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Kiwigrunt
08-19-2009, 12:34 PM
On posts 14 and 15 of this (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=80361#post80361) thread Jcustis suggested and Ken linked this (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf) 7.4 Mb pdf called ‘Scouts out’.

Interesting link, thanks for posting it.
Haven’t read the whole thing yet, just the conclusion. (No, I don’t do that when I read novels:p)

From the conclusion (page 202 / 203)

Instead of being a function of specialized troops, perhaps reconnaissance is one of many functions of maneuver units similar to attack, defend, or move. Commanders cannot misuse units if they are organized and equipped to perform a variety of functions, of which reconnaissance is but one. So organized, former reconnaissance units will provide more flexible employment similar to the interchangeable modular brigades. As one of many similar units, they will not require augmentation. The heavy-light debate will then become moot or part of a larger discussion over the equipping of general-purpose forces.

So as not to digress from that original thread which is about armoured recon units, I’ve started a new one to see if the conclusions from this article can be applied to infantry battalions. This conclusion is conceptually (I think) what Jcustis and Wilf seem to suggest (on another thread which I can’t find back) with regards to dedicated snipers at battalion level. With other words, doing away with them. Just for clarification, they suggest DMR’s as opposed to snipers, so as not to loose the ‘sharp shooting’ aspect.
Or is their surveillance role (still combined with sniping?), as apposed to their recon role, under the S2 still useful, as this part of the conclusion may suggest:

(page 205)

The technical aspects of reconnaissance that do not require routine interface with enemy forces and rely on specialized equipment, such as radars, are usually referred to collectively as surveillance operations. Surveillance operations do require specialized troops. However, the functions of such troops are clearly in the realm of combat support, not combat, and more properly belong in military intelligence support units rather than in combat squadrons.


And for as far as those snipers are part of a recon platoon, that platoon could then be renamed / re-rolled as a surveillance platoon…..

Another reason I can think of to keep snipers employed would be for counter-sniping (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6773)


…..hmmm, food for thought, any takers?


PS: Schmedlap, I like your leather personnel carriers. Are the soles V-shaped?:D

Fuchs
08-19-2009, 01:07 PM
Infantry battalions have mortars, yet brigades have howitzers.

Infantry squads have designated marksmen, yet battalions should have a sniper plt.

A KISS drive might eliminate such partial redundancies, but that doesn't appear to be optimal to me.

Specialization advantages, a pool of expertise and the ability to attach experts to units based on their needs look promising to me.

Mark O'Neill
08-19-2009, 01:58 PM
Snipers shape (and destroy) , and snipers and recon inform, Both are vital at the tactical level in cOIN,

Cheers

Mark

William F. Owen
08-19-2009, 02:11 PM
My beef/ concerns are basically as follows.

Precise effect, long range rifleman are good. No argument. Hitting folks with one shot at 6-900m is a capability I want in Companies and Platoons as part of my fire support.

I also want an STA capability, to call in fires and conduct observation - that may include operating a small UAV -. Do I want the same men doing the same job and the same time? My opinion is that I do not.
I want to simplify "Sniping" down to long range fire support, and build it as an individual skill based on some degree of natural ability.

Mark O'Neill
08-19-2009, 02:19 PM
My beef/ concerns are basically as follows.

Precise effect, long range rifleman are good. No argument. Hitting folks with one shot at 6-900m is a capability I want in Companies and Platoons as part of my fire support.

I also want an STA capability, to call in fires and conduct observation - that may include operating a small UAV -. Do I want the same men doing the same job and the same time? My opinion is that I do not.
I want to simplify "Sniping" down to long range fire support, and build it as an individual skill based on some degree of natural ability.

But no one said that snipers were an 'in lieu' item for effective ISTAR systems on the battlefield. In sucessful armys they are a complimentary.



regards

Mark

William F. Owen
08-19-2009, 02:57 PM
But no one said that snipers were an 'in lieu' item for effective ISTAR systems on the battlefield. In sucessful armys they are a complimentary.



OK, so why do I want my limited sniper manpower grouped off, with "ISTAR" and not in the platoons?

Rifleman
08-19-2009, 02:58 PM
I want to simplify "Sniping" down to long range fire support, and build it as an individual skill based on some degree of natural ability.

Exactly. And just because artillery forward observers and snipers are both trained, professional observers doesn't mean they belong in the same platoon.

Ken White
08-19-2009, 05:19 PM
Sorry, old US TV commerical allegory... :D


...Hitting folks with one shot at 6-900m is a capability I want in Companies and Platoons as part of my fire support.Agree.
I also want an STA capability, to call in fires and conduct observation - that may include operating a small UAV -. Do I want the same men doing the same job and the same time? My opinion is that I do not.Disagree.

All the UAVs and technical means in town cannot replace a good scout. Good scouts are born, not made and there aren't many of them about -- but a good one is worth his weight in Kiwi Fruit and can do things no gadget will ever do. Even a mediocre scout is better than not having one. We may get to the point in future where that is no longer true -- but at this time, it certainly is.

My belief is that the 'snipers / DM / whatever you want to call them' should not be in the Scout organization. While those shooters, like every other Infantryman are ISTAR sources and good ones, their primary aim is different (pun intended). "Shooters over here, you Scouts go out and play..." :wry:

Thus you have the shooters at Company level -- I'd go for Platoon level, one team each, Co Cdr to pull for some missions (or give him a team also). With maybe a couple of teams at Bn level; senior NCO to be the shooter trainer, working for the S3.

A Scout Section working for the S2. A platoon is probably more than are needed, 10-12 for a Bn should be adequate for most purposes. They should operate purely in a stealth, sneak and peek mode, lightly armed to preclude getting into firefights. Many in combat carried just a pistol for that reason.

Purely light Infantry should have just that Scout Section. Old style heavy or standard infantry and mechanized infantry, all with vehicles should have, in addition to the Scouts, a mounted Reconnaissance or Cavalry Platoon able to fight for information. Light Infantry should never be put in a situation where that's required (but they should be able to employ an OpCon or Attached Cavalry Troop).

My experience in doing jobs like that for a fair number of years is that most S2/S3 and Commanders do not really know how to employ their Scouts or Recce elements. Thus the Scouts Out contention that most dedicated recce units end up as minor combat units. That has been true but need not be as that result is directly attributable to my observation. :rolleyes:

Said Scouts and Recce/Recon Platoons should not be used as a palace or commanders guard. Ever. :mad:

Michael C
08-19-2009, 08:22 PM
The problem in Afghanistan, and sometimes in Iraq from what I have heard, is not that snipers cannot do their job, or that the Battalion doesn't have enough people, but that they cannot effectively patrol based on restrictions placed by higher. These restrictions are that units must have a minimal manning to leave the wire, and often that manning is more than a scout team needs to be effective.

My thoughts are FOs have a role, recon soldiers have a role and snipers have a role in combat (both high intensity maneuver and counter-insurgency). If I were king of the Army, and I am not, I would designated marksman at the platoon level, sniper teams at the company level, a purely recon/scout platoon for the infantry battalion, then an additional sniper platoon at the battalion level. Basically, after months engaging an enemy at distances always greater than 500 meters, I don't think you can have too much long range marksmanship.

Steve Blair
08-19-2009, 08:50 PM
My experience in doing jobs like that for a fair number of years is that most S2/S3 and Commanders do not really know how to employ their Scouts or Recce elements. Thus the Scouts Out contention that most dedicated recce units end up as minor combat units. That has been true but need not be as that result is directly attributable to my observation. :rolleyes:

I wonder how much of this has its roots in the Army's early historical practice (prior to World War I, to put 'early' in context) of farming out a great deal of the "sneaking and peaking" side of recon to either private contractor-types or highly-specialized units (often of an ad-hoc nature)?

jcustis
08-20-2009, 05:25 AM
Or is their surveillance role (still combined with sniping?), as apposed to their recon role, under the S2 still useful, as this part of the conclusion may suggest:

Snipers should snipe (along with employ long-range indirect fires) AND conduct surveillance. They should not attempt reconnaissance as a primary mission set...at least not snipers organized within a battalion.

USMC sniper platoons used to be uniformly referred to as STA Plts, (or Surveillance, Target, Acquisition). In that role, they are great for our MEU capabilities. I think we quickly learned that bad habits can crop up when you try to employ a sniper team in a thoroughly hostile environment of Iraq, while utilizing TTP best suited to a semi-permissive environment found in a peacekeeping/enforcement or non-combatant evacuation type op.

Ken was right when he talked about:


Old style heavy or standard infantry and mechanized infantry, all with vehicles should have, in addition to the Scouts, a mounted Reconnaissance or Cavalry Platoon able to fight for information.

Being able to fight for information is a key component of the doctrine...the "what you should do" aspect of doctrine. He is also right when he concurs with the contention that dedicated recce units typically become minor combat units. That's what I was getting at with the other thread that USMC LAR units are great at execution but could use work at planning. It was a light-hearted cut at the fact that we will always be glad to bite off more than we can realistically chew, while we are executing tasks that some might call reconnaissance, but we would refer to as a good old fashioned movement to contact, or vice versa.. It is bred into us, after all, despite the cavalry blood that also runs through our veins...having a 25mm cannon can be a intoxicating thing sometimes :D.

Successive OIF rotations have had an adverse impact on our core competencies though, since there has been a whole lotta commuting to work for several years, through the same terrain, villages, and road networks.

I've done both straight-legged infantry and light armored recon time, and though I haven't done specialized recon time the likes of Division or Force Recon (which are different beasts anyway), I don't think there is a need for any recon formation within a battalion. Companies can do it well enough alone, and are in fact supposed to do that as a functi0on of the types of combat patrols under RACES. Our doctrine says as much here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/18404280/US-Marine-Corps-Scouting-and-Patrolling-MCWP-3113

If it is a frontage or depth issue, than call in a specialized asset that can accomplish what you need. Surprisingly enough, collecting the information isn't what I think requires the advanced training, it is the reporting piece that requires the extra effort, because you have to report what you know, and add the assessment in only at the end (and sometimes only when specifically asked).

That's a tall order for the coy commander who has been bred to do just about everything with an eye towards recommending a course of action as soon as he makes contact. If he is a GP infantry guy, he may think more in terms of defend, attack, or fix so someone else can attack, whereas I might think more in terms of finding the seam, or bypassing. based on my bypass criteria.

Interesting thread though kiwigrunt. It'll be interesting to se how it pans out.

Rifleman
08-20-2009, 06:23 AM
Thus you have the shooters at Company level -- I'd go for Platoon level, one team each, Co Cdr to pull for some missions (or give him a team also). With maybe a couple of teams at Bn level; senior NCO to be the shooter trainer, working for the S3.


It seems that snipers have usually been employed most effectively at battalion level. Having said that, company commanders could most likely use a true sniping capability, not just "designated marksmen."

I've mentioned before that I like the idea of a "sharpshooter type" rifle squad led by a senior staff sergeant in a rifle company's weapons platoon. The squad should be big enough to attach a team (or two?) of DMs out to each rifle platoon and have a team left under the company commander's control. Platoon leaders could further attach the DMs directly to a squad if necessary for operations but I don't like the idea of DMs living with a rifle squad full time even if it's been done successfully before.

Use the arms room concept: the teams attached to rifle platoons would likely operate with semi-auto rifles with the team(s) employed by the company commander using bolt rifles or a .50 Barrett, mission dependant.

This squad should also be a natural for things like LP/OP duty or other types of screening.

Ken White
08-20-2009, 07:15 AM
Jon:

It's not that the Rifle Cos can't / aren't patrolling and plunking in beaucoup Intel, the reasons for a Bn Scout section are to avoid having to task a Co to provide a patrol that would take people away from their Sector or Zone for those EEI that the S2 identifies that do not fall clearly in the areas assigned to a Co; to provide some Intel trained eyes that can notice things that the Co patrols might miss due to personnel turbulence, casualties/replacements, etc.; Provide people that can give a good full bore report -- a trained observer and reporter is better than a good one. It allows for special training in forensic examination, document review, Rifle Co Recon Patrol debriefs and other good stuff without having to cull from the Cos some who might have had such training -- I can go on for another hour. :wry:

However, I do acknowledge that they would have / have had limited use in most Bn AOs in Iraq. They probably would have little employment in Afghanistan in current reality but that job is tailor made for such a section -- provided the Theater Commander had the testicular fortitude required to let 'em be sent out.

In a mid intensity or high intensity situation, they'll earn their money many times over. Partly due to Rifle Co casualties and personnel turnover.

Not a frontage issue in all cases but it can be -- it is a depth issue in the sense that the Rifle Co Recon (Combat patrols are a separate animal and they belong to the Cos and not to the Scout sect) Patrols should normally go out no more than 10-15 km, max, generally less -- and METT-TC dependent -- so they run about 4 hours out and 4 back, max (with 4-6 total being better and with no overnight stays) the Scout Sec, OTOH should be prepared for three to five day patrols in bad guy territory or up to about 30 km out. Not everyone grooves on that-- or can do it. Div Recon should be used for the stuff from 30-100km out while Force Recon can do the strategic stuff beyond 100km.

What usually happens in peacetime is the Sections get cut, the Rifle Cos get tabbed to do things they should not and Div gets called in to do what should be the Bn's job while force is busy with other things (That from a former Div [war] and Force [peace] guy ;) ).

Rifleman:

You said:
:It seems that snipers have usually been employed most effectively at battalion level..."Is that because that's where they've been placed most of the time due to fear of unsupervised NCOs shooting the wrong people or because that's really the most effective location? ;)
"Having said that, company commanders could most likely use a true sniping capability, not just "designated marksmen."I'd think so -- not least because in Korea there were snipers in most rifle companies in the 1st Mar Div -- some had 'em down to Platoon level. Some units in Viet Nam did the same thing, most didn't bother but the decision was generally based on the terrain and vegetation the unit operated in -- not much call for 5-800m shots in triple canopy... :D

What's your objection to the DM being / staying part of the squad?

Why would you go with a .50 at Co level? For that matter, why go with a bolt gun in the Co?

Rifleman
08-20-2009, 07:49 AM
What's your objection to the DM being / staying part of the squad?

For some of the same reasons that crew served weapons are usually kept seperate for training and garrison and attached out as needed. It seems to me that snipers and DMs would better trained under the supervision of a senior staff sergeant with sniper experience instead of a rifle squad leader who might not have any.


Why would you go with a .50 at Co level?

It wouldn't have to be a .50 but wouldn't it be benificial for the company commander have some kind of heavy rifle available?


For that matter, why go with a bolt gun in the Co?

Why, because you're just not a real sniper without a bolt rifle. Think about it. With a semi-auto you actually have to wait for gas to cycle the action before firing again, while a good man with a bolt rifle can.....;)

Seriously though, I was just thinking that a semi-auto isn't as necessary once you're removed some distance from the firefight and perhaps operating in something closer to a true sniper role instead of a DM role, plus the M24 is still in the system and will be for some time, won't it?

But I'd be less concerned about what rifle is used and more concerned about grouping all snipers/DMs into a single squad for training and admin. MGs do it that way, mortars do it that way, anti-armor does it that way, etc. Sometimes those weapons mass and sometimes they're attached out. Seems to me that concept sould also work well with snipers/DMs at rifle company level, that's all.

As always, Sergeant Major, I look forward to your rebuttal! :)

William F. Owen
08-20-2009, 07:55 AM
Disagree.
I'm not sure you do!


All the UAVs and technical means in town cannot replace a good scout. Good scouts are born, not made and there aren't many of them about -- but a good one is worth his weight in Kiwi Fruit and can do things no gadget will ever do. Even a mediocre scout is better than not having one. We may get to the point in future where that is no longer true -- but at this time, it certainly is.
Concur. There are good "stalkers / scouts." Yes, if you can find them and train them, then they are a positive asset.
I am not suggesting we replace that capability with UAVs, but some of the new tactical UAV capabilities are extremely impressive, and also combat proven. My point being, let's not confuse, Sniping/Scouting and STA as all being the same thing. They are not.

My belief is that the 'snipers / DM / whatever you want to call them' should not be in the Scout organization. While those shooters, like every other Infantryman are ISTAR sources and good ones, their primary aim is different (pun intended). "Shooters over here, you Scouts go out and play..." :wry:
Yes I agree. Different jobs, so different people doing different things, but that becomes very hard to sustain, when you have "sniper training" that emphasises an STA type task, and the reason it does comes purely from WW1, and trench warfare.

Ken White
08-20-2009, 07:14 PM
For some of the same reasons that crew served weapons are usually kept seperate for training and garrison and attached out as needed. It seems to me that snipers and DMs would better trained under the supervision of a senior staff sergeant with sniper experience instead of a rifle squad leader who might not have any.Totally agree with your logic but not the solution. First, a key distinction is just that 'crew served' -- keep the 'crew' together in both garrison and combat. Recall also that all the crew served weapons we have are best employed in multiples (yes, even the Javelin) so keeping the crew together for cohesion makes sense, training them altogether makes sense. Employing then together makes sense.

The designated marksman, to be most effective in combat should part of a crew involved in the fire and maneuver business. That crew is the squad so that's where he or she should be. The training issue in garrison is easily solved by scheduling the DM sustainment training so that they all get together under the senior Co (or Bn) DM / Sniper. In my view, you'd have two Sniper * tms at Co, a DM in every squad and the senior Sniper becomes the Co DM trainer. if there's also a Bn Sniper Tm or section, the leader becomes the Bn Master Shooter and oversees training.

Let me caveat all that by saying that's a here and now answer to your point. In a dream world, all the Squad Leaders (and thus the PSG) would have been DMs and would thus know how important the job was and would not neglect the training which they could conduct themselves. I'll add that 'dream' isn't at all hard to achieve -- all it would take is will power and an acknowledgment by the Army (and Congress) that not everyone who sticks around long enough and keeps his nose clean needs to be a Squad Leader...
It wouldn't have to be a .50 but wouldn't it be benificial for the company commander have some kind of heavy rifle available?Yeah but I'd go with a .338 or similar on weight aspects.
Why, because you're just not a real sniper without a bolt rifle. Think about it. With a semi-auto you actually have to wait for gas to cycle the action before firing again, while a good man with a bolt rifle can.....;) Yeah, yeah -- lot of tha going around... :D
Seriously though, I was just thinking that a semi-auto isn't as necessary once you're removed some distance from the firefight and perhaps operating in something closer to a true sniper role instead of a DM role, plus the M24 is still in the system and will be for some time, won't it?Valid on all counts. My though is that to preclude identification by the other guys shooters and on logistic grounds, all the weapons in the Co that can possibly be similar should be, the more they all look and operate alike, the easier your training and the better to conphooze the evil enema. not a big thing, though...


But I'd be less concerned about what rifle is used and more concerned about grouping all snipers/DMs into a single squad for training and admin...Seems to me that concept sould also work well with snipers/DMs at rifle company level, that's all...As always, Sergeant Major, I look forward to your rebuttal! :)here's my re -- the buttal was up above... ;)

I hear you but I think that's a peace and not a warfighting approach -- it also neglects the fact that 'attachments' in combat do not work well, a guy cannot work for two masters and that the DM is an individual with an individual weapon as opposed to a crew with a crew served weapon. Combat cohesion is critical...

A lot of our poor structuring is a result of trying to make life easy in garrison and in peace time; unfortunately, while it works well there it often is a minor problem -- sometimes a major one -- in combat where there are so many bigger problems that the minor ones are overlooked. Not a good way to do it, IMO.

Ken White
08-20-2009, 07:26 PM
I'm not sure you do!... My point being, let's not confuse, Sniping/Scouting and STA as all being the same thing. They are not.I see -- and I agree...
..."sniper training" that emphasises an STA type task, and the reason it does comes purely from WW1, and trench warfare.I also agree with you on the 'Sniper' problem but I'm lazy and use the term as shorthand for 'An individual with an effective long range weapon and sighting appendage designated to fire at high value targets, materiel and personnel with a strong probability of success who is part of the fire support effort.' (thus my Asterisk in the post above to Rifleman when I meant to clarify that I was using the inappropriate term due to intrinsic sedentariosis, an affliction with which I have long suffered. :( ).

I am working on an acronym... ;)

Kiwigrunt
08-20-2009, 08:06 PM
I am working on an acronym... ;)

How about sharp shooter? The acronym for that would be.......ooohps.:eek:

kaur
08-20-2009, 08:10 PM
Wilf, could you elaborate your this thought in this thread context.


PBID essentially suggests that you train, organize, and operate light infantry in a way that best utilizes their inherent strengths. In practice, this means that you train infantry to accomplish two basic tasks, these being a reconnaissance patrol and an observation post. These two core skills are built on a high level of individually developed field-craft skills. In simplistic but easily understood terms, you train Soldiers as snipers and then train them as a recce platoon.


Why? Surely this is completely against the teaching that only the brightest, best, and most experienced of infantry unit Soldiers become snipers and members of the recce platoons.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_95/ai_n16346580/?tag=content;col1

Ken White porposed his definition of sniper:


An individual with an effective long range weapon and sighting appendage designated to fire at high value targets, materiel and personnel with a strong probability of success who is part of the fire support effort.

I think that this is more appropriate to define designated marksman. I'd like to borrow sniper's definition from Mark Spicer's book "Illustrated manual of sniper skills."


Sniping is the employment of individual shooters from concealed positions with no warning, from any distance, depending on the range of the weapon. This is not to say, of course , that to maximize the chances of sniper surviving to fight again, the longer the distance between him and the victim the better. Conversely, if the sniper is able to conceal himself and endage successfully at close range, then that is also sniping.

Page 18,
http://books.google.com/books?id=B5u5UI6NzbcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=mark+spicer#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Last Gun's and Ammo "Book of AR-15" has short article "The Art of the SDM". If understand correctly (with my limited knowledge of English) Army is outsourceing training from civilian shooting community.

Kiwigrunt
08-20-2009, 09:14 PM
Ken White's sniper:

An individual with an effective long range weapon and sighting appendage designated to fire at high value targets, materiel and personnel with a strong probability of success who is part of the fire support effort.

Kaur:

I think that this is more appropriate to define designated marksman. I'd like to borrow sniper's definition from Mark Spicer's book "Illustrated manual of sniper skills."

Mark Spicer's sniper through Kaur:

Sniping is the employment of individual shooters from concealed positions with no warning, from any distance, depending on the range of the weapon. This is not to say, of course, that to maximize the chances of sniper surviving to fight again, the longer the distance between him and the victim the better. Conversely, if the sniper is able to conceal himself and engage successfully at close range, then that is also sniping.

Thanks Kaur.
You illustrated one area where I still can't see snipers being replaced by DMs. I think the issue is in Ken’s last part of his definition: "who is part of the fire support effort".
For as far as the snipers are indeed an integral part of the overall fire support effort, then I can probably agree that a DM is just as useful, if not more so. The strength of a sniper is in the "individual" aspect of his capabilities, supported by his much advanced field-craft skills as compared to average rifleman. A DM is an average rifleman with exceptional shooting skills (I think).
Now I know what Wilf is going to say here, regarding witchcraft etc, and I don’t disagree for as far as the myth-status and such almost celebrity-level exaggerations. But I still can see a potential use for the combination of these exceptional shooting skills and exceptional field craft skills, resulting in the ‘sniper’.

And here lies of course the attraction/risk of having snipers used for the scouting/recon role, which is probably understandable but not necessarily advisable. Conversely that doesn’t mean that there should be a law against it either, IMO.

I think the same level of justification for specialized scouts as compared to recon by line-platoons was well made here:

Ken’s Post 27 of the current parallel thread.

Reconnaissance is a necessary and vital function. It IS everyone's job as Wilf says -- it also requires a few, not many, specialists that can do it stealthily, quickly, thoroughly and tell you accurately what's out there without fighting for it. They need to be a bit better than the average bear.

Bringing that concept back to snipers, I can still see a justification for a number of snipers, probably at battalion level. At lower levels, probably concentrate on DMs.

Ken White
08-20-2009, 09:30 PM
I think that this is more appropriate to define designated marksman. I'd like to borrow sniper's definition from Mark Spicer's book "Illustrated manual of sniper skills."You're right on that being the Designated Marksman (DM). I tend to agree with Wilf that the term Sniper is subject to misuse. For example, Spicer's definition you supplied:
"Sniping is the employment of individual shooters from concealed positions with no warning, from any distance, depending on the range of the weapon. This is not to say, of course, that to maximize the chances of sniper surviving to fight again, the longer the distance between him and the victim the better (1). Conversely, if the sniper is able to conceal himself and engage successfully at close range, then that is also sniping (2)." (Notes added / kw)shows the problem; in the first place 'no warning' is not necessarily always correct or necessary and the distance or range is subject to a great many tactical and terrain variables. In the second case the shooter is doing the same thing any DM does. So While I made my definition mostly as a joke, I think it might really be more accurate than the 'Expert's' serious attempt at a definition.

Wilf's point that the term 'Sniper' suffers from the baggage of the trenches here in the west and from a lot myths worldwide is correct I think.

"Sniper' has been and is misused, Designated Marksman is unwieldy and Sharpshooter has bad connotations. I was also joking about thinking up a new acronym but maybe I really ought to do that. How about 'Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter' (BADASS). Hmm. Maybe not. Needs more work. I'll see what I can come up with...

On the civilian assist in small arms training -- true. There are a lot of sport shooters here that concentrate on long distance shooting. That kind of shooting got to be a lost skill in the Army with the departure of the M1 so to build the skill for a lot of people rapidly, the Shooting Clubs pitched in to help -- as they have in every war we've been in since the 19th Century.

Kiwigrunt
08-20-2009, 09:41 PM
How about 'Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter' (BADASS).

love it:D

Ken White
08-20-2009, 09:42 PM
...The strength of a sniper is in the "individual" aspect of his capabilities, supported by his much advanced field-craft skills as compared to average rifleman. A DM is an average rifleman with exceptional shooting skills (I think).If I understand what you wrote, then a 'sniper' is just an average DM with exceptional capabilities... :wry:

I have a three fold question. What are these exceptional capabilities really; why are they necessary or desirable; and what are they to be used to accomplish?
...But I still can see a potential use for the combination of these exceptional shooting skills and exceptional field craft skills, resulting in the ‘sniper’.To do what? ' Snipe' is not a good answer:

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coenocorypha). :D

Infanteer
08-21-2009, 02:16 AM
In our Army, Infantry battalions have a Recce Platoon which is made up of specially trained infantryman. We also have a Sniper Cell, under the administrative command of the Recce Platoon Commander, which is in reality overseen by the Unit Master Sniper (a Warrant Officer). Recent experience has seen us aim to grow the Sniper Cell into something bordering on Platoon strength, with the potential for an Officer to command it simply to keep the UMS out of the CP to do his job.

Our Armoured Regiments have mechanized Recce Squadrons and Troops. They are currently armed with the Coyote (LAV 25) although the government is looking at some sort of JLTV to replace them, which may cause a bit of a debate as we've become used to a decent fighting vehicle in the Armoured Recce Role.

Infantry Recce Platoons focus on Close Recce while Armoured Recce works on the medium recce. They can both do either, but really excel at one or the other. They both are pretty good at Combat Recce and work in conjunction with the Snipers to develop and prosecute targets.

Designated Marksman are something we are wrestling with at the moment - the idea hasn't been fully grounded yet. These are essentially "Sniper-lite" soldiers who recieve extra training on marksmanship.

At various times, different operations have seen these organizations under various command relationships with eachother (all grouped together, all seperate, etc, etc); I've heard various reports about both - I'd venture that personalities, more than anything else, make or break an effective combination of these various assets.

Our military has just released a new PAM entitled Ground Manoeuvre Recconaisance which rolls all of these into one and is actually quite good.

Kiwigrunt
08-21-2009, 04:16 AM
From Ken:

To do what? ' Snipe' is not a good answer:

Bummer, back to the drawing board.:mad:


Ken:

If I understand what you wrote, then a 'sniper' is just an average DM with exceptional capabilities...

Correct, and that would be the point. Just like with your battalion level scouts regarding recon. ;)


Ken:

I have a three fold question. What are these exceptional capabilities really; why are they necessary or desirable;

They would be referring to (apart from ‘sharp shooting’) field craft, as taught to all infantry, but to much higher standards (again, similar to your scouts).

Snipers are capable of operating unseen, behind enemy lines, in small teams (typically of two) to engage the enemy. This in contrast to scouts who avoid any contact.

I see a DM (what’s with the ‘D’ anyway, why not just M?) as integral to the unit, be that squad, platoon or company. As such his rifle can essentially be seen as a support weapon. I don’t see a DM as someone who is likely to move far from said unit.

A sniper works directly for battalion (or whatever) and can operate independently, behind enemy lines at great distances from anyone else. His rifle, which may be the exact same, would be an IW (for him).


Ken:

and what are they to be used to accomplish?

To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens
Ambush – or cut off to ambush
Area denial /covering terrain
Blocking positions
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.

(I pulled some of these points straight out of Mark Spicer’s book)
And again, potentially all behind enemy lines and in very small teams (stealth and economy of force). And there, I think, lies the difference between a sniper and a DM.

Also from the book:
Page 17

The British army definitions: The sniper is a selected soldier who is a trained marksman and observer, who can locate and report on an enemy, however well concealed, who can stalk or lie in wait unseen and kill with one shot. The marksman/sharpshooter is a soldier who consistently achieves a high standard of shooting and who is trained to inflict casualties on opportunity targets using the standard individual weapon.

I think we have pretty much moved beyond the standard IW, although....nah, different discussion.

And more:
Page 18

Firepower usually means an increased number of misses per minute. Fifty misses are not firepower. One hit is firepower.

This is also nicely applicable to our conversations on firepower and suppressive fire….


And:
Page 47

Close target reconnaissance is usually carried out by the dedicated recce troops of a unit and wherever possible, it should be left to them. But the sniper should still be able to carry out this task both to assist where needed, and to recce likely sniper and hide locations as a part of his own operational deployment. The similarities between the sniper’s role and that of the recce soldier are often confused. The sniper does not necessarily make a good recce soldier. Likewise the recce soldier does not necessarily make a good sniper. However, they complement each other when deployed correctly.


One more:
Page 115

A role that usually gets overlooked whenever people think of snipers is that of observation and reporting. This role is usually coupled to the sniper’s main role of killing selected enemy personnel. It requires him to have the ability to read the overall battle plan of his commanders, and to know when to shoot and when to report in order to assist his commander’s plan and to not compromise it. Much of the sniper’s time is spent observing the battlefield, looking for anything unusual that will lead him to his quarry. He is therefore the ideal man to assist and complement the recce troops.



And I do agree with Ken for the need for a battalion recon (okay, I keep calling it that, call it scout or whatever) unit, be that a squad or a platoon. Note that usually the platoons are actually not all that large anyway.
I support that with Ken’s words:

Ken:

It's not that the Rifle Cos can't / aren't patrolling and plunking in beaucoup Intel, the reasons for a Bn Scout section are to avoid having to task a Co to provide a patrol that would take people away from their Sector or Zone for those EEI that the S2 identifies that do not fall clearly in the areas assigned to a Co; to provide some Intel trained eyes that can notice things that the Co patrols might miss due to personnel turbulence, casualties/replacements, etc.; Provide people that can give a good full bore report -- a trained observer and reporter is better than a good one. It allows for special training in forensic examination, document review, Rifle Co Recon Patrol debriefs and other good stuff without having to cull from the Cos some who might have had such training -- I can go on for another hour.



from Infanteer:

We also have a Sniper Cell, under the administrative command of the Recce Platoon Commander

I can see the logic in that, from an admin perspective. I just hope that that won’t draw the snipers unnecessarily close to the recon camp.

Infanteer
08-21-2009, 04:23 AM
I can see the logic in that, from an admin perspective. I just hope that that won’t draw the snipers unnecessarily close to the recon camp.

Nope - they work in different areas and both the Recce Pl Comd and the UMS report to the CO and receive their tasks from him.

Ken White
08-21-2009, 05:26 AM
Correct, and that would be the point. Just like with your battalion level scouts regarding recon. ;)Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right? :wry:
They would be referring to (apart from ‘sharp shooting’) field craft, as taught to all infantry, but to much higher standards (again, similar to your scouts).

Snipers are capable of operating unseen, behind enemy lines, in small teams (typically of two) to engage the enemy. This in contrast to scouts who avoid any contact.

I see a DM (what’s with the ‘D’ anyway, why not just M?) as integral to the unit, be that squad, platoon or company. As such his rifle can essentially be seen as a support weapon. I don’t see a DM as someone who is likely to move far from said unit.

A sniper works directly for battalion (or whatever) and can operate independently, behind enemy lines at great distances from anyone else. His rifle, which may be the exact same, would be an IW (for him).In stability operations and in mobile warfare, there are no enemy lines to speak of -- that's always subject to modification based on the METT-TC of the war or a particular period in a war. If there is a degree of stasis, is this sniper team restricted to the Battalion zone and if so, how far out in front of the BN FLOT / FEBA / MLR or whatever we call it today can they be expected to go?
To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens *
Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
Area denial /covering terrain *
Blocking positions *
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)No sniper team or collection of sniper teams is going to do those things I placed an asterisk by. They can try but they will not be able to do any significant damage in such missions. You may not agree and if it's important, perhaps you could give me some examples of such actions. Taking just one example, in the area denial mission or the screening mission against marginal opponent, I believe that if one were to try that against a mediocre or even a poor Rifle Co they'd eat your lunch in about 30 minutes. You might get a few but your survival expectation would be quite low...

While I see some counter recon value, a DM ( LDM, Lowly DM ??? ;)) can do that job and I do not agree on using shooters for recon or scouting -- wrong mentality.

So what you're left with is HVTs (perhaps if the fates smile), targets of opportunity, harassment, counter sniping and some counter recon. Is the cost and effort to train compensated by that?
(I pulled some of these points straight out of Mark Spicer’s book) And again, potentially all behind enemy lines and in very small teams (stealth and economy of force). And there, I think, lies the difference between a sniper and a DM.Presuming there is an enemy line, what precisely is the sniper to do behind them? He can get off a good shot or two but then he's going to have to move thus decreasing his 'unseen' quotient. He may kill an opposing Brigade Commander -- but that is unlikely to even slow the Brigade, much less stop it. I think I see far more myth than reality here -- but I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

Kiwigrunt
08-21-2009, 05:53 AM
I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

Do prepare yourself for a bit of sniper-myth chest-beating ;)

William F. Owen
08-21-2009, 07:10 AM
Wilf, could you elaborate your this thought in this thread context.



PBID essentially suggests that you train, organize, and operate light infantry in a way that best utilizes their inherent strengths. In practice, this means that you train infantry to accomplish two basic tasks, these being a reconnaissance patrol and an observation post. These two core skills are built on a high level of individually developed field-craft skills. In simplistic but easily understood terms, you train Soldiers as snipers and then train them as a recce platoon.
Quote:
Why? Surely this is completely against the teaching that only the brightest, best, and most experienced of infantry unit Soldiers become snipers and members of the recce platoons.



Ahhhh.... well spotted. Yes I do have to explain this. What I was intending to outline was training ALL soldiers in a high degree of individual skills, and using the acknowledged basics of sniping and scouting as a base from which to start. I have since dropped this as when I presented it at RUSI, there was outrage from the UK sniper community - albeit for mostly inexplicable and entirely emotional reasons.

William F. Owen
08-21-2009, 07:17 AM
And here lies of course the attraction/risk of having snipers used for the scouting/recon role, which is probably understandable but not necessarily advisable. Conversely that doesn’t mean that there should be a law against it either, IMO.


I wouldn't want to outlaw it either, but some of the issues it raises strike to heart of what you want folks to do, why and how much time and money you wish to expend doing it.

The real danger is "drift." You start with good intentions and end up with something other than what you intended. Some clear definitions and carefully explained doctrine is the best way to prevent this/that.

davidbfpo
08-21-2009, 03:16 PM
Originally Posted by Ken White
How about 'Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter' (BADASS).

How about Dedicated Intelligent Marksman? DIM.

Couldn't resist this, sorry for increasing the tone and vigour here.

davidbfpo

Ken White
08-21-2009, 03:39 PM
Dedicated Intelligent Marksmen With Incredible Tactical Skills. :D

There was a time when I qualified for the job -- still qualify for the acronym... :wry:

Fuchs
08-21-2009, 09:43 PM
If I understand what you wrote, then a 'sniper' is just an average DM with exceptional capabilities... :wry:

I have a three fold question. What are these exceptional capabilities really; why are they necessary or desirable; and what are they to be used to accomplish?To do what? ' Snipe' is not a good answer:

The differences between snipers and designated marksmen (it's about time to call the latter riflemen in my opinion) are useful and clear.

DM:
Is an infantryman with a rifle meant to enable well-aimed, longer-range shots. The DM is part of the infantry and has additional shooting and counter-sniping expertise.

Sniper:
Meant to work in teams of two or three, usually separated from infantry (except movement to and from missions). Relies more on concealment and camouflage, less on cover or body armour for survivability than DM.
Extreme single shot long-range capability (training+hardware) and long-range observation capability (spotting scope). Low mobility, but extraordinary patience and endurance.


Their survivability concept allows completely different missions and tactics.
A sniper team in an infantry platoon would be mostly wasted, it would have much less choice of positions and much less surprise opportunities.
A DM is neither prepared nor meant to leave his platoon and go stalking in isolation.

The niches are simply different ones, and both are well-justified.

Kiwigrunt
08-21-2009, 11:05 PM
Thanks Fuchs, you made the points a bit clearer and more concise than I managed.


Ken:

Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?

We could. And we could call a scout an Exceptional Designated Find Function Rifleman.:p


Ken:

In stability operations and in mobile warfare, there are no enemy lines to speak of.

Sure, but there could still be something that we might call ‘bandit country’.


Ken:

…that's always subject to modification based on the METT-TC of the war or a particular period in a war. If there is a degree of stasis, is this sniper team restricted to the Battalion zone and if so, how far out in front of the BN FLOT / FEBA / MLR or whatever we call it today can they be expected to go?

I think your first sentence answers the second. :confused:(I’ve gota be careful here.)
I have no idea of how they typically operate but I might imagine that, METT-TC dependant, they could be pooled together at brigade level. Or perhaps uses to operate alongside SF if it is deemed that their potential effect there is greater than within the battalion structure….ohh…I’m stabbing here.


Ken:

No sniper team or collection of sniper teams is going to do those things I placed an asterisk by. They can try but they will not be able to do any significant damage in such missions. You may not agree and if it's important, perhaps you could give me some examples of such actions. Taking just one example, in the area denial mission or the screening mission against marginal opponent, I believe that if one were to try that against a mediocre or even a poor Rifle Co they'd eat your lunch in about 30 minutes. You might get a few but your survival expectation would be quite low...

Point taken. In fact, I would pretty much be inclined to agree. Those were a few points that I pulled out of the book where warning bells were ringing in my head as well. I imagine that in those scenarios they would only be used for reasons of force economy in areas where enemy action is not anticipated but surveillance is still required. So, where the battalion commander simply can’t afford to drop a rifle coy. So here surveillance may be the main effort with shooting being a tool to just buy a little time, hopefully enough for the CO to react……….blah blah blah.


Ken:

While I see some counter recon value, a DM ( LDM, Lowly DM ??? ) can do that job and I do not agree on using shooters for recon or scouting -- wrong mentality.

Does that mean that riflemen have the wrong mentality for the find function? If that’s so than we may want quite a few recon platoons to a battalion.:D


Ken:

So what you're left with is HVTs (perhaps if the fates smile), targets of opportunity, harassment, counter sniping and some counter recon. Is the cost and effort to train compensated by that?

And that would be the crucial question. Part of that equation would be, what might it potentially ‘cost’ the battalion if snipers were not fulfilling those tasks, even if they are only marginally effective. And I certainly cannot answer that.:(


Ken:

Presuming there is an enemy line, what precisely is the sniper to do behind them? He can get off a good shot or two but then he's going to have to move thus decreasing his 'unseen' quotient. He may kill an opposing Brigade Commander -- but that is unlikely to even slow the Brigade, much less stop it. I think I see far more myth than reality here

Concur. And that is what I’m digging at. I know everything that there is to know about snipers…..because I’ve read the book. And from a professional perspective, I can only support that with relatively limited infantry/rifleman/mortar handler experience. I’m really just trying to get to the bottom of this ‘myth’ and to understand it better.

So, who we gonna call…….myth busters!

Ken White
08-22-2009, 01:38 AM
Thanks Fuchs, you made the points a bit clearer and more concise than I managed.Yes, he did. In fact, he went where I was trying to get -- which is away from the sniper myth and into reality. Good job, Fuchs.
Sure, but there could still be something that we might call ‘bandit country’.Yep -- and that's a very different thing than 'behind enemy lines.' Neutral ground may have good guys or bad guys in varying amounts and decently trained troops can operate there in small numbers with a little stealth or in large numbers without it. Behind enemy lines implies that the Enemy occupies the territory in numbers enough that you are not there -- it's a question of opponent density.
Does that mean that riflemen have the wrong mentality for the find function? If that’s so than we may want quite a few recon platoons to a battalion.:DYes and no. Depends on a lot of things like age, maturity (those two are not the same thing), experience, physical condition and other things. The basic problem is that if you have offensively oriented folks (snipers, DM, average rifleman) they do not comfortably ignore small batches of opponents and they do not have the training (nor should they) to classify a bridge, collect soil samples, determine load bearing surface capability, determine locations for river crossings or drop zones, and they are not specifically trained to observe and report. They can do a Recon patrol to find enemy formations or positions, provide local security or to select movement routes but the detailed stuff requires more than most infantrymen will be able to provide. It does take a different guy to lay still in a hide and let bad guys step on his hand. ;)
And that would be the crucial question. Part of that equation would be, what might it potentially ‘cost’ the battalion if snipers were not fulfilling those tasks, even if they are only marginally effective. And I certainly cannot answer that. Old METT-TC again but having operated as one -- plus later in units in combat with and without snipers -- I'd say most Bns most of the time can get by without them but if present they provide a capability that can enhance that Bns combat power slightly in some types of warfare and significantly in stability ops.

I carried a Scoped '03 during part of the moving war in Korea, I got some good shots and know others that did also -- but we admitted we did little real damage and had no significant effect. OTOH, a couple of years later when it was a static war of trenches and outposts, snipers had a ball and countersniping was in and some did some good stuff.

Snipers in Viet Nam did some legendary stuff, Carlos Hathcock for example -- but they didn't really have much effect on the war. The biggest complaint I've heard from Desert Storm snipers is that they didn't get to fire a shot.

Yet, today in both Afghanistan and Iraq, snipers have been extremely effective. Far more so than most realize or makes the news. So; lot of variables and the key, I think, is that in stability ops or a static warfare situation, they're generally more valuable than in mobile warfare.

All that said, the skill is important and needs to be maintained because in some situations, it is extremely valuable.
. I’m really just trying to get to the bottom of this ‘myth’ and to understand it better.Aren't we all...

Where to put them? Rifleman has a point with a Bn cell -- that occurs because it simply makes the training easier to manage in garrison -- and because if you put them in the Co (where in both our current theaters, they really should be) you have the human factor problem of disinterested or lazy NCOs or Officers that will interfere with the training and / or the employment. Bde's probably too high; Bn and Co are about right but the factors mentioned mitigate for a Bn cell. Right now in the US Army they're in the Bn Scout Platoon, I don't think they should be but the US army is reluctant to do what the Commonwealth Armies do and trust things like that to a WO or NCO. :mad:
So, who we gonna call…….myth busters!True dat. Myths abound about all things but the snipers, parachutists and SF have some real whoppers. Been all those and learned believing the myths can get you killed and / or embarrassed... :wry:

William F. Owen
08-22-2009, 07:04 AM
True dat. Myths abound about all things but the snipers, parachutists and SF have some real whoppers. Been all those and learned believing the myths can get you killed and / or embarrassed... :wry:

...and worrying, when it appears that most "sniper history" and thus "sniper doctrine" is built on myths and very little evidence to support how and why.

My point: Very good shots, with very good rifles are an essential infantry capability (75% still air hits on a 1 x 0.5m tgt at 800m?). That does not necessarily describe, or justify the "snipers" of popular imagination.

kaur
08-22-2009, 08:16 AM
Ken's argument:


Not a frontage issue in all cases but it can be -- it is a depth issue in the sense that the Rifle Co Recon (Combat patrols are a separate animal and they belong to the Cos and not to the Scout sect) Patrols should normally go out no more than 10-15 km, max, generally less -- and METT-TC dependent -- so they run about 4 hours out and 4 back, max (with 4-6 total being better and with no overnight stays) the Scout Sec, OTOH should be prepared for three to five day patrols in bad guy territory or up to about 30 km out. Not everyone grooves on that-- or can do it. Div Recon should be used for the stuff from 30-100km out while Force Recon can do the strategic stuff beyond 100km.

plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin :)

kiwigrunt cited Spence's book missions:


To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens *
Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
Area denial /covering terrain *
Blocking positions *
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)


Fuchs added his definition:


Meant to work in teams of two or three, usually separated from infantry (except movement to and from missions). Relies more on concealment and camouflage, less on cover or body armour for survivability than DM.
Extreme single shot long-range capability (training+hardware) and long-range observation capability (spotting scope). Low mobility, but extraordinary patience and endurance.

I agree with Ken White that snipers (DM's) can't accomplish those missions alone. They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business :)

If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.
If squad DM is trained in a week to hit human targets in 500m distance with 5,56x45 ammo (without spotter, without LRF), I think this is really possible that the same soldier can hit targets with .338 in 800m (or even further) distance. If USA Army will find themselves new assault rifle via competition, maybe they should add that contenders (Colt, FN, HK etc) should add semi-auto .338 to their family of weapons. Armalite already has http://www.armalite.com/ItemForm.aspx?item=10TBNF338&ReturnUrl=Categories.aspx?Category=f4bd4a13-55d1-41aa-aea0-49488ec48776
If .338 is chosen, who get's those M110 rifles? Another question is on what level this DM should be located. Platoon level, like Wilf has proposed?

Just one comment to Ken White's post:


That crew is the squad so that's where he or she should be. The training issue in garrison is easily solved by scheduling the DM sustainment training so that they all get together under the senior Co (or Bn) DM / Sniper. In my view, you'd have two Sniper * tms at Co, a DM in every squad and the senior Sniper becomes the Co DM trainer. if there's also a Bn Sniper Tm or section, the leader becomes the Bn Master Shooter and oversees training.

Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word :D

http://www.scribd.com/doc/18522946/Striker-Brigade-Designated-Marksmen

William F. Owen
08-22-2009, 08:45 AM
If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.


I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do! :D

My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.

jcustis
08-22-2009, 04:36 PM
All that said, the skill is important and needs to be maintained because in some situations, it is extremely valuable.

Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems.

Ken White
08-22-2009, 04:37 PM
I'm still working on that acronym...;)
...plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin :) I'm inclined to agree on the word -- but the concept is still viable. There's a need in many circumstances, it's just important that the capabilities and limitations be understood.
...They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business :)True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.
Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word :DYes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon. Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.

Rifleman
08-22-2009, 07:46 PM
True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.

In the '80s the only information we really had to work with, employment wise, was the 9th Infantry Division's Vietnam experience. I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.

9th ID SOP called for the sniper team to be secured by a fire team to squad size element. The SOP acually reads four to eight men. I have no idea where those exact numbers come from since they don't match any official unit size from that era. Probably the 9th's understrength rifle squads were within that number range?

And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.


Yes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon.

That's where I was coming from with my idea to have all company snipers/DMs in one squad in a rifle company's weapons platoon. I believe in battalion level snipers too.


Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.

Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.

tankersteve
08-22-2009, 08:28 PM
"Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems. "

I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.

Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?

Tankersteve

Kiwigrunt
08-22-2009, 10:57 PM
Hmmm, good points indeed Jcustis and Tankersteve.
That lack of direction and understanding from outside the ‘sniper community’ may be largely responsible for the myth as well….or at least for creating or allowing an environment for it….


And on that myth and acronyms, I’m starting to get the feeling that the myth is associated more with the word ‘sniper’, rather that the job. Now what if sniper wasn’t a word but an acronym:
SNIPER -- Special Needs Individual Precious Expert Rifleman.

We’ve had these so far:
BADASS -- Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter
EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen
DIM -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksman
DIMWITS -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksmen With Incredible Tactical Skills.
KAUR -- Kinetic Assault Ultra Range
Keep’m comin’:D


Ken:

True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.

Would that not negate the individual/stealth/blahblah aspect of a sniper? This seems a scenario where a DM is sufficient.


Ken

I'd say most Bns most of the time can get by without them but if present they provide a capability that can enhance that Bns combat power slightly in some types of warfare and significantly in stability ops.

I carried a Scoped '03 during part of the moving war in Korea, I got some good shots and know others that did also -- but we admitted we did little real damage and had no significant effect. OTOH, a couple of years later when it was a static war of trenches and outposts, snipers had a ball and countersniping was in and some did some good stuff.

Snipers in Viet Nam did some legendary stuff, Carlos Hathcock for example -- but they didn't really have much effect on the war.


Thanks for all the points you made in that post Ken.
Now this goes back to the bean counter aspect. How much effect ‘should’ a small (but relatively expensive to train) team as part of an 800 or so strong unit have to justify its existence? For instance, how much effect does a 51 mm platoon mortar man have on the overall effect of a war? (I’m not suggesting to scrap platoon mortars, and realise this is not apples/apples.)

Ken White
08-22-2009, 11:12 PM
jcustis:
we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control.I'd be willing to bet that the training of prospective commander on the Machine Gun barely scratches the surface. They teach the use of the Clinometer? I'm not at all sure that training or the employment of snipers is a glaring shortfall -- or even a minor oversight. It would seem to me that an Officer or Senior NCO would dig into the capabilities and the employment of elements he might have access to on his or her own. Many will say they should not have to do that and while there's some truth there, I doubt it's possible to adequately cover all the possibilities in any training -- and I'm probably the loudest guy on this board about more and better training...

That said, I don't dispute the fact that some sort of capability outlay is needed but I believe it should be in the book of war (the FM / FMFM for one's particular unit type) because any School education or training is going to have a shelf life and is going to be placed in the users own priority for recall and use.

One of the problems with snipers, discussed above, is that they have little to no value in some kinds of warfare, only moderate value in others and are a highly situational dependent asset. That leads to neglect until they appear and in a situation where the skills are pretty important.

Rifleman:
I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.Parochialsim is the American way. In the mid 90s, my son was doing the obligatory earthling tour in the 25th, in a Scout Platoon and was sent to the Marine Sniper School at Kaneohe (LINK) (http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/marines/a/marinesniper.htm). They trained Scouts as well so he came back with all sorts of good ideas (like not wearing the Kevlar on the range... :D) and virtually everything he suggested that he thought the Marines were doing better was roundly rejected as not being the Army way and the rejection was usually pretty derogatory. In Germany he went to the NATO LRRS School for several courses, brought back good ideas and all were rejected because the US Army didn't do it that way. True -- and an amazing number of Armies do a lot of things better than we do...

Earlier, I had been an Instructional Branch Chief at the Armor School. I spent a lot of Kitchen Table time developing some really good lesson plans. Not sure why I bothered because I knew at the time that all the NCO instructors would watch someone else teach a class, pattern their own class after it and would ignore the lesson plan. I even put trick sentences in a couple to see if they'd catch them. They did not. (so I had to resort to deceit and treachery to force them to think -- they mostly did pretty well but did I assist few in finding other employment. ;) ).

The point of all that is that your comment doesn't surprise me a bit -- and I think that all three items are a major smack at the 'selection' of instructors (there isn't any, most are pipeline feeds or self selected folks that want to hide from TOE units; curiosity about what they're going is not an issue), the training of instructors (abysmal, too much on tasks etc. and counseling) and the parochial "It wasn't invented here" syndrome (which is everywhere. Unfortunately. It is dangerous.).
And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.True, many miss that aspect -- and that goes back to my comment to jcustis -- people have to think and the old METT-TC thing makes every situation different. Many want nice pat book solution -- no one on this board, of course but others -- however there aren't any that will work reliably in all situations. Life is easy if you can do what those NCO Instructors at Knox did and just follow the example of others. Those Instructors you mention should've dug a little deeper, there are some great good and bad sniper actions out of WW II and Korea. Like this: LINK (http://www.bobrohrer.com/sea_stories/making_of_a_legend.pdf). That's been here before...
Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.I can take that or leave it, some people work better alone and I think if you know your people and you have one of those, he should be allowed to go out singly. Varies from unit to unit. That's with respect to the sniper -- on the DM, he's a part of a Squad, has no spotter -- and should not IMO -- so I'm inclined to make the system work rather than adjust to cope because it doesn't want to do the right thing 'cause it's too hard...

Tankersteve:
I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.Thus you'll probably disagree with my comment to jcustis above. That's fine but my observation has been that new capabilities get introduced in every war (or, like snipers, old ones are reinvented) and I'm not sure the training system can cope with every need. Some stuff you just have to pick up on the fly...

I know no one here is guilty of it (or they wouldn't be here) but there are many out there -- and we've all known a couple -- who take the line that "Every Officer and NCO is responsible for his or her own professional development." to mean solely selecting future assignments and doing all the important things that get noticed Many forget or would like to forget that it also means they have a responsibility to spend some of their own time learning the trade and that may mean that other, more personally intiguing things have to be foregone occasionally.

On Iraq, perhaps it depended on where one was and what was being done. I've talked to several who are convinced that the snipers in the last couple of years had a great deal to do with taking out a lot of the IED pizzazz by making planting a very risky occupation. Not to even go into the counter sniper effort.
Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?My perception is that they are best employed at and by the Company in most cases where they are of value but due to the points you, jon and rifleman have all mentioned, they are located Bn. That's part administrative and training ease in peacetime or garrison but mostly human factors related; the S2 or S3 should be better able to employ them; they're a body of people all in one place for training; and they don't have to cope with personalities of 1SGs who don't like 'special' people or a Co Cdr who's too busy with 180 other things to use them properly (very difficult when there may be at the time, no real employment -- which is another sniper problem). The down side of that is more reluctance to employ them occasionally as that mean placing them in some company's AO. Sometimes, that Co doesn't want the hassle of "Bn's snipers." Lot of interesting sidelights and perambulations to the issue.....

A recurring mention or implication by many is snipers out running loose with no command supervision. Well, yes -- that sort of goes with the territory. Reluctance of some to accept that responsibility (with concurrent inability to personally affect it...) is part of the sniper problem. And the sniper myth doe not lead to dispelling that. Also mildly problematical when they're at Co level is the unit that insists on sending a support and cover party with them -- that can have an adverse affect on the sniper himself as well as the mission.

Due to all that they're tightening the criteria for selection for the Sniper School. With the right people selected, that ''no command supervision' isn't a problem (except for the few commanders or 3s who will make it so due to a lack of self confidence -- or CSMs / 1SGs who are overprotective of their Boss...) and the problem you had in Iraq should disappear. Well, be ameliorated a bit, anyway... :wry:

Fuchs
08-23-2009, 02:08 AM
Maybe a bit war experience from wars with 'peer' powers:
The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe.
Sniper action provoked enemy sniping and indirect counterfires, and the infantry got hit in return for the sniper's actions. Infantrymen with scope scratch marks on their rifles got killed upon capture for being alleged snipers.

Snipers were dead if captured and really hated (even by their own infantry) in both World War's stationary phases. Exceptions prove the rule.


There are really a lot of factors that play into the sniping issue simply because snipers usually work detached from infantry formations/positions without needing a force concentration to be effective (that's a difference to AT units, for example).

My preference is a platoon at Bn level that trains snipers and forms sniper teams. The snipers can then be tasked with missions (support defence, support offence, surveillance, counter-sniping, free hunt). A loss of a sniper team (or something simple like sickness) wouldn't take away snipers from a Plt or Coy simply because the Bn level sniper Plt sergeant could send a ready replacement team.
An additional need for snipers in offensive actions or to counter enemy sniping could be met as well.

Ken White
08-23-2009, 02:52 AM
Maybe a bit war experience from wars with 'peer' powers:Peer power has little to do with it. It's the type of warfare and the degree, if any, of hatred of the opponents.

The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe.
Sniper action provoked enemy sniping and indirect counterfires, and the infantry got hit in return for the sniper's actions.In Korea, during the static phase, both the Chinese and the US were generally too smart to fall into the trap of over responding to sniper. Both tended to deploy a countersniper and not lose a lot sleep over it because only rarely did a truly deadly sniper appear. Nobody got particuarly irate at snipers because they didn't do much damage.

US line infantry in Koreas later stages did hate Tank which would crawl up a hill, fire a couple of rounds across the valley and leave rapidly before the 82, 76, 122 and 152 rain came --as it always did. :wry:

Minor off the wall comment; the Chinese and North Koreans could put a mortar round in your hip pocket but they were not good rifle shots. Their snipers were only so-so at best. In Viet Nam, the VC were good with neither but the North Viet Namese Army while poor with mortars, artillery and rockets were good rifle shots out to a hundred or so meters and particularly if armed with the SKS, however, their Snipers were not particularly good at any range over a couple of hundred meters. :confused:

In the pacific in WW II both the US and the Japanese made fairly extensive use of snipers generally without the actions you note; though they all are certainly valid for Europe and particularly the Eastern Front.

jcustis
08-23-2009, 04:26 AM
I stand corrected. During ground intelligence officers course, our ground intel 2ndLts undergo 2 weeks of employment training. How well they recommend use of snipers when they are called on to develop R&S plans for infantry battalion ops is a different animal.

This makes me think back to a point. I was trained as a DM by USMC school-trained snipers who held the MOS. They used the terms R&S for about everything that required effort. I realize now that they really meant more along the lines of surveillance, and less along the lines of recce, since we were never trained in any reporting techniques, learning only how to draft observation sketches. Misuse of the term indeed...

Ken White
08-23-2009, 05:03 AM
How well they recommend use of snipers when they are called on to develop R&S plans for infantry battalion ops is a different animal.I realize I'm a Dinosaur and things may have changed a great deal but in my day a LT S2 and or a LT Scout Plt Ldr w/ Sniper Teams would've been asked about employment but given but given the slightest suspicion they might not understand all they know about what they think they're saying, El Commandante woulda said "Where's SSG Phugabosky?" Then when the Sniper Boss appeared, one of those lovely and enjoyable learning experiences could take place and probably the next time or certainly the time after that both LTs would know answers and forcefully state a position, just about guaranteed.

No one reports into any place knowing all the aspects of the job -- that's why training is an ongoing effort for everyone, in combat or out. IET needs to be improved but it will never be able to get all the job knowledge crammed into craniums; some if it is too experience related and too esoteric to translate at all well into books or instruction. Lot of cogntiive skills that simply take practice.

If someone cannot do something they should be able to do, someone has to train them. I'm not criticizing here, I'm looking for info. I get an impression -- and that's all it is, an impression -- from a lot of posts here from a number of serving people in the Army, Marines and AF that such training, mentoring, whatever you call it is far more rare than it used to be. It seems that the not fully competent tend to just be left alone while folks turn to the competent workhorses and over use them. That's one of many problems with oversize Staffs today, there are enough folks to let a poor performer slide because someone can cover it...

jcustis
08-23-2009, 05:09 AM
If someone cannot do something they should be able to do, someone has to train them. I'm not criticizing here, I'm looking for info. I get an impression -- and that's all it is, an impression -- from a lot of posts here from a number of serving people in the Army, Marines and AF that such training, mentoring, whatever you call it is far more rare than it used to be. It seems that the not fully competent tend to just be left alone while folks turn to the competent workhorses and over use them. That's one of many problems with oversize Staffs today, there are enough folks to let a poor performer slide because someone can cover it...

Ken, once again you are absolutely right, and it doesn't even have to be with an over-sized staff. I'd argue that the clutches of pre-deployment training regimens has done this too us, or at least made us think we are too busy to do the work of staff planning training.

Rifleman
08-23-2009, 05:13 AM
.....The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe....Snipers were dead if captured and really hated (even by their own infantry) in both World War's stationary phases. Exceptions prove the rule....


This was a common feeling on both sides during the War of Northern Aggression.

One account from the war says that there was an unwritten rule that you didn't bother a man when he "goes out to do his business in the morning" but that "these sharpshooting brutes are always violating that."

And artillery officers of that war are on record making quaint statements in their offical reports like, "We were a good deal annoyed by sharpshooters." The guncrew members worded things a little differently: one artilleryman said, "We went in a battery and came out a wreck!"

kaur
08-23-2009, 12:52 PM
kiwigrunt said:


And on that myth and acronyms, I’m starting to get the feeling that the myth is associated more with the word ‘sniper’, rather that the job.

If you go back to the roots of the word "sniper", then every good shot can be sniper. You just have to be able to hit this bird called snipe :)

http://a.imagehost.org/0752/bird_snipe.jpg (http://a.imagehost.org/view/0752/bird_snipe)

As I understand in US SOF there is only one sniper in squad and no spotter. He should be able to accomplish following tasks.


• Employ gas-operated sniper
systems (SR-25/M-110 SASS), both
day and night and in rural and urban
environments, while engaging stationary
targets, moving targets and targets
with limited exposure times. (Note: the
M-24 Sniper Weapon System is still
the primary weapon system employed
during SFSC.)
• Employ the Barrett M-107 sniper
weapon, both day and night.
• Conduct technical-surveillance
familiarization.
• Familiarize students with current
tactical reconnaissance kit.
• Employ the tactical reconnaissance
kit and equipment.
• Select urban surveillance/firing
positions and construct urban hide
sites.
• Conduct urban stalking.
• Learn building-climbing techniques
(ascending and descending).
• Collect and manage information.
• Operate a tactical information
center.
• Learn collection methods
and techniques.
• Conduct close-target
reconnaissance.
• Conduct long-range, standoff
observation.
• Learn vehicle-reconnaissance
tactics, techniques and procedures, or
TTP.
• Learn walk-by TTP.
• Learn to operate manned and
unmanned remote sites.
• Demonstrate planning considerations
for sniper operations.
• Plan urban and rural operations.
• Conduct time-sensitive planning.
• Develop target stand-alone products
for near- and long-term use.
• Develop RECCE concept of
operation.
• Learn to shoot from aerial platforms
(familiarization only).
• Spend two additional days of sniper
and field-shoot marksmanship events
in preparation for must-pass exams.

Look at page 30 http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/08May.pdf

As far as I understand (with my limited knowledge about topic), the only difference between sniper and scout is former's skills to shoot precisely further. SOF sniper should be able like scout infiltrate and exfiltrate. Action in final firing position is similar to observation post procedures (except shooting act). This additional skill could be really demanding for the whole team. I'm glad if Infanteer will correct me, but if I remember correctly Canadian sniper team consists already of four snipers. The reasons are security, huge load of equipment (several SWS with different ammo from 5,56 to 12,7 calibre) and possibilty to man position 24h. It seems that it's easier for organisation to train all scouts like snipers, than to add to sniper pairs just security element. USMC has choosen this path.

krsna
08-24-2009, 06:12 AM
In his 2002 book “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” (a title drawn from T.E. Lawrence's “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”, describing the messiness of waging “war upon rebellion”), John Nagl, an American lieutenant-colonel, concluded that Americans in Vietnam remained wedded to “unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower”,

According to Mao's well-worn dictum, guerrillas must be like fish swimming in the “water” of the general population. T.E. Lawrence, helping to stir up the Arab revolt against Turkish rule during the First World War, described regular armies as plants, “immobile, firm-rooted, and nourished through long stems to the head”. Guerrillas, on the other hand, were like “a vapour”. A soldier, he said, was “helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.

Even if America cannot imagine fighting another Iraq or Afghanistan, extremists round the world have seen mighty America's vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, the AK-47 and the suicide-bomber.

The U.S. Army has just ordered another 1,095 Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems, and 2,195 vehicle installation kits. For decades, sniper detectors were theoretical darlings of military R&D geeks. But now, with lots of need, better technology and money to quickly buy several generations of a system, the devices are actually making themselves useful. Not all units have officers or troops who can make the most of sniper detection systems. But those that do, are hell on the local sniper population.

The Chechens made extensive and effective use of snipers. Snipers fired from well inside rooms versus near window openings, as well as, from rooftops and basements. The Russians lacked an effective sniper and counter-sniper capability of their own. (Lessons Learned from Russian Military Operations in Chechnya 1994-1996)

Well!! The long prelude is to highlight the following:

1. “unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower” is no guarantee of mil success.
2. Unconventional wars leave the conventional soldier “helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.
3. Chechens made extensive and effective use of snipers while Russians lacked an effective sniper and counter-sniper capability of their own.
4. Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems are in demand with US Forces.

Hence the Snipers shall continue their "usefulness" for opposing forces as "Force Multipliers".
Recon missions would be relevant at the lowest end of technological spectrum due to need of Human Psyche for "Feeling the Ground" or "Seeing it first hand". The "eye for the ground" is the cause of all Recon activity. If UAV tends to replace the "Recon Soldier" then Armed Drones should replace the "Fighting Soldier".

Bottomline: When all fails the Human spirit prevails.:)

kaur
08-24-2009, 07:09 AM
1 "old" proposal by LtCol Jeffery E. Dearolph


Conclusion

The proposed solution involves creating a division-level sniper company to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set. Research shows that potential adversaries will seek to offset U. S. strengths by operating in urbanized terrain. Primarily designed to achieve maximum effectiveness in open terrain, U. S. weapons suffer from degraded effectiveness in urban areas. The presence of civilians further complicates fighting in cities due to constraints designed to limit collateral damage and non-combatant casualties. The enemy operates in a dispersed pattern versus concentrated pattern in order to avoid U. S. firepower. This dispersed pattern manifests
itself in an urban target set consisting of enemy combatants mixing with non-combatants, enemy snipers, and enemy SPTs. Given the limitations of U. S. weapon systems in attempting to minimize collateral damage, this urban target set presents a dilemma for commanders fighting in cities. However, research indicates that U. S. Army and Marine Corps snipers can effectively
engage the elements of the enemy’s urban target set without incurring civilian casualties.
Although U. S. snipers possess the weapons, equipment and training required to engage the urban target set, they do not possess the number of snipers to cover effectively the large urban areas where the enemy operates. Located only at the infantry battalion-level, U.S. snipers, provide
support only to those organizations. In order to provide the coverage necessary in urbanized terrain, the creation of a division-level sniper company must occur. Consisting of thirty-two more sniper teams for the division, the sniper company provides the division with the capability to engage the enemy’s urban target set in large cities. The requirement exists and research shows that the proposed division sniper company satisfies the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability criteria. Therefore, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps can create sniper companies in order to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA402701&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

William F. Owen
08-24-2009, 07:20 AM
Consisting of thirty-two more sniper teams for the division, the sniper company provides the division with the capability to engage the enemy’s urban target set in large cities. The requirement exists and research shows that the proposed division sniper company satisfies the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability criteria. Therefore, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps can create sniper companies in order to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set.

Empire building? That makes no sense that I can see, unless these "sniper teams" have the support, communications, sensors and weapons to make the investment worthwhile.
How many Helicopter hours would that little "empire" drag away from rifle companies?
I'd be really interested to know if the"research" is in reality just a set of opinions. Not much "urban" in A'Stan for example, and there is no evidence that snipers are actually decisive, as a function of their numbers.

Fuchs
08-24-2009, 08:45 AM
The U.S. Army has just ordered another 1,095 Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems, and 2,195 vehicle installation kits. For decades, sniper detectors were theoretical darlings of military R&D geeks. But now, with lots of need, better technology and money to quickly buy several generations of a system, the devices are actually making themselves useful. Not all units have officers or troops who can make the most of sniper detection systems. But those that do, are hell on the local sniper population.


Most systems rely on the supersonic crack created by the bullet.
That supersonic crack is not being caused by subsonic bullets, which can be powerful nevertheless by being heavy.

Look at this, for example:
http://world.guns.ru/sniper/sn72-e.htm

kaur
08-24-2009, 10:04 AM
Fuch mentioned silenced Russian rifle - i remembered killing of Dagestan interior minister with silenced rifle - i remembered killing of US soldiers in Iraqi urban check points - John West has written book about those kind of action and this is called "Art of urban sniping". This book and everyday life in some violent urban centers has spoiled one more time the definition of sniper. In western sniper community the sniper is man who can achieve 1st shot hits in very long distance. In Iraq the distance is sometimes 50 meters. This difference is very well covered by Greg Roberts in the article "Insurgency sniping" in "Combat and Survival" magasine. This fact makes me come back to Spicers definition:


Sniping is the employment of individual shooters from concealed positions with no warning, from any distance, depending on the range of the weapon. This is not to say, of course , that to maximize the chances of sniper surviving to fight again, the longer the distance between him and the victim the better. Conversely, if the sniper is able to conceal himself and endage successfully at close range, then that is also sniping.

If we talk about such short distances, then every scout can be sniper. Here couple German snipers talk about distances during II WW.


6. What was the range of the furthest target you ever fired at, and what kind of target, size?

A. About 1,000 meters. Standing soldier. Positive hitting not possible, but necessary under the circumstances in order to show enemy that he is not safe even at that distance! Or superior wanted to satisfy himself about capability.

B. 400 to 700 meters.

C. About 600 meters, rarely more. I usually waited until target approached further for better chance of hitting. Also confirmation of successful hit was easier. Used G43 only to about 500 meters because of poor ballistics.

http://www.snipersparadise.com/history/german.htm

I speculate that for average scout those distances are not hard to achive. Today the sniper community is pushing the distance limits via what they define their professional skills. When Canadians achieved record shot in Afgansitan, then everyone is trying to copy this (German spotting scopes, Swiss range finders, expencive rifles etc). For average scout this is too much. In Afganistan with huge terrain with open fields of fire, this need is understood, but in a lot of other places?

This is nice article by Michael Haugen that talks about calibres and distances.

http://www.remingtonmilitary.com/articles/DA%202005.05MH.pdf

Fuchs
08-24-2009, 01:49 PM
The need for expensive rifles is gone. There's a sub-MOA rifle in 7.62mm available on the civilian U.S. market for less than 500 US-$. The scope would be separate, but doesn't need to be more expensive either.

krsna
08-24-2009, 01:54 PM
Returning to the original argument: Snipers are valid in the Infantry Battalions for following reasons:
1. Surveillance at ranges beyond that of Rifleman.
2. Target Acquisition for crew served weapons at the "Area of Interest" boundary.
3. Target engagement with a view to put caution in the minds of the enemy and delay his move for own forces to be ready to engage from a position of tactical advantage.
4. Cause harassment and make enemy deploy a part of reserves to deal with the unseen threat much earlier than "contact ranges".
5. Cause disarray by knocking the heads off i.e. "Kill the Commanders".
6. Must operate in buddy pairs for inherent "continued surveillance" and "local protection" at the lowest level.
7. The highest level could go upto a squad or platoon where they can be grouped with dedicated Recon Platoons/Companies.
8. They have proved their worth in Urban Warfare as also in Counter Terrorist operations where collateral damage is to be avoided.

Recon capability is mission essential requirement. At the Infantry Battalion level it can be foot based or vehicle based but must not be seen as "armed recon". It must remain "silent recon" with integral SATA/ISTAR Equipment including Micro UAVs when available. Human angle is important for "feel of the ground" and "natural awareness" besides "experiential analysis" of situation.

reed11b
08-24-2009, 05:21 PM
I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do! :D

My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.

Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
Reed

William F. Owen
08-24-2009, 07:03 PM
Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
Reed

Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.

Fuchs
08-24-2009, 07:38 PM
I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task.

I always thought it's common sense that all combat (sub-)units (down to squad Ldr and his 2nd) that move independently (at minimum platoon) should be able to call for fires.

The officers of non-combat units should be able to do so as well (maybe restricted to smoke, though).

The dedicated fire support teams / forward observers should be limited to

- pricey dedicated equipment like powerful radars, mast-mounted thermals, counter-artillery radars (Aufklärende Artillerie, reconnoitering artillery, units in German)

- especially important tasks to be done from dominating terrain features

- doing the fire support coordination in open terrain (enough line of sight that a these experts can make a difference) at especially important places (CoG, river crossing / major obstacle breaching, for example)

The differences in the ability to call for fires should be only in its scope (mortars only? smoke only? binding requirement or just a plea?)*.


An old solution to the FO problem in Germany was that artillery battery COs were acting as FO, for their battery and for others. They ensured a high level of competence and a connection (dedication) of the artillery arm to the front.
I think Gudmundsson mourned over the loss of this connection in "On Artillery" (I read it years ago, not sure).
It never felt quite natural to me; more like a legacy of 19th century (and WW2 AT ambush) arty direct fire tactics.
The Germans fixed the mortar FO problem by often attaching medium mortars to front-line units for quasi direct fire. Only heavies and some mediums were kept massed in the "rear" (actually more like in the last company defensive position, as the "rear" was even less safe).




--------------
*: Sorry for lots of non-standard terms. I'm not much into all those acronyms and terms, especially not as I use sources in three languages). I'm already incomprehensible to most laymen, so there's little motivation left to learn even more acronyms.

krsna
08-25-2009, 04:25 AM
1 "old" proposal by LtCol Jeffery E. Dearolph



http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA402701&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Thanks for the info. I think it is a workable concept as "Force Multiplier". Need to know more on the employment and deployment.

krsna
08-25-2009, 04:43 AM
Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.
True! Fire Support is a different task than STA and Snipers must not be seen as former. They don't count for much impact on ops either. But the role suggests surgical action at ranges beyond matching capability, not to forget the collateral damage avoidance in Urban Warfare.

kaur
08-25-2009, 05:34 AM
Kiwigrunt, sorry for stretching your topic, but I think that precisely shooting men/and women have done harm to opposite side through the history of armed conflict (I don't mention javelin throwers and longbow handlers :). As Ken has mentioned several times, everything depends on METT. This picture shows in a nice way different possible armed conflict modes. Your TTP depends a lot on what side you are fighting. There are myriad variations to define sniper, but for me Spicer's definition is most universal.

http://a.imagehost.org/0562/one_man.jpg (http://a.imagehost.org/view/0562/one_man)

Diagram source
http://www.understandterror.com/articles/Defining%20Terrorism%20by%20Dr%20Boaz%20Ganor.pdf

sixthree
08-25-2009, 12:40 PM
I hope this doesn't come across as to bold or arrogant for my first post aside from introducing myself. As always with everything opinions are like fleas and every dog has them :o

Snipers are an asset that specializes in being covert. A DM in general is more of an overt role especially with the tendency towards presence patrolling. A DM can perform some of the tasks a Sniper fulfills but unless he emerged from the womb ghillied up and leopard crawled past the Doc and out the door he isn't going to have the level of field craft or self discipline required to remain covert for 24-72 hr periods. If he did chances are he has been identified and snapped up by Recon or Snipers already. The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it. When everything turns pear shaped a DM will revert to his most basic role which is a rifleman with a scoped rifle, a Sniper team is an independent entity commanded by a JNCO which can react to whats going on and has been trained to hopefully be able to deal with drastic situation changes.

Now whether or not you need this covert capability and level of independence in an asset to be deployed depends on what types of operations you are conducting.

Recon detachments are indispensible and I don't say that just because I command one. In general rifle Platoons are noisy messy things that leave a black bin liner worth of rubbish everywhere they travel, rifle sections are not much better. Some Platoons/sections are better than others but none can ever achieve the level of noise and field discipline expected of a Recon det, if they were capable of it they would be in Recon. The discipline required in Recon is the main thing that sets them apart from the rest of the Battalion. Remaining covert for a long period of time in adverse weather conditions or when the pucker factor is high is not easy. A lot of Soldiers can't cut it which is why there are courses to assess possible candidates.

Any rifle section is and should be capable of conducting reconnaissance type tasks but they are not ideal for that role. The size of a section hinders its ability to perform the tasks through the amount of sign it makes and amount of ground it requires when in an LUP. Cutting a section down to a det size to negate this removes a lot of the fire power the commander has until now taken for granted, unless he has spent a lot of time conducting BCDs he is going to be at a disadvantage trying to achieve a clean break. Recon dets don't have this problem they do not have to go out and conduct Sect/Pl IAs and Coy DLOC. All they practice is the different types of BCDs until they become second nature. Due to the size of a det the commander does not have the luxury of sitting back and assessing the situation, he is right there in the fight and has to rely on his teams level of training for the first few bounds until he can get them to grips and start making command decisions.

From my own experience as a commander and DS on patrol procedures courses I would say that 10% of the Soldiers in a Battalion are capable of doing the job well. For most it is the self discipline that lets them down. Enforced discipline can be used but is hard to apply in a close prox OP. Now one could disband the RISTA elms in a Bn and hope that their experience is filtered out to the remainder but that is a pretty long shot. At the end of the day the CO is pushing his Recon assets out to find information about the En and deny the En info on FF assets. If he sends out a C/S that is compromised quickly and does not meet his CIR all that has been achieved is the exposure of his possible intent.

William F. Owen
08-25-2009, 02:18 PM
I hope this doesn't come across as to bold or arrogant for my first post aside from introducing myself. As always with everything opinions are like fleas and every dog has them :o
Nothing wrong with arrogant or bold, if you deliver!

Snipers are an asset that specializes in being covert. A DM in general is more of an overt role especially with the tendency towards presence patrolling.
That's based on one understanding of a DM.

A DM can perform some of the tasks a Sniper fulfills but unless he emerged from the womb ghillied up and leopard crawled past the Doc and out the door he isn't going to have the level of field craft or self discipline required to remain covert for 24-72 hr periods.
So where are Sniper currently crawling off to engage targets? That's all romantic wonderful stuff but does it represent what snipers on operations actually do.

The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it.
All JNCOs should be able to call for fire.

Recon detachments are indispensible and I don't say that just because I command one. In general rifle Platoons are noisy messy things that leave a black bin liner worth of rubbish everywhere they travel, rifle sections are not much better.
So the justification for Snipers is the apparent chronically poor training of platoons?
Every worthwhile platoon should be able to generate 4-7 teams of 4-5 men. In WW2, they did. 20-man close reconnaissance patrols of 4 x 5 man teams were routine.
Reconnaissance is a core infantry skill. No excuse not to be good at.
Poor training and leadership is likewise not an excuse to maintain the status quo.
If infantry training and employment wants to stay stuck in the stone age, then all you say is true, but then you have to understand the historic beliefs and infatuations with the "classical" roles of Snipers and Reconnaissance may not be examples of best practice, but actually products of wholly thinking and poor training.

Ken White
08-25-2009, 06:23 PM
...The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it.but it is criminally stupid and can easily be remedied by dumping the 1914 training mentality prevalent in most Armies.
Some Platoons/sections are better than others but none can ever achieve the level of noise and field discipline expected of a Recon det, if they were capable of it they would be in Recon. The discipline required in Recon is the main thing that sets them apart from the rest of the Battalion. Remaining covert for a long period of time in adverse weather conditions or when the pucker factor is high is not easy. A lot of Soldiers can't cut it which is why there are courses to assess possible candidates.Not true in my experience. You take what the system provides, you train it well and it will do what it is trained to do. There are certainly people who cannot adapt and therefor should not be in the Army at all -- you get rid of them -- but the bulk can be properly and acceptably trained by a good trainer. That entails the units sustaining that training to retain the cognitive and muscle skills. That last is the cause of many seeming failures of line units to perform (and a reason for 'elite' formations which are usually small due to their expense); they do not get adequate sustainment training because that's expensive. Particularly so for a too large force. Politicians would rather spend money to buy votes.
...I would say that 10% of the Soldiers in a Battalion are capable of doing the job well.Probably true, though I'd go with 20%. Not the issue, though. The issue is how many can do it acceptably in combat. I believe that figure is about 80% with halfway decent training. Never been a perfect Army or unit and never will be. Having been in a large number of so-called elite units, I'm firmly convinced that Bill Slim had it right -- a good infantry battalion properly trained can do any mission with the possible exception of strategic reconnaissance. I also believe that carries through down to rifle Platoon and even Squad or Section level.

The key to 'good' units is better and more careful selection of ALL entrants for a professional peacetime force and acknowledgment that a war time force, bulked up, will have less exacting standards and must adjust slightly. Only slightly...

reed11b
08-26-2009, 12:07 AM
but it is criminally stupid and can easily be remedied by dumping the 1914 training mentality prevalent in most Armies.Not true in my experience. but the bulk can be properly and acceptably trained by a good trainer. That entails the units sustaining that training to retain the cognitive and muscle skills. That last is the cause of many seeming failures of line units to perform (and a reason for 'elite' formations which are usually small due to their expense); they do not get adequate sustainment training because that's expensive. The key to 'good' units is better and more careful selection of ALL entrants for a professional peacetime force and acknowledgment that a war time force, bulked up, will have less exacting standards and must adjust slightly. Only slightly...
Bingo! This is also why I am not a fan of centralized schools that units send individuals to. Training the whole unit is going to have much better long term effects on a units ability to perform the mission then having any number of tabbed or badged individuals in it it.
Reed

Fuchs
08-26-2009, 01:19 AM
Bingo! This is also why I am not a fan of centralized schools that units send individuals to. Training the whole unit is going to have much better long term effects on a units ability to perform the mission then having any number of tabbed or badged individuals in it it.
Reed

It's all about the mix. You need some centralized courses to dissipate innovations quickly.

The German Army detected many shortcomings in its 1939 Poland campaign.
The lessons learned (that were mostly about "mistakes of our officers") were compiled and thousands of officers were moved through courses to correct the deficiencies in about half a year.


On the other hand it seems natural to me that soldiers join their unit after periods of courses and train with it for a rather long time before it's again about time to attend schooling for new assignments.

krsna
08-26-2009, 07:28 AM
The key to 'good' units is better and more careful selection of ALL entrants for a professional peacetime force and acknowledgment that a war time force, bulked up, will have less exacting standards and must adjust slightly. Only slightly...

Ideally yes...but remember what Alexis de Tocqueville remarked "When the best part of a nation forsakes the military profession .....sovereignty is the first casualty". Hence training is the only answer to make the 'good' the 'best'. However, it is easier said than done. We must create 'Islands of excellence' first and then join them as 'Centers of excellence'.:)

sixthree
08-26-2009, 08:02 AM
That's based on one understanding of a DM.


My understanding is a DM is a member of a rifle section or platoon who has received extra training in marksmanship and is equipped with a scoped rifle capable of a good degree of accuracy. He is able to accurately engage EN forces at distances outside the range of IW with accurate single shots but is also able to provide rapid fire. At its most basic he is a sharpshooter. The level of skill in other areas will depend on who has trained him and the individual himself. He is not trained to the same level as a sniper. If he was he would cease to be a DM and would then be a sniper. If I am wrong please direct me to the doctrine that states otherwise but I am not aware that DM were being taught to operate independently of their Sect/PL/Coy.



So where are Sniper currently crawling off to engage targets? That's all romantic wonderful stuff but does it represent what snipers on operations actually do.


I don't remember there being anything romantic about leopard crawling in a ghillie :) What I meant to present was that some people have a natural affinity to certain roles, others struggle. Some don't make the grade, that does not make them bad soldiers, all it means is they are not suited to or do not have the affinity for that role.
I can think of quite a few times I have seen snipers use ghillies in East Timor. I personally know two snipers who have had call to wear their ghillies in Bamyan, I'm sure others have used them if the task required as well. A ghillie is only an aid, just like parachuting or fast roping is only a way of getting there.



All JNCOs should be able to call for fire.


Yes they should, I would further say any Pte should be able to call in a cold grid or ECAS mission when the SHTF and his commander cant. However a DM is not usually a JNCO. Being able to call in indirect and being able to use that indirect effectively is a different thing. I would like all soldiers to be able to call in a linear or converge mission if the opportunity presents and also have called it live beforehand. The reality is mortar bombs cost money and there is only so much to go around. WTS are cheap to use and a good tool but they are no substitute for live rounds.



So the justification for Snipers is the apparent chronically poor training of platoons?
Every worthwhile platoon should be able to generate 4-7 teams of 4-5 men. In WW2, they did. 20-man close reconnaissance patrols of 4 x 5 man teams were routine.
Reconnaissance is a core infantry skill. No excuse not to be good at.
Poor training and leadership is likewise not an excuse to maintain the status quo.
If infantry training and employment wants to stay stuck in the stone age, then all you say is true, but then you have to understand the historic beliefs and infatuations with the "classical" roles of Snipers and Reconnaissance may not be examples of best practice, but actually products of wholly thinking and poor training.

I never said it was the justification for Snipers at all and I wouldn't say the level of training is chronic either. Considering the soldiers average at 1-2 years service and a tour patrolling the streets of Dili I don't expect their close country drills to be anywhere near as good as someone who spent 6 months patrolling the bush on INTERFET/UNTAET let alone the forces we sent to Vietnam who had a long period of training in Malaysia beforehand. The bin liner was picked up after tracking up a Pl for an 8 day period and the majority was found as someone thought he was a smart bugger and tried to bury his rubbish. Another Pl was followed up by a patrol other than mine for the same period and all they picked up was an ear plug. The individual that did that would have hopefully been identified by the selection process most Recon Pl use. A Pl has strength in numbers, a small group is only as strong as its weakest member.

As it stands METLs have to be met and currently there is no identified requirement for a Pl to be able to break down into well trained recon patrols. If the need is identified then it will be implemented but I believe it will be to the detriment of other skills. The jack of all trades analogy is a great idea but I personally believe it is better in the current environment for troops to specialize in certain fields, I base that off my own experience. Rotating people back to the companies to impart their skills onto others should be done however and it stops the Recon Pl or Sniper cell from becoming a boys club.

What do you see as the historical roles of Recon and Snipers and the difference with how the are being used now? As I know it the role of a BN Recon PL is to provide the CO with information on EN and terrain in the BN AO, the role of the Sniper cell is the similar with the addition of being able to destroy selected targets at X range and to provide harrasing fire out to X range. X being the effective and maximum ranges of the weapon system employed. I don't see that being any different in the past or present. Recon is the COs asset that he can push out to provide him with the information he needs to employ his other assets. Yes he could detach a fire team from a Coy to do it but that would require them to reorg for this role. It requires specialized eqpt like optics, comms and data transfer ability and training in its use. It requires a well trained CLS who is able to provide care above the normal level. A Recon Pl provides him this capability immediately.

You can try to train people to do everything but eventually you will reach information overload. The people who are able to do everything are special individuals and are in a unit a lot flasher than mine.

I fully believe that a WWII unit would have been capable of what you speak. Having talked to veterans of that conflict on ANZAC day one of the things that struck me was the continuity of personnel they had, replacements rounded out casualties but the in most cases the core of the unit remained. Having operated together for a number of years they would have achieved a very high level of training I wish my Bn could aspire to. Sadly people move around to frequently, a Sect Comd will finally get to a good level of training with his troops and then he will lose a number to release, promotion and transfer and is forced to start all over again. If that was not a factor I agree that my job would be obsolete and that unit would be a force to be reckoned with. In the modern world I don't see it happening any time soon though.

Thanks for taking the time to reply to my comments.


...

Ken, I agree with you. Given the time and money much could be accomplished, however their is only so much money and training time to go around. Continuation training is vital and it is normally something that is paid lip service to. Directed outputs have to be met.

Thank you also for taking the time to reply to my comments.

William F. Owen
08-26-2009, 12:53 PM
Sixthree

I appreciate where you are coming from, but 95% of your arguments/statements are the same as I have heard for keeping the infantry rifle platoons back in the dark ages and not forcing a higher standard of competence on to them.
As it is, in most Commonwealth Army's infantry has a far greater range of skills than any other arm. We undervalue the infantry and always have, and we fail to serve them well with equipment, training and doctrine.

I think we need "snipers"/Long Range Rifleman.
I think every platoon needs two. Selecting and training them, need to be re-thought in that regard.
I also think Platoons should train towards a predominantly dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance role. Do that well, all else follows.
I think all Infantrymen, should have "Ghilles" - in the right terrain.

The arguments about optics/sensors and comms were true, 20 years ago. Today, every fire team can have a data capable PRC-148, spotting scopes, and Thermal Imagers. Having said that, I served in a Close Reconnaissance Platoon in the early 1980's with little in the way of specialised equipment.

The ultimate consequence of wholly Recon and Sniper thought, is you end up pulling good man power from the Rifle Platoons. Rifle Platoons are the critical element. Rifle Platoons literally win wars. That is where the main effort of training and resources needs to go.

Fuchs
08-26-2009, 02:08 PM
I think all Infantrymen, should have "Ghilles" - in the right terrain.

That's something I have said for years, but I've scaled it down to a more practical approach.

Infantry should in fact place a much greater emphasis on camouflage to enhance its survivability.
The ongoing wars taught terrible lessons. Soldiers were standing around for weeks with heavy armour plating and survived. That wouldn't even work for minutes against competent opponents. Our soldiers learn that it's OK to be seen if you have enough armour - a terrible lesson that will likely hurt us later.


Helmet, Shoulder and arms are most important and should be covered with great camo. Soldiers carry very little equipment in those places anyway (few pouches on arms).

An even more practical approach is to use 3D camouflage (similar to this) on arms and helmet.
The current discussion about mere universal digital camo patterns is already technically obsolete in my opinion.

reed11b
08-26-2009, 05:02 PM
Holy Cow! I agree with Fuchs on something.
Reed
Wilf, I would add one cavet to your patrol/reconn based infantry. The "close" fight, ie, restricted terrain and urban settings, is a core skill for infantry as well.

Fuchs
08-26-2009, 05:10 PM
An even more practical approach is to use 3D camouflage (similar to this) on arms and helmet.

the link didn't work:
link (http://www.tacticaldistributors.com/ZoomImage.aspx?productID=TNT-BOONIE)

William F. Owen
08-26-2009, 05:13 PM
Wilf, I would add one cavet to your patrol/reconn based infantry. The "close" fight, ie, restricted terrain and urban settings, is a core skill for infantry as well.

Sure. We could call it.. let me think.... errr... fighting patrols? :D

Fighting dismounted is fighting dismounted and yes context is critical. If anyone can point out to me how an infantry Platoon is hindered by equipping, training and organising for fighting and reconnaissance patrol activity, I'll gladly listen.

reed11b
08-26-2009, 05:26 PM
The reason I stated "close" fighting was due to the tendency of infantry theorists to focus on firepower over mobility and tend to organize to assualt static positions to the best that I can figure out. Dismounted 120mm and even 81mm mortars make little sense, as does heavy long range AT weapons, yet they keep appearing in organizational schemes low on the echelon scale. The other reason was that reconn "purists" state that reconn should not have ANY heavy wepons or HE projection capability since reconn is looking and not fighting. This is also flawed. As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle.
Reed

William F. Owen
08-26-2009, 05:47 PM
The reason I stated "close" fighting was due to the tendency of infantry theorists to focus on firepower over mobility and tend to organize to assualt static positions to the best that I can figure out. Dismounted 120mm and even 81mm mortars make little sense, as does heavy long range AT weapons, yet they keep appearing in organizational schemes low on the echelon scale. The other reason was that reconn "purists" state that reconn should not have ANY heavy wepons or HE projection capability since reconn is looking and not fighting. This is also flawed. As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle.

Eyhh... yes and no. Yes, you are right in the purist approach, and yes, no dismounted 81 or 120mm.

However, if we take rifle Platoons to be the basis for the capability we are talking about, then they do need support. You need mortars from somewhere. How and who needs to be examined. I am working on this at the moment, looking at Infantry Battalion of less than 500 men.

AT weapons, such as Javelin or Spike are required, but they are an optional capability. Any platoon should be able to employ them. - so could you have a Mortar Platoon, worked the same way?
Could they be manned by the artillery?
Point is, if we all agree on where we are going, we can then discuss how we get there!

kaur
08-27-2009, 05:14 AM
Fuchs, I'll add to your post 1 good comment :)

Modern basic individual camouflage

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/08/modern-basic-individual-camouflage.html

Off-topic request.

Wilf said:


However, if we take rifle Platoons to be the basis for the capability we are talking about, then they do need support. You need mortars from somewhere. How and who needs to be examined. I am working on this at the moment, looking at Infantry Battalion of less than 500 men.

AT weapons, such as Javelin or Spike are required, but they are an optional capability. Any platoon should be able to employ them. - so could you have a Mortar Platoon, worked the same way?
Could they be manned by the artillery?
Point is, if we all agree on where we are going, we can then discuss how we get there!

I'm trying to find information about IDF unit Maglan's structure, where in small unit are connected long range AT weapons and scouts.


The unit is made of two elements - the missile launching teams, which will deploy and launch the ATGM, and the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) teams that will detect the target as well as guide the ATGM to it by laser designating it.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=120866

Any additional information (with additional sources) is very welcome and I'm waiting your PM's :)

William F. Owen
08-27-2009, 05:55 AM
I'm trying to find information about IDF unit Maglan's structure, where in small unit are connected long range AT weapons and scouts.


Almost everything about Maglan is classified. As far as I can work out though, they are basically the Parachute Brigades, Recon and Anti-tank unit. How those two roles come to be together, I guess comes from the M151 Jeeps with TOW launchers they were equipped with back in the 1970s.

.... and doctrinally it's not a stretch or even silly to have AT and Recon as the same people, for a who range of reasons I will not bore everyone with right now.

COMMAR
08-28-2009, 05:24 PM
.... and doctrinally it's not a stretch or even silly to have AT and Recon as the same people, for a who range of reasons I will not bore everyone with right now.


Its not a stretch at all. Its exactly what the Force Recon Hunter/Killer Teams did in the opening days of Afghanistan.

Force Recon Teams teamed up w/the BLT's (Battalion Landing Team) CAAT Teams (Combined Anti-Armor Team) to form up H/T Teams that operated as a separate Maneuver Element in Deep Battle Space.

These combined small teams conducted DA & Interdiction missions out in a 400+mi radius fr/ FOB Camp Rhino alone or sometimes escorted or by Cobras or LAVs.

The 1 famous Interdiction, only known b/c it was caught on camera, was the Shoot Out on Highway 1 which is just outside of Kandahar.

Excerpt fr/an LA Times article, "What The Marine Saw" referring to the Combat Cameraman attached on that particular Interdiction:


Once Camp Rhino was established, Marines from the elite Force Reconnaissance moved northward to intercept Taliban and Al Qaeda forces fleeing a major battle north of Kandahar to regroup and possibly mount a counteroffensive.

In Humvees and light-armored vehicles, Marines moved slowly through villages in search of fleeing enemy troops. They disarmed anyone suspected of being Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters and, if they were not hostile, let them go. Villagers, mostly old men and children, greeted the Marines.

He was also there a few days later when the heavily armed Marine "hunter-killer" teams moved cautiously toward the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar--unsure whether Afghan villagers would treat them as liberators or enemies.

...To prevent enemy vehicles from fleeing Kandahar, the Marines were ordered on the night of Dec. 7 to set up a roadblock. Thirty feet of razor-sharp concertina wire was strung across a narrow asphalt road and anchored by tent pegs.

Glowing "chemlights" were attached to the wire so the roadblock could be seen by oncoming drivers. Marines positioned their vehicles at the bottom of a berm beside the road and snipers crouched several hundred yards away. Chenelly took up his video camera.

Shortly after 4 a.m., headlights were spotted rushing toward the roadblock. A truck hit the concertina wire and skidded to a stop. On the video, Marines can be heard calling to each other excitedly, "He blew it. He blew it." Chenelly remembers the sound of the wire scraping the side of the truck. A Marine who speaks the local Afghan dialect shouted for the men in the truck to drop their weapons.

Instead, men in the cab and the truck bed--who appeared to be sleeping--raised their AK-47s at the Marines, some of whom were just 10 feet away. In an instant, both sides began firing--captured on video as green glowing tracer rounds. "Force Recon didn't hesitate for a second," Chenelly said. "They didn't flinch. If they had, I don't think we'd have all made it out alive."

The heat of the rounds ignited an ammunition cache in the back of the truck. Rounds, including rocket-propelled grenades, shot off in all directions, like some deadly Fourth of July celebration.

"It's very surreal when it's happening," said Chenelly. "For a second, you can't believe it. It's like an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie. It goes so fast and everything blows up."

Seconds later, Marines can be heard on the video calling out, "Go, go, go, quick, quick, get back." An authoritative voice--that of a master sergeant, the ranking Marine on the scene--barks out, "Let me know when everybody is in."

The Marines withdrew down the road, leaving eight Taliban and Al Qaeda members dead, their truck a flaming ruin. The Marines left the bodies on the road as a warning to others who might decide to fight rather than surrender. None of the Marines were injured.

kaur
08-29-2009, 08:17 AM
Wilf said


and doctrinally it's not a stretch or even silly to have AT and Recon as the same people, for a who range of reasons I will not bore everyone with right now.

COMMAR said:


Its not a stretch at all. Its exactly what the Force Recon Hunter/Killer Teams did in the opening days of Afghanistan.

There is information that Maglan is useing Nimrod long range AT missiles.


The Nimrod is an exceptionally long-range anti-tank guided missile developed by Israel Aerospace Industries. It provides standoff strike capability against a variety of point targets such as tanks, APCs, ships, bunkers and personnel concentrations. Nimrod has a semi-active laser guidance system, capable of day and night operation. Its flight trajectory can be set below obscuring cloud layer, while a forward scouting team uses a laser designator to direct it from up to 26km behind. Nimrod may be installed on a variety of towed launchers, light combat vehicle
launchers, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The launching vehicle or aircraft may fire up to four Nimrods at once from a single pack.

http://www.shpmedia.com/Images/ADJ%20Nov%202007_air%20launched%20weapons.pdf

If i understand correctly Maglan is company-sized unit. I don't even dare to speculate what is the ratio "missile platforms vs recce units". Both must be able to act alone because 26 km is really long distance that you can't cover between breakfast and dinner.

To come back to sniper topic, here is one article about snipers in Afganistan.

A Close Fight, and a Couple of Miracles
By Noah Shachtman August 27, 2009

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/08/danger-room-in-afghanistan-a-close-range-fight-and-a-couple-of-miracles/

120mm
08-30-2009, 12:45 AM
Don't know if this will come through, but the following is a link to CTC Quarterly Update for 1st Qtr '09. I wrote an article of the Brigade staff's employment of Snipers and the role of the Sniper Employment Officer.

https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=5086

You need AKO login to read it, but the bottom line is that the Army Sniper community would like to see Snipers used more appropriately, trained better, and more weight given to the advice of the Sniper Employment Officer at the Brigade level.

As much as I agree with Wilf's ideas about how are armies SHOULD be run, I don't think any of us will see it in our lifetime, so there remains the need for specialized sniper and recon capabilities. Straight infantry guys just seem incapable of "getting" what the sniper and recon role is.

William F. Owen
08-30-2009, 04:52 AM
As much as I agree with Wilf's ideas about how are armies SHOULD be run, I don't think any of us will see it in our lifetime, so there remains the need for specialized sniper and recon capabilities. Straight infantry guys just seem incapable of "getting" what the sniper and recon role is.

Why is that? Is it because the sniper and recon roles are poorly described? I believe/know (as I am sure do you) that 99% are not actually stupid. Poor educated maybe, and this should not apply to officers.

Essentially you are saying that the role cannot be expressed in a way that describes how they should be employed? I fully agree that is the problem.

This is why my "Platoon snipers- Long Range Riflemen" concentrate on one simple task - providing long range precision engagement in support of the platoon.
Recon - as in Finding the enemy and/or gaining information is a whole other issue, but unless you can describe the role in ways that can be practically applied, you are doomed.
What all this tells me, is that instead of finding ways to use Recon and Snipers, we should focus on describing, in the simplest useful way, what capabilities, Platoons, Companies and units actually need.

Uboat509
08-30-2009, 06:26 AM
Why is that? Is it because the sniper and recon roles are poorly described? I believe/know (as I am sure do you) that 99% are not actually stupid. Poor educated maybe, and this should not apply to officers.


Education is not the issue at all. They get it. The problem is that they hate it. It takes a certain kind of person to spend three days under glass in a hide watching a target that you may not even get to shoot at. Most guys would much rather be on the assault. You can order regular infantry guys to do the S/O mission and most will do their best but it takes a level of patience and focus to be a good sniper that not everyone has. Tell most infantrymen, or most anyone for that matter, that their job will consist of laying in hide looking at a target through glass for up wards of several days, that while they are in that hide they can't move or even get up to void their bowels, that they have to keep eyes on that target for the entire time that they are there which means little to no sleep and that at the end of all that they may not even get to engage the target even when the assault kicks off, and they will tell you that you need to find someone else for the job.

SFC W

William F. Owen
08-30-2009, 07:23 AM
Education is not the issue at all. They get it. The problem is that they hate it. It takes a certain kind of person to spend three days under glass in a hide watching a target that you may not even get to shoot at. Most guys would much rather be on the assault. You can order regular infantry guys to do the S/O mission and most will do their best but it takes a level of patience and focus to be a good sniper that not everyone has.
Well having done more than my fair share of time on OP hides (as part of a Reconnaissance Platoon). I've done all the peeing into bags plastic bags (containing sanitary towels) and eaten nothing but cold food. I concede life can be hard, but in comparison to what? Infantry operations are physically and psychologically demanding. It is an extremely challenging role and should not attract or tolerate those looking for an easy life.

UK infantry training takes OPs as a normal infantry task - is it always well taught? No, so I do have gripes about how you train, but I absolutely assert that it should be trained for and used.

Does that mean life it too tough to lie in an ambush position for a couple of days? Sorry, but if a normal Rifle Platoon cannot do a 3-5 OP task or lie in ambush for 2-3 days, then you simply do not have infantry worthy of the name.

Current Recon/Sniper concepts are always held to a notional level of low infantry skill. My objective is to promote and discuss a more useful understanding of infantry. I absolutely agree if you have a low standard of infantry training, then you may well need Sniper/Recon as quasi-force multipliers, instead of inherent skill sets.

120mm
08-30-2009, 09:47 AM
Why is that? Is it because the sniper and recon roles are poorly described? I believe/know (as I am sure do you) that 99% are not actually stupid. Poor educated maybe, and this should not apply to officers.

It's not that at all. Besides Uboat509's comments about straight infantry hating the roles, perfectly intelligent (and perfectly useful) infantry guys just aren't suited for the role, and will deliver suboptimal results. On the other hand, those whose personality is suited to recon or sniping just don't seem to ever pull their thumb out and conduct that attack on that hill when necessary.

I've edited this to add that sometimes, suboptimal is good enough, and there is a very good argument for multi-tasking regular infantry. In fact, the more I think on it, the more I like Wilf's argument for more talented and broadly trained infantry. But I think there will always be a need for specialized roles and training among sniping/recon.

Now, I think there is an error in selection: Those with a talent for sniping/recon need to be selected because of aptitude, proven during operations, and not as a result of assignment.

William F. Owen
08-30-2009, 10:10 AM
It's not that at all. Besides Uboat509's comments about straight infantry hating the roles, perfectly intelligent (and perfectly useful) infantry guys just aren't suited for the role, and will botch the damned mission each and every time. On the other hand, those whose personality is suited to recon or sniping just don't seem to ever pull their thumb out and conduct that attack on that hill when necessary.


Are not all Sniper and Recon skills merely extrapolations of normal infantry skills, held to a higher standard?
Aren't Snipers and Recon Operators identified from the ranks of the infantry via testing? - so all Snipers etc, must first prove themselves as infantrymen. I see nothing to suggest that skills and personalities makes them mutually exclusive.

My case is simply:

A.) The stripping out of skilled and determined individuals from Platoons, to go off and form specialist platoons deprives Rifle Platoons of effective soldiers. In a manpower limited army, that makes no sense. Why create two or three tiers of infantry?
B.) Warfare evolves, so Infantry training and roles must evolve in line with the conditions required. That requires altering current concepts. I see no actual evidence that infantry training cannot be developed to produce the required skills levels.

Almost all the opposition I encountered to adapting infantry training in the UK came from career-based Sniper and Reconnaissance soldiers, who seem to want to prevent discussion and thus progress.

120mm
09-01-2009, 02:50 AM
Are not all Sniper and Recon skills merely extrapolations of normal infantry skills, held to a higher standard?
Aren't Snipers and Recon Operators identified from the ranks of the infantry via testing? - so all Snipers etc, must first prove themselves as infantrymen. I see nothing to suggest that skills and personalities makes them mutually exclusive.

My case is simply:

A.) The stripping out of skilled and determined individuals from Platoons, to go off and form specialist platoons deprives Rifle Platoons of effective soldiers. In a manpower limited army, that makes no sense. Why create two or three tiers of infantry?
B.) Warfare evolves, so Infantry training and roles must evolve in line with the conditions required. That requires altering current concepts. I see no actual evidence that infantry training cannot be developed to produce the required skills levels.

Almost all the opposition I encountered to adapting infantry training in the UK came from career-based Sniper and Reconnaissance soldiers, who seem to want to prevent discussion and thus progress.

Actually, no. The guys who make good Recon guys and snipers typically don't play well with straight infantry guys. And straight infantry guys usually shun them, and drive them out of the military completely, if there isn't a friendly place for them to go. Like to recon or sniper units.

So the "stripping out of infantry units" never really happens. Infantry guys get rid of guys as "unsuitable" on a daily basis who might've made decent recon and snipers.

And then infantry guys, who have no real appreciation for the nuance involved - (The idea that recon and sniping is just a higher standard of infantry tasks is laughable to someone who "gets it") promote people "just like them" to do those tasks, which they eventually do, with usually poor results.

William F. Owen
09-01-2009, 03:53 AM
Actually, no. The guys who make good Recon guys and snipers typically don't play well with straight infantry guys. And straight infantry guys usually shun them, and drive them out of the military completely, if there isn't a friendly place for them to go. Like to recon or sniper units.


Well then there's a massive difference between the US/USMC and the UK. No one in the UK "Shun's" snipers at all. In fact quite the opposite is sometimes a problem. Every swinging d*ck wants to be one, and "Sniper skills" are held to be the gold standard of infantry skills.

Strangely enough I just found an old UK Army Doctrine Training report on Manoeuvre Support Sections at the company level, as used by one unit in Iraq in 03. 5 Men = All sniper trained, with 2 x L96 and but a secondary roles to employ Sustained Fire GPMG. - put the same in a platoon and I think we have something!

Uboat509
09-01-2009, 04:09 AM
A.) The stripping out of skilled and determined individuals from Platoons, to go off and form specialist platoons deprives Rifle Platoons of effective soldiers. In a manpower limited army, that makes no sense. Why create two or three tiers of infantry?

Let's talk about that for a second. I have heard the whole argument about Scouts/LRSU/SF/etc. poaching all the good soldiers from the line companies for years now. Frankly it's insulting to the guys who choose to stay in the line companies. Seriously, are the line companies so utterly devoid of talent because a few decide to go to Scouts or SF or whatever that they can't function? Scouts are one platoon out of an entire battalion. SF is one small regiment out of the entire Army. Does that really represent the majority of good NCOs and soldiers in the Army? That's it just those few? It always has sounded more like sour grapes to me than a valid argument against Scouts or LRSU or SF.

In any case it is only creating two or three tiers of infantry if you believe that they are doing the same job. They are not.


SFC W

Ken White
09-01-2009, 04:11 AM
I've seen all that happen but I've far more often seen it not happen. I've seen and been in recon units and sniper crews populated only with 'selected' volunteers and been in others populated with whatever the pipeline fed in the way of replacements - to include 'school trained snipers' who couldn't use a mil formula or calculate windage.

Very little difference in performance. In fact, the 'selected' crews tend to be mediocre in performance and showboat prima donnas if you don't watch 'em. What you postulate is true a few places in peacetime, in a busy war no Army could afford that mentality. No decent Commander would tolerate it. Yes, I know all commanders aren't decent -- but most are.

Any good Cav NCO can train 80% of the average grunts to be decent scouts; he can train about 20% of them to be superb scouts -- and those same percentage are about the number that will be decent and super Infantrymen, just different skillsets and yes, the Scout does have to know and do more, a bunch more -- most of these kids can do far more than too many officers and NCOs are willing to let them do.

A decent sniper can train any guy who has a flair for shooting and the patience for the job to be a sniper. How good he will be is a matter of time and experience.

The above comes from about 11 years, four in combat in two different wars, of recon from FMF and Corps to Infantry Battalion level, Cav and Infantry, Mech and Airborne. You show me a unit that acts as you say -- and, as I said, I've seen and been in a few, I know they exist -- and I'll show you a sorry unit (They were and to make your day one of 'em was Airborne :D ). Good units don't have those problems. I've also not seen the shun idea -- in most units I was in or familiar with, there were people in the rifle companies who wanted to be Scouts or Snipers and had to wait for a vacancy to move...

RJ
09-01-2009, 04:23 AM
"Actually, no. The guys who make good Recon guys and snipers typically don't play well with straight infantry guys. And straight infantry guys usually shun them, and drive them out of the military completely, if there isn't a friendly place for them to go. Like to recon or sniper units.

So the "stripping out of infantry units" never really happens. Infantry guys get rid of guys as "unsuitable" on a daily basis who might've made decent recon and snipers.

And then infantry guys, who have no real appreciation for the nuance involved - (The idea that recon and sniping is just a higher standard of infantry tasks is laughable to someone who "gets it") promote people "just like them" to do those tasks, which they eventually do, with usually poor results."

My last tour in the Corps was with the 2nd Recon Bn, 2nd Marine Div. Prior to that I had spend 36 months with Line Regiment Marines in the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.

Once I acclimated to the 2nd Recon focus, the attitude from the Line Companys was a little touchy. They knew they were good to go, in their mission and resented the fact they "we" might be just a tad ahead of them.

When I reported to the 2nd Marine Div., it was to a Casual Company that received Marines from other Divisions or duty stations. I reported to the 2 Mar. Div Casual Company on a Sunday and was greeted by a Cpl. clerk typist. He looked at my orders and said something about sending me to a regular Marine Infantry Regt. I put a bottle of burbon on the counter and said what else do you have available. 2nd Recon was and option. I liked to think of it as water, or burbon, seeking its own level.

Ken White, will appreciate my bit of horse trading at the Reception Center.

Life in Marine Battalion Recon Units revolved around 9 man Squads. 8 paddlers and a Coxsun for a rubber boat equaled a Squad Leader and two four man recon teams.

Back in the day the Recon Bn. of a Marine infantry Division had one mission. Beach Assualt Recon. No sniper attachment what so ever. Our mission was to paddle into hostile beaches and "test" them for firm vs. loose sand compaction. Firm was good, and loose was not acceptable for an amphibous invasion.

Our A/O stretched from the high water mark to 2,000 yards into the potential beachhead.
As an infantry grunt, I appreciated the Gator Navy. As a recon Marine the submariners became my shipmates.

Our Battalion had the responsibility to scout and confirm beaches that could handle an Amphibous Assualt by a Marine Division.

Our T/O weapn was a 45 cal. sub machine gun nicked named "Grease Gun" and produced by the ACME Toy Company of Newark, NJ.

Our training dictated that shooting it out with the enemy was the last option.

Our job was to get in and get out with a good hydrographic survey of the beach and a in depth recon of the land beyond the beach for 2,000 yards or so.

Zero enemy contact was considered a perfect mission. There were no Seals at the time and Frogmen did underwater demolition work on beach obsticals, but their A/O didn't extend into the littoral zone above the high tide mark.
The Marine Corps did not have a Sniper Training Unit at Quantico at that time.

When I was a Marine Infantry Squad Leader the Battalion had two fighting units attached to the H&S Company at Battalion HQ. A Scout and Sniper Platoon and a 81 mm Mortar Platoon. The Scout Platoon did point and flank screening as the Battalion moved forward. The snipers were utilized as a long rifle shot, defense unit. Each Rifle platoon knew who were the best shots and if specific, long range shots were needed at the immediate platoon front, the platoon commander would designate who the shooters were going to be. In my day shooters were more than likely to be used for defense and not offense. There wasn't a need to designate a DM in theplatoons. We knew who was really good and who wasn't.

As a young grunt, I was a proficient gunner with 60mm Mortars (Thank You NYNG) and for a short time humped an 81mm Base plate as a PFC in the 5th Marines. I also spent time as a .30 cal LMG gunner and was a Rocket Section Leader in a Weapons platoon. (8.5 Bazooka). In M Co. 3/5.

120mm mortars were assigned to the Regiment level of force protection.
Iv never interacted with those lofty master mortar gunners.

My favorite order was and still is "Guns Up!' With "Fire Mission" a close second.

Infantry was my think, Dude!

William F. Owen
09-01-2009, 04:26 AM
Let's talk about that for a second. I have heard the whole argument about Scouts/LRSU/SF/etc. poaching all the good soldiers from the line companies for years now. Frankly it's insulting to the guys who choose to stay in the line companies.
I agree. Let me explain.

Scout, LRSU, and SF are not all the same thing.
Some guy wants to go do SF, off you go, and good luck. SF is a legitimate and vital role.
LRSU(?) - Worked with LRSU at LRRP School in Wiengarten. Never really understood the role, as they explained it, but it was a formation level capability - above unit, so quasi-SF role.

Now if some guy in a platoon wants a greater challenge, to go do something outside the unit, then good for him.

What I am against is the division of roles and capabilities WITHIN units, that creates creeping excellence, parochialism and worst of all, does not serve operational capability.
The only two valid applications I can see for some level of platoon specialisation (excluding CSS types) is Mortars, and dedicated STA/FOO/FAC.

PS: I am not anti-sniper. I want at least 2 per Platoon, (maybe 6 per Company) and to be as good as they can be. I just don't want them spending time parcelled all together, perpetuating a ownership of skills, that IF relevant should be common to all.

krsna
09-01-2009, 08:07 AM
Enlarging the argument on Generalisation of Recon job vs Specialisation, here's a news feed. This may give some ideas on things for the future.

"Now, a communications system that two Fort Lewis Stryker brigades are fielding in Iraq aims to provide leaders with more real-time information – and a better chance of tracking insurgents.The Tacticomp system can link soldiers on the ground with commanders back at the operations center, using troops’ geographical coordinates and live video from cameras soldiers carry or from drone aircraft circling overhead.The information streams back to computers inside the Stryker vehicle and to the unit’s tactical operations center.Soldiers carrying the device can send texts to each other or broadcast a message in an ad-hoc chat room. And the ability to send video or still photos to the operations center can be used to verify identities of targets.

Fort Lewis’ 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigades – both part of 2nd Infantry Division – are fielding the equipment in Iraq. The 3rd Brigade left earlier this summer for Diyala province; the 4th Brigade leaves in the coming weeks for Baghdad. Between them, they have nearly 8,000 soldiers.

Soldiers from 4th Brigade tested the equipment two weeks ago, with mixed feelings. Many liked the idea of live video – especially with the ability to tap into the data stream from unmanned aerial vehicles overhead – but some believe carrying the extra gear will make them stand out.“The video feed is a really good concept,” said Spc. Anthony Morris, an infantryman preparing for his second deployment. “I like the ability to see what guys are talking about. But the extra equipment makes you a big target.”

Each kit weighs about 8 pounds and includes a handheld controller with a video screen and a camera that can attach to the helmet or body armor. Battalions will decide which soldiers field the equipment, but previous units that have deployed to Iraq with the system have distributed them to platoon leaders and higher."

Comments.

William F. Owen
09-01-2009, 12:57 PM
The Tacticomp system can link soldiers on the ground with commanders back at the operations center, using troops’ geographical coordinates and live video from cameras soldiers carry or from drone aircraft circling overhead.

I the IDF is issuing V-RAMBO (http://www.tadspec.com/index.php?id=188) to all the Infantry units with equipped with the Skylark 1LE UAV.

Based on what the users tell me, it's a very impressive system - and I'm a UAV sceptic!!

COMMAR
09-02-2009, 05:24 AM
The only two valid applications I can see for some level of platoon specialisation (excluding CSS types) is Mortars, and dedicated STA/FOO/FAC.

PS: I am not anti-sniper. I want at least 2 per Platoon, (maybe 6 per Company) and to be as good as they can be. I just don't want them spending time parcelled all together, perpetuating a ownership of skills, that IF relevant should be common to all.


I just need a little clarification. Now when you say, "I am not anti-sniper. I want at least 2 per Platoon".

Do you mean "Snipers" or do you mean snipers as in Glorified DMs?

Why I say that, beyond the obvious, is b/c the US Army (I know ur Brit) & the USMC's idea of Sniper Employment is different. This discussion seems more Army centric in the Ideas of sniper/recon employment.

The Army keeps their snipers very close to their Line Units, very much like DMs, nothing wrong w/it just their TTP.

The USMC is more liberal w/the autonomy given to their Scout-Snipers often giving free range thru-out say a Comp-sized AO to disrupt enemy movement & cause havoc as a separate almost mini-maneuver element.

So when you say snipers, are you proposing "Snipers" whose missions are independent of, but in conjunction with the Rifle Plts & at times (choke pts, crossings, etc.) supporting?

Or are you proposing DM type snipers, 2 per platoon, whose 'Primary' job is to support Rifle Plt movements?

Nothing wrong w/the latter just want to be on the same page.

MikeF
09-02-2009, 06:05 AM
Enlarging the argument on Generalisation of Recon job vs Specialisation, here's a news feed. This may give some ideas on things for the future.

"Now, a communications system that two Fort Lewis Stryker brigades are fielding in Iraq aims to provide leaders with more real-time information – and a better chance of tracking insurgents.The Tacticomp system can link soldiers on the ground with commanders back at the operations center, using troops’ geographical coordinates and live video from cameras soldiers carry or from drone aircraft circling overhead.The information streams back to computers inside the Stryker vehicle and to the unit’s tactical operations center.Soldiers carrying the device can send texts to each other or broadcast a message in an ad-hoc chat room. And the ability to send video or still photos to the operations center can be used to verify identities of targets.

Fort Lewis’ 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigades – both part of 2nd Infantry Division – are fielding the equipment in Iraq. The 3rd Brigade left earlier this summer for Diyala province; the 4th Brigade leaves in the coming weeks for Baghdad. Between them, they have nearly 8,000 soldiers.

Soldiers from 4th Brigade tested the equipment two weeks ago, with mixed feelings. Many liked the idea of live video – especially with the ability to tap into the data stream from unmanned aerial vehicles overhead – but some believe carrying the extra gear will make them stand out.“The video feed is a really good concept,” said Spc. Anthony Morris, an infantryman preparing for his second deployment. “I like the ability to see what guys are talking about. But the extra equipment makes you a big target.”

Each kit weighs about 8 pounds and includes a handheld controller with a video screen and a camera that can attach to the helmet or body armor. Battalions will decide which soldiers field the equipment, but previous units that have deployed to Iraq with the system have distributed them to platoon leaders and higher."

Comments.

Technology may complement reconnaissance, but it will not replace it. The sterile videos footage cannot replace those that creep through the night.

Although the article and technology you cite is new to those stykers, the reporter, and yourself, it is not new. Under the blessing of then MG William Caldwell, my squadron tested the same technology in 2005 and employed it in 2006 and 2007 in Iraq.

The technology provided us enhanced capabilities, but it could not replace the paratrooper burrowed deep in an observation post. For example,

- we observed that when UAVs flew overhead, everyone hid. We could HEAR the UAVs from a mile or two away. The picture shown in the videos did not reflect the picture on the ground. The enemy was smart enough to counter this notion of alternative coverage.

- Video footage and UAVs could not pick up the difference in Arabaic dialogue that we could. In one instance, one of my scouts managed to get close enough to a stronghold to determine that the dialogue spoken was not Iraqi but Egyptian. This intel helped confirm the presence of foreign fighters.

- Video footage is deceiving. I cannot tell you the amount of hours that I spent trying to explain to CAS, NTISR, and the command group that the footage they were watching was dogs running around and not insurgents.



v/r

Mike

120mm
09-02-2009, 10:16 AM
I've seen all that happen but I've far more often seen it not happen. I've seen and been in recon units and sniper crews populated only with 'selected' volunteers and been in others populated with whatever the pipeline fed in the way of replacements - to include 'school trained snipers' who couldn't use a mil formula or calculate windage.

This isn't what I'm talking about. What I'm talking about is people who's avocation happens to be the job. In other words, they are suited by personality and aptitude.


Very little difference in performance. In fact, the 'selected' crews tend to be mediocre in performance and showboat prima donnas if you don't watch 'em. What you postulate is true a few places in peacetime, in a busy war no Army could afford that mentality. No decent Commander would tolerate it. Yes, I know all commanders aren't decent -- but most are.

Actually, wartime is where the avocational scout or sniper is a) allowed to do the job regardless of MOS and b) really shines at it. I think we are in complete agreement about any selection "non-process" the Army likes to use to award MOSs.


Any good Cav NCO can train 80% of the average grunts to be decent scouts; he can train about 20% of them to be superb scouts -- and those same percentage are about the number that will be decent and super Infantrymen, just different skillsets and yes, the Scout does have to know and do more, a bunch more -- most of these kids can do far more than too many officers and NCOs are willing to let them do.

Which takes serious time. Not something you can just say "you, you and you are now scouts or snipers - now go do that recon/occupy a hide site, in enemy territory, accomplish your mission and survive". Which is precisely what WILF appears to be proposing. Or not, depending on which post it is.


A decent sniper can train any guy who has a flair for shooting and the patience for the job to be a sniper. How good he will be is a matter of time and experience.

As an aside, here is what is currently happening: Sniper comes trained in BASICS (note the use of all-caps) from the school, is neglected, failed to allow to train and/or abused for a few years by his parent unit, then some crusty NCO/Officer sees him in his decrepit state and then judges snipers by that example. This is a pretty universal complaint, btw, and isn't the result of a few "bad" commanders.


The above comes from about 11 years, four in combat in two different wars, of recon from FMF and Corps to Infantry Battalion level, Cav and Infantry, Mech and Airborne. You show me a unit that acts as you say -- and, as I said, I've seen and been in a few, I know they exist -- and I'll show you a sorry unit (They were and to make your day one of 'em was Airborne :D ). Good units don't have those problems. I've also not seen the shun idea -- in most units I was in or familiar with, there were people in the rifle companies who wanted to be Scouts or Snipers and had to wait for a vacancy to move...

I'd say then, that you are pretty enculturated as an Infantry guy and are blind to the problem. It's kind of like racism, and unless you are part of the minority, it is very difficult to "get" the problem. (which makes me wonder why I'm wrestling the pig) The problem is also that to an enculturated guy, the phoney-baloney prima donnas, wannabes and posers are hard to distinguish from the "real deal" guys who just act weird, look different and play with unusual toys, from an institutional standpoint.

There are all sorts of insiduous ways that the kind of guy who'd make an exceptional (not a plodder, just doing the job, school or no) recon guy or sniper is treated differently from his peers. Primarily because he may not be that good at being "hoo-ah air-bone infantaree!" (sorry, I couldn't help myself) or not care for the culture it's wrapped up in. Of course, there's all sorts of decent specialty guys who don't have that problem, and I do not speak to them, lest they descend on this post in droves. :)

Ken White
09-02-2009, 04:49 PM
This isn't what I'm talking about. What I'm talking about is people who's avocation happens to be the job. In other words, they are suited by personality and aptitude.but acknowledging this aspect is valid -- anyone with a personality and aptitude is going to do any job better than one lacking the traits -- most of the rest is opinion and, like this one:
Actually, wartime is where the avocational scout or sniper is a) allowed to do the job regardless of MOS and b) really shines at it.is partly true. This one is that due to the fact in wartime the rules structure dissipates. You did note I didn't deny that the structure and attitudes you cited existed -- I simply said they were not in my experience as pervasive as you seemed to say. I'll also note that those attitudes are more prevalent in peacetime and tend to disappear or at least diminish significantly in wartime.
Which takes serious time. Not something you can just say "you, you and you are now scouts or snipers - now go do that recon/occupy a hide site, in enemy territory, accomplish your mission and survive".Depends on what you mean by serious time. In Viet Nam I got new kids (i.e. Basic and AIT completions w/about 6 months in the Army and newly arrived in country) up to speed in a couple of weeks to do all that -- those coming in from the Rifle Companies with three or more months in country took slightly less time (mostly due to having to break bad habits). That's for Scouts doing sneak and peek stuff; snipers do take more time.
...This is a pretty universal complaint, btw, and isn't the result of a few "bad" commanders.I can believe that and will grant that lack of professional knowledge due to inadequate training and education -- and pursuit of knowledge by individuals creates an Army wide problem and leads to the syndrome you cited; I also contend that good Commanders can and do turn that stuff around.

Recall that I don't dispute the problem exists, I said that it did -- I also said it was in my experience the exception rather than the rule. Maybe the problem is that today's Commanders do things differently than in my day. We are, after all talking about the Army I was in in the 50s to 70s versus the one you're more familiar with currently, in the 90-10 period. It does seem to me that the Army is more hidebound than it used to be and it is absolutely more bureaucratic than it was. Bureaucracy can lead to a 'it's not being done our way' syndrome...
I'd say then, that you are pretty enculturated as an Infantry guy and are blind to the problem.Gee, project much? 18Fs and 19Ds are Infantry? Who knew? :D

Of course, it could also be that I don't see it as an all pervading problem because I've been lucky enough to have been in more good units that bad ones. Sorry your experience differed.
(which makes me wonder why I'm wrestling the pig)The anger thing, perhaps? You seem to enjoy wrestling a lot. ;)
The problem is also that to an enculturated guy, the phoney-baloney prima donnas, wannabes and posers are hard to distinguish from the "real deal" guys who just act weird, look different and play with unusual toys, from an institutional standpoint.Nope. Posers and wannabes always give themselves away by talking trash and not producing. Prima donnas look great but don't perform well.
There are all sorts of insiduous ways that the kind of guy who'd make an exceptional (not a plodder, just doing the job, school or no) recon guy or sniper is treated differently from his peers.In other words, they aren't doing it your way? Yeah, I've seen a lot of that. Again, I don't deny that happens -- I just don't think it is the rule; you do. Your prerogative and we can disagree on that. We don't need to be disagreeable in that disagreement. I'm just trying to sort out the 'why...'
Primarily because he may not be that good at being "hoo-ah air-bone infantaree!" (sorry, I couldn't help myself)I know you can't and I'm used to that from earthlings ;) -- but IMO you're still not right in your assessment that only the eccentric can do the job. That's really what the issue is IMO, all the bit about treatment of eccentrics is a small part of the problem -- which is who can do it in combat (peacetime doesn't count for much).
or not care for the culture it's wrapped up in.Then why would they stick around a culture they don't like, respect or agree with? No one today is drafted. Makes no sense to me that folks come in the Army, decide they hate it for this or that reason and stay. Why would one do that...
Of course, there's all sorts of decent specialty guys who don't have that problem, and I do not speak to them, lest they descend on this post in droves.Yes, there are -- and while there are Infantry (and other branch) guys who are way too doctrinaire, there are also all sorts of guys in the Army who don't have the problem you attempt to tack onto them -- unless the Army has changed a whole lot more than it seems to have from my day...

William F. Owen
09-03-2009, 02:18 AM
Or are you proposing DM type snipers, 2 per platoon, whose 'Primary' job is to support Rifle Plt movements?

Nothing wrong w/the latter just want to be on the same page.

This is closer to what I am proposing, but equipped with bolt-action 8.59mm/300 WinMAG, and course qualified by virtue of 2 weeks training. All the training is focussed at the long range (qualification 800m+, training 1000m) application of fire, and the skills needed to do it.
- alternatively there could be an 8-10 Sniper section at the company level.

Now this has to held relevant to the standard of infantry training I am proposing, which is far more focussed on Patrol/Surveillance type skills.

William F. Owen
09-03-2009, 03:04 AM
Why I say that, beyond the obvious, is b/c the US Army (I know ur Brit) & the USMC's idea of Sniper Employment is different. This discussion seems more Army centric in the Ideas of sniper/recon employment.


THis might explain the difference between the UK and US (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BaXPg_2FJ4) approach to a lot of stuff

Kiwigrunt
09-03-2009, 03:26 AM
THis might explain the difference between the UK and US (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BaXPg_2FJ4) approach to a lot of stuff

I don't understand:p:)

krsna
09-03-2009, 01:44 PM
Technology may complement reconnaissance, but it will not replace it. The sterile videos footage cannot replace those that creep through the night.

Although the article and technology you cite is new to those stykers, the reporter, and yourself, it is not new. Under the blessing of then MG William Caldwell, my squadron tested the same technology in 2005 and employed it in 2006 and 2007 in Iraq.

The technology provided us enhanced capabilities, but it could not replace the paratrooper burrowed deep in an observation post. For example,

- we observed that when UAVs flew overhead, everyone hid. We could HEAR the UAVs from a mile or two away. The picture shown in the videos did not reflect the picture on the ground. The enemy was smart enough to counter this notion of alternative coverage.

- Video footage and UAVs could not pick up the difference in Arabaic dialogue that we could. In one instance, one of my scouts managed to get close enough to a stronghold to determine that the dialogue spoken was not Iraqi but Egyptian. This intel helped confirm the presence of foreign fighters.

- Video footage is deceiving. I cannot tell you the amount of hours that I spent trying to explain to CAS, NTISR, and the command group that the footage they were watching was dogs running around and not insurgents.



v/r

Mike

Precisely! In an operation of recent vintage we flew a UAV for two days over an area and got zilch. That very night we had a contact and killed two in the same area at close range. Basic skills and hunch never fail an Infantarian.

120mm
09-04-2009, 12:07 AM
Of course, it could also be that I don't see it as an all pervading problem because I've been lucky enough to have been in more good units that bad ones.

But it's not a "good unit, bad unit" thing. It's a micro-culture thing. Even the best units get to the point where they don't see their own micro-cultural bias. Personally, based on working at the CTCs plus a couple of deployments, I disagree with the assertion that more units use their low-density specialties correctly. It certainly seems like more units misuse them than not.


Then why would they stick around a culture they don't like, respect or agree with? No one today is drafted. Makes no sense to me that folks come in the Army, decide they hate it for this or that reason and stay.

I don't see why a guy who isn't suited to the infantry "mindset" (which is what we're discussing here... See the OP; WILF is asserting that specialized recon and snipers are not necessary. I'm attempting to rebut that assertion.) has to leave the army. All God's critters got a place in the choir, etc., when it comes to this here Army, which means we're discussing something we probably agree about. My point is that really good infantry guys probably won't make really good recon or sniper guys. It takes a different mindset, imo.

[quote} Why would one do that...Yes, there are -- and while there are Infantry (and other branch) guys who are way too doctrinaire, there are also all sorts of guys in the Army who don't have the problem you attempt to tack onto them -- unless the Army has changed a whole lot more than it seems to have from my day...[/QUOTE]

Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, imo, and a tendency to use them as a mini-regiment, as witnessed by 3ID's sending 3-7 CAV into Baghdad. Watching several CTC rotations, I saw Brigade and Battalion Scouts doing more fighting, and less recon missions. LRS has been disbanded, so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.

Add to this the current state of the art, over-taxonomied and over-specialized S-2 shop at the BCT level, you have a perfect storm.

I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.

Ken White
09-04-2009, 02:48 AM
But it's not a "good unit, bad unit" thing. It's a micro-culture thing.Which exists -- and I'm not sure it's micro; all I contend is that good units can override that and the few really good ones do so.I'm basing my thought they still do on my son's experience as a Scout Dude in good and not so good units in recent years.
Even the best units get to the point where they don't see their own micro-cultural bias.Best units, good people, most everyone falls into that trap on occasion.
Personally, based on working at the CTCs plus a couple of deployments, I disagree with the assertion that more units use their low-density specialties correctly. It certainly seems like more units misuse them than not. I don't think I said that they did (though someone else may have). Even good units frequently fail on that depending on human variables. A bad S3 can destroy all the work of a good Commander and god Co Cdrs. FWIW from 1950 until I left troops in 1984, most Commanders did not know how to use their reconnaissance units. Specialty platoons and sections were very much dependent on their leaders; the good ones produced good people and good performance, the mediocre ones did not. I don't expect that's changed...
I don't see why a guy who isn't suited to the infantry "mindset" ...has to leave the army. All God's critters got a place in the choir, etc., when it comes to this here Army, which means we're discussing something we probably agree about. My point is that really good infantry guys probably won't make really good recon or sniper guys. It takes a different mindset, imo.On staying or leaving, given a war, that becomes moot, in peacetime my point was that if it annoys someone, I can't see why they'd keep beating their head against the wall. However, people differ. He sure doesn't have to leave but if it irritates him for whatever reason (say more than three days a week :wry:) then I don't see why he'd put up with it...

FWIW, LRS hasn't been disbanded, they're still in being, are being used and are doing some good stuff. They do have the problem of risk averse folks being afraid to use them properly but that's not an Infantry mindset, that's an Army mindset.

I don't really disagree on the mindset but my WAG is that about a third can do both jobs with obvious ranking from great to good (and not necessarily for most the same ranking in all three jobs), about a third are suited for either one or the other but not both with the Scout obviously being more demanding and the remaining third probably should have another job somewhere -- but are likely to be tolerated in the Infantry if there's a war on.
Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, ... so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.[quote]Agree on that based on what I've seen -- we have lost the track on scouting and reconnaissance. Sadly, that trend goes all the way back to Viet Nam -- we did not properly use the assets and skills we had in that war; we took a lot of good Cav and Recon units who were not bad prior to going to Viet Nam and totally misused them. The skills got lost. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war, including micro management. In the reinvention of the Army post VN, Reconnaissance got passed over for going out Armored and looking for bear. Bad answer. Commanders also, as a result of the CTCs and their time compression lost the ability to be patient enough for the Recon elements to do their jobs. That's why the CTC OpFor always out-reconned the Rotation. That and knowing and using the terrain.[quote]I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.Nor do I really disagree with your points as amplified but my initial point was, "I hear what you're saying but it ain't THAT bad." Which I can't say, really, now that I think about it. I can say it wasn't that bad 30 plus years ago but today's not in my vision block FOV...:o

I'm pretty sure it shouldn't be and sorta sure it doesn't need to be that bad, tho' :wry:

MikeF
09-04-2009, 03:15 AM
Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, imo, and a tendency to use them as a mini-regiment, as witnessed by 3ID's sending 3-7 CAV into Baghdad. Watching several CTC rotations, I saw Brigade and Battalion Scouts doing more fighting, and less recon missions. LRS has been disbanded, so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.

Add to this the current state of the art, over-taxonomied and over-specialized S-2 shop at the BCT level, you have a perfect storm.

I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.

120mm,

I appreciate your posts. I'll add some thoughts that may add to y'all's discussion.

First, the CTC's. They are 3 weeks long. Most true recon missions (FIND FUNCTION) take much longer than that. There is a game-manship that must be played by EVERY commander there in order to "Pass" or at least not get fired.

Second, 3/7 CAV went into Baghdad. So what? The original OPORD ended south of Baghdad. They, and the rest of us, conducted a movement to contact. The DIV CAV is capable of taking limited objectives. 3/7 seized the airfield in leau of (or to the angst) of an airborne seizure by the 82nd with support from 1st BCT. The rest of the Division and the Marines (a couple of days behind us :cool:) took the city. I don't see anything wrong with that. It flowed with the doctrine. Additionally, the initial attack into Baghdad (i.e. the first Thunder Runs) was led by A company, 1-64 AR as directed by then COL Perkins to "see what was going on :)." A more interesting study is what the rest of 3ID's recon assets did. It differs by brigade. 2nd BCT BRT assumed a traditional role of advanced guard leading the brigade from Kuwait to Najaf then fell back into a guard/cover role. 3rd BCT BRT assumed a guard role from the beginning. I'm not sure about 1st BCT BRT. As a tank platoon leader, I was attached to TF 1-15 IN. I led my batallion, and the scouts were divided up within my company. I actually had my own little regiment of tanks, scouts and engineers which was fun. So, I would argue that MG Blount employed his scouts in traditional roles thoughout the initial invasion. Moreover, there were many "other" units conducting strategic and long-range recon throughout.

Third, I have to cide with Ken on the issues and capabilities of traditional 19D's. Yes, as a commander, I had some growing pains as I explained over and over that we would have to go past our traditional roles of FIND and continue on towards FIX, and FINISH, but once we entered theatre, I continued to be impressed by the basic skill sets of scouts (LZ/PZ operations, demolitions, communications, and reporting). Working with both heavy and light scouts, tankers, engineers, and infantry, I have never observed any animosity towards scouts or snipers.

v/r

Mike

Steve Blair
09-04-2009, 01:43 PM
Second, 3/7 CAV went into Baghdad. So what? The original OPORD ended south of Baghdad. They, and the rest of us, conducted a movement to contact. The DIV CAV is capable of taking limited objectives. 3/7 seized the airfield in leau of (or to the angst) of an airborne seizure by the 82nd with support from 1st BCT. The rest of the Division and the Marines (a couple of days behind us :cool:) took the city. I don't see anything wrong with that. It flowed with the doctrine. Additionally, the initial attack into Baghdad (i.e. the first Thunder Runs) was led by A company, 1-64 AR as directed by then COL Perkins to "see what was going on :)." A more interesting study is what the rest of 3ID's recon assets did. It differs by brigade. 2nd BCT BRT assumed a traditional role of advanced guard leading the brigade from Kuwait to Najaf then fell back into a guard/cover role. 3rd BCT BRT assumed a guard role from the beginning. I'm not sure about 1st BCT BRT. As a tank platoon leader, I was attached to TF 1-15 IN. I led my batallion, and the scouts were divided up within my company. I actually had my own little regiment of tanks, scouts and engineers which was fun. So, I would argue that MG Blount employed his scouts in traditional roles thoughout the initial invasion. Moreover, there were many "other" units conducting strategic and long-range recon throughout.

I second the "so what?" comment, but for more historical reasons. Cavalry in the American Army has never really been a reconnaissance asset, at least not in traditional terms (no matter what doctrinal discussions might say). In times of conflict it's typically been used in ways similar to what we saw with 3/7 and in Vietnam...and this goes back to before the Civil War. I'd argue that recon and scouting has often been left to either outside contractors or specialized, ad hoc units formed and disbanded as needed by field commanders (again, something like the development of the LRRP units in Vietnam). But I digress and wander down historical paths again....:o

tankersteve
09-04-2009, 01:47 PM
Just want to stir the pot here with a question about scouts in general.

In the old Force XXI heavy brigade, the infantry battalions fed their own scout platoon from the infantry soldiers in the battalion. The tank battalions had 19Ds assigned directly to the platoon. I am not 100% on how they deal with this in the combined arms battalions now.

My thesis is, since I never heard anyone specifically say that the infantry scouts were better/worse than the 19Ds, maybe the job is easier to train a scout from the GP force than some might think. While I always loved the 19Ds attached to my company, they always had that 1% dud guy who had to be chaptered out. He sucked up a slot in the platoon until he was gone. Meanwhile, the infantry battalion kicked the same type of loser back to his original unit and got another stud who was standing by, eager to get into arguably the 'most desirable' platoon in the battalion.

Tankersteve

Ken White
09-04-2009, 05:20 PM
Steve Blair
Cavalry in the American Army has never really been a reconnaissance asset...I'd argue that recon and scouting has often been left to either outside contractors or specialized, ad hoc units formed and disbanded as needed by field commanders (again, something like the development of the LRRP units in Vietnam).True on both counts I believe -- with one caveat; a few commanders have been reconnaissance fans and have allowed and / or pushed their Recon elements to do their job but that has certainly been the exception rather than the rule.

At one point in the early 1960s of 12 Cav or Recon Platoons in the 82d Airpocket Division, it was generally acknowledged that only three of those -- and none of them Cav -- were into recon work as opposed to economy of force, escort and palace guard missions.

In both Brigades in which I served in Viet Nam, only one Bn used their Recon Platoon as Scouts, the other two combined them with their AT Platoons and used them as mini-rifle companies (probably on the rationale that they had six M-60s...:rolleyes:). Needless to say, the mini-Cos had high casualty rates. Dumb way to do business IMO. In my estimation, of the max of 60 plus Inf Bns in Viet Nam, an average of only about 6 to 8 did Recon work and that varied over time. All the Cav Units I saw were pure combat elements.

I'm also convinced that the LRRPs were invented to fill that shortfall in reconnaissance assets caused by most Infantry Bns converting their Recon Platoons into economy of force units with a commensurate loss of capabilities -- and skills and the Cav units doing econ of force stuff (or major combat ops in the case of the 11th ACR). The LRRPs did some heroic stuff -- they also did some really dumb stuff because few Cdrs/S2/S3 knew how to employ them...

Tanker Steve:

You're right in my experience and observation. Saw both sides as a 19D in two Cav units and an 11F Infantry Scout in a couple of more back in the day when everyone in the Infantry was not an 11B (the troops in the Inf BG / Bn Recon Platoons were 11Bs, the NCOs were 11Fs, there were, thankfully, no 11Ms). I'd say more Inf Bn platoons played fall out one as you say than did not but some units were loth to allow that desirable unit syndrome.

Having been trained as a 19D at Knox (1950s) and having much later (1970s) helped train them there and having been through the old Infantry Intel and Recon course at Benning, I think you're correct. I'll also say that I learned more about reconnaissance (and the Intel side of things) at the Benning I&R School than I did -- or saw taught -- at Knox where there was IMO, excessive emphasis on the combat missions at the expense of the Recon missions. In their defense and as Steve Blair said, that's what the Cav units do more so than any recon work...

I mentioned before that a Cav COL recently told my son when he complained about the lack of stealthy recon skills in the US Army and the Armor heavy Cavalry Troops in the BCTs that "We don't have the patience to do that. We just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor."

I think there's great accuracy and acceptance of current reality in that statement. I do not think there's much merit in it -- or the philosophy that underpins it.

I've always wondered how much of the current 'Cavalry' is a grasping for more Armor Branch force structure based on historic unit designations as opposed to a real desire for reconnaissance trained units. That sounds like a smack at Armor but it is not -- it is question that occurs to me often because I don't think we've really thought through much of our force structure, it's just sort of evolved and not always logically. Nor do I think we really have an appreciation for ground reconnaissance as a force multiplier.

tankersteve
09-05-2009, 12:46 AM
Ken,

Totally agree about the 'cavalry' units being an effort by Armor branch to have a finger in the pie. Right now we are using the 'cavalry' units as economy of force maneuver units, almost exclusively. And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.

One example that I remember - as a 2LT newly arrived in my first battalion, we were training up for NTC and I found myself as the night battle captain. The battalion commander, a great leader who commanded a brigade in OIF1, used the scout platoon as guides for the tank companies. It was much more important to get his combat forces to their AOs/LDs, rather than knowing much about the enemy. The scout platoon, call sign 'Snake', soon was nicknamed 'Sheppard'. This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.

But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?

All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped as infantry/combined arms battalions, with a single, robust RSTA troop in the BSTB. However, it would take more troops than you think as a single robust troop would probably require 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.:(

Tankersteve

COMMAR
09-05-2009, 12:47 AM
This is closer to what I am proposing, but equipped with bolt-action 8.59mm/300 WinMAG, and course qualified by virtue of 2 weeks training. All the training is focussed at the long range (qualification 800m+, training 1000m) application of fire, and the skills needed to do it.
- alternatively there could be an 8-10 Sniper section at the company level.

Now this has to held relevant to the standard of infantry training I am proposing, which is far more focussed on Patrol/Surveillance type skills.

2 questions:

1) Are these "snipers" attached to the Rifle Plts in direct support as in, their movement are tied to the RPs or are they semi-autonomous operating under Company Guidance but are available to support the RPs.

2) Is the "standard of Inf training your proposing" similar to present day Line Inf. tactics or more like True Light Inf tactics, more along the lines of what Distributed Ops is proposing w/the Observation/Surveillance package of Combat Hunter.


It sounds like you might be proposing something the Marines wrestling w/the last few yrs. DO now called ECO, you probably know, is a few yrs out.

Combat Hunter which deals with teaching Advanced Observation/Surveillance techniques along w/Man Tracking & subject Profiling, is what the Corps has now moved to in the teaching Infantry tactics.

Ken White
09-05-2009, 02:41 AM
And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.I agree as well but do believe that's partly a poor quality training induced habit that can be corrected. That does not mean I think we will correct it... :rolleyes:
One example that I remember...This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.That mirrors far more of my observations than I'd like. Distrust of subordinates due too rapid turnover and known marginal training leads to ad hoc solutions like that -- most of which have about an equal chance of producing bad results as not applying them in the first place.
But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?My belief is that you've nailed it. In trying to push tactical training in my Cav and Mech days, I continually pointed out that I'd seen very few if any US vehicles outperformed and destroyed by enemy gunnery but a bunch destroyed by poor US tactics.

Armor, Cavalry and Mech Infantry Gunnery and Maintenance are tremendously important -- to HRC. They provide concrete numbers, 'metrics,' to promotion and command slate boards. Congress continually pings DoD for 'unfairness' in promotions; Congress insists on 'objective' data (read: numbers -- no matter if they're flaky as long as they look good and can be backed up with 'data.). Thus those units who do gunnery and have OR Rates for something more than small arms and VS 17 panels are loved by HRC because the boards can have 'data.' Thus mounted units emphasize gunnery and maintenance over tactical training even though the latter is IMO more important to success and survival.

For the real Recon effort and for most infantry stuff, it's tactical application that counts and judging that in peacetime is -- and always will be -- subjective. A lot of people hate that, they are uncomfortable telling others they aren't competent based only on skills and knowledge with no hard numbers for backup -- it's easier to let the numbers be tha bad guy.

One of the designers of the ARTEP back in the early 70s told me that one goal was to eliminate having to do that, to force the unit commander to 'self assess.' This primarily to save senior officers the need to 'grade' subordinates or penalize them for failure but the sales rationale was to be 'making the Commander master of his own training.' Dumbbb with three 'b's...

I've seen half a dozen attempts to provide 'objective' analysis of training and tactical evolutions -- all simply traded macro subjectivity for micro subjectivity, all failed to convince anyone of note of their value.

Good Recon work is not hard to train but it is quite hard to evaluate (in that it is a lot of work to properly evaluate, it's not difficult to do it on a 'Go-No go' basis). It also entails trusting low ranking people doing things when and where they cannot be properly supervised. It is more risky than traveling in large armored herds... :wry:

The patience factor also contributes, as does time and space -- bottom line is we do not do it well.
All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped... 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.:(Totally agree; my sensing is that TOE was not well thought out. My Son was in one Sqn at Bragg and they had some major training and employment problems; it was getting sorted by the time they deployed but that showed other flaws.

I think the entire Recon and Surveillance (two separate functions requiring two different sets of training and concentration) functional area needs an in depth look.

William F. Owen
09-05-2009, 02:58 PM
1) Are these "snipers" attached to the Rifle Plts in direct support as in, their movement are tied to the RPs or are they semi-autonomous operating under Company Guidance but are available to support the RPs.
I see platoons as either operating as platoons or generating mission tailored groups which would allow semi-autonomous fireteam multiples to conduct a wide range of reconnaissance and surveillance missions. - so if I need 6 x 4-man Sniper teams, the Company can generate them - 2 from each platoon.


2) Is the "standard of Inf training your proposing" similar to present day Line Inf. tactics or more like True Light Inf tactics, more along the lines of what Distributed Ops is proposing w/the Observation/Surveillance package of Combat Hunter.
I don't agree with Distributed Ops, but yes the training (still working on it) is focussed on a lot of individual skills training, and lots of Patrol types Recon and Surveillance skills for Fireteams either operating as multiples or part of a platoon/Company.

Ken White
09-09-2009, 05:27 PM
I said in this post (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=80560&postcount=27) I'd order Spicer's book. However, my son who lurks here occasionally, called me and said he had that one and one other by Spicer and told me he'd send them for me to read and suggested that I could buy the one Spicer book he did not have. So I ordered "Sniper: The techniques and equipment of the deadly marksman." In the event, that arrived before the other two. Since Spicer probably makes pretty much the same points in all the books, I can comment on the one I have.

Not a bad book, allowing for the differences between the British and US armies, he seems to have it all down pretty accurately and reasonably. His wording is only occasionally hyperbolic -- but then, he's writing for a mass audience so that's okay.

The real problem is that unless one is careful on can absorb myths from his approach with phrases like this:
"The sniper has for many years been the most feared man on the battlefield...it can be understood why he is often credited with mystical powers...if this man(leader) is taken out, the morale of the group can be seriously affected, if not destroyed. (all pp 112-3)I dispute all those comments; never seen the fear, any delusion of power or a loss of morale if a leader is taken out in US or allied forces with whom I've worked. I have seen folks get annoyed but little more. So those are myths IMO.

He then discusses the ability of Snipers to slow or even stop both helicopters and Armor and follows that with
Many reconnaissance soldiers resent the sniper...(pg 115)He had earlier said that Snipers were feared and looked upon as assassins by fellow soldiers. I suppose if he said that those things occurred somewhere -- but I have never seen those reactions other than jokingly or semi-derisively and I think suggesting that potential to drop helicopters and stop Armor by Snipers is possibly a dangerous idea. More myths, I believe...

He provides a Sniper's Creed., Item 2: "Respect all Soldiers and use your own knowledge to assist and aid without fostering needless elitism." The Creed is sensible, Item 2 is really good and he mostly follows it -- but he does have a book to sell...

So, good effort but I wouldn't base any war planning on the book. In his defense, he does pay adequate attention to METT-TC and he does provide numerous cautionaries throughout the book. The problem may be that folks tend to home in the sensational and not the humdrum.

Nothing in this book refutes any of my experience. In fact it generally reinforces it so he didn't change my mind on anything.

However, some of the "I'm selling Sniping as a golden bullet (or trying to sell this book)..." verbiage is dangerously misleading if taken out of context.

Infanteer
09-19-2009, 01:32 AM
The skills got lost. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war, including micro management. In the reinvention of the Army post VN, Reconnaissance got passed over for going out Armored and looking for bear. Bad answer. Commanders also, as a result of the CTCs and their time compression lost the ability to be patient enough for the Recon elements to do their jobs. That's why the CTC OpFor always out-reconned the Rotation. That and knowing and using the terrain.

Interesting points and discussion on Recon (or, more properly, Recce...:D).

We are seeing a similar debate in our Army with Armoured Recconaissance units being slated to lose their Coyotes (LAV-25s) for the forthcoming JLTV. Issues with losing a fighting vehicle for a tough truck and debates as to what Recce really is.

As I mentioned before, we have a new manual on this which is pretty good at encapsulating all arms recce.

I find the argument of "saber or stealth" to be interesting - is recce "scouting" or "cavalry"? I caught this at an AUSA presentation a while back and found it interesting.

http://www3.ausa.org/pdfdocs/lwp_53.pdf

We had a long debate about it on a forum here, if anyone is interested.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,35526.0.html

I'll take the time to read through this thread again and try and offer more.

Cheers,
Infanteer

jcustis
10-13-2009, 06:08 AM
The bit that resonates with me from the saber vs. stealth work is the part about every fight being a movement to contact.

With the exception of the attack across the berm (and even that suffered from poor targeting and templating) into the Safwan Hill region, I felt I had very little information to work with, and even as our LAV-25s led the 1st Marine Division, we spent more time almost stumbling into contact than confirming the presence of enemy forces. Confirmation came at times through leading with our chin.

Follow-on forces benefited to some degree, but the snoop-and-poop techniques did not support the tempo that was required by CFLCC, and we spent more time dashing forward than was probably doctrinally prudent.

Ken White
10-13-2009, 04:20 PM
Follow-on forces benefited to some degree, but the snoop-and-poop techniques did not support the tempo that was required by CFLCC, and we spent more time dashing forward than was probably doctrinally prudent. (emphasis added /kw)Against a reasonably competent peer enemy; yep...

There's a time and place for both types of 'recon / recce' and the good leader or commander will use the correct one -- sometimes bad staff officers who forget they are not commanders 'require' speed that the Commander isn't even aware of because they think that'll please the commander. Staff types should just do their job and stop trying to impress the Commandante.

The old saw "There's never enough time to do it right but there's always time to do it twice" sort of applies. Some times you just have to trade bodies for progress or forward movement -- usually you do not but our impatience often leads us to do it when it is ill advised and totally unnecessary.

William F. Owen
10-13-2009, 04:25 PM
There is some compelling sets of data that show, except in open desert, average rates of advance since 1918 are < 2km per hour, and often substantially less. 30km per day is considered good.

Fuchs
10-13-2009, 04:41 PM
There is some compelling sets of data that show, except in open desert, average rates of advance since 1918 are < 2km per hour, and often substantially less. 30km per day is considered good.

Average and median are really of little interest.

A WW2 armoured corps with 40 km/h tanks* advanced 400 km in quite exactly four days- against the opposition of several conventional divisions in suboptimal tank terrain (Manstein's Corps to Vilnius).


Advance through defence is of little interest today in general. There are enough gaps for advance, and no continuous line of defence. You don't need to advance through deep defensive positions in most conventional warfare scenarios.
You can - if you prepare well for it - rather go back to an extremely accelerated version of Central European 18th century army maneuvers (Wars of Silesia as examples).
Speed of advanced in defended terrain was irrelevant then and it is (almost) today.



*: (that needed maintenance every hour of driving in order to prevent excessive breakdowns)

William F. Owen
10-13-2009, 04:56 PM
Average and median are really of little interest.

A WW2 armoured corps with 40 km/h tanks* advanced 400 km in quite exactly four days- against the opposition of several conventional divisions in suboptimal tank terrain (Manstein's Corps to Vilnius)
So that figure is a sound basis for discussion, based on the fact it happened once?

Advance through defence is of little interest today in general. There are enough gaps for advance, and no continuous line of defence. You don't need to advance through deep defensive positions in most conventional warfare scenarios.
On what do you base that assertion. You are stating a fact?
How do you know where the enemy defence is? Finding the defence is the problem we are discussing.

You can - if you prepare well for it - rather go back to an extremely accelerated version of Central European 18th century army maneuvers (Wars of Silesia as examples).
Speed of advanced in defended terrain was irrelevant then and it is (almost) today.

So how do we do this? What do you suggest as useful data sets around which to base a discussion?

Fuchs
10-13-2009, 05:22 PM
So that figure is a sound basis for discussion, based on the fact it happened once?

It shows the possible. Much more should be possible today. Maybe 400 km in three days. I'd certainly not call a 350 km "dash" in two weeks against marginal and demoralized opposition "fast" or "lightning fast" nowadays.

The Armor Journal (Magazine?) had an article on historic advance speeds in a late 90's issue and found relatively modest differences between horse and mech advance speeds, though (yet we know how fast horse would advance against defences today).

On what do you base that assertion. You are stating a fact?
I consider recce and combat team movements two different things. It makes no sense to speak of advance speeds if we're talking about recce. Speed of advance always means the arrival of the main force (or at most its powerful spearhead) afaik.

How do you know where the enemy defence is? Finding the defence is the problem we are discussing.

Recce and non-main force combat elements do the "finding", and their movements shouldn't be measured like the main body's movements.
Recce is about smaller unit movements (squad to reinforced battalion), and we know that the smaller units of the main body move many times (IIRC x2, x5 or even more) faster than the "advance speed" (moving back, sideways etc).

It is a widely acknowledged opinion that there's little reason to expect continuous front lines in modern conventional war. Lebanon (a hilly terrain that doesn't suggest high speed advances anyway),a hypothetical continental front between Greece and Turkey and some other examples like an opposed amphibious landing on Taiwan's shores are the few examples that still promise continuous fronts.

There's no need and not enough force density to maintain continuous, defensible fronts in other scenarios, though.
*Opinion* I do expect lines or rather clouds of screening forces with very low force density in most places as a substitute for the classic WWI-Korean War infantry division front line.

So how do we do this?

I'm working on that answer - it's exactly my area of research. Few parts of it are (anywhere near) ready to be published.



What do you suggest as useful data sets around which to base a discussion?
The answer is basically
We should exploit this great time of no pressing conventional threats for experiments!
Large-scale experiments can clarify much about the organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges.

Instead, we're discussing how to succeed against tribal warband warfare.
Those warbands won't overrun any of our today's formal allies, ever. <- more than just opinion. This was a prediction.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 06:22 AM
We should exploit this great time of no pressing conventional threats for experiments!
Large-scale experiments can clarify much about the organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges.
You may want to look at the Biddle's Military Power (http://www.amazon.com/Military-Power-Explaining-Victory-Defeat/dp/0691116458) - it has extremely good data on modern rates of advance.

Personally I use the following figures, based on the historical data I have to hand.
March = 40 km/h (convoy) - with obvious road, route and configuration modifications.
Advance to contact = 2-3 km/h - with obvious terrain modifications.

Point being, you do have to come up figures in talk about t he organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges. - so means and averages do have place.


Instead, we're discussing how to succeed against tribal warband warfare.
Those warbands won't overrun any of our today's formal allies, ever. <- more than just opinion. This was a prediction.
Small Wars? Hmmm... go figure, but as a British Captain writing in 1905 warned loosing battles against "savages" could not loose them the Empire. Loosing a war with a European power could them the Empire and the Country.

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 09:13 AM
Personally I use the following figures, based on the historical data I have to hand.
March = 40 km/h (convoy) - with obvious road, route and configuration modifications.
Advance to contact = 2-3 km/h - with obvious terrain modifications.

Point being, you do have to come up figures in talk about t he organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges. - so means and averages do have place.

I do partially disagree.

Historical info is valuable in pointing out the impossible under certain conditions and it's a rich source, but it's not very useful if you want to develop something new, different. History is poor at prediction.
The old data doesn't apply then - and you can simply use the status quo knowledge for the non-innovative parts of your idea.

Variable values are important, averages and medians not so much.


Average advance speeds are especially uninteresting to me because I separate the recce and main combat elements.


The speed of modern, unopposed units is so high that the movement speed isn't really of interest anymore anyway. It's quick. So quick that it becomes quite uninteresting in comparison to the other variables. Look at a Bde; it could easily cross its area of operation in less than an hour if we look at its average march speed.

I'm much more interested in very different time info:
- time for maintenance (h/100 km, h/day)
- time between Bde issuing warning order and reinforced Bn on the march
- time a reinforced Bn needs to deploy from marching column to battle formations
- time needed for a reinforced Bn to disengage (break contact), move 30-50 km and re-engage in battle formation

Simple movement is 'lightning' quick - the average speed is therefore uninteresting, it's not the bottleneck. The other processes that cannot be expressed in km/h are the bottlenecks.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 11:00 AM
Historical info is valuable in pointing out the impossible under certain conditions and it's a rich source, but it's not very useful if you want to develop something new, different. History is poor at prediction.
The old data doesn't apply then - and you can simply use the status quo knowledge for the non-innovative parts of your idea.
So does experimentation or recent experience suggest?

Average advance speeds are especially uninteresting to me because I separate the recce and main combat elements.
Why? How is Recce going to work moving at anything much over 2-3 kph - unless they want to blunder into an ambush. As the Soviets found out, you can't locate the enemy by the location from the burning wrecks of your CRP or Advanced Guard.

The speed of modern, unopposed units is so high that the movement speed isn't really of interest anymore anyway. It's quick. So quick that it becomes quite uninteresting in comparison to the other variables. Look at a Bde; it could easily cross its area of operation in less than an hour if we look at its average march speed.
What type of Brigade and what size of area? Number of routes. Recce and securing of Assembly areas? Route proving?
Have convoy speeds improved since the 1970's - 40 kph?

I'm much more interested in very different time info:
- time for maintenance (h/100 km, h/day)
- time between Bde issuing warning order and reinforced Bn on the march
- time a reinforced Bn needs to deploy from marching column to battle formations
- time needed for a reinforced Bn to disengage (break contact), move 30-50 km and re-engage in battle formation
How on earth could you come up with those numbers? - and BTW, planing cycles today are 4 times what they were in 1944.

Simple movement is 'lightning' quick - the average speed is therefore uninteresting, it's not the bottleneck. The other processes that cannot be expressed in km/h are the bottlenecks.
OK, that's why you have staffs. Staffs today are -based on evidence - less effective than they were in WW2.

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 11:47 AM
Why? How is Recce going to work moving at anything much over 2-3 kph - unless they want to blunder into an ambush. As the Soviets found out, you can't locate the enemy by the location from the burning wrecks of your CRP or Advanced Guard.

It's in part a function of risk and different speed/tempo for different unit sizes.
1) You're able to advance with small elements if there's no continuous defended front line (enabling the use of a combat-capable recon screen or cloud as a substitute for WW infantry division lines).
2) Small elements are quicker in all regards than large ones (making large element stats irrelevant).
3) Losing small elements (or part thereof) is less a disaster than doing so with large elements. Both offer the same benefit (gaining access to territory and info) by advancing, so it follows that small elements can be ordered to advance quickly more than large ones. (no assumption of a zero casualty policy) at the same risk expectancy value.

Even if small units did not advance quicker - who cares? Many small ones advancing at 3 km/h gain way more ground and info than few large ones doing so. There's also no need to accept major battles quickly, and even 3 km/h cover a very long distance in a mere week (500 km)! Many small elements advancing at 3km/h get far behind enemy main forces in a single day.
Movement speed is no bottleneck and therefore of marginal interest (today).


What type of Brigade and what size of area? Number of routes. Recce and securing of Assembly areas? Route proving?

I'll have that nailed down in one to three years (in article or book form), it's work in progress. It's already for sure that the end result will be very different from orthodox concepts.
The concept brigades will be less unorthodox than everything else, though.

A hint: I won't assign an area or zone or phase lines or anything similar to main combat forces (combined arms brigades or similar).
The combat-capable recce by company-sized elements would own the land much like many boxers shape the fight with the quick jab(Coy+) and seek the major blows with the powerful cross (Bn+, Bde).

Have convoy speeds improved since the 1970's - 40 kph?

I don't care. Operational relocation movement of a Bde wouldn't last for longer than two or three hours anyway - often less than its preparation. There are usually enough streets for use, so that bottleneck is likely gone as well (traffic capability is proportional to average vehicle length, spacing, speed - and available roads*used lanes).
Besides, convoy speed is a function of employed tactic & terrain.

How on earth could you come up with those numbers? - and BTW, planing cycles today are 4 times what they were in 1944.

It's actually less about coming up with those numbers today. I'd rather let the units exercise for weeks in the field and push them for becoming ever quicker, removing obstacles in the process.
In the end tactics and operational concept would need to be adjusted/limited (impossible or too risky moves being cut out).

The present problem is that such figures vary a lot between units (and over time) as well as between countries. An minimum, average, median and maximum would only become useful if the room for improvement was already mostly exploited (because that would need to happen in wartime).

I don't pay much attention to today's planning cycles. I work on major conventional war theory. A major conventional war would be certainly crack down on a lot of poor habits that we developed. Units would lose officers and staffs officers would be sent as replacements, staffs would overall become much leaner in size and procedures.

Manstein wrote in a book about the huge difference between staff work in combat ops and in resting phases; the paperwork and slow stuff was done in the latter. He lead an army group (dozens of divisions) from a few railway cars.

OK, that's why you have staffs. Staffs today are -based on evidence - less effective than they were in WW2.

And that will change once change is necessary for survival. Major warfare is an evolutionary shock for military organizations. They change a lot.
We couldn't even triple our brigade count without a switch to much leaner Bde HQs, for example.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 12:04 PM
Even if small units did not advance quicker - who cares? Many small ones advancing at 3 km/h gain way more ground and info than few large ones doing so. There's also no need to accept major battles quickly, and even 3 km/h cover a very long distance in a mere week (500 km)! Many small elements advancing at 3km/h get far behind enemy main forces in a single day.
Movement speed is no bottleneck and therefore of marginal interest (today).
Well please note I did originally refer to rate of advance, not speed of movement.
I think 2-3 km/h seems reasonable - and you can only advance as fast as your Recce forces do.

I also think that all the things that have made Formation, unit and even sub-unit moves problematic in the past will continue be problems.

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 12:19 PM
1 Take a map of a potential conflict region, take the quantity of arm units that would fight there. Now take away one third as reserve.
2 Look at the force density along an imagined "front".
3 Now forget about that already low figure quickly because the units won't be distributed evenly.
4 Take away a third of one side's brigades and replace it with reinforced Coy all over the place. These Coy dash forward using elements of about small Plt size. Few of them would experience losses, while all others would quickly flood the area and do their job there.
That's worth the price in MCW.

You seem to be glued to the concept of advance against opposition, but that's a stupid force-on-force exception. That's like American Football where players ram each other along a line, not like in European Football where players advance through gaps and don't need to ram anyone to advance.
Now imagine American Football with only four players per team on the same field size. Who would still care about the pushing power of these players?


The obvious counter-tactic if of course the use of a similar dispersion; that's why I emphasize the optimisation of small elements (reinforced Coy) for the low force density (a.k.a. economy of force) shaping mission.
The team with the better low force density units (or more) would gain the upper hand (up to an optimum, for there's of course a potential for over-emphasizing the low force density units in overall force structure).


I don't expect you to agree because the whole concept is material for a 30-50 pp chapter and too unorthodox to be understood based only on a few lines in a forum.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 01:03 PM
You seem to be glued to the concept of advance against opposition, but that's a stupid force-on-force exception.
I'm actually glued to finding the enemy so I can defeat him. - Find being the first core function

I don't expect you to agree because the whole concept is material for a 30-50 pp chapter and too unorthodox to be understood based only on a few lines in a forum.

Actual new conceptual writing on Land Warfare is incredibly and that of the type you propose even less common.

What experience has taught me, is that the novelty or originality of the ideas - in this area is usually very unimportant. What is important is their adoption - or serious consideration, because only then can fresh eyes spot the things that may cause it to fail.

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 02:20 PM
What experience has taught me, is that the novelty or originality of the ideas - in this area is usually very unimportant. What is important is their adoption - or serious consideration, because only then can fresh eyes spot the things that may cause it to fail.

The originality is not so much in the concept as in the gluing together of its parts. There are historical examples and analogies for pretty much every bit.

And I guess I'm not gonna help the adoption of new ideas before I can present one in written form.

RJ
10-14-2009, 03:59 PM
Fuchs,

Have you studied the disengaement of Patton's Third Army from one front and the movement to engage the German Forces in what is called the Battle of the Bulge?


"In late 1944, the German army launched a last-ditch offensive across Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France, popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, nominally led by German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. On December 16, 1944, the German army massed 29 divisions (totaling some 250,000 men) at a weak point in the Allied lines and made massive headway towards the Meuse River during one of the worst winters Europe had seen in years."

"Patton rapidly disengaged his army from fighting in another sector and moved it over 100 miles in 48 hours to relieve the siege."

"Patton turned the Third Army abruptly north (a notable tactical and logistical achievement), disengaging from the front line to relieve the surrounded and besieged U.S. troops holding the Belgian crossroads town of Bastogne. Many military historians remark that this complicated maneuver was Patton's (and the Third Army's) greatest accomplishment during the war. (John MacDonald, a management consultant specializing in operations and quality control, cites it as one of the greatest examples of logistics, stating, "General Patton is extolled as one of the greatest battlefield commanders and motivators of military trooops, yet probably his greatest miltary achievement, unsurpassed at the time, was the logistic repositioning, within twenty-four hours, of a whole army corps at the Battle of the Bulge."[26]) By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton had pushed units into the Saarland. Elements of the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on March 22, 1945"

He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.

Nudging numbers is basic, but each fight is different and affected by terrain, opposition and the leadership of both sides. You can figure the pattern and numbers but you can not create a blue print that will work in every case.

The movement Patton led to relieve the pressure on the Allied Forces seems to be the best, modern war example of movement into an attack and it included recon, logistics and fighting spirit and excellent leadership. That movement contributed greatly tothe defeat of 29 enemy divisions and helped brig the war in Europe to a quicker finish.

Do you have the statistics on which of the German forces in that fight moved as quickly and as far?

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 04:20 PM
He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.
...
Do you have the statistics on which of the German forces in that fight moved as quickly and as far?

I used the search function and only found 40 kph (Wilf) and 40 km/h (me), not a single one mentioning 40 km/day.


About the speed of the German units in the 2. Ardennes battle:
Are you aware that the Germans had almost no fuel for their motorized/armoured vehicles and most of the German troops were moving on foot, using horse carts for transport of material and supplies?
They did so under Winter conditions and *serious* threat of air attack.

Their march speeds are very much irrelevant for modern theory unless we're talking about worst possible conditions.


I already mentioned Manstein's 1941 dash to the river bridges in Lithuania where his corps defeated several enemy divisions and averaged about 50 miles/day as well (I've got to correct my previous statement; 320 km not 400 km in 4 days - memory is tricky). The whole corps had if I remember correctly only two real roads available.

Btw, where comes your 100 miles from for the XII corps?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/P23(map).jpg
That doesn't look like a geographical distance to me.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 05:08 PM
He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.

The 40 kph is me, not FUCHS and IIRC it's the the NATO STANAG Convoy planning speed - meaning in 10 hours you can march 400kms - so a march rate of 500 miles in 2 days.

Based on your figures Patton was doing 80 miles a day on the march. Correct?
Harold Godwinson marched his Army 185 miles in about four days, in 1066, so 46 miles a day on foot!

Food for thought?

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 05:43 PM
Wilf, such figures are for units, but large units need to march on a street one after another.

Thin of pre-20th century armies setting up amp at the end of a day's march when the last units were beginning their march at the earlier camp (part of the reason why musket and rifle age corps had a practical limit at 25k-30k men).

Today we should bother about brigades, not corps. A brigade (still too many vehicles) needs a time slot of about an hour on a one-lane road. And then there's friction...

Btw, I recall 50 km/h as a standard for road march, but I think 80 km/h convoys are the norm in peacetime (for truck convoys, obviously not so for armour) and if there's no real threat of obstacles (other than explosives) on the road.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 06:37 PM
Thin of pre-20th century armies setting up amp at the end of a day's march when the last units were beginning their march at the earlier camp (part of the reason why musket and rifle age corps had a practical limit at 25k-30k men).
Correct. Napoleon marched 90K men on three routes, each column spread out over 5 miles.

jcustis
10-31-2009, 04:04 PM
Btw, I recall 50 km/h as a standard for road march, but I think 80 km/h convoys are the norm in peacetime (for truck convoys, obviously not so for armour) and if there's no real threat of obstacles (other than explosives) on the road.

I was trained to use 40 KPH as a reasonable standard for tactical roadmarch planning along an unblocked, undefended (peacetime) route. It has proven reasonable through dozens of marches I've conducted along a particular corridor in S. California. 80 KPH is really a pipe dream because that number does not factor in crew rest, "hot check" maintenance halts, civilian traffic

Just a week ago, I traveled 209.214 km in an LAV in 5 hours, at a speed of 8 KPH below the speed limit, for a rate of march of 41.8 KPH. We had two ~15 minute short halts to check planetaries and differentials, and did not hit traffic along the way.

tankersteve
11-01-2009, 12:59 PM
Absolutely. Anything over 40kph is a dream, not considering the typical age of the equipment we are operating, the typical age of the Operators :D, and ole Murphy getting involved. Add some traffic and that is as good as it gets.

Even in Germany, where we would 'roadmarch' elements of our companies (arms rooms, mainly) back and forth to Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels on the autobahn, we would rarely make much better than 40kph, despite starting at the typical 0'dark-thirty. And this was just a few HMMWVs and some old 5-tons.

Add some track vehicles to the mix and watch out!

Tankersteve

Pete
01-15-2010, 04:09 AM
Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?
The DoD R & D guys have a prior claim on that acronym, meaning Engineering Design Model.

We used to have thousands of guys called RTOs, for radio-telephone operators, but the acronym had to be given up because Railway Transport Officers (all 12 or so) had an earlier claim to the abbreviation dating back to the First World War.

Pete
01-15-2010, 05:18 AM
The Tom Ricks blog has the following quote from Gunner Keith, USMC:


Technology. Used appropriately, can be a force multiplier. Unfortunately, Marines look at our technology as short cut tools. If I got my trusty G-Boss aimed down that road, I don't need to patrol it or if there is a boom in the area, no reason to go and investigate as I will just track it on my handy G-Boss. No doubt these things are impressive tools and can help considerably but nothing compares to a Marine being there or seeing it with his own eyes.

To read the rest click on the link below. This is the 12th in a series of tutorials by Gunner Keith on small unit tactics in the Ricks blog--they can be found by scrolling backwards through the blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/14/a_marine_s_afghan_aar_xii_technology_can_t_replace _being_there

RJ
01-15-2010, 05:20 AM
Wilf posted

Based on your figures Patton was doing 80 miles a day on the march. Correct?
Harold Godwinson marched his Army 185 miles in about four days, in 1066, so 46 miles a day on foot!

Food for thought?

1066 - Hmmm. That date is floating around the back part of my brain.

I'm a bit foggy about England's history back beyond the War of the Roses

How did old Harold make out when he met the enemy with a tired, footsore and strung out bunch of Axe, Swordsmen and Carls or Jarls?

We have shifted from Recon and Infantry Battalions to Mech Road March statistics and the occasional historical reference.

I suspect Recon in Afgahanistan is going to be much different than Recon has been in Iraq.

I just finished Zinni's book with T. Clancy and am looking at 5 different wars fought in Vietnam, controled by the terrain.

I had a brother in I Corps, and an other in the Central Highlands and a cousin married a Seal who did duty in the Mekong Delta. Sitting around a fire having a taste with these men and you realize they all fought in a different war tactically. I never put it togther until I read Zinni's book.

reed11b
02-22-2010, 07:58 PM
Update. Just returned from RSLC at Benning and have some infantry recon observations. One, the infantry recon community is tiny. Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission. Three, there is a huge disconnect between the larger Cav scout community and the infantry scout community. There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts. I say that the latter idea is a really bad one. This would transfer many of the missions that we do over to SF, not Cav, and our SF community is already A) over tasked (often a self created problem) and B) using less experienced and trained soldiers to a meet this over tasking. Much of the Urban and long range recce missions can be performed by infantry given time and training, freeing up SF to do other missions.
Reed

Ken White
02-22-2010, 08:40 PM
As one who has been all three -- SF, Inf Recon and Cav -- I wholeheartedly agree with what you say. The SF intrusion into the reconnaissance and surveillance business was all about funding and mission turf expansion (and it hit at a low point in the fortunes of the US Army when McNamara's project 100,000 was in full bloom and training was being dumbed down). Spaces and budget slices. :rolleyes:

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element and due to bad equipping decisions (and the aforementioned poor training system), Armor heavy and 'Hi diddle diddle right down' the middle oriented.

Much of our problem with recon is impatience -- some staff squirrel is afraid his Boss will ask a question he cannot answer so they drive their Recon elements into dumb situations and thus the perception that Recon is (a) too slow and (b) too dangerous to employ properly is thoroughly embedded in the heads of too many.

There are some exceptions to all the above but they are far too few. :mad:

Fuchs
02-22-2010, 09:00 PM
The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element (...)

Question:
Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??


Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

reed11b
02-22-2010, 09:35 PM
Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

Cavalry mission and R&S teams missions are not the same either. There is overlap in route recon and some area and zone recon but surveillance and urban recce are a pure infantry R&S team mission.
Reed

Ken White
02-22-2010, 09:36 PM
Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??personnel intake was concerned. Some very sharp enlisted and officer acquisitions as opposed to the 1970s dreg problem; thus my mention of McNamara's Project 100,00 (LINK) (http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/05/29/mcnamara/), (LINK) (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n6_v27/ai_17040672/).

Aside from the problems that fiasco caused directly in the 70s and early 80s, many of those folks stuck around for 20 or 30 years and thus screwed things up far longer than they should have, they were also the real reason for the Army electing to adopt that dumbed-down Task, Condition and Standard training system. The 20 to 30 year dwell time of the 100K (actually, the total number recruited was greater) was the main reason that flawed system was allowed to stay -- it was all many could handle and in later years, they were senior NCOs... :rolleyes:

By the late 90s, that problem was gone, the training system was flawed and everyone knew it but too much was invested to change it even though it was not only an inadequate training process, it was virtually insulting to the really sharp and well educated enlisted and officer accessions from the mid 90s on.

Clinton wasn't responsible for the 'peace dividend' problem, George H.W. Bush did that. Clinton didn't know anything about the Armed Forces so he left them pretty much alone other than to misuse them in places like Somalia (which GHWB started but Clinton screwed up) and Bosnia.

Agree with you on the vehicles, problem is that to develop and field the ideal Recon vehicle would be an extremely expensive proposition and the fear that Recon assets are 'high risk' permeates the acquisition community. Their solution to low quantities with high risk is to not buy them.

Thus we have the M3 Bradley purchased as part of a deal between the then Chief of Armor and then Chief of Infantry, so we ended up with the Bradley and the Abrams because that deal killed off the M8 armored Gun system (just as well, that was poor vehicle also...)...

There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fscs-pics.htm). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war. :mad:

Fuchs
02-22-2010, 10:04 PM
There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fscs-pics.htm). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war. :mad:

I thought the NTC mock battles were rigged to overemphasize recce & counter-recce by adding a static early phase for recce (till sometime around 2005)?

I personally tend to favour a mix for the heavy scouting / skirmish role; normal combat vehicles of around 40 tons for the combat-leaning recce and French-like ~10-20 ton 6wd vehicles for deep missions.
The mix of Bradley/Abrams + HMWV was too far beyond both extremes.

Ken White
02-22-2010, 10:21 PM
I thought the NTC mock battles were rigged to overemphasize recce & counter-recce by adding a static early phase for recce (till sometime around 2005)?That due to the fact that early NTC experience showed the OPFOR's good recon (USSR like) techniques versus the Blue force poor techniques showed that the US Army had a serious problem. That was pretty obvious by the late 80s but it took Desert Storm to drive an impetus to change and that was just getting embedded when 9/11 came. Then it was Change 2 time...

Sigh. :(
I personally tend to favour a mix for the heavy scouting ...
The mix of Bradley/Abrams + HMWV was too far beyond both extremes.True on both counts IMO.

Rifleman
02-22-2010, 10:22 PM
One, the infantry recon community is tiny.

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.


Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?


There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.

reed11b
02-22-2010, 10:53 PM
What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.
LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.




Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?
Bingo, got it in one.



The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.
They still don't, though there is a push that all Scout NCO's need to go to RSLC.

82redleg
02-23-2010, 12:45 AM
LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.

Each IBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 22 pax, 3 x 6-man "squads" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTO. Additionally, there is a 10-man sniper squad, which is administratively a separate squad in the HHC, but usually attached to the scout platoon.

Each IBCT recon squadron has a dismounted recon company, authorized 2 x platoons of 28, 3 x 8-man "sections" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTOs. In addition, the company has a 7-man sniper squad, a 6-man 60mm mortar section and a company HQ, but they aren't really involved in scouting, except for the maybe the snipers.

Each SBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 24 pax, 3 x 5-man "squads", 4 x 2-man vehicle crews (including the PSG) and a PL. Additionally, there is a 7-man sniper squad, administratively separate in the HHC. I've never been Stryker, so I'm not sure if they are lumped in with the scouts or not. I'm also not sure how often 11Bs fill these 11B slots, vs how often 19Ds are used.

Regarding the LRS units, on the active side, the division LRSDs are no more, AFAIK. I know that 82nd LRSD went to the CAB and became a Pathfinder Company, although they still call themselves LRS. The Corps LRS-C still exists, but has been rolled into the 1-38 CAV in 525 BfSB. I've heard that they have stood up a new LRS-C in the BfSB at FT Hood, but I don't know for sure.

Ken White
02-23-2010, 01:21 AM
Each IBCT recon squadron has a dismounted recon company, authorized 2 x platoons of 28, 3 x 8-man "sections" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTOs. In addition, the company has a 7-man sniper squad, a 6-man 60mm mortar section and a company HQ, but they aren't really involved in scouting, except for the maybe the snipers.He was and is a minor force of nature, so while he was there, that Squadron's C Troop was totally, emphatically and positively into scouting. Period. When he left, it became a junior rifle Company... :rolleyes:

That they are not involved in Scouting is in part a function of the type of war we're in, in part due to lack of competent training, in part due to Infantry folks not being real sure what to do about reconnaissance (also a training shortfall) and lastly in part due to risk avoidance in not wanting to kick Squads and Platoons out on independent missions where someone might get hurt. The capability is there, it was designed to be there but is simply not being used. Hopefully we'll get smarter and train it for use when it is required.
Regarding the LRS units, on the active side, the division LRSDs are no more, AFAIK. I know that 82nd LRSD went to the CAB and became a Pathfinder Company, although they still call themselves LRS. The Corps LRS-C still exists, but has been rolled into the 1-38 CAV in 525 BfSB. I've heard that they have stood up a new LRS-C in the BfSB at FT Hood, but I don't know for sure.One of the ongoing turf battles which will likely destroy the US Army long before any enemy does... :mad:

The LRS mission is not a SOF mission and it is emphatically not a SF mission --yet the SOF folks think the LRS mission should go to them. The MI folks are not comfortable with a bunch of rowdy parachute types who aren't really "intelligence trained (read; the right branch...). Yet, the LRS Cos have long been associated with and / or asgd to MI Bns and Bdes.

The LRS mission and units(Infantry, not SOF or MI people) to do it have been around since WW II with only a short hiatus in the late 40s. The concept fluctuates in popularity with senior leaders. That shouldn't be the criteria. The criteria should be what is required and who can best do it.

Using SF to do it is waste of expensive skills not required for the mission...

E6TLS0369
03-15-2010, 10:42 PM
Forgive my ignorance, but, does Army Recon and Marine Recon have the same mission ? "If" so, being a Marine Reconman myself, the mission of Intel gathering forward of the FEMA is of the utmost importance to a Unit Commander in planning tomorrows or next weeks offensive movements. 90% of Marine Recon missions are "Keyhole" missions, Intel gartering, the five (5) W's. 10% are "Stinger" missions, pin point demolition, prisoner snatch, military target elimination (at times from long range). Having specialized, highly motivated, highly dedicated, highly trained individuals capable of moving undetected behind forward lines is a craft that will be sourly missed if left to wilt on the vine. The repercussions of one well placed round, in a time of need, will be felt long after the body hits the ground. Semper Fi.

reed11b
03-16-2010, 11:56 PM
Could probably give a better answer if I knew what FEMA stood for. The short answer is "no". Army and Marines use there "recon" elements in differnt ways. A lot is alike and I will try to go deeper into this later, unless Ken chooses to make it clear before I do (hint, hint)
Reed

Pete
03-17-2010, 01:44 AM
It's probably FEBA, Forward Edge of Battle Area, sort of like a front line or a FLOT.

E6TLS0369
03-18-2010, 12:32 AM
Excuse my typo, yes FEBA. :D

GI Zhou
03-18-2010, 01:20 AM
The translation is mine and I take responsibility for any errors:
Sniping by PLA forces in the Korean War started in early 1952 when the 230th Communist Youth League Regiment brought with them some ‘special grade shooters’. These were sharpshooters and not specially trained snipers but as the Chinese People’s Volunteers referred to them as snipers that is what I will call them in this article. They employed captured United States M-1 Garand semi-automatic rifles and Soviet Mosin-Nagant 1891-30 bolt-action rifles without telescopic sights. The maximum engagement range was between 400 and 500 metres with the average engagement range around 100 metres. Spread along the front and operating in teams of one to two men, one acting as an observer and the other the shooter, they killed or wounded 14 enemy soldiers for the expenditure of 29 rounds according to Chinese sources. Special ranges were built for their use, utilizing both fixed and disappearing targets.


In the First World War British Army, snipers and Vickers medium machine gunners, were loathed by front line soldiers. After they did their mission they went back behind the lines and the British infantry recieved heavy Minenwerfer fire in return - no good deed goes unpunished.

Ken White
03-18-2010, 02:51 AM
to China after WW II and which they captured or obtained when the Nationalists were defeated in '49. Their Snipers weren't bad, weren't terribly good, either (up through late fall '52; don't know about later). They also had some dedicated marksmen, not snipers, in most units.

reed11b
03-18-2010, 07:04 PM
Forgive my ignorance, but, does Army Recon and Marine Recon have the same mission ? "If" so, being a Marine Reconman myself, the mission of Intel gathering forward of the FEBA is of the utmost importance to a Unit Commander in planning tomorrows or next weeks offensive movements. 90% of Marine Recon missions are "Keyhole" missions, Intel gartering, the five (5) W's. 10% are "Stinger" missions, pin point demolition, prisoner snatch, military target elimination (at times from long range). Having specialized, highly motivated, highly dedicated, highly trained individuals capable of moving undetected behind forward lines is a craft that will be sourly missed if left to wilt on the vine. The repercussions of one well placed round, in a time of need, will be felt long after the body hits the ground. Semper Fi.

Battalion Scouts have very simalier mission statements, minus any actual training (other then some OTJT) to accomplish the specialized missions. LRS is guided by MI and upper echelon commanders requests for intel and lacks any DA mission. Having met Marine Recon guys at RSLC, I am fairly impressed with them and have been looking to see if they run any schools that Army soldiers can attend (BRC seems to be more like an AIT then a skill school). Army recon is in "transition".
Reed
I have made a mess of this one.:o Ken, feel free to step in anytime now....

GI Zhou
03-18-2010, 07:27 PM
to China after WW II and which they captured or obtained when the Nationalists were defeated in '49. Their Snipers weren't bad, weren't terribly good, either (up through late fall '52; don't know about later). They also had some dedicated marksmen, not snipers, in most units.
Ken,

Have you got a reference for the M1Cs going to the Nationalsts I couldn't find a reference. Was it the US Marine's after the end of their tour in China post-Second World War?

Ken White
03-18-2010, 09:33 PM
(or possibly M1Ds, hard to tell from a distance) from the Army Depot on Guam loaded along with many more plain M1s, many BARs and Browning MGs (both .30 cal models) plus much other surplus equipment on the blue and yellow LSTs of the Nationalists in 1946-7 for transfer to mainland China. Chepaer to give it to them than send it home. Also a better deal, I guess, than dropping it into the Mariana Trench -- the fate a lot stuff left in the Pacific at the end of the war.

Doesn't mean the PLA ever got hold of 'em so I should have been more explicit and put a perhaps in there. Apologies for not doing so.

The Marines never used the M1C or D to my knowledge (other than those few traded or lifted from the Army :D ). In China, 1945-49 they had the USMC M1941 Sniper rifle (a star gauged '03 with a 7.8 power Unertl scope). Late in Korea, they had the USMC Model 1952 Sniper rifle which looked like but was not an M1C/D. It mounted, IIRC, a Square D (Kollmorgen) scope. It was not well liked.

I do know 5th Marines captured at least one M1C/D from the Chinese in mid 1952 but how it got there is not known to me.

Reed:

You don't need any help, you're doing just fine...

I'd add that Viet Nam totally wrecked Army recon at Battalion level, it still hasn't recovered. The concentration on the NTC and north German Plain in the 70-90 period didn't help. Iraq and Afghanistan will further erode that level unless someone gets smart. In the 50s and early 60s, most Divisions ran a recon school and had a Recon platoon competition annually.

There is an LRS leaders course at Benning (or there was) plus, LRS guys in Germany get to go to the NATO International LRS School at Weingarten. There are some who get to attend other nation's recon courses and also to USMC courses.

Pete
03-18-2010, 09:55 PM
In the 50s and early 60s, most Divisions ran a recon school and had a Recon platoon competition annually.
You hardly ever hear of Recondos or Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols these days. I met a few graduates of division-level Recondo schools when I joined in 1977 and Lurps were spoken of with a kind of awe.

reed11b
03-18-2010, 11:09 PM
There is an LRS leaders course at Benning (or there was) plus, LRS guys in Germany get to go to the NATO International LRS School at Weingarten. There are some who get to attend other nation's recon courses and also to USMC courses.

LRS Leaders course is RSLC (Recon and Surveillance Leaders Course) and the NATO LRS school is now called something else and run by SOCOM (very hard for non-SOF to get into). RSLC and Army Reconnaissance Course are just about it. I have failed to find any Marine school soldiers can attend.
LRS mission is unclear at this point, and infantry scouts have always been undertrained and rarley used in the scout role since I joined in the mid 90's.

Perhaps when I get some time in a "RSTA" I will be able to better answer some the questions raised in this thread.
Reed

Pete
03-18-2010, 11:26 PM
In 1982 when I was in 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California we were able to send guys to the Marine Corps sniper school at Camp Pendleton. Division headquarters put out guidance to stop sending unmotivated or mediocre soldiers there who lacked basic math skills. The Marines were giving them math tests when they arrived and those who failed were sent back without even touching a rifle.

Rifleman
03-18-2010, 11:56 PM
I'd add that Viet Nam totally wrecked Army recon at Battalion level, it still hasn't recovered. The concentration on the NTC and north German Plain in the 70-90 period didn't help. Iraq and Afghanistan will further erode that level unless someone gets smart. In the 50s and early 60s, most Divisions ran a recon school and had a Recon platoon competition annually.


Would the Army have been better off to have had Recon Battalions (in addition to the Cav Squadrons) at division level?

I believe Marine Divisions have both a Recon Battalion and Light Armored Recon Battalion, correct? I'm assuming an infantry battalion gets a platoon from each when combat teams are formed?

Ken White
03-19-2010, 02:43 AM
LRS Leaders course is RSLC (Recon and Surveillance Leaders Course)...Mixing close and deep is really unwise, very different skill sets and even mindsets required. I bet they went ahead and said all the NCOs have to be Rangers, too... :eek: :rolleyes:
and the NATO LRS school is now called something else and run by SOCOM (very hard for non-SOF to get into).If that is true -- and I find it hard to believe because the School has instructors from the FRG, Netherlands, Italy and UK as well as the US -- and occasionally from other nations for specifc courses as well. I do not find it hard to believe that SOCOM has taken control of the ATRRS space allocations for the course -- though they should not have.
LRS mission is unclear at this point,That's due to SOCOM grabbing it but not really wanting to do it unless its exotic -- and then they'll tab it to the two ArNG Groups. It is not really a SOCOM mission under most circumstances; only if it's deep strategic recon should it be theirs.
and infantry scouts have always been undertrained and rarley used in the scout role since I joined in the mid 90's.Yup, like I said, went to hell in the 70s and never recovered. They were pretty good prior to VN.

Due to risk aversion, it's likely to get worse before it gets better. Lacking a major war and a total shake up of the hierarchy, no big changes will occur. :mad: :(

Ken White
03-19-2010, 02:51 AM
Would the Army have been better off to have had Recon Battalions (in addition to the Cav Squadrons) at division level?and did a good job until they got the M3 Bradleys in the early 80s. That Bradley drug deal between the Chief of Armor and the Chief of Infantry really messed up a lot of things. It turned the Cavalry, who were Scouts prepared to fight for information if absolutely necessary into junior tankers whose idea of recon was to go out looking for a fight. As some French Dude once said, "That's magnificent but it is not war..."

The Cav Sqns also had any LRS assets (as opposed to their being in the MI Bn) until another turf battle screwed that up. :mad:

Fuchs
03-19-2010, 10:05 AM
Would the Army have been better off to have had Recon Battalions (in addition to the Cav Squadrons) at division level?

There's no real need for a Div level and LRS should be assigned to Corps (I'd say a Bn or Rgt each).

Modern operational theory is very mobile and expects long marches of Bdes with short notice.

LRS infiltrate, observe and exfiltrate. The more movement in their area of operations, the greater the danger of being detected & identified.
They could not exfiltrate, recover, infiltrate and become effective again in time if their Bde (or Div) is moved by 150 km in two days.

The area of operations (an area expected to be assigned for weeks) should be the Corps' area, and the LRS operating in this area should be the Corps'.
Much of their tasks go way beyond what Bdes and Divs should bother about.

Div and Bde whose staffs care about far away opfor tend to have (require?) very big staffs - when it's really not necessary as long as Corps staffs can do the job.


The right place of LRS in an Army TO is thus linked to the distribution of tasks between Bde/Div/Corps. Air-Land-Battle and its secondary effects have overburdened the Divs with tasks that should really belong to Corps (or even theatre Cmd).

Rifleman
03-20-2010, 12:11 AM
There's no real need for a Div level and LRS should be assigned to Corps....

...The area of operations (an area expected to be assigned for weeks) should be the Corps' area, and the LRS operating in this area should be the Corps'. Much of their tasks go way beyond what Bdes and Divs should bother about.


That would bring LRS more in line with what the USMC's Force Recon Companies were: a Fleet Marine Force asset.

I think the Force Recon Companies have since been absorbed by the Division's Recon Battalions for administration but still operate detached at FMF level? I'm not sure about that.

jcusits, can you clarify?

jcustis
03-28-2010, 03:55 AM
Rifleman,

I'm honestly not sure about the operating concept for the Force Companies, beyond the fact that they are supposed to maintain the deep recce capability. I do not know what the doctrinal frontage or depth is supposed to be.

The wikipedia entry makes mention of supporting direct action requirements if MSOB is not around, but I do not know if the companies train to the same standard they had to when DA was the sole domain of Force.

reed11b
04-07-2010, 04:10 AM
...said all the NCOs have to be Rangers, too... :eek: :rolleyes:If that is true -- and I find it hard to believe because the School has instructors from the FRG, Netherlands, Italy and UK as well as the US -- and occasionally from other nations for specifc courses as well. I do not find it hard to believe that SOCOM has taken control of the ATRRS space allocations for the course (

Yes they have, Not in my NG unit yet, but soon. As for The NATO LRS school, I'll look up the new name and a link by tomorrow, but they specifically stated that it is for US SF and NATO SOF on the web page. I know a fair number of LRS guys, and we all want the school, but I know of no one that has gone. I'll ask over at the QP and SOCNET forums and get some clarification.

Reed

Kurt Vara
06-07-2010, 04:04 PM
Pete; I am curious why you were sending Army guys to the Marine Sniper School when we had a Sniper School right at Fort Ord.
I only say this because I graduated from Sniper School at Fort Ord,
March 26, 1982 and was stationed there at Fort Ord with
the 7th infantry division A 1/32.
Kurt

Uboat509
06-08-2010, 01:04 PM
Pete; I am curious why you were sending Army guys to the Marine Sniper School when we had a Sniper School right at Fort Ord.
I only say this because I graduated from Sniper School at Fort Ord,
March 26, 1982 and was stationed there at Fort Ord with
the 7th infantry division A 1/32.
Kurt

The Marine sniper course is different than the Army course. I'm not going to say better or worse because I don't know but it is different and I have had friends who were qualified Army snipers who still wanted to get that course.

JMA
06-08-2010, 03:15 PM
The Marine sniper course is different than the Army course. I'm not going to say better or worse because I don't know but it is different and I have had friends who were qualified Army snipers who still wanted to get that course.

Different in what way?

Kurt Vara
06-08-2010, 05:20 PM
I've talked to some of the Marine Snipers and we talked about the Training and they didn't tell me anything that we had not done.
Plus we use to go around and training with all the other Special Forces,
We trained with the Navy Seals we trained with the Rangers and some of our instructors were Green Berets. I do know how ever that they were using differant rifles then we were. But that was the only thing differant that I knew of. We were using a XM - 14 which is like the M21 with a 3x9 power scope.
Kurt

Kurt Vara
06-24-2010, 01:51 PM
Wow; I was waiting to talk to Pete see if he knew any of the people I used to know. But probably not those Company's were big and I mostly only knew the guys in my company. I graduated from AIT in 1980 and the entire 3rd Platoon of A company 1/32 graduated with me. The rest of the guys
were spead out thru the 7th Infantry division. I know one of the guys, Jerome was hurt in a bad car accident the other two soldiers with him were killed. They were in a Mach 1 mustang that went off the road and hit a telephone pole and the car split in half. the driver and the back seat passenger were ejected. Jerome was the only one wearing his seat belt. He was busted up badand I never seen him after that.

Kurt

COMMAR
08-23-2010, 03:28 AM
Different in what way?

From the Scout/Sniper's in my old unit the major differences are;

1) its a 10wk course as opposed to the Army's 5wk course.
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/marines/a/marinesniper.htm

2) There's also a 4wk Pre-Sniper or PIG (Professionally Instructed Gunman's) course, thats a prerequisite which is basically a Basic Snipers course followed by months of OJT before getting a slot in SSBC. An article on the Pre-Sniper Course: http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=80919

3) A large portion of the course is dedicated to the employment of Combined Arms coordination & planning.

4) Most of the course is dedicated to Scout/Sniper Mission Planning & Sniper Employment b/c most of the sniping basics is covered in the PIG course & in OJT.

5) Actually becoming a "Scout"/Sniper which involves learning to operate in up to 6-man teams to conduct reconnaissance missions independently at extended ranges.

TAH
08-23-2010, 01:31 PM
Would the Army have been better off to have had Recon Battalions (in addition to the Cav Squadrons) at division level?

I believe Marine Divisions have both a Recon Battalion and Light Armored Recon Battalion, correct? I'm assuming an infantry battalion gets a platoon from each when combat teams are formed?

As long as you are staying past tense, yur first statement about Div CAV is correct. With Transformation, the CAV Sqdron (Part of the Old DIV Base) is now gone. And not really replaced.

The current thought is that if a DIV CDR needs someone to do that mission, they will task a BCT.

BTW, same applies a Corps level. Soon, if not already the last Armored CAV Regiment (3rd ACR) will convert to a standard HBCT.

The proposed solution is the Battlefield Surviellance Brigade (BFSB).

A couple of issuues.

1. There will never be enough BFSB to give one per division (11 total BFSBs to cover 18 divisions and 4 Corps).

2. The standard manning of a BFSB is around 1200/1300. Of that, only 375 are in the Recon Sqdron and of that 139 are in the Long-Range Surveillance Company.

As a side now, force structure of the Army is driven/limited by manning. Adding a unit of 100 to one organization means a 100 slot reduction(the term is billpayer) soemwhere else.

TAH

82redleg
08-24-2010, 12:07 AM
BTW, same applies a Corps level. Soon, if not already the last Armored CAV Regiment (3rd ACR) will convert to a standard HBCT.
It will convert to an SBCT sometime next year (or maybe FY 12)


1. There will never be enough BFSB to give one per division (11 total BFSBs to cover 18 divisions and 4 Corps).
Right.


2. The standard manning of a BFSB is around 1200/1300. Of that, only 375 are in the Recon Sqdron and of that 139 are in the Long-Range Surveillance Company.

The Recon SQDN in the the BFSB is an emasculated organization- besides the LRS, it only has 4 x 6 truck scout platoons, in two troops. The LRS is bigger than the 2 recon troops combined. What a crock.

The recon in the BCT is too big- better a large (4 platoon) troop in the BSTB, with a couple more troops (a big mounted troop, and a LRS) in the DIV HHB.

I guess I come down on the side of DIV CAV AND a Recon BN, like the USMC, is a good idea.

COMMAR
08-24-2010, 12:25 AM
Rifleman, I'm honestly not sure about the operating concept for the Force Companies, beyond the fact that they are supposed to maintain the deep recce capability. I do not know what the doctrinal frontage or depth is supposed to be.

Presently due to size, currently 3 Plt as opposed to the standard 6, & lack of current ability to independently support them at the MEF they are currently still administratively under the Div but Operationally under the MEF.

W/their return to the MEU they have returned to the FR-DAP mission again picking up the Precision Raids, Hostile VBSS, GOPLAT, & other Black-side missions; although the MSPF has a different structure & a new name.

http://www.marines.mil/unit/31stmeu/Pages/NewsStories/31stMEUreconassaultscombattown.aspx



The wikipedia entry makes mention of supporting direct action requirements if MSOB is not around, but I do not know if the companies train to the same standard they had to when DA was the sole domain of Force.

As of 2009 the MSOCs were still conducting the CQB Course followed by the 5wk Direct Action Course, but I haven't heard or read anything this year.



Its still listed as a course taught by by the MEF SOTG though listed under the Dynamic Assault Course:
http://www.marines.mil/unit/iimef/sotg/Pages/For-the-Marines/default.aspx

W/the lessened MSPF now MSF, not sure if the MEU's are still doing TRUEX: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/12/mil-041216-usmc01.htm

Ranger94
08-24-2010, 05:18 AM
M I bet they went ahead and said all the NCOs have to be Rangers, too... :eek: :rolleyes:(

Why is it a bad thing that a LRS team leader has been to additional schooling for leadership/planning?

(Note my Bias: I believe EVERY leader would benefit from at least attempting Ranger/Light Leaders training.)

Ranger94
08-24-2010, 05:52 AM
That's due to SOCOM grabbing it but not really wanting to do it unless its exotic -- and then they'll tab it to the two ArNG Groups. It is not really a SOCOM mission under most circumstances; only if it's deep strategic recon should it be theirs.(

Exotic in SOCOM = "direct action". That is why SOCOM will never be successful in LRS missions.

LRS is mentally challenging for NCOs during planning (72hr planning cycle) because they have to plan for every contingency for a 48 or 72 hr mission.

During the mission, the TL may report back, via HF on di-pole or inverted V or a long whip that "the weather is sunny but no vehicle traffic". This is not "sexy" but it is important! SOCOM hates this report but it is GREAT in LRS!

LRS is dying because OCS schools dont teach that the NCOs can plan as well as lead.

If you are my officer, you still have to plan and lead better than me.

Ranger94
08-24-2010, 06:00 AM
only if it's deep strategic recon should it be theirs.(

"Deep Strategic"?!?! Come on? really? I just returned from Mongolia without a visa. I could have walked out of Bejing Airport without papers. I could have taken a motorcycle ride into Russia.

TAH
08-24-2010, 01:05 PM
It will convert to an SBCT sometime next year (or maybe FY 12)


Right.



The Recon SQDN in the the BFSB is an emasculated organization- besides the LRS, it only has 4 x 6 truck scout platoons, in two troops. The LRS is bigger than the 2 recon troops combined. What a crock.

The recon in the BCT is too big- better a large (4 platoon) troop in the BSTB, with a couple more troops (a big mounted troop, and a LRS) in the DIV HHB.

I guess I come down on the side of DIV CAV AND a Recon BN, like the USMC, is a good idea.

My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.

Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.

But....

The concept of seperate battalions in a division is now gone.

Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).

While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.
:(
So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.

Ken White
08-24-2010, 03:25 PM
"Deep Strategic"?!?! Come on? really? I just returned from Mongolia without a visa. I could have walked out of Bejing Airport without papers. I could have taken a motorcycle ride into Russia.Civilians can do all sorts of things guys in uniform cannot. However, that has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that SOCOM has worldwide responsibility while the combatant commands all have geographic limitations. The to-be LRS Companies in the BfSBs can do deep strategic recon but will be constrained to their Theater; SOCOM has no to few Theater limitations (personality dependent :rolleyes:). Nor does that have much to do in an era of relative international peace with the way those borders and nations would be in a state of war...
Exotic in SOCOM = "direct action". That is why SOCOM will never be successful in LRS missions.That's true. That's partly due to a very flawed personnel system that says a TF 160 aviator, a C-141 driver or a SEAL can be the BBMFIC. All Generals are not equal. It can also be attributed to the 'ability' of the "Kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" Shooter mentality to too often acquire a nominal peacetime advantage or lead over more thoughtful but possibly less openly agressive SF -- and LRS -- types. Very different mindsets. Neither is wrong but they are different... :wry:
Why is it a bad thing that a LRS team leader has been to additional schooling for leadership/planning?It isn't.
(Note my Bias: I believe EVERY leader would benefit from at least attempting Ranger/Light Leaders training.)I don't entirely disagree but I do wish Ranger School did a better job of teaching leadership and combat operations and put a little less emphasis on the mind games showing people they can take more stress than they may have thought they might. Being old enough to have two Infantry / Recon combat tours before there was a Ranger School plus a few more afterwards, I'm not one, didn't miss it a bit (I'm lazy...). One son was an RI, so we're an equal opportunity family. ;)

Nothing wrong with being a Ranger. There's a great deal wrong with believing that so being makes one smarter, stronger, better in any and/or all aspects than those who are not (or that an LRS guy will necessarily be better if he has a G suffix...). Actually, it isn't really wrong -- but it can be dangerous...

Sabre
09-12-2010, 03:08 PM
My bad on the HBCT. I thought that's what was going to happen based on what they did with the two Guard ACRs. But 2nd went SBCT a while back.

Agree with all of your comments on the BFSB.

But....

The concept of separate battalions in a division is now gone.

Prior to modularization/transformation, we had "type" divisions: light, airborne, air assault, mechanized and armored (we will set aside 2 ID).

While each type was different, they did share a common set of units (battalions and companies) organic to the "Division Base". Those were: an ADA Bn, an Engineer Bn, an MI Bn, a Signal Bn, MP and NBC companies and a Cavalry Sqdrn. All gone now. Re-orged into either a BCT or a modular Support Brigade.
:(
So, the discussion of adding an additional Bn to the division is moot. Sorry.

Ah, but where is your sense of adventure? We’ll just attach the DivCav Squadrons to the... uh, “whatever” brigades. After all, the DivCav *was* part of the Air Combat Aviation Brigade in the old Division86/Army of Excellence designs – and we *do* still have one ACAB per division…

Back in the days of 2nd ACR (Light), we called two dozen Humvees out on recon missions a “light cav troop”. Now two dozen Humvees, a company of grunts, and an unnecessarily larger grouping of MI weenies calls itself a “brigade”. (…and only 4 UAVs! A single platoon, added almost as an after-thought) Delusions of grandeur…
Seriously, more MI personnel does not equal more actionable, accurate intelligence.

In the first moment that I saw the new BCT organization, just a glance, I saw two combat battalions and a cav squadron. I reflexively assumed that the cav squadron was similar to the old DivCav, and thought “Huh, that could work. A cav unit for economy of force, to hold everywhere else, and two battalions for a one-two punch.”

Sadly, of course, that turned out not to be the case. The cav/scouts organizations look like the pieces that they had left over, after shattering the old MTOEs. Can’t really fight, can’t /won’t be allowed to /don’t want to do recon, either. Recall that 3/7 Cav, a DivCav organization with 3 ground troops, 41 Bradleys and 27 M1 tanks, led the way deep into Iraq, quite successfully. It’s quite ironic that the DivCav, and now, finally, the last of the Heavy ACR’s, is being totally dismantled despite proven combat effectiveness, despite being the most modular organizations in the entire Army for *decades*, dismantled in the name of modularity. Absurd. (And don’t complain about a heavy ACR didn’t fit into ArForGen and RIP-TOA, etc. Thinking that every problem on the battlefield happens to be exactly two combat battalions big at all times is a fantasy.)

(BIG CAVEAT – everything below is NOT referring LRS, but to heavy Cav units)

Seeing enough of the Army, staring at enough MTOEs, and reading enough history, and I am convinced that, at the end of the day, you’d better have some organizations that can fight. That, and perhaps we are trying to “push a noodle uphill” with regards to recon. (I agree with the "Scouts Out" paper - Cav units are used to fight, because that is what commanders need the most - so let's dispense with the facade.)

We are supposed to defer to the judgment of the commander on the ground.
Recon and cavalry organizations often end up in direct fire combat. Sometimes it’s because that it what the commander wants. Commanders have made a very CLEAR and CONSISTENT choice to either explicitly task or tacitly allow Cav organizations to fight. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t… sometimes it is merely necessary - but that is just like any other military endeavor. Perhaps it’s time to admit that there may be a good reason for this. Perhaps we should admit that we only think that we need way more intelligence than we will ever actually be able to get in real life, or that we’d change what we were doing in the face of that perfect intelligence if we ever did somehow get it.

I know, I know, with brigades/battalions at NTC, if the scouts got decisively engaged they got destroyed, and if the scouts got destroyed, then the whole unit did as well. (Looking back at the numbers, I don’t recall the ones where the scouts actually lived doing so hot, either.) Well, what did we expect? 6 Bradleys just got swallowed up so fast (just a few mechanical breakdowns, and you are at 50%). 10 Humvees can easily get eaten alive just as quick on real-world battlefields that are far “messier” than the battlefields of simulations or even the NTC.

I’d say the real problem was that, IF we really wanted to do recon, then we didn’t have enough scouts – which admittedly, the current BCT does finally have. Notably, scouts can also fight better than the ever-increasing numbers of MI people that turn up in every tiny tweak to the TOEs. I think that MI branch has actually managed to grow from the numbers it had back in the 80’s, when Army end-strength was vicinity 800,000 (and now it is down to what, 547,000-ish).

In the end, in a US Army that expects to fight outnumbered, why wouldn't we want formations to have an good, solid economy-of-force Cav outfit that can fight? (Even more so, given only two combat battalions per brigade...)

TAH
09-13-2010, 04:30 PM
In the end, in a US Army that expects to fight outnumbered, why wouldn't we want formations to have an good, solid economy-of-force Cav outfit that can fight? (Even more so, given only two combat battalions per brigade...)

Could not agree with this conclusion more.

However, adding anything to the current organization means a corresponding subtraction somewhere else.

My thoughts over on the BCT threat about a Re-structured HBCT Cav Sqdrn is a zero sum game. I "re-arranged the deck chairs" with the end result being two "Heavy" Cav Troops (13 CFVs and 9 tanks) and one Light/wheeled troop in the Cav Sqdrn. Much more combat capability then the current. The price was the substution/reduction in the CABs to a six-HMMWV platoon of limited/restricted capability.

Too much time, effort, resources ($$s) was tied up in the "Quality of Firsts, See 1st, understand 1st, act 1st, finish 1st":mad: Blah, blah blah. We also had too many folks for too long who could not see recon as a mission vice a unit type. The doctrine changed back in March 2010. Now Recon Sqdrns are "allowed" for fight for information. However, the equipment and organizations remain the same :confused:

The Billpayers to field the HBCT Recon Sqdrns were: the Brigade recon Troops, The Division Cavalry Sqdns, and the ADA Bns (strangly enough). The piece/parts available to transform/modularize were armored HMMWVs and CFVs and a handful of tanks. The tought of tanks in recon was bad. (What do you need those for? You'll just get into a fight and get distracted from your real purpose...) Same over in the SBCTs, no MGS in the recon just the line battalions.

gute
09-13-2010, 07:58 PM
If the primary job of the ARS is to conduct reconnaissance and not look for a fight why not replace it with a SBCT RSTA squadron/model? The CAB scout teams have six M3 vehicles instead of 2-3 and M114s?

Now, this is based on the HBCT receiving a third CAB.

Secondly, is a squadron necessary or should one large troop be capable of doing the job (again, this is based on a 3-CAB HBCT)?

reed11b
09-13-2010, 08:18 PM
LRS is dying because OCS schools dont teach that the NCOs can plan as well as lead.

If you are my officer, you still have to plan and lead better than me.

We also lack aviation assets. This is a big deal. No aviation, limited LRS capability, period.
Reed

Fuchs
09-13-2010, 08:28 PM
Oh come on. Army aviation is the luxury version of LRS insertion and LRS exfiltration.

Competent and motivated LRS can their job do without such support, even if that means that the losses rise by a few per cent.

Army aviation wouldn't be of much use for LRS in face of well-equipped opponents any way.



Btw, can I quote your assertion that the U.S. lacks army aviation assets? It'll be good for many laughs with friends all over the world.

reed11b
09-13-2010, 08:39 PM
Btw, can I quote your assertion that the U.S. lacks army aviation assets? It'll be good for many laughs with friends all over the world.

No, you may not. What I assert is that BfSB has no organic aviation assets, making LRS mission planning difficult. Especially in a NG BfSB. Yes we do other insertion methods, including stay behinds (one of the better ones), vehicle, boat and walking. However, useful time on station for Rucking in 75 or so klicks is pretty limited, unless your waiting for a friendly advance to catch up to you.
Reed

Steve Blair
09-13-2010, 09:03 PM
No, you may not. What I assert is that BfSB has no organic aviation assets, making LRS mission planning difficult. Especially in a NG BfSB. Yes we do other insertion methods, including stay behinds (one of the better ones), vehicle, boat and walking. However, useful time on station for Rucking in 75 or so klicks is pretty limited, unless your waiting for a friendly advance to catch up to you.
Reed

Concur, Reed. This has been an issue going back to Vietnam. Note that Reed says organic air assets...things the commander controls and "owns."

Fuchs
09-13-2010, 10:09 PM
Have a look at any given scenario, compare the area and the forces involved. In most scenarios you could infiltrate and exfiltrate in a Lada Niva without unacceptable risk.

You're too much accustomed to the high end luxury solution.


LRS teams of a few men would not need and not get a helicopter QRF in a major conventional war. That's peacetime nonsense. Corps commanders must not care about a sub-squad sized team when they're facing full brigades. There are always better uses for a MilSpec helicopter on a full war battlefield than waiting on a helipad for an emergency call or facing hostile air defences for the mere insertion of two surveillance teams.

LRS would also not exfiltrate just because rations are depleted. They would organise some food and relocate by a few kilometres. The hostiles will likely not have the personnel to execute sweeps anyway.

One more shocker: LRS in wartime (challenging, major conflict) would quickly become 90-95% quickly retrained personnel, not some elite force. The present LRS strengths suffice barely for maintaining enough experts for wartime trainer needs.


I save this file under "encountered yet another quality exaggeration, zero casualty tolerance peacetime attitude".

Ken White
09-13-2010, 10:49 PM
Oh come on. Army aviation is the luxury version of LRS insertion and LRS exfiltration.At Baumholder (12 x15 km, 400m maximum elevation change), yes. At Fort Irwin (110X80km, 1,500m elevation changes) No. Even more so in Alaska where Reid11B is located and trains -- and where there are few road and a lot of boreal forest and squishy tundra, No. In Afghanistan, No. This:
In most scenarios you could infiltrate and exfiltrate in a Lada Niva without unacceptable risk.may work in Germany or much of Europe. It will not in the deserts of the ME or North Africa, in the Hindu Kush or in the Jungles of Africa, South America or South East Asia. It'll get you killed quickly in most scenarios outside Europe.
Competent and motivated LRS can their job do without such support, even if that means that the losses rise by a few per cent.Losses aren't the major issue -- time and distance are the issues. Foot and Vehicle infil and exfil takes a lot of time...
Army aviation wouldn't be of much use for LRS in face of well-equipped opponents any way.Without going into any TTP, that is just flat incorrect. Both the Fernspählehrkompanie and a number of US LRSU use that method routinely in exercises and elsewhere agasinst some technologically advanced opponents.
Btw, can I quote your assertion that the U.S. lacks army aviation assets? It'll be good for many laughs with friends all over the world.As he pointed out, that's not what he said. Having a desire to snipe is okay, doing that without understanding or noticing all that is said or written can cause one to have to have a foot surgically removed from ones mouth... :D

As Steve Blair mentioned, that lack of direct control of Aviation has been problematic since Viet Nam -- and it was in Desert Storm and has been currently. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution; the guys who are really good at contested flights don't like to haul the nut and bolt LRS guys...
I save this file under "encountered yet another quality exaggeration, zero casualty tolerance peacetime attitude". No one mentioned casualties other than you...

You're going to file it there? Really? I filed it under the 'All Wars will be as I Wish Them Syndrome' heading; got a bunch of posts there from Americans and others who think all wars will go a certain way and that detailed knowledge of one war, one terrain set, one Army's peculiarities lend them omnipotent expertise. Those folks always forget there are other places and other ways of doing things...

Armies that operate worldwide have to make a lot of undesirable compromises. It would be great if they could program and train more narrowly and everything was more predictable -- but it never is so they cannot.:eek:

Fuchs
09-13-2010, 11:45 PM
I mentioned casualties because the need for quick exfil was the very best explanation for why anyone would consider helicopters a necessity for LRS.

Speed and time are only critical if the conflict is very fast-moving (in that case the corps commander better gets his timing right to set up recce & surveillance before his decisive action) or if the LRS teams have problems with sustainment (food, hydration).

I do assert that they can get food and water from their area of operations (at the very least when leaving it for another), so the portable amount does not restrict their mission duration. The morale is the real limiting factor (unless something goes wrong on the mission).


Conflicts with a force density that prohibits infil and exfil on land will most likely not allow for risky helicopter flights with a useful depth. Helicopters are very vulnerable to all kinds of missiles (and the countermeasures only help against one kind) and at low altitude they would face even more threats.
The Fernspäher do a lot, including training with UH-1Ds which wouldn't be considered fit for duty in an actual LRS mission even if the company was very desperate. At least their unit name acknowledges that it's a training outfit. An army corps would rather need a battalion or more of LRS teams in actual war.


I struggle a bit with the idea how infil/exfil on vehicle could take a lot of time. You could easily attempt to reach your target position for 15 hrs/day. It may take a whole night to move for 10 km at maximum caution, but vehicles can use the element of surprise and speed for a completely different style. 100 km/day should easily be feasible in most terrains world-wide.
Few armies have enough troops to set up checkpoints and OPs everywhere. Most cannot even maintain a single proper picket line without disintegrating their combat brigades.


You mentioned that access to aviation assets has worsened after Vietnam. Do you realize that Vietnam was the extremum, the exception? No army has greater access to aviation support, all need to make do without much of it.
This means that better access to aviation support cannot be necessary for a greater LRS capability.

That's why I sniped at the dependency on luxuries.

Ken White
09-14-2010, 03:14 AM
I mentioned casualties because the need for quick exfil was the very best explanation for why anyone would consider helicopters a necessity for LRS.Apparently in your opinion. I'd be inclined to say that was a very poor reason. If the team is in a good and important location and is otherwise uncompromised, I'd leave the casualty(ies) there to take their chances in order to avoid compromising the team and thus the mission. Distance is the most likely reason to infiltrate by air, time next most likely. Exfiltration is a whole different bundle of contradictions and the Team may just be abandoned. War's tough on folks...
Speed and time are only critical if the conflict is very fast-moving (in that case the corps commander better gets his timing right to set up recce & surveillance before his decisive action) or if the LRS teams have problems with sustainment (food, hydration)...I do assert that they can get food and water from their area of operations (at the very least when leaving it for another), so the portable amount does not restrict their mission duration. The morale is the real limiting factor (unless something goes wrong on the mission).Corps normally look 200km out; to infiltrate on foot, that's at least five days, add a day or two to select and occupy a hide. That time may or may not be available. Plus there are strategic Recon LRS tasks that entail 500-1,000 km inserts. METT-TC guides all. Including the local food and / or water; some places that can occur, other no. Morale in war time becomes almost a non-issue. Yes, the team may just get discouraged and give up. That's why they're isolated going in and no team knows where another is going. War is not for the uncommitted.
Conflicts with a force density that prohibits infil and exfil on land will most likely not allow for risky helicopter flights with a useful depth. Helicopters are very vulnerable to all kinds of missiles (and the countermeasures only help against one kind) and at low altitude they would face even more threats.All true -- and all not insurmountable. Not a topic for discussion.
The Fernspäher do a lot, including training with UH-1Ds which wouldn't be considered fit for duty in an actual LRS mission even if the company was very desperate. War's occasionally get desperate. However, there are also the CH53Gs with rather more capability and we can offer and have provided various Schlangenfesser a ride in penetration aircraft (not just helicopters...)
I struggle a bit with the idea how infil/exfil on vehicle could take a lot of time..Again, depends on the situation. Sometimes, a couple of days is acceptable, sometimes it may not be. You're also confronted with the 500 plus km strategic infil...
You mentioned that access to aviation assets has worsened after Vietnam...This means that better access to aviation support cannot be necessary for a greater LRS capability.Number of aircraft isn't the issue; dedicated aircraft that the LRS unit can depend on having and that are capable of the rather dangerous infil and exfil missions is the missing element. There are work arounds and they get used but the basic point is that we have not put the right resources in the right places in all cases. The number of aircraft is good, where they are assigned is not so good. Divisions who do not need the number of aircraft assigned will not release their aircraft to go do a mission, particularly one where the Bird may be lost, for some Captain-commanded little Company of LRS folks. Tactical requirements immaterial. :mad:
That's why I sniped at the dependency on luxuries.Not dependency on luxuries, requirement for mission accomplishment in some -- not all -- cases. Again, it's not a raw numbers issue, rather an allocation problem and a METT-TC problem.

Fuchs
09-14-2010, 09:45 AM
Infil for 500 km cannot be done with helicopters if the enemy is well-equipped. That's far too risky even over Southern Chinese mountain terrain. The helicopters would take four hours even if they were flying almost directly and few helicopters have the necessary flight radius at all (= some offshore service helicopters and CSAR/SF models).

A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.

Steve Blair
09-14-2010, 01:48 PM
A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

Really? So you'd toss your recon guys back behind enemy lines and hope that they could find a civilian vehicle? And what happens once you leave Central Europe and the only available civilian vehicle is a donkey? Or a jinga truck? That tactic also ties you directly to improved roads (especially given the state of most civilian vehicles in many less-than-optimal countries in the world).

Sure, ground infil is quite possible, but in unfavorable terrain it takes a great deal of work to accomplish properly (and if you doubt that, go read up on some of the LRS-type activities during Operation Anaconda...your 10km distance estimates were wildly optimistic in that terrain). And in some situations it just isn't an option.

And Fuchs, you might just want to research the command and control of US aviation units in Vietnam before you toss out your statements. I'd direct your attention specifically to the 1st ID, the 23rd ID, and the 4th ID. These were NOT airmobile units, and the 23rd in particular faced some major challenges with their aviation assets. I mention the 1st because they were the first US unit to strip control of the air cavalry troop away from their divisional cavalry squadron and parcel it out to brigades. The air cav troop wasn't large, and had a major impact on operations when it was allowed to function as designed (and that includes lifting in recon elements).

Fuchs
09-14-2010, 02:17 PM
You didn't get my "it's luxury" point.

Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.

Sure, army Aviation can do much - it better should, for it's very expensive and thirsty - but you can do without. No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.


Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.

Steve Blair
09-14-2010, 02:54 PM
You didn't get my "it's luxury" point.

No, I saw it. But it felt more like a dodge than a serious point.

And the limiting factor in Operation Anaconda for ground infiltration wasn't as much the altitude as it was the terrain. You'll find the same limitation at lower elevations as well.

And I really think you're missing the point when it comes to distance. Ken's comments are spot on. You state that speed is relative in high altitude operations. You'll also find that distance is relative as well. It's one thing to look at the map and say you understand distance, but until you actually experience it and actually live someplace where "close" translates to 200-300 miles (and there are no towns or settlements within that "close" span) I would contend that you really don't understand distance. And since many of your LRS comments appear to be based on both a good road network and readily available civilian vehicles you're more likely to miss the point that such things are not all that common outside Europe.

Aviation is thirsty and a luxury, sure. But so is motorized transport depending on your location. And when speed's an issue, you can't depend on foot mobility when you're dealing with the sort of space I mentioned above.

Ken White
09-14-2010, 03:12 PM
Infil for 500 km cannot be done with helicopters if the enemy is well-equipped....A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield...A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.In reverse order, METT-TC and you cannot say that as a certainty, only that it is true in your opinion.

I'm dazzled with the thought of five or six big, pale Gweilo scuffing a Lifan 620 and wandering around Guangdong and not arousing the populace to get on their cellphones and call the local Cops. Hopefully, they'll steal one with a full tank of fuel... :D

Depends on many factors. Again, you state an opinion, not a certainty. Not by any means and that's been proven.
Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.So? That's irrelevant. We should not use a capability we have because others do not have it? Conversely,, the fact that we have many more than most arbitrarily means it's a luxury? Weird logic...
No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.No one is suggesting that is the case, though I still contend your Eurocentrism is showing. Worldwide terrain and combat demands introduce more variables than a land war in northwestern Europe might require.
Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.Huh? I agree with the first sentence. The rest of it is diversionary. What is relevant here is the time factor, not speed. That time factor depends on ALL aspects of METT-TC, terrain is but one consideration. Distance affects that time factor as much or more than terrain. So to do does the attitude of civilians in the area, they are likely to be a greater concern than troops and checkpoints. Most of the deep LRS penetrations in Desert Storm and in both current wars that were compromised owed that to local civilians. There were bad results in a case or two. ..

reed11b
09-14-2010, 05:32 PM
A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.

NO ROADS. None where I train, none in A-stan (what we train for). Can take my team several hours to move a few klicks due to terrain, weight of equipment (physical conditioning only helps so much) and, ta-da, the need to not be seen or comprimised (i.e. we are not moving out on trails or roads even if available).
Reed

TAH
09-20-2010, 01:57 PM
If the primary job of the ARS is to conduct reconnaissance and not look for a fight why not replace it with a SBCT RSTA squadron/model? The CAB scout teams have six M3 vehicles instead of 2-3 and M114s?

Now, this is based on the HBCT receiving a third CAB.

Secondly, is a squadron necessary or should one large troop be capable of doing the job (again, this is based on a 3-CAB HBCT)?

1. While the job of the ARS remains unchanged, there is now general concurrence that mounted reconnaissance will often require figthing for information. The current 3X5 platoon lacks the combat power to do that when deployed as sections (one HMMWV + 1 CFV).

2. The CAB scout platoon share the same 3X5 task organization.

3. The SBCT ARS Troops have three platoons of 4 vehicles each vice two platoons of eight in the HBCT. Part of the issue is the lack of standard platoon and troop organizations are overly complicting training.

4. Force struture remains a "zero-sum" issue. Add a 3rd CAB means somethinf like 50% fewer HBCT. There are currently 25 HBCT split between the active army and national guard. That means 50 CABs. Putting a third CAB into each HBCT would most likely result in 16/17 HBCT, a nearly 1/3 reduction in the number of HBCTs. This does not count the recent announcement to convert 2 or three HBCTs.

5. Large troop versus squadron depends on what you mean by large and the loss of the squadron staff for inter-facing with the Bde. The current HBCT ARS has a total of 20 CFVs, 30 armored HMMWVs and 6 120mm mortars. Really little more the two troops (one tracked and one wheeled) already.

82redleg
09-20-2010, 10:23 PM
Proposition:
Standardize ALL mounted recon platoons at 10 x vehicles.

IBCT Recon SQDN mounted troops utilize HMMWVs.

SBCT RSTA SQDN uses 1 x M1127 troop (3 x 10) plus 2 x HMMWV troops.

SBCT IN BN uses 1 x M1127 platoon.

HBCT ARS (not really an ARS anymore, but anyway) uses 3 x M1127 troops (3 x 10).

HBCT CAB uses 1 x M3 platoon.

Alternatively, we can go back to the mixed troops from the ACR, LCR and DIV CAV- each recon troop has 2 x recon PLTs (10 vehicles now, instead of 6) and 2 platoons of tanks/MGS/TOW HMMWV. The organization of all troops (and platoons) is the same. The difference is the system.

Rough math (I'm sure TAH will correct me) tells me that we can get the force structure personnel (not sure about the systems, but that should be doable, too) from the overhead (HHCs, CO HQs) of the HBCTs we have to reduce to put 3 CABs in each HBCT, with requisite CS/CSS elements (FA Btrys, EN PLTs, FSCs, etc).

TAH
09-21-2010, 04:49 PM
Proposition:
Standardize ALL mounted recon platoons at 10 x vehicles.

IBCT Recon SQDN mounted troops utilize HMMWVs.

SBCT RSTA SQDN uses 1 x M1127 troop (3 x 10) plus 2 x HMMWV troops.

SBCT IN BN uses 1 x M1127 platoon.

HBCT ARS (not really an ARS anymore, but anyway) uses 3 x M1127 troops (3 x 10).

HBCT CAB uses 1 x M3 platoon.

Alternatively, we can go back to the mixed troops from the ACR, LCR and DIV CAV- each recon troop has 2 x recon PLTs (10 vehicles now, instead of 6) and 2 platoons of tanks/MGS/TOW HMMWV. The organization of all troops (and platoons) is the same. The difference is the system.

Rough math (I'm sure TAH will correct me) tells me that we can get the force structure personnel (not sure about the systems, but that should be doable, too) from the overhead (HHCs, CO HQs) of the HBCTs we have to reduce to put 3 CABs in each HBCT, with requisite CS/CSS elements (FA Btrys, EN PLTs, FSCs, etc).

So now I get to be the "Math Nazi" :wry:

The math does got two ways personnel and vehicles.

A 10-vehicle platoon would need as a minimum 30 Soldiers (pretty much the recent standard) I am more inclined to standarize at 6 vehicle platoons.

Knox was/is pushing 36-man scout/recon platoons.

6 CFVs = 6 fully manned vehicles + 18 dismounts spread across two or three sections.

6 M1127 RVs = 6 fully manned vehicles + 18-24 dismounts spread across two-three sections.

6 HMMWVs (or JLTV in the future) = 6 fully manned vehicles + 12 dismounts and 6 extras as there is no more room in the HMMWV (four inside and one up top).

I favor the single function platoon inside a mixed troop so 2 scout platoons = 2 "gun" platoons works for me.

By adding the "Gun" platform you get addiotional capability as opposed to just more of the same.

82redleg
09-22-2010, 02:10 AM
So now I get to be the "Math Nazi" :wry:

OK, OK, I'll do it myself :D I must depreciate my math-in-public abilities in advance, so I may mess up some multiplication :confused:.

HBCT:
Current ARS Recon Troop is 93 pax, 36 in each PLT. Increasing to a 10 x M3 platoon increases 14/PLT, 28 per troop, and 2 tank platoons are an additional 28 pax per troop, so 56 pax, 5 M3 and 8 M1 x 3 troops = 168 pax, 15 M3 and 24 M1
Same 14 pax and 5 x M3 in each CAB scout platoon equals additional 28 pax and 10 M3 in each CAB = a total of 196 pax, 25 M3 and 24 M1 per HBCT.

SBCT:
Current RSTA Recon Troop is 3 platoons x 27 pax + 4 M1127 RVs. Conversion to 2 PLTs x 10 M1127 + 50 pax / PLT = 8 M1127 + 19 pax increase/ troop x 3 troops = 24 M1127 + 57 pax / SQDN.
4 MGS + 12 pax / PLT x 6 platoons (2/troop) = 24 MGS and 72 pax = net increase of 24 MGS, 24 RVs and 129 pax in the SQDN
Current IN BN Scout PLT is 24 pax + 4 RVs- same increase to 50 pax and 10 RVs is 6 RVs + 26 pax/PLT x 3 PLTs (1/ IN BN) = 72 pax + 18 RVs.
Total of 201 pax, 24 MGS and 42 RVs per SBCT.

IBCT:
Current RS Recon Troop is 3 PLTs x 6 HMMWV + 24 pax = 18 HMMWV + 72 pax/troop. Conversion to 2 PLTs x 10 HMMWV + 40 pax = increase of 2 HMMWV + 8 pax/ troop x 2 troops = 4 HMMWV + 16 pax / SQDN
Addition of 4 TOW PLTs x 4 HMMWV + 12 pax/ PLT = 16 HMMWV + 48 pax / SQDN
Total of 20 HMMWV + 64 pax per IBCT.

Sabre
09-22-2010, 01:14 PM
However, adding anything to the current organization means a corresponding subtraction somewhere else.

My thoughts over on the BCT thread about a Re-structured HBCT Cav Sqdrn is a zero sum game. I "re-arranged the deck chairs" with the end result being two "Heavy" Cav Troops (13 CFVs and 9 tanks) and one Light/wheeled troop in the Cav Sqdrn. Much more combat capability then the current. The price was the substitution/reduction in the CABs to a six-HMMWV platoon of limited/restricted capability.

Too much time, effort, resources ($$s) was tied up in the "Quality of Firsts, See 1st, understand 1st, act 1st, finish 1st":mad: Blah, blah blah. We also had too many folks for too long who could not see recon as a mission vice a unit type. The doctrine changed back in March 2010. Now Recon Sqdrns are "allowed" for fight for information. However, the equipment and organizations remain the same :confused:

The Billpayers to field the HBCT Recon Sqdrns were: the Brigade recon Troops, The Division Cavalry Sqdns, and the ADA Bns (strangely enough). The piece/parts available to transform/modularize were armored HMMWVs and CFVs and a handful of tanks. The thought of tanks in recon was (considered) bad. (What do you need those for? You'll just get into a fight and get distracted from your real purpose...) Same over in the SBCTs, no MGS in the recon just the line battalions.

I rather like your particular rearrangement of deck chairs.

What I find interesting about the ADA cuts was that, de facto, "Gun" ADA units often provided convoy security and extra firepower in general. Perhaps it's often overlooked, but it still was a constant historically. Of course, no one believes that the USAF will ever do anything less than a perfect job of clearing the skies of enemy airpower. (Do any potential enemies have attack helicopters? I forget.)
Of course, my worry is that this combat power wasn't really replaced (and that's in addition to all of the Heavy Cav that got a lot lighter.)

On a similar subject, as best I can tell, the Cav units were a big bill-payer for the MI battalions, when those were first conjured up in Division 86 (as the CEWI). I can recall an article by a general complaining that the new CEWI battalions weren't adding sufficient value, and on top of that he had now had less Cav. (Back when DivCav was two ground troops of 19 Bradleys each, and two AirCav troops.)

Of course, that general was complaining back in the 80's.
Back when the US Army was much larger, and MI branch was actually smaller than it is now.

But yes, your plan would give a Brigade commander two economy of force heavy troops, and one light one for sneaking around - probably the best we could hope for, given the current constraints.

TAH
09-22-2010, 02:49 PM
OK, OK, I'll do it myself :D I must depreciate my math-in-public abilities in advance, so I may mess up some multiplication :confused:.

HBCT:
Current ARS Recon Troop is 93 pax, 36 in each PLT. Increasing to a 10 x M3 platoon increases 14/PLT, 28 per troop, and 2 tank platoons are an additional 28 pax per troop, so 56 pax, 5 M3 and 8 M1 x 3 troops = 168 pax, 15 M3 and 24 M1
Same 14 pax and 5 x M3 in each CAB scout platoon equals additional 28 pax and 10 M3 in each CAB = a total of 196 pax, 25 M3 and 24 M1 per HBCT.

SBCT:
Current RSTA Recon Troop is 3 platoons x 27 pax + 4 M1127 RVs. Conversion to 2 PLTs x 10 M1127 + 50 pax / PLT = 8 M1127 + 19 pax increase/ troop x 3 troops = 24 M1127 + 57 pax / SQDN.
4 MGS + 12 pax / PLT x 6 platoons (2/troop) = 24 MGS and 72 pax = net increase of 24 MGS, 24 RVs and 129 pax in the SQDN
Current IN BN Scout PLT is 24 pax + 4 RVs- same increase to 50 pax and 10 RVs is 6 RVs + 26 pax/PLT x 3 PLTs (1/ IN BN) = 72 pax + 18 RVs.
Total of 201 pax, 24 MGS and 42 RVs per SBCT.

IBCT:
Current RS Recon Troop is 3 PLTs x 6 HMMWV + 24 pax = 18 HMMWV + 72 pax/troop. Conversion to 2 PLTs x 10 HMMWV + 40 pax = increase of 2 HMMWV + 8 pax/ troop x 2 troops = 4 HMMWV + 16 pax / SQDN
Addition of 4 TOW PLTs x 4 HMMWV + 12 pax/ PLT = 16 HMMWV + 48 pax / SQDN
Total of 20 HMMWV + 64 pax per IBCT.

Pencils Down. :)

HBCT recon is a total of 8 platoons of 3 CFVs, 5 HMMWVs & 36 PAX each for a total across the BCT of 24 CFVs, 40 HMMWVs and 288 PAX.

As I understand your HBCT proposal this would go to:

8 platoons of 10 CFVs and 50 PAX each (80 CFVs + 400 PAX) plus
6 platoons of 4 tanks and 16 PAX each (24 tanks and 96 PAX)

For an increase across the BCT of 56 CFVs + 24 Tanks + 208 PAX.

The CFVs and tanks are a one time buy, but that number of an increase probably traslates to more supporters also. The real kick is the 208 PAX increase. Across the force of 25 HBCTs thats 5200 more Soldiers, an increase over more that a full BCT.

Drop 100 CFVs back to 6 and the increase in CFVs in still 24 and PAX is just the 96 tankers. Still 2400 PAX total (2/3s of a BCT)

SBCT recon is currently 12 platoons of 4 M1127 RVs and 27 PAX for a total of 48 RVs and 324 PAX. Reducing the number of platoons to 9 of 10 RVs & 50 PAX plus 6 platoons of 4 MGS & 12 PAX results in 90 RVs (an increase of 52) 24 MGS and increase of 24 and 450 scouts and 72 MGS "Tankers" for 522 and increase of 198 PAX per SBCT or 1386 PAX (about 1/3 of an SBCT).

Reducing SBCT Scout platoons to 6 RVs of 36 PAX equals 9X6 Rvs for 54, 9X36 for 324 PAX. Reducing MGS to 3/platoon equals 18 MGS and 54 PAX for a total increase per SBCT of 6 RVs, 18 MGS & 54 PAX.

I have been kicking around a re-structured SBCT of only two Infantry Battalions but with four versus 3 line companies and a re-orged SBCT ARS of 3 recon Troops (2X2 RV & MGS) and a infantry Company. Brings SBCT structurely inline with the HBCT and IBCT model, I use the remaining Bn HQs to form the SBCT Special Troops Bn of the engineers, MICO, Signal Co, Anti-tank company, again to simplify the overall BCT structures.

never looked at the IBCT but the numbers look about right.

Here, we have the luxury of unlimited bugets and no limiting manpower caps. No so in the "real Army".

More is almost always better then less. It really takes some work to some how the same is better just re-arranged or better yet, less is better.

TAH
09-22-2010, 02:54 PM
I rather like your particular rearrangement of deck chairs.

What I find interesting about the ADA cuts was that, de facto, "Gun" ADA units often provided convoy security and extra firepower in general. Perhaps it's often overlooked, but it still was a constant historically. Of course, no one believes that the USAF will ever do anything less than a perfect job of clearing the skies of enemy airpower. (Do any potential enemies have attack helicopters? I forget.)
Of course, my worry is that this combat power wasn't really replaced (and that's in addition to all of the Heavy Cav that got a lot lighter.)

On a similar subject, as best I can tell, the Cav units were a big bill-payer for the MI battalions, when those were first conjured up in Division 86 (as the CEWI). I can recall an article by a general complaining that the new CEWI battalions weren't adding sufficient value, and on top of that he had now had less Cav. (Back when DivCav was two ground troops of 19 Bradleys each, and two AirCav troops.)

Of course, that general was complaining back in the 80's.
Back when the US Army was much larger, and MI branch was actually smaller than it is now.

But yes, your plan would give a Brigade commander two economy of force heavy troops, and one light one for sneaking around - probably the best we could hope for, given the current constraints.

I appreciate the vote of confidence and concur with your overall assesment.

An interesting aside is the use of ADA/AAA units for missions other then shooting things out of the sky. It started back in Korea and continued in Viet Nam. During OIF, it was the best use of the resources as opposed to letting them sit idle. The gate guard / perimeter security mission at the FOB I was on in Iraq was done by the Brigade ADA Battery. When the 41st Division went in 2005 it was not initally given and ADA Bn (No mission) but I think it was given back for just such roles as above.

The only things left for the ADA guys to shot at are TBM, UAVs and cruise missiles. All viable threats. Oh and mortar rounds and rockets before the hit a FOB. ;)

PsJÄÄK Korte
07-02-2011, 08:51 PM
Sorry this raise this thread.
On snipers:
I once borrowed finnish book "Tarkka-ampuja 1 (Sniper 1, but finnish term for sniper translates literally into "sharpshooter)" by Finnish carreer officer Major Pauli Salo. He is sort of authority in snipercraft here in Finland.
He defined three sniper classes by their level of training/skill required
"lowest" class is simple designated marksman at squad and maybe platoon level. they have not camoflage but should have scoped
Then comes "fire support sniper" they is trained in camoflage and sharp shooting, but they don't "roam freely", instead give supporting fire to platoons and companies.
Then at the top of heap are scout/snipers, something in vein of for example scout/snipers of USMC. He lamented in his book that scout/snipers are not trained in Finland.
I know that partially these are similar what I have seen other countries have, but I'd like to hear your opinion. How realistic(Term?) are these definitions.

I skimmed thread but didn't find clear opinion on my though:
If youd have enough decent enough manpower and rifles. Would it make sense to have sniper units at all levels ie.
infatry squad: designated marksman/men
infatry platoon: sniper pair
infatry company: sniper team
infantry battalion: sniper platoon
infantry brigade: sniper company <-of this feasiblity I am espesially interested
I am also partially thinking of point of view of finnish army.
Even though even AR armed soldiers are trained to take carefully aimed shots one would think that snipers would be good and cheap force multiplier for non-professional army like ours. :)
To be continued...

PsJÄÄK Korte
07-02-2011, 09:13 PM
On recon: I wonder wether is based on reality of finnish terrain or misunderstanding of armoured recon but here in finland armoured recon platoons are basicly four reduced strenght foot-recon squads riding in either CV90 or BMP-2. I wonder do other countries have similar systems or do everyone else have dedicated platforms for armoured recon and would our type of armoured recon platoon be uselful in any other kind of terrain.
Also in I know here armoured recon means IFV mounted recon, but I am not sure wether APC mounted recon is armoured recon or is it foot-recon albeit with better protected transport. Is for example stryker recon armoured recon or foot recon?

PS. Had I had motorcyclist licence and better fitness (and insaner attitude) before I did my service I might have applied to armoured recon platoon's motorcycle team. but past is past. :D

jcustis
07-03-2011, 05:45 PM
I wonder do other countries have similar systems or do everyone else have dedicated platforms for armoured recon and would our type of armoured recon platoon be uselful in any other kind of terrain.
Also in I know here armoured recon means IFV mounted recon, but I am not sure wether APC mounted recon is armoured recon or is it foot-recon albeit with better protected transport. Is for example stryker recon armoured recon or foot recon?

The US military has a variety of systems, doctrines, and organizations that conduct reconnaissance. I'd say that the Stryker community, much like the USMC's Light Armored Reconnaissance community, would identify with armored reconnaissance, although dismounted reconnaissance patrolling is practiced to a high level of art for the times when the scouts are on the deck.

Long-Range Surveillance units in the Army, and Reconnaissance Battalion and Force Reconnaissance Company units conduct reconnaissance and surveillance that tends to be oriented of foot-mobility, but they retain the generic skills to operate mounted. They are usually limited by the small-arms weapons systems employed on the vehicles the use for mobility, but they can still fight for information to some degree.

PsJÄÄK Korte
07-18-2011, 02:35 PM
By the way was it Wilf or some other who noted that recce should be one of the soldiers basic skill sets? I have no problem with that when talking about professional armies where soldiers sign contracts for x years and thats what was propably talked about. But how would that work for army like Finland's where conscripts serve 6, 9 or 12 months? One would think that if you tried to teach guy serving six months both "line" infantry and recce skills he would have pretty shallow grasp of both. So it would make sense to specialise given short training times.

Fuchs
07-18-2011, 03:24 PM
It takes about half a year to train an infantryman fully, including short-range scouting. Make that 9 months in peacetime due to weekends and lower intensity.

The problem with conscript armies is that the army leaders want to use conscripts as active force personnel, they don't consider conscripts to be men who get a training and then leave. As a result, conscript training is cut down to press at least some months of reduced effectiveness active service out of them - and many conscripts are being mis-used as cheap forced labour to be used on the most stupid jobs with minimal training.

The political leadership can force the military leadership to consider conscripts as men to be trained for war, and nothing else. That, after all, is the purpose of conscription in wartime, true to Scharnhorst's idea.

Allow the top brass in uniform to consider conscripts as cheap unfree labour that's available no matter how attractive the service is and you'll end up with a ####ty for of conscription.
Force them to train the conscripts and then release them - you will end up with a huge pool of trained reservists when the #### hits the fan.

Firn
07-18-2011, 05:02 PM
The problem with conscript armies is that the army leaders want to use conscripts as active force personnel, they don't consider conscripts to be men who get a training and then leave. As a result, conscript training is cut down to press at least some months of reduced effectiveness active service out of them - and many conscripts are being mis-used as cheap forced labour to be used on the most stupid jobs with minimal training.

The political leadership can force the military leadership to consider conscripts as men to be trained for war, and nothing else. That, after all, is the purpose of conscription in wartime, true to Scharnhorst's idea.

Allow the top brass in uniform to consider conscripts as cheap unfree labour that's available no matter how attractive the service is and you'll end up with a ####ty for of conscription.
Force them to train the conscripts and then release them - you will end up with a huge pool of trained reservists when the #### hits the fan.

I do think you really hit the nail on the head with that post, and have really nothing to add to the intent of it.

[OT:

Having followed the debates in quite some European countries in the last ten years, the most important argument for conscription seems to have been that without it you can not offer civil service as an alternative to it, thus loosing a very important work force for the social sector. So now we finally know the true idea behind conscription, it is a legal move to force young males to work in the social sector for almost nothing. :rolleyes:

:end the OT part]

Fuchs
07-18-2011, 05:15 PM
There were three more major reasons in Germany:

# A national myth about how conscription ensures that the military is loyal to the democracy (sure, as if Hitler had not re-introduced democracy...).

# The fact that the conservatives fought hard for it in the 50's (it was Germany's first major payment for the Western integration) and treated it as a great party accomplishment.

# The fact that the military is totally inept at recruiting and enlisted soldiers job experience in the military is not really attractive. That, of course, was caused by the fact that military leadership mis-used the almost for free conscripts for decades - and especially so in the last decade of conscription with its very short service period.


There were also some low opinions about foreign professional troops (especially French and British soldiers, who were often characterised as pub brawlers) and their high fiscal cost (especially U.S. troops).
An economist can of course easily point out that conscription has a lot of otherwise avoidable hidden costs (especially the loss of freedom).


Eventually, conscription became so dysfunctional in Germany and conventional warfare defence was lost so much out of sight that conscription went away - without a proper reserve pool generating replacement.

jps2
07-19-2011, 02:52 PM
My two cents about conscription and markmanship :

I made my 'National Service' during the end 80's; Main thread was called RED; We were supposed to slow then enough by conventional means to allow NATO strength (US & CAN) avoiding nuke use.
The conscription was, for me, the better way to mix people : farmers and urbans, low and high educated. Social mixing, each with his background to reach a same goal. I'm not naive, even if one tenth of a class was really motivated, these 1/10 could be more than useful as reserve if a major threat happens. Politicians forget that particular conscription's goal, and for electoral and economical (not my point of view) reasons switch to professional army.
We were not, after 12 month, really skilled as today professionals can be, but physical & intellectual requirements wasn't so high as today : 90% were good enough for the job.
Today, with unemployment rates between 8 and 10% (especially for youngs), teaching discipline and community's life will not be a waste of money and time for many young men (an perhaps women).
The loss of freedom is part of living together, "my rights finishes where other's rights began". Nowadays, everyone is focused on his/her rights, none on his duties. Conscription was a way to learn / remember that.

Marksmanship can be learned before enrolling, basics can be acquired with a 22lr between 50 and 200m.
It is a school of self control and mental strength. It does not require some specific physical skills.
Marksmanship is one of the ways to reduce ammunition consumption, improving fire support.

GI Zhou
10-14-2011, 07:25 AM
NO ROADS. None where I train, none in A-stan (what we train for). Can take my team several hours to move a few klicks due to terrain, weight of equipment (physical conditioning only helps so much) and, ta-da, the need to not be seen or comprimised (i.e. we are not moving out on trails or roads even if available).
Reed

Getting back to the subject, terrain is the primary key for distance and range is dependent on that. Jungle, urban or mountainous terrain (with without cover), infrastructure and the type of enemy faced, all decide the recon/scout element as well as the use of snipers. It is vital for a battalion commander to have knowledge of the terrain and enemy he faces. Can we stick to ideas on this please. Personally I believe a recon/surveillance platoon organic to the battalion, and a sniper section/squad is an invaluable asset. Their issue/or misuse and continuation training has more effect on the battlefield. There was no section marksmen when I served (and I do not go into combat) but even on peacetime exercises the best shot assumed the role of a squad marksman. Squad and platoon commanders adjusted their structures so that their skills were best utilized.

shlomz
03-05-2012, 03:38 PM
It seems that snipers have usually been employed most effectively at battalion level.

That's what my experience thought me. Both recon & sniping are capabilities which, in a perfect army, any infantry company should have. However, I have found it very difficult to maintain these capabilities within the company level, due to the small number of men concerned and the "force of momentum", which tends to constrain the company CO to his more immediate and generalized tasks.

Moreover, the battalion CO should not, IMO "sub-let" this crucial element to his company commanders.

Therefore - a battalion recon platoon and sniper section.

gute
03-09-2012, 10:18 PM
My beef/ concerns are basically as follows.

Precise effect, long range rifleman are good. No argument. Hitting folks with one shot at 6-900m is a capability I want in Companies and Platoons as part of my fire support.

The XM-25 may allow for infantry to engage targets out to 900 meters without the need for trained snipers. I know the weapon was not designed to be a sniper or DMR weapon, but this could end up being a benefit.

Fuchs
03-10-2012, 02:01 AM
The XM-25 may allow for infantry to engage targets out to 900 meters without the need for trained snipers. I know the weapon was not designed to be a sniper or DMR weapon, but this could end up being a benefit.

The grenade is low density and relatively low velocity. Its effective range drops dramatically if there's some wind.

Effective range against moving targets sucks as well, for the effective frag radius is certainly smaller than the distance a man can run before the grenade arrives at 500 m.

It is a niche weapon, the thermal sight and the restrictions it imposes on the hostiles are most likely the most useful things about it.

Culpeper
03-13-2012, 04:07 AM
Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

Yes; their actions can easily stop or deter anti-coalition activities in a small area. And that is whether they are present or not. The problem lies with the age old problem of company commanders reluctant to let them loose to do their jobs as they were trained.

reed11b
03-13-2012, 04:47 PM
The XM-25 may allow for infantry to engage targets out to 900 meters without the need for trained snipers. I know the weapon was not designed to be a sniper or DMR weapon, but this could end up being a benefit.

A sniper is NOT the same as a squad marksman. Stealth and an ability to gather information are big parts of our job. It's why we are a battalion or higher level asset.

There had been talk back in '05-'06 of making the XM-109 BORS site compatible with the air burst fuzed round. Now that would have made the XM-109 upper welcome in most sniper sections that already use the M-107 LRSR.
Reed

Compost
12-17-2014, 05:49 AM
The Australian Infantry Magazine Oct14 – Apr15 issue has an article on the future of the Reconnaissance, Sniper and Surveillance (RSS) Platoon in the Standard Infantry Battalion (SIB). The SIB is a light infantry unit that is also intended for mounted (integral 4x4 Bushmaster IMVs) and mechanised (attached M113 APCs) operations each usually supported by cavalry with ASLAV-25s.

The article noted that the specialised surveillance trade in the current 49-man battalion-level RSS PL – 5-man HQ, 8-man surveillance det, four 5-man recce patrols, four 4-man sniper quads – is to be blended into both other trades to form a revised recce and sniping PL. It then proceeded to briefly examine options for that similar sized platoon to meet battalion level needs for mounted recce, dismounted recce and sniping by organising into various mixes of 4-man, 5-, 6- and 8-man squads.

Rifle companies were mentioned only once: “SIBs of three rifle companies, each with three platoons and integral manoeuvre support sections”. There was no mention of any associated need for company recce and/or sniping assets within the battalion, nor that sniper elements also have the vital functions of forward observation (FO) and fire direction (FD) in immediate support of battalion and company operations.

Recce and sniping certainly have a common need for covert movement. But in other respects they seem as fundamentally different as mounted and dismounted recce. On one hand it seems that specialised integral mounted recce has to be a battalion level role with (lightweight/basic) dismounted recce assigned to rifle companies. On the other hand sniping including FO and FD might be better met by company level sniper sections rather than being concentrated in and then detached from a battalion-level support company.

It is intriguing to speculate and to learn how other ground forces are organised to satisfy light infantry needs for recce, sniping and surveillance spanning FO and FD. Hence this post.

OUTLAW 09
12-17-2014, 07:46 AM
The Australian Infantry Magazine Oct14 – Apr15 issue has an article on the future of the Reconnaissance, Sniper and Surveillance (RSS) Platoon in the Standard Infantry Battalion (SIB). The SIB is a light infantry unit that is also intended for mounted (integral 4x4 Bushmaster IMVs) and mechanised (attached M113 APCs) operations each usually supported by cavalry with ASLAV-25s.

The article noted that the specialised surveillance trade in the current 49-man battalion-level RSS PL – 5-man HQ, 8-man surveillance det, four 5-man recce patrols, four 4-man sniper quads – is to be blended into both other trades to form a revised recce and sniping PL. It then proceeded to briefly examine options for that similar sized platoon to meet battalion level needs for mounted recce, dismounted recce and sniping by organising into various mixes of 4-man, 5-, 6- and 8-man squads.

Rifle companies were mentioned only once: “SIBs of three rifle companies, each with three platoons and integral manoeuvre support sections”. There was no mention of any associated need for company recce and/or sniping assets within the battalion, nor that sniper elements also have the vital functions of forward observation (FO) and fire direction (FD) in immediate support of battalion and company operations.

Recce and sniping certainly have a common need for covert movement. But in other respects they seem as fundamentally different as mounted and dismounted recce. On one hand it seems that specialised integral mounted recce has to be a battalion level role with (lightweight/basic) dismounted recce assigned to rifle companies. On the other hand sniping including FO and FD might be better met by company level sniper sections rather than being concentrated in and then detached from a battalion-level support company.

It is intriguing to speculate and to learn how other ground forces are organised to satisfy light infantry needs for recce, sniping and surveillance spanning FO and FD. Hence this post.

In the ongoing hybrid war between the Russians and Ukrainians they both are in a combat phase of sniping coupled with recon in force both in large units up to companies and down to squads/teams.

In fact the entire Ukrainian SOF elements have shifted to a full scale guerrilla warfare mode behind enemy lines and deep recon work. Reminds me a little of the Moore's Ranger concept from 1776.

This is an important lessons learned coming out of eastern Ukraine and affects the hybrid warfare concept that is being now seen. Totally joint deep SOF/CF operations evolving out of the immediate forward lines.

Compost
12-20-2014, 08:48 AM
What arrangements do light infantry battalions in other armies employ to satisfy their needs for forward observation, surveillance, sniping, counter-sniping, fire direction, and reconnaissance ?

davidbfpo
03-20-2015, 11:08 PM
There is a parallel thread Snipers,Sniping & Countering them (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2627) which may help with this topic; it has been closed, but can be re-opened upon request.

Granite_State
07-31-2016, 01:46 AM
http://www.stripes.com/army-looks-to-deactivate-long-range-surveillance-companies-1.419337


The Army is moving to cut all nine of its Long-Range Surveillance companies from active duty and the National Guard this year as part of a plan to restructure its force, Army officials told Stars and Stripes.

The Pentagon will finalize a decision to deactivate three active-duty and six National Guard Long-Range Surveillance companies in the next 60 days.

“Every year there are capabilities that must be added, but unfortunately this means the Army must divest some,” Army spokesman Troy Rolan said. Commanders identified operational LRS units as a low priority, he said, adding that the decision to cut LRS companies was aided by “extensive computer models using combatant commander plans to determine what the Army needs.”


“What’s the price in blood we’re going to pay when we have to retrain soldiers to do the things we lost?” he asked.

Compost
07-31-2016, 09:48 AM
Disbanding Army and Guard long-range surveillance companies could free-up skilled personnel for posting to reconnaissance and observation/sniper sections in infantry battalions.

Long-range needs seem to now be mostly assigned to RSTA and air cavalry units, and on occasion special forces.

Morgan
07-31-2016, 04:04 PM
Given the capabilities of conventional forces to do what current Ranger Battalions do (airfield seizures, deep raids, etc....think 82d, 101st), why not reorganize the 75th RGT in the following manner: 1-75 remains as currently organized and serves as the US Army's primary direct action/airfield seizing/ HVT raid bubbas while 2-75 and 3-75 are redistributed among the Army, active and reserve component (at division and corps levels), as LRS companies, which is part of the core function of Ranger units...? This would also reduce redundancy between current LRS companies and Ranger BN elements.

Compost
08-01-2016, 10:01 AM
The merger of Long-Range Surveillance Companies into Ranger units would serve the apparent Joint Force practice of enlarging the extent of USSOCOM at the cost of the individual services.

If that is continued for several more years then USSOCOM could grow to rival the USMC, and after further transfer of motivated and skilled personnel the US Army infantry battalions might be re-roled as training units.

Granite_State
08-01-2016, 01:34 PM
The merger of Long-Range Surveillance Companies into Ranger units would serve the apparent Joint Force practice of enlarging the extent of USSOCOM at the cost of the individual services.

If that is continued for several more years then USSOCOM could grow to rival the USMC, and after further transfer of motivated and skilled personnel the US Army infantry battalions might be re-roled as training units.

That's certainly the direction we're heading.

davidbfpo
08-02-2016, 11:23 AM
Maybe peripheral, but I have added a link to a review of a book by a South African recce veteran, as it is topical and covers small team work:http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1133/1141

The book itself is 'Recce: Small team missions behind enemy lines' is an autobiography by Colonel (retired) Koos Stadler.

Amazon (US) shows the English version is due to be published in December 2016 and has reviews from the Afrikaans edition, yes in English:https://www.amazon.com/Recce-Small-Missions-Behind-Enemy/dp/1612004040/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1470136745&sr=1-1&keywords=koos+stadler

Amazon (UK):https://www.amazon.co.uk/Recce-Small-Missions-Behind-Enemy/dp/1612004040/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1470136928&sr=1-1&keywords=koos+stadler