Leading scouting/counter-scouting theorists

[Fuchs]

I already asked about leading infantry theorists (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5626) and got some replies, now it's the turn for scouting/reconnaissance, and its counter.

Armour, infantry and air get a lot of attention, but scouting is hugely important as well.
I recall several armor journal articles of the 90's about how the (counter)reconnaissance decided most NTC battles.

There are other, more theoretical reasons for my interest as well.

Well, does anybody know modern (post-'92) theoretical work about ground scouts or cavalry?
An author's name would already suffice as a first hint.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

Not sure if 'scouting' is in your view the same as tracking. There are threads on tracking, notably: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2180 Within are some practitioners who have started in the field. Apologies if 'scouting' is armoured recce or whatever.

davidbfpo

[Fuchs]

I was indeed thinking of armoured recce, but I have a growing feeling that "reconnaissance" is a poor term for it.

"Scouting" & "screening" seem to fit much better.
Navies historically use these terms as well.


I am developing something new anyway; it's just based on armoured recce/cavalry and that's why I am interested in new theoretical works about those.

[RTK]

Screening is part of the Guard and Cover family of security operations that are designed to buy reaction time and maneuver space for the main body commander in order for him to most appropriately apply his elements of combat power in the most adventageous manner to achieve success on the battlefield. Reconnaissance is a sub-element (indeed "perform continuous reconnaissance" is one of the five fundamentals of security operations).

I've written in Armor and Cavalry Journal about planning for reconnaissance and security operations (see ACJ DEC08). What else are you looking for?

"RTK, rush chairman, damn glad to meet you." :D

[William F. Owen]

I think the problem you will find is a complete lack of relevant material, plus as you have indicated, a poor use of language.

My thoughts in this area is that it is that Land Warfare Reconnaissance is writ large with fuzzy logic and some very bizarre assumptions. Finding the enemy is a simple and useful guide to action. Strange that many have made it so difficult.

Screening is a useful term if applied to giving early warning, to prevent surprise. Scouting is somewhat less useful, because it is far less well defined

[Fuchs]

I think the problem you will find is a complete lack of relevant material, plus as you have indicated, a poor use of language.

My thoughts in this area is that it is that Land Warfare Reconnaissance is writ large with fuzzy logic and some very bizarre assumptions. Finding the enemy is a simple and useful guide to action. Strange that many have made it so difficult.

Screening is a useful term if applied to giving early warning, to prevent surprise. Scouting is somewhat less useful, because it is far less well defined

Well, a way out of the trouble is to invent something new; the inventor can define its name. :D

scouting
screening
security
infiltration
skirmishing
reconnaissance

All these terms are close to my idea, but none is perfect.
"Reconnaissance" is too general, especially as it's in great part an air power job and it doesn't hint at small combat actions at all.

My present working title is "heavy skirmishers", but maybe I'll settle on "heavy low force density unit" as my concept is very much about filling the gaps left by friendly and enemy combat brigades with few resources and executing the aforementioned tasks.
It's very different from my rather static idea for the "light" counterpart (working title "light skirmishers").


It was difficult to get sufficient accounts about historical armoured recce ops (the Eastern Front accounts were most inspiring, but they're obsolete), and I haven't found any real modern theory about it yet.
I assume that the modern "swarming" theory and the theory that led to the U.S. CavRgt of the 80's and 90's may be useful to some degree.

As usual, secrecy slows down progress.

About "Strange that many have made it so difficult."

The amount of pre-planning demanded in U.S. FMs on mobile ground war is unrealistic anyway. Recce is an art form for daring characters, not management science.
U.S. doctrine for mobile warfare looks at times like American Football.
Planning - action - planning - action - planning - action.
Wait, that's inaccurate. In theory it looks more like planning - action - victory.

The German FM on armoured recce looks like WW2 doctrine plus sensors minus combat capability. It's incredibly inadequate.

I don't have more manuals on armoured recce. Maybe a translated Russian one may be available somehow? Their OPSEC doesn't bother us, right?

[Fuchs]

@RTK:
The armored cavalry journal is new to me, I have no access.
It's not in the official list of journal - it is some kind of non-classified association publication?

[William F. Owen]

scouting
screening
security
infiltration
skirmishing
reconnaissance

All these terms are close to my idea, but none is perfect.
"Reconnaissance" is too general, especially as it's in great part an air power job and it doesn't hint at small combat actions at all.


The biggest issue I find with people taking about "Reconnaissance", is that it always seems that they mean something over and above "finding the enemy".
Now I don't really KNOW what "Reconnaissance" is. I just accept that I/someone has to find the enemy, to fulfil the "FIND" function. FINDING is vital. I'm not so sure about "Reconnaissance".

[Fuchs]

The biggest issue I find with people taking about "Reconnaissance", is that it always seems that they mean something over and above "finding the enemy".
Now I don't really KNOW what "Reconnaissance" is. I just accept that I/someone has to find the enemy, to fulfil the "FIND" function. FINDING is vital. I'm not so sure about "Reconnaissance".

There's a spiral.

First, you do want to find him.

Then you do not want him to find yourself ("counter-reconnaissance")

Then you've got recce units who can fight, and you want them to do so even offensively at exceptional opportunities.

And then you may become greedy and turn your recce unit into a combat brigade with organic attack helicopters and call it "armored cavalry".


I advanced to step two, with step three in mind with wolfpack-esque tactics (uniting several units).

[RTK]

Also known as Armor Magazine, depending on which cover you get. It's put out by the United States Armor Association.

Reconnaissance, by definition, is "a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the actions and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area." FM 1-02.

Counter-reconnaissance is preventing the adversary, by whatever means available, from accomplishing the mission as stated above.

For an open source reference on American heavy armored cavalry, take a look at Tom Clancy's "Armored Cav." It has a pretty good interview of my old boss and his troop's actions during Desert Storm. I think that's the vein you were looking for to start with.

[Mike Burgoyne]

I would say that within the cavalry community the terms recon and security with their associated missions are pretty well defined in US doctrine.

Not sure if you can access it but I would recommend asking this question on Mounted Manuever Net. You need an AKO account but the link is at http://www.knox.army.mil/school/

Also highly recommend Armor Magazine. In particular there was a great article by LTC Jeffrey Broadwater on the new Brigade level Recon Squadron.
"Reorganizing the Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy Brigade Combat Team Capabilities"
https://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/armormag/currentissues/2007/so07/5broadwater07c.pdf

Good luck with the research

Mike

[jcustis]

You might want to look at USMC LAR ops. We could stand to plan way better, but we kick ass at execution.:D

[Fuchs]

Armor magazine and some similar publications have been unavailable to me since '03. They keep them from the public although the publishing institutions thought that it's stupid to do so.

[jcustis]

Fuchs, have you obtained and read a copy of a "Scouts Out!"? It is a history of US application of just what you are talking about.

[Ken White]

Big slow 272 page .pdf

LINK (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf).

[Fuchs]

Thanks, but I knew that paper - saw it months ago.
It's incredibly superficial in its historical part.
The conclusion chapter is much better, but I don't agree with some points that are in my opinion key points.

[Steve Blair]

Have to concur about "Scouts Out." It had some interesting points here and there, but the historical sections were not up to standard and ignored what I believe are some of the unique aspects of American cavalry development.

[Ken White]

in many ways. Almost every way, in fact. We never went the Curassiers, Hussars or Lancers route.They were effectively Mounted Infantry -- not Dragoons -- Mounted Infantry, not the same thing at all.

I recall reading that when Rudyard Kipling visited the US, he talked to a US Cavalry Trooper at Yellowstone, one who had been in the Household Cavalry in the British Army. The man said "Our horses aren't half trained and we almost never use the Saber or do Saber drill -- but we can shoot. I fire more ammunition here in one month than I fired in seven years with the Blues." That carried through to the present day and the Armored Cavalry Regiment that Fuchs fails to appreciate is the result. :D

As one US Cavalry Colonel was heard to remark when asked why we Americans weren't better at sneak and peek reconnaissance; "We don't have the patience for it. We just go out looking for trouble and find it -- if you're going to do that, you have to have Armor and Tanks." True statement, that.

The flip side is that we can and do perform sneak and peak reconnaissance -- we just do it in small batches and we don't talk about it.

[MikeF]

The biggest issue I find with people taking about "Reconnaissance", is that it always seems that they mean something over and above "finding the enemy".
Now I don't really KNOW what "Reconnaissance" is. I just accept that I/someone has to find the enemy, to fulfil the "FIND" function. FINDING is vital. I'm not so sure about "Reconnaissance".

Wilf, I disagree with this comment. Before you can FIND the enemy, you must KNOW the terrain. That's where Reconnaissance comes in. In American Doctrine, we have different forms of how to figure out the terrain.

Several forms of Reconnaissance:
-Map
-Aerial
-Route
-Area
-Zone

There are differing views between our Infantry and Armor communities on how to execute reconnaissance missions. I've worked in both, and I prefer a combination of the guidance listed in the Scout Platoon and Infantry Platoon manuals.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

in many ways. Almost every way, in fact. We never went the Curassiers, Hussars or Lancers route.They were effectively Mounted Infantry -- not Dragoons -- Mounted Infantry, not the same thing at all.




Now your talking! Damn this walking everywhere with a 150 pound kitchen sink on your back. This is America...we be riding,styling and high profiling:)

[William F. Owen]

Several forms of Reconnaissance:
-Map
-Aerial
-Route
-Area
-Zone


-Map = part of the normal planning process
-Aerial = aircraft sortie, tasked by at least formation
-Route = again, part of the planning process
-Area = to what end?
-Zone = as above.

Mike, I do accept that you have gain access to information about the terrain, (and even the population) but that is pretty much a given. My point, (poorly made perhaps) is that "Reconnaissance" has bloomed into something it was never meant to be. I think there is a blind spot when it comes to asking how much information do you want to feed the staff beast, and how much time and effort do you want to expend doing it, for no actual proof that it is actually making things better.

In the "Dicta Wilf" Formation I still have no good reason to allocate forces to something we call "Reconnaissance." - Surveillance and Observation, yes!

[MikeF]

In the "Dicta Wilf" Formation I still have no good reason to allocate forces to something we call "Reconnaissance." - Surveillance and Observation, yes!

Wilf, traditionally, the terms surveillance and observation sufficed. I concur with your point. Current Army doctrine on reconnaissance can be very confusing. Back in 2005, when I was a lonely staff weenie trying to transition our infantry battalion into a RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition) unit, I sorted through all the current doctrine and summarized it as best as I could. Simply put, Mike's intepretation of our doctrine is:

1. Reconnaissance- Human Observation
2. Surveillance- Technological Observation (UAV's, sensors, etc)

This simplified our work so when I use the term reconnaissance, I am referring to a group of soldiers collecting intelligence on the terrain or populace to covertly/overtly infiltrate and conduct observation. Likewise, surveillance covers intelligence collected from all the technological toys that we have to play with today.


I think there is a blind spot when it comes to asking how much information do you want to feed the staff beast, and how much time and effort do you want to expend doing it, for no actual proof that it is actually making things better.

In my mind, recon efforts are not driven towards feeding the staff beast. Rather, these missions exist to empower the platoon leaders and staff sergeants conducting missions. Two quick points.

1. Aerial Reconnaissance. Perhaps one of my best learning points from my last deployment taught to me by some wise infantry dudes. Prior to entering a new area, I would take the company leadership for a helicopter ride after we conducted our map reconnaissnce and initial in-brief. These flights allowed my NCO's and O's to gain a better appreciation for the terrain prior to infiltration. We operated in river valleys, mountanious areas, cities, and desert environments so I wanted them to comprehend the differences. The helicopter flight was one such method for better understanding.

2. Route, Area, Zone Reconnaissance. I hate the term that "insurgents melt back into the populace." One's enemy does not possess supernatural powers. After a hasty ambush (IED or small arms attack), they egress using established trails, paths, or roads. Often, these avenues of approach cannot be found on a map. So we conducted patrols to collect better intelligence on every route that existed within our AO. Simultaneously, these patrols gave us the opportunity to talk with the locals. (In some extreme cases, we were the first americans that they had ever met). Later, the knowledge gained allowed us to better understand the enemy's course of action. We established our own ambush positions followed with a "Suprise" for the enemy.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Prior to entering a new area, I would take the company leadership for a helicopter ride after we conducted our map reconnaissnce and initial in-brief.

So we conducted patrols to collect better intelligence on every route that existed within our AO. Simultaneously, these patrols gave us the opportunity to talk with the locals. (In some extreme cases, we were the first americans that they had ever met). Later, the knowledge gained allowed us to better understand the enemy's course of action.


...and that has been operational best practice since Biblical times. These are sound and essential activities, and I don't see these as confusing the terminology or doctrine of RSTA, Recon or Needle finding. I think the problem arises when these useful activities get bound up into something they are not.

My basic point is that everyone does "reconnaissance" all the time. It's not and should not be a distinct activity. Now translating that into organisation, training and doctrine, may still be a problem.

[Tom Odom]

1. Reconnaissance- Human Observation
2. Surveillance- Technological Observation (UAV's, sensors, etc)

This simplified our work so when I use the term reconnaissance, I am referring to a group of soldiers collecting intelligence on the terrain or populace to covertly/overtly infiltrate and conduct observation. Likewise, surveillance covers intelligence collected from all the technological toys that we have to play with today.

Mike

As a former intel guy that is close to what we learned 30 plus years ago with the following caveats:

Reconnaissance is a time duration limited and target defined operation. Humans look at something and report back. But you can do recce with technical means as in aerial recce.

Surveillance is continuous in its goal against a target area with more general criteria for what is actually of interest. As such it is more conducive to use of technical means.

You are correct in that the confusion is rampant, especially with the abuse of the term(s) ISR as a catch all, mean nothing phrase. I sat in a trends refersal conference about 9 years ago and the representative from Ft Huachuca admitted that the school house could not define ISR even as it claimed there was a negative ISR trend that needed to be reversed.

At that same conference, Ft Huachuca and Ft Knox announced an epiphany: Huachuca said that ISR had to be fixed. Knox announced that movement to contact/actions on contact were largely the same (they are not) and that both were in need of a fix. The fix came with a Huachuca statement that in essence claimed it was possible to see all and understand all (gave no vote to the enemy) and Knox gave the Guiness "brilliant" salute with the concurring statement that achieving said goal would eliminate the need for a movement to contact because you would know where the enemy is and would then attack him. Again the enemy had no vote --and neither did I sitting and listening.

The 3 star and all the one stars nodded their heads north and south while I picked my jaw up off the floor.

So if you find confusion in this arena today do not be surprised. It is a tradition.

Best
Tom

[MikeF]

...and that has been operational best practice since Biblical times. These are sound and essential activities, and I don't see these as confusing the terminology or doctrine of RSTA, Recon or Needle finding. I think the problem arises when these useful activities get bound up into something they are not.

My basic point is that everyone does "reconnaissance" all the time. It's not and should not be a distinct activity. Now translating that into organisation, training and doctrine, may still be a problem.

Agree. Nothing we currently do is new, we just have better toys. Trying to institutionalize it, get everyone using the same language, and execute is difficult. Specialization is required in special units conducting man-hunting, tracking, etc, but recon is simply a task conducted by every soldier on every level.


Originally posted by Tom Odom:
Reconnaissance is a time duration limited and target defined operation. Humans look at something and report back. But you can do recce with technical means as in aerial recce.

Surveillance is continuous in its goal against a target area with more general criteria for what is actually of interest. As such it is more conducive to use of technical means

Well said.


Originally posted by Tom Odom: So if you find confusion in this arena today do not be surprised. It is a tradition

I'll refrain from my comments about Fort Knox. I have a love/hate relationship with the school house. As a young 2LT, I remember a colonel stating that, "the M1A1 tank is the premier reconnaissance platform in the US Army inventory." Years later, sitting deep in a hide site in some very thick palm groves overwatching an enemy safe-house, I whispered that story to my senior medic. I had to cover his mouth while he burst out laughing so that we weren't compromised.

In a perfect world, I'd send every new soldier and officer to the SLC (Scout Leaders course), RSLC (Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course), and Ranger school. The combination of those schools would provide a good understanding of both mounted and dismounted recon.

v/r

Mike

[RTK]

Wilf, traditionally, the terms surveillance and observation sufficed. I concur with your point. Current Army doctrine on reconnaissance can be very confusing. Back in 2005, when I was a lonely staff weenie trying to transition our infantry battalion into a RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition) unit, I sorted through all the current doctrine and summarized it as best as I could. Simply put, Mike's intepretation of our doctrine is:

1. Reconnaissance- Human Observation
2. Surveillance- Technological Observation (UAV's, sensors, etc)

This simplified our work so when I use the term reconnaissance, I am referring to a group of soldiers collecting intelligence on the terrain or populace to covertly/overtly infiltrate and conduct observation. Likewise, surveillance covers intelligence collected from all the technological toys that we have to play with today.



As I wrote last year in Armor Magazine:

"If surveillance is the passive method, reconnaissance is the resultant active effect when the information gathered during the surveillance period are analyzed and processed."

I think it's important to make the distinction between the two. I think you broke it down better than I did.

[Ken White]

Wilf, you can have Saturday off; Mike, you can have Sunday off, Tom -- you deployed, no soup for you! :D

Seriously, very good stuff -- I agree and have suffered much that both Tom and Mike say. Goes with the job, I guess...

I can recall setting up more than one R&S line that did not entail any reconnaissance to speak of and which had extremely poor ability to surveill due to human limitations; thus Mike's definitions are I think a step forward.

I agree with Wilf and Tom that RSTA is a bad combination. As is ISR...

Mike also said this:
In a perfect world, I'd send every new soldier and officer to the SLC (Scout Leaders course), RSLC (Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course), and Ranger school. The combination of those schools would provide a good understanding of both mounted and dismounted recon.I agree but suggest that if we simply did IET (Officer and Enlisted) correctly, the critical aspects of all three plus current IET would be included -- and those three courses could be tuned to do a far better job than they now do because of having to train some basics and retrain others...

I went to the old I&R course at Benning a long time ago. It effectively was Ranger School minus idle harassment combined with RSLC running nine weeks and it started with the premise that most of us knew and could do more than we did and proceeded to rapidly move forward causing us to have to scramble to keep up. Best Army School I ever attended by far; the old Pathfinder school (when we still did DZs) was the next best -- operated the same way. Only schools I ever attended that did not cram eight hours instruction into three days and that dropped people for non-performance.

Reconnaissance is a necessary and vital function. It IS everyone's job as Wilf says -- it also requires a few, not many, specialists that can do it stealthily, quickly, thoroughly and tell you accurately what's out there without fighting for it. They need to be a bit better than the average bear.

[Tom Odom]

Wilf, you can have Saturday off; Mike, you can have Sunday off, Tom -- you deployed, no soup for you!

Thanks, mate!

But I am home on R&R and headed back this weekend...:D

[Ken White]

Hope the leave was a good 'un! :cool:

Be careful out there.

[carl]

You are correct in that the confusion is rampant, especially with the abuse of the term(s) ISR as a catch all, mean nothing phrase. I sat in a trends refersal conference about 9 years ago and the representative from Ft Huachuca admitted that the school house could not define ISR even as it claimed there was a negative ISR trend that needed to be reversed.

At that same conference, Ft Huachuca and Ft Knox announced an epiphany: Huachuca said that ISR had to be fixed. Knox announced that movement to contact/actions on contact were largely the same (they are not) and that both were in need of a fix. The fix came with a Huachuca statement that in essence claimed it was possible to see all and understand all (gave no vote to the enemy) and Knox gave the Guiness "brilliant" salute with the concurring statement that achieving said goal would eliminate the need for a movement to contact because you would know where the enemy is and would then attack him. Again the enemy had no vote --and neither did I sitting and listening.

The 3 star and all the one stars nodded their heads north and south while I picked my jaw up off the floor.

So if you find confusion in this arena today do not be surprised. It is a tradition.

Best
Tom

This story should be Appendix I of the next edition of Parkinson's Law.

[William F. Owen]

Reconnaissance is a time duration limited and target defined operation. Humans look at something and report back. But you can do recce with technical means as in aerial recce.

Surveillance is continuous in its goal against a target area with more general criteria for what is actually of interest. As such it is more conducive to use of technical means.

Clear, concise and excellent pointer. Owe you a drink for that (even if it was in a manual somewhere) and I'll buy you two if it wasn't!

[Tom Odom]

Clear, concise and excellent pointer. Owe you a drink for that (even if it was in a manual somewhere) and I'll buy you two if it wasn't!

Thanks, mate. Just memory and practice. Headed east tomorrow.

Best
Tom

[Van]

First and foremost; excellent thread. Challenging assumptions is an underpracticed discipline in the organizations I've been part of.


...My basic point is that everyone does "reconnaissance" all the time. It's not and should not be a distinct activity...

Yes, everyone does recon all the time.

Aphorism to live by; the secret to military success is reconnaissance and rehearsal. Most failure can be traced back to one of these two things.

But, "...should not be a distinct activity..."
-Not everyone is equally competent at recon, and we don't have time to train and educate everyone to the level I'd want my scouts at. But we don't ask scouts to be brilliant mechanics, either.
-Operationally, it's useful to have recon discussed as a discrete activity. Stop discussing a necessary step, and people will assume it away (sealing their doom).
-In the budget wars, politicians and their uniform wearing toadies will cut numbers anywhere they can. Having dedicated scouts in a unit is having the bodies commited to a necessary task. Take away the recon element and the political hacks will claim it as a brilliant cost saving while expecting the unit to do everything they did when they had more people.

Let's not denigrate the advantages of specialization.

Maybe we're looking at this backwards.

Rather than doing away with dedicated scouts, why not make scouts the basic unit? In the U.S. Army, 19D Cavalry Scout may be the most broadly trained soldier outside of Special Forces. Small, highly dispersed recon elements finding the enemy and coordinating air and artillery strikes was one on the visions of ground forces proposed in the '80s and '90s.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not suggesting that "Recon" is not vitally important. It is. FIND is the first Core Function.

I think Surveillance/Observation, in the service of static security, or screening is vital and probably requires Formation level, specifically trained and equipped unit. Also such units are extremely useful in irregular warfare as well.

However, going and "Finding" the enemy is a very costly business, especially as the enemy is often only detected when they open fire.

Yes, I am aware that in forest/jungle or close terrain, small Recon Units can usually detect major units, either moving or at rest, but that probably requires theatre and conflict specific unit training programs, and personally, I think every infantry unit should be able to take a good stab at that type of task.

[Fuchs]

My basic point is that everyone does "reconnaissance" all the time. It's not and should not be a distinct activity

Wilf, you have a tendency to call for masters of all trades and to completely disregard the advantages of specialization.

That may be almost acceptable in "small and nice" armies like the Royal Army.
Yet, it's a REALLY BAD idea in general and especially in major conflicts.

You should really pay more attention to specialization advantages.

We can cook, but that doesn't mean that there should be no cooks, therefore no restaurants.


A better approach is in my opinion to keep XY specialists (albeit they don't need to be specialised in only one field) but to also place due emphasis on basic XY expertise (in that area) for many others, just in case.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, you have a tendency to call for masters of all trades and to completely disregard the advantages of specialization.


Well then you mis-understand me. I am all for specialisation. My whole approach is geared to being extremely good at a small number of general tasks.

It is the nature of those tasks that are the issue. As far as I am concerned an infantry unit IS a close reconnaissance unit or patrol unit. Is an infantry Platoon that cannot do those things, actually any good at all?

The issues arise when you start fine slicing the tasks, that create a specialisation. That's when time, and money are wasted and mission drift sets in.

[davidbfpo]

Team,

Should we not also consider the quasi-military recce performed, within treaties e.g. BRIXMIS in East Germany 1945-1980 and as mandated by the UN for example UNSCOM in Iraq? I accept inspection is not normally a military recce role.

There remains a profusion of monitoring missions around the world, OSCE in Europe and UN bodies beyond.

Just a thought from my armchair.

davidbfpo

[Fuchs]

Well then you mis-understand me. I am all for specialisation. My whole approach is geared to being extremely good at a small number of general tasks.

It is the nature of those tasks that are the issue. As far as I am concerned an infantry unit IS a close reconnaissance unit or patrol unit. Is an infantry Platoon that cannot do those things, actually any good at all?

The issues arise when you start fine slicing the tasks, that create a specialisation. That's when time, and money are wasted and mission drift sets in.

Come on, whenever I talk or write about anything that's specialized, you come up with the statement that your standard infantry should be able of doing it anyway. You never gave me the impression that you understood the importance of specialization advantages or the importance and rigidity of mindsets.

I've got a strong impression that you're developing your theory for the top 5% of an army's personnel resources.


One example: There's no doubt that really good armoured recce requires a special type of leaders; especially daring ones who feel comfortable moving into the dangerous unknown.

That kind of mind is rare (just think of your Wignam source). The dedicated armoured recce units exploit many of the few suitable officers.

You could of course say that armoured recce is something that every tank company should be capable of.
Right, but armour companies would be loud and they have a wrong mindset.

Recce is nevertheless an essential element of armor activities.

[Van]

... As far as I am concerned an infantry unit IS a close reconnaissance unit or patrol unit...

Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.

Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.

The difficulty with "Wider Recce" is that many first rate military people aren't comfortable with duplicity, and this sort of strategic recon is very close to low-down, nasty, espionage. Honest, noble combat arms folks and harder working support people might find this distasteful, bordering on unethical.

Me, I'm not saddled with that sort of baggage. :D

[Ken White]

Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.The question is how many Commanders in the US Army today are willing to allow that to happen?
Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.Probably so -- and perhaps doesn't bear too much open discussion anyway... :o

[William F. Owen]

Come on, whenever I talk or write about anything that's specialized, you come up with the statement that your standard infantry should be able of doing it anyway. You never gave me the impression that you understood the importance of specialization advantages or the importance and rigidity of mindsets.

In which case I am failing in my attempt to outline what and more importantly WHY, the infantry should be core arm of land warfare.

More over it entirely depends what level and type of specialisation we are talking about.

[William F. Owen]

Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.


"Close" is a UK term, essentially meaning, "dismounted." Personally, I feel General Infantry should be able to sustain themselves for about 72 hours, but the devil is in the detail. (6 x PRC-148 batteries per set for a start).

However, the only reason I am not suggesting every infantry platoon should be de-facto SOG-type RT is because the comparison is simplistic. Having said that, the UK's 1937 Infantry training regulations did state that night reconnaissance patrolling was the "gold standard" of infantry work. Words to the effect, that any Platoon/section that can do that well, has little difficulty with anything else.

[Rifleman]

In the '80s, I understood close to be inside the arty fan (105s and 4.2s for me). Long range patrolling was outside the arty fan.

That was an informal light/airborne outlook.

Battalion scout platoons operated "close." Division LRRP units operated "long." There was no brigade level recon that I can recall.

[RTK]

In the '80s, I understood close to be inside the arty fan (105s and 4.2s for me). Long range patrolling was outside the arty fan.

That was an informal light/airborne outlook.

Battalion scout platoons operated "close." Division LRRP units operated "long." There was no brigade level recon that I can recall.

When did Brigade Reconnaissance Troops come to being?

[Van]

When did Brigade Reconnaissance Troops come to being?

At least in the 2nd BDE 1st Armored Div, 1998-9. (I was the 1-35 AR S2 at the tail end of standing up the BRT.)

I like Rifleman's definition of 'close'; within organic fire and DS support (check or hold?).

As to Ken's question about how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments. Consider one of the key arguments against 7.62mm NATO caliber rifles - "Soldiers rarely engage targets past 400m"... So we'll remove the capability so they cannot engage targets past 400m, and not bother to train them to? Now, this is Cold War surplus doctrine, when badguys wore distinctive clothes and hats, but the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.

I firmly believe in the most flexible and highest quality tools, and training to get the best advantage out of those tools.

Sadly, there are too many ORSA bean-counters and political hack accountants that advocate lowering the standards to save money and make the troops fit their models better.

[Van]

Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.Probably so -- and perhaps doesn't bear too much open discussion anyway... :o

Yeah, I'm inclined to limit my comments to discussions of Baden-Powell's Aids to Scouting for NCOs and Men (http://www.amazon.com/Baden-Powells-aids-scouting-N-C-Os-men/dp/B0006F5J1E/) and My Adventures as a Spy (http://www.amazon.com/My-Adventures-Spy-Robert-Baden-Powell/dp/1435378709/), although Allen Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence (http://www.amazon.com/Craft-Intelligence-Legendary-Fundamentals-Gathering/dp/1592282970/) has some good discussion of the general concept.

P.S. I've got soft copy of Baden-Powell's books, drop me a PM and they'll be on the way.

V

[Fuchs]

Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.

Uhmm, Mr. thread opener thinks he meant this to be about armoured recce. ;)

[Ken White]

Rifleman:

That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war... :mad:

Prior to that foolishness, the rule of thumb was that close was indeed inside organic and DS fire support range but that was the province of the Companies. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoons (recall they were mounted where Scouts are not) had no close or distance restrictions, it was simply a METT based decision and I've operated 60-70 km out for three to five days at a time on many occasions. We pulled two mounted missions in Viet Nam when I was the acting PL and there were no distance or support limits. The rest of the time, we used Helicopter insertions and those were frequently 50-100 km away from everything.

The Separate Brigades in VN had LRP Platoons and Cav Troops. What they did depended on th Bde Cdr. That was all general practice in training prior to VN. After VN, we got stupid.

Van:
...how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments.True on both counts. The Commanders are constrained by yet another Viet Nam myth and our newly acquired risk aversion. That needs to go. The current TOEs are a 1990s production designed to save spaces and money; it is not a wartime TOE -- and that tradition of peacetime design has hurt the US Army on many occasions. :mad:

I'd note that the Scouts being dismounted are far more a result of the cost of a HMMWV being ten times the cost of the M151 it replaced than any logical doctrinal or tactical reason...
...the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.EXACTLY! We continually do this. Criminal. :mad:

Fuchs
...thinks he meant this to be about armoured recceHe may think that but that's not exactly what he said: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=80185&postcount=1). No intent to hijack but recce is a broad topic. In US usage, Scouts generally do dismounted stuff, Cavalry does mounted stuff and Reconnaissance or recce is the act that both perform. All that said not to pick on you, but after three 'mad' icons above, I wanted to leave smiling. ;)

[tankersteve]

(Warning: shameless plug)

I just started reading Scout's Out, and therefore have not formed an opinion on the content, but the cover photo is SGT Burns, one of the tankers in my company in Tal Afar. For that alone, I presently approve:D.

Tankersteve

[Steve Blair]

Rifleman:

That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war... :mad:



Part of that grew out of combat experience with the 4th ID in the Central Highlands (although it later spread to other CTZs and sectors), and was really a result of the 4th being asked to cover FAR too much territory. The 4th also gave birth to the short range recon concept (as distinct from LRRP and considered a death sentence by those asked to do the short-range missions) and a number of other ideas that seem to have lingered on well past their shelf-life.

[Ken White]

but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.

[Steve Blair]

but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.

I should have been more accurate. They weren't spread as far as the Americal, but they did operate in terrain that (especially in the early days) they didn't seem to understand, and also had to deal with the presence of large NVA concentrations just across the border (which, again, they seemed to have issues dealing with). My read on their ops in the early days has always been that after a few rough encounters they went over to larger-unit patrols and operations within artillery fans no matter what. That comment of course applies to the units working the Highlands and no so much those down near the coast.

You're quite correct, I think, in their desire to continue controlling ops as a division as opposed to recognizing the decentralized elements of their environment. There was also the issue of the "brigade swap" between them and the 25th ID down by Saigon. I've never seen much concerning how that might have impacted their operations, although I'd certainly suspect that it wasn't for the better...

I'm not sure, but it might have been General Peers who came up with the SRP (short range patrol) concept. Don't remember off the top of my head, but it came into use around 1967. Some units did ignore it, while others tried to put it into place.

[slapout9]

One of the SWJ research Links is called... A Horse Soldier Speaks..., here is a paper he wrote in 1981. Just found it so I haven't read it myself but seems have some merit for this thread.



http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=983&filename=984.pdf

[120mm]

However, going and "Finding" the enemy is a very costly business, especially as the enemy is often only detected when they open fire.


Seriously? In recon terms, this is what we call "Not doing it right."

Otherwise, I am warming to your ideas vis-a-vis recon.

Personally, I still pray to the "Find the enemy" God at night for dissolution of MI branch and return of surveillance assets to those who know what they're good for.

[William F. Owen]

Seriously? In recon terms, this is what we call "Not doing it right."

Concur, but in the Lebanon in 2006, a great many enemy positions where not detected until soldiers were within some meters of them, despite extensive surveillance and observation. Look at OP Anaconda? A lot of the AQ positions went undetected until they opened fire.

My point being, many (not all) reconnaissance missions, will entail "advancing to contact." Over watch and surveillance will help, but you might as well not lead with your chin!

Not one size of Reconnaissance fits all, which is why I get little concerned when it becomes an equipment and formation specific role.

[MikeF]

Concur, but in the Lebanon in 2006, a great many enemy positions where not detected until soldiers were within some meters of them, despite extensive surveillance and observation. Look at OP Anaconda? A lot of the AQ positions went undetected until they opened fire.

My point being, many (not all) reconnaissance missions, will entail "advancing to contact." Over watch and surveillance will help, but you might as well not lead with your chin!

Not one size of Reconnaissance fits all, which is why I get little concerned when it becomes an equipment and formation specific role.


God created tanks. :cool:

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

God created tanks. :cool:

Amen Brother Mike. Might as well take a big gun to a gun fight.
In a tank or on foot, I the see the "Advance to Contact," as the bread and butter or ground based reconnaissance. That does not mean charging ahead regardless. It means good use of ground, and moving at a rate that does not prejudice your safety or the mission.

[Fuchs]

Does anybody know/have files about the French armoured recce?
I understand that they have a rather unique idea of armoured recce, as they're the strongest proponents of 90-105mm armed 6wd recce vehicles in NATO (and possibly world-wide).

[Fuchs]

This is the kind of stuff and quality I am (still) looking for:
Trading the saber for stealth (http://www.ausa.org/pdfdocs/LWP_53.pdf)

Mod's Note: link is broken.

The main disadvantage of this study is that it's very U.S.-specific, mostly about (predictable) disillusionment.

[jmm99]

this char-jockey (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=615) - RICM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RICM) avec 10RCs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMX-10RC).

Bonne chance.

Mike

[jcustis]

Fuchs,

Any luck finding new material on this subject?

[davidbfpo]

Might this fit Fuchs & Jon C's quest for information?

'The French Rapid Effects System', an article from the annual RUSI publication RUSI Defence Systems:http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_Oct2010_Birchall.pdf

The UK equivalent, known here as FRES, is a project mired in controversy and after millions spent nothing has appeared.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

Any luck finding new material on this subject?

Not much. Tiny bits from different sources only.
My own ideas (or whatever I think are my ideas - you never know, maybe I just forgot that I've heard the idea before?) clearly outnumbered my findings from sources in the last two years.

I suspect that most relevant post-1990 works are probably linked to ideas like DO. I do also suspect that most relevant works are simply not easily accessible.


Let's at least hope that our opposition in the next major war didn't make enough progress in (counter-)scouting tactics. The Western forces surely don't even master the full scope (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/07/what-is-armoured-reconnaissance-good.html) of (counter-)scouting tactics and missions of WW2.
I'm especially concerned about the trend towards surveillance instead of scouting. Scouts ought to be something else than (very) forward observers.

[jcustis]

Might this fit Fuchs & Jon C's quest for information?

'The French Rapid Effects System', an article from the annual RUSI publication RUSI Defence Systems:http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_Oct2010_Birchall.pdf

The UK equivalent, known here as FRES, is a project mired in controversy and after millions spent nothing has appeared.


I don't understand how they determined that a single-man turret could be put to good use in something they are classifying as a IFV. It looks more like an APC, in the same vein as the Marine Corps' AAV, the US M113, etc. The allowance for a troop commander station doesn't do much more than allow him access to communication assets he might otherwise struggle with if in the back compartment.

This is a pretty interesting snippet right here:



The French demonstration troops at the Section Technique de l’Armée de Terre (STAT) and the 35th Infantry Regiment have now completed a sequence of trials on the VBCI, starting with just one vehicle in October 2008 and building up through four levels of command to a Battle Group-level trial in July 2009, which also included urban warfare. The objectives of the trials were to assess the impact of VBCI on infantry manoeuvre, make changes to tactical procedures, operational training and collective skills,
and, of course, modify field doctrine and manuals.

The findings from these extensive trials, involving more than 30 VBCIs and crews, have been profound. In his presentation to the AFV Symposium in 2009 year, Colonel Alain Vidal (STAT) described the experience as a “revolution”. Most importantly, the lessons learnt during trials have already been translated into a new doctrine that has been issued from the French School of Infantry to all infantry units, which are being equipped
with VBCI.

I read this to mean that the "revolution" was not necessarily something that complemented current capabilities, but rather that they had to take existing doctrine and re-write it to fit the limitations of the vehicle. That's what I infer from looking at the vehicle.

The challenge with recce (and some IFV) vehicles stems from a couple of factors that tend to dominate the matter of actually being effective. The first is the business of conducting the reconnaissance in the first place. In armored recce, I'd argue that the force has to have the capability to do it quickly, relative to the main forces that are waiting to make the move forward based on the information collected.

The second component is that as a force mounted in these vehicles conducts the recce, it needs to report the information. That can be done in-stride or at a halt, with the in-stride method being preferred (at least in my book) since it supports maintaining relative tempo against the enemy.

I have had the occasion to employ our Blue Force Tracker C2 system in a number of platforms, from the M1114, M-ATV, MRAP, MTVR 7-ton truck, and both the LAV-25 and LAV-C2 variants. As the vehicle bangs around and one tries to type out a message or even extract a grid location to pass over the radio via voice, it requires a ballet that keeps the vehicle commander's head down and situational awareness degrades as a result. This can be mitigated by an experienced driver who can tend to a lot of things by himself, but the most effective assistant is the vehicle gunner. When I was a company commander, I routinely had my gunner directing the movement of the LAV-25, reporting some information, answering radio calls coming from higher headquarters, as well as recording fragmentary orders while I was issuing one to the platoons.

In our light armored community, we refer to the synergy of the driver, gunner, and vehicle commander as crew cohesion, and is why we strive to avoid disrupting crew assignments as much as possible. The human factor of a crew training, qualifying, and then deploying together, is significant and has played out time and again in the real world. When everyone is working together, and utilizing a two-man turret where the gunner can direct the vehicle's movement for short periods, the commander can tend to a lot of tasks while he works the business of collecting, analyzing, and reporting that combat information. Although I know this is totally an apples-to-oranges analogy, the process of trying to do all this is akin to flying a jet fighter. I have used the term "task overload" to describe those moments when a vehicle commander cannot effectively juggle the things he needs to do to fight the vehicle. This same condition causes student pilots to wash out if they cannot manage the information coming into their brain and fly the aircraft.

A one-man turret only exacerbates the difficulty, and therefore, the French are going to get a less capable vehicle. If you want to move troops from point A to point B in an administrative fashion, then you can get away with this sort of vehicle. Their organization may be a little less tiered as well, with one platoon commander for say, 5-10 VBCIs, and those subordinate vehs might not be expected to exercise much in the way of independent action. Either way efficiently fighting or conducting recce from a on-man turret is a wholly different prospect altogether.

Also from the article:



Secondly, it has been achieved by what the French call ‘Integrated Qualification’, which means that at every stage of design and development, approval is signed off by a triumvirate of user, designer and procurer. This system pre-empts problems, speeds up development, making kit cheaper and, critically, fosters the much vaunted and desired ‘no surprise’ culture

This sounds like a great approach, but tells me that someone in the triumvirate is enamored with shiny little things, and has been checking off on capabilities that don't make much sense.

If anyone has access to the field trial information Col Vidal references, I"m keen to see it. Isn't he the program manager of the thing anyway; of course he'd declare remarkable success! :wry:

Fuch, I suppose if you were able to get a hold of some of the presentations coming out of the light armored vehicle summits for the past few years, you might be able to get some theoretical material.