War of Choice?

[Zack]

Is our open-ended occupation of Afghanistan a good strategic decision? I thought that I was alone in the view that it was not, but Stephen Walt seems to agree with me.

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/20/safe_haven_2_a_response_to_peter_bergen (http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/20/safe_haven_2_a_response_to_peter_bergen)

I don't see how we expect to completely eliminate safe havens inside Afghanistan after we leave, particularly in light of some of the more dismal assessments of the war. In addition, many of the safe havens are across the border in Pakistan, safe for the most part from Afghan forces, and our own ground troops. It doesn't seem plausible that we will successfully eliminate all of these havens in the region, much less across the globe. This also assumes that if the Taliban were to regain power in Afghanistan (a proposition I am skeptical of anyhow) it doesn't necessarily or even likely follow that they will invite al-Qaeda to set up shop in their country, or even if they did, that it would in any meaningful way improve al-Qaeda's capabilities. The Taliban itself is not a ideologically homogeneous entity, and is furthermore not as global in its aspirations as al-Qaeda is. The camps that were in Afghanistan taught small unit tactics for the most part, which did not play any role in the attacks on American soil. The knowledge necessary to make explosives is also not in any way related to our success or failure in Afghanistan. Bombings targeted at Westerners do not seem to be at all related to the existence of safe havens.

Our presence in Afghanistan seems to have the opposite effect of what we intend. Removed from its state as a "vital national interest" the blood and treasure we have and are expending to try to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the government seems wasted. I, like Walt, do not find the moral argument compelling, nor would I expect the Congress or American people to be willing to expend enormous resources on something that is not necessary, and probably hurts our security in the short term.

[Abu Suleyman]

The flaw with Walt, as is so often the case, is that he fundamentally believes that most states, and indeed most organizations are merely security seeking, that is to say that all they really want is to keep on doing what they are doing without interference. Although he does not explicitly state so in these articles, he is a well known and perhaps even the leading advocate of Defensive Realism.

In the Afghanistan case, this is fatal in several ways:

1) Even assuming that the Taliban and any Taliban inspired successor state are merely security seeking, their very presence in the region is destabilizing, as proven by how things were prior to 9/11. Neither Pakistan (as long as it is secular, but with large Islamist contigents), nor Shi'ite Iran can allow a Salafi regime exist unmolested in their neighborhood, to say nothing of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, or Uzbekistan, which all have their own problems.

2) There is reason to believe that the Taliban, even if they have no designs on attacking the U.S., are more than security seeking insofar as they also wish to convert Pakistan to a Islamic state. Witness the seizure of Swat Valley. If Pakistan became a "Taliban" state, then we would have a Pashtun-Islamist Nuclear Superstate in Central Asia.

3) Even if the Taliban fails to seize power in Pakistan, as actually seems likely, the biggest threat for training camps and safe havens is not attacks against the US, but attacks against China, India, and Pakistan. All three countries have significant Muslim minorities/groups, and are nuclear powers. Indeed, there are more nuclear states within driving distance from Kabul than from Berlin. While there may be reason to doubt that the US would be their target in any meaningful timeframe there are already Salafist groups operating in all three countries, and we have every reason to believe that at least in Pakistan and India there are direct and indirect ties between those groups and the Taliban.

These three reasons are not proof that the war is a war of necessity for the United States, but it is proof that the war is necessary for a super-power. It is no secret that many realists, and many political scientists believe that the doctrine of primacy (i.e. holding on to superpower status) is a case of the juice not being worth the squeeze. However, such ideas are not common in the American Foreign Policy community. If the U.S. were to abandon Afghanistan, it would be exatly like Britain abandoning Greece in the opening hours of the Cold War. In essence, we would be signalling to the world that we are abandoning all pretence of Superpower status, leaving areas like Central Asia to the Great Powers of the region, and becoming one great power among many.

This all goes unsaid, because the President and his staff neither wish to seem like they are pursuing the same strategy as Pres. Bush, nor do they wish to admit that if they abandon Afghanistan, they have essentially presided over the demise of the American "Empire". Walt, for his part, knows that even outside of the United States, in spite of protestations to the contrary, the idea of the return to multipolarity is not popular, because most countries are freeriding off the US. Therefore he cannot openly say "we need to accept that we are no longer a superpower". Even returning to a position of hegemonic offshore balancer seems like a step down from the titanic power the US has had for the past twenty years.

[Fuchs]

1) Even assuming that the Taliban and any Taliban inspired successor state are merely security seeking, their very presence in the region is destabilizing, as proven by how things were prior to 9/11.

Incursions to the north were under control of Russian forces, Pakistan was stable, the Muslim separatists in the Chinese border region didn't make it into our news and Iran had a more stable government and less separatist trouble than today. So what exactly was worse or more destabilizing in the region prior to 9/11 when the Taliban were in power?
It doesn't look as if our actions actually stabilized the region.

2) There is reason to believe that the Taliban, even if they have no designs on attacking the U.S., are more than security seeking insofar as they also wish to convert Pakistan to a Islamic state.

The USA is a better example of a state that is actually not security-seeking (no matter what the propaganda says).

3) Even if the Taliban fails to seize power in Pakistan, as actually seems likely, the biggest threat for training camps and safe havens is not attacks against the US, but attacks against China, India, and Pakistan.

Their problem - their solutions. None of our business.

These three reasons are not proof that the war is a war of necessity for the United States, but it is proof that the war is necessary for a super-power.

I disagree. inf act, I even disagree with the assertion that the USA is a super power. It's a great power. It had much too small actual influence and success for a superpower in the past eight years.


There's no way of staying a superpower by pretending so with a series of failures.
The USA did not lead in any successful major affair for about ten years unless its influence was codified in multinational institutions (and even then only occasionally).
The only independent political initiatives with an U.S. "leadership" function in the past 8+ years were utter failures so far. Those nations who followed the U.S. lead usually followed into disaster; in economic policy, foreign policy and wars.

The Afghanistan war is therefore no war that protects U.S. superpower status; it's more like the Suez crisis or the Soviet-Afghan War.
It confirms the inability to dominate and reform even an extremely backward country.

The direct Western involvement in the Afghan Civil War was a war of choice. We probably would have achieved the extradition of OBL and his loons if we had respected Pashtun hospitality a bit more. At the very least we would have prevented that OBL and AQ take responsibility for 9/11 (which would have taken away the Taliban's excuse for no extradition; the assertion of innocence). That in turn would have spared us of most of the global jihad crap.

An alternative path would have been an indirect involvement; pressure on Pakistan to stop support and own support for Northern Alliance warlords and non-Taliban Pashtun powers.

Finally, we could have limited ourselves to raids and covert actions (that's what I expected to happen in autumn 2001).

[Abu Suleyman]

I just knew that Fuch's would be the guy who would post a reply, and I just knew that he would have to take a swipe at the U.S. ;)

Up front I have to take issue with some of your assertions, in part because I don't understand some of your assertions. In your refutation of the Taliban as a destabilizing force, you cite domestic instabilities. However, my point was not that the Taliban contributes to domestic instability, but that as a government it contributed to international instability, which it undoubtedly did. When the Taliban was in power, all states in the region had a vested interest in controlling it and a legitimate fear of interference in their domestic affairs. Moreover, the fact that something doesn't hit our news is hardly an argument.

I love the ad patria attack at the US:rolleyes:, but I guess I can't be surprised, since you are European.:wry: (See what I did there,nudge, nudge, wink, wink.) Whether the US is more or less security seeking, or whether it claims to be is irrelevant to whether the Taliban can be trusted to behave as a security seeking state.

Finally, your belief and my beliefs about the US's superpower status are irrelevant to the assertion that American Policy makers believe that the US is a superpower and therefore act accordingly. Whether successfully or not, any state (US or otherwise) which views itself as Superpower is going to view involvement in Afghanistan as a war of necessity, because it is for any state that is a superpower. The rest of the arguments about what form that involvement should take are spurious and irrelevant to the question of necessity.

Put another way, imagine that you have a daughter, who thinks that she is a princess. A princess must have a crown, and arguing with her that she is not a princess and therefore does not need a crown is futile because she is a princess, dammit; now get her her crown! There are things that whether we agree with them or not, or even if they are true is not the important issue. In this case, America and American's generally believe that the US is a super power, indeed so do the Jihadi's which is why we are the "Great Satan" and not, China or India. You may be right, and I know plenty of people who would agree, but that doesn't matter for this discussion.

I would point out that you are completely willing to address the Pashtun's in terms of their cultural perspective, and demand that the US do so, but are totally unwilling to look at things from an American Policy makers perspective. In English we have a saying that goes "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." I know there is one in German that means the same thing, but I can't remember it. It means, in this case, that what is good for one country is good for them all. (If you know the German saying, please tell me.)

[Fuchs]

OK, let's focus on one thing.

You wrote


(...)Although he does not explicitly state so in these articles, he is a well known and perhaps even the leading advocate of Defensive Realism.

In the Afghanistan case, this is fatal in several ways:

1) Even assuming that the Taliban and any Taliban inspired successor state are merely security seeking, their very presence in the region is destabilizing, as proven by how things were prior to 9/11. Neither Pakistan (as long as it is secular, but with large Islamist contigents), nor Shi'ite Iran can allow a Salafi regime exist unmolested in their neighborhood, to say nothing of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, or Uzbekistan, which all have their own problems.

in a "War of Choice?" thread.


I took your words as an assertion that the entry into the war was not a matter of choice, but of necessity because the Taliban were intolerable.


First, I wondered why they were tolerable up to 9/11, but that's a worn (albeit strong) question.


Second, I decided to poke at the oh-so terrible situation of Taliban in power by describing how relatively stable, under control and tolerable the pre-9/11 situation in and around Afghanistan really was.


A robust, shi'ite Iran was their Western frontier.
Russian 'peacekeeper' MRDs were keeping Muslim guerrilla incursions under control north of Afghanistan.
Pakistan was still a much more stable and robust state in the SE than it's now.
China had at most minor troubles with Muslim separatists who didn't even make it into our news, so were hardly a significant component of "necessity" (in fact, afaik those Uighurs aren't much connected to the Taliban anyway).
The Afghan Civil War was still going on, with wannabe-religious representatives of the majority tribe in power.

That was an acceptable, bearable situation, it did not constitute a necessity for a Western involvement in the war.


Finally about the superpower thing:
Beliefs constitute no necessity. Beliefs are illusions, thoughts - not the real world.
And group think doesn't impress me at all anyway, so I'm not particularly impressed by the prevalence of certain ideas in certain institutions or nations if those ideas cannot stand up to analysis.

[Abu Suleyman]

I took your words as an assertion that the entry into the war was not a matter of choice, but of necessity because the Taliban were intolerable.


First, I wondered why they were tolerable up to 9/11, but that's a worn (albeit strong) question.


Second, I decided to poke at the oh-so terrible situation of Taliban in power by describing how relatively stable, under control and tolerable the pre-9/11 situation in and around Afghanistan really was.




Fuchs, you are an excellent representative of discourse that I have read. I mean that as a compliment, in spite of what I am about to say.

I am not addressing this question as a historical one (i.e. how did we get here), but rather as one of current situations. Indeed, this is the way in which Walt approaches the problem himself. The point of any current political question is not what the problem was then, the question is what the problem is now. Most people, at least in the US, would agree that ignoring the Taliban/Al Qaeda in AF prior to 2001 was a mistake. The fact that we did so does not make it any less of a mistake. Apparently, you believe that we should have continued on pretty much the same path post 2001 as we (the US) had pre-2001, and I think that if you can be dispassionate about the issue you could make the argument that a purely covert/law enforcement approach to AF would have been preferable to what we did. The problem is that in the US there is no such thing as dispassion about 9/11, everyone has strong emotions, and we just have to accept that. What happened, regardless of whether it was good or not was almost inevitable given the political make up of the US.

All of that notwithstanding, the question is "Where are we now?" I do believe that Pres. Obama clearly stated that he is approaching the issue from a current events mode, and I think we have to take him at his word. As things stand now, AF is a critical theatre of operations if the US sees itself as a Superpower. It is possible that the US entered AF voluntarily, and I would say that our method of entry was definitely elective. Nevertheless, given the axioms extant in the US, AF is a "must-be" involved area.

To put it analogously, imagine if you had a man who was afraid of heights on a cruise ship, who went out on decks and because of his fear of heights passed out and fell overboard. Barring external intervention like a helicopter rescue, at that point if he wishes to return to the ship his is in a 'Must Swim' situation. Tossing him a dinghy and saying that that is actually an acceptable alternative is not going to work. Neither is berating him for being afraid of heights nor for falling overboard. None of this is to say there isn't something to learn from the situation afterwards, but at the moment the man is in the water, his assumptions and beliefs about the situation create a critical interest.

The same is true for the US. America's national personality guaranteed that after 9/11 no small response would do. Love us or hate us, we don't take kindly to MASCAL sneak attacks, just ask the Japanese, (or Spain, although it probably wasn't their fault). Now that we are where we are at, our assumption that we are a Superpower, rightly or wrongly, and the situation in Central Asia demands that we be involved there.

Pre-empting a possible response, you may be thinking, "All you have to do is abandon your stupid/futile/arrogant idea of Superpower status and the problem goes away." This is my point exactly. But so far, no one is openly talking about that, and I don't forsee it becoming politically viable in the US any time soon.

[William F. Owen]

A robust, shi'ite Iran was their Western frontier.
Russian 'peacekeeper' MRDs were keeping Muslim guerrilla incursions under control north of Afghanistan.
Pakistan was still a much more stable and robust state in the SE than it's now.
China had at most minor troubles with Muslim separatists who didn't even make it into our news, so were hardly a significant component of "necessity" (in fact, afaik those Uighurs aren't much connected to the Taliban anyway).
The Afghan Civil War was still going on, with wannabe-religious representatives of the majority tribe in power.


That was an acceptable, bearable situation, it did not constitute a necessity for a Western involvement in the war.

Well 911 could have been planned and conducted by any average bunch of Canadian students, living in Montreal, with enough funding for the plane tickets, and MS Flight Sim. That's a fact.
Invading A'Stan and still being their is a choice. It's not an essential imperative to US National Security. Being in A'Stan is also a Policy, not a Strategy. I more over doubt that it is even possible to have a strategy for the "GWOT" as you cannot have a strategy for a war against an abstract noun.


Fuchs, you are an excellent representative of discourse that I have read. I mean that as a compliment, in spite of what I am about to say.

I've known Fuchs for about 5 years, and well before we ever came to SWC. Yes he is a very annoying German, and he regularly holds my feet uncomfortably close to fire, but his whole approach to the current norms and approaches to warfare deserves to be better understood than it is.
Personally, I see great merit in trying to view the world the way he sees it. Point being, it behoves us all well to note that however competent the US Army maybe, the US does not set the gold standard of either strategy or the conduct of any type of warfare - and nor does the UK.

[Entropy]

A couple of points:

A war can evolve over time. In the case of Afghanistan I think it began as a war of necessity and is now, in it's current form, a war of choice. A COIN-based nation-building enterprise is a choice and there are other options to consider between nation-building and abandonment.

Secondly, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Taliban in Pakistan are not the same thing. They may appear to be similar, but they are not. Different leaders, different fighters, different constituencies, different goals. Also, the idea that the Pakistani Taliban might take over or conduct a coup in Pakistan is ludicrous. That said, there is a real possibility that Islamists could come to power in Pakistan, but an Islamist take-over is not the same thing as a Taliban take-over.

Third, the Taliban may or may not be destabilizing, but I think the same could be said for a highly centralized Afghan government as well as the US presence. Which is more destabilizing? It depends on who you ask, which is one reason terms like "stability" are less useful as descriptors and policy goals for a place like Afghanistan.

Fuchs,

I agree with some of what you say, but on this you are flat wrong:


We probably would have achieved the extradition of OBL and his loons if we had respected Pashtun hospitality a bit more. At the very least we would have prevented that OBL and AQ take responsibility for 9/11 (which would have taken away the Taliban's excuse for no extradition; the assertion of innocence). That in turn would have spared us of most of the global jihad crap.

That's exactly what the US tried for more than five years. Much of the source material from that era is now declassified at the GWU archive (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/index.html#mesa). Contrary to your assertion, the US engaged the Taliban on many levels to get them to either control, extradite or expel UBL. A useful summary of this activity can be found here (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal40.pdf).

And this mostly a myth:


Second, I decided to poke at the oh-so terrible situation of Taliban in power by describing how relatively stable, under control and tolerable the pre-9/11 situation in and around Afghanistan really was.

The Taliban brought a lot of anarchy and bloodshed to many parts of Afghanistan that were perfectly stable. (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2007/04/24/the-persistent-myth-of-pre-taliban-anarchy/)

[Fuchs]

@Abu Suleyman:

I am aware that emotions and an urge to not do things by halves led to what happened.
Our difference is that I consider this to be a failure, while you seem to consider it as a justification.

@Entropy:
About our two disagreements:
I assume that disagreement #1 centers around a different estimate about the effect of 9/11 on the amount of pressure to be applied. It was a Pearl Harbour moment, and I assume that those guys were smart enough to understand this after a bit of discussion and possibly some demonstration. Imagine a perfect continuous double circle of JDAM craters around Kabul as a late argument.

The second disagreement, the internal state of affairs: There was a civil war, so what?
We had lived with an Afghan Civil War for 22 years and most of the time it hadn't bothered us at all. Ask a taxi driver whether he can recall any negative effect of that civil war on his life in '79-'00. He won't remember any.
Things were awry, so what? We still don't seem to go into Sudan. Or Congo. We don't go into the tribal regions of Pakistan right now.

Sure, there were some not so pleasant things going on. Yet, that doesn't make it a war of necessity. Also keep in mind that an indirect involvement had a huge chance of replacing Taliban atrocities with Northern Alliance atrocities.

History as it happened replaced Taliban atrocities with Northern Alliance atrocities, underground Taliban atrocities a couple of bombed marriages and other misfortunes.

I simply fail to see a necessity. Urge, yes. Hate and anger, yes. Gut and stomach feelings - yes.
Rational necessity - no.

Keep in mind; no Taliban crashed into skyscrapers. And if I remember correctly they didn't even declare war at least on paper until directly attacked.


Even Neocon warmongers didn't see a necessity to invade Afghanistan until 9/11, and even then they regretted that Afghanistan wasn't Iraq.

[Entropy]

Fuchs,

Suggesting a few JDAM's would have compelled the Taliban into giving up UBL is wishful thinking even if it were politically possible at the time. Regardless, we made it clear to them beforehand that they would be held responsible for any more attacks. Even when the Taliban were completely routed and in disarray they kept to their narrative of previous years and demanded evidence of UBL involvement before turning him over.

The Taliban wanted to be recognized, to be treated as a state entity. We de-facto recognized them as such in the course of our relations pre-9/11 and offered up the possibility of political recognition if the UBL problem could be solved. They claimed they had UBL under control. They claimed he could not plan or conduct any attacks and they claimed he was innocent. They were either lying or were wrong. As a de-facto state, invasion was entirely legitimate. In other words, if you want to be seen and recognized as a state and the legitimate representatives of your "nation" among the community of nations then you damn well better prevent your allies from attacking other states.

In the end, I think it remains unclear who was the dog and who was the tail in the Taliban-AQ relationship. A decent argument can be made that the Taliban were dependent upon AQ and could not have split with UBL even if the Taliban wanted to.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs,

Suggesting a few JDAM's would have compelled the Taliban into giving up UBL is wishful thinking even if it were politically possible at the time.
My point wasn't that simple.
Regardless, we made it clear to them beforehand that they would be held responsible for any more attacks. Even when the Taliban were completely routed and in disarray they kept to their narrative of previous years and demanded evidence of UBL involvement before turning him over.
...
They claimed he could not plan or conduct any attacks and they claimed he was innocent.And were likely right about it, at least in the strict sense of your words.

The important point is that AQ claimed the same at that time. That was important because it was a major barrier to their later global jihad phenomenon that turned many previously harmless people into new (wannabe)terrorists.


You're missing one bit of info to understand me in this case:
I define justified or not, successful or not based on the net effect. An action that does not lead to a better end result than inaction is neither justified (at least ex post) nor successful. (PM)

OBL's later admittance of guilt did in my opinion hurt us very much, and as paradox as it seems; we could have been better off even if he wasn't extradited.

By the way; I don't think that threats must always be carried out if unsuccessful. Bluffs are part of the business. A previous threat (especially one that doesn't constitute an entitlement to someone else, as Britain's guarantee of sovereignty did with Poland in '39) does not constitute a necessity to go to war.

[Abu Suleyman]

@Abu Suleyman:

I am aware that emotions and an urge to not do things by halves led to what happened.
Our difference is that I consider this to be a failure, while you seem to consider it as a justification.



First off, I hope that neither Fuchs nor Wilf has taken offense to anything I have written. I am a firm believer in dialog, preferably strong dialog, between people of differing opinions, because that is the only way that you can figure out the truth. I appreciate having such an able proponent of the "typical" European point of view on this forum, and hope you will continue to keep us informed and honest. Anything I have said which was taken as hurtful I assure you was intended only in the spirit of affection that exists between those who embark on challenging tasks together, and if it was taken in any other way, I apologize for presuming on your good natures.

I don't see emotional decision making as a justification; I see it as something that just is. This delves more into a moral question than the one that we are addressing, but I think that it explains our discussion well. I realize that there are plenty of people who see what is natural, normal, or unavoidable as somehow justified. I do not. Even inevitability is not justification. Norms are made to constrain behavior that is outside of morality. If all things which are natural were moral, we would need no norms.

However, when analyzing policies, we need to first figure out where we are, and understand the conditions which we can change, and most importantly the ones that we cannot change. The US's reaction falls into the cannot change category. It was certainly sub-optimal, as all emotionally informed state reactions are, but it was completely unavoidable. As an observer, which when dealing with things like national character we all mostly are, I see no point in fretting over things which we cannot change in any meaningful way .

That said, as we go through history and learn from mistakes it is possible that we as individuals can shape future reactions in more effective ways. To do that however, we have to understand that things like culture are not going to change quickly, if at all, and that goes both ways.

What I often hear from European writers and scholars (and I apologize in advance for the hasty generalizations) and the American left is that we have to be cognizant of things like Pashtun culture in dealing in AF. That is 100% correct, and I have told it to anyone who will listen. However, we need to be just as cognizant of our own culture, when dealing with our own and our allies policies. When someone says "Those dang A-rabs just need to stop doing what they are doing, and be more like us" they are rightly mocked and laughed at, because Middle Eastern culture is the product of thousands of years of history. However, many times we forget that similar forces that have shaped Arabic or Pashtun or Chinese culture have also shaped American culture and German Culture etc. It is just as unlikely to get AF to act like the US as it is to get the US to act like AF for the same reason.

That said, there is a whole other discussion to be had about what should have happened. When dealing with policy we live in "The Land of Is" where everything I just discussed applies, and we have to just accept the way a lot of things are. Such is the plight of the warfighter in general, who often can only influence as far as he can shoot. However, another discussion entirely is the normative one, which exists in "the Land of Ought". In that discussion we can talk about what should have happened, and what we should do without the policy constraints. Both discussions are useful, but "Is" and "Ought" are no where near each other, and trying to mix them together is like trying to Landnav in New York using only a map of Paris.

[William F. Owen]

First off, I hope that neither Fuchs nor Wilf has taken offense to anything I have written. I am a firm believer in dialog, preferably strong dialog, between people of differing opinions, because that is the only way that you can figure out the truth. I appreciate having such an able proponent of the "typical" European point of view on this forum, and hope you will continue to keep us informed and honest. Anything I have said which was taken as hurtful I assure you was intended only in the spirit of affection that exists between those who embark on challenging tasks together, and if it was taken in any other way, I apologize for presuming on your good natures.


No apology necessary from my side. However, just because I cut a dash, as suave, good looking, incredibly charming English chap, it may be a mistake to assume I think like one or would welcome the description of being "European" or even worse, of being "typical." :wry:. I am a long way from either!

[Fuchs]

Same for me, I'm quite proud about my habits of thinking outside the box and questioning mainstream positions.

'European' is my access to information and experiences, not my opinion.
My criticism of Germany is about as fierce as the one of the USA.

[Entropy]

I define justified or not, successful or not based on the net effect. An action that does not lead to a better end result than inaction is neither justified (at least ex post) nor successful.

The Afghan war is not just one action though but a series of actions, like all wars. As I said originally, I think the invasion itself was both justified and necessary given the previous failed efforts to stop AQ through other means. Since the invasion, however, a lot has happened and many things have changed. The original rationale for the invasion - destruction of a clear and present threat - is gone and now the rationale is primarily focused on how to prevent that or similar threats from returning. That's why I said in my original post that I don't think the war we're in NOW is one of necessity, at least as currently being prosecuted, since it's really not the same war as 2001-2002. I've made the point many times on this forum and elsewhere that I don't believe that building a highly-centralized government in Afghanistan, as we are now attempting to do, is likely to succeed in the long run.

If you are critical of how the US responded to 9/11, it would be interesting to hear what you believe was a viable alternative. Personally I think there were few alternatives and most of those were unviable.

[Fuchs]

If you are critical of how the US responded to 9/11, it would be interesting to hear what you believe was a viable alternative. Personally I think there were few alternatives and most of those were unviable.

First of all I would have made clear that terrorism is mostly a problem of internal security. Police, federal police and intelligence agencies are the main defence against terrorists.

Diplomacy needs to activate such assets in other countries to improve security also for traveling nationals.
Diplomacy can also be employed as a countermeasure to terrorist propaganda in order to reduce their recruitment success.

Finally it was appropriate to use overt violent action against terrorists who don't hide ("terror camps"). This level of activity needs to be low, though. An over-use would just drive all into hiding and probably achieve even less than little action.

The most important part was to remember the old wisdom; maximize allies, minimize enemies. A nation with decades of containment experience should have chosen the path of political containment instead of needlessly inciting potential enemy recruits with stupidities like OIF or "self defence" of F-16's at 15,000 ft against AK shots on marriage parties.

It was right to exert pressure on Pakistan in order to reduce the support for the Taliban.

Finally, it would have been wise to communicate that 9/11 was a disgraceful crime by words, action - and in cooperation with others (especially non-secular authorities).

The extradition was secondary in comparison to the containment of the wannabe holy war idiocy.

--------------

Honestly, at that time with my limited available info I expected that raids and covert action would be necessary and effective.
My emphasis on the political dimension grew later when I learned about stupid religious / political reactions.

On the other hand, I would probably have prevented the whole mess if I had been in power during the 90's, as I was always against a military involvement in the Persian Gulf area and also opposed to the perverted no-fly zones and associated skirmishes once the brief uprisings in Iraq were over. The same goes for the excessive and perverted economic sanctions on Iraq.

[Abu Suleyman]

'European' is my access to information and experiences, not my opinion.

My criticism of Germany is about as fierce as the one of the USA.

Agreed. I think that in this case I was using European as a short hand for a type of criticism which is common in Europe, although by no means exclusive thereto.

[Ken White]

First of all I would have made clear that terrorism is mostly a problem of internal security. Police, federal police and intelligence agencies are the main defence against terrorists.Agree but recall that the US has a significant problem in this due to its geography, size, population and the diversity of that population. While even for the US, your statement is correct it unlikely that the measures you state will be adequate and therefor other measure will almost certainly be required.
...Diplomacy can also be employed as a countermeasure to terrorist propaganda in order to reduce their recruitment success.True but for several reasons mostly attributable to a non-thinking Congress our Diplomacy efforts have been less than they should have been. :mad:
Finally it was appropriate to use overt violent action against terrorists who don't hide ("terror camps"). This level of activity needs to be low, though. An over-use would just drive all into hiding and probably achieve even less than little action.Totally agree. The problem is that we neglected the development of doctrine, training and equipment required to do this in spite of indications the requirement existed. Much but not all that neglect was due poor focus and a failure to realign after 1989. Money saved was slight so there's no real excuse for that -- but it is the reason the option taken was so taken; there were few real alternatives available to the US Government even though there should have been. :(
Finally, it would have been wise to communicate that 9/11 was a disgraceful crime by words, action - and in cooperation with others (especially non-secular authorities).True -- we have a bad tendency to overreact to stimulation...:rolleyes:
On the other hand...The same goes for the excessive and perverted economic sanctions on Iraq.If you meant Iran and /or Iraq, I agree with that whole paragraph. Shame no one asked us... :wry:

[Zack]

@Entropy

I still don't understand exactly why you think Afghanistan was a war of necessity at the beginning. I don't see the security connection between Taliban/AQ presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and US national security. Like I said in my original post, we were not attacked by insurgents using small units tactics, or even explosives (knowledge of which could have been gained at a camp in Afghanistan). The money that funded the hijackers was not earned in Afghanistan either. So AQ's unmolested (generally) presence in Afghanistan did not contribute financially or by allowing the training of personnel. The only relation to the operation they had was command and control (a big maybe) and ideological. I certainly don't buy the second one as a casus belli, and it seems to me that the cells that carried out the attacks were fairly autonomous (as were previous attacks on US soil), and the planning that did take place, was in Western Europe. So I see a tenuous connection between AQ/Taliban presence in Afghanistan/Pakistan and 9/11 at best.

Even if there were a strong connection between the two, it seems we haven't done much to address the "reasons" we went there. AQ and the Taliban remain relatively safe across the border, free to plan attacks as they wish. OBL is nowhere to be found, and we have helped the AQ recruiting machine immensely.

Where is the strategic logic in all of that? I am interested in what our involvement there has done for us, not Pakistan, India, or Iran.

[Entropy]

Zack,

I think AQ in Afghanistan was much more important to the ultimate success of the 9/11 attacks than your comments would indicate. Despite a variety of diplomatic, criminal and military attempts to thwart AQ attacks over the years prior to 9/11, AQ retained a significant capability to train, facilitate and fund attacks against Western targets, especially the US. Efforts to contain AQ failed. I would therefore argue that military intervention was necessary to deal with the threat posed by AQ.

Now, we might quibble with what form that intervention should have taken, but I think intervention was necessary.

[Zack]

Zack,

I think AQ in Afghanistan was much more important to the ultimate success of the 9/11 attacks than your comments would indicate. Despite a variety of diplomatic, criminal and military attempts to thwart AQ attacks over the years prior to 9/11, AQ retained a significant capability to train, facilitate and fund attacks against Western targets, especially the US. Efforts to contain AQ failed. I would therefore argue that military intervention was necessary to deal with the threat posed by AQ.

Now, we might quibble with what form that intervention should have taken, but I think intervention was necessary.

Ok I will grant that they have been able to retain a capability, but the 9/11 attack was not in almost any way predicated on their sanctuary in Afghanistan (so far as I can tell). The bombings in Tanzania and Kenya may have been conducted by AQ operatives trained in camps in Afghanistan, but this was not the case on 9/11 (or at the least skills learned there would not have helped their mission). If we want to disrupt and destroy AQ I would presume that we need to: kill the leadership, undermine political motives and recruiting efforts, and cut off operational funding. Our invasion of Afghanistan undermined the second requirement, and didn't solve the third. It also seems we haven't done a spectacularly good job at the targeting the leadership of AQ. So yes, we removed what little of their capabilities were present in Afghanistan, but at the expense of a surge in recruitment for them, plus costs in blood and treasure. If our goal is to keep American citizens from begin killed, invading Afghanistan seems a high-risk/low-reward scenario.

[Ken White]

... If we want to disrupt and destroy AQ I would presume that we need to: kill the leadership, undermine political motives and recruiting efforts, and cut off operational funding.The first is symbolic but has little real effect; the second and third are ongoing and both are long term, low viz operations.
Our invasion of Afghanistan undermined the second requirement, and didn't solve the third.Had nothing to do with the third and not all that much to do with the second. It was meant to send a message to South Asia that attacks supported from there in any way against US Soil would not be tolerated. The folks in south Asia understood that even if most westerners do not. The attacks on Iraq were to send a similar message to the ME that attacks on US interests world wide would no longer be tolerated. That also was understood by many in the world if not by most westerners.
It also seems we haven't done a spectacularly good job at the targeting the leadership of AQ.Didn't have the tools to do it until mid 2004, by that time they were firmly ensconced in Pakistan and thus diplomatically difficult. We've got plenty of time, early days yet; it was said early on that this would be a 20 to 30 year effort and much would not be visible...
So yes, we removed what little of their capabilities were present in Afghanistan, but at the expense of a surge in recruitment for them, plus costs in blood and treasure. If our goal is to keep American citizens from begin killed, invading Afghanistan seems a high-risk/low-reward scenario.The goal was not to keep American citizens from being killed -- there is absolutely no practical way to prevent a determined enemy from doing that. The goal was to strongly deter attacks on US soil (and secondarily on US interests worldwide) and disrupt the networks.

That's all been done and it's worked.

[jmm99]

"The Base" - and as such, is supporting to efforts by other groups on a global basis to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on its analysis of each group and its plans. It also was (and probably still is, to a lesser extent) capable of its own direct action operations.

By analogy, AQ can be viewed as waging unconventional warfare in the classic sense of our FMs. A SFOB hinges on its personnel and functions, not on its location (or locations, which can be multiple - though obviously network-linked). So also AQ. That is COL Robert Jones' concept, which makes sense to me.

As to the 2001 invasion of Astan, two reasons were (1) retribution and reprobation; and (2) specific deterrence . Both reasons would have been satisfied by a complete destruction of the AQ leadership in Astan as we then knew it. That goal was not realized (Tora Bora et al).

The direct action effort against the AQ leadership still persists (separate US command); but has been submerged by the much larger efforts of UN-NATO ("nation-building" and peace enforcement in favor of the Karzai government) and the US FID-SA effort with major combat support (as noted by Bill Moore).

Since AQ (as a "base" of personnel and functions) is a moving target, the linkage between the effort against it, and the much larger Astan efforts, is not very clear to me. I expect I shall be enlightened.

The Taliban, very intentionally on their part, simply got in the way of our direct action efforts against AQ.


-----------------

Specific deterrence deters the individual wrongdoer (you execute the serial killer). That may have no general deterrence effect on serial killers to be.

[Zack]

So do you think we have successfully deterred AQ and ME states opposing our interests? How? Other than the fact that we haven't had another attack on US soil (not for lack of trying), what evidence do we have that this message was effective with those we were sending it to? If OEF was meant to deter AQ, why have we had a bunch of attempted operations in the US and some successful ones in Europe? They have also had no qualms about attacking US/Coalition forces in the region (which, while not on US soil is certainly a US interest). I don't see how OIF strengthened our deterrent either. Post-invasion was bungled so badly that it seems more reasonable to say that OIF damaged our ability to deter ME states. If it was in fact just to deter WMD proliferation, Libya might be evidence of this, but I have read that Gaddafi's decision was quite apart from OIF.

Our goal is to keep Americans, and their interests safe (particularly their lives). That is what deterring attacks is all about. If we are not deterring them, we are forcing them to move their networks into less accessible areas, and we are swelling their ranks, then how have we done anything but make our situation worse?

[Ken White]

...what evidence do we have that this message was effective with those we were sending it to?None. Too early to tell. The strong probability is that it was effective. we'll see but I suspect the targets -- the nations, not the non state groups, got the message.
If OEF was meant to deter AQ, why have we had a bunch of attempted operations in the US and some successful ones in Europe?Not what I said. South Asia -- the Nations thereof. No nation's big military action is going to deter a non-state actor; OTOH military actions will deter adverse action and support by other nations who have those things and don't want them destroyed. Individuals and ill minded groups don't care what happens to nations, theirs or yours...
They have also had no qualms about attacking US/Coalition forces in the region (which, while not on US soil is certainly a US interest).AQ and the Talibs have -- has any nation overtly sponsored either?
I don't see how OIF strengthened our deterrent either. Post-invasion was bungled so badly that it seems more reasonable to say that OIF damaged our ability to deter ME states.It certainly wasn't as effective as it could have been were the post attack not so badly flawed, however, it'll likely end up being almost as successful. The message in the attack was that the US is nuts; that got pretty good coverage. That was the prime intent.
If it was in fact just to deter WMD proliferation, Libya might be evidence of this, but I have read that Gaddafi's decision was quite apart from OIF.WMD had almost nothing to do with Iraq; they were used as the stated rationale -- and the Administration later acknowledged that was one of their several big mistakes.
Our goal is to keep Americans, and their interests safe (particularly their lives). That is what deterring attacks is all about.Who says that is our goal? Can you explain to me how you would do that? With any assurance at all...
If we are not deterring them, we are forcing them to move their networks into less accessible areas, and we are swelling their ranks, then how have we done anything but make our situation worse?First, what make you think we're swelling their ranks? Second, our situation worse in what way? Third, how do you deter a group of people that effectively have nothing you can attack except themselves as individuals and their funding?

[jmm99]

We've done a decent job on specific deterrence of AQ on three fronts: (1) intelligence + direct action (military); (2) intelligence + detention (law enforcement); and (3) disruption of network nodes, especially financing support (intelligence + counterintelligence).

As to general deterrence, not a real clue because I see no real plan to do that. By analogy, we need something akin to the European socialists who were anti-communist, but scarcely supportive of USG announced policies. I suppose support of certain Muslim governments (which ones ?) would be the answer. I also expect the tradeoff would be a much lesser role for the US in the Muslim world. That seems to be where Kilcullen is heading at the end of his book (Accidental Guerrilla).

As Ken noted, we are just getting into this - e.g., changes in Cold War strategy over decades.

Anyway, this is really a question for the younger generations.

So, what are your solutions to gain specific and general deterrence re: AQ ?

[Zack]

I'll try to organize my response here:

If the deterrence we were trying to achieve by OEF was against nations what were we doing that for? AQ was not really tied to any one state sponsor. The Taliban gave them sanctuary, but they weren't receiving any material support so far as I know. If our intent was to deter State-sponsored terror (what does this have to do with 9/11?) then we don't have much progress to speak of on that front either. Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc still support terror to some degree or another. I haven't seen or heard of any evidence suggesting that OEF & OIF have made otherwise noncompliant countries stop supporting terror.

How could security of our citizens and vital national interests not be our goal? That is the whole purpose of defense. We try to deter other actors because we don't want them killing our citizens, attacking or disrupting our national interests, or that of our allies.

So how do we deal with AQ? Like jmm99 says, specific deterrence. We go after the individual members and their sources of funding, undermine whatever popular legitimacy they have through the media and such, along with attacking the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to flourish. There is plenty of literature out there about how our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has attracted a large amount of foreign fighters from throughout the region; fighters who will eventually return home to cause trouble there as well. How is our situation worse? We have spent billions of dollars, have thousands more dead, and while doing so, we are helping AQ recruit.

I don't think we can deter AQ, but we can try to dismantle them, and do our best to remove the conditions that breed extremism. Targeted killings, removal of financial resources, pressure on ME countries to do educational reform/police their own populations, aid money, strategic communication... The list goes on.

Of course we won't be able to claim that Americans and their interests are safe, but we should certainly try. I don't see what you disagree with on this point. What is national security about in your opinion?

[Ken White]

If the deterrence we were trying to achieve by OEF was against nations what were we doing that for? AQ was not really tied to any one state sponsor. The Taliban gave them sanctuary, but they weren't receiving any material support so far as I know. If our intent was to deter State-sponsored terror (what does this have to do with 9/11?) then we don't have much progress to speak of on that front either.Sponsors and support. the Taliban gave AQ support -- a home -- the fact is that could've been handled in other ways but it was not. The intent was to say that if you sponsor or support on your territory, bad things will happen.
Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc still support terror to some degree or another.Against the US ot its interests outside of combat zones?
I haven't seen or heard of any evidence suggesting that OEF & OIF have made otherwise noncompliant countries stop supporting terror.Any evidence they've directed anything against the US?
How could security of our citizens and vital national interests not be our goal? That is the whole purpose of defense. We try to deter other actors because we don't want them killing our citizens, attacking or disrupting our national interests, or that of our allies.Of course we do -- but while we can deter other nations; deterring individuals is virtually impossible.
So how do we deal with AQ? Like jmm99 says, specific deterrence. We go after the individual members and their sources of funding...Being done.
undermine whatever popular legitimacy they have through the media and such, along with attacking the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to flourish.We're trying that but not doing too well for a number of reasons; mostly bureaucracy. They're ahead in the media war - partly because most western media is relatively clueless.
There is plenty of literature out there about how our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has attracted a large amount of foreign fighters from throughout the region; fighters who will eventually return home to cause trouble there as well. How is our situation worse? We have spent billions of dollars, have thousands more dead, and while doing so, we are helping AQ recruit.How accurate is that literature? Most of that stuff is printed and disseminated by folks with agendas. Those numbers don't add up -- and the majority of the fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan are out of work kids for whom it's a job. What has that cost in dollars and dead -- and wounded -- bought? More importantly, what will it buy?
I don't think we can deter AQ, but we can try to dismantle themI think we're doing that -- as I said, slow going
...and do our best to remove the conditions that breed extremism.Pipe dream, I'm afraid. There's not enough money in the world to do all that -- not to mention that most of the potentially dangerous ideologies won't succumb to better conditions. They use that as a ploy and aren't serious about getting it fixed -- if you fixed it, then they wouldn't get any recruits; there'd be no need for them and they know that, so they'd just find another cause.
Targeted killings, removal of financial resources, pressure on ME countries to do educational reform/police their own populations, aid money, strategic communication... The list goes on.All being done. We're back to that 20 or 30 year effort again. Turning around several centuries of hate and discontent is not going to be done in less than a couple of generations -- and we aren't even halfway through one generation thus far. :wry:
Of course we won't be able to claim that Americans and their interests are safe, but we should certainly try. I don't see what you disagree with on this point.I thought we were trying. Still think we are.
What is national security about in your opinion?Probably pretty much the same as yours -- but one has to be realistic about what tools were and are available as well as what can be achieved. I've long said that both the Afghanistan and Iraqi operations or something like them was necessary because four previous Presidents from both parties failed to respond to provocations and probes from 1979 on that emanated from the Middle East and each of which encouraged ever bolder and more dangerous attacks. I've also said I wouldn't have done either the way and at the time they were done -- Afghanistan was started well and properly but was morphed into another thing; Iraq had its good and bad points. Regardless of the flaws, -- and the heavy costs, I think both will achieve their design goal, albeit not as well as one could hope. Regardless, it is not possible to secure the borders in this large diverse nation and it is not possible to deter truly determined individuals. -- so you do what you can with what you have.

The big work on AQ et.al. is all Intel and Law Enforcement centric with just a little military stuff in area where there are fights going on, usually for other reasons and where AQ and such try to horn in on the action. It will take years to disrupt them and their erstwhile allies.

[Zack]

So what is the end state then? If Iraq remains mostly stable and doesn't slide back into civil war, and the Taliban are for the most part defeated, what will we have accomplished? AQ/Taliban will be located in FATA where we will continue to do our best to kill them and we will hopefully have two mostly friendly governments we can work with. So we will have made the point that if you harbor terrorists that attack the US itself (not abroad) we will deal with you directly. This may be an effective deterrent, but once again, I don't see how AQ's ability to strike on US soil had anything to do with state sponsorship. Furthermore it doesn't address state sponsored groups that attack our interests abroad. Hezbollah blew up the Khobar towers with Iranian help, etc... They and their state sponsor have consistently opposed US interests and killed US soldiers and continually threatened and fought against Israel.

Maybe you are right about the foreign fighters, I have not done the field research myself, but nonetheless I would hesitate to think that they all "have an agenda."

So if I may distill the argument. You think that that by invading and occupying Afghanistan we have told other sponsors of terror (against the US homeland) that we will destroy you if you hit us. This, to you, is worth the blood and treasure sacrifices we have made.

My contention is that the Taliban were not necessary or involved in the 9/11 attack, and as their sponsorship was not necessary to AQ's success, we should focus our attention elsewhere. Our interests abroad are still at risk to state sponsored terror groups, and thus I don't think OEF has deterred terror sponsorship. So the tradeoff has not been worth it in my opinion.

Would you distill exactly what the real strategic intent behind OIF was? I think I understand your position on Afghanistan, but what were we deterring other ME states from doing? other than proliferation of course.

[William F. Owen]

I still don't understand exactly why you think Afghanistan was a war of necessity at the beginning. I don't see the security connection between Taliban/AQ presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and US national security. Like I said in my original post, we were not attacked by insurgents using small units tactics, or even explosives (knowledge of which could have been gained at a camp in Afghanistan). The money that funded the hijackers was not earned in Afghanistan either.
The US Attacked AQ because US public opinion demanded that it do so. The Taliban would not give them up, so they got it as well. Nothing wrong with that.
There is also the issue of reciprocity. Actions have consequences, and it's good to make enemies or potential enemies aware of that.

The desire to turn A'Stan into a modern functioning democracy is not a strategic security need. It's just an unintended consequence of a policy to go after AQ, and a belief that it is achievable given the very meagre military resources put the task.

[Ken White]

So what is the end state then?... So we will have made the point that if you harbor terrorists that attack the US itself (not abroad) we will deal with you directly. This may be an effective deterrent, but once again, I don't see how AQ's ability to strike on US soil had anything to do with state sponsorship.It was not the sponsorship, there was none -- it was hosting AQ headquarters and training facilities.
Furthermore it doesn't address state sponsored groups that attack our interests abroad. Hezbollah blew up the Khobar towers with Iranian help, etc... They and their state sponsor have consistently opposed US interests and killed US soldiers and continually threatened and fought against Israel.Don't confuse your Hezbollahs. The one that hit Khobar was Hezbollah Al Hejaz; the Saudi Arabian home grown variant, not the Lebanese model. The Saudis effectively dismantled theirs after we got off Saudi territory. The Lebanese version has pretty well left us alone since the Marine Barracks and Embassy bombings and kidnappings in Beirut -- which Reagan handled very poorly.
Maybe you are right about the foreign fighters, I have not done the field research myself, but nonetheless I would hesitate to think that they all "have an agenda."Most everyone has an agenda of some sort. Nothing wrong with that, it's just wrong when you try to obscure your interest and pass it off as pure and objective news or reportage.
You think that that by invading and occupying Afghanistan we have told other sponsors of terror (against the US homeland) that we will destroy you if you hit us. This, to you, is worth the blood and treasure sacrifices we have made.Too soon to tell for certain but I believe that a big part of why we went to both nations was to restore credibility. Whether that was the reason or not, the practical effect is that the cred has been essentially restored.

From 1979 until 2001, we were probed and provoked by folks from the ME -- not just AQ but the Muslim Brotherhood and several others and the fact that ME folks were AQ in Afghanistan added it to the mix -- and four Presidents refused to respond forcefully to those probes. That loss of credibility from Viet Nam, through Somalia and the failure to properly respond to the strike and bombings led folks to believe we could be continually pushed until we toppled. Been the cause of almost all our wars, some one though the Americans wouldn't respond. So the credibility had to be restored. Not leaving Iraq helped a great deal, not leaving Afghanistan until it is in better shape will help more.

In both cases, a far better job by the Armed Forces and fewer casualties would have enhanced that effect but the services did the best they could with what they had. My guess is that both will prove to have been worth the effort and the cost.
My contention is that the Taliban were not necessary or involved in the 9/11 attack, and as their sponsorship was not necessary to AQ's success, we should focus our attention elsewhere. Our interests abroad are still at risk to state sponsored terror groups, and thus I don't think OEF has deterred terror sponsorship. So the tradeoff has not been worth it in my opinion.We can differ. The only real state sponsor of any significance at this time is Iran and they're a whole different ball game on several levels...
Would you distill exactly what the real strategic intent behind OIF was? I think I understand your position on Afghanistan, but what were we deterring other ME states from doing? other than proliferation of course.In the ME -- and all the former Persian Empires (plural) which included all or part of Afghanistan, the Eye for Eye rule is followed. Afghansitan was the eye for the eye of hosting the crew that financed the 9/11 attack. Most in the area totally understood that. Iraq, OTOH, was the arm for the arm -- in the ME, eyes and arms are not interchangeable; responses are expected to be specific -- that were all the attacks around the globe including Khobar Towers and the African Embassy Bombing, the USS Cole and so forth. All those attack emanated from various parts of the ME (and few if any of the attackers were deprived youth) so the issue after 9/11 became we could not really stop attacks on the US, we're too big and the borders are too porous. All these attacks originated from various nations in the ME, so the question became could we send a message to the whole ME?

The issue was to convince them to not support actions or host those that would act against American interests

Voila, there's Iraq, geographically central, plenty of room for basing, will not disrupt the world oil supply (important -- we wanted China and India to have all the oil they wanted...), hated and despised dictator, pariah state -- there will be upset but it will be mild and then we'll have forces in the area that will help keep the neighbors honest. Folks in the ME of course screamed -- but they knew what the message was even if most in the west couldn't understand it. All the WMD and thus proliferation stuff was mostly diversionary because any attempt to state up front the real reason -- to send a message -- would never have flown past Congress whose approval was desired.

Had we gone in and gotten out quickly as was originally planned, the message would have been far more potent. It still will be adequate, I believe. Why the change to the plan in early May 2003 from rapid departure to staying, I don't know -- but it'll come out some day

[Zack]

I guess time will tell whether Iraq and Afghanistan have restored our credibility as a deterrent. I certainly hope that you are right, and that the sacrifice will have been worth it.

Regarding OEF, if restoration of our credibility was the end goal in mind, it seems a terrible risk to try to nation build. Why not just destroy the Taliban and what we can find of AQ and leave? We could have continued every time either group stuck its head out, but without committing significant ground forces, or trying to turn Afghanistan into a democracy.

The use of OIF to deter states of the ME in general still seems to an odd twist of reasoning. If you are correct and we are retaliating for Khobar, USS Cole, the embassy bombings, etc, by making an example of Iraq, how exactly does that make us a more credible deterrent? It seems to me as though our relative power was decreased (grossly?) by Iraq. I guess if it had gone off without a hitch, it might have had that effect but not now. And like you said, Iran is the last really major state sponsor, and instead of adjusting their behavior in light of threats they seem to be moving in the opposite direction, especially now that they are more or less a military junta. Hopefully Iraq will remain independent of Iran, but it is predominantly Shi'a, so I wouldn't be sure either way.

So why 2 wars to improve our credibility? I guess it was assumed Afghanistan was under control by the time Iraq got underway, but I digress. Time will tell I suppose.

[Zack]

The US Attacked AQ because US public opinion demanded that it do so. The Taliban would not give them up, so they got it as well. Nothing wrong with that.
There is also the issue of reciprocity. Actions have consequences, and it's good to make enemies or potential enemies aware of that.

The desire to turn A'Stan into a modern functioning democracy is not a strategic security need. It's just an unintended consequence of a policy to go after AQ, and a belief that it is achievable given the very meagre military resources put the task.

I agree with the first part, but if nation building is just an unintended consequence of reciprocity why is it still going on? It is obvious now that it is not achievable with meager military resources.

[William F. Owen]

... if nation building is just an unintended consequence of reciprocity why is it still going on? It is obvious now that it is not achievable with meager military resources.
Because it's now the policy. This is politics. It's not logic or reason.
We don't know that it is not achievable. The "NEW COIN" crowd believe it is. I strongly suspect, that given current resources and manpower, it is not, but that is just my opinion.

[Overland]

Why not just destroy the Taliban and what we can find of AQ and leave? We could have continued every time either group stuck its head out, but without committing significant ground forces, or trying to turn Afghanistan into a democracy.

With respect, it sounds as if you're trading one untenable situation for another.

I don't find any comfort in a strategy that relies exclusively on our ability and willingness to react. I can think of no supreme benefit inherent in a stance where the enemy chooses the field of battle and weapons employed. Even the material benefit associated with opting out of an occupation is called into question when one realizes that much of our wealth is generated by the stability of our nation and its "infallible" image-- both sure to be damaged as the mosquito bites add up (or the mosquito manages to go NBC and provide us with a heavy dose of EEE).

[Entropy]

Because it's now the policy. This is politics. It's not logic or reason.
We don't know that it is not achievable. The "NEW COIN" crowd believe it is. I strongly suspect, that given current resources and manpower, it is not, but that is just my opinion.

What Wilf said.

[Zack]

With respect, it sounds as if you're trading one untenable situation for another.

I don't find any comfort in a strategy that relies exclusively on our ability and willingness to react. I can think of no supreme benefit inherent in a stance where the enemy chooses the field of battle and weapons employed. Even the material benefit associated with opting out of an occupation is called into question when one realizes that much of our wealth is generated by the stability of our nation and its "infallible" image-- both sure to be damaged as the mosquito bites add up (or the mosquito manages to go NBC and provide us with a heavy dose of EEE).

I'm not so sure about our "infallible image," we have done considerably worse things for less valid reasons. An expensive occupation (blood and treasure) would also seem to detract from the "stability" of our nation as well.

Also how would a more limited response allow the enemy choose the field of battle and weapons employed? In either scenario (occupation or limited response) we are being reactionary (reciprocity for 9/11). If it was a more limited response; maybe a MEU blocking force, SF, air assets, we would be able to strike where we please without allowing AQ/Taliban to have much opportunity for reprisal. We would spend less money, incur fewer casualties, less negative response from other countries in the region, and still disrupt the networks, c&c, and emphasize that cooperation of AQ is something we will not stand for.

It seems to me that the occupation (if either) is more untenable than a limited, but strong response.

[Ken White]

An expensive occupation (blood and treasure) would also seem to detract from the "stability" of our nation as well.but the real question is why did we elect to stay rather than do as you suggest...
We would spend less money, incur fewer casualties, less negative response from other countries in the region, and still disrupt the networks, c&c, and emphasize that cooperation of AQ is something we will not stand for.Without knowledge of why that course was elected as a change to the original plan, we can only speculate. What has happened has happened. It will all come out eventually and then -- only then -- will we be able to assess the pros and cons.
It seems to me that the occupation (if either) is more untenable than a limited, but strong response.Many agree with you, Thus why that was not done is a mystery -- at this time. Make no mistake, it is a political mystery, not military.

In the meantime, The key is to do as Overland suggests and NOT let others place us in the reactionary mode -- though I'm not at all sure that our Congress is prepared to accept that idea.

[Zack]

Congress not reactionary? Har har

So in the end we more or less agree? Or do you think the occupation was a good choice (based on your own reasoning) and it is only the motives the Bush administration acted on that are a mystery?

[Ken White]

which you call an occupation has not been beneficial, I think. I'm not sure we agree on whether all things considered either action, to include the occupation or stability operation, was worth the cost.

While I think the post attack phase in both nations was badly mishandled by the government, I fault the Army in particular for not being better prepared. Whether the results achieved (or likely to be achieved) justified the gross costs will hinge on the reason we stayed to a great extent (i.e. it was certainly political but domestic or international?). We'll know more eventually but based on what I have seen and heard thus far, I believe that both were worth it.

I think we agree that we can rely on Congress to be reactionary -- and not to allow anything remotely looking like forward thinking... :D

[Overland]

Zack,

This is going to sound quite flip, and I'm sure I stand the chance of being roundly criticized (and maybe justifiably so), but I am always wary of anyone who measures the cost of our involvement in "blood". Not that the sacrifice of every individual Soldier, Sailor, Marine and Airman isn't painful, but I'm always put off by an argument that rests its laurels on the morally superior position afforded by stating, "I don't want more of them to die." Welcome to the club. I can't think of a single rational, decent person who wants more servicemen and women to die.

However, the measure is at best naive and at worst intellectually arrogant. We currently field an all-volunteer force that is dedicated to performing the mission at hand. Individual servicemembers are willing to risk their lives for a variety of reasons (from the professional to the personal), but every single one of them made the choice to be where they are. Attempting to use their "blood" as a bargaining chip in any manner (pro- or anti-war) other than what they intend is unacceptable. So let's focus on the economic aspect of the debate on "cost" as we could not possibly provide the attention due to the individual sacrifices made and the motivations behind them.

As for the choice of the field of battle and weapons employed, I should have been more explicit. Let's use a quick example to highlight the point I'm attempting to make. Pre-9/11 most of our anti-terrorism/force protection efforts focused on the hardening of government and military installations, with little or inadequate attention being paid to our civilian infrastructure. The result? Our enemy found the gaps in our defenses and exploited them to attack us. It's a friction I'm sure everyone is familiar with-- you can try to defend everything all of the time, but eventually the enemy is going to find a way around your defenses and use a novel method to attack you.

Thus, we're basically allowing the enemy the room and time to decide when, where and how to attack the United States. Placing the US on the permanent defensive (or at least until our adversary decides it is done attacking us) should not sit well with anyone. In terms of cost, the constant revamping of our defenses and wasted money for unnecessary or ineffective measures (read that: TSA) could drain our treasury just as completely as fixing the problem at its source. Even further, such a defensive mindset opens possibilities for peer competitors, not just our enemies.

[Fuchs]

Zack,

This is going to sound quite flip, and I'm sure I stand the chance of being roundly criticized (and maybe justifiably so), but I am always wary of anyone who measures the cost of our involvement in "blood". Not that the sacrifice of every individual Soldier, Sailor, Marine and Airman isn't painful, but I'm always put off by an argument that rests its laurels on the morally superior position afforded by stating, "I don't want more of them to die." Welcome to the club. I can't think of a single rational, decent person who wants more servicemen and women to die.

However, the measure is at best naive and at worst intellectually arrogant. We currently field an all-volunteer force that is dedicated to performing the mission at hand. Individual servicemembers are willing to risk their lives for a variety of reasons (from the professional to the personal), but every single one of them made the choice to be where they are. Attempting to use their "blood" as a bargaining chip in any manner (pro- or anti-war) other than what they intend is unacceptable. So let's focus on the economic aspect of the debate on "cost" as we could not possibly provide the attention due to the individual sacrifices made and the motivations behind them.

As for the choice of the field of battle and weapons employed, I should have been more explicit. Let's use a quick example to highlight the point I'm attempting to make. Pre-9/11 most of our anti-terrorism/force protection efforts focused on the hardening of government and military installations, with little or inadequate attention being paid to our civilian infrastructure. The result? Our enemy found the gaps in our defenses and exploited them to attack us. It's a friction I'm sure everyone is familiar with-- you can try to defend everything all of the time, but eventually the enemy is going to find a way around your defenses and use a novel method to attack you.

Thus, we're basically allowing the enemy the room and time to decide when, where and how to attack the United States. Placing the US on the permanent defensive (or at least until our adversary decides it is done attacking us) should not sit well with anyone. In terms of cost, the constant revamping of our defenses and wasted money for unnecessary or ineffective measures (read that: TSA) could drain our treasury just as completely as fixing the problem at its source. Even further, such a defensive mindset opens possibilities for peer competitors, not just our enemies.

Blood is one of the currencies of warfare, and neither currency should be ignored if you gotta spend it to buy something.

The exploitation of a weak spot is not related to the concept of friction. The failure of a strong point due to bad luck would be friction.

A defensive posture on the strategic level does not necessitate a defensive posture on the tactical level, unlike you implied it.
It's always a bad idea to use a tunnel vision on a problem, and discussing OEF/ISAF as part of a CT strategy without taking into account civilian CT assets like the hugely effective* intelligence services and police.

My assertion:
Civilian CT assets have been 99% of our CT defence since 9/11. Meanwhile we're waging wars that are only supposed to be part of a CT strategy.


*: Once they pulled their act together.

[Ken White]

media and the chattering classes busy instead of allowing them to poke into other things. Occupy the Diplomatic types and allow them to "tut-tut." Puts people off balance, trying to figure out what the war maker is up to. Upsets the neighbors and causes rats to crawl out of their holes. Stirs up the world economy in unpredictable ways. Makes the ungodly focus on the wrong objectives. Stops Constitutions from being approved. Sews dissension among the onlookers. Forces people to choose side and tip hands. Modifies economic hegemony. Disrupts currency changes -- and more...

Sort of like a magician who palms something in one hand while keeping up a stream of patter and waving the other hand about airily... ;)

One would think any strategist worth his pay would glom onto that. Not to mention that the many would realize there is almost never a single reason for any war but a multiplicity of things synergistically collide at a time and place. One would also think that any thinking person would realize that if he or she sees an inexplicable anomaly, many others also see it as that. :cool:

The easy solution is to elect a Hanlon's Razor explanation. That may or may not be correct. ;)

[Overland]

Blood is one of the currencies of warfare, and neither currency should be ignored if you gotta spend it to buy something.

I just don't see the benefit of such hyperbole.

If you want to make an academic evaluation of the casualties associated with our current conflicts versus others then feel free. Referencing vague concepts such as, "blood is a currency," serves no purpose other than to accomplish what I noted above-- assumptive moral superiority.


The exploitation of a weak spot is not related to the concept of friction. The failure of a strong point due to bad luck would be friction.

I think you're utilizing the term "friction" in a context other than what was intended. If there's a technical and exclusive use for the term I'm shamefully unaware of it. Rather, I was putting forward that there exists friction between efforts competing for limited resources. We cannot cover all of avenues of attack available to our enemy, and the enemy takes advantage of that situation. Thus, they choose the field of battle and the weapons employed.


A defensive posture on the strategic level does not necessitate a defensive posture on the tactical level, unlike you implied it.

It's my impression that a withdrawal from Afghanistan and focus on homeland defense necessitates a change on more than the tactical level. You may disagree, although I do not see how.


My assertion:
Civilian CT assets have been 99% of our CT defence since 9/11. Meanwhile we're waging wars that are only supposed to be part of a CT strategy.

99%? That's a fairly exact estimation. Could you expand?

[Rex Brynen]

99%? That's a fairly exact estimation. Could you expand?

He's rounding up :D

[Surferbeetle]

media and the chattering classes busy instead of allowing them to poke into other things. Occupy the Diplomatic types and allow them to "tut-tut." Puts people off balance, trying to figure out what the war maker is up to. Upsets the neighbors and causes rats to crawl out of their holes. Stirs up the world economy in unpredictable ways. Makes the ungodly focus on the wrong objectives. Stops Constitutions from being approved. Sews dissension among the onlookers. Forces people to choose side and tip hands. Modifies economic hegemony. Disrupts currency changes -- and more...

Sort of like a magician who palms something in one hand while keeping up a stream of patter and waving the other hand about airily... ;)

One would think any strategist worth his pay would glom onto that. Not to mention that the many would realize there is almost never a single reason for any war but a multiplicity of things synergistically collide at a time and place. One would also think that any thinking person would realize that if he or she sees an inexplicable anomaly, many others also see it as that. :cool:

The easy solution is to elect a Hanlon's Razor explanation. That may or may not be correct. ;)

Wikipedia (the magic source of all knowledge :eek: )


The parable of the broken window (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable_of_the_broken_window) was created by Frédéric Bastiat in his 1850 essay Ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on ne voit pas (That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Unseen) to illuminate the notion of hidden costs associated with destroying property of others.

[Ken White]

OTOH, there are a lot of parables about and one can pull one out to support about any proposition.

I'm familiar with the 'Broken Window' and Bastiat -- many of whose ideas I strongly support -- but have to point out that he, like all Economists, relies unduly on metrics, and that you can take any given economic theory or postulation from one or a group of them and find another equally well know individual or group who are diametrically opposed.

I'd also point out that the economic and other costs of war are only part of the equation. There are intangibles and no Economist or metrics can properly weigh them because they are in the minds of infinitely variable human brings.

Sometimes, you just have to make a subjective call...

If your allusion to Bastiat was to make the point that unintended consequences can outweigh seeming benefits, well yeah. They always do and most of us over 16 are aware of that. He also pointed out that war was almost always not a sound endeavor from an economic perspective. True, certainly -- but irrelevant. If it were relevant, there would be no war...

May I ask what is the precise point of your donated parable? :confused:

[Fuchs]

... that he, like all Economists, relies unduly on metrics, ...

I got a 1.3 grade (2nd best possible) for my diploma dissertation without a single equation in a hundred pages.
I know metrics and math-focused economist (I even endured lectures on the philosophy of public finance where the professor really described the whole philosophy in math!!!), yet "all" is entirely off.

@Overland:
I wrote 99% (and imo sufficiently marked it as a personal assertion) because I have yet to hear about a single plot foiled or Western sleeper cell eliminated by military action at the end of the world. There may be some contribution, but it's in the realm of other's assertion. The military contribution to CT (excluding military self-protection CT) was probably limited to grabbing prisoners for interrogation and neutralising some leaders who wouldn't have dared to set foot on Western soil ever again anyway.

[Surferbeetle]

...here...instead while listening and learning I noted that I had heard a description of war before that sounded similar to yours...my original route to Bastiat came from a quote from the character of Jean-Baptiste Emanuel Zorg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fifth_Element) ("Life, which you so nobly serve, comes from destruction, disorder, and chaos." ) which has been pinging around in my head for a while....

With respect to the opportunity costs of Afghanistan I suspect that particular analysis has been done and is updated regularly...and it's going to remain Ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on ne voit pas until 50 years or so pass.

In short, more links in your discussions would be greatly appreciated Ken...you are a walking encyclopedia...and now back to regularly scheduled programming.

[Ken White]

yet "all" is entirely off.True, hyperbole on my part. I should have said 99%. :D

Joking. Should really have said many or even some. So I do stand corrected on that...
No sly subterfuge......here...Didn't suspect it, just wasn't sure what the point was as my contention was apparently that those costs, unintended as well as foreseen were worth the possible results while Bastiat IIRC seemed to say they rarely were -- which is okay, Frédéric and I agree on much but do not have to agree on everything. :wry:
In short, more links in your discussions would be greatly appreciated Ken...I was not channeling Bastiat, just stating my opinions based on open sources and common sense so I'm unsure what I could have linked in that post. Everything in the subject line and the first paragraph of that 1715Z post of mine has been said by others in many places.

Sorry, not a linker. I do link when I think it necessary but I do not believe that the number of links discloses the merit of a comment. I am in fact inclined to think the reverse is true. To me they are a distraction more often than not. Most of what I say here is fairly common knowledge (with the caveat that some of it is restricted to us Dinosaurs) and should be easily Googled (including the saurian recollections...). If someone wants me to 'prove' a certain statement (provided that said statement is not merely my opinion), I may or may not provide a link depending upon what kind of mood I'm in at the time. ;)

So I stand chastised but uncorrectable or is that incorrigible? Unporridgeable? Unvinculumable... :eek:

[Surferbeetle]

So I stand chastised but uncorrectable or is that incorrigible? Unporridgeable? Unvinculumable... :eek:


And to think that I thought just the bourbon and the french were flowing.... :eek: :D

There is a beer waiting in my fridge...gotta get there first though...laters ;)

[omarali50]

I am surprised at the notion of "everything was going fine until we invaded" (OK, I am exaggerating, but there are a couple of posts saying something close to that). I am not saying the invasion was the best thing to do, but things didnt look that rosy to me back in August 2001. There IS such a thing as the serious jihadi project, which is not just "geopolitics by other means" (meaning its not just Pakistan, and certainly not just Afghanistan, playing at geostrategic thinking and using whatever means are at hand). Since the time of General Zia, there has been a determined core of jihadis who had/have a vision of avenging Palestinians, capturing Kashmir, humiliating India, liberating Central Asia, etc etc, all under the broader goal of Islamist revival. This project was going swimmingly until 2001, when someone overreached or whatever and things started going south. There are definitely Taliban who are only interested in ruling Afghanistan and there are many many Pakistanis who are only interested in improving Pakistan's position vis a vis India, but the idea that the Pakistani Taliban are completely different from the Afghan variety and AQ is completely detached from both is an exaggeration. All the jihads are interconnected and will stay interconnected. IF there is a non-jihadi Pakistani govt and a non-jihadi Afghan govt, then yes, its just a local insurgency with occasional terrorist acts far away. But the Pakistani govt of pre-2001 did not qualify in that category. Probably out of foolishness, the army high command (even the whisky drinkers like Musharraf) were all on board the jihadi project or willing to look the other way, which is much the same thing. The status quo ante was not as rosy as projected. Pakistan has indeed become destabilized after 2001, but a big part of that is precisely because the army has had to pull back from its jihadi partners and they are going berserk. Are you suggesting that it would be in US interest to have left that arrangement in place? (I am not saying this was the best way to achieve the change...this was probably a lousy way from the US perspective, costing too much and not achieving enough. It may have been better to use carrots and sticks more subtly and carefully). I should add that I am conflicted about this myself. I am generally left of center and close to being a pacifist (besides being a Pakistani and not really wanting to have the US "help" the country the way they helped Iraq), but still, unlike most American leftists I am aware that there are real people out in the world, with "agency" and sometimes with very violent and dangerous desires.In this case, the alternative to this war is also a war.

[Zack]

It's my impression that a withdrawal from Afghanistan and focus on homeland defense necessitates a change on more than the tactical level. You may disagree, although I do not see how.


How does the occupation of Afghanistan make us offensive strategically? AQ may have been "headquartered" in Afghanistan in 2001 (though I think it is difficult to claim that something as decentralized as AQ has a head to cut off) but they certainly are not now. We are actively seeking out and destroying networks whenever we can, but that is completely independent of our occupation of Afghanistan. Securing our borders is, I agree, a basically impossible task, but continuing to occupy the former host country of AQ is not a solution to that problem.

@omarali50

I don't know if you were referring to me, but I in no way think the situation pre-2001 was "ok." There are plenty of anti-status quo, human rights abusing, regionally destabilizing groups out there, but we don't go around trying to destroy them all. We went after this one for reciprocity. The public demand for revenge is gone now. All we have left is an increasingly difficult nation building project with no end in sight, and with very little (at best) gains to be made (if we are successful at all).