New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[Michael C]

Abu Muqawama listed this link to the new Commander of ISAF General McChrystal's guidance to counter-insurgency. The direct link is right
here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/COMISAF-COIN-GUIDANCE

As I have said before, I am a huge fan of population-centric COIN as put forward in the Army manuals, David Kilcullen, John Nagl and General Petraeus. This short document lays out clearly the intentions to secure the support of the population while leaving kill/capture missions as the lowest priority.

Most importantly, as a soldier who saw large scale missions repeatedly not yield effects, this is music to my ears. We have tried to use firepower to win for many years now, this seems like the way ahead.

[Taiko]

So the Australians are going about it all wrong (http://www.smh.com.au/world/australian-troops-kill-rebel-leader-20090825-eya9.html)? May be we didn't get the memo.

[MikeF]

Michael C,

Thanks for sharing the link. I've been considering McChrystal's guidance today. IMO, much of it is good, but here are two quick points that where I would differ.

1. Securing the populace and destroying the enemy (capture, kill, or turn) are NOT mutually exclusive. Rather, they are comprehensively intertwined. Patreaus and Odierno addressed this issue in Iraq as identifying the reconciliables and irreconciliables. Regardless of how much influence one garners with the locals, there are still going to be dudes that make bombs, put them in the roads, volunteer for suicide bombings, etc. It takes a lot of intelligence collection to FIND these bad dudes, but then you must act decisively to FIX, FINISH, and EXPLOIT. When you neutralize the bombmaker, then the roads no longer blow up, and the market place becomes safer. That's what I call security.

2. Information Operations when dealing with Families. Yes, when you detain or kill a dude for placing bombs in the road, you are going to upset his parents, uncles, grandmother, and others. So what? I think the argument can be better understood by looking at our own country. Should a policeman release a drug dealer, murderer, or rapist because that person's family is upset over his detention? Of course not. So what do you do?
IMO, this is where Information Operations is best used. When possible, you address the family, the village, and the local leadership to EXPLAIN why you killed/detained the individual. Then, you ENSURE that he receives a fair trial. If he is found not guilty, then you help him get readjusted to home. You can drive him from the police station to his village. You can help him find a job. If he is guilty, then you inform the verdict to his family, and you can assists with helping them visit/communicate with him during imprisonment.



As I have said before, I am a huge fan of population-centric COIN.

As opposed to what other strategy? SFA, FID, or SSTR? Or are you referring to the kill/capture tactics? I never considered sitting in a FOB and going out on raids to kill/capture a true strategy.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

So the Australians are going about it all wrong (http://www.smh.com.au/world/australian-troops-kill-rebel-leader-20090825-eya9.html)? May be we didn't get the memo.But then I'm old and slow... :wry:

I for one see absolutely nothing wrong in the guidance to the bulk of the general purpose forces comprising ISAF that is posted, it makes sense to me. Couple of things that won't get done but they had to be said and most command guidance has that problem.

Everyone understands or should that the SOF guys will certainly be doing something that is not publicly posted and, of course, should not be. Nobody's getting a free pass and no one is picking on the Strynes.

What is your point? :confused:

[jcustis]

Anyone have that as a truly downloadable document yet, without all the drama of having to sign up for a service that "respects your privacy" ? :rolleyes:

I need this for a guided discussion.

[Red Rat]

The UK Mil system does not allow access to the link. Does anyone have a copy of the new guidance that they could send to me, or even better post a copy on this site? Much appreciated!

RR

[davidbfpo]

Via the SWJ Blog there is a clear link, hassle free too: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/COMISAF-COIN-GUIDANCE

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Well I'm not a fan of "Pop-centric COIN." This paper seems to confirm my opinion that PC COIN is actually a very clumsy forcing mechanism to try and educated people not to do criminally stupid and counter-productive things. Worst case is that this is "dumbing down" warfare for what is doable, rather than requiring a raising of standards to the required level.

That policy comes at the cost denigrating correctly applied combat power as being the essential element of irregular warfare.

[Red Rat]

Via the SWJ Blog there is a clear link, hassle free too: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/COMISAF-COIN-GUIDANCE

davidbfpo

Tried that - doesn't work for me!! The aim of the UK's IT system is to add more process - not to enhance communications and make us more effective.

RR

Copy received by e-mail. Many thanks! :D

[Old Eagle]

DOIM says that GEN McCrystal's giuidance falls into these categories:
Adult/Mature Content, Alternative Sexuality/Lifestyles, Auctions, Chat/Instant Messaging,
Extreme, Gambling, Hacking, Illegal Drugs, Illegal/Questionable, LGBT, Nudity, Online Storage,
Pay to Surf, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), Phishing, Pornography, Proxy Avoidance,
Spyware/Malware Sources, Streaming Media/MP3s, Violence/Hate/Racism.

[Michael C]

I am currently at a training exercise so I will quickly try and reply to all.

First, towards the UK folks, I am trying to get it downloaded. As soon as it is I will post again and I will email it to you if you have an email.

Second, to Mike F. You don't really say anything with which I disagree. I believe security operations have a precise place and I believe counter-force operations have a place. The correct thing is analyzing the percentages. In a given insurgent population maybe only five percent are irreconcilables: those who have to be killed or captured. You also mention turning the population which I think is always better than killing the enemy.
You also made some great points on IO which is how it should be conducted. The only thing I would add is that once you live in the population and eliminate armed propaganda in the villages, then conduct regular shuras, eventually you will ask the people to turn in the bad guys so they can reconcile. Surprisingly they will and the violence will lower dramatically. The key is not killing the right people, its securing and living with the right people. This is also much easier when partnered with local units, not conducting solo operations.
When it comes to comparing population-centric COIN with other theories, people frequently say like what? Well, my first answer is fire-power reliant theories that the US Army used in the beginning of the Iraq war, the Afghanistan war until now, and throughout the Vietnam war. Firepower and vague concepts of maneuver replaced interaction and intelligence gathering. Above all, though, US army might say they do not advocate that, in practice that is the majority of their actions.

To William F. Owen: I don't think we see eye to eye but I don't think small little forum posts will change that. The problem with "correctly applied combat power as the essential element of irregular warfare" is defining correctly applied power. Is it fire power? Is it living with the population? Is it partnering with the local security forces? Is it gathering more accurate intelligence?
It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.

[William F. Owen]

To William F. Owen: I don't think we see eye to eye but I don't think small little forum posts will change that. The problem with "correctly applied combat power as the essential element of irregular warfare" is defining correctly applied power. Is it fire power? Is it living with the population? Is it partnering with the local security forces? Is it gathering more accurate intelligence?
Well you may yet be surprised.


Is it fire power? - Yes, but 5.56mm and 7.62mm applied against armed targets, clearly identified and engaged within ROE.
It is not 454kg JDAMS, Hellfire, or 155mm, unless very clear criteria are satisfied
Is it living with the population? Yes, as and when it merits benefit.
Is it partnering with the local security forces? Yes, especially if they can trained to operate in ways that acknowledge both their limits and strengths and not just as less capable mirrors of yourselves.
Is it gathering more accurate intelligence? Absolutely! That is about the most important thing you can do!



It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.
It's not a euphemism. It is exactly what I mean.

If I can find 30 armed insurgents on the move, away from any population, why should I not attempt to engage and kill all of them? Are you seriously suggesting we should not do this?

If however, I risk killing civilians, or I am not sure as to the identity of those 30 armed men, then I'll seek to conduct operations to clarify their identity, till I can successfully engage them, or consider them not a threat.

[Infanteer]

If I can find 30 armed soldiers on the move, away from any population, why should I not attempt to engage and kill all of them? Are you seriously suggesting we should not do this?

If however, I risk killing civilians, or I am not sure as to the identity of those 30 armed men, then I'll seek to conduct operations to clarify their identity, till I can successfully engage them, or consider them not a threat.

Changing one word highlights the sillyness of dividing war simply on what clothes one side decides to wear to battle....

[Ron Humphrey]

DOIM says that GEN McCrystal's giuidance falls into these categories:
Adult/Mature Content, Alternative Sexuality/Lifestyles, Auctions, Chat/Instant Messaging,
Extreme, Gambling, Hacking, Illegal Drugs, Illegal/Questionable, LGBT, Nudity, Online Storage,
Pay to Surf, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), Phishing, Pornography, Proxy Avoidance,
Spyware/Malware Sources, Streaming Media/MP3s, Violence/Hate/Racism.

That and half the DOD public information sites:confused::(

[ODB]

but in the mean time, maybe I posted this LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=80739&postcount=96) in the wrong thread.

Everyone with all the stastical data, metrics, whatever the flavor of the month is I have one question. What percentage of the Afghan populace supports US prescence?

Some may remember my rant some months ago on some PSYOPS guys here LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=64883#post64883), well let's just say our I/O does not exist.....or in others words it is pure bureaucratic horsesh*t; at least in the other theatre it is that way. Maybe, just maybe someone has it right in Afghanistan......anyone, anyone, anyone?

I really need to stop all this ranting.....sorry

[Michael C]

ODB- Knowing what percentage of the population supports the government of Afghanistan is the most important metric. That being said, we don't know it. Finding it out would involve daily conversations with locals and rigorous searching for that answer. The result would be operations very much like population-centric COIN.

In short, that is the most important metric but in Afghanistan and Iraq the US Army's most important metric is friendly KIA.

Wilf- I guess the only thing we disagree on is that it is much better to flip a known insurgent to supporting the government than killing him. Otherwise, I agree with everyone of your points except that violence is the last resort in a counter-insurgency.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf- I guess the only thing we disagree on is that it is much better to flip a known insurgent to supporting the government than killing him. Otherwise, I agree with everyone of your points except that violence is the last resort in a counter-insurgency.

The very fact an insurgency exists, shows that the insurgent was very happy to resort to violence. Before the insurgency occurs, violence should indeed be a last resort.

I think if you can get an insurgent to give up or change sides (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chieu_Hoi), you should. Point being he is only likley to do that, once you have subjected him to some harm or threat.

My real concern being that POP-COIN is either very poorly explained, or actually suffers from profound failure to understand the nature or irregular warfare, - as I think my answer to your questions would seem to indicate.

The central tenet of POP-COIN is "protecting the population." My reasoning, based on history, is that if you defeat the insurgency (kill, capture, coerce) then you fulfil your aim, axiomatically. My reasoning also being that I want to protect the Government, because the Government, not the Population make the Policies, we wish to benefit from - Clausewitz!
POP-COIN is essentially a poor reasoning of END-WAYS-MEANS.
POP-COIN reasons that killing the enemy means killing the population - which is essentially assuming folks are stupid and changing the means to account for it.

[jcustis]

POP-COIN reasons that killing the enemy means killing the population - which is essentially assuming folks are stupid and changing the means to account for it.

No Wilf, you have it all wrong on this statement.

If you spend all your time trying to kill the enemy, you stand to lose sight of many things concerning the population, like whether or not the enemy is slipping into his villages and towns at night to deliver mischief and mayhem.

We should do our best to avoid killing civilians...and that's about the gist of it. You talk a lot about concepts and ideas standing up to rigor. Please show the council where anyone advocating a effort that focuses on the population (or even just looks to pay attention to the population), actually said that killing the enemy mens kills the population.

That is not an equation I have seen anyone make.

[Fuchs]

I think he aimed at the accidental guerrilla aspect that insurgents are a part of the population and linked to it.

[William F. Owen]

No Wilf, you have it all wrong on this statement.

If you spend all your time trying to kill the enemy, you stand to lose sight of many things concerning the population, like whether or not the enemy is slipping into his villages and towns at night to deliver mischief and mayhem.
How does any intelligent application of force against the enemy, allow them to freely move in and out of villages? That is precisely what focussing on the enemy would aim to prevent. 1st Core Function is FIND.


We should do our best to avoid killing civilians...and that's about the gist of it. You talk a lot about concepts and ideas standing up to rigor. Please show the council where anyone advocating a effort that focuses on the population (or even just looks to pay attention to the population), actually said that killing the enemy mens kills the population.

I have long said that the application of force should be intelligently applied. - EG - not killing civilians. The New ROE for A'STAN explicitly talk about restricting the use of force to prevent civilian casualties, as part of POP CENTRIC COIN do they not.

My reasoning is same, if not tighter ROE, should be applied as part of going after the enemy.

Now COMISAF COIN Guidance states (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/isaf-counterinsurgency-guidanc/) claims 8 years of successful kinetic actions have made the problem worse. Essentially in that killing the enemy alienates the population. So does that mean the population all support the Taliban and don't like seeing them get killed or does it mean that negligent use of fire power risks killing the population?

In fact the document explicitly states that large operations risk killing civilians.

To logically extrapolate from the COMISAF, it basically says that you can't kill the Taliban because it will make them want to kill you. This logic does not seem to extend to what happens when you have to kill them, when they try and attack the civilians you are trying to protect.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

I suggest COMISAF's guidance for COIN is a good example of tight writing and appropriate use of vignettes to drive home a point. Alarmingly the current trend in draft revisions of Army doctrinal manuals is not to include such vignettes (see the posts on Army Doctrine Reengineering on the TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference thread). As you well know by now I think this is a mistake. In writing doctrine we should follow GEN McC's lead rather than sacrificing the inclusion of any historical perspective in doctrinal manuals on the altar of brevity (as we are apparently about to do).

[h2harris]

A possible addition to the discussion would be Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game - The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia". It is the story of a small military force controlling a sub continent with northern extensions. It can be said that the English having practiced on the tribal peoples of Scotland, Ireland and Wales decided to turn to the sub continent of India.

From Hopkirk's "Prologue"

"If this narrative tells us nothing else, it at least shows that not much has changed in the last hundred years. The storming of embassies by frenzied mobs, the murder of diplomats and the dispatch of warships to the Persian Gulf..."

"Had the Russians in December 1979 remembered Britain's unhappy experiences in Afghanistan in 1842... then they may not have fallen into the same terrible trap.."

"The Afghans, Moscow found too late, were an unbeatable foe. Not only had they lost none of their formidable fighting ability, especially in terrain of their own choosing, but they were quick to embrace the latest techniques of warfare..." "...their modern counterparts the heat-seeking Stinger, which proved so lethal againist Russian helicopter-gunships"

[Michael C]

The issue in population-centric COIN versus anything else, or even just itself as a term is percentage of operations. At its core, in irregular or counter-insurgency warfare there are different types of missions. On one hand you can conduct actions against the enemy, counter-force. On the other, you can conduct security operations to prevent the enemy, or insurgent from influencing the population either through persuasion or coercion. The key is that they are not the same mission. Logistics, intelligence, information operations, governance development, and economic/infrastructure development.

That being said, the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily conducting counter-force operations. You are right Wilf, we were not very effective and we caused civilian casualties. However, the solution is not better counter-force operations it is more security patrols. Security leads to every other aspect of COIN. And, yes they mix up so improved security leads to improved governance which creates better security. There is no simple if this then that, but changing the bulk of our patrols will lead to a more empowered government.

[MikeF]

There is no simple if this then that, but changing the bulk of our patrols will lead to a more empowered government.

Maybe it will; maybe it won't. Empowered, better governance is up to the host nation. We can secure areas, build infrastructure, advise the government and military apparatus forever, but in the end, it is up to the populace and governing bodies to determine how they are going to live. I believe that this never-ending tactical debate on kinetic versus non-kinetic actions in war distracts our thinking on the real debate.

I would suggest, as currently constructed, a population-centric COIN model applied to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan may allow the Governent of Afghanistan to secure large portions of territory. That is it. It will not solve the illiteracy problem, the unemployment problem, the drug problem, the ethnic divisions, nor will it end radical Islamic terrorism. So, what should we be doing? This answer is something that has been perculating for a while...Maybe this thread is a good place to explore.

I think we need to relook our assumptions. Here's some that I've started.

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

A. Occupation. We take over. Germany and Japan after WWII.
B. Security Force Assistance. Combination of military and political ASSISTANCE throughout the world. (Phillipines, Colombia).
C. Peace-keeping. Bosnia/Kosovo.
D. Regime Change (For lack of a better term.) Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001).

2. The military is best equipped to conduct security operations. We have several approaches to accompish security. It appears that a combination is currently being used in Afghanistan.

A. Mentoring. Typical MiTT teams. Small groups of advisors focus on training military staffs.
B. Advice/Assist. Traditional Foreign Internal Defense. Small groups of advisors work directly with a larger combat unit.
C. Partnering. GPF forces pair up with HN companies on a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio.
D. Unilateral. We do it ourselves, and hope that the HN military catches up.


3. There are other alternatives to nation/state-building than military options.

A. One understudied approach is the use of non-state actors to tackle non-state symptoms. Greg Mortenson's work in building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a great example of a social entrepeneur creating real progress WITHOUT security.

B. Another approach is soft-power or indirect approach. Plan Colombia is a great example where State Department leads the effort to assist the government with a small military presence as advisors.

Long post, but a culmination of my thoughts for the week. Looking foward to hearing others comments/criticisms.

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

On one hand you can conduct actions against the enemy, counter-force. On the other, you can conduct security operations to prevent the enemy, or insurgent from influencing the population either through persuasion or coercion.

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound?
Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month?
The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.
You require massive logistic support for those operations, there is the risk that the Taliban roam free interdicting your supply routes. More over the static security approach does defeat the Taliban. They merely go on existing.


That being said, the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily conducting counter-force operations. You are right Wilf, we were not very effective and we caused civilian casualties. However, the solution is not better counter-force operations it is more security patrols. Security leads to every other aspect of COIN.
Sorry, I disagree. Patrolling is an aid to fixing the enemy. It reduces their freedom of action. Yes, security operations are vital, but not to the degree where the enemy has less to fear.
The solution is better "counter-force" operations. That requires a solid approach to ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. US Forces should be better trained, better commanded and better equipped than the Taliban. Security is always traded against Activity, and it is very time dependent.
Intelligence is the key. All efforts should be harnessed in that direction. Nothing here is new. The entire first chapter of Callwell's Small Wars devotes an entire chapter to it. Kitson talks about it at great length. In fact, if you wanted to drift out on another definition of "Irregular Warfare," then the primacy of tactical intelligence would be a not all-wrong start.
So, given that you can successfully and consistently locate the enemy and or predict his activity, why would you not harness that towards killing/capturing him?

Another sad fact that POP-COIN refuses to recognise is that Afghan civilian deaths are almost entirely politically irrelevant. US/UK deaths are vastly more politically significant in terms of sustaining the political will to remain committed.

[MikeF]

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it. Tom

Tom,

You aptly described what we are doing (Oxford and Princeton version),; I am attempting to reframe the conversation towards what should we be doing not monday-morning quarterback the boys on the ground.

I am simply trying to shift this debate from tactical towards strategic and policy. If I was a commander on the ground in Afghanistan right now, I would follow McChrystal's words verbatem.

There is simply a huge gap between clear and build, between COIN theory and nation-building. If anything, your time in Africa can attest to that.

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.


v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.


OK, all good points, but what do you mean "Strategic?" Strategy and policy are not the same things. Tactics (Operations?) is how you apply strategy. Strategy should set forth the policy.

The Policy in Iraq/A'Stan is to force Pro-US Governments upon the population of each nation. Anti-US Governments are unacceptable.
That, simply stated is the aim. In this case, the "Strategy" is how you use specific actions and effects (Tactics) to make that happen. That may include violent (military) and non-violent (diplomacy) means. Military means require the use or the threatened use of force.

Overall my thoughts are that the COIN/FID/Peacekeeping debate is irrelevant in that it always manages to frame the problem, and thus solution, in the terms the observer finds most appealing to their political inclination and not in terms of what the evidence suggests.

The issue you are trying to force in irregular warfare is almost always that the irregulars (insurgents?) cannot win by violent means. They must surrender/disband and/or negotiate a settlement beneficial to you, the Government. Unless the enemy is being convinced of that, all else is frankly rubbish.

What ever you want to call it, the reason the US Armed Forces are in Iraq and A'Stan is there is a need to conduct warfare. Warfare requires will and skill, regardless of the type being conducted. Any policy or idea that detracts from that simple truth is extremely risky and historically likely to fail.

[Fuchs]

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound? Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month? The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.

I keep telling that to people for maybe two years now.

My interpretation of the whole affair is that the "establish security" crowd thinks of magic, for there's a huge black box in their reasoning.

Problem - black box - security established

It's the old rule; those who attempt to defend everything defend nothing. Old Frederick already knew that 250 years ago, why is it so difficult to grasp today? Ego?

The Spanish cannot prevent bomb strikes of ETA in their own country for decades. How should that work in Afghanistan? What's the troops:population ratio? One soldier who leaves the fortified bases per village?

ISAF will never manage to do the equivalent of the police of Naples providing a witness-protection programme for the whole population of Southern Italy.

Maybe the problem is simply that ego prevents people from accepting their lack of power, so they adopt an illusion and follow a route that at least promises them to be powerful enough to handle their problem.

[Bob's World]

The very fact an insurgency exists, shows that the insurgent was very happy to resort to violence. Before the insurgency occurs, violence should indeed be a last resort.

I think if you can get an insurgent to give up or change sides (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chieu_Hoi), you should. Point being he is only likely to do that, once you have subjected him to some harm or threat.

My real concern being that POP-COIN is either very poorly explained, or actually suffers from profound failure to understand the nature or irregular warfare, - as I think my answer to your questions would seem to indicate.

The central tenet of POP-COIN is "protecting the population." My reasoning, based on history, is that if you defeat the insurgency (kill, capture, coerce) then you fulfil your aim, axiomatically. My reasoning also being that I want to protect the Government, because the Government, not the Population make the Policies, we wish to benefit from - Clausewitz!
POP-COIN is essentially a poor reasoning of END-WAYS-MEANS.
POP-COIN reasons that killing the enemy means killing the population - which is essentially assuming folks are stupid and changing the means to account for it.

Focusing on crushing the insurgent has never done more than create, in effect, a "cease fire" until such time as the populace can generate whatever part of the equation (leaders, ideology, fighters, resources) you have taken out. History is rife with examples of locations where there have been COIN "victory" after "victory." If it keeps coming back, you never resolved anything.

This is the problem with the Colonial mentality. It rationalizes that the outside presence is proper, and that governments supported by that outside presence are therefore proper as well. Most populaces disagree, though most will also tend to put up with it as well. As Thomas Jefferson said:

"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security."

In today's information environment it provides more advantages to the insurgent than it does to the government. Tactics like those practiced successfully in Malaysia would be far less likely to succeed today. One Dinosaur of the new info age is the "Friendly Dictator." No longer can a Colonial power (or a pseudo-"I'm not really a colonial power, I'm the U.S.") strike a deal with some Dictator that is mutually beneficial for those parties, but that rides on the back of the Dictator's populace, for one simple reason: Other than perhaps N. Korea, there is nowhere on earth where the populace, and the information available to the populace, can be fully controlled.

Now, I am not a big fan of the CNAS-promoted form of COIN that is based in tackling "effectiveness" of government and controlling populaces. What Kilcullen calls "Population-Centric" COIN.

I am, however, a fan of my own theory which is based in tackling "poorness" of governance (targeted on the specific issues by region/community that are at the core of causation; while also targeting the aspects of the governance that deny those same populaces the ability to address these issues through legitimate means) and supporting the populace (governments come and go, as do threats. The populace is what endures. Ultimately, all governments are expendable, and threats transient. Focus on what's really important). What I call "Populace-Centric" COIN.

WILF is pretty savvy on conventional warfare, both between states and with irregular forces as well; but my opinion, in his refusal to recognize that warfare within a state is unique and must be handled differently than by the rules derived from Napoleonic warfare; is dangerously off track when discussing insurgency.

The Brits lost an empire "winning" insurgencies using the mindset WILF promotes. The U.S. will suffer a similar fate if we apply the same. Good news for the Brits was that they had little brother to pass the torch to. The US might want to ponder just who picks up the torch when we are forced to drop it as well...

[William F. Owen]

WILF is pretty savvy on conventional warfare, both between states and with irregular forces as well; but my opinion, in his refusal to recognize that warfare within a state is unique and must be handled differently than by the rules derived from Napoleonic warfare; is dangerously off track when discussing insurgency.
Well thanks, but actually I am merely repeating the cannons and teachings of great men, in whose shadow I reside. I am not an original thinker, by any stretch.
So how exactly is war within a state different? Spanish, US, English(3) and Columbian civil wars ? The de-facto Iraqi Civil war?
a.) There are no rules derived from Napoleon's conduct of War (not warfare). He merely made enemies to create no advantage. He lost. The era in which he conducted Warfare holds relevant and timeless lessons.
b.) I merely suggest using force to gain what force has always been best at gaining. The insurgents are using force. Why the great confusion in persuading them to pursue peaceful means?
An insurgency is rarely, if ever, a legitimate expression of discontent.
If you don't take military action against an "insurgency", the "insurgency" will win, using military action against you! - as in Cuba and Nicaragua.


The Brits lost an empire "winning" insurgencies using the mindset WILF promotes. The U.S. will suffer a similar fate if we apply the same. Good news for the Brits was that they had little brother to pass the torch to. The US might want to ponder just who picks up the torch when we are forced to drop it as well...

Actually that's not true. We did not loose an Empire. Retaining an Empire was not economically or politically viable, after 1945 - mainly thanks to the US!
For 180 years, we held onto our Empire and expanded it, almost exclusively using skill in irregular warfare, as an expression of the politics of the age.
Post 1945, what our ability to conduct irregular warfare achieved in most cases, (thought not all) were non-communist Governments who could be productive members of the Common Wealth, at the time of independence. -contrast and compare that to the French and Dutch!

The two insurrections we "lost" - Ireland and Palestine, were against mostly against British Army trained irregulars, - both in under 2 years and both after a major war.

[Bob's World]

All Clausewitz and Jomini is rooted in Napoleonic warfare. Good stuff both, but products of the era all the same. The trick is to ferret out the enduring principles and to ID what is colored the most heavily by the Westphalian system of governance it occurred within, and the European culture as well.

Also, all violence is not warfare; just as all warfare is not violent. To over simplify in the wrong areas is dangerous, not so much in others. This is a dangerous area as it can shape bad strategy, which is far more dangerous than bad tactics (for a nation, not necessarily the poor infantryman on point). There are broad categories, and sliding scales of violence within each. When does dissatisfaction become insurrection, and when does insurrection become insurgency...more importantly, do such distinctions even matter to divining and applying effective strategy (which should span all three).

Similarly, when does competition between states become rivalry, and when does rivalry become warfare, and again, as to strategy, does where you are on the scale really matter?

We tend to focus on what is in front of our face, and assess it as colored by what we know and or have experienced. Quite natural. As a strategist I believe one must be able to look beyond what is in front of their face, and similarly be able to step back from what they know to consider what others know as well. I haven't met many strategic thinkers, as like leadership, it is a talent that can be trained, but no amount of training will create it where no talent exists.

Westerners are particularly blind to perspectives of others. Look at the definition we apply to "Failed and Failing" states. We define the Westphalian system; designed by Europeans for Europeans and then exported around the globe through colonialism; and then use those criteria to call any populace that dares to reject, or simply cannot make work, that system within the borders those same colonials drew for them, to be "failed." Pure arrogance.

[max161]

warfare within a state is unique and must be handled differently than by the rules derived from Napoleonic warfare; is dangerously off track when discussing insurgency.

Though I disagree with the backhanded slap at Clausewitz, Bob :) because passion, reason, and chance and the fact that war [all war] is a true chameleon is still applicable - he was not advocating how to fight using Napolenic warfare but like Sun Tzu (and I am convinced he read the 1789 French translation of the the great Master Sun) he admonishes us to understand the nature and character of the war, but I digress).


The problem with the American Way of COIN (as adapted from the American Way of War) is that the way we fight a war within a state presupposes US forces being in charge. We want to take the lead and we rationalize this in all kinds of ways as in when they stand up we will stand down, they are not ready, we have to provide security until they can get on their own two feet. With us in charge we undercut the very legitimacy that we seek to provide to the state. Now of course we have gotten to where we are today because we deposed two totalitarian regimes (that needed deposing) and now we have to come in and conduct armed social work.

Just for a minute if we think about what if we had used those dreaded Napoleonic rules of war and looked to take the surrender of the those regimes (a success to those criminals who were in charge) and instead of destroying the government and all its institutions (Sun Tzu: it is better to take a country in tact that to destroy it, it is better to take an Army in tact than to destroy it) we took the surrender akin to Germany and Japan and then embarked on a Marshall plan type effort to support the successor regime and allowed that successor government to develop in accordance with its own customs, traditions, and political processes rather than impose our own way on them.

To be successful in supporting a host nation in its war within in a state we must support the host nation. They must be in charge as the COIN equation is that there are only 3 main elements:

1. the insurgents
2. the population (battlefield of human terrain)
3. the counter-insurgent (and this includes as a sub-element external support to the nation conducting COIN).

Unfortunately we do not like being the sub-element and only in a support role. It is our nature to be in charge and build all institutions in our image (including the host nation security forces and their ways of governance).

We are on the right track with our emphasis on cultural awareness in today's situation. It is the new buzzword phrase (along with cultural agility and other similar catch phrases). We want cultural awareness so we can derive solutions that we think will work within that culture and also because we think it will win us the hearts and minds of the people (again, us as in the U.S., winning the hearts and minds which is the wrong construct - we should not be worrying about us winning hearts and minds but support the host nation in ensuring they have the hearts and minds of their population, but I digress again) Unfortunately we use cultural awareness as a means to an end and do not strive for the two things that are really necessary - cultural understanding (e.g., the reality of that culture as it really is, was, and likely always will be) and cutlural respect (and the understanding that we cannot and should not try to change it, nor their political systems, legal systems, etc -change can only come from within and while we can nurture and support that change it is of course generational and we cannot and should not try to force that change).

Now to my bottom line. (Sorry I did not put it up front). I am afraid that the American Way of COIN presupposes future OIF and OEFs. Although it does not explicitly say it, our doctrine combined with OUR strategic culture also presupposes us being in charge always (just look at the hot debates we have had had in the past about US forces under command of a foreign commander - something many Americans will never stand for, but I continue to digress and I apologive for the rambling). We pay lip service to FID and the new fashionable term Security Force Assistance but as we look at how we are going to employ forces it is all about "shaping" the environment and this in turn can undercut our legitamacy. FID is still the best construct for what we need to do because the very nature of its definition is that it supports the host nation in its programs for internal defense and development which is critical for war within a state (FID: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.")

So in closing, I would say that war within a state has to be conducted by he state, it can have external support but that external support cannot supplant that legitmate and sovereign nation-state. If it does it is defacto an occupying power and of course one of types of traditional insurgencies is to rid a country of an occupying power. And if we would kep in mind those Napoleonic principles in the future and ensure that our military operations against a nation state result in a formal surrender we might not have to be forced back into a "you break it you buy it" situaiton.

And lastly, we must purge ourselves of the romanticization of COIN. It is this idea that we can come in and save the people by us being in charge that gets us into trouble. We need to figure out how to best help a soveriegn nation state (when it is of course in our strategic, national interest). Yes, I am a student (just a student, not a self-described expert) of TE Lawrence and all the other great COIN theorists but I do not think that we should try to fancy ourselves as Lawrences as it is so fashionable to say today. The romanticization of COIN today is going to hurt us in the long run and we need to ensure our future doctrine development understands that. Yes we are going to be faced with a myriad of threats around the world from irregular forces with hybrid capabilities. But underforunately it will be the rare case in the future when we can take them on directly and we must realize that we have to support soveriegn nations in their quest to bring security and stability to their under-governed, perhaps improperly governed and ungoverned spaces that provide sanctuary for insurgents and terrorists.

Finally, I wholeheartedly agee with Bob that war within a state requires a different way of operating. We know how to do that. We have had doctrine for it. Now we need to build strategies and campaign plans that will correctly implement that doctrine to acheive our national security objectives.

Dave

[Dayuhan]

I think if you can get an insurgent to give up or change sides (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chieu_Hoi), you should. Point being he is only likley to do that, once you have subjected him to some harm or threat.


This is not always the case. In the Philippines in the last years of the Marcos regime, the Communist New People's Army had roughly 40k armed members and was approaching strategic parity with a poorly led and demoralized AFP. In '86 Marcos fell, and his network of local governors, mayors and village captains, many of them in place for decades and responsible for a wide variety of abuses that served as recruiting tools for the NPA, were removed and replaced. NPA numbers dropped drastically, and by the mid 90s they were down to 6-8000. The hardcore ideologues stayed with the fight, but the followers abandoned it en masse - not because they were harmed or threatened, but because the regime they perceived as their enemy was no longer there, elections were happening, and there was potential for change within the existing political framework.

Only one case of course, but it illustrates the importance of understanding why the insurgent fights - not "the insurgency", as a whole, but the individual insurgent. The insurgency may be Communist, Islamist, Separatist, what have you, but it's often the case that many of the individual insurgents are fighting not because they are devoted to those goals but because of some more immediate and often more local grievance. Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

[Rex Brynen]

Only one case of course, but it illustrates the importance of understanding why the insurgent fights - not "the insurgency", as a whole, but the individual insurgent. The insurgency may be Communist, Islamist, Separatist, what have you, but it's often the case that many of the individual insurgents are fighting not because they are devoted to those goals but because of some more immediate and often more local grievance. Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

An excellent point. If you look at fluctuations in the strength of Hamas over the years, for example, it soon becomes clear that it has relatively little to do with IDF military activities. Rather, it grew during the first intifada (at a time when the IDF shifted from initial passive tolerance to active countermeasures--in a sense, IDF military action against it enhanced its "street cred"), waned sharply at the beginning of the Oslo process (when it fell to single digits in some polls as a consequence of optimism about the peace process), grew to over 40% by 2006 (because of a combination of collapse of the peace process and poor Fateh/PA governance), and has slowly slipped since then (largely because Hamas governance hasn't been much better, although here it could also be argued that IDF military action has had some effect).

[Bob's World]

What Dave said!

(And I don't rough up CvC, only those who take him a bit too literally and universally. Everything must be read within the context of its time and culture. Sun Tzu was crafted over hundreds of years of experience I believe, so has a broader base of time; but both still colored by their cultures all the same)

And when I speak to populace focused approaches, it is not to say one does not go through the government; but often it is the government that must change the most for them to regain peace with their populace. So my focus is to help the Gov't get straight with its populace, or if they refuse either leave, or help the populace get a Gov't that will (depends on how big the interest is that brought us there); but to simply take the govt as they are and assist them in subduing their populace is simply to add our names to the target list.

Often we refuse to play hardball with governments because we fear the consequences. Often these fears are based in our addictions (energy being a big one); sometimes these fears our based in concerns with other states and what happens if we lose some support or right of access from the one we are engaging. Fear is healthy. It just isn't always rational.

[slapout9]

And when I speak to populace focused approaches, it is not to say one does not go through the government; but often it is the government that must change the most for them to regain peace with their populace. So my focus is to help the Gov't get straight with its populace, or if they refuse either leave, or help the populace get a Gov't that will (depends on how big the interest is that brought us there); but to simply take the govt as they are and assist them in subduing their populace is simply to add our names to the target list.




Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff:) Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff:) Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.

Even in external conflicts where the COG is likely something that must be "defeated" I rarely think it is something that should be attacked directly. Derive the CRs that make it function in the way that makes it the COG in the first place; and then derive a subset of those CRs to the ones that are also susceptible to successful engagement, and call those CVs and make them the focus of your campaign.

[Fuchs]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

[Bob's World]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

He really didn't have much to say about COG. But then I sure never read the original, nor all of any translation.

To me this is a concept he tossed up for consideration, and all real value comes from how it has been applied and thought about by others.

[William F. Owen]

Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.
That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.


... and has slowly slipped since then (largely because Hamas governance hasn't been much better, although here it could also be argued that IDF military action has had some effect).
Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.

[William F. Owen]

Though I disagree with the backhanded slap at Clausewitz, Bob :) because passion, reason, and chance and the fact that war [all war] is a true chameleon is still applicable - he was not advocating how to fight using Napolenic warfare but like Sun Tzu (and I am convinced he read the 1789 French translation of the the great Master Sun) he admonishes us to understand the nature and character of the war, but I digress).
Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

[jcustis]

Now COMISAF COIN Guidance states claims 8 years of successful kinetic actions have made the problem worse. Essentially in that killing the enemy alienates the population. So does that mean the population all support the Taliban and don't like seeing them get killed or does it mean that negligent use of fire power risks killing the population?

In fact the document explicitly states that large operations risk killing civilians.

The document also clearly states, in the third paragraph, that we will not win simply by killing insurgents.

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called pop-centric COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present more options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads. And there is nothing at all in the tactics of FID, SA, COIN, whatever, that says you have to put all of your eggs in one basket. That wasn't done when we got sharper in Iraq, and it need not be done in Afghanistan either. That's why we can employ CA as economy of force operations of a sort.

And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called POP-COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads.
I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.


And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.
Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

[Rex Brynen]

Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

...and the Southern Lebanon as a whole? My information is that while they are still the majority, support has dropped, to less than what it was. They certainly didn't do so well at the national level.

[Bob's World]

I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.


Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.

This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

How about this: We all recognize how important the Pashto populace is to both Afghanistan and Pakistan; and all should recognize by now that targeting the insurgent segment of that Pashto populace is destabilizing to BOTH of those countries; and also to the Western countries involved in the effort. Why not simply seek a new form of lesser included sovereignty that recognizes new rights for the Pashto populace without ripping apart the two states in which they reside? A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.

All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy. One of my leadership sayings probably applies here:

"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

[Surferbeetle]

...is paved with?


This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

This strategy is not going to spring forth fully formed; none-the-less I see the new policy as an important step on this journey. If we accept that a sustainable solution is favored, and if we are able accept that sustainable is defined as the condition in which resources used are less than or equal to resources generated, then perhaps we can be effective partners in a regional solution.


Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

:D


A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

I disagree here BW, dual-citizenship is definitely a Westphalian construct...we are back to states here...and the tax-lawyers are salivating. :eek:

A trip to the US-Mexico border might be instructive with respect to examples of commonly found clashes between strategy formulated elsewhere and operational & tactical realities found on the ground...


All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy.

Elections first, then perhaps some substantive discussions among Afghanistan, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, EU, China, and the US....

[William F. Owen]

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole.

No one is talking about attacking the populace. No one is talking about killing the Non-Taliban. That is exactly what we will avoid doing. We are talking about only killing the people who are killing other people.
Basically, you suggest taking no action against the Taliban because the people they are trying to kill will hate us for trying to kill them? I wonder how do their victims feel about this?


Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."
Sorry, but valid though observations about the treaty of Westphalia may be, we now have world composed entirely of nation states, working as competing or co-operating economic and political powers. You cannot undo that. We have to deal with how people are, not how we wish them to be.


How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.
There is no such thing as an evolving strategy. Strategy can only change if changes are made to the Policy and the means by which that policy is set forth. It can't free-wheel. Strategy is instrumental. It's like surgery or construction. It's not just something that somehow happens. No policy, no strategy.

[Surferbeetle]

...is a fluid event likened to a two way street...despite one's dreams of winner-take-all.


There is no such thing as an evolving strategy. Strategy can only change if changes are made to the Policy and the means by which that policy is set forth. It can't free-wheel. Strategy is instrumental. It's like surgery or construction. It's not just something that somehow happens. No policy, no strategy.

With respect to the construction analogy consider the impact of differing site conditions, change orders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Change_order) and contract modifications upon the strategy...you are still going for the structure, pipeline, or levee but tactical and operational realities have just intruded into that nice plan dreamed up in the air-conditioned office far from the sound of construction machinery.

Lets consider the changes to the strategies of US, British, German, and French states pre and post WWII for our war-centric topic...

[William F. Owen]

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

[William F. Owen]

With respect to the construction analogy consider the impact of differing site conditions, change orders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Change_order) and contract modifications upon the strategy...you are still going for the structure, pipeline, or levee but tactical and operational realities have just intruded into that nice plan dreamed up in the air-conditioned office far from the sound of construction machinery.
Sure, you have to alter how you do something, as the conditions change, or you yourself change them. My point is that Strategy is the link between the Policy and how you use tactics to achieve them. A strategy cannot have a life of it's own. It is instrumental. It can be both good and bad.

[Infanteer]

As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.


No one is talking about attacking the populace. No one is talking about killing the Non-Taliban. That is exactly what we will avoid doing. We are talking about only killing the people who are killing other people.
Basically, you suggest taking no action against the Taliban because the people they are trying to kill will hate us for trying to kill them? I wonder how do their victims feel about this?

Interesting discussion, and probably one that gets the heart of the matter.

I recall something similar with Iraq that Bing West discussed - American soldiers and their presence were assumed to have brought violence with insurgents which only led to escalation. Thus the solution was to keep, as much as possible, US soldiers away from Iraqis. US forces keep to the COPs with some patrolling, things spiral out of control, a new strategy with a "surge" and soldiers reassert their presence, and now things are much better (relative to before). Is it due to the increased activities of soldier amongst the populace or is it simply a matter of a society becoming exhausted by its own internal conflict? I don't know.

It can pretty much be assumed that the presence of a Western soldier in Afghanistan will trigger some sort of violent outcome with insurgents (and the locals as onlookers caught in the middle). Is this a bad thing or a good thing?

Bob's World discussed Pashtun tribalism - how does this, which at times seems to approach the ideal of the "Noble Savage", compete with a more base human instinct? How do these "culture specific" forces (ie: "You killed my cousin, thus I am honour bound to kill you!") play against a more general human force (ie: "I want to have grandkids")? I often try to imagine a situation going on in my own neighbourhood, bearing in mind that it will be slewed, to an extent, by my neighbourhood's own cultural perceptions:

1. I'm not going to appreciate rabble rousers in the neighbourhood and I am definitely not going to like armed foreigners. Whom do I dislike more?

2. I'm not going to want rabble rousers killed in the neighbourhood but I really don't want them pushing my family and friends around. Which will I tolerate less?

3. I'm really not going to be happy if my friends or relatives are killed as a result of armed foreigners but at the same time getting more killed really doesn't support a better future for my kids. Which action do I choose?

What makes sense - I dunno? But this argument seems to be a part of process informing COMISAF's new policy.

[PhilR]

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Semper Fi,
Col. Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Surferbeetle]

Sir, greatly appreciate your willingness to engage the issues. For whatever its worth, I don't post rank as I hope that any ideas which I may or may not advocate/discuss/examine will stand or fall based solely upon their merits/lack thereof.


I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

My take: technically it's FID or advising, but COIN works from a marketing standpoint...coins generally have value, etc. FM 3-24, FM 3-24-2, some of the CA FM's (CAG? ones) are important steps along the journey...


The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

OIF1 vet, Michael Yon reader...no Afghanistan experience, non-Dari/Pashto speaker which admittedly hobbles any insights...however...given the history of Afghanistan the possibility of a spontaneous leap into 'functional nation state status' appears to be remote from this armchair without the 'benefit' of some sort of catalytic event...


In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Concur...

[max161]

Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

It is only my hunch but we know there was a 1789 French translation of the Sun Tzu and Clausewitz read French. But the best "evidence" I have to support my hunch is Michael Handel's work Masters of War in which he compares the major points of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu (and Jomini too). The similarities are striking when you read Handel's work and either the theories that Clausewitz wrote are timeless and self-evident or he was infleunced by the Sun Tzu.

Dave

[PhilR]

While it’s always a possibility, I’d offer that Clausewitz’s writings were more drawn from his interpretation of his experiences and history as he understood it. Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976) is a useful biography that highlights this point. This is only foremost in my mind, because I only recently read the book. In looking not only at On War, but many of his other writings, Paret really reveals how Clausewitz zero’d in on the political underpinnings of every war. This is not simply in terms of policy, but that how any entity (usually as state, but not necessarily) goes to war and conducts war is a fundamental reflection of how their society is politically and culturally organized. Clausewitz’s thoughts and experiences are broader than just the phrase “Napoleonic Wars.” He realized that the true power of the French at that time was not in tactics or organization, but in how the fundamental changing of France to a nation that could tap the energies of the whole populace enabled it to wage total war against other European monarchies who still thought in terms of the limited wars.

Clausewitz could very well recognize the wisdom of Sun Tzu, but in all likelihood (and I can’t really speak for him), he’d assert that Sun Tzu’s tenets were applicable to the social and political makeup of China at the time he wrote it. Sun Tzu’s idea of avoiding bloody war, to win without fighting, reflected the tenuous hold Chinese kings/emperors had on their kingdoms. They could not bleed their kingdom dry, nor risk all on a long war. In this way, they were similar to the European wars of the 18th century before the French Revolution came on the scene.

Clausewitz actually focused much of his writings on politics. He understood that the concept of a nation in arms could express itself through a government and army, or through guerilla war without much account to an effective government or army (like Spain). In fact, as he became frustrated with the lack of reform in Prussia, he advocated the idea of the nation resisting through guerilla warfare.

All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.
Highlights were done by me.

Bob, Yes I am a Wardenphile or a possible ASCOPEian and your description of SBW (Systems Based Warfare) is probably what he would recomend...you want to affect a change in a failing government to achieve a certain desired effect. And that does not necessarily have to be violent. If the government is the COG or Focal point and you are successful you win the population by default, however if you don't focus on fixing the government...... how would winning the population do you any good....unless you were trying to do UW or something similar???

[slapout9]

Phil Ridderhof USMC


Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it;)
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

[PhilR]

Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it;)
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

"Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Dayuhan]

That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.


Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.

What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?

I'm not saying that violence has no place in fighting insurgency; that would be absurd. I'm saying that before we assume that the solution to insurgency is killing as many insurgents as possible, we might be well advised to try and identify the various motivations driving the actual fighters (not necessarily the leaders) and remove as many of those motivations as possible. Plenty of people who supported and fought for communist insurgencies wouldn't have known Karl from Groucho; they were fighting over local and often personal grievances with government, many of which were legitimate grievances. I suspect that the same may be true of many Islamist insurgencies. Identifying and addressing those grievances can be an effective way of isolating the ideological core of an insurgency from their active and passive support base.

What we may see as defending a government against insurgents may be locally perceived as an outsider taking sides in a local quarrel, not a role that anyone really wants to play. It pays to be very careful before deciding who the "good guys" and "bad guys" are.

In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

[William F. Owen]

What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?


I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

[William F. Owen]

All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.

My emphasis added.

Thank you! Excellent observation. I would also submit that FM3-24 is a reflection of the political and social beliefs of it's writers, based on a flawed understanding of the problem. - Thus the title "COIN."

[slapout9]

I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

"Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

It is an excellant paper and you make an excellant point.

[Dayuhan]

I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

Here's a scenario, and I don't think it an unreasonable one:

Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

[William F. Owen]

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

I assume you are asking me a soldier? I am an instrument of Policy. What Policy am I there to enforce? The source of the discontent may not be open to negotiation and/or subject to conditions of sovereignty that make my interference a bad thing.
It's not my problem to solve. Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

Now, I may want to "de-escalate" the situation and try and keep peace, but that depends on brokering a cease fire with the insurgents. Will both the indigenous and my own Government allow me to do that? Dunno!

My feeling is that this strikes to the heart of the issue here on SWC.
Soldiers are instruments of policy. Warfare is instrumental. There seems to be a constant desire here to effect Policy. Policy is Political. As a soldier your are absolutely limited to understanding the effects of your action on THE Policy. - not changing the Policy to better match your strategy.

[Dayuhan]

Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

Yes, I'd agree that as a soldier that would be all you could do... and one would hope that the policy maker would understand the possibility that a simplistic approach might very well strengthen the overall position of the insurgent.

Of course in order to report that situation you would first have to be aware of it, and if you enter the area with the assumption that your job is simply to kill as many insurgents as possible there's a good chance that you might not become aware of it. All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan
In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

Dayuhan makes an important point that I hope isn't simply glossed over. I have seen this too many times. Some local befriends a senior American officer or other official and all the sudden this person speaks for all indigenous personnel in the area, because it what we want to hear. Anyone saying anything contrary to the party line is obviously a minority. I seem to recall we were dubbed by a couple of key manipulaters during the build up to invading Iraq. Later the Kurds dubbed us repeatedly to achieve their objectives, and amateurs fell for it hook, line and sinker. Just two examples of how dangerous this trait this, and it probably due to arrogance and an excessively rosey outlook of the world where we mistakenly assume everyone wants to be like us and shares our values.

[William F. Owen]

All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.
I have no problem with that. My focus on irregular warfare begins once the policy is to prevent the "Insurgent" from gaining his goal using violence. If he wants to use the Ballot box, or dialogue, then good luck.

[MikeF]

Excellent discussion probably one of the best that I have read in a long time. I'll highlight several points that jumped out at me.


In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.


Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.


This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

YES, YES, AND YES. Dayuhan's points echo the gap that I've observed between the theory of counter-insurgency and the practice. The environments that we currently work in are complex, fluid, and dynamic. The local populaces operate in a manner that can be both foreign and confusing to American soldiers. Ancient tribes follow different rules of governance and economics. Social norms, customs, and traditions often differ from what we would call normal. Acceptable levels of violence exceed what we would consider stable. It is different for us, but it is normal for them.

Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States.

One of my favorite sheiks put it to me bluntly:

"Mike, only believe half of what I tell you, and if you cannot verify that information from two sources outside of my tribe or family, disregard it. This is Iraq. We have different rules."

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...

One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

v/r

Mike

[milnews.ca]

Tried that - doesn't work for me!! The aim of the UK's IT system is to add more process - not to enhance communications and make us more effective.

My own system at work (Canadian government) also blocks me from accessing Scribd.com - NATO's posted a copy here:
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf

[slapout9]

One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

v/r

Mike

I would like to see a study like that myself,for the reason you point out.

[PhilR]

Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States...

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...



Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[William F. Owen]

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence.

If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?

[MikeF]

Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way


I was going to make a point on this by adding up all the times the word WE was used in the current guidance. I lost count. In the long run, it is not so much about what WE do, but on what the Afghanis decide to do.



If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?

Simply put, Find, Fix, Finish, and Exploit.

Here's a start...

Pakistan Army: Taliban Camp Destroyed (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125154199646769315.html)
Associated Press


Helicopter gunships destroyed a training camp for suicide bombers in northern Pakistan's troubled Swat Valley overnight, killing six Taliban militants, the army said Saturday.

Several more militants were wounded in the camp, located on a small island in the Swat River opposite the town of Charbagh, the army said. It said the operation followed reports on the camp by intelligence agents and local residents.

"The place was being used as a launching pad for preparing the suicide attackers," the army said in a statement, adding that those being trained were to bomb targets in Swat, including the valley's main city of Mingora.

About a week ago, two suicide attacks on consecutive days killed seven people in Swat.

"In the last weeks, the terrorists have been sending suicide bombers to cities in the valley. We have been working to find their source, and today we destroyed that source," Lt. Col. Akthar Abbas, the army spokesman in Swat, told The Associated Press.

Lt. Col. Abbas said another six militants were killed in two separate operations elsewhere in the Valley. In one operation, five Taliban fighters were killed, including a close aid to a high-ranking Taliban commander, Shah Doraan.

The officer said military operations were weakening the Taliban, and that many had chosen to turn themselves in rather than fight.

"With every day passing, the noose is being tightened around them, and that's why more and more of them are opting to surrender," Lt. Col. Abbas said.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Simply put, Find, Fix, Finish, and Exploit.

Welcome to the land of moonlight, and shadows..... or maybe you were already there!

[Fuchs]

I recall rumours about Soviet Spetznaz officers who allegedly stalked in the night and stabbed mujaheddin and their supporters. That apparently freaked out a lot of mujaheddin.

Another rumour is about the recent conflict; Lithuanian SF patrolling the countryside on motorcycles, hunting for Taleban.


Reinforced rumours may have be effective in creating fear.
That's how the French broke at Sedan in 1940, after all...rumours.

[MikeF]

Welcome to the land of moonlight, and shadows..... or maybe you were already there!

I've definitely walked a bit in the dark mostly in circles.:D

My point is that the military should stick to its core competencies of security and warfighting. From this vantage point, we can act as arbitrators, referees, or peace-keepers. This is where I will probably diverge from Wilf's world. The pop-centric COIN crowd wants to force the military past security to nation-state building tasks. Unless we want an Empire and/or occupation, I would submit that this is an illusion of our own capabilities and a lack of understanding of our own limitations- not to mention the cost of both "lives and national treasure" to quote the late Sen. Kennedy.

So, this gets us back to the question I asked on Friday.

"What should we be doing?"

Bob's World is probably on to something over in the deterence thread. I'm curious to read his upcoming paper.


Most counterinsurgencies struggle because the counterinsurgent is unwilling to recognize and admit his own shortcomings, after all, he is in the right. Far easier to focus on the insurgent, who is by definition a criminal.

So the BW approach is rooted in what I believe to be the underlying principles of human dynamics, group dynamics, and governance that I see at work in these types of conflicts. This is very different than the dynamics that lead to conflicts between states.

The dynamics that drive insurgency are the same ones that drive neighborhood and family disputes. They are deeply personal and not about what "side" you are on; because at the end of the day you are on the same side, you just have an issue that is intolerable to some, and those same few don't feel they have a legitimate venue to resolve it.

This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.

Another concept is to look at non-state actors to solve non-state problems. Again, I'm intrigued by the work Greg Mortesen has accomplished in Pakistan and Afghanistan in building schools.

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Comments on comments, looking back over a useful discussion...



The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?


Is this the policy? I hope not, because if it is, we're toast. A more reasonable goal would be a government that is not going to attack anyone or host those who do. Personally, I don't care if they are pro-US or anti-US. As long as they don't resort to violence in pursuit of that orientation, or give sanctuary to those who do, how they feel about the US is not for us to decide.


we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.


True in a sense, but the government in question is our creation. We need to remember that, because nobody else in the picture is likely to forget it.



I have no problem with that. My focus on irregular warfare begins once the policy is to prevent the "Insurgent" from gaining his goal using violence. If he wants to use the Ballot box, or dialogue, then good luck.

Wilf, are you assuming here that the policy-makers have sorted this stuff out before you come into the picture? If so, your faith in the policy-makers exceeds mine by several orders of magnitude.


I recall rumours about Soviet Spetznaz officers who allegedly stalked in the night and stabbed mujaheddin and their supporters. That apparently freaked out a lot of mujaheddin.


And at the end of the day, who was left standing?

[Bill Moore]

Quote:
Originally Posted by PhilR
we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

Posted by Dayhuan in response to PhilR,
True in a sense, but the government in question is our creation. We need to remember that, because nobody else in the picture is likely to forget it.

I do tire of the party line that we don't do COIN, we do FID and the host nation does COIN. Hopefully that is true in most in most situations, but it sure as hell doesn't apply to Afghanistan where a large part of the fighting is still being done by U.S. and coalition forces. As the Zen instructor frequently yells during mediation sessions, WAKE UP! We do COIN. We are confusing the desired state (the Afghans leading the COIN effort) with reality, and delusions in war are dangerous.

Besides winning (still needs to be defined), we need to identify what's more important:

- Is the most important thing to win, no matter what? If a win is more important than who wins it, then perhaps we can do more by focusing on winning instead of focusing on nation building.

- On the other hand if it is more important that the Afghans win or lose this fight with the coalition in support, then that leads us to a different strategy (their strategy, not ours).

Which one is it?

[Ken White]

I do tire of the party line that we don't do COIN, we do FID and the host nation does FID. Hopefully that is true in most in most situations, but it sure as hell doesn't apply to Afghanistan where a large part of the fighting is still being done by U.S. and coalition forces.Can't be 'cause I say it -- and I don't belong to any one party. Not the big war crowd, not the COIN crowd, not the SOF crowd or the GPF crowd -- I belong to all of 'em and none of 'em, been in all of 'em and they all have strong and weak points, good and bad doctrine -- and theories. I do try for pragmatic realism, don't like crowds and am suspicious of a lot of theory...:cool:
As the Zen instructor frequently yells during mediation sessions, WAKE UP! We do COIN. We are confusing the desired state (the Afghans lead he COIN effort) with reality, and delusions in war are dangerous.Yep, I agree, delusions are dangerous, particularly in wars. However, we aren't doing COIN, we're using some (not all, not yet...) COIN techniques to assist the Government of Afghanistan. Admittedly while trying to nudge that Government to do what we'd like them to do. My perception is that we aren't being terribly successful at that...

WE need to wake up and realize that because that fact -- and it is a fact, a harsh one and not a semantic quibble -- will color everything that happens in that country in the next few years. We are not in total or even near total control of our own destiny there. Among other things, the US diplomatic coup of getting NATO to become involved has certainly been a double ed -- one of these (LINK) (http://home.earthlink.net/~federicomalibago/moroweapons.html). The delusion that we are -- or were -- 'doing COIN' is big part of the reason we're where we are eight years after we arrived. :mad:
Besides winning (still needs to be defined), we need to identify what's more important:

- Is the most important thing to win, no matter what? If a win is more important than who wins it, then perhaps we can do more by focusing on winning instead of focusing on nation building.

- On the other hand if it is more important that the Afghans win or lose this fight with the coalition in support, then that leads us to a different strategy (their strategy, not ours).

Which one is it?It's 'C,' neither of the above. No body's going to win, there is no win in any insurgency; you can achieve most of your aims but you aren't going to win because lacking killing 'em all, the other guys aren't going away; they'll be back, one way or another and sooner or later. So winning isn't the issue. An acceptable outcome is the issue and that can be obtained without either of your alternatives.

Initially, We were going to just leave. then we decided to stay and told the Afghans we' fix it. That morphed into setting up a strong central Government -- and I think we're finally realizing that's not going fly -- it never was. Now, it's likely to be a mix of more COIN support -- and yes, that means fighting -- and 'nation building' without going full bore on either and getting to the point where there is borderline stability in the area and it's better than it was when we got there.

When we get to that point, we'll leave. Then we'll have four win-less wars in a row; I did the first two; these two are for you guys...;)

Where we gonna intervene and do COIN stuff next? :wry:

[Dayuhan]

I could add that saying "the government in question is our creation" is actually an understatement. It would be more accurate to say the government in question is our infant, still suckling at our collective breast. We can put as much effort as we want into announcing that we are just helping out, but I doubt we'll fool anyone, except possibly ourselves..

[Ken White]

True in a sense, but the government in question is our creation. We need to remember that, because nobody else in the picture is likely to forget it.In either sense -- as you very accurately said earlier:
..In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate.So did we create a government or participate in a massive con game. I suspect more the latter than the former. I also suspect most everyone in the neighborhood is aware of the fact we got shnookered a bit -- just as we did in Kosovo. We are so easy...

Your later post:
...is actually an understatement...It would be more accurate to say the government in question is our infant, still suckling at our collective breast. We can put as much effort as we want into announcing that we are just helping out, but I doubt we'll fool anyone, except possibly ourselves.is, I think even further off on the 'understatement' part but is certainly correct on the suckling aspect.

As for fooling anyone, my bet would be that a few of the more passionate Anti-American Americans and others will espouse your view but that most of the world will not (brilliant move by us bringing in NATO, that'll aid in spreading the blame... ;) ) and thus that "it is our creature" idea will soon go by the wayside -- except for the usual few over wrought Americans who will complain that they wouldn't exist if it weren't for us, ya-da ya-da...:rolleyes:

Bottom line is we opened and held up the edge of the tent, the camel got his nose and then his body inside and now we don't know how to get him out -- and the rest of the world will, mostly, figure that out. Not least because we will very likely go to foolish lengths to be sure that government gets its own way on many things. Even to the point of self harm -- to the US... :wry:

[Surferbeetle]

Bottom line is we opened and held up the edge of the tent, the camel got his nose and then his body inside and now we don't know how to get him out -- and the rest of the world will, mostly, figure that out. Not least because we will very likely go to foolish lengths to be sure that government gets its own way on many things. Even to the point of self harm -- to the US... :wry:

...we can be likened to that big goofy kid who you have to keep an eye on because the wheels are turning in there even though he hides it well sometimes...fortunately he's big enough and young enough to recover from those hard hits resulting from inexperience....


Among other things, the US diplomatic coup of getting NATO to become involved has certainly been a double ed -- one of these (LINK (http://home.earthlink.net/~federicomalibago/moroweapons.html)).

:D

Things are changing fast (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/08/russian-arms-shopping-spree-belies-decaying-industry/), we have passed the cold war thaw and are moving into a new spring in which we are really going to start having to pay attention.


No body's going to win, there is no win in any insurgency; you can achieve most of your aims but you aren't going to win because lacking killing 'em all, the other guys aren't going away; they'll be back, one way or another and sooner or later. So winning isn't the issue. An acceptable outcome is the issue and that can be obtained without either of your alternatives.

Agreed


Now, it's likely to be a mix of more COIN support -- and yes, that means fighting -- and 'nation building' without going full bore on either and getting to the point where there is borderline stability in the area and it's better than it was when we got there.

When we get to that point, we'll leave. Then we'll have four win-less wars in a row; I did the first two; these two are for you guys...

Where we gonna intervene and do COIN stuff next?

Ouch.

We are slowly extracting our head from our economic point of contact and it has been much less traumatic than it could have been...this gives me a bit of hope that perhaps, just perhaps, a willingness to try a hybrid/conventional/interagency/COIN/FID/hezbollah-kepi's blu fusion journey can get us where we need to go...no promises though (step 1 in all CA/CMO operations) :wry:

[MikeF]

I do tire of the party line that we don't do COIN, we do FID and the host nation does FID. Hopefully that is true in most in most situations, but it sure as hell doesn't apply to Afghanistan where a large part of the fighting is still being done by U.S. and coalition forces. As the Zen instructor frequently yells during mediation sessions, WAKE UP! We do COIN. We are confusing the desired state (the Afghans lead he COIN effort) with reality, and delusions in war are dangerous.

Bill, I'm confused by your post. According to FM 3-24 (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf) (p vi),


COUNTERINSURGENCY DESCRIPTION
Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. It supports and influences an HN’s IDAD program. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of PSYOP. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency

By definition, we can only conduct COIN within our own borders. Everything else is a partisan effort or intervention. In Afghanistan (currently) and Iraq (circa 2006-2007), we conducted an occupation using unilateral operations combined with COIN principles.

v/r

Mike

[jmm99]

who is actually doing the "strategic and operational planning", and supplying the bulk of the assets for "tactical-level operations" ?

If the answer is the US, then according to another JP (not writing from my home computer, so I can't cite chap and verse; but IIRC, it's the JP on FID), that situation goes beyond FID with combat support and enters the realm of "war". That might be Bill's point - that's for him to say. But, it is my legal point - we are essentially a co-belligerent in the Astan Govt vs Taliban armed conflict. Similar legal situation as in Vietnam (IMO).

[Ken White]

LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=78685&postcount=28). And we did do all this before... :D

Who's doing the bulk of the work is not terribly material; who's at least in theory providing direction could be. You legal types can argue that; the practical matter is that if the Afghan govt complains about civilian casualties, we react...

[Bill Moore]

MikeF, I share your frustration, thus the purpose of my post.


By definition, we can only conduct COIN within our own borders. Everything else is a partisan effort or intervention. In Afghanistan (currently) and Iraq (circa 2006-2007), we conducted an occupation using unilateral operations combined with COIN principles.

O.K. Mike I'll bite, because this is the argument that others have presented, but if we're doing the bulk of information activities, the bulk of the PSYOP, the bulk of the fighting, the bulk of the economic development, who is really the assisted party? The Afghan government or the U.S. government?

I'm sure jmm99 can help us on the legal front, but if you over throw a government and occupy a country in effect you are now within your borders. We conducted COIN in post WWII Germany (or COIN like tactics). You are legally bound to provide basic services to include security to the populace until your status changes. When does that status change? After you stood up a government, or after you stood up an effective government?

We're doing FID in Columbia and the Philippines, but we were doing something else in Iraq and Afghanistan that was COIN like, but not COIN if Ken's and your argument is correct.

Ken wrote,


However, we aren't doing COIN, we're using some (not all, not yet...) COIN techniques to assist the Government of Afghanistan.

Are we conducting Stability Operations? Seems to be a little closer to definitional truth. Does it really change anything?

WILF wrote something a while back roughly stating we're too eager to put something into a doctrinal box, instead of accurately framing the problem and addressing it effectively. Like Ken, I'm extremely leary of all the theories, especially those not grounded in history.

[slapout9]

Bill, this whole thread is an example of why I became a Wardenfile:D as Bob's World would say. War is a system...understand it as that and you might figure out how to win, don't and you will get into all kinds of mentaly ill war concepts and stuff that just confuses the issue;)

How you been doin? haven't seen you here in a while. Slap

[William F. Owen]

Is this the policy? I hope not, because if it is, we're toast. A more reasonable goal would be a government that is not going to attack anyone or host those who do. Personally, I don't care if they are pro-US or anti-US. As long as they don't resort to violence in pursuit of that orientation, or give sanctuary to those who do, how they feel about the US is not for us to decide.
I submit that after all the time and effort, -especially in Iraq- having a Government which is not Pro-US, to the extent that it may be a de-facto enemy, and even consistently votes against the US in the UN, then you have achieved very little.

Wilf, are you assuming here that the policy-makers have sorted this stuff out before you come into the picture? If so, your faith in the policy-makers exceeds mine by several orders of magnitude.
Well I have to have a policy to set forth. No policy, no action.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,



LINK. And we did do all this before...

Who's doing the bulk of the work is not terribly material; who's at least in theory providing direction could be. You legal types can argue that; the practical matter is that if the Afghan govt complains about civilian casualties, we react...

It concerns me when a senior citizen has a better memory than I do :D. I remain envious of your vast knowledge and mental acumen, but

I don't still don't agree with your opinion on this topic, because IMO the bottom line is if we are killing insurgents, we're doing counterinsurgency. I'm not sure that doctrine is sufficiently clear to determine the difference between when we're doing COIN and doing FID.

True we react when the Afghan government complains about civilian casualties, but let's me honest, these complaints have been going on for years, and our reaction was mostly a public apology, not a change in policy. That seems to have changed with GEN McCrystal's new guidance.

It doesn't matter to Joe on the ground doing God's work whether it is COIN or FID, but it does matter from a strategy perspective, because it determines how we're framing the problem and if we're framing the problem incorrectly we won't get the desired results.

Got ya on winning, not a good term, but my definition of winning is an acceptable outcome. WWII was an acceptable outcome, even if we did have to give the USSR much of Germany and Eastern Europe. Conflict never ends, it just changes form.

I do think the COIN/FID debate should be addressed in more detail in another forum; probably in irregular warfare debate. It is being proposed that IW consists of COIN, FID, UW, SO, and CT, meaning these are the activities that "we perform", so if that is true, that sort of rains on the parade of those who say we don't do COIN. With that low blow, I depart the debate for the evening.

[William F. Owen]

From this vantage point, we can act as arbitrators, referees, or peace-keepers. This is where I will probably diverge from Wilf's world.
No you don't. De-escalation is good, as long as the enemy or potential enemy is complying with your will, and not you with his. If your ability to use violence is suppressing his, then we are making progress.

[Ken White]

... but if we're doing the bulk of information activities, the bulk of the PSYOP, the bulk of the fighting, the bulk of the economic development, who is really the assisted party? The Afghan government or the U.S. government? Wrong question -- who's country is it?
I'm sure jmm99 can help us on the legal front, but if you over throw a government and occupy a country in effect you are now within your borders. We conducted COIN in post WWII Germany (or COIN like tactics). You are legally bound to provide basic services to include security to the populace until your status changes. When does that status change? After you stood up a government, or after you stood up an effective government?The former. Germany was occupied and governed from 1945 until 1949 by the Allied powers. The Occupation continued after the BRD Government stood up in 1949 for another six years, until 1955 and Germany was truly able to stand on its own. Ten years total. We've been in Afghanistan for eight and they've had a government for the last four. Like it or not, it's been recognized by everyone and NATO is there to help -- and that help is contingent on there being an Afghan government. They were not willing to help the US with what they saw as a US problem...
We're doing FID in Columbia and the Philippines, but we were doing something else in Iraq and Afghanistan that was COIN like, but not COIN if Ken's and your argument is correct.Since both those latter were and are several things aside from an insurgency, I think you could safely say we're fighting wars in both places -- no doubt in my mind that's accurate and should satisfy any purist.
Are we conducting Stability Operations? Seems to be a little closer to definitional truth. Does it really change anything?Works for me. As for change, not for you or me or the troops there but it probably changes something for both NATO and the Afghans and our relations with most of the rest of the world...
WILF wrote something a while back roughly stating we're too eager to put something into a doctrinal box, instead of accurately framing the problem and addressing it effectively. Like Ken, I'm extremely leary of all the theories, especially those not grounded in history.I agree that the problem should be accurately framed, as for addressing it effectively, jury's still out.

The history says that if you try to run a campaign as if it is your campaign and the 'host nation,' no matter how bad they are, no matter how little they may be contributing, doesn't buy into what you're doing, you'll probably lose. Trust me on that one.

[Ken White]

...and even consistently votes against the US in the UN, then you have achieved very little.Who doesn't? :D

[Bill Moore]

:D


Bill, this whole thread is an example of why I became a Wardenfile as Bob's World would say. War is a system...understand it as that and you might figure out how to win, don't and you will get into all kinds of mentaly ill war concepts and stuff that just confuses the issue

How you been doin? haven't seen you here in a while. Slap

Slap, as always good to hear from you, and when I can I follow your posts on the other threads, always interesting, and the utube video links are always good for a laugh.

I think Bob's World identified an appropriate label for you :).

You have seen my posts countering "some" of Warden's arguments in other threads. I'm not vehemently anti-Warden, but I think he has a very narrow focus and is more of an advocate for his service than an advocate for developing the "right" strategy for our nation. Of course it can be argued that Army planners didn't do much better in Iraq or Afghanistan. As you may recall I am a fan of punitive raids, and of course we can do those most effectively with Air Power, but to demonstrate national resolve you still need to put some boots on the ground to show you're prepared to accept risk to pursue policy. As for leaving boots on the ground and trying to transform another culture that is another debate. In most cases I'm opposed.

Also I'm not convinced war is a system, it is conflict at the highest level, but are attempt to define things as systems have led us astray too many times. Look forward to more debates on this topic. Bill

[Bill Moore]

The history says that if you try to run a campaign as if it is your campaign and the 'host nation,' no matter how bad they are, no matter how little they may be contributing, doesn't buy into what you're doing, you'll probably lose. Trust me on that one.

I do

Also agree we're fighting a war in Iraq and Afghanistan, that cuts to the chase.

[Ken White]

It concerns me when a senior citizen has a better memory than I do :D.Also makes you dashingly handsome to the fairer sex...:rolleyes:
I don't still don't agree with your opinion on this topic, because IMO the bottom line is if we are killing insurgents, we're doing counterinsurgency. I'm not sure that doctrine is sufficiently clear to determine the difference between when we're doing COIN and doing FID.In one sense, I'm not sure it makes a great deal of difference to you, me or the troops -- war is war. OTOH, it does make a legal difference and, more importantly, a perceptual difference on the part of many. Including the Troops...

If you say the US is doing COIN in Afghanistan in the eyes of some, you're saying those folks are in an insurgency against the US. That doesn't compute to Joe, who also doesn't understand why he needs to care what the Afghans want since we're paying the freight...
True we react when the Afghan government complains about civilian casualties, but let's me honest, these complaints have been going on for years, and our reaction was mostly a public apology, not a change in policy.I think you just sort of made my case; "The delusion that we are -- or were -- 'doing COIN' is big part of the reason we're where we are eight years after we arrived."(emphasis added / kw)
That seems to have changed with GEN McCrystal's new guidance.True, thus, as I said, we'll see; "...as for addressing it effectively, jury's still out..."
It doesn't matter to Joe on the ground doing God's work whether it is COIN or FID, but it does matter from a strategy perspective, because it determines how we're framing the problem and if we're framing the problem incorrectly we won't get the desired results.Absolutely -- that's been my point. Like it or not, it is their country and we cannot go charging around as if it were ours. We did that once and it didn't work out at all well.
I do think the COIN/FID debate should be addressed in more detail in another forum; probably in irregular warfare debate. It is being proposed that IW consists of COIN, FID, UW, SO, and CT, meaning these are the activities that "we perform", so if that is true, that sort of rains on the parade of those who say we don't do COIN. With that low blow, I depart the debate for the evening.I'd agree that COIN is IW -- but that doesn't define who's doing what to who. That's what's important, the definition inside the IW continuum.

Not a low blow, just another example of our 'doctrine' problem -- too many cooks, all want their part of the pie included in everything and selection of terms is part of that. I don't particularly care about the terminology -- I do know that the "We are the US and we're here to help you, please stand back" mindset is not a good thing.

Saying we're doing COIN leads to that, the troops get frustrated because they can't understand why the host nation has a say in anything, the host nation gets their feelings hurt and won't cooperate and 'allies' who would help said host nation aren't all that happy to be seen helping the US. It's all politics and perceptions so the Joint pub folks better be smart in final their word selections and definitions.

[MikeF]

:eek:
MikeF, I share your frustration, thus the purpose of my post.

O.K. Mike I'll bite, because this is the argument that others have presented, but if we're doing the bulk of information activities, the bulk of the PSYOP, the bulk of the fighting, the bulk of the economic development, who is really the assisted party? The Afghan government or the U.S. government?

I'm sure jmm99 can help us on the legal front, but if you over throw a government and occupy a country in effect you are now within your borders. We conducted COIN in post WWII Germany (or COIN like tactics). You are legally bound to provide basic services to include security to the populace until your status changes. When does that status change? After you stood up a government, or after you stood up an effective government?

We're doing FID in Columbia and the Philippines, but we were doing something else in Iraq and Afghanistan that was COIN like, but not COIN if Ken's and your argument is correct.

Are we conducting Stability Operations? Seems to be a little closer to definitional truth. Does it really change anything?

WILF wrote something a while back roughly stating we're too eager to put something into a doctrinal box, instead of accurately framing the problem and addressing it effectively. Like Ken, I'm extremely leary of all the theories, especially those not grounded in history.

Hi Bill,

I'm not trying to get anyone to bite. I'm simply trying to reframe the problem set as it is not as some would wish it to be. I used current doctrine as a beginning. As far as boxes are concerned, I'm don't fit into any of them...I disagree with everyone. :eek: If I must be labeled, then I'm closer to Ken White than anyone else. I suppose that is the perpetual pragmatic optimist in me- searching for solutions to unsolvable problems...

If we need to use force, then I side with Wilf and I'll be the most brutal of them all.

If we need to influence, then I tend towards Bob's World.

If we need to reconsider ourselves, then I'm more adept to study Washington's final speech regarding the need to stay out of others affairs.

Regardless of the approach, I'm just trying to attempt to reframe the problem set into something that I can comprehend. Honestly, I don't know if our current mission is counter-terrorism, nation-building, or (God forbid ((it's sunday, so i can say that))) the war on terror.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

No you don't. De-escalation is good, as long as the enemy or potential enemy is complying with your will, and not you with his. If your ability to use violence is suppressing his, then we are making progress.

that was an assumption of mine...you apply the force needed to be the "biggest tribe"...

[MikeF]

who is actually doing the "strategic and operational planning", and supplying the bulk of the assets for "tactical-level operations" ?

If the answer is the US, then according to another JP (not writing from my home computer, so I can't cite chap and verse; but IIRC, it's the JP on FID), that situation goes beyond FID with combat support and enters the realm of "war". That might be Bill's point - that's for him to say. But, it is my legal point - we are essentially a co-belligerent in the Astan Govt vs Taliban armed conflict. Similar legal situation as in Vietnam (IMO).

Fair enough (and I never thought that I'd be contradicted by a lawyer when I cited doctrine and rules:D).

My point is that what we've been doing since 9/11 surpasses doctrine and law. It moves into the realm of occupation.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

Saying we're doing COIN leads to that, the troops get frustrated because they can't understand why the host nation has a say in anything, the host nation gets their feelings hurt and won't cooperate and 'allies' who would help said host nation aren't all that happy to be seen helping the US. It's all politics and perceptions so the Joint pub folks better be smart in final their word selections and definitions.

And with this point, I'll be quiet.

Task: Presence Patrol
Purpose: To show the populace that you're there or something.

IMO, the most absurd contradiction/consideration that anyone has ever made. I know that I flow from tactics to operations to strategy, but my reasoining is logical (at least in my own head). You cannot tell a GPF (or any other) sergeant to simply drive around aimlessly.

If that is the aim, then just put the entire Army on temporary duty to explore the world in some notion of the early 20th century Roosevelt's "Great White (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_White_Fleet)Fleet."

Every mission must be tied towards the bigger picture.

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I submit that after all the time and effort, -especially in Iraq- having a Government which is not Pro-US, to the extent that it may be a de-facto enemy, and even consistently votes against the US in the UN, then you have achieved very little.


I'm not so ambitious. If we can walk away from Iraq and leave a functioning government that we don't have to enforce sanctions and no-fly zones against, and walk away from Afghanistan leaving a functioning government that doesn't blow up our buildings, ships, etc or shelter those who do... we may have achieved very little, but we've achieved enough. If they vote against us at the UN 100% of the time, I'm ok with that, not like it's anything unusual.

We didn't go to Afghanistan for truth, justice, and the American way, or to spread democracy, or for womens rights, or because they blew up Buddhas. We went there because a group that was based there and sheltered by the Afghan government was waging war against us. As long as we stop that war an assure that it is not resumed, I don't give a hot round one whether they are pro-US or not.

[Fuchs]

I'm not so ambitious. If we can walk away from Iraq and leave a functioning government that we don't have to enforce sanctions and no-fly zones against, and walk away from Afghanistan leaving a functioning government that doesn't blow up our buildings, ships, etc or shelter those who do... we may have achieved very little, but we've achieved enough.

You didn't have to enforce no-fly zones and an embargo against Iraq at all. A quick vote in the UNSC and you would have gotten rid of the embargo nonsense, which most nations despised anyway.

The only useful and near-consensus embargo was the one about arms, and that would have been enforced by neighbours (including Kuwait and Iran) if the U.S. had left the theatre.

The no-fly zones had expired their purpose within a few weeks and were a mere tool of bullying and humiliation for years - and obviously contributing to the later troubles with extremists.

The government of Afghanistan / the Taliban NEVER blew up a ship.

I'm surprised that you've got a problem with governments blowing up/demolishing buildings, for that's what the U.S. government and the Israeli government are known for.

- - - - -

A war is a success and under certain additional circumstances justifiable if it's the least evil. OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace, no matter how much the spin doctors distort the story.

The Afghanistan war (well, the 2001-? involvement of the West) was quite certainly not the lesser evil in comparison to a more indirect approach, and likely not even a lesser evil in comparison to no invasion at all.


Sentiments and misinformation ruled over objective analysis and the result were self-harming military adventures of Western politicians. Sadly, they don't pay the price.
Late, too late came the conclusion of COIN celebrities: 'Don't do it again'. Guess why? Because it was a stupid idea and no success at all.

[Dayuhan]

I'm probably not the best person to defend the Iraq war, since I was not in favor of it from the start, but I think you're perhaps oversimplifying the situations that prevailed in both Iraq and Afghanistan prior to the American interventions. Inaction would have had consequences as well, and there is certainly no assurance that those consequences would have been any better than what we have now.

The mistake of not carrying the first Iraq war to its logical conclusion and removing Saddam at that time (a mistake clearer in hindsight, but no less a mistake for that) left a distinctly awkward landscape behind it.

Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal. On a more practical level, a de facto Kurdish State had emerged under American protection, including the protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection? Of course we don't know, since we didn't try, but based on prior experience one would not expect a group hug.

Lifting the sanctions, particularly the sanctions on oil exports, would have led inevitably to rearmament. The notion of an arms embargo is close to absurd, and the notion that Kuwait and Iraq could have enforced an arms embargo is downright bizarre: how do you propose that they would do that, board and search every ship entering Umm Qasr? How long do you would think it would take the Russians, French, and Chinese to trade arms deals for oil concessions, regardless of any embargo... seconds or minutes? Given Saddam's long and inglorious history of attempts to annex neighboring territory, what would be the probable consequence of rearmament?

As long as Saddam ruled Iraq, containment and punitive action was going to be necessary, unless you favor allowing moves like the attempt to annex Kuwait to go unpunished, and unless you trusted Saddam to behave in the future.

Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences.

What "indirect action" would you have suggested? I guess we could have tried the Bill Clinton approach, fired off a few cruise missiles and gone back to watching the Nasdaq. That didn't work out very well the first few times, and by 2001 watching the Nasdaq was no fun anyway.

The statement that "OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace" would be more compelling if there was peace to start with, or any reasonable likelihood of achieving peace.

There is certainly abundant room to criticize the steps that were taken, and a great deal more to criticize the way those steps were taken. Claiming that there were clearly superior alternatives available, though, requires some fairly loose assumptions about the probable consequences of those alternative actions. A history of bad decisions and neglect had created a situation with very few attractive alternatives.

[Fuchs]

The mistake of not carrying the first Iraq war to its logical conclusion and removing Saddam at that time (a mistake clearer in hindsight, but no less a mistake for that) left a distinctly awkward landscape behind it.

Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal. On a more practical level, a de facto Kurdish State had emerged under American protection, including the protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection?

"mistake":
The UNSC resolution legalized a violent liberation of Kuwait, not more. It was illegal and illegitimate to topple Saddam, the Bush I administration stayed smartly out of a protracted war and stayed in the bounds of the U.N.
It was no mistake - going further would have been a mistake, it would have badly influenced the immediate post-Cold War era. A march on Baghdad would have turned the U.S: itself into an aggressor (an Iraqi aggression against Kuwait didn't entitle the U.S. for anything, Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations restricted the U.S..


UN Charter

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

The U.S. committed itself to this charter. It's binding and any violation is both illegal, illegitimate and deserves a fair share of additional resentment and informal sanctions.

Conclusion: No mistake at all, Bush I was wise and right in his decision and his ability to be satisfied with limited goals.*

An invasion of Iraq right into Baghdad would have been as illegal and illegitimate as Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.
To do that would have been a terrible start into the volatile and sensitive post-Cold War world. It would have meant near-pariah status instead of huge political capital for the U.S..


- - - - -

"...no consequences at all..."

Sorry for being blunt (again), but that is utter B.S.
Losing regional power status, about 100% of sea power, 80% of land power and 90% or air power and losing a war was a huge consequence.

Again, I think it's a good opportunity to hint at "limited goals" and humility. It's not good if you want maximum solutions only.


- - - - -

"...protection of the no-fly zones. What would have been the probable consequence of removing that protection?"

1st.
Protection against what? Almost his whole air force was destroyed or out of reach. Supply of spare parts was dried out by the arms embargo.

2nd.
The factual, real ally of the U.S. was Turkey, and a crackdown on Kurdish rebels would have been in Turkish interests (actually, they did it themselves several times). What weighs heavier? The national security interest of an ally or the interest of a non-state enemy of a former state enemy of yours?
Turkey was ready to fight WW3 with the U.S., it provided bases for Desert Storm - yet the later U.S. policy ran 180° against vital Turkish national security interests despite staying allied.
It always amazes me how much this ally gets neglected and underestimated.

3rd.
Saddam didn't crack down on the Kurds on land either - the Northern no-fly zone was no complete protection anyway.

4th.
Your argument is entirely inapplicable to the Southern no-fly zone (which, IIRC, persisted for years as well?)


- - - - -

"Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences."

Oh really? Bay of Pigs anyone? How many consequences were felt by Cuban terrorists in Miami for decades? Hypocrisy anyone?


"What "indirect action" would you have suggested?"

Proxy warlords with minimal liaison components after the initial phase.
No direct involvement (occupation) needed.

"The statement that "OIF was not the lesser evil in comparison to peace" would be more compelling if there was peace to start with, or any reasonable likelihood of achieving peace."

I wrote OIF, not OEF.

"Claiming that there were clearly superior alternatives available, though, requires some fairly loose assumptions about the probable consequences of those alternative actions. A history of bad decisions and neglect had created a situation with very few attractive alternatives."

You contradict yourself. "bad decisions and neglect" means "that there were clearly superior alternatives available".
It's just - as always - difficult to prove that a specific action would have necessarily had a superior outcome.
This is a limitation of life as long as we don't discover parallel sandbox universes. We have therefore learned to use rational analysis with our limited brains for ex-post and ex-ante critique of actions. That method needs to be acceptable to everyone, for the only alternative would be random actions.


*: Look at Putin. he was able to be satisfied with limited goals in Georgia and won a war in a record of five days, reversing much of NATO's policies in Eastern Europe. He could have occupied Georgia and would have stumbled into a second Chechnya. That's the blight of maximum goals.

[Dayuhan]

You might wish to read posts before responding to them. I wrote:


Allowing a full rehabilitation for Saddam with no consequences at all for the attempt to forcibly annex a neighboring state would hardly have sent an ideal signal.

You replied:



Sorry for being blunt (again), but that is utter B.S.
Losing regional power status, about 100% of sea power, 80% of land power and 90% or air power and losing a war was a huge consequence.

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world? That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?

The party that subverted international law in this case was not the US, it was the UN. By abdicating its responsibility to impose personal consequences on Saddam for his personal decision to invade, pillage, and attempt to annex a neighbour, the UN left a complete vacuum in the space it is meant to fill. Of course nature abhors a vacuum, and in this case it was the US who filled it: but do you blame the US for following the laws of international physics or the UN for leaving the vacuum in the first place?

If it is against the law to enforce the law, then there is no law, and where there is no law common sense has to prevail. Common sense says that dictators who repeatedly attempt to conquer their neighbors need to be removed from power. By the logic you cite, the second world war should have ended at the borders of Germany and Japan, and after a few years the Fuhrer and the Emperor should have been permitted to rearm and try again. Fortunately at that time we had a bit less law and a bit more common sense.

The European concept of "International Law" seems to revolve around elegant laws, erudite jurists, and dignified courts, with no police, no penal system, no capacity for enforcement. Not a concept likely to succeed in the real world.



"Yes, the Taliban didn't blow anything up, they merely provided shelter and support to those who openly declared and prosecuted a war against another state. These actions do tend to have consequences."

Oh really? Bay of Pigs anyone? How many consequences were felt by Cuban terrorists in Miami for decades? Hypocrisy anyone?


If we are going to speak of historical hypocrisies, what shall we say of Germany criticizing the US - or anyone - for aggressive behaviour?

Yes, the Bay of Pigs was a stupid move. Does that mean that the US should no longer respond when attacked? For how long? A century? Forever? Would Germany's history of aggression make it "hypocritical" for Germany to defend itself if attacked? Does England's historical involvement in narcotics peddling make it "hypocritical" for England to prohibit the importation of narcotics?

Nations will respond to the limits of their capacity when attacked. This may be argued as hypocrisy in any nation with much of a history, but it's still going to happen.



1st.
Protection against what? Almost his whole air force was destroyed or out of reach. Supply of spare parts was dried out by the arms embargo.

2nd.
The factual, real ally of the U.S. was Turkey, and a crackdown on Kurdish rebels would have been in Turkish interests (actually, they did it themselves several times). What weighs heavier? The national security interest of an ally or the interest of a non-state enemy of a former state enemy of yours?
Turkey was ready to fight WW3 with the U.S., it provided bases for Desert Storm - yet the later U.S. policy ran 180° against vital Turkish national security interests despite staying allied.
It always amazes me how much this ally gets neglected and underestimated.

3rd.
Saddam didn't crack down on the Kurds on land either - the Northern no-fly zone was no complete protection anyway.

4th.
Your argument is entirely inapplicable to the Southern no-fly zone (which, IIRC, persisted for years as well?)


1st: He had enough left to routinely violate the no-fly zone. Not enough to threaten a modern military force, but enough to do a lot of damage to a civilian population.

2nd: Do ypu propose that the US (and at that point the UN) should have allowed Saddam to resume his on-and-off campaign of genocide agoainst the Kurds because the Turks don't like the Kurds either?

3rd: The Peshmerga were a bit more capable of defending themselves on land.

4th: Saddam was also being rather harsh on the southern Shi'a, no? Remember the Marsh Arabs?




"What "indirect action" would you have suggested?"

Proxy warlords with minimal liaison components after the initial phase.
No direct involvement (occupation) needed.


Please apply the following comment to that proposal:


It's just - as always - difficult to prove that a specific action would have necessarily had a superior outcome.

Proxy warlords might have been able to prevent the Taliban from regrouping and returning... or they might not have. More than likely not, I would guess.



I wrote OIF, not OEF.


Yes, I know. The comment still applies. The alternative to OIF was maintaining a status quo of low-level conflict or a level of appeasement and surrender that would almost certainly have led to another large-scale conflict. Not attractive alternatives.



You contradict yourself. "bad decisions and neglect" means "that there were clearly superior alternatives available".


It means nothing of the sort. A bad decision can seem good at the time but be clearly bad in retrospect, neglect may seem a reasonable policy and later prove otherwise. What I said was that with hindsight, a sequence of bad decisions and neglect had left an untenable situation. Ideally that situation would have been resolved by multilateral action. Multilateral action is preferable to unilateral action, but unilateral action may at times be better than multilateral paralysis.

[slapout9]

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world? That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?




There is some Strategic Wisdom in the above statement. The person/regime that started the whole mess needs to feel the pain not the general population.

[Bob's World]

There is some Strategic Wisdom in the above statement. The person/regime that started the whole mess needs to feel the pain not the general population.

Not to bypass the government, but to recognize now, like never before in history, populaces are empowered to act out.

The measures we put in place to punish Iraq (the state) and Saddam (the dictator), did neither, but did punish the Iraqi populace horribly. The young men who formed the core of the Iraqi resistance movement to counter the US invasion grew up in an environment deprived of resources (food, meds, etc) by the U.S.; with U.S. planes dropping bombs on regular occasions; and Saddam telling them that everything would be great if it wasn't for the oppressive acts of the Americans.

The global environment was changing, and we had not caught on to the new rules. Rules that demand that you do not write off the populace as irrelevant. Or perhaps we thought that the Iraqi populace would blame the hardships we placed upon them on Saddam? Were we that naive?

Such sanctions must be carefully designed today to take into account fully the super-empowered status of today's populaces. We must assess how they will be impacted, and how they will likely react. If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

[jmm99]

If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

part of Bob's World. You must be feeling kinetic today - I'll loan you my dinosaur. :D

[Bob's World]

part of Bob's World. You must be feeling kinetic today - I'll loan you my dinosaur. :D

But I abhor stupid violence.

That the Iraqi populace rose up to fight us was not the strategic surprise; the surprise is that we assumed after years of such harsh treatment at our hands, colored by Saddam's propaganda, that we thought they would not.


This also weaves into the concept that I am working to flesh out on full-spectrum deterrence. This balancing of engagement to ensure that we identify these potential effects early, and either modify our initial COA of engagement to avoid the negative effects, or balance it is someway to mitigate the same.

[MikeF]

The point of Population-centric engagement is not to bypass the government, but to recognize now, like never before in history, populaces are empowered to act out.

The measures we put in place to punish Iraq (the state) and Saddam (the dictator), did neither, but did punish the Iraqi populace horribly. The young men who formed the core of the Iraqi resistance movement to counter the US invasion grew up in an environment deprived of resources (food, meds, etc) by the U.S.; with U.S. planes dropping bombs on regular occasions; and Saddam telling them that everything would be great if it wasn't for the oppressive acts of the Americans.

The global environment was changing, and we had not caught on to the new rules. Rules that demand that you do not write off the populace as irrelevant. Or perhaps we thought that the Iraqi populace would blame the hardships we placed upon them on Saddam? Were we that naive?

Such sanctions must be carefully designed today to take into account fully the super-empowered status of today's populaces. We must assess how they will be impacted, and how they will likely react. If we want to punish a dictator we need to have the moral courage to shoot him in the face, and not in the populace.

Sir, no issues with this statement. I think that perspective reigns true throughout a lot of the Special Forces community and some of the GPF; however, in my observations, the current interpretatoin of population-centric COIN by many is skewed in translation to suggest that no violence should be used.

Additionally, the method of execution is one in which we struggle. Some of my former NCO's are currently deployed with 4/82 ABN in the SFA mission in Afghan. I asked them what they would do when the Afghan Army refused to execute a mission. They replied that they would do it themselves. Mission accomplishment and unilateral action is heavily ingrained into our mindset, and that is why I caution on the current construct of Pop-centric COIN. Changing that culture and forcing GPF to advise and assist, not kick down the doors will be a long process.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

Bribing and controlling your a populace is like a leader who puts strict controls on his men, ignores their real issues, but buys them beer come Friday. I actually had a squad leader like that who asked my why his men disrespected him so much when after a week of abuse he would buy them sodas.

One tremendous handicap that we have in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have tremendous authority to do whatever we want. In the Philippines our hands were tied and our resources constrained. We were forced to be smart, be frugal and to take a backseat to the HN's desires and lead. Much of what is good about what we have done there was more by irritating necessity than brilliant design.

Best thing we could probably do in Afghanistan is place similar harsh constraints on ourselves, and tailor our mission set accordingly as well. Not only does this help remove the stink of US legitimacy over the Karzai government, it also forces us to shape our efforts to support and not lead the efforts there. Such actions will empower our narrative that we are not invaders. Focus our presence on force multipliers to empower HN security forces rather than on combat power to hunt insurgents

Our threat centric approach led us to using Afghanistan as a base camp for a grand hunting expedition in the mountains. This approach enabled us to allow the Afghan government to get off to a stunted start, and also to slip into a scheme of engagement that has been incredibly destabilizing to the Pakistani government as well.

Like a Law school exam question, we miss-identified the issues in our analysis of the question, and have written a brilliant answer to the wrong question. That is usually a "C" at best. Working harder based on that same analysis is still a C. Time for a new analysis of the problem and reduced effort rather than greater. After all, we must also take into account how our actions there at the operational level impact us at the strategic level around the globe. How much strategic capital have we expended on this misstated problem set?

My ops sergeant in ROTC was an E-5 in 5th SFG in Vietnam. He told me about a patrol of ARVN that he was taking into the bush after some VC. When he said he put the ARVN out front, I cut in and asked why he did not lead the patrol himself? I remember vividly the look on his face as he locked eyes with me and said: "Last time I checked, it was their war, not ours."

We need to remember whose war this is, and stop trying to define it in our terms, our lead it with our men. Last time I checked, Vietnam is doing just fine.

[Fuchs]

You might wish to read posts before responding to them. I wrote:

You replied:

The consequences you cite were suffered by the Iraqi State and the Iraqi military, not by Saddam Hussein.

Indeed, this is a world of states. Germany is allied with Italy, not Merkel with Berlusconi. Consequences for evil state actions punish states, while the punishment of actually responsible individuals is a rare cream on the cake. That's the situation.
Again I'd like to point at humility: Those who set maximum goals are destined to fail.
And the international community didn't authorize a punishment of Saddam. Waging war to punish an individual would be a crime in itself.
Oh, and finally; you're wrong again. I didn't mention it, but Saddam suffered a lot. He lost some power, the ability to travel, and he had to fear for his life for years. Why do you think he didn't get killed on day 1 of OIF by cruise missiles? He would have been an easy target and been long since dead if he had lived without serious security-related restrictions post-'91.

The Iraqi people also suffered consequences. Saddam, as I said, suffered no consequences whatsoever: after invading, pillaging, and attempting to annex a neighboring state he was still kicking back in the Palace du jour, receiving oral pleasure from George Galloway. Is that the message you want to send to the dictators of the world?

That's what the United Nations have to decide, not you, me or the POTUS. The U.S. is legally obliged to respect the Charter of the United Nations, which requires peaceful solutions unless authorized by the U.N..
Besides; much of the "pillaging" was mere propaganda anyway.

That they can personally decide to do any damned thing they please, and the consequences, if any, will be suffered by others? That all you have to do is wait a few years and you'll be right back in play with an open invitation to have another go?

Now you don't really want me to apply this to every nation and every head of government, right? I mean, be careful about what you wish. ;)

The party that subverted international law in this case was not the US, it was the UN.

Impossible by definition.

By abdicating its responsibility to impose personal consequences on Saddam for his personal decision to invade, pillage, and attempt to annex a neighbour, the UN left a complete vacuum in the space it is meant to fill.

There's no such responsibility. And honestly, all U.S.Americans should wait till the Cold War has been over for at least one generation (or till the country has distanced itself reliably from Cold War disrespectful behaviour patterns) before seriously expecting that such arguments impress foreigners.

Of course nature abhors a vacuum, and in this case it was the US who filled it: but do you blame the US for following the laws of international physics or the UN for leaving the vacuum in the first place?

Your whole concept seems just wrong to me.
I understand that you aim at the "policeman of the world" image, but to me it's more like a "global schoolyard bully" image, so don't expect me to be impressed.

If it is against the law to enforce the law, then there is no law, and where there is no law common sense has to prevail.

There is a law. Article 1.1 of the United Nations Charter.
It clearly forbade OIF. The offender was the U.S., UK, Poland and some other mislead countries.
The U.S. got away with it officially thanks to veto right in UNSC, but I'm quite sure that the unofficial backlash will last for decades and hurt a lot.

Common sense says that dictators who repeatedly attempt to conquer their neighbors need to be removed from power.

Oh, but they deserve to be supported on the first attempt or what? I ask because that was the U.S. policy on Saddam.

By the logic you cite, the second world war should have ended at the borders of Germany and Japan, and after a few years the Fuhrer and the Emperor should have been permitted to rearm and try again.

WW2 pre-dates the United Nations. The U.N. had no opportunity to authorize more ambitious actions.
I do also fail to see any significant similarity between Iraq and German or Japan.

Would you say it's fine to immediately hang a horse thief nowadays because there were no cell phones in 19th century to call for today's police to do their job on the thief?

Fortunately at that time we had a bit less law and a bit more common sense.

Unfortunately, it led to a fiasco.
Now I guess we won't agree anytime soon if that's your idea of a good solution.

The European concept of "International Law" seems to revolve around elegant laws, erudite jurists, and dignified courts, with no police, no penal system, no capacity for enforcement. Not a concept likely to succeed in the real world.

It's not an European concept, it was very much coined by the U.S., it was agreed on by all U.N. member states and it's the obligation side of the coin of international relations for the U.S..
The other side of the coin includes such things like others feeling obliged to respect treaties with your country, to respect the U.N. and to grant your country a veto right in the UNSC.
It's childish to expect such advantages without accepting the obligations that come with them.
It's even mroe childish to try that and to expect no sh** flying into the fan.


If we are going to speak of historical hypocrisies, what shall we say of Germany criticizing the US - or anyone - for aggressive behaviour?

Easy. We're the ones who learned lessons that you didn't need to learn yet.

Besides; Germany was united in 1871 and began on its own exactly one war since (WW2), participated in three international alliance wars together with Brits and others (Boxer uprising, Kosovo, OEF-A), waged one colonial conflict worth to be called war (Herero uprising) and entered one war as ally (WWI).
1+3+1+1=6. Did I miss one? Six wars and forcible interventions in 138 years. Three in 74 years till unconditional surrender.

For comparison: The U.S. by comparison was involved in about three dozen wars/interventions in the same time frame, almost all of them voluntarily.
My country had a talent for getting almost only into really big fights, but it has never been such a serial offender as the U.S. and UK.

Yes, the Bay of Pigs was a stupid move. Does that mean that the US should no longer respond when attacked? For how long? A century? Forever? Would Germany's history of aggression make it "hypocritical" for Germany to defend itself if attacked? Does England's historical involvement in narcotics peddling make it "hypocritical" for England to prohibit the importation of narcotics?

It means that aggression does not necessarily lead to proportional consequences, and there's no moral high ground to be had for the U.S. after waging so many dirty wars for decades.

Besides; the Taliban did not attack the U.S., so it's not adequate to speak of self-defence.

Maybe you remember the Altmark incident; it's usually agreed that the British action against the Altmark in Norway's waters was illegal even by the standards of the time. That's the best historical analogy for the AQ/Taliban case that I can think of in modern history.

We would need to look back to ancient times to find examples of wars fought because a power provided hospitality to offenders. Troy and stuff.
I do therefore conclude that this is a rather recent U.S. (re-)invention. That doesn't look like a strong case to me.

Nevertheless, I did consider raids as acceptable.
I do just think that the total-war-all-enemies-must-die-or-surrender-to-the-last-man attitude is nonsense.

It's hypocritical anyway, as long as you don't invade Pakistan as well. The friendship with Saudi Arabia was barely stained. Now that looks hypocritical as well.

mine is red, obviously

[Ken White]

Mission accomplishment and unilateral action is heavily ingrained into our mindset, and that is why I caution on the current construct of Pop-centric COIN. Changing that culture and forcing GPF to advise and assist, not kick down the doors will be a long process.He is completely correct that it will be a long process. The real question that MUST be asked is; Do we really want to do that?

That it can be done is a given, whether it should be done is the question. Changing that culture -- and it is a deeply entrenched cultural phenomenon -- may have quite adverse consequences in other forms of war. The hard fact is is that the GPF are not designed, trained or suited for such roles. Special Forces are equipped and trained to do that and can do it very well; their employment prior to a situation deteriorating to the point the GPF are committed can reduce the need to so commit.

There is no question that the GPF have to be prepared and trained for such commitments but there should also be no question that such usage will adversely impact their core skills and, far more importantly for the US, will produce only poor results unless the GPF are assisted by significant quantities of SF in their training role and civilian agency support in the development roles in which case the performance level will rise to marginal. Stellar performance is not an option given our personnel and rotation policies. These fact lead to the conclusion that GPF commitment in such roles should be only done as a last resort and due to the failure of all other options.

Mike F is advocating caution in the employment of the GPF in a role for which they are not tempermentally suited. History says that's correct. We can employ the GPF in such roles but will get only a marginal performance. There several counterpoints to that, two obvious examples are:

1. Changing the culture to gain improvement. Can obviously be done but that improvment in a supplementary and minor role will denigrate capability in primary warfighting mission sets.

2. Form dedicated 'Advisory' elements. This is woefully far from being cost effective and it will lead to forced usage of those elements even in situations where such use is contraindicated. Congress will insist on employment or deactivation.

Neither of those or several other alternatives offer much hope for improvement. Thomas P. M. Barnett's 'SysAdmin Force' is a possible alternative but it should be a new element, part of DoS and NOT DoD and should not be considered an Armed Force or military service, more a Peace Corps not totally peaceful and on steroids. I doubt Congress will pay for that.

So far better to heed Bob's World who advocates less interference in the affairs of other nations. We do that not so much because it is necessary but because we're big enough to get away with it, too selfish to invest in others and too lazy to investigate other ways to achieve the changes we desire. Those are not good reasons...

[MikeF]

The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

Bribing and controlling your a populace is like a leader who puts strict controls on his men, ignores their real issues, but buys them beer come Friday. I actually had a squad leader like that who asked my why his men disrespected him so much when after a week of abuse he would buy them sodas.

One tremendous handicap that we have in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that we have tremendous authority to do whatever we want. In the Philippines our hands were tied and our resources constrained. We were forced to be smart, be frugal and to take a backseat to the HN's desires and lead. Much of what is good about what we have done there was more by irritating necessity than brilliant design.

Best thing we could probably do in Afghanistan is place similar harsh constraints on ourselves, and tailor our mission set accordingly as well. Not only does this help remove the stink of US legitimacy over the Karzai government, it also forces us to shape our efforts to support and not lead the efforts there. Such actions will empower our narrative that we are not invaders. Focus our presence on force multipliers to empower HN security forces rather than on combat power to hunt insurgents

Our threat centric approach led us to using Afghanistan as a base camp for a grand hunting expedition in the mountains. This approach enabled us to allow the Afghan government to get off to a stunted start, and also to slip into a scheme of engagement that has been incredibly destabilizing to the Pakistani government as well.

Like a Law school exam question, we miss-identified the issues in our analysis of the question, and have written a brilliant answer to the wrong question. That is usually a "C" at best. Working harder based on that same analysis is still a C. Time for a new analysis of the problem and reduced effort rather than greater. After all, we must also take into account how our actions there at the operational level impact us at the strategic level around the globe. How much strategic capital have we expended on this misstated problem set?

My ops sergeant in ROTC was an E-5 in 5th SFG in Vietnam. He told me about a patrol of ARVN that he was taking into the bush after some VC. When he said he put the ARVN out front, I cut in and asked why he did not lead the patrol himself? I remember vividly the look on his face as he locked eyes with me and said: "Last time I checked, it was their war, not ours."

We need to remember whose war this is, and stop trying to define it in our terms, our lead it with our men. Last time I checked, Vietnam is doing just fine.

This may be the post of the year.

[Ken White]

and this thread is going beyond normal discussion. I think it would be wise for all of us to avoid any more posts on this thread at this time about any nations failures. All nations have many and all have their good points -- not much of that has to do with warfighting.

A reminder that this Board is for the discussion of warfighting and not for political diatribes. Some political discussion is inherent but accusations and casting aspersions and blame contribute nothing and merely invite defenses and counterclaims.

So please, let's return to the thread: New Guidance on Counterinsurgency.

[Steve Blair]

and this thread is going beyond normal discussion. I think it would be wise for all of us to avoid any more posts on this thread at this time about any nations failures. All nations have many and all have their good points -- not much of that has to do with warfighting.

A reminder that this Board is for the discussion of warfighting and not for political diatribes. Some political discussion is inherent but accusations and casting aspersions and blame contribute nothing and merely invite defenses and counterclaims.

So please, let's return to the thread: New Guidance on Counterinsurgency.

Concur. Otherwise it will be locked.

[Dayuhan]

Looking at a whole stack of unsupportable and vulnerable red-type arguments just waiting to be dissected... but the moderators object (rightly, I concede), and a day on the river awaits, so I shall reluctantly refrain. Y'all have fun.

[jmm99]

from Bob's World (JMM bold added)
The populace-centric ideas I have put forward (prioritize the needs of the populace over those of the government or threats emerging from them) are significantly different than the population-centric (control the populace while attempting to buy their support with massive governmental effectiveness programs) pushed by CNAS.

I recognize the difference in your approach from the what I would call the "reformist" (population-centric) approach - no word-coining on my part; I ripped off Eqbal Ahmad (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eqbal_Ahmad).

So, the question is: What do you do, given the needs of the populace (and including in the rights to self-determination and to good governance), where the incumbant government cannot or will not meet those needs ?

This question posits that the existing insurgency against the incumbant government is also unacceptable. Historically, we could pick any number of Latin-American countries in the past century - with a number of US interventions. That is, oligarchs ruling over very poor and exploited populations, with insurgencies too radical for our taste as well.

Do you simply pack up your bags and leave; or do you engineer a "third way" movement - perhaps, not that far from the radical insurgents, but expressing the needs of the populace ?

Further posit that the NCAs have given COL Jones complete freedom of action to do what he thinks is right.

----------------------------

Also posited is that the incumbant government has no ears to hear the excellent briefings of COL Jones, who is therefore in the same shoes as Paul of Acts.

PS: Upon reflection, you can answer this in two parts, using two roles: (1) COL Jones, USASF - not indigenous (so, not "his fight"); and (2) COL Jones, indigenous military, who has the appropriate group of "misfits", military and civilian, to engineer a "third way" (so, it is "his fight").

[Bob's World]

I recognize the difference in your approach from the what I would call the "reformist" (population-centric) approach - no word-coining on my part; I ripped off Eqbal Ahmad.

So, the question is: What do you do, given the needs of the populace (and including in the rights to self-determination and to good governance), where the incumbant government cannot or will not meet those needs ?

This question posits that the existing insurgency against the incumbant government is also unacceptable. Historically, we could pick any number of Latin-American countries in the past century - with a number of US interventions. That is, oligarchs ruling over very poor and exploited populations, with insurgencies too radical for our taste as well.

Do you simply pack up your bags and leave; or do you engineer a "third way" movement - perhaps, not that far from the radical insurgents, but expressing the needs of the populace ?

Further posit that the NCAs have given COL Jones complete freedom of action to do what he thinks is right.

----------------------------

Also posited is that the incumbant government has no ears to hear the excellent briefings of COL Jones, who is therefore in the same shoes as Paul of Acts.

PS: Upon reflection, you can answer this in two parts, using two roles: (1) COL Jones, USASF - not indigenous (so, not "his fight"); and COL Jones, indigenous military, who has the appropriate group of "misfits", military and civilian, to engineer a "third way" (so, it is "his fight").

Like my country, I must start with our Declaration of Independence. We are founded on the principle of the unalienable right and duty of every populace to rise up in insurgency at such time as its governance becomes "despotic." What exactly is despotic? Well, that is something for every populace to decide for itself as well.

So, If I am faced with a country that has a government that first was so despotic (what I call poor governance) as to incite some significant segment of its populace to insurgency; and then is so lame as to not be able to deal with the problem that it started; that to me is a government that must go. No government has a right rule when its own populace thinks it must go. To intervene and attempt to preserve the government against it populace's will creates the very conditions that I think are at the root of what we call the GWOT.

When a populace believes that its government draws its legitimacy more from some source that they do not recognize than it does from one they do, they will target that source in the conduct of their insurgency if need be to achieve good governance. I believe this conditions exists throughout the middle east due to our Cold War engagement, and AQ is conducting a savvy UW campaign to incite and support these disparate insurgencies, and also encouraging them to attack the source of inappropriate legitimacy over the same. So the Main Effort for the US should be to ID and address these perceptions of inappropriate US legitimacy over these allied governments. And then, where necessary, be a mediator between the governments and their populaces to try to keep change evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Now, it is not up to us to decide if the incoming government is "acceptable" or not. By definition any government that prevails is "acceptable" to the populace. If it turns out that it did not have full support and itself becomes despotic, it too will suffer the same fate. Some things you just have to work out for yourself, because any external solution, no matter how good, will be bad. We can certainly let the new kids on the block that we have eyes in the sky, and that if we see them violating international law and abusing their populace that we will punish key leaders. We have the tools to do this; and we don't need to occupy the country to do so.

[Bob's World]

I recognize the difference in your approach from the what I would call the "reformist" (population-centric) approach - no word-coining on my part; I ripped off Eqbal Ahmad (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eqbal_Ahmad).

So, the question is: What do you do, given the needs of the populace (and including in the rights to self-determination and to good governance), where the incumbant government cannot or will not meet those needs ?

This question posits that the existing insurgency against the incumbant government is also unacceptable. Historically, we could pick any number of Latin-American countries in the past century - with a number of US interventions. That is, oligarchs ruling over very poor and exploited populations, with insurgencies too radical for our taste as well.

Do you simply pack up your bags and leave; or do you engineer a "third way" movement - perhaps, not that far from the radical insurgents, but expressing the needs of the populace ?

Further posit that the NCAs have given COL Jones complete freedom of action to do what he thinks is right.

----------------------------

Also posited is that the incumbant government has no ears to hear the excellent briefings of COL Jones, who is therefore in the same shoes as Paul of Acts.

PS: Upon reflection, you can answer this in two parts, using two roles: (1) COL Jones, USASF - not indigenous (so, not "his fight"); and (2) COL Jones, indigenous military, who has the appropriate group of "misfits", military and civilian, to engineer a "third way" (so, it is "his fight").

At some point, when it becomes clear that the government will not or cannot do its job, and the insurgent is an evil band that will be no better for my country, then it would be my duty to take down the government myself in a military coup, create what alliances I must to get the government working again and to suppress the insurgent; and (this is where the wheels usually fall off) then set up fair elections put the government back into the hands of the populace.

As the US we should be prepared to support such an option and not simply call it an illegal act because we had a good deal going with the guys who got ousted. By doing so we can make the ultimate elections part of the deal for assisting in getting things under control.

Easier said than done, both answers. But if doing the right thing were easy, more people would be doing it.

[jmm99]

with your six substantive paragraphs - usual reservation of rights as to analysis of specific situations. :)

My bottom line re: the "bad" government is: COL Jones USASF packs his bags, but keeps an eye on the situation; MR Smith USX, in a more "private" capacity, taps into the pipeline of the indigenous COL Jones; at some point COL Jones USASF returns with his bags; and the rest is history (good, bad or indifferent - rather depends on the will of the masses, doesn't it ?).

Any historical examples ? - my history brain is temporarily dead tonite. :(

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Now, it is not up to us to decide if the incoming government is "acceptable" or not. By definition any government that prevails is "acceptable" to the populace. If it turns out that it did not have full support and itself becomes despotic, it too will suffer the same fate. Some things you just have to work out for yourself, because any external solution, no matter how good, will be bad. We can certainly let the new kids on the block that we have eyes in the sky, and that if we see them violating international law and abusing their populace that we will punish key leaders. We have the tools to do this; and we don't need to occupy the country to do so.

Halaluhya......somebody say Amen:)

[Ken White]

..................;)

[Bill Moore]

Posted by BW,
Now, it is not up to us to decide if the incoming government is "acceptable" or not. By definition any government that prevails is "acceptable" to the populace. If it turns out that it did not have full support and itself becomes despotic, it too will suffer the same fate. Some things you just have to work out for yourself, because any external solution, no matter how good, will be bad. We can certainly let the new kids on the block that we have eyes in the sky, and that if we see them violating international law and abusing their populace that we will punish key leaders. We have the tools to do this; and we don't need to occupy the country to do so.

I'm not sure where to go with this argument, because on the surface it makes sense, but when you go a little deeper it tends to become less stable. I agree with your premise that Vietnam is doing O.K., but it took time for Vietnam to get to that point. It is also true that Vietnam would be probably be O.K. if we prevailed. Using that logic you could argue that Cuba did O.K. under Castro compared to Batista (since there was a valid reason for the insurgency); however, Castro then exported his revolution throughout Latin America and many parts of Africa (and his policies further bankrupted his country). However, going back to your argument the people won (that can be argued), so it isn’t our business, yet Cuba’s policies were clearly challenging U.S. interests. Another example is a potential future Afghanistan government (post U.S. military involvement on a large scale). We’ll assume this new government is tolerated by the people, but that the new government supports, or turns a blind eye towards, Al Qaeda who has once again established a safe haven in Afghanistan. Once again we have an acceptable solution to the people, but it is not in our national interests.

In these examples it appears you’re making an argument that we can target the leaders of these countries and not the populace, but if the populace supports the government that is quite a task. A foreign government can’t target our national leadership and win the support of the American people. Just how do we go about targeting national leadership without targeting or punishing the people? As you stated we tried this in Iraq with sanctions, and seriously harmed the local populace while further strengthening Saddam’s hold on power by even further centralizing power. I think your arguments may be founded on false assumptions.

So while I partially agree, I think there are some fatal flaws in your argument. We deploy forces to achieve national security objectives, and that is not always in line with popular opinion of the country we're conducting operations in. While state conflicts have always had to consider the populace as a critical planning factor, the level of populace empowerment, as you pointed out, is new due to the proliferation of information technology. Thus the challenge we seem to be wrestling with is finding "effective" ways to neutralize the population’s hostility towards us.

[Dayuhan]

Like my country, I must start with our Declaration of Independence. We are founded on the principle of the unalienable right and duty of every populace to rise up in insurgency at such time as its governance becomes "despotic." What exactly is despotic? Well, that is something for every populace to decide for itself as well.

So, If I am faced with a country that has a government that first was so despotic (what I call poor governance) as to incite some significant segment of its populace to insurgency; and then is so lame as to not be able to deal with the problem that it started; that to me is a government that must go. No government has a right rule when its own populace thinks it must go.


It's a good thing to think about "the populace", but it can also be a dangerous thing. Very few countries have a monolithic populace. In many cases populaces are deeply and bitterly divided, with competing factions fighting for their own interests. Policies that one faction demands may be seen as incendiary provocation by another. The concept of majority rule with minority protection, so familiar to us that we often take it for granted, is wholly alien to many places and populaces.

I certainly recognize the foolishness of the cold war pattern of supporting inept dictators over reform-minded populaces simply because the dictators were nominally "on our side", but we do ourselves no favors by imposing this paradigm on circumstances where it may not fit. A small, violent faction may be outraged over poor government; it may also be outraged at its own inability to control government or draw enough popular support to wage an insurgency. We cannot assume that every angry violent group represents an insurgent populace. It is inappropriate to assume that anyone who takes up arms against a government is an evil terrorist manipulated by a foreign ideology. It is equally inappropriate to assume that that anyone who takes up arms against a government represents an honest populace outraged by bad governance.



To intervene and attempt to preserve the government against it populace's will creates the very conditions that I think are at the root of what we call the GWOT...

When a populace believes that its government draws its legitimacy more from some source that they do not recognize than it does from one they do, they will target that source in the conduct of their insurgency if need be to achieve good governance. I believe this conditions exists throughout the middle east due to our Cold War engagement, and AQ is conducting a savvy UW campaign to incite and support these disparate insurgencies, and also encouraging them to attack the source of inappropriate legitimacy over the same.


I'm not at all sure this is true, and I think the allegation deserves good deal more supporting evidence and argument.

What is this thing we call GWOT? It is not a war on terror, or a war on terrorism: terrorism is a tactic, not an actor, and nobody ever fought a war against a tactic. It's also not a war against an insurgency, or a populace. We were not attacked by an enraged populace, or an insurgent group. Our response to attack may have created insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but those are consequences of the GWOT, not causes.

The distinction is significant. In the past efforts to find an address a grand overarching cause behind terror attacks have led to decisions that diluted ourt efforts and empowered our opponents. The neocon clique declared that the long-term solution to ME-based terrorism was to "drain the swamp", and declared Iraq the pivotal front in that effort. The resulting war diverted our efforts from attacking those who had attacked us and generated a wave of support for our enemies; for quite a while we were closer to drowning in the swamp than to draining it, and a positive outcome is still in no way assured.

I am similarly suspicious of any effort to declare that the long term solution to ME-based terror is to reverse cold war errors by intervening in nations that are currently not major fronts in the GWOT on behalf of populaces who have not sought our assistance. I suspect that the effort would produce more suspicion and hostility than appreciation from the populaces in question, destabilize existing (flawed but necessary) alliances, and would be likely to accomplish nothing, divert attention and resources from core efforts, and make existing tasks more difficult.



So the Main Effort for the US should be to ID and address these perceptions of inappropriate US legitimacy over these allied governments. And then, where necessary, be a mediator between the governments and their populaces to try to keep change evolutionary rather than revolutionary.


We can only mediate if we are asked to mediate and our mediation is acceptable to all parties concerned. If we attempt to impose ourselves as mediators we are simply reinforcing the perception of inappropriate influence.

We have to recall also that perception is not necessarily real, and in many of these areas we actually have very little influence and very little ability to place pressure on allied governments. If we attempt to influence a government on behalf of a populace and fail, we antagonize the government, leave the populace feeling betrayed (assuming on scant evidence that our intervention was sought in the first place), and appear impotent.

We have a tendency to think that all populaces want what we would want and will respond as we would respond, and that we are entitled to speak on behalf of any given populace. Not necessarily true. My view is that any intervention, armed or unarmed, imposition or mediation or anything else, should be undertaken very reluctantly, only after very deep examination, and with a clear idea of exactly what we are trying to accomplish and how we propose to accomplish it. Sticking our faces into another nation's domestic affairs on the illusion that we do so on behalf of "the populace" is not going to get a positive reaction from either government or populace, and is likely to create more problems than it resolves.



Now, it is not up to us to decide if the incoming government is "acceptable" or not. By definition any government that prevails is "acceptable" to the populace.

How is that the case? If a government seizes power in an armed coup, or cheats in an election, it has prevailed, at least for the moment, but it is not necessarily acceptable to the populace. It is not up to us to decide whether that government is "acceptable", but it is up to us to decide whether or not we want to support that government.

[Bill Moore]

I was hoping to generate a serious debate with my previous comment above, but since no one took the bait I’ll attempt to explain where I was going (pardon this post for being a bit long). Since we now have a doctrine that advocates population centric tactics, good governance, development, and essential services I think it is valuable to look at the population centric strategy and tactics of our communist foes during the Cold War, which were sometimes successful and sometimes not, but it is worth noting that our current adversaries borrow heavily from their doctrine.

BW's comments about Vietnam doing alright after the war implying that the population was content with the result of the war actually elicited a bit of rage, as did many of the arguments posited in "Eating Soup with a Knife" written by John Nagal, but instead of countering the argument directly I went along and added Cuba as another example of a country that is doing relatively O.K. after their people's revolution victory. I could have also added Lenin and Mao victories, as they also were governments where the people allegedly removed ill legitimate governments and installed legitimate ones. However, the truth is another matter entirely, and in my opinion that truth undermines many of BW’s populace centric theories (such as the people always know best).

Victory in Vietnam led to the execution of thousands, detainment of tens of thousands more in re-education camps (with a very high morbidity rate), and a mass exodus of innocent victims (the boat people), which resulted in the deaths of thousands more. I have seen well researched estimates that indicate the new People's Government killed more than 500,000 in former S. Vietnam since 1975. That figure is hard to comprehend when you actually put a name and a human life next to each number.


“... we had to make the people suffer, suffer until they could no longer endure it. Only then would they carry out the Party’s armed policy.” - Senior Viet Cong defector


“We’ve been worse than Pol Pot, but the outside world knows nothing.” - Vietnamese communist boast

So to say Vietnam is doing O.K. is misleading. Yes, they are doing relatively well now, but it was a long and bloody road to this point, and it definitely wasn't due to the result of the communist victory, but rather a relatively recent liberalization of government policies.

Cuba wasn’t as bad in total numbers of those killed by their newly installed communist government, but none the less thousands were killed or died due to Castro’s policies, as they also conducted a purge, and several thousand Cubans fled on make shift rafts to escape communist oppression (and several died attempting to flee); another people's war that went south after the victory.


“... if any person has a good word for the previous government, that is enough for me to have him shot.”
- Che Guevara


“If the [Soviet nuclear] rockets had remained, we would have used them all and directed them against the very heart of the United States, including New York...” - Che Guevara

The Leninists, Stalinists, and Maoists killed more of their own people than there were people killed total worldwide in both WWI and WWII.


“Surely you do not imagine that we shall be victorious without applying the most cruel revolutionary terror?” - V. I. Lenin

Mao is now believed to have killed or starved to death 60 million to 80 million of his own people due to his policies, which is more deaths than those caused by Hitler and Stalin combined.


“If we were to add up all the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and rightists, their number would reach thirty million... Of our total population of six hundred million people, these thirty million are only one out of twenty. So what is there to be afraid of? ... We have so many people. We can afford to lose a few. What difference does it make?” - Mao Zedong

The French Revolution also the result of another "people's movement' resulted in excesses of violence, as have other so called "popular" uprisings.

My points for this post are three fold, first there are few, if any, examples throughout history of a collective people's uprising against a government perceived to be ill legitimate (although Cory Aquino's in the Philippines and Solidarity movement in Poland came close). There are normally different entities vying for their version of legitimate governance (numerous resistance groups in WWII in the same country were opposed to one another and had different goals for their country once the occupier was thrown out). Second, it is difficult for any counterinsurgent to overcome the effect of terrorist tactics applied against the populace, and while extremely difficult to do in practice, protecting the populace is critical to breaking the powerful hold this tactic has on the population. Third, government remains a necessary evil, and at times must employ force (skillfully) to remain in power. The fact that some people are revolting against the government does not in fact mean the government is necessarily ill legitimate, and in fact is probably better for the people than those attempting to force their rule over them.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/vietnam/hochiminh.html


If the communists’ “persuasion” techniques spawn deep and enduring hatred, Ho could not care less; the first necessity is the utter, subjugation, of the people. Ho was disturbed by the rapid expansion of South Vietnam’s educational system: between 1954 and 1959, the number of schools had tripled and the number of students had quadrupled. An educated populace, especially one educated to democratic ideals, does not fit into the communist scheme. Hence, the country’s school system was one of Ho’s first targets. So efficiently did he move against it that the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession soon sent a commission, chaired by India’s Shri S. Natarajan, to investigate


Teachers were warned to stop providing civic education, and to stop teaching children to honor their country, flag and president. Teachers who failed to comply were shot or beheaded or had their throats cut, and the reasons for the executions were pinned or nailed to their bodies.

The Natarajan commission reported how the VC stopped one school bus and told the children not to attend school anymore. When the children continued for another week, the communists stopped the bus again, selected a six-year-old passenger and cut off her fingers. The other children were told, “This is what will happen to you if you continue to go to that school.” The school closed.

What is most interesting is that the communists failed to reduce school attendance, the people stood up against the terrorists.


“The Tet offensive represented a drastic change in tactics,” says General Walt. “This is a war to take over the South Vietnamese people. Ho launched the Tet offensive because he knew he was losing the people. But his troops didn’t know it; they were told that they didn’t need any withdrawal plans because the people would rise and fight with them to drive out the Americans. What happened was just the opposite. Many fought against them like tigers.” Some of the Tet offensive’s explosion of atrocities probably can be attributed to sheer vengeful frustration on the part of Ho’s terror squads — which Ho may well have foreseen, and counted on.

There seems to be some constants throughout history, terror will only work if applied at the right level, if the barbarians go over board it will backfire.


The full record of communist barbarism in Vietnam would fill volumes. If South Vietnam falls to the communists, millions more are certain to die, large numbers of them at the hands of Ho’s imaginative tortures. That is a primary reason why, at election times, more than 80 percent of eligible South Vietnamese defy every communist threat and go to the polls, and why, after mortar attacks, voting lines always form anew. It is why the South Vietnamese pray that their allies will stick the fight through with them. It is why the vast majority of American troops in Vietnam are convinced that the war is worth fighting. It is why those who prance about even in our own country — waving Vietcong flags and decrying our “unjust” and “immoral” war should be paid the contempt they deserve.

I believe the true history of this war was never accurately presented, the media cherry picked certain events to support their view of the war, and that is what America saw. We were more focused on the misbehavior of a few of our fighting men, than we were on the approved policy of terror that the VC were employing. That appears to remain true to this day.

[Ken White]

Thus, little needed saying...

Re: Viet Nam, you're correct on all aspects but the problem with Viet Nam is that the history has been corrupted by dueling ideologies in all too many cases. Some espouse the typically idealist progressive view of Viet Nam -- i.e. it should have not occurred and the US was the malefactor. Their prerogative but they are missing a lot of facts and are doing themselves a disservice.
My points for this post are three fold, first there are few, if any, examples throughout history of a collective people's uprising against a government perceived to be ill legitimate...Totally true and too many theorists refuse to acknowledge that because they've got a flawed view of people and of governance. Operating on the 'do it my way' theory is well and good but many folks just won't play along... :wry:
There are normally different entities vying for their version of legitimate governance (numerous resistance groups in WWII in the same country were opposed to one another and had different goals for their country once the occupier was thrown out). Second, it is difficult for any counterinsurgent to overcome the effect of terrorist tactics applied against the populace...The first point is quite correct and I'd add that in recent wars and troubles there have been and are numerous groups in all cases operating against the so-called Counterinsurgent. None of these fights is nearly as simple as the theoretical types would like to or seem to believe.
...while extremely difficult to do in practice, protecting the populace is critical to breaking the powerful hold this tactic has on the population.You're a master of understatemnet. It is almost impossible to do unless you're prepared to be equally ruthless -- and we are not. It is fascinating that Politicians commit forces to quelling terror and disruption but insist on 'clean' fighting and 'upholding the moral imperative' or similar foolishness. It is more fascinating that some people in uniform are prepared to believe that such an attitude is acceptable much less necessary and that 'we will "win" because (or if) we have right on our side.' :rolleyes:

The 'we cannot stoop to their level' sounds good on paper and even when spoken. When you're out there rooting around in the mud, settling a 'who's going to walk away from this' issue with the ungodly, it becomes quite a bit more abstract. However, as Jimmy Stewart said in 'How the West Was Won,' "You can't tell someone if they haven't been to see the animal..."
Third, government remains a necessary evil, and at times must employ force (skillfully) to remain in power. The fact that some people are revolting against the government does not in fact mean the government is necessarily ill legitimate, and in fact is probably better for the people than those attempting to force their rule over them.True -- but again, the 'it must be done MY way' syndrome takes hold. All government is illegitimate to an extent, all governments are crooked to an extent.

There is no perfect government because there are no perfect people. Never have been, never will be. The bleeding hearts need to accept that and get over their meddling and 'fix it' mentality.

The really fascinating thing is that a number of the 'My way' crowd will go on about the need for 'self determination' by people while wishing or insisting that those people must have 'democracy' when said people are quite happy with a number of un-democratic variations on that theme...