Strategic vignette

[Fuchs]

Scenario:
You are being hired by a merc company that works for your country's intelligence service.

The problem:
Indigenous criminals terrorize and maraud in a Latin American valley.
An energy corporation from your country wants to set up a lucrative palladium mining business in this valley and asked your government to clean the mess up first.

The mission:
Solve the organized crime problem to the extent that the mining business won't be affected. Success expected in six months.

The enemy:
A homeless youth gang, mostly known for domestic drug business, arson and random violent crimes.
A protection money and drug export gang with firearms and stolen explosives (from mines).
A rumoured corruption network run by a pre-existing competing mining company.
Possible opposition by corrupt policemen and mining company guards.

Your resources:
10,000 USD/week, plus four retired senior NCOs from your country (two with combat experience, two with mostly support experience). Four one-way flight tickets. A two-hour briefing at the embassy.

The terrain:
A valley, mostly with potato fields. A small polluted river separates both valley halves. Few and weak (enough for a truck) bridges. Small forests. Larger settlements mostly in favela style, smaller villages in rural style.

The civilians:
Many illiterates, qualitative malnourished, few rich families with traditional claims to power, many poor families, a tiny middle class of clerks. 30% unemployment, 30% under-employment. 100% conservative Catholics. Traditional drug abuse is significant. Everyone can speak Spanish.



Your turn.

[Abu Suleyman]

Well, last time this happened, what we did... I mean ... uh...

[Surferbeetle]

Eine interesante problem. Ich will mehr lernen: was wissen wir von der Polizei, die Wirtschaft, und die Regierung, in dieser platz?

It's an interesting problem, and I would like to learn more: what do we know about security/police, economics, and governance?

Who has mined in this area before and what is the associated history with that operation? Is this a reputable company and if so how long is this operation projected to last for? What's the plan for mine waste?

1) What’s the ratio of police to inhabitants, how are they armed and supplied, how are they trained, are they drawn from this town, are they regularly paid, and how are they perceived?
2) What loads are the roads and bridges rated for, where is the nearest airport/port, what is known about hydroelectric/thermal power generation/transmission/distribution, how many nearby hotels & restaurants, what about fuel & repair sites? What's the river polluted with? How deep to groundwater (what are the results of groundwater testing)?
3) What Government arm supports this effort? How effective is the Alcalde, how large is his staff, what are his current concerns and priorities? What about Rule of Law infrastructure/human capital? Where is the nearest church? What political parties work in the area? Is German Agro Action working this area? Where is the nearest clinic? Where is the nearest school? Is there a radio station?

Can I see a copy of the business plan? What’s my share of the mining operations gross take again? :rolleyes:

[Rex Brynen]

Can I see a copy of the business plan? What’s my share of the mining operations gross take again? :rolleyes:

Yes, I wondered about that one, not to mention wondering what my country's intelligence service was doing hiring mercenaries to solve criminal problems in another country for a MNC. Or is the mercenary company just boasting of its connections, and has been hired by the MNC (which would make a lot more sense)?

If the IC is directly involved in this, I'll reserve my seats now for the parliamentary (or Congressional) inquiry :D

[Schmedlap]

I thought Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes) went out of business.

[Fuchs]

I designed it with an intent, I'll disclose that later.
There's enough relevant info for my purpose.

About further details: Live with uncertainty, and don't expect to know everything in advance. To assume otherwise would be unrealistic.

[slapout9]

Here is a picture of the 4 man group that will save the country X.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWGeRgFa-hI

[Ron Humphrey]

Scenario:
You are being hired by a merc company that works for your country's intelligence service.

The problem:
Indigenous criminals terrorize and maraud in a Latin American valley.
An energy corporation from your country wants to set up a lucrative palladium mining business in this valley and asked your government to clean the mess up first.

The mission:
Solve the organized crime problem to the extent that the mining business won't be affected. Success expected in six months.

The enemy:
A homeless youth gang, mostly known for domestic drug business, arson and random violent crimes.
A protection money and drug export gang with firearms and stolen explosives (from mines).
A rumoured corruption network run by a pre-existing competing mining company.
Possible opposition by corrupt policemen and mining company guards.

Your resources:
10,000 USD/week, plus four retired senior NCOs from your country (two with combat experience, two with mostly support experience). Four one-way flight tickets. A two-hour briefing at the embassy.

The terrain:
A valley, mostly with potato fields. A small polluted river separates both valley halves. Few and weak (enough for a truck) bridges. Small forests. Larger settlements mostly in favela style, smaller villages in rural style.

The civilians:
Many illiterates, qualitative malnourished, few rich families with traditional claims to power, many poor families, a tiny middle class of clerks. 30% unemployment, 30% under-employment. 100% conservative Catholics. Traditional drug abuse is significant. Everyone can speak Spanish.



Your turn.

Send a group in first with lots of money and start buying local loyalty to the extent possible.

Take time( approx 3 months) to build up information on all local dynamics and players.
Begin talks privately with gov officials about which "law breakers" they're looking for and get set to turn the info over to gov when you're ready to.

Use the extortion groups paid guarantees to build what you need built and pay the young gangsters well to build it.

Look for those who have shown the most promise in leadership and probable long term stability to last and turn all the rest of them over to the gov to do with as they please.

Pay those left well and spend the next month or so consolidating any developmental cycles you established

Month six fly to Tahiti and sleep well and wealthy since you apparently have no conscience or ethics but you did finish the job as requested.


Back to you ;):eek::D.

[Bob's World]

Nothing strategic about this vignette. (i.e., you sucked me in with false advertising)

But I suspect you could buy these guys off well less than your $10 K/week budget. This is first a business transaction. If that fails, then consider other options.

[Fuchs]

Well, it's an isolated problem, not part of a greater mess. The solution would therefore be about the whole; "strategic".

Anyway, I don't see yet how bribes in themselves would have lasting effect.

Ron's solution looks to me a bit as if the opponent(s) were static targets.
Lucky boy if that's part of his interpretation's details, I'm a bit less optimistic.

[Ron Humphrey]

Well, it's an isolated problem, not part of a greater mess. The solution would therefore be about the whole; "strategic".

Anyway, I don't see yet how bribes in themselves would have lasting effect.

Ron's solution looks to me a bit as if the opponent(s) were static targets.
Lucky boy if that's part of his interpretation's details, I'm a bit less optimistic.

and theres always the whole bit to bite ya in the backside:o

You'll recall when others mentioned the "details" part you wanted to stick to the basics:D

Anywho, As to your original case you have to admit from the perspective of one merely being hired to get the mine running productively and fairly securely the Whole might be considered by the hired help to be someone elses problem:cool:

[Surferbeetle]

Here is a picture of the 4 man group that will save the country X.

Well at least Spock is on the team! ;)

[bourbon]

Anyway, I don't see yet how bribes in themselves would have lasting effect.
In the short term it allows you to get the mining project off the ground, which will improve the employment problem in the region which in turn effects the gang issue.

Plus foreign bribery is a tax deduction for some European countries, I believe.

[Stan]

Well at least Spock is on the team! ;)

Hey Steve,
I was just about to say the same thing :cool:

[William F. Owen]

[
The mission:
Solve the organized crime problem to the extent that the mining business won't be affected. Success expected in six months.


A.) I think I want four highly experienced "Anti-gang" police officers, not 4 NCOs.

B.) I think I'd want to know what is the minimum level of security/level of risk, the mining business is prepared to accept. I mean success here is someone making money by mining. Success here is not stopping the violence, if it can't stop the mining, or make it cost too much?

Am I getting it?

[kaur]

Fuchs, you should find man (what ever title he has) who has enough resources to enforce tolerable level of security in the valley. You should ask what he asks for this favor and you must bargain. I think this is too much to start rebuilding the society. Do you need this? I doubt. Your task is like US task in Afganistan in the autumn 2001.

[Surferbeetle]

From RAND, by: William Rosenau, Peter Chalk, Renny McPherson, Michelle Parker, Austin Long : Corporations and Counterinsurgency (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP259/)


Like nongovernmental organizations and private military companies, large multinational corporations (MNCs) can play significant roles in zones of violent conflict. Any comprehensive conflict analysis needs to understand these roles, especially as they relate to counterinsurgency. Using a set of three case studies, the authors explore MNC operations in Liberia, Papua New Guinea, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The case studies highlight the activities of the MNCs that were intended to shape their violent environment and protect their infrastructure and personnel. Policymakers may be tempted to leverage corporate activities. However, corporate actions, no matter how well intentioned, can have less-than-benign consequences. Moreover, any potential “subcontracting” to MNCs would raise questions about accountability, legitimacy, and state responsibilities.

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Bank Group (http://www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm)


Investors and lenders in today's dynamic investment climate understand the potential benefits of investing in emerging markets. The even smarter ones also understand the critical importance of addressing the political risks that may accompany an investment in an untested environment. MIGA can help investors and lenders deal with these risks by insuring eligible projects against losses relating to:

* Currency transfer restrictions
* Expropriation
* War and civil disturbance
* Breach of contract


Hey Stan,

Been watching this one (and the Austrian Banks (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/austria/)) as well...

From BusinessWeek by S. Adam Cardais: Ukraine Must Reform to Tap EU Energy Aid (http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2009/gb20090827_935453.htm?chan=globalbiz_europe+index+ page_top+stories)


The European Union, which receives most of its Russian natural gas imports via Ukrainian pipelines, is trying to prevent the next in what's becoming the annual Moscow/Kyiv gas standoff, one that last year left much of Europe with energy shortages in January. Backed by the EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other international banks have laid out an approximately $1.7 billion aid package to help Ukraine pay for gas supplies during a recession that saw its GDP fall 18 percent last quarter year-on-year, and reform its domestic natural gas market to prevent future crises.

[slapout9]

Fuchs, you should find man (what ever title he has) who has enough resources to enforce tolerable level of security in the valley. You should ask what he asks for this favor and you must bargain. I think this is too much to start rebuilding the society. Do you need this? I doubt. Your task is like US task in Afganistan in the autumn 2001.

Sounds like a pretty good plan to me.

[Rex Brynen]

Fuchs, you should find man (what ever title he has) who has enough resources to enforce tolerable level of security in the valley. You should ask what he asks for this favor and you must bargain. I think this is too much to start rebuilding the society. Do you need this? I doubt. Your task is like US task in Afganistan in the autumn 2001.

I'm not sure it is anything like the US task in Afghanistan, to be honest. There (rightly or wrongly) the US is trying to build the long-term legitimacy and stability of the central government, including by trying to reduce corruption. In the scenario given here, you're trying to maximize the profits of a private company, possibly by ignoring or undercutting the central government (we're given no information on their attitude to all this) and possibly by using corruption.

Moreover, there's not enough information in the scenario to decide anything at the moment. Leaving aside the rather iffy issue of who exactly one is working for (unclear), we don't know anything about the intended investment, length of anticipated operations, possible labour demand (and economic benefits), the possible environment effects, the attitude and interests of key stakeholders, existing social alliances and patterns of conflict, and so forth. Palladium is typically found alloyed with gold, platinum, nickel and copper deposits, and usually involves mining, separating, and refining many tons of raw ore (http://www.palladiumcoins.com). There are substantial environmental (and hence social and economic) costs to this, and so the benefit and impact to the local community needs to be thought through in much more detail before the corporate security issues can be approached.

First thing to do, therefore? Ask an awful lot of questions. (Not such a bad idea in COIN operations either.)

[Surferbeetle]

First thing to do, therefore? Ask an awful lot of questions. (Not such a bad idea in COIN operations either.)

Rex,

I am in agreement, although Auftragstaktik (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission-type_tactics) has it's time and place, when one commits large amounts of community/organizational resources over significant time periods techniques such as SWOT (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis)(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) VRINE (http://flicksinc.com/StrategicDemo/) (Value, Rarity, Inimitability, Non-sustainability, Exploitability) Value Chain Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_chain), Stakeholder Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis), Marketing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketing), and all those other detail rich-time intensive methodologies are the proven ones which have helped us to reach those high water marks of 1.426 trillion per year GDP (http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=canadian+gdp) and 14.5 trillion per year GDP (http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=us+gdp). The one-dimensional heuschrecken IO campaign (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuschreckendebatte) doesn't cover all the nuances of our methods...:wry:

[kaur]

Rex Brynen said:


I'm not sure it is anything like the US task in Afghanistan, to be honest. There (rightly or wrongly) the US is trying to build the long-term legitimacy and stability of the central government, including by trying to reduce corruption. In the scenario given here, you're trying to maximize the profits of a private company, possibly by ignoring or undercutting the central government (we're given no information on their attitude to all this) and possibly by using corruption.

This is long term strategy. I'm not sure that Fuchs need this.


The CIA’s paramilitary operations in Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban regime by the end of the year.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22017.pdf

Did those small units collect infrmation and loyalty through verbal persuasion?


First thing to do, therefore? Ask an awful lot of questions. (Not such a bad idea in COIN operations either.)

One of the questions should be what can we do for you?

About corruption. I expressed myself in too general terms. One example about getting local's help is air base in Kyrgyzstan. As a bystander this seems to me like textbook bargaining process. I don't know who was the man (what ever title he has) who has enough resources to enforce tolerable level of security (in the valley). Maybe he is sitting in Kyrgyzstan's case in Bishkek, maybe in Moscow. You should just ask questions from PR firm :) What those guys got for air base. At least Kyrgyzstan got huge amount of money. To come back to smaller administrative level, maybe you don't need to pay money to local boss, but you just have to build nice modern football pitch to local school. You just got hint from local boss.

[Uboat509]

The company will need to make a positive impact on the local economy. That means buying local food and hiring local labor. In a poor region like this one, that won't be overly expensive but it will pay huge dividends. More than that they need to make sure people see the positive effect that they are having as well as seeing the negative effect that the corrupt officials are having. Perhaps hiring someone to do a documentary on the subject might work. It probably wouldn't hurt to say nice things about how the central government has helped you to help the locals, then mention how your efforts are still being hamstrung by corrupt local officials. That might induce them to act. In any case, our notional MNC would not have free reign to establish security by force and so would have to do so by information management. They should be able to control the narrative and make sure that everyone sees that they are a benevolent force who want to make a profit but also make the world a better place or some other such Pollyanna nonsense, while at the same time shining a light on what the gangs and the corrupt officials are doing. It also wouldn't hurt to throw some money at one or more NGOs and make sure that it is known that you did. You can probably never eliminate the crime and corruption but you should be able to keep it to a manageable level.

SFC W

[RJ]

Didn't Dirty Harry do this using a midget, a dancehall hooker and the old fella that ran the stable?

This seems to be the begining of a "What If" we do this or add that story line based upon an Italian Western shot in Bosnia.

Two shooters and two logistic dudes to kick start a important and expensive mining operation?

= 4 dead former military types in less than a week.

[Bill Moore]

A homeless youth gang, mostly known for domestic drug business, arson and random violent crimes.

You just described a bunch of punks who are terrorizing their own people, so an assumption is they have no popular support. None the less, pour on the propaganda to ensure the locals think that every bad thing that has ever happened to them is due to these thugs.

Find out who the power brokers are, especially those who can influence the local security forces and persuade (bribe) them to crack down on the thugs (keep your guidance general, e.g., we just need this problem to go away so we can invest, and then we'll both make money). Don't need the four NCOs, because we don't want to get our hands dirty. Let the business get taken care of, don't tell the locals how to do it, they know what is culturally acceptable.

When the problem is suppressed move in fast and push as many benefits possible to the people (within reason, but they should sense a qualitative increase in their quality of life), and tell them this would have been possible a long time ago if the gang wasn't here. Hopefully that will keep the information channels open, so if other trouble makers pop up they can be dealt with.

The key is the follow up after the clearing operation. Corporations are required to maximize their profits for the benefit of their share holders, but they need to think strategically, and realize that building schools, digging wells, putting in irrigation systems for the locals, building and supporting medical clinics in the long run will result in stability, increase the potential of their work force, and lead to greater profits.

Since it a notional scenario, I can have my notional plan.

[William F. Owen]

Find out who the power brokers are, especially those who can influence the local security forces and persuade (bribe) them to crack down on the thugs (keep your guidance general, e.g., we just need this problem to go away so we can invest, and then we'll both make money). Don't need the four NCOs, because we don't want to get our hands dirty. Let the business get taken care of, don't tell the locals how to do it, they know what is culturally acceptable.

I have no problem with this. It fulfils the description of the mission, and is an acceptable strategy in terms of gaining the desired outcome, using available means. - actually, all in all a pretty good lesson. Kudos Fuchs.

[Fuchs]

OK, it's about time to tell about the intent:


A part of the the exercise was to see whether people can think of solving such a problem without a company FOB, armoured vehicles and air support. That's how we've become used to think about such challenges; lots of resources, lots of time, high exposure.

The Merc aspect wasn't of interest to me.
It would have looked strange if I told you that the scenario is about five soldiers being tasked to fix troubles in an entire valley with a small budget, right?
That's not what armies do, at least not ours.


The ability to succeed with minimal resources thanks to clever ideas and with a readiness to improvise is something that I miss a lot in armies, at least in officer ranks.
Many NCOs and officers believe they're good tacticians when in fact they were only taught well the tactic compendium of their army. Many don't think themselves as much as is necessary to adapt well to alien circumstances.

The clever ideas needed to be specific and were therefore not really interesting in themselves. I was more curious about the general reception of the challenge.


It was also interesting to see whether the own survivability would be taken into account. Most replies described actions against the problems, but no countermeasures to stay alive. The enemy is not a static live fire target on a range - he will react.
My survivability tactic would be to work covertly, without being undertood as what I am for months.
I wouldn't set up a "base" (hotel room, storage area) inside the valley, but a hidden one (or two) outside - and move that one every week if possible. The vehicles would be changed or at least re-coloured often as well - and they would be typical in the region.
The basic survivability tactics would therefore be distance and covertness.


It was also interesting to see whether the replies treat the threat categories differently, with custom solutions.

The mere youth gang could be dissolved by simply hiring them as unskilled workers. You might also get rid of some by giving them a one-way ticket. Part of them may be hired by a business you set up yourselves in another place.

The corruption network might be defeated MI-style, by setting up legal traps.

The extortion gang with explosives would be the toughest nut, but there are unlimited options, and you could mix several tactics.

The threat of interference by corrupt policemen and criminal guards on behalf of competitors could hardly be countered before it manifests itself. I would accept this as an unsolvable problem (in this time frame) and tell the client that some security efforts will be necessary once the construction begins.


Plans may fail, so you'd need to have another idea for every problem. The trickle of your money gives you enough reserves for a 2nd attempt.

One of the keys to success is always to find, interview and to cooperate with local contacts, experts who already know much and many.


There's also a cultural/social aspect in the vignette; the society consists of a few rich people who own a lot and have the power and of many poor people. Parts of both classes are threats. A disruption of this structure looks impossible with the few resources available, but any attempt of disruption could turn the disadvantaged class even more against our interests. A bit politics may be necessary to prevent being covered by a social landslide. The rich could be assured and convinced of the advantages of the project on some dinner parties, for example.



@Bill Moore:
Nice approach, but the NCOs would be good for dispersed intelligence collection and I doubt that the budget suffices for your plan.
I furthermore doubt that bribing is a long-term solution; it tends to lose effect once you stop doing it and the vignette asked for a solution, not for a temporary suppression before the problem even becomes a problem.
It may work to turn one power against another and even eliminate one, but there was more than one threat category, and one problem was exactly the need to bribe.

- - - - -

There's also something that wasn't really taken into account by all replies, and I tell you from my consultant experience:
You cannot set the strategy and behaviour of your client. You can consult him, but it's foolish to expect that he'll do what you advise. Some clients are extremely resistant to even the best advice.

Don't expect the company to invest in anything but mining at all. They will probably even begin work with minimum security guards. The mining company may come half a year late, or begin its operations slowly - there's no guarantee on their behaviour that would allow you to plan for an exact and critical transition from your mission tot he mining company's operations.

You have your business and they have theirs - just as the business of ISAF and the Afghan government isn't the same.

[Dayuhan]

My survivability tactic would be to work covertly, without being undertood as what I am for months. I wouldn't set up a "base" (hotel room, storage area) inside the valley, but a hidden one (or two) outside - and move that one every week if possible. The vehicles would be changed or at least re-coloured often as well - and they would be typical in the region.
The basic survivability tactics would therefore be distance and covertness.


I hate to say this, but... dude, you would be SO dead.

I've lived much of my life in remote 3rd world valleys. I've been living in one for the past 9 years... in fact the valley I live in has successfully blocked the entry of mining companies, though the scenario is radically different from what you describe.

You cannot be covert in a place like this. Outsiders stick out like sore thumbs. Outsiders who sneak around, change locations a lot, and appear driving different vehicles or changing the colors of their vehicles stick out like large and very conspicuous sore thumbs. For vehicles, "typical in the region" means nothing, the locals will know every individual vehicle on their roads and who drives it - a foreigner driving a local vehicle would be noticed instantly. You might as well walk down the street with a huge placard that says "I'm spying on you" in the local dialect. People may not know what you are, but they will know that you are something they don't want around, and they will respond accordingly. If there's an active drug trade in the area you will probably be tagged as a narcotics agent and summarily disposed of.

The initial scenario sounds resolvable, but developing feasible tactics would require far more information. Describing the groups involved means very little. You need to know about the people in each group: is there a single boss, a loose coalition? There will always be key individuals: who are they, who are their principal rivals? Who takes care of dirty business for the local elite, and how are they connected to the local bad guys? There will be some kind of local military or law enforcement apparatus; who is in charge, who is getting paid off by whom? Who in the local elite is connected to who in the central government, and how? And on, and on, and on... The points of vulnerability in a scenario like this revolve around individuals and the relationships among individuals - you have to know who's who and how they connect. There are ways to find these things out without attempting a covert role that you will never achieve.

In any event, the likelihood of a mining company going to their home country intelligence agency and the agency hiring mercenaries seems rather improbable to me. More likely the company would make their deal with whoever in the host country government stand to earn the most from the project, and let them handle it their own way.

[Fuchs]

Meh, I shouldn't have deleted the line saying that my full approach would have filled pages.


There's a rather simple trick how to fool someone, it can be summarized under "deception".
Few people keep searching for causes if they have already found one.

One NCO can play the bait, take the blame, appear later, behave differently and be a very elusive target. The opponent's countermeasures will focus on him.

Meanwhile, the main team can - loosely connected - stays covert (not the same as invisible), for example in association with some local clerics, fooling them into thinking that you're from an aid NGO. There's nothing wrong with spending some money on survivability.


Besides; the exact approach to survivability isn't that interesting (to me) at all. To not ignore the requirement of survivability was of interest (to me).

[Dayuhan]

You could learn most of what you need to know without ever setting foot in the valley. Your valley is not a static place, people enter and exit all the time. Given the limited opportunities there, there is probably a great deal of outmigration. There's very likely a neighborhood in a nearby city where people from your area of interest are clustered. There are institutions (the church for one, and there will be others) that send people there and then post them elsewhere. Because these people are not in the valley, it's much easier to get them talking: they're less concerned that they will be seen communicating with an outsider.

Don't try to gather and process your information yourself: you need local people and foreigners who has lived in country for a very long time involved. They need to be street smart, with their own networks in place, and you need several perspectives.

Your problem with posing as NGO workers is that the questions you need answered are going to raise suspicions. People in these environments learn to be suspicious, and they are by no means stupid. Passing yourself off as something you're not is going to be much harder than it sounds.

I actually did a job rather like this once, though I only dealt with the information-gathering end of it. Much stranger situation in some ways, but the solution at the end of the day was fairly simple: there was one key individual that needed to be paid. The company decided not to go ahead with the investment, for other reasons. A wise decision, the place was a pretty surreal mess.

[Surferbeetle]

...there are many, many, many differences about new people that are obvious to any long term resident (child or adult) of an area. Is a long term native resident of Latin America going to drop into your average German Dorf (village), slip under the radar, and just fool everybody while covertly and quietly effecting his plan to mine the hell out of the nearby Wald (woods)?

Just think about some of the subtle things Germans use to discriminate between native Germans. Local police are even more focused...

Dialects and Accents of Germany (http://web.ku.edu/~idea/europe/germany/germany.htm)


The archive provides:
# downloadable recordings of accent/dialect speakers from the region you select
# text files giving the speakers' biographical details
# scholarly commentary and analysis in some cases
# and, in most cases, an orthographic transcription of the speakers' unscripted speech.

In a small number of cases, you will also find a narrow phonetic transcription of the sample (see Phonetic Transcriptions for a complete list).

Transparency and accountability are required for sustainable/major projects (mining engineering or otherwise)...financial folks, engineers, and soldiers are taught these things in entry level classes... ;)

[kaur]

Surferbeetle:


Transparency and accountability are required for sustainable/major projects (mining engineering or otherwise)...financial folks, engineers, and soldiers are taught these things in entry level classes...

What about advanced level classes :)

[Surferbeetle]

Surferbeetle: What about advanced level classes :)

Kaur,

I hear you; there is what we shoot for (civil society) and then what we actually do/find (not so civil society)...:wry:

For me OJT (on the job training), aka mistakes I have made and learned from...for example just go ahead and conduct a stakeholder analysis and then go meet with everybody because it's gonna be a lot less painful in the long run...has been a big thing and I try and combine that with regularly going back to some sort of schooling.

Any suggestions on advanced level classes?

Best,

Steve

[Rex Brynen]

I hate to say this, but... dude, you would be SO dead.

I absolutely agree with Dayuhan and Surferbeetle on this one--all of the James Bond skulking gets you nowhere other than to set all of the locals' alarm bells off. Before the week is up, they'll be convinced that you're CIA, DEA, a rival crime syndicate, and several other things beside.

This is true, I might add, not only in remote valleys but many other places beside. Moreover, anyone who thinks that hotel rooms aren't routinely searched by curious cleaners clearly never takes countersurveillance measures when they stay in interesting places :D


In any event, the likelihood of a mining company going to their home country intelligence agency and the agency hiring mercenaries seems rather improbable to me.

Indeed it is--and frankly the first step in survivability in this scenario was recognizing that your "employers" are almost certainly not being truthful with you!

[Bill Moore]

@Bill Moore:
Nice approach, but the NCOs would be good for dispersed intelligence collection and I doubt that the budget suffices for your plan.
I furthermore doubt that bribing is a long-term solution; it tends to lose effect once you stop doing it and the vignette asked for a solution, not for a temporary suppression before the problem even becomes a problem.

Fuchs, understand your intent and it is probably a worthwhile exercise but we can post back and forth stating what I really meant was......., because a short post with a couple of paragraphs doesn't provide enough context to provide a common understanding (surferbettle, Dayuhaun, and myself probably envisioned three different scenarios based on our life's experiences, and probably none of them came close to what you envisioned).

In response to your last post, I ask you to re-read it and note I did address teh morning after. Second, if you get the security forces to buy in to the mutual benefit of your business being successful, they can address a wide range of bad actors. Police in the U.S. deal with various threat groups, I don't need a different surrogate to go after each threat group, I need one (sufficiently enabled) to suppress the threat sufficiently in the geographical space you identified.

Still something along the lines of what you proposed would be a decent scenario in our NCO schools and junior officer schools to generate discussion on alternative courses of action to solve problems. However, once you throw in all the constraints associated with a military led (or even in support) operation, you'll find we're not flexible and other organizations are probably better suited to address this type of issue.

[kaur]

Now the Times of London reports that the Italian secret service had been paying off Taliban commanders in region before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008.


Regardless of the accuracy of the Times account, the story should also force re-examination of the “bribe the tribes” strategy being floated by a number of pundits as a solution to Afghanistan’s troubles. After all, that approach seemed to work in Iraq’s Anbar Province, where the United States paid Sunni insurgents not to fight.

The Times, in fact, implies that the attack only happened after French troops replaced the Italians, whose intelligence service had supposedly been paying Afghan insurgent commanders not to fight. Whether or not that is true, it points to the biggest flaw in the “bribe the Taliban” argument: What happens when you stop paying?

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/10/after-taliban-payoff-controversy-questions-about-%e2%80%98bribe-the-tribes%e2%80%99-plan/

Moderator's note: this issue is mainly being discussed on: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5901&page=2