these pre-conditions are not generally available in some of the areas where COIN / SFA / FID is taking place. So, in order to solve the "problem", at least the example problem I gave, you have to do two things. First, you have to discover what constitutes "legitimacy" at the lived, cultural level - that's why I gave the answer I gave to question #4 (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=79665&postcount=5)). Now, in order to discover what constitutes "legitimacy", you have to get rid of "snout counting" as an axiomatic assumption. It is not always an indicator of legitimacy. In some cases, it may well be an indicator of social theatre operating to "validate" what the actual systems of legitimacy have already decided will happen; think of it as Oberammergau (http://www.oberammergau-passionsspiele.de/passion-play-oberammergau.html?gclid=CLew-9fYoJwCFdVL5QodUzNWdQ) on steroids ;).

So, that's point 1. Point 2 is that you have to figure out what is the "legitimate" way of getting rid of or modifying the behaviour of the local governor. And, as a note, you have to do this without assuming "snout counting" and its precursors as the basis for legitimacy - in effect, forget the democratic social thatre known as "mass protests" or "impeachment hearings". The Mosul Case Study had some interesting observations on culturally appropriate and legitimate ways of removing officials (basically, using personal contact networks to show how the offical was a danger to other power brokers). Basically, you have to figure out how the local political power system operates - the real system, not the formality which may have been imposed - and use it.

2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.

3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.

In general, tactics for dealing with this problem are similar to those for dealing with the first problem. The primary area of difference lies in motivation. The first thing to find out is how the individuals view their "office" - how is it connected in a semantic web of meaning, and how is this web reinforced. As a simple example, police forces in many areas of the world assume that bribery is a basic part (perq) of their office. This assumption is built in at the highest level via HR policies on remuneration and other perqs. If this is the case, then the best tactic is to attack the root cause (low/infrequent pay, poor perqs, etc.) while, at the same time, increasing the sense of professional pride. The basic idea is that you make holding the office valuable in a way that is legitimate and acceptable, and then create an organizational / professional culture that is aimed at protecting access to that office.

If we are dealing with the army officer who is using his office as an inquisitor (aka death squads), then you are back to a political solution along the lines of question #1.

4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

I already gave my answer to this, but the general rule is always ask to find out what they perceive is happening and how they would solve it. Find a local solution that meets your requirements, and then "sell it".

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
08-15-2009, 12:01 AM
Hi Marc,

For the most part, I agreed with your last comments, specifically on our pre-conditioned values, beliefs, and norms that we all must learn to relax when dealing with a foreign indigenous population. I find myself constantly struggling to remember that normal for me is not normal for others. I will take issue with one and use a current example to try and articulate.


One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.


My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.

Taliban threaten to chop off voters' fingers in Afghan election (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6031177/Taliban-threaten-to-chop-off-voters-fingers-in-Afghan-election.html)

Ben Farmer
The Guardian


Insurgents in southern Afghanistan told locals that fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.

"We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off," a commander warned villagers in the south of the country, the New York Times reported.

The Taliban ruling council led by Mullah Omar has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.

The new threat of mutilation appeared to rule out hopes that lower level Taliban leaders would call a temporary ceasefire to allow the vote to proceed without violence.


To the rational western actor, we would assume that the Taliban would simply allow the people to vote. If the Taliban won, then we would be in a difficult conundrum. Instead, the Taliban is using another measure of coersion to control the populace through fear.

Just another example of what the boys are dealing with.

v/r

Mike

marct
08-15-2009, 01:48 PM
Hi Mike,


My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.

I agree that it is a nasty situation. Going back to how I was parsing things out for a moment, I would argue that AQI was using the first model - destroying the "traditional structures" via selective assassination and forced grafting by marriage into their remnants. There's a definite tipping point in that type of tactic, as the Anbar Awakening showed, where those groups will revolt against the "insurgent" activities (the principle is called hysteresis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hysteresis)). In biological terms (sorry, my head is wrapped up in them right now... :wry:), they are doing a forced mutation by applying stringent selection pressure.

What I find fascinating about the Taliban threat to cut off fingers is that they are only talking about fingers. I know that probably sounds callous, but in their view, voting is an act of treason and I am surprised that they aren't harsher in their threats.

MikeF
08-15-2009, 07:56 PM
I agree that it is a nasty situation. Going back to how I was parsing things out for a moment, I would argue that AQI was using the first model - destroying the "traditional structures" via selective assassination and forced grafting by marriage into their remnants. There's a definite tipping point in that type of tactic, as the Anbar Awakening showed, where those groups will revolt against the "insurgent" activities (the principle is called hysteresis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hysteresis)). In biological terms (sorry, my head is wrapped up in them right now... :wry:), they are doing a forced mutation by applying stringent selection pressure.

What I find fascinating about the Taliban threat to cut off fingers is that they are only talking about fingers. I know that probably sounds callous, but in their view, voting is an act of treason and I am surprised that they aren't harsher in their threats.

To add on to this point, I would suggest that those actions "sometimes" lead to a Tipping Point. Other times, the events can lead to what sociologist term anomie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomie), and there is a breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values. One example include when agrarian societies moved into the big cities. Rapid changes in economics, family support structures, and daily life cause a relaxation or a sense of loss to how one used to view the world.

Getting back to the initial example, what the ground force commander is trying to determine is how and when to intervene. On one hand, he must try to respect the local's governmental structures, societal values, "ways of doing business," etc...On the other hand, sometimes, he has to make a judgement call...i.e. It's not okay to cut off your neighbor's head, hand, or finger.

It's a fine line, and there are no easy answers. Additionally, it is important to realize in my personal experiences that I shared (and some of the current situations in Afghanistan), US forces are not doing SFA or FID. They are unilaterally occupying using COIN principles as a matter of triage to stop an unacceptable level of violence. Later, we transitioned to FID once we had established security. This point is sometimes overlooked in the scope of the bigger picture.

v/r

Mike

Bob's World
08-15-2009, 10:05 PM
Tactical problems are always hard, regardless of the type of warfare one is engaged in. This is the hard fact of the life of the combat soldier.

Doubly frustrating is that nagging question that is also always there, regardless of the form of combat, of if your hard efforts and sacrifice have in any way contributed to the ultimate "good" that brought you to this harsh place to begin with. Sadly, far too often, history shows that often effort and lives are squandered on efforts that contribute little to that ultimate success.

So, as to Mike's questions:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.

I have opinions that I will share on all of these, but figured I'd see what others had to offer first.

Ron Humphrey
08-16-2009, 03:09 AM
Tactical problems are always hard, regardless of the type of warfare one is engaged in. This is the hard fact of the life of the combat soldier.

Doubly frustrating is that nagging question that is also always there, regardless of the form of combat, of if your hard efforts and sacrifice have in any way contributed to the ultimate "good" that brought you to this harsh place to begin with. Sadly, far too often, history shows that often effort and lives are squandered on efforts that contribute little to that ultimate success.

So, as to Mike's questions:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.

I have opinions that I will share on all of these, but figured I'd see what others had to offer first.

It has been a constant frustration to me how often we fail to follow the adage know yourself before trying to know the enemy.

Put more bluntly can anyone point to any given society ours included within which all of 4 of those don't exist in some form.

And more importantly how they are addressed differently not only in different nations but even in different cities/towns/etc.

If we can accept at the reality of their existence and as they exist in a much more familiar form thus the reasons for various approaches will be easier to actually understand; then maybe we can ask the more important questions like why, where, and how to address them somewhere else.

-Ron

marct
08-16-2009, 03:03 PM
Hi Mike,

I've been thinking about this since you posted it yesterday, but decided to hold off on my response until this morning.


To add on to this point, I would suggest that those actions "sometimes" lead to a Tipping Point.

Sorry, i should have explicitly stated that - you're right of course that it is only sometimes.


Other times, the events can lead to what sociologist term anomie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomie), and there is a breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values.

I've always had problems with anomie as a concept, mainly because it has six major definitions :wry:. Still, if we go back to Durkheim's original use of it, that's a valid point. I should point out, however, that, in the case of Afghanistan, that "breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values" is exactly what NATO is pushing for by establishing a centralized system of governance.


One example include when agrarian societies moved into the big cities. Rapid changes in economics, family support structures, and daily life cause a relaxation or a sense of loss to how one used to view the world.

Yupper, there's some really good studies of this. As a note, I remember reading a working paper (not online unfortunately) years ago about how this was operating in Nigeria. It seems that the clan system was being exapted (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exaptation) in the urban environment into mutual help groups. A structurally similar event took place in the US and, to a lesser degree, in Canada during the 19th century using secret societies (see here (http://www.amazon.com/Secret-Ritual-Manhood-Victorian-America/dp/0300051468/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1250434303&sr=8-3) for some of it).


Getting back to the initial example, what the ground force commander is trying to determine is how and when to intervene. On one hand, he must try to respect the local's governmental structures, societal values, "ways of doing business," etc...On the other hand, sometimes, he has to make a judgement call...i.e. It's not okay to cut off your neighbor's head, hand, or finger.

I would say that, at present, it's an insoluble problem. If it's not okay to cut off heads and hands, then why does the US support the Saudi government that does so? Is it any better, ethically, to put people in cages where they will be gang raped and/or killed?

Yeah, I'm using emotionally charged language here (;)), but it's to make a point - cultures have emotional reactions to actions at a very deep, almost sub-conscious level. You have to be aware of your own cultural programming in order to be effective. And that requirement to "know yourself" is even stronger if you want to change the cultural programming of another group of people. When you attack a cultures rituals, you are attacking a cultures values. If you want to get them to change their rituals, i.e. the actions that are culturally programmed to arise of of certain situations/events, then you have to do it fairly slowly and in a manner that doesn't dis the core value.

Let me give you an interesting example from the Norther Sudan from back in the 1980's. One of the "insurgent" groups operating then decided that FGM was not acceptable. Rather than banning it, they replaced it by arguing that the act of a girl killing a man was the ritual analog of shedding blood for her purity. Know what, it worked.


It's a fine line, and there are no easy answers. Additionally, it is important to realize in my personal experiences that I shared (and some of the current situations in Afghanistan), US forces are not doing SFA or FID. They are unilaterally occupying using COIN principles as a matter of triage to stop an unacceptable level of violence. Later, we transitioned to FID once we had established security. This point is sometimes overlooked in the scope of the bigger picture.

I do agree with you that it is an occupation using COIN principles. However, i would also note that it is using constantly changing principles depending on whose AO it is, so it is even worse - COIN by committee!

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
08-16-2009, 04:28 PM
COL Jones, Ron, and Marc provided some excellent comments that I will try to address from my vantage point.


The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.

Population centric COIN is a theory not a law. A serious gap still remains in the transition from clearing and holding to stabilization and reconstruction. Furthermore, in very hostile and complex environments, the required method for military action is typically more Wilf and CvC than Ghandi or Greg Mortensen.

I used this thread to highlight some of the problems company commanders face on the ground. In most situations, company grade officers do not have the luxury of choosing when, where, and how to fight. They must accomplish the mission given to them; however, these types of inductive case studies may ultimately prove superior to others grand theorizing using extrapolated data sets of metrics on levels of violence, schools built, wells dug, etc...That's why it is important for others to write on the both capabilites and limitations of their operations.

I think that Bing West's Tactics or Strategy? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/tactics-or-strategy/) (an initial spot report to be followed up with a more detailed account I hope:cool:) is poignant:


I came back from my latest month in the field in Afghanistan disquieted about our basic military mission. Is the military mission to engage, push back and dismantle the Talbian networks, with population protection being a tactic to gain tips and local militia, or is the military mission to build a nation by US soldiers protecting the widespread population, with engagements against the Taliban as a byproduct?

It appears our strategy is nation-building, with fighting and dismantling of the Taliban a secondary consideration. Thus, the number of enemy killed will not be counted, let alone used as a metric. This non-kinetic theory of counterinsurgency has persuaded the liberal community in America to support or at least not to vociferously oppose the war. But we have to maintain a balance between messages that gain domestic support and messages that direct battlefield.

On really bad days, it seemed like all we were doing was trying to force social re-engineering on a society that was not quite ready for it. On better days, one can see a glimmer of hope as children of different sects, tribes, and religions attend school together.


Originally by Ron Humphrey: Put more bluntly can anyone point to any given society ours included within which all of 4 of those don't exist in some form.

I'm from North Carolina. I've spent some significant time studying some of the south's negative history in terms of race equality and relations. Reading back through some of the propaganda used by the KKK in the early twentieth century is hauntingly familiar to what I've observed by extreme Islamist groups in Iraq.


Originally by MarcT: Yupper, there's some really good studies of this. As a note, I remember reading a working paper (not online unfortunately) years ago about how this was operating in Nigeria. It seems that the clan system was being exapted in the urban environment into mutual help groups. A structurally similar event took place in the US and, to a lesser degree, in Canada during the 19th century using secret societies (see here for some of it).

I vividly remember the feast of Ramadon 2006. I was having dinner at Sheik Adnon al-Timimi's house, one of the leading ####tes in my area. He had established a refugee camp for about twenty displaced families, and he wanted me to meet them so that I could have a firm grasp on the deteriorating situation in Diyala. Throughout the night, we talked about family, religion, business, and life in general. At one point, he started going on about the "New Generation." It reminded me of the lectures from my Papaw as a child. He was complaining how the new generation was going off to college in the "big" cities of Baqubah and Baghdad, earning degrees in engineering, law, and medicine, and being changed by the western influence.

"Mike, it's just different now. They no longer respect the way life has always been. Now, everyone wants to be just like you Americans. After all this fighting is done, I'm afraid it will never be the same."

"Sadi (Sir)," I replied, "Maybe that's not a bad thing.

He smiled. The society was changing, but it started long before the American invasion. Those changes were not forced by the sword. There may be a learning point in that antecdote.


v/r

Mike

MikeF
08-16-2009, 07:21 PM
I would say that, at present, it's an insoluble problem.

Insoluble or possibly unsolvable. That's what makes these types of problems so interesting. Hence, the technical study of wicked (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem)problems.


""Wicked problem" is a phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems."

I meant to add some on-line resources earlier that better define these problems and potential solutions, but I forgot...Here's a good start point.

CogNexus Institute (http://www.cognexus.org/)

Dillema in General Theory of Planning (http://www.uctc.net/mwebber/Rittel+Webber+Dilemmas+General_Theory_of_Planning. pdf)

Knowledge Mapping for Complex Social Messes. (http://www.stanford.edu/~rhorn/a/recent/spchKnwldgPACKARD.pdf)


I don't necessarily subscribe that these problems are unsolvable. Rather, many of these issues simply take time and alternative approaches. Regardless, these are the types of dillemas that young company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders face on a daily basis.

v/r

Mike

William F. Owen
08-17-2009, 07:29 AM
1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.


Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)

MikeF
08-17-2009, 07:48 AM
Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)

As I've attempted to sort through the feedback and my own experiences, I consolidated the given scenario into this specific guidance for a young company commander dealing with these types of problems. Focus on the following:

1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

With a broad sweep, that is the best that I can provide. I'll step aside (really this time), and allow others to confirm, deny, or add to the template.

Have I missed something?

v/r

Mike

William F. Owen
08-17-2009, 08:26 AM
1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.


I'd actually make it even simpler.

1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.

MikeF
08-17-2009, 09:10 AM
I'd actually make it even simpler.

1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.

Wilf, for the American Army, my suggestions are a bit unconventional...Your views are simply subversive or rebelious:D.

The typical view would state that one must maneuver along these lines of operation:

- Security
- Essential Services
- Tribal/Political Leadership engagement
- Security Force Development/Training

These views are simply too constrained and ambigious for me.

v/r

Mike

Bill Moore
08-17-2009, 09:21 AM
Contrary to my statement above, I believe we have to focus on the populace, because a mobilized populace is a powerful weapon. Thus the softer side of irregular warfare where we focus on providing basic needs, hope for a better tomorrow, education, and an alternative narrative to the enemy among other activities is critically important, and perhaps even decisive over time. I think most of us agree on this point to varying degrees.

This is why I think Secretary Gate's push for a whole of government approach (team effort) is the basis of enabling the strategy. A promising sign that we're perhaps moving in this direction (ever so slowly) is that the State Department was recently given several million dollars to take lead on the counter propaganda war in Afghanistan. The military role in irregular warfare is not "the strategy", but simply one leg in the total effort, and its role in this soft zone should largely be focused on providing security and logistics to enable the other legs (do gooders) to their work.

The problem since 9/11 is that the military was implementing the entire strategy by itself. Sort of like putting a football team in the field that only has an offense team. They know the principles of defense, but they're not very good at it. This has forced the military to play positions on the team that they were not prepared for, and now it has become the norm. Of course the danger is we're weakening our offense team by making them play defense. Not until recently have we seen a concerted interagency effort to get into the fight and better enable a holistic strategy, but I suspect we're still a long ways off from getting it right.

Our senior military and many junior leaders in the field are focused on building schools, improving the economy, and taking a stab at good goverance (good luck on that one), because they know it needs to be done and no one else has been picking up the ball and running with it. Now that the team is "begining" to get flushed out with the appropriate interagency players we may need to reassess what the military should be focused.

I think Mike F. took a good first stab at it with:


1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

At a minimum I would add:

4. Provide security and logistics support to the do gooders.
5. Conduct offensive operations against the enemy.
6. Help build host nation security force capacity.

I know there are multiple schools of thought on what comes first in the counterinsurgency chicken or the egg argument, but I'm in the school who believes you have to establish security for the populace before you can develop their economy and establish good governance (if a government can't protect its people, then it is a stretch to claim they're providing good governance).

I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.

During 2003-2005 in Iraq, as many have stated, we conducted drive by COIN, by executing nightly raids to go after suspected insurgent leaders, and then we turn the populace back over to insurgent control. Since we were only focused on offensive operations, rather than providing security to the populace, this strategy proved ineffective and of course led to resentment of our forces in many cases. It wasn't until the surge (in some locations prior to the surge) that the military adjusted its military strategy and pushed out into the streets to protect the populace which had telling results (however, the results are only temporary without the right team coming in once security is established to start fixing the other problems). Since we had even less forces in Afghanistan (a much larger country), we obviously left a lot of terrain under the control of the enemy. In short, we didn't execute the military portion of the strategy very effectively. The military can't blame the interagency for failure to follow the basics of military strategy of taking and holding physical and human terrain. Instead we pursued some network targeting "theory" that continues to fail us. The network targeting theory would be a great supporting effort to a real clear and hold strategy (which would result in more dead insurgents), but it is no way to win this this fight.

Bob's World
08-17-2009, 01:03 PM
I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.



First I must make clear that I am not an advocate for CNAS-brand "Population-centric" engagement that is all about controlling the population and attempting to buy them off by producing "effective" governmental services free from corruption, etc.

I am an advocate for Jones-brand "Populace-centric" engagement that is all about understanding the needs of the populace and enabling self-determined governance on their terms while focusing on brokering/enabling positive movement between the populace and their existing government to address conditions of "poor governance" (defined as any issue, real or perceived, that is so important to any substantial segment of a populace so as to drive them to subversion or full insurgency; that they also perceive they have no means to address through legitimate channels).

Poor governance does not require a dictatorship; it merely requires a little bit of governmental arrogance or ignorance mixed with a lack of effective process for a populace to express their discontent. Personally, I think we should focus our effort on enabling good process and communication; but because we have cast these problems as "warfare" we apply military solutions, as WILF wisely points out, the military role is far more about defeating threats and providing security.

At the end of the day, we have overstated this entire problem to the degree that it appears impossible to address. On the Government/Civil side we have created a "population-centric" problem set that we in no way have the capacity to address; and on the population end have conflated the threats into a massive "they are evil and out to get us" monster that we are lashing out at inappropriately in all directions.

Less is more definitely applies.

Remember, the key to good governance is not how well it performs, the key is both how the populace feels about the governance and the degree of certainty they have that they can do something about it short of breaking the law.


As to the US and how we got mixed up in these little soap operas; is due to our degree of interference in these relationships. What I call "establishing an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government of others." When a populace perceives that a 3rd party is an obstacle to their achieving good governance at home, they will target that third party to attempt to break that obstacle. So, to reduce the threat at attack to the US and our interests is not to target these nationalist movements, but instead to target this perception that we are an obstacle to good governance.

We chose to make our focus "Defeat AQ"; and may well achieve a tactical success that produces a strategic defeat in the process. Make the focus these perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy instead, and keep our efforts against AQ low-key and IAW the main effort; and we can render AQ irrelevant. If we simply "defeat" them they will be replaced by a smarter and more effective organization that is free from their baggage but primed to run through the hole AQ made for them. That would be a tragedy, simply becasue it is so avoidable.

MikeF
08-18-2009, 06:18 PM
The feedback in this thread has allowed me to consolidate and shape some of my thoughts on general guidance for a company commander should approach interdicting into a denied area. Over the next several weeks, I'm going to try and consolidate it into an essay explaining how my troop did it. Below is the outline. It combines some existing COIN principles, a bit of Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond Model, and other advice received from SWJ and other mentors. If you have a moment, take a look at it, and let me know if I've missed anything.

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

2. CLEAR and SEIGE
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence
c. Confront the Sheiks
d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance
b. Restore Essential Services
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force
d. Conduct reconciliation
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

Thanks,

Mike

Rex Brynen
08-18-2009, 06:34 PM
Several quick and semi-incoherent thoughts:


Why "confront" the sheikhs? It some cases might it not be sway, coopt, or some other (less combative) verb? Also, if you're writing this for broader significance than Iraq, you might want to be wary about implying that tribal leaderships are equally relevant in all places.

Can "humanitarian assistance" always be held to 4e? Might it not have to come much sooner in some cases?

Are the subpoints meant to be sequential (in which case I would move up 4c, or collapse it into 4a), or simultaneous?

Should Step 1 also point to the need to seek information from sources beyond boots on the ground and local leadership engagement? This could include NGOs, SME, neighbouring areas, or even the unit that you just RIPed.

"Transition to FID" can mean many things, some of which overlap considerably with 4c (Establish a Police or constabulary force).

4a (a. Restore Governance) assumes that there was (central government) governance before the insurgency (dubious in parts of Afghanistan, it seems to me), and becomes problematic in those cases where NOT being governed by the central government in a desire of much of the local population (parts of Afghanistan, Somalia, etc).

Ken White
08-18-2009, 07:38 PM
with his stoopid advocacy...:D

Obviously all those apply to how your Troop did it and I'm sure the lessons are generally relevant. If the essay is to be Historical, that outline will be great. OTOH if the Essay is intended for those who follow, you might consider as you probably already have, in addition to Rex Brynen's good comment, the remarks below:

1. a. Covert infiltration and reconnaissance will often not be possible due to ethnic, language, time or other constraints. It may also not be necessary dependent upon the unit mission.

2. c. Control the population. Very much METT-TC dependent. In a typical scenario of today given enlightened and civilized behavior on the part of the US armed forces and with media presence almost assured, I doubt the population can be controlled in almost any sense. You might be able to manipulate them, bribe them, even exercise a mild degree of coercion but it is unlikely they can be controlled for any extended period.

2. d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. Again METT-TC will rule. What if the opponents are not counter state. As is the case today in Afghanistan and as was the case in Iraq in many areas with a plethora of counter state, smugglers, criminal gangs, people with other agendas and who knows what. Regardless, they may have an infrastructure and a -- more likely several -- support network(s) that should be destroyed but the different character and goals of varied types of opposition will almost certainly impact how that destruction -- or disruption, which may be adequate -- will occur.

2. e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population. Comment above applies.

3. a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense. FID may not be the goal.

3. c. Confront the Sheiks. What if there are no Sheiks. Point is that leaders or elders in various societies vary widely in the degree of control or even influence they possess. Sunni Sheiks possess some clout, a Village Chief in coastal Viet Nam possessed almost none while a Montagnard Chief possessed only a little more. An Afghan warlord may not be tribal leader but can still effectively rule a fief (of people or terrain or both). A Lur or or Bakhtiar Vali in Iran will have power very much dependent on his current wealth and which branch of the tribe he or she (yes, she -- it can happen with them though not with Arabs) represents. Lot of variables in this one.

Generic comment. Interdiction in denied areas for the purpose of FID will or should generally follow your outline. I'll note for many who contend that the 'armed social work' model is viable that your experience, like mine, is apparently that not a lot of service restoration and humanitarian assistance will or can take place until there is a degree of security...

Know that you know all that I mentioned, but I cued on the outline presented -- my Wife is always amazed that my mind reading skills have not improved in the last 44 years -- so my apology if all that's redundant. Look forward to the essay.

jmm99
08-18-2009, 07:59 PM
Hi Mike,

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT

[1/2a. Prepare General Area Study before insertion]
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements

Talk with local leaders ?
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

[d. Prepare Area Assessment Study (updated throughout employment)]

2. CLEAR and SEIGE

[1/2a. Bring in indigenous security forces - need something to FID in phase 3a; and also a permanent presence in area for this and succeeding stages]
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks

What mean "destroy" ? Same as CORDS-Phoinix "neutralize", which translated to roughly 1/3 kill, 1/3 capture & detain, 1/3 convert ? Some legal issues here.
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

IO and the "Political Struggle" ? If so, need indigenous political cadres.

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence

Same questions as 2d.
c. Confront the Sheiks

[co-opt ?]
d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance

[see 2e comment]
b. Restore Essential Services

[continuing 3d. ?]
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force

"Ruff-Puffs" should be in play, in and after phase 2. Here, as part of 4a., we are talking two things: 4c1. Establish a criminal justice system; and 4c2. Establish a civil justice system (there is more civil justice in a community than criminal justice), which must contain a process to enforce good governance and allow the masses' complaints to be heard
d. Conduct reconciliation

[optional - cf. Peace Enforcement & Peacekeeping, etc.]
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

We've done all this - or at least tried to - as laid out by BG Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm) (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL).

Regards,

Mike

Bob's World
08-18-2009, 09:33 PM
Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

Steve Blair
08-18-2009, 09:49 PM
Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

Bob's World
08-18-2009, 10:06 PM
Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

However, "CHB" remains a threat-centric approach; coupled with the belief that once once clears out the threat, if they build effective government infrastructure and process they will "win."

All situations being unique, of course, for the situation the US currently finds itself in (mired in the insurgencies of two countries that we imposed ourselves into; and also targeted by the insurgencies of several other countries that we consider as allies, but who's populaces see us a protector of governments that they are dissatisfied with).

I suggest that instead of targeting the insurgent (there will always be insurgencies all over the world, and no amount of engagement will change that fact), that instead we target the perception that we stand as an obstacle between populaces and their respective governments.

A shift of focus.

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

And we'll be able to look in the mirror when we shave in the morning to boot.

Ken White
08-18-2009, 11:05 PM
"Effective genocide program!" I love it...

Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." :eek:

Which is why I pointed out above that 'population control' is not likely at all and in any even if implemented, will not last long -- lacking the Phrase of the Week. :wry:

Bob adds this:
"This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check."Truly good statement. More to the point, influence is better than force -- and once you've escalated to the point where you've committed the GPF it is not ever going to be nice or tidy or easy or cheap. Ever...

slapout9
08-19-2009, 12:07 AM
From our own SWJ/Library An Introduction to the Technique of Small Wars by Major Utley. I think ????? he wrote more later but have not been able to confirm this. Once the fighting is over or calmed down you move in and esatblish a partial or complete miliatry government to keep the country running with the ultimate aim of setting up a stable government/elections and then go home. Sounds like a plan to me don't worry if it is COIN,LIC,or CT, or More Tea:D just handle it.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/utley.pdf

MikeF
08-19-2009, 12:22 AM
Thanks for the initial feedback and criticism. The hardest part of writing this essay is trying to get the outline correct. During the actual operation, events were very fluid and unstructured. A lot of our learning came on the fly.

To clarify a couple of things, I'm writing my account of my company's operations in Zaganiyah, Iraq from March-June 2007. It is the follow up to my first article on SWJ titled "The Break Point: How AQIZ established the ISI in Zaganiyah." That essay focused on how AQI created a shadow government and denied or "No-Go" area in the Diyala River Valley. This essay will explain how we took it back with primary focus on company level planning, operations, strategy, decision making, and problem solving.

It is by no means a definitive account- just one more narrative to add to the growing collection of works that others have published. I'll be happy if it helps some young captain trying to comprehend the difficulties of command.

As for the outline:

1. Prepare General Area Study. I'm going to add that one to the list.

2. Controlling the Populace. This is impossible to do 100%, but for a short-term you can enforce curfews, driving restrictions, block roads, etc...

3. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. This entails shutting down enemy training camps, shadow government offices,
neutralizing IED networks, etc...To accomplish this, heavy reconnaissance is required and you must gain influence and trust networks of your own.

4. Confronting the Sheiks. I need to rephrase this own, but I haven't found the right words yet. On a personal level, I got along with most of my sheiks, but everytime we had to talk business, it became confrontational. At times, I felt like a used car salesman trying to pitch a clunker.

5. I'm not advocating a "burn the village down in order to save it" strategy, but a certain level of violence is required to secure an area.

That leads to some questions.

Should we be employing GPF forces in this manner? My current answer is no, but President Obama hasn't asked me to weigh in on his foreign policy:D (that would be a sad, sad day!). The reality is that we are conducting these types of operations. I'm skeptical of the current population centric crowd. In my experience, there is a tremendous gap between the theory and the practice. I introduced several examples in the beginning of this thread, and I guess my take is that some of these "wicked" problems cannot be solved by US military. Even when we have success, it is almost impossible to accurately predict the secondary and tertiary effects. Additionally, deploying into these types of areas can bring high risk and come at a high cost.

What should we be doing? I wish I knew. I tend to side with Bob's World's thoughts and overall SF mentality- small footprint, indirect actions, lower expectations, and longer presence.

v/r

Mike

Dayuhan
08-19-2009, 01:01 AM
This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.


This highlights one of the key problems in our current interventions: our exit strategy depends on an evolutionary process that we do not control. That process may be far more complex and difficult than we initially assume it to be: in Iraq in particular, our intervention was supported by some quite naive underestimations of the challenges of developing a government that would be functional and acceptable to all of the major groups. Something to consider before intervening, certainly: realistic assessment of challenges is a useful thing..



Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

I largely agree, but there's a factor here we often overlook. Americans often assume that people who have lived long under bad government will crave and strive for good government, and that they will define "good government" much as we do. In reality our concept of "good government" may never enter the picture: people who have only experienced bad government are likely to define "good government" as whatever type of bad government brings the most benefit directly to them. In these cases the quest for "good government" is likely to be violent and destabilizing, as each group's idea of "good government" is likely to be focused on immediate benefit and is likely to come into conflict with competing definitions from other groups.

All of this of course is on a wider scale and is of little use to those facing local problems such as those discussed in the OP. In these cases I'd only add that one obstacle to seeing a solution to an ill-defined problem set is our tendency to define problem sets in our own terms and according to our own framework, which may mean we're trying to solve the wrong problem. Typically outsiders would be biased toward a national "government vs insurgency" paradigm, which may be of limited relevance on a local scale. An example would be a situation where one subgroup allies with the government to gain advantage in a pre-existing conflict with another subgroup, which then turns to the insurgents to gain leverage of its own. In this case support for the group allied to the government (which may or may not have a more legitimate position in the root conflict) would be less advisable than an attempt to address the underlying conflict between the groups.

There was discussion of the impact of a corrupt governor, and the idea of a culturally acceptable level of corruption. The culturally acceptable level of corruption is likely to vary radically depending on who is speaking: a level that would be perfectly acceptable in an official who is one of "us" might be totally unacceptable if the governor is one of "them". In this case the objection openly stated as "he's corrupt" might actually be "he's not one of us and we feel threatened by his ability to leverage government resources for the benefit of our rivals".

All a roundabout way of advising people facing intractable problems to take a bit of extra time to be sure they're addressing the right problem... with full knowledge that everybody you speak to on the local scene is likely to be trying to distort your picture according to their own perception.

Bob's World
08-19-2009, 02:54 AM
The more we focus on what we think is "good governance" the less likely we are to be helpful to the process

We need to use our considerable influence not to force our will, but instead to enable (relatively) peaceful evolution of governance.

We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

This is the message that we need to carry to the White House. Control-based policies brought us to where we are. They will not take us to where we need to be.

Bill Moore
08-19-2009, 03:27 AM
Posted by Bob's W, We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.


Posted by Ken: Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

jmm99
08-19-2009, 03:55 AM
it would be easier accomplished by a military with political commissars and heavily filled with political cadres (also doubling as military cadres). We don't have that - and I'm not recommending it.

The attached snips I ran into from some early evening reading tonite. They seem applicable and general enough - even though we lack political commissars. And, they do come from the "winner's playbook" (01 (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?@JmyRxdUzJ3PLnRqJuhBEG31GPyHoNBYewI1 4VSX2vSY7XEVksfWXcbKavtlWWpcA2pslVWGue6w8dYSadYNVl vkju75acwCw@2xDSVTqD4/2130805016a.pdf) and 02 (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?9e2rO9LcRs2P@TEUGEczrOZ45pojmS1WTqpM RL8nASLLmJEnFBNRROYC1uvFIvuYtuhfZ4FJ0MZRlJr7IP7iOn A@hCJ7wUbfLsHLBJNTcYc/2130805016b.pdf)) :(

Please note that Giap considered the RVN to be the insurgents ("rebels", "puppets", "lackeys"), with the US supplying the external muscle power. So, Giap was practicing "counter-insurgency" by combining guerrilla and conventional forces - or, unconventional warfare in occupied territory.

Bob's World
08-19-2009, 04:00 AM
That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.



Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

When was the last time you preferred to be "controlled" in some context, rather than been "supported.?"


The U.S. has interests. These must be supported, that is our job. But, if we do so in such a way that we offend the populaces of the countries where those interests lie, we harm our cause, rather than support it.

Interests will rarely match up, so this requires that we make reasonable compromise. Others before us have used their historic positions of power to ignore popular concerns and to enforce their will over others. Those power are all now minor players on the global scene. We can avoid their fate by refuting their tactics. We must, must, live up to our American heritage by being the one nation that marches to a different drummer.

The age of European dominance over others is over. We held their place to win the Cold War, but now that is over too. Now we enter a new age, and we can lead the way and prevail, or seek to obstruct the way and be over ran.

To me, the choice is obvious. We must lead.

Ken White
08-19-2009, 04:00 AM
...For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.I don't support arguments against populace control -- I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.
I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.I agree with that -- I did not and do not say do away with it -- I do say it is beyond difficult to do, so try we must but the probability of success in that aspect is not great. Been there, done that...

What can be and is being done is local, short time control and long time shaping. Makes the job harder but as you say, ain't no Utopias out there...
Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems.Really? Well, the added (east) was simply to remind Bob's World that there were Indians in the east as well as in the west of the US but to get to your comment, let me repeat the salient point of that post of mine for you: ""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really... :cool:

Bill Moore
08-19-2009, 05:05 AM
Posted by Ken, I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.

Agreed, and we sometimes fail to mention that during the troubles both Malaysia and Algeria were colonies, so that somewhat mitigated the third party effect. Population control measures can include a wide range of activities, and I agree that some of them have a short shelf life due to the impact on those affected, but others like protecting the population must endure for the length of the crisis. Population control is not a "strategy", but rather a means to set conditions that will allow the political strategy to be implemented. In my view, population control creates a window of opportunity to do the real work that needs to be done. It isn't the end game.


""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really...

I don't think we should confuse genocide with population control, and I'm sure you agree with that. We're not talking Hitler's Final Solution, but rather a means for separating the populace from the insurgents. Furthermore, the Spanish during that time frame were highly ineffective at most things. They were the equivalent of the Christian Taliban during that era, and thus were incapable of learning, assimilating knowledge from other cultures, or modernizing a foreign culture until they got their church under control. Spain may be a great nation now, but during its dark period they were far behind the rest of Europe. Therefore, I don't think it is accurate to equate their genocidicial approach as the reason they failed, that was simply a reflection of their overall backwardness during that time frame. In the U.S. we were heavy handed also, but we were effective, why? I think like most things in life the answer is never simple or black & white.

Bill Moore
08-19-2009, 05:26 AM
Posted by Bob's World: The age of European dominance over others is over. We held their place to win the Cold War, but now that is over too. Now we enter a new age, and we can lead the way and prevail, or seek to obstruct the way and be over ran.

To me, the choice is obvious. We must lead.

Agree with your last post, and in the end we may be talking past one another. Population Control has a terrible connotation, and we need a new term for a new era that reflects what we're actually trying to do. I don't like being controlled, but the fact is I'm controlled to a large extent by a number of laws (and regulations since I'm in the military). I sure as hell wouldn't like it if some foreigner was imposing those controls over me in my country, so we're in agreement.

Two counterpoints:

Population and Resource Control is focused on separating the populace from the insurgents, and the majority of this effort should be focused on providing security to the populace so they cannot be coerced by the insurgents. (If they support the insurgent's ideology, then we're on the losing side and shouldn't be there to begin with unless we're practicing UW). This includes check points, intelligence operations, combat outposts, patrols, information operations, etc. However, when you mention Population Control everyone has visions of the moving people away from their villages and confining them in a camp like the Brits did in Malaysia or we did to the American Japanese in the U.S. during WWII. From my optic that is not the intent, we do this as gently as possible, but we do implement the necessary measures based on the situation. I'll meet you half way, and agree we need another term for this, but you still have to achieve this effect to be effective.

Second counterpoint: You suggested supporting over controlling, and that would be ideal in a real FID scenario, but in Iraq and Afghanistan we are/were an occupying power and that changes the dynamic from where we support to where we must do, until we can evolve the situation to a point where we can really transition to a supporting role. This why I think severe punative raids may be a better option in some cases instead of occupying a country and trying to transform their society at great cost to "all" concerned. In my opinion we over emphasize what we can accomplish with soft power.

Ken White
08-19-2009, 06:05 AM
...others like protecting the population must endure for the length of the crisis.Agree, problem is getting enough people to do that. Million and a half troops in Viet Nam could not even begin to protect more than about a fifth of the population of 16M or so in a nation half the size of the Philippines land area and a quarter the size of Afghanistan -- where there are less than a quarter million troops of all coalition types in terrain far more rugged and compartmented than was VN.

I'm pretty sure that the likelihood of having enough troops to do the population control thing thoroughly in any nation larger than Belize or Singapore is unlikely unless we get a whole lot of Allies willing to work. :wry:
Population control is not a "strategy", but rather a means to set conditions that will allow the political strategy to be implemented. In my view, population control creates a window of opportunity to do the real work that needs to be done. It isn't the end game.Not to be nit picky but if you cannot control them totally, aren't you talking more about providing security to the extent you can and shaping their thoughts and goals also to the extent you can?

I think we're pretty much in agreement on what has to be done if you're there and we both know if the Pols say go, we're going -- but I do agree with Bob's World that we should try our best not to be in that position. In this era, it is a no-win proposition, not least because of the lack of ability to control the population to a great extent. Population centric COIN is a good book theory, it just doesn't work at all well in practice -- and that lack of population control is the reason; only works if conditions are ideal or in a relatively small area.
I don't think we should confuse genocide with population control, and I'm sure you agree with that.I do agree, of course. However, my subject line comment about your irony pill was at taking that whole genocide train of thought -- which started with a purely and surely ironic statement by Bob's World, followed by one by Steve Blair and one by me -- as being something meriting serious comment. It wasn't meant as anything other than 'Well, we aren't going to do that...' and it doesn't work that well in any event (as you said also) so no one was seriously or even in jest proposing it...

Ken White
08-19-2009, 06:16 AM
(If they support the insurgent's ideology, then we're on the losing side and shouldn't be there to begin with unless we're practicing UW).I agree with that. Totally. However, what if, as in Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq, the population doesn't really support the 'insurgents' but OTOH, they don't support you or the government either; they just want everyone to go away and leave them alone. That really compounds your population control problem.
This includes check points, intelligence operations, combat outposts, patrols, information operations, etcAgree with that definition and you're correct that the 'control' word produces bad vibes for some -- but the real problem is not that you are going to put em in Camps -- the real problem is that you cannot put them in camps, thus you are NOT going to control them and you are unlikely to have enough people to effect any can kind of temporary control over other than a small area. Population control's problem is that it takes more people than the US Army can provide in most cases.
This why I think severe punative raids may be a better option in some cases instead of occupying a country and trying to transform their society at great cost to "all" concerned. In my opinion we over emphasize what we can accomplish with soft power.Agreed! :cool: :wry:

davidbfpo
08-19-2009, 11:47 AM
A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective).

I'm no expert on Malaysia or Algeria, but the populace control was not of the general population. In Malaysia it was the Chinese minority, mainly in the countryside and a large minority, the Malays were "on side" throughout.

Malaysia became independent in 1957 (excluding Borneo & Singapore) and the 'Malayan Emergency' lasted from 1948-1960. The UK had indicated way before 1957 that independence was coming and that helped undermine the insurgency. Note an amnesty played a big part in the COIN campaign. Some help from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency

In Algeria there was a large European minority, the Pied Noir, 10% of the population (1m) and for many complicated reasons lage numbers of Algerians served in the regular (170K) and irregular units (236K, often called Harkis). The film 'Battle of Algiers' portrays only a small part of the war and 2m were forced into camps. The real war was in the countryside, although one can argue the 'Battle' lost the war for the French.

With help for the war: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War and the Pied Noir: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pied-noir

From my armchair in such conflicts an important metric is how many locals loyally serve in state service alongside the intervenors? Or serve the state, e.g. black Africans in Rhodesia.

So, if we cannot have minority populace control, what are the options? SWC have often written on these options, good governance, good works, undermining the narrative etc.

davidbfpo

Surferbeetle
08-19-2009, 12:21 PM
Governments remain in power by providing effective security, economic, and governance services through good times and bad. By doing this they can only influence the population, over the long-term governmental population control is just a dream. Taking a western centric view we could consider the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and the breakup of the Soviet Union just to name a few instances of the illusion of population control.


This highlights one of the key problems in our current interventions: our exit strategy depends on an evolutionary process that we do not control. That process may be far more complex and difficult than we initially assume it to be: in Iraq in particular, our intervention was supported by some quite naive underestimations of the challenges of developing a government that would be functional and acceptable to all of the major groups. Something to consider before intervening, certainly: realistic assessment of challenges is a useful thing.

Steve (Dayuhan/the Foreigner?), in my western mind at least, you have identified some of the key components of the problem set we face in Afghanistan and Iraq: US staying power in the field is limited; only local populations can truly define the acceptability of local governments; only local populations are placed (they are the true owners of the AO) to deal with long term changes.


All of this of course is on a wider scale and is of little use to those facing local problems such as those discussed in the OP. In these cases I'd only add that one obstacle to seeing a solution to an ill-defined problem set is our tendency to define problem sets in our own terms and according to our own framework, which may mean we're trying to solve the wrong problem.

Truly wise words.


Population and Resource Control is focused on separating the populace from the insurgents, and the majority of this effort should be focused on providing security to the populace so they cannot be coerced by the insurgents. (If they support the insurgent's ideology, then we're on the losing side and shouldn't be there to begin with unless we're practicing UW). This includes check points, intelligence operations, combat outposts, patrols, information operations, etc. However, when you mention Population Control everyone has visions of the moving people away from their villages and confining them in a camp like the Brits did in Malaysia or we did to the American Japanese in the U.S. during WWII. From my optic that is not the intent, we do this as gently as possible, but we do implement the necessary measures based on the situation.

I would suggest that these are short-term measures and that local police forces, ranging over a spectrum of beat cop to gendarme, need to be an integral part of this tactical security centric solution.


Second counterpoint: You suggested supporting over controlling, and that would be ideal in a real FID scenario, but in Iraq and Afghanistan we are/were an occupying power and that changes the dynamic from where we support to where we must do, until we can evolve the situation to a point where we can really transition to a supporting role. This why I think severe punitive raids may be a better option in some cases instead of occupying a country and trying to transform their society at great cost to "all" concerned. In my opinion we over emphasize what we can accomplish with soft power.

An advisory role focused upon security, economic, and governance services may be the most sustainable model out there. From my civil affairs centric viewpoint, I believe that it is much more cost effective to influence the influencers. There will always be more locals present in country than coalition personnel.

A hybrid vehicle: Predictive models (Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb? (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-t.html)), OGA, SOF, Robust PRT’s, Trade Policy, Diplomacy, and GP Military Force as a last option?

We need to get back to a long term focus, which includes a balanced combination of these and other components, which serves to minimize costs and meet our national goals.

Dayuhan
08-19-2009, 10:57 PM
Steve (Dayuhan/the Foreigner?)


Alam mo pala eh... ganyan talaga ako, kahit saan. 'Di bale, sanay na.



An advisory role focused upon security, economic, and governance services may be the most sustainable model out there. From my civil affairs centric viewpoint, I believe that it is much more cost effective to influence the influencers. There will always be more locals present in country than coalition personnel.


An advisory role is what we're looking for. In Iraq and Afghanistan, though, we're advising governments that we effectively created, and while we may see ourselves as advisors to "their" government, many of "them" may see us propping up a government that is more ours than theirs. Changing this perception is a major challenge. There is no single step that can do it, needs time, gradual evolution, and a delicate balancing act: external forces are needed to give the government room to grow to a point where it can be independent, but at the same time the presence of those forces is seen as compromising independence.