Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl

[Bob's World]

The first question one must always ask is "What are our National Interests?"

The Washington Post ran this quote from John Nagle on 31 August:


JOHN NAGL

President of the Center for a New American Security

America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.

U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.

In a well-stated countering perspective, Major Jeremy Kotkin published the following piece here in the SWJ that argues in fact that we have no such National Interests at stake. Though Jeremy is a bit of a protégé' of mine, and a co-worker here in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM, these thoughts are his own. Jeremy makes a good case, and it is one grounded in sound history as well as the principles of Strategy and Insurgency. Frankly, Dr. Nagl's argument has no such foundation to rest upon.

For your consideration: U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan; and the young, untested Major Kotkin vs. the CNAS machine and Dr. Nagl


http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/is-the-war-in-afghanistan-in-t/

[omarali50]

with apologies for rampant cross-posting:
I am going to stick my neck out and make some predictions (as an amateur with nothing to lose):
1. Af-pak is a cash cow for the Pak army, the insurgents, the afghan govt and assorted warlords. They have been in this trade so long, they are really really good at it. They will keep the temperature warm enough to keep things flowing, but not hot enough to scald. There is also a lot of US prestige and credibility at stake (such things do exist). Then there is the bureaucratic inertia of the US establishment. Maybe we should factor in some actual corruption (in the sense of US officers whose direct financial interests are tied with this policy). Finally, India and China and Russia and Iran do NOT want a jihadi takeover of Afghanistan, but are OK with seeing the US bleed a little in the process (well, maybe not India, not the bleeding part; they are probably the closest thing to a genuine ally in this endeavor, but they are also the most rickety state on that list, so they count for less). SO, the prediction is that all these forces will conspire (sometimes literally, mostly indirectly) to keep the US in Afghanistan doing recognizably similar things to what it is doing right now, for at least 2 more years.
2. The really mad cow jihadis are enough of a headache for pakistan that they will need to be fought. The army will try to convince some to go to Kashmir and others to join the "good taliban" (aka Haqqani network??) but there are true believers in that party and they are the wild card. They can upset the best laid plans of mice and men. 0ne really big attack in India or the US and all bets are off. No prediction.
3. I think the US is not impossibly far from a workable afghan govt but if the current Karzai setup is the best they can do, then it doesnt look like it will work. On the other hand, maybe the embassy is not clueless and they have a cunning plan. Prediction: I am unable to decide so I tossed a coin (literally) and came up with this: Miracle Max will deliver. The US will stabilize a near-workable Afghan govt enough to make a legitimate drawdown in 5 years (not a Saigon embassy helicopter scene). A jihadist insurgency will continue, just as it does in Iraq, and in time India and china and Pakistan and iran will have more to do with it than the US does, but it wont be a defeat. It will cost a hell of a lot of money and will finance many mansions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, England, and back in the US itself, where blackwater investors will be joined by discerning warlords and Pak army generals (who will buy ranches to escape the disorder back home).
Wishful thinking?
Comments?

[Ken White]

Quoth Nagl:
...The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. * I wish he had expanded that and told the world how, without a multi-decade presence in Afghanistan, he proposes we might accomplish that...
...al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.Clearly? I think not. If it were clear, then even I would see the logic and rationale. I do not. Some said we clearly had to win the 'Cold War.' I didn't see the logic there either -- and regardless of those who say we 'won' it, I suggest that the erstwhile opponent is still around and still causing minor problems. That's the key point -- minor. That, I suspect is the best we can hope for with Al Qaeda and it's clones, derivatives and Allies. We are not going to eliminate terrorism or Islamist fundamentalism. We can through many avenues reduce the problems they bring to an acceptably low level -- major military force is not one of those avenues at this point; it is, in fact, pretty close to counter productive.

As Major Kotkin says, Hezbollah is far more dangerous than is A.Q. and neither poses an existential threat. Both and their allies require a comprehensive diplomatic and low key SFA approach with enhanced strategic entry capabilities predicated on the probable force structure size limitations faced by the US. Executing a series 'COIN campaigns' is not only not the best answer, it is a quite poor answer that will almost certainly fail.
The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.Obviously, Doctor Nagl's math and mine differ.

The US and NATO plus any nascent Afghan forces do not and will not have the manpower to provide anything other than a light footprint. The objectives -- if they are cited above (*) -- are not attainable at an affordable cost and they need a more comprehensive re-look.

I do agree with him that a more comprehensive approach is needed -- simply comprehending that COIN efforts as a large force intervenor do not work would be a good start.

[Surferbeetle]

Omarali50,

Interesting posts as always.

Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things (http://csis.org/files/publication/burke/090803_BriefSummary.pdf) in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.

My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita) range from less than $365 (less than the 'magic' $1/day mark, my source is a 2004 World Bank Hydraulics & Hydrology Study of Afghanistan, Working Paper # 36, Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for the Amu Darya Basin) to $800 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html) and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=80088&postcount=34)). Would you agree?

[Ken White]

...I am going to stick my neck out and make some predictions (as an amateur with nothing to lose):

1. Af-pak is a cash cow...There is also a lot of US prestige and credibility at stake (such things do exist). Then there is the bureaucratic inertia of the US establishment... keep the US in Afghanistan doing recognizably similar things to what it is doing right now, for at least 2 more years.Probably correct. I think you have the timing about right as well -- I'd note that US domestic politics also intrude on the timing... :wry:
2. ... 0ne really big attack in India or the US and all bets are off. No prediction.I'd add Europe as well. :eek:
3. ... The US will stabilize a near-workable Afghan govt enough to make a legitimate drawdown in 5 years (not a Saigon embassy helicopter scene)...Wishful thinking?Probably not. Pretty close to right, I'd say, though I might go with "...five years -- or less." :cool:

[omarali50]

I deliberately left Europe out of the picture. Lets say there is a big attack on London: my guess is the majority of the British people (and CERTAINLY a majority of the British press) will blame the British presence in Afghanistan and suggest a pullout. Same for most other NATO countries. Subsequently, there may well be a rise in nativist/fascist nonsense and life will become harder for the various islamists who still get welfare payments (their number is probably decreasing anyway) but it wont lead to a re-invigorated mission in Afghanistan. Or am I completely off?
One can also imagine an attack in China: That would lead to a large number of detained Uighurs suddenly dying in a tragically failed jailbreak, followed by a meeting with the Pakistani ambassador and then the Pakistani airforce will go out and bomb 10 or 15 villages and compounds in Waziristan and desperately look around for some Uighurs they can round up and put on a plane to Urumqi. And more Chinese special forces will enroll in that pushto and dari training school in inner Mongolia or whatever (I hear the Chinese are great at thinking ahead). Still, no immediate change in Afghanistan.

[omarali50]

Omarali50,

Interesting posts as always.

Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things (http://csis.org/files/publication/burke/090803_BriefSummary.pdf) in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.

My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita) range from less than $365 ...l"]$800[/URL] and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=80088&postcount=34)). Would you agree?

I dont know any official figures, but have a couple of anecdotes:
The average Afghan is dirt poor. Our family used to send something like 30 dollars a month to a family in the khyber agency and they were eternally grateful. They are also verry very hardworking and reasonably honest as long as they regard you as part of the community. Their first instinct is NOT to be a freeloader. Pathan taxi drivers in the Gulf states run their own informal insurance scheme and its much much better than any "regular" insurance company. The average pathan is not a blood thirsty killer, he is a very hardworking protocapitalist good citizen but lacks a functioning state...where they find a functioning state, they are better workers than the Chinese and almost as good in business.
2. The average drug dealer or smuggler is so rich its unbelievable. But I have no idea what an average poppy farmer makes.

[Ken White]

I think it would depend on the scale and location of the attack. Multiple attacks would have interesting effect on the European body politic...

I should have clarified that I was thinking long term and not Afghanistan specific.
...Subsequently, there may well be a rise in nativist/fascist nonsense and life will become harder for the various islamists who still get welfare payments (their number is probably decreasing anyway) but it wont lead to a re-invigorated mission in Afghanistan. Or am I completely off?Not off IMO. I'm not thinking Afghanistan so much as the overall and long term effect. My "Uh-oh" scenario involves stupid attacks irritating Europe to the extent that they shake off the 'no more war' dream and get annoyed enough to respond. Forcefully.
One can also imagine an attack in China: Still, no immediate change in Afghanistan.True. Plus as you say, China thinks ahead and has no qualms with using force internally.

[William F. Owen]

As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.

I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.

[slapout9]

Remember what I said the side with the most PH'D's will lose:D

[jmm99]

tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:


from article, p.2
To be clear, a vital national interest is that which is directly tied to our national peace and security. If these interests are threatened the nation itself is at existential risk.

Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.

And, there is no doubt that ...


...these thoughts are his own.

He did not use the phrase "good governance" once. :D

[Bob's World]

tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:



Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.

And, there is no doubt that ...



He did not use the phrase "good governance" once. :D

Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.

Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!

[Bob's World]

As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.

I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.

CNAS has been very successful, puts out some good thoughts, and has tremendous influence currently.

They also are getting into a sticky area of conflicting interests. I suspect Ms Flournoy would like to compete for the SecDef job, and by all accounts she is qualified. John may have an eye on Mr. Vickers office as well....who knows. Like I said, success no matter how well earned creates conflcts of interest that can shape the positions one takes.

I suspect the President may well feel compelled to take a hard stance on Afghanistan for fear that he will be called out as totally soft on terrorism. These guys have to make hard choices, and there is no right answer. I wish the boss was getting better advice though. We don't need to get harder on terrorism, we need to get smarter, and that doesn't necessarily mean we have to become decisively engaged in a course of action in Afghanistan that may well fail the Suitable, Acceptable, Feasible test.

He needs someone to explain the concept of "Good Governance" vs. "Effective Governance" perhaps...:)

[slapout9]

Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.

Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!

He will do just fine.....as it appears he is a Wardenfile of the highest order;)

[slapout9]

Remember what I said the side with the most PH'D's will lose:D

Dave,loose is southern spellin :)

[jmm99]

insertion of and infiltration by the BW team into our little nation is definitely in progress (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=81602&postcount=2) - G-d help us ! ;)

In any event, Kotkin, welcome to the boondocks - have fun.

Cheers

Mike

-----------------------
PS: To which "failure of the CJCS during Viet Nam" do you refer in your post linked above ?

The 1954 "failure" stating in effect that Indochina was not a vital national interest for the US; the 1961-1962 "failure" in pointing out the force requirements and risks to hold the T-bone of Laos; or the later capitulation to "limited war" and "counterinsurgency" (on the cheap) after the Kennedy administration dumped Decker and others ?

[Entropy]

MAJ Kotkin's critique is, in my judgment, very good - one of the best I've read, in fact. Well done sir.

[kotkinjs1]

First, thanks to all who took the time to read my initial essay. However, what's becoming apparent by some of the responses is that its being translated to mean that I'm calling for a 'full and immediate departure' of Afghanistan - basically a cut and run. They, rightfully so, point to the damage that would have to our credibility across the globe because, right or wrong, we said that since we broke it, we'll fix it.

That's not what I'm proposing though. Just because a situation doesn't threaten our 'vital' national interests doesn't mean we should ignore it; just the opposite. National interests are still critical to promote (and that's they key word....versus 'enforce' or 'coerce by force') and there are instruments of national power and (thanks to 'Bob's World' for explaining this theory to me) concepts of full-spectrum deterrence to achieve them. Not only invasion, occupation, and nation-building through military intervention.

My last comment over at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/is-the-war-in-afghanistan-in-t/#c004155 explains what I'm trying to say better.

And thanks again for all the constructive ideas. They are appreciated.

[omarali50]

cross posting again:
I think discussing the war as if its all about afghanistan (or afghanistan and pakistan) is also misleading. What IS the purpose of going to war after 9-11? Obviously the final purpose is not some kind of police mission to arrest a particular perp. IF that is the purpose, then this trillion dollar war is the most ridiculous possible way of going about it. You could have paid Musharraf 100 billion and had everyone in Alqaeda in Guantanamo in one month. The fact is, that is NOT the overall purpose. Let us define the overall purpose, then the purpose of each subsidiary operation can be debated…..
My contention is that the reasons include some combination of deterring future attacks like 9-11 (or worse) “by any means necessary”, making sure that no organized modern state in the Muslim world actively supports or even passively tolerates such terrorists, and perhaps, getting some other geopolitical benefits in the process. Is that a fair assessment?

[Ken White]

My contention is that the reasons include some combination of deterring future attacks like 9-11 (or worse) “by any means necessary”, making sure that no organized modern state in the Muslim world actively supports or even passively tolerates such terrorists, and perhaps, getting some other geopolitical benefits in the process. Is that a fair assessment?My take has always been that the synergy of a number of things led to both attacks, that Afghanistan was a quid pro quo for allowing the paymaster who supported the 2001 attacks to live an operate there and the attack as mounted was pure serendipity in that what was available worked.

Attacking Iraq OTOH was a quid pro quo for 22 years of attacks emanating from the ME and was directed to Iraq because Saddam was a pariah and Iraq was geographically central to the ME. In the event, it did not work as well because what was available didn't know how to do what was asked of it -- which muted the intended effect but it has worked out fairly well so far which will not do as much good as had it gone well but is better then a total failure would have been. In the long term the view will be that the US wanted to get rid of Saddam and did that and that when the Iraqis asked them to leave, they did so.

Afghnistan is a work in progress. For both, the final results will not be truly known for some years. For both the lesson is the tool that is available gets used -- whether it's a good idea or not. The solution to that is to add to the tool box. Power saws are great but sometimes you need a Scalpel...

[kotkinjs1]

"For both the lesson is the tool that is available gets used -- whether it's a good idea or not. The solution to that is to add to the tool box. Power saws are great but sometimes you need a Scalpel..."

I think the true lesson learned is that sometimes the US doesn't need to be the only surgeon operating, even if we have the sharpest of scalpels. ;o) Beyond that, maybe the surgeon is mistakenly operating with the left hand if he is in fact right handed (mucking it up by using the DoD when the true solution lies with the other aspects of national power mainly wielded through the Interagency).

Ultimately, to run with that analogy, we enlisted a bunch of Physician's Assistants to help us out in the initial and ongoing triage (the CT effort using NATO in OEF), but maybe the time for triage is long past over and what we really need are other doctors, not just PAs, who have vested and similar interests with the patient; doctors with names like Dr. Russia, Dr. China, Dr. Iran.

[William F. Owen]

Just because a situation doesn't threaten our 'vital' national interests doesn't mean we should ignore it; just the opposite. National interests are still critical to promote (and that's they key word....versus 'enforce' or 'coerce by force') and there are instruments of national power and (thanks to 'Bob's World' for explaining this theory to me) concepts of full-spectrum deterrence to achieve them. Not only invasion, occupation, and nation-building through military intervention.


So help me understand the how to judge "Vital" national interest, versus an interests it is "critical to promote." The UK and NATO clearly does not believe it to be "critical", because they are not even trying to resource the war based on that premise.

I personally am very comfortable in a world with failed states, providing their continued failure is irrelevant to the foreign policy concerned.
It is an absolute fallacy to suggest that failed states are a threat to US National interests, based purely on the fact they are failed states.
Some maybe, but as I keep saying 911 could have been planned in Canada, by French students, protesting climate change. There is also not useful definition of failed and it is all highly context specific to the policy concerned.

Terrorism, using criminal means does not require safe havens (ask the Basques or the IRA). Irregular Forces however do. To say that a presence in A'Stan is required to prevent another 911 is an article of faith with no evidence to support it.

However, I absolutely agree that quitting A'Stan would be a de-facto US defeat, (same as Vietnam.) - so do not it. However, until a simple clearly stated unambiguous policy can be presented, I think there will continue to be a alarming level of strategic dissonance.

[Ken White]

I think the true lesson learned is that sometimes the US doesn't need to be the only surgeon operating, even if we have the sharpest of scalpels. ;o) Ah, but do we have the sharpest of scalpels? Perhaps? Are they all in the right place, available to be be used? Do we have enough of them?

Can we deliver the covertly? Not totally because we purposely neglected development of that capability so that we could not deliver them; that way no one would get cut or contaminated with body fluids by accident. Do we have the political will to use those scalpels? That's the question that needs answering, that and delivery capability (which we've only known we needed since 1951; reinforced in 1980...).

Do we also have in addition to scalpels and the Sledgehammers, a few other intermediate tools (and the will to accept casualties and potential prisoners / hostages made of those all those tools and their wielders...)
Beyond that, maybe the surgeon is mistakenly operating with the left hand if he is in fact right handed (mucking it up by using the DoD when the true solution lies with the other aspects of national power mainly wielded through the Interagency). I very much agree -- so did many on this thread: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6497) and it's cropped up several times in other threads here -- most agree with you. As I said, ambidextrousness is nice -- but even better is one who is highly skilled using the correct hand for the job.
Ultimately, to run with that analogy, we enlisted a bunch of Physician's Assistants to help us out in the initial and ongoing triage (the CT effort using NATO in OEF), but maybe the time for triage is long past over...Too early to tell, patient not yet stabilized.
and what we really need are other doctors, not just PAs, who have vested and similar interests with the patient; doctors with names like Dr. Russia, Dr. China, Dr. Iran.Mmmm. Perhaps, though it might be a very good idea to insure that our assisting surgeons do not have a whopping life insurance policy on the patients. :eek:

A missed sponge -- or more difficult to spot, a simple moldy pea -- sewed in can cause sepsis. Surgeons tend to use only people they know and trust on their teams for a good reason; some people just will not play fair and a good many people in this world love nothing better than to see the big guy lose one. Though they of course would never be so crass as to say that...

Being ambidextrous is highly beneficial. Having a variety of tools is highly beneficial. Or, how about avoiding any surgery with better preventive care and treatment; paying $2K a year for prescriptions beats paying than $50K for a surgery with a 60-70+ % historical loss rate; that would be even more beneficial.

Using understudies who resent being understudies and roundly object to even the thought is not so beneficial...

As I said earlier, be careful what you ask for, you may get it. :wry:

[jmm99]

What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please.

---------------------

By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.

[kotkinjs1]

Mr. Owen: Sir- I think we agree on each of the points you made. To clarify though, I think a vital interest is one that, in reality, we cannot 'choose' not to react to; one that demands a response and more often than not, that response will be martial in flavor because of the threat involved. The punitive nature of early OEF was a vital national interest as was the destruction of the Wehrmacht in WWII ("You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces.")

National interests are 'critical' (maybe important would have been a better word) to promote because through espousing our principles, we can (if we so choose) advance an economic, diplomatic, development, and trade plan with other countries because when our interests can be aligned with other nations, we can both benefit. If I can promote a free press, open markets, and the rule of law with Country X, I will have a better chance to form a lasting relationship with it to access their markets and yield other beneficial exchanges. This is an interest that my country will not be threatened from if I choose not to pursue it.

Back to your post, I too, agree that the notion of failed states in and of themselves do not fall into the former category. In fact, they can be left alone, or if we as a nation decide, can be engaged through instruments of national power to address. But that's just it - its a choice we can choose to make because the failed state of Somalia presents just as much as the ungoverned area of the Australian outback which presents just as much threat as the quasi-state of Afghanistan. Which is to say none to our vital interests. Poor governance, which is the progenitor of insurgencies that could, at some point, pose a threat to us or our overseas interests. This is what we can choose - or not - to address through the synchronized interagency. If directed, the DoD can play a supporting role in that mission or, as in (early) OEF, we can be used what militaries are best used for - to compel an enemy to do our will. Anything beyond that and its forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun.

[Ken White]

What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please... By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.In my view - jaundiced as it may be -- we have no legal obligation that would call for dispensing a few billion though we certainly have done that. :rolleyes:

Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay. :confused:

Bush (George W. President of the US, arbiter of US foreign affairs, etc.) said in early 2002 that we would stay and help (LINK) (http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/28/rec.bush.karzi/index.html). He reaffirmed that in 2004 (LINK) (http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/index.html) and again in 2008 (LINK) (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/world/asia/15afghan.html). President Obama has also chimed in (LINK) (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/03/28/Karzai-Obama-plan-better-than-expected/UPI-77191238248545/)Thus, IMO -- and I'll bet big money, in the eyes of over half the 250M Muslims in this world among others, we have a moral obligation to do what we can to improve the capability of Afghanistan to stand on its own. Aside from the military commitment, more billions may well be disbursed... :eek:

Whether we should have said we would stay or not, we did, thus even though I sure don't think that should've been said, it was -- and we're stuck...:(

[jmm99]

as to the agree:


from Ken
Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay.

and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).

Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.

We supported Astan for about 10 years in the 80s, helping them expel the Soviets by assisting them in waging unconventional warfare. We then properly enough left them alone to establish their own governance. Their efforts did not turn out well - so, by 2001, there was no recognizable government in Astan (merely two warring groups).

We then engaged in another episode of unconventional warfare in support of the Northern Alliance. That actually went fairly well, considering that it was done in rapid planning mode, since no contingency plan for Astan was in place before 9/11.

The international community then set up a governance plan for Astan as reflected in the Bonn Agreement. We and many other states and organizations have been supporting that plan since Dec 2001. We are now into year 8, with progress on the governance front showing no substantial improvement over what existed in 2002. We cannot conduct the political stuggle for the Astans, or for anyone else - despite the soaring rhetoric of our presidents.

Where this thing is busted is at the political struggle (good governance) level. Militarily, we can stay there as long as we want - but, as Jim Gavin said long ago to Dave Petraeus, there is no such thing as a low-cost "limited war".

I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment. However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario.

As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.

My take.

PS: Camelot never lived; but it also has never died - what a wonderful country is Camelot; and what a hellish real world its rhetoric creates.

[omarali50]

More cross posting: IF the its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not? If not, then a badly managed withdrawal or a badly managed "slog on for now" will both lead to reinvigoration of the jihadi project. BUT, the first victims of that reinvigorated project will be the other infidels in the region and those in Afghanistan and Pakistan who became too close to the infidels. So maybe the US should say F-you and leave? Let the locals sort it out. Which then brings us to whether the US should care what happens after it leaves? Is the US the policeman of the world? Leftists would say NO (they would also say that things will get better with the US out of the way, but that may or may not be the case). What is the correct answer to that question?Comments?

[slapout9]

- but, as Jim Gavin said long ago to Dave Petraeus, there is no such thing as a low-cost "limited war".


jmm99, is this the real Jim Gavin or somebody else?:confused:

[Surferbeetle]

IF its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not?

...and we are wasting time searching for that magic silver bullet.

Omarali50,

The question in my mind is more along the lines of how the project be done, what are the project costs, what is the project schedule, and what should the realistic expectations be for the project deliverables.

In short, from this armchair, it appears to be gut check time...to be quickly followed by the issuance of appropriate marching orders.

Along those lines, there is a recent link to a Marine CAP Paper floating around on SWJ somewhere, which provides some interesting backgound on that particular concept (Dr. Holt helpfully provides references on the Marine CAP concept as well). My experiences lead me to believe that Dr. Holt's thought piece Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/afghan-village-militia-a-peopl/) has merit, and is worth considering...American patience and political cycles may not be compatible however...what are your thoughts?

[jmm99]

"Rightists" were saying that the the US should not be the policeman of the world, well before "leftists" - e.g., that rabid leftist Bob Taft (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Taft) in regard to our Korean "police action". :D

Since the New World Order is now into its sixth presidential election cycle - and is endorsed by both parties, the left-right distinction (in regard to the US and its "world policeman" role) has become meaningless.

Policies are more shaped by whether one believes that the Indian Ocean is a US lake. If so, US presence in Astan is very meaningful. If not (my view), continued US presence in Astan (in a large footprint mode) is not very meaningful - and could in fact be negative.

[jmm99]

in GEN Petraeus' 1987 dissertation - snip is on my home computer - somewhere in pp.50-100 in a footnote to Gavin's 1950's book introducing the concept of limited war. His later (in the 1980s) statement is the last sentence in the footnote.

[slapout9]

in GEN Petraeus' 1987 dissertation - snip is on my home computer - somewhere in pp.50-100 in a footnote to Gavin's 1950's book introducing the concept of limited war. His later (in the 1980s) statement is the last sentence in the footnote.

Thanks for the response.1950's book was War and Peace In The Space Age. Good to know General Petraeus reads the right books:). Now if he just gets our Missiles back for the Air Force everything will be OK.

[jmm99]

from the 1987 Petraeus Dissertation, as well as two others stating the views of Gavin and MacArthur with respect to engaging in a ground war in a land-locked Asian country (in that case, Laos).

As a general note, please do not confuse those of the "Never Again, but School" (including JMM) with pacifists, isolationists and absolute non-interventionists.

[Ken White]

and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).I recalled that and since neither of us old dudes is totally addled, suspected you were up to some Lawyerly exercise (not chicanery, never that...) so I gave you one before and Obama after the two I had given earlier. Always issue a surfeit of rope. ;)
Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.Umm, Obama maybe but I doubt even that; Bush? Not hope -- what suited his political purpose at the time. Either way, I'm pretty sure most opinion today is with you -- delusional -- but I don't think that's the case, it was almost certainly cold blooded political expediency. Took some heat off Iraq and, more importantly, to W., tied his successors hands and forced that successor (and probably his successor as well) to follow through on what Bush had done because he was concerned that his successor might not do what Bush did -- correctly, in my view (though it could've been more efficiently and effectively done...). :wry: (Syntax degarbler available on request).
I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment.I don't think that would be at all wise, not least for the reason you cite:
However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario. I see no benefit in more troops, rather some downside. What should happen is the Administration publicly announcing their goals (hopefully realistic and not the CNAS / Kilcullen variant) as of this latest Commander's Assessment update and we should set about trying to get there as efficiently as possible. Note efficiency and not effectiveness... ;)
As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.I didn't go for the whole Billion, only those in the areas affected (not including India who is only partly affected; they, the Indonesians and Malays, the Turks, most of the Maghreb and Muslim Africa don't really care other than as an item for rhetorical support and the odd Fighter here and there...). I don't think so. It is negative for many but it's an annoying negative and little more. Walking away from it, OTOH will just feed a new propaganda frenzy which in turn will draw more recruits -- the current crop of recruits are easily dissuaded because so many die; given 'peace', no working war, then recruiting people to do dumb things gains. Symbology, pride and such are more important to the Arab and the Afghan than they are to westerners. There is also a major double standard problem -- they don't have to do what they said and they can lie to you because you are not Muslim but you cannot return the favor because your code says you should not therefor if you do, you are doubly wrong and they'll scream it to the world. Proving yet again western perfidy to people who epitomize Huntington's quote:
"The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."They do not forget it, nor for a minute -- and they look for weaknesses in our application of violence to exploit. That includes the strategy(ies), operational techniques and TTP as well as political actions...

Creighton Abrams once said that "Generals should be noted for their silences." True. More importantly, so should Politicians. Because if the President says it in this celebrity rock star era, it becomes a commitment, not just a delusional (at worst) or political (at best? at worser?) statement which is all it really was. Not my idea, the media construct, I believe. Really stupid whoever's idea it is..:mad:

[jmm99]

Dr Holt's suggestion:


(p.2)
I propose a synthesis drawing on several COIN models: 1. the classic Thompson/Briggs [Nagl, 2002: 28-29; 70-71] politics first/the population is the center of gravity approach; 2. the village militia of the Marine Corps Combined Action Program/Platoons in Vietnam, 3. culture as a key “force-multiplier, 4. basic lessons learned from the Philippine Insurrection to the Present as noted in FM 3-24, 5. the “inkspot approach” of Galula and others, and 6. the need for a unified military and civilian structure similar to CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support] system that included 7000 advisors by 1969.

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program . CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.


We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no "syntax degarbler" needed - I fully understand your thesis; but have a different take on the risk assessment of a policy reversal. Because of the domestic politics involved, my thesis (risky or not) is not likely to be implemented. That's happened before without causing me to jump overboard. :)

I thought the last chapter (Chap 5) of Kilcullen's book (TAG) is interesting, with its sectional sub-heading "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended" (p.264) and "Mission Sets" (pp. 288-289) - the two missions being "strategic disruption" and "military assistence". I've no argument with either of those as stated (especially as the latter emphasizes the political element).

I also thought it interesting that Kilcullen says (p.269) that: "My personal position on coiunterinsurgency, and on Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as "Never again, but ...." So, it seems he is still very much on the boat but shifting seats (closer to mine ;)).

Cheers (temp ca. 65, sunshine, no bugs)

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Dr Holt's suggestion:

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program . CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.


We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Not too many differences in the grand scheme of things...however...

My qualifier would be that politics (in the western sense) may be too strong a word for the demographics that I believe we need to influence (and I have never visited or worked in Afghanistan). I think many (the bulk of the curve (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_distribution)) would be more or less happy with three hots, a cot out of the weather, and some security. Studies that I have been plowing through seem to indicate that approximately ~85% are low tech farmers scrabbling to get by...long way of saying I don't believe the participatory Jeffersonian Democracy approach (as we know it) to be a viable one in the short term.

Your point on carefully considering the applicability of the CAP model to Afghanistan is wise.

As I understand CAP and with what I have done in the Army I think that I could not only survive but that I could also be an effective team member with a CAP/CORDS/CA/PRT/HTT lead element embedded in a SF/Advisor style matrix manned by a ISAF/ANA/ANP/Militia effort plus some heavy firepower to pound the stuffing out of anybody who gets stupid.

We would be located in some key places, with no Subway/Pizza Hut/Monster Chow Hall/FOB bull#### anywhere to be seen, and all would be focused on developing some sort of a functional economy & simultaneous security, some GoA capability, getting the neighbors involved in a constructive way, and getting the hell out when it all can move on its own... :wry:

I think that the President and Mr. Gates will not keep us in suspense much longer and I suspect they understand better than most what we need to do. I haven't retired yet and will ride it out a bit longer either way...let's just get it done.

Regards,

Steve

[slapout9]

from the 1987 Petraeus Dissertation, as well as two others stating the views of Gavin and MacArthur with respect to engaging in a ground war in a land-locked Asian country (in that case, Laos).

As a general note, please do not confuse those of the "Never Again, but School" (including JMM) with pacifists, isolationists and absolute non-interventionists.

jmm99, thanks for posting that. If you want more find General Gavin's testimony before Congress during the 1966 Fulbright hearings. Short version is we shouldn't do it (Vietnam) but if we do he believed in the Enclave Strategy. This used to be on the internet but for some reason I can no longer find it, it is a most fascinating interview. For you Cavalry guys he has a few comments about how they were using the wrong helicopter...the ch-47 was meant to be the main troop carrier in his original concept of the Air Cavalry (he called Sky Cavalry) Division. Also had some comments on the Kennedy Assassination.

[jmm99]

To Steve ....

My reference to politics as the major problem was not intended to suggest that the problem is that Astans have failed to become "politically Westernized". What I'm talking about are indigenous Astan politics (as I understand them from "book knowledge" - haven't been there either), as they have stood and presently stand.

As to CAPs, we have "Combined Action and US Marine Experiences in Vietnam, 1965-71 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ridderhof.htm)", by one Phillip J. Ridderhof. So, COL Ridderhof, if you happen to be listening, you should be telling us about the plusses and minuses of the Marine CAP program. His bottom line then:


Disregarding the political aspects of Vietnam, as a military answer to counterinsurgency, Combined Action was effective. Its use for area security could come in handy again. There is a good chance that in future, US forces could again be called on to support a friendly government against an insurgency. Combined Action, properly employed would achieve area security while providing training for the indigenous forces involved. It would have to be clear that the Combined Action units would be there for security only. The establishment of government, law and order would be up to the host government, possibly with US economic assistance. Combined Action will not win a counterinsurgency war, but it would provide civil authorities time and protection to establish themselves. Combined Action, if implemented in the future, is a military concept. Being such it can only help fight, not win in revolutionary warfare.

My argument, BTW, is not that US troops cannot do CAPs - the Marines did it; as also SF in the early CIDGs in the Highlands. Some folks can do it; most probably cannot - the two Vietnam examples involved force selection in both cases. An eventual larger indigenous "Ruff-Puff" and "People's Self Defense Force" effort was the desired end goal, never really achieved.

----------------------
To Slap

We may see something of an Enclave Strategy in Astan before we are through. That would entail a change from the policy of holding all of Astan. In Vietnam, that was politically unacceptable to the South Vietnamese. An Enclave Strategy would fit into Kilcullen's mission sets of strategic disruption and military assistence. I should guess that Karzai would be opposed.

It is interesting that the "Never Again, but Schoolmates" (MacArthur, Ridgway, Shoup, Griffith, Norstad and Gavin) tended to out of the box thinking.

Cheers and regards to all

Mike

[slapout9]

----------------------
To Slap

We may see something of an Enclave Strategy in Astan before we are through. That would entail a change from the policy of holding all of Astan. In Vietnam, that was politically unacceptable to the South Vietnamese. An Enclave Strategy would fit into Kilcullen's mission sets of strategic disruption and military assistence. I should guess that Karzai would be opposed.

It is interesting that the "Never Again, but Schoolmates" (MacArthur, Ridgway, Shoup, Griffith, Norstad and Gavin) tended to out of the box thinking.

Cheers and regards to all

Mike

Yes we might, I have a question for anyone should would focus on the villages or the major cities?

[Ken White]

It is interesting that the "Never Again, but Schoolmates" (MacArthur, Ridgway, Shoup, Griffith, Norstad and Gavin) tended to out of the box thinking.That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...

[jmm99]

from Ken
That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...

at least as to McNamara - I have to pass on Wheeler (insufficient knowledge).

------------------------
From a civilian and political standpoint, any enclave concept would have to take transportation and communications into account. Setting up enclaves in say a dozen or so of Astan's widely separated cities would simply set up a dozen or so Dien Bien Phus. More logical would be enclaving on the basis of local commerce (such as it is), where the enclaves would be relatively self-sufficient with respect to the indigenous populace - and close enough to be eventually networked.

Someone military can address the military pros and cons of enclaving.

[omarali50]

...and we are wasting time searching for that magic silver bullet.

Omarali50,

In short, from this armchair, it appears to be gut check time...to be quickly followed by the issuance of appropriate marching orders.

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win[/URL] has merit, and is worth considering...American patience and political cycles may not be compatible however...what are your thoughts?

Surfer, my thoughts are yet to be finalized, but then i have the luxury of being able to stay on the fence (as an observer, though as a citizen I cannot be absolved of all responsibilities). Instead of giving you an amateur operational plan, I will lay out some random thoughts that came to my mind today; maybe they will trigger some insights in more qualified people (and these are really random thoughts, I reserve the right to be more coherent tomorrow):
1. I caught myself thinking "maybe I shouldnt say A or B because the US is probably going to pull out. Can i risk saying this? I will still have a connection with Pakistan and should i really risk trouble and misunderstanding (or correct understanding) among those likely to be holding the long knives after the Americans are gone". Then I thought, AHA! this is why losing afghanistan will be a much bigger disaster than just giving up some of the planet's most inhospitable real estate. If someone like me is having these thoughts, imagine what the average fence sitter in Pakistan and Afghanistan is thinking. This withdrawal talk can snowball...
2. Defeat in Afghanistan (or just the serious prospect of defeat in Afghanistan) will mean that everyone from Iran to Russia to China to India (and of course, Pakistan) has to reassess what they will do the day after. Do I trust them all to do better without the US of A around to muck things up? Will their own relationships with the US remain unchanged in such a scenario? I find myself thinking "hell no"! Maybe I am just a natural born pessimist, but every time i try to play it out in my head, i end with massive disaster.
3. OK, why use the word defeat. What about partial withdrawal, or some other thing in between. Why the apocalyptic talk? But the problem is that I cannot see any obvious scenario which is not a defeat but is still a withdrawal or even a backing off.
4. What about staying and winning? The closest thing I have seen to a plan that looks viable to me is one I saw on abu muqawama (posted by Anan), that involved putting the ANA in the lead and embedding US troops with them instead of the other way around, but the problem with that is that the ANA is not the govt. The govt of astan is karzai and company. Maybe they are ten times more capable than they look in the media, but unless thats almost literally true, we are in deep doo doo. The US army is the most lethal army in human history and very professional, but it cannot seem to find the taliban's leaders or even attack them too proactively. Most of what we read seems to be going out and having THEM attack. Does someone have a cunning plan(and not the kind in "black adder)_?..
3. So what? Disaster there is hardly the same thing as disaster in the continental United States. As a Pakistani-American I may not be able to ignore the prospect of taliban/jihadi takeover, but as an AMERICAN, I dont necessarily have to care? or do I? That question is one of many to which I have no good answer yet. But I am trying out answers. Someday, one will seem to fit.
4. With less American intervention, latin america seems to have become a BETTER place (no paradise, but better). What if the same thing happens in southwest asia? But I am from southwest asia, and unless the CIA has been responsible for much more #### than we ever knew, we are really capable of far too much mayhem without any help from the CIA. What if the CIA leaves and we turn into central africa with better technology? But, can we expect America to spend blood and treasure to save the necks of some (probably ungrateful) westernized liberals in Pakistan and Afghanistan ? Whats in it for America? Superpower status? what if we are NOT a superpower anymore? Sweden and Canada are not superpowers, but their citizens seem pretty happy. They even have national healthcare. What if the US really doesnt remain the sole superpower or even A superpower? who gets hurt? Israel? why should i care? "paleoconservatives" and leftists both think being world policeman is an evil distraction. Could they be right? On the other hand, arent Sweden and Canada just enjoying the fruits of order maintained by the US marines and the long arm of the US armed forces?
as you can see, I have no solution. At least not tonight. Maybe tomorrow....

[slapout9]

4. What about staying and winning? The closest thing I have seen to a plan that looks viable to me is one I saw on abu muqawama (posted by Anan), that involved putting the ANA in the lead and embedding US troops with them instead of the other way around, but the problem with that is that the ANA is not the govt. The govt of astan is karzai and company. Maybe they are ten times more capable than they look in the media, but unless thats almost literally true, we are in deep doo doo. The US army is the most lethal army in human history and very professional, but it cannot seem to find the taliban's leaders or even attack them too proactively. Most of what we read seems to be going out and having THEM attack. Does someone have a cunning plan(and not the kind in "black adder)_?..


Some good points here.

[Bob's World]

This isn't about "victory or defeat" so much as it is about "success or failure."

As Jeremy points out, we've kept moving the bar as to what it is we want to accomplish. The follies of the proposed 'strategy', IMO, are primarily that there is little evidence that massive "effectiveness of governance" campaigns waged by some outside state have ever resolved the conditions of poor governance that gave rise to insurgency within that state.

It is a bold, and expensive experiment that sets the bar for success very high; thereby increasing the odds of failure.

Defeat? Not likely, but then that was never the issue in the first place.

We must decide what success for the US in Afghanistan is, as well as what success for Afghanistan is. They should not be the same thing. Arguably we achieved success back in 2002. But then we moved the bar.

Is there some rule that says we can't move the bar closer instead of constantly moving it farther away? This is another reason why I have trended toward my current position on FID intervention in another nation's insurgency. Narrowly focus your efforts to helping to ID and address those narrow issues of "poor governance" (quite likely to be intangible and able to be largely curred by changes of policy rather than massive infrastructure programs of effectiveness), shaped by the local values rather than our own; and assist with creating conditions perhaps to put those changes of policy into motion. All the time being very careful to not create the perception that this is a US imposed solution, but rather one selected and implemented by that nation (as we must avoid infecting the government with the perception that it draws its legitimacy from us, as this will make its job many times more difficult, and when it fails most of the blame will fall to us, or if we try to prop it up artificially, the insurgents will target us).

As to our issues with AQ? We need neither to fix Afghanistan nor break Pakistan to wage a persistent, enduring, low visibility campaign against that little club of villains (oh yeah, and all you intel types out there: just because you put on an Aerosmith t-shirt and like to play their songs in your basement on your "guitar hero", doesn't make you a member of Aerosmith; similarly all these nationalist insurgencies that either affiliate with the AQ UW operation or even change their name to some form of AQ does not make them members of that band either. They're probably just doing it for the chicks as well). And by addressing our own policies of engagement with the nations of the populaces they draw their support from we will ultimately render them irrelevant. "Defeat" is the wrong verb. It sets the bar higher than it needs to be and lends itself to a family of engagement that produces tremendous negative second and third order effects (see thread on "deterrence of irregular threats"). "neutralize" is all these guys deserve; and it should be a supporting task to the military in a State Department plan for promoting US interests in the current environment; not a primary task in a DOD plan for countering terrorism. Balance and perspective, roles and missions, work smarter not harder.

We can do this. We must do this.

[Entropy]

BW,

Good comment!


This is another reason why I have trended toward my current position on FID intervention in another nation's insurgency.

I think that's a key insight. Sometimes it is possible to do more with less and a maximalist approach can make success less likely, not more. My biggest frustration with the Afghanistan debate is the competing strawman positions that our only two COA's are abandonment or a full-blown pop-centric COIN effort. There is a lot of middle ground between those two extremes - middle ground that should be fully explored.


oh yeah, and all you intel types out there: just because you put on an Aerosmith t-shirt and like to play their songs in your basement on your "guitar hero", doesn't make you a member of Aerosmith; similarly all these nationalist insurgencies that either affiliate with the AQ UW operation or even change their name to some form of AQ does not make them members of that band either. They're probably just doing it for the chicks as well

Wow, you really don't like intel people. It's a shame you've apparrently had some bad ones along the way.

[Eden]

At the war college they teach that strategy...at least effective strategy...ties together and balances the ends, the ways, and the means. But we seem to be unable to do that due to our inability to suppress our appetite for grandiose ends, or to abandon ways of operating that we can't support. The core problem in Afghanistan is that the means required for a politically acceptable end are not themselves politically acceptable. The secondary problem is that our leadership (and the for-profit-punditocracy) seems to think that we can reach an acceptable end with insufficient means if we can only devise clever enough ways to do so. Hence the ongoing rearranging of deck chairs.

Sorry, you can't get there from here.

I think the best we can salvage from the situation is a return to 2002. Place American firepower in the hands of a few selected power-brokers to ensure the Taliban cannot regain power and hope that over a decade or so the Afghans can sort themselves out. I think they can restore the social and political restraints that existed pre-1979 which afforded the country a modicum of stability and prospects for economic growth.

[Bob's World]

BW,

Good comment!



I think that's a key insight. Sometimes it is possible to do more with less and a maximalist approach can make success less likely, not more. My biggest frustration with the Afghanistan debate is the competing strawman positions that our only two COA's are abandonment or a full-blown pop-centric COIN effort. There is a lot of middle ground between those two extremes - middle ground that should be fully explored.



Wow, you really don't like intel people. It's a shame you've apparrently had some bad ones along the way.


I just hate the pig-headed "threats R US" approach the community clings to, coupled with its complete disregard to the fact that they are completely clueless about the nature of this type of conflict; and absolutely no instituional motivation to learn or change. Dangerous. They send us pell mell in pursuit of tactical victories with absolute obliviouisness to the strategic risk they put as at.

[omarali50]

I think the best we can salvage from the situation is a return to 2002. Place American firepower in the hands of a few selected power-brokers to ensure the Taliban cannot regain power and hope that over a decade or so the Afghans can sort themselves out. I think they can restore the social and political restraints that existed pre-1979 which afforded the country a modicum of stability and prospects for economic growth.

I dont think you can go back to 2002 in 2009. Unfortunately, the world moves on. Other people have already adjusted to things that happened in 2002. As far as I can see, this war is more about making Pakistan (and other countries) behave than actually making "afghanistan a better place". My guess is, the naughtier boys in Pakistan and Iran and elsewhere are going to take any return to 2002 as vindication of their strategy (wouldnt you?) and go much further than they ever did in 2002. Just a thought...

[Rex Brynen]

(oh yeah, and all you intel types out there: just because you put on an Aerosmith t-shirt and like to play their songs in your basement on your "guitar hero", doesn't make you a member of Aerosmith; similarly all these nationalist insurgencies that either affiliate with the AQ UW operation or even change their name to some form of AQ does not make them members of that band either. They're probably just doing it for the chicks as well).

Oddly, my experience has been almost the exact opposite--the IC folks that I know consistently stress the variations and difference, and emphasize that not all Islamists (even radical violent ones) or NSAGs are the same. Indeed, it is a matter of some frustration to them that the nuances they spend so much of their time analyzing get rather overlooked when the product leaves the building.

[Bob's World]

Oddly, my experience has been almost the exact opposite--the IC folks that I know consistently stress the variations and difference, and emphasize that not all Islamists (even radical violent ones) or NSAGs are the same. Indeed, it is a matter of some frustration to them that the nuances they spend so much of their time analyzing get rather overlooked when the product leaves the building.

Becuase everytime I review a US intel product I swear it came out of the AQ Ops or Plans shop.

[Entropy]

I just hate the pig-headed "threats R US" approach the community clings to, coupled with its complete disregard to the fact that they are completely clueless about the nature of this type of conflict; and absolutely no instituional motivation to learn or change. Dangerous. They send us pell mell in pursuit of tactical victories with absolute obliviouisness to the strategic risk they put as at.

I think there is something to that, but one should be careful painting with too broad a brush. Intel people do tend to have a "threat" mindset because that is the way we are trained (at least for military intel people), which is something I frequently complain about.

However, Commanders and policymakers have the ability to force change, starting with priority intelligence requirements (PIR's). PIR's, for those who don't know, are like a Commander's intent/guidance for intel. PIR's tell intel people what information a Commander wants in priority order. BW, have you looked at the CENTCOM or even USSOCOM's PIR's recently? It's been a couple of months since I've read them, but I recall they were very threat-centric.

As I pointed out in another thread on this topic, Commanders are in control of what intel they receive. They set the PIR's and the intel people are usually their subordinates. If they want less "threats R US" they have the authority and ability to change that through a variety of means.

One effective method is feedback - one of my biggest complaints about the ops side of the house is a lack of feedback. If what we're providing isn't relevant or useful, then we need to know. Too often there is zero feedback on products or briefings. I've learned through experience that this can be a warning sign, but many intel people interpret the silence as a sign they are adequately performing their job. In short, if your intel folks are overly focused on threats, all you need to do is tell them that they need to focus more on whatever area you want them to focus on. Additionally, make sure your PIR's reflect that.

There are systemic problems as well. Intel support is still setup with the assumption that HHQ will have more information and a better "picture" of what's going on and will push information down. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other irregular conflicts the knowledge gap is often reversed - individual units will know more about their AO than HHQ, so much of the intel that passes down is wrong, irrelevant, or is "well duh" information the local unit already knows. I know this is an issue that's heavily debated in the MI community, but as an AF guy I don't really know where things are headed or what changes, if any, have been made.

Finally, the strategy problems (particularly for Afghanistan) affect intel as well. As you know, the intel requirements for an AQ-focused, limited CT mission are much different than the requirements for a population-centric COIN effort. When our ends ways and means are not clear then intel support is going to suffer because requirements will conflict and collection and analytical resources are limited. So your perception about intel could, I think, reflect a bigger conflict on strategy.

[Bob's World]

I think there is something to that, but one should be careful painting with too broad a brush. Intel people do tend to have a "threat" mindset because that is the way we are trained (at least for military intel people), which is something I frequently complain about.

However, Commanders and policymakers have the ability to force change, starting with priority intelligence requirements (PIR's). PIR's, for those who don't know, are like a Commander's intent/guidance for intel. PIR's tell intel people what information a Commander wants in priority order. BW, have you looked at the CENTCOM or even USSOCOM's PIR's recently? It's been a couple of months since I've read them, but I recall they were very threat-centric.

As I pointed out in another thread on this topic, Commanders are in control of what intel they receive. They set the PIR's and the intel people are usually their subordinates. If they want less "threats R US" they have the authority and ability to change that through a variety of means.

One effective method is feedback - one of my biggest complaints about the ops side of the house is a lack of feedback. If what we're providing isn't relevant or useful, then we need to know. Too often there is zero feedback on products or briefings. I've learned through experience that this can be a warning sign, but many intel people interpret the silence as a sign they are adequately performing their job. In short, if your intel folks are overly focused on threats, all you need to do is tell them that they need to focus more on whatever area you want them to focus on. Additionally, make sure your PIR's reflect that.

There are systemic problems as well. Intel support is still setup with the assumption that HHQ will have more information and a better "picture" of what's going on and will push information down. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other irregular conflicts the knowledge gap is often reversed - individual units will know more about their AO than HHQ, so much of the intel that passes down is wrong, irrelevant, or is "well duh" information the local unit already knows. I know this is an issue that's heavily debated in the MI community, but as an AF guy I don't really know where things are headed or what changes, if any, have been made.

Finally, the strategy problems (particularly for Afghanistan) affect intel as well. As you know, the intel requirements for an AQ-focused, limited CT mission are much different than the requirements for a population-centric COIN effort. When our ends ways and means are not clear then intel support is going to suffer because requirements will conflict and collection and analytical resources are limited. So your perception about intel could, I think, reflect a bigger conflict on strategy.

We must get sound strategy out in front of the problem. And here of course is the rub. Find 10 "experts" on this conflict and get 10 conflicting answers. Add to that our "intel leads ops" approach, and you have what we have.

Are commanders, planners, and ops all innocent? Clearly not, plenty of fame and shame to go around; but as an institution it is the intel community that is the most dogged in its refusal to evolve and focus on the environment over the threats that emerge from that environment. They analyze symptoms rather than causes, and defend that as their right and their duty.

I won't excuse them.

[J Wolfsberger]

My contention is that the reasons include some combination of deterring future attacks like 9-11 (or worse) “by any means necessary”, making sure that no organized modern state in the Muslim world actively supports or even passively tolerates such terrorists, and perhaps, getting some other geopolitical benefits in the process. Is that a fair assessment?

I think it's pretty accurate.

The problem is that our own rhetoric led us into overreach. I googled the following terms:

Community of Nations 179,000 hits for the past year
World Community 2,770,000 hits for the past year
International Community 8,980,000 hits for the past year

As long as we think in those terms we also think in terms of the rights and responsibilities of membership, among which are human rights and law enforcement. Since no one was doing the latter (especially not the UN), and since it's in the nature of US culture to "fix things," the US obligingly stepped forward.

If we all recognized that the "community" does not in fact exist, and that most people don't want their problems "fixed" for them by outsiders, we'd be much better off.

[MikeF]

We must get sound strategy out in front of the problem. And here of course is the rub. Find 10 "experts" on this conflict and get 10 conflicting answers. Add to that our "intel leads ops" approach, and you have what we have.

Sir, I think it is more of an process problem as Enthropy noted:


There are systemic problems as well. Intel support is still setup with the assumption that HHQ will have more information and a better "picture" of what's going on and will push information down. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other irregular conflicts the knowledge gap is often reversed - individual units will know more about their AO than HHQ, so much of the intel that passes down is wrong, irrelevant, or is "well duh" information the local unit already knows. I know this is an issue that's heavily debated in the MI community, but as an AF guy I don't really know where things are headed or what changes, if any, have been made.

Transition from top-down to bottom-up intelligence collection and analysis is a day-to-night adjustment. I observed many analysts that simply edited rather than analyze intel pushed forward. It's kind of like assuming that IW is just the converse of UW so if you are trained at UW then you can easily do IW.

The best analysts that I observed passed intelligence horizontally AND vertically to the appropriate stakeholders. The best product I received from higher during my last deployment in Diyala Province was passed down from division. A heads up marine intel dude in Anbar received reports of AQ trafficking/smuggling from a sheik in diyala. I was able to consolidate his reports and add them to my own in order to arrest that sheik and keep him in jail.

My belief is that as more intel guys do deployments on the line and more combat experienced combined arms guys transition to intel, it'll sort itself out although egos and ricebowls will always hamper mission success.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

I dont think you can go back to 2002 in 2009...My guess is, the naughtier boys in Pakistan and Iran and elsewhere are going to take any return to 2002 as vindication of their strategy (wouldnt you?) and go much further than they ever did in 2002...distilled if illegal Vodka with a number of locals in the wee hours of the night in several nations leads me to believe you have got it exactly right.

I agree with Bob's World and Eden on many things but one thing you cannot do is put the cards back in the box and call them new...

[slapout9]

As long as we think in those terms we also think in terms of the rights and responsibilities of membership, among which are human rights and law enforcement. Since no one was doing the latter (especially not the UN), and since it's in the nature of US culture to "fix things," the US obligingly stepped forward.

If we all recognized that the "community" does not in fact exist, and that most people don't want their problems "fixed" for them by outsiders, we'd be much better off.

SBW- Jackpot except not only is there no community....I don't think is an A'stan except in some politicians mind. Even higher ups are waking upto this with the term Af-Pak but it is a lot worse than that. I think there are a 100 little A'stans inside a man drawn map of what he "thinks" A'stan is or should be....which has nothing to do with the reality of the situation.


Point 2 as the SWC SME on Music anybody that listens to Aerosmith has no business in Intell. Would you believe anything from a guy that listens to "Dude Looks Like A lady"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qRTu5I2loY

[Entropy]

Would you believe anything from a guy that listens to "Dude Looks Like A lady"

Hey, that might not be so bad when there are MAM's with guns running around in Burkas. :D

[marct]

Point 2 as the SWC SME on Music anybody that listens to Aerosmith has no business in Intell. Would you believe anything from a guy that listens to "Dude Looks Like A lady"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qRTu5I2loY


Hey, that might not be so bad when there are MAM's with guns running around in Burkas. :D

Funny, I was just going to say that the first 45 seconds or so of that song sounded remarkably like the rhetoric of an ex-VP and Sect'y of Defense you guys used to have :cool::D! Just change the lyrics to Dude looks like an Enemy and it could be a quote :eek:!!!!

[slapout9]

Now this is Intelligence Music;)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXEQgemMUe8&feature=related