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IntelTrooper
09-21-2009, 06:30 AM
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103363131



"The only thing I've said to my folks is, 'A, I want an unvarnished assessment, but, B, I don't want to put the resource question before the strategy question,'" Obama said. "Because there is a natural inclination to say, 'If I get more, then I can do more.'"

I think that's fair enough, but the 'If I get more, then I can do more' comment strikes me as a little Rumsfeldian. I have to imagine that the number of troops available would weigh heavily in deciding what strategy to pursue.

SWJED
09-21-2009, 09:54 AM
McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure' (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/mcchrystal-more-forces-or-miss/)
by SWJ Editors

Via The Washington Post:

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict “will likely result in failure,” according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post. Bob Woodward reports; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung provide analysis; and a declassified version of document is available on washingtonpost.com.

The Report: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” … McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan’s prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.

Bob Woodward’s full story can be found here (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html?hpid=topnews).

Analysis: McChrystal’s assessment, in the view of two senior administration officials, is just “one input” in the White House’s decision-making process. … When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit. But Obama’s deliberative pace — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal’s report so far — is a source of growing consternation within the military. “Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let’s have a discussion,” one Pentagon official said. “Will you read it and tell us what you think?” Within the military, this official said, “there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration.”

The full piece by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung can be found here (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002878.html?hpid=topnews).

The Department of Defense on Sunday evening released a declassified version of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's assessment of the war in Afghanistan. The Post agreed to publish this version, which includes minor deletions of material that officials said could compromise future operations, rather than a copy of the document marked "confidential." The document can be viewed here (http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 ).

John T. Fishel
09-21-2009, 11:10 AM
few understand what it is. :eek: I go by the Army War College definition that strategy consists of an ends, ways, and means construct based on the nature of the threat. It does not, as most so-called strategists think, consist only of ends and ways. It always requires a realtionship between ends and means. So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT

MikeF
09-21-2009, 01:26 PM
As posted by Exum here (http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews). PDF was too large to attach. I'm sorting through it now. One question that I think we must consider is:

What are maximalist objectives for Afghanistan?

In Iraq, we set out to develop a democratic, federal state that was friendly to the US. BG McMaster's states (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/18/mcmaster_speaks_what_went_wrong_in_iraq) those objectives were maximalist and defied reality. Given that Afghanistan ranks at the bottom on almost any world metric of nation-states, what is the best we can hope for? No easy answers.

v/r

Mike

slapout9
09-21-2009, 01:46 PM
So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT

Kinda hits the nail on the head in my opinion.

Steve the Planner
09-21-2009, 02:31 PM
If only we can connect to the "powerful Afghan people."

Isn't that the crux of the problem?

The Afghan people are neither powerful nor meaningfully engaged in any of this. They are pawns of powerful international and transnational forces, as expressed through national, regional and local power brokers of one form or another, all working for their own, or some "bigger" objective not related to the people of Afghanistan. At best, they "people" are working to survive, and at worst, to prosper on the backs of the rest.

The Kharzai re-election was no more a surprise to knowledgeable folks than the new "discovery" of widespread governmental corruption and ineffectiveness. Now, it is plain for all to see.

So where, in this assessment, is the means, ends and ways of connecting the Afghan people to a viable future? Short-shrift to some vaguely discerned civil-military operational tweaking?

A serious plan for Afghan civil restoration, in light of substantial public corruption from the top down, and major civilian governmental ineffectiveness at all levels and by all parties, really needs to be civilian-focused, econ/agriculturally based, and not military-driven.

Packing a bunch of FSOs, USG bureaucrats, former military (now in civilian billets), and anthropologists into a military plane and flying them to Afghanistan for relatively short deployments has been tried before (over and over), and it just doesn't work any better than giving billions to NGOs for disjointed ineffectiveness.

Absent a viable civilian/economic/political means, end and ways that will result in a sustainable Afghanistan, all of this military "strategy" isn't strategy at all. It is just rearranging deck chairs.

So, what is the civilian, economic, political strategy to which a military sub-strategy can be successfully aligned?

Steve

Rob Thornton
09-21-2009, 02:47 PM
I agree with John. I don’t think it is incumbent upon the military to decide what our policy end should be - that is a job for the elected leaders based on what is best for our interests - after all its the use of our people and resources to achieve that end. I understand fully that Afghanistan has a NATO consideration, got it - but I think its clear based on commitment of resuorces the U.S. is the designated driver. So in this case our "interests" are broad and include broader stability of the region, U.S. leadership/prestige, viability of NATO, etc. Consdieration of those interests should not constrain us, but should always be balanced against what ultimately matters to the United States and its ability to have some control over its course in the future.

Waiting on something to become politically viable is a sure way to miss opportunity and let events get to a point where you are only in a position to react.

The military's share of strategy:

I think it’s the military’s requirement to inform policy and to determine the best ways to achieve the policy and give the best military advice on what means will be required. I think the military might also give several alternative COAs that offer varying perspectives on what might be achieved in the context of feasibility, acceptability and sustainability. Ultimately, the folks with the responsibility to determine the policy ends are the elected leaders.
Without a determined policy end that guides the application of power and influence, those charged with developing an operational approach are kind of left to muddle through as best they can.

It sounds like ISAF has given their best estimate of ways and means given what they understand to be the policy end. If the answer is uncomfortable, then redefine (or perhaps just define it) the end and see what new estimates come back.

Best, Rob

slapout9
09-21-2009, 03:15 PM
So, what is the civilian, economic, political strategy to which a military sub-strategy can be successfully aligned?

Steve

Steve, planning is Communism so we don't do that:D. We do allow the Military to cheat and plan some stuff but other than that.....we just wait for that Invisible Hand to swoop down and guide us to.........where ever.

marct
09-21-2009, 03:15 PM
really bothers me about the discussion is that it is focused on "strategy" and not grand strategy. While I can easily live with the ends ways means version of strategy, this is missing the key element which is the overall vision of purpose. And, after going through the assessment, I am left feeling somewhat frustrated with the buck passing that is going on. As I rather snarkily noted (http://marctyrrell.com/2009/09/21/the-new-strategy-in-afghanistan/)

If you read the assessment carefully, and not only between the lines, there is a quality of “put up or shut up” to it regarding the political ends. Someone from the political side has to stand up and act as the lead on this, and I really cannot see either President Karzai or President Obama doing so effectively.

So, a) what is the grand strategic objective and b) who is the lead on it? This, BTW, gets to the part behind the "means".

Steve the Planner
09-21-2009, 03:55 PM
We are always planning. It is just that so much of it can be disjointed and counter-productive.

Having spent enough time with military planning to understand the exigencies of driving such a big ship through narrow channels, I am always left with the feeling that we are using the wrong tool---the hammer in search of a solution.

Civilian planning starts with Jane Jacobs, an open ended approach to interactive self-actualizing systems grounded in local connections and choices. Doesn't matter what community it is, engaging them, and helping them to frame a positive future---and the means and ends to get there---is the root.

What are some critical branches? Meaningful public participation, open government, goal focused plans, plan-based budgeting, forums for address and redress, reasonable checks and balances against excesses/corruption, feedback loops, ongoing refinements.

President Obama starts as a community activist, so he knows the basics (and limitations) of what has to be done on the civilian side to by-pass, and ultimately, change a disfunctional community and governance structure.

I am afraid that, upon entry to office, he was a bit too bewildered by all the stars, bars, jargon, and bureaucracy, to look at Afghanistan through a traditional community-based and people-focused lens.

But time flies, the political/economic/social crisis is at hand, and the limits of US civilian/military bureaucracy are pretty self-evident. So what CHANGE does he bring?

The current assessment really underscores the problem: The military can not plan around the current civilian policy/implementation gap. Somebody needs to set a new civilian strategy for the military to conform to, and he is the somebody.

Steve

slapout9
09-21-2009, 04:54 PM
few understand what it is. :eek: I go by the Army War College definition that strategy consists of an ends, ways, and means construct based on the nature of the threat. It does not, as most so-called strategists think, consist only of ends and ways. It always requires a realtionship between ends and means. So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT


John, you know thats not a bad idea.....we should send(invite) the president to the War College.;)

Ends,Ways,Means and Risks don't forget the Risks!

John T. Fishel
09-21-2009, 06:19 PM
Slap, I never got to the FAS test in my previous posts.

Marc, to my way of thinking all strategy from grand strategy to theater strategy to even a business strategy should be built around the ends, ways, means construct. The differences are the levels of generalization and the level of objectives. American Grand Strategy for the Cold War was laid out pretty well in NSC 68 which really filled in trhe ways and means of the Containment Policy.

Steve, once upon a time I was also a "community organized" in Mexico and Peru. The understanding of strategy that I got as a LTC in SWORD and afterward at SSI would have stood me in good stead in those days. I would add, however, that doing strategy from the bottom up is probably one of the more difficult things one can attempt. Real stratregic corporals and PCVs are hard to come by in the best of circumstances.

Cheers

JohnT

marct
09-21-2009, 06:27 PM
Hi John,


Marc, to my way of thinking all strategy from grand strategy to theater strategy to even a business strategy should be built around the ends, ways, means construct. The differences are the levels of generalization and the level of objectives. American Grand Strategy for the Cold War was laid out pretty well in NSC 68 which really filled in trhe ways and means of the Containment Policy.

The only problem I have with that construct is that it is linear (and limited), while I tend to view Grand Strategy as dynamic and highly integrated systems thinking, usually guided by a fairly well laid out philosophical underpinning. That being said, I can't think of many nations that have managed to achieve what I would truly call a Grand Strategy that lasted longer than, say 50 years or so. As you can see, I tend to take a long view when it comes to Grand Strategy ;).

Cheers,

Marc

slapout9
09-21-2009, 08:15 PM
Hmmmm seems to be differant.
The Army says Ends+Ways+Means=Strategy.
The Marines say Ends+Means=Way(Strategy).

Link from SWJ Libraray on USMC Strategy manual
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mcdp1-1.pdf

Steve the Planner
09-21-2009, 08:55 PM
I was just reading new and old Zbrezinski quotes.

In 1998, he was crowing about how he Carter & Gates had duped the Soviets into Afghanistan to counter our "secret" backing of the Taliban.

Now, his point is that, by increasing the amount of troops stationed in country, we will incur the same wrath as a foreign occupier----mirroring Mullah Omar's point.

How much is too much?

Back to the boring old question: What are we really trying to achieve?

Steve

davidbfpo
09-21-2009, 09:50 PM
If this conflict / intervention was not taking place in Afghan culture and society - what would we seek to achieve and what would we do? This may seem abstract, but allows clearer thought IMHO.

Yes, a Grand Strategy without Afghans. Slot in your objectives such as stabilise Pakistan, deter AQ from return to the area and 'X'.

Then factor in Afghan history and the Afghans. Allow thinking on whether the aims and means are worthwhile, let alone practical, politically OK etc.

Make your decisions and issue directions.

Steve the Planner,

I think we know what the objectives are, just that few express them well. Let alone take into account the actions of the current Afghan power brokers and bandit "lords" who have done everything to reduce Western involvement.

davidbfpo

Adrienne
09-21-2009, 09:53 PM
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103363131


I think that's fair enough, but the 'If I get more, then I can do more' comment strikes me as a little Rumsfeldian. I have to imagine that the number of troops available would weigh heavily in deciding what strategy to pursue.

While I respect POTUS's decision to wait until he has all the facts to determine strategy, he could start with articulating a POLICY on Afghanistan. He doesn't need a full, unvarnished assessment to explain what we're actually trying to do there. Yes, he's said our goal is to rid Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and prevent their return, but we need a few more details. We went through this same thing in Iraq - we can get the job done, but what exactly is the job you're asking us to do?

Also a bit concerned of the emphasis in the McChrystal report on ramping up the Afghan security forces. Reminds me of Iraq as well - from 2004-2006 it was all about training the ISF, and to hear MNSTC-I tell it by 2006 things were going pretty swimmingly. The reality on the ground was that things were getting worse by the day. We tend to overestimate the capabilities and willlingness of indigenous security forces to conduct a strong counter-insurgency campaign. It doesn't help when some elements of the security forces are beholden to specific ethnic/sectarian factions. I don't know the Afghan security forces that well, but I would be cautious about estimates of how fast we can transfer security to them.

Rob Thornton
09-21-2009, 10:19 PM
Hi Slap


Hmmmm seems to be differant.
The Army says Ends+Ways+Means=Strategy.
The Marines say Ends+Means=Way(Strategy).

While I agree with the former, I could live with the latter.

What I'd rather avoid is Means + Ways = Ends = Strategy. There may be times when it is all you can do based on resources - got it, but its not where I would want to be as it generally means you don't have the initiative, and/or are subject to whim and fancy (or bias and agenda)

Best, Rob

slapout9
09-21-2009, 11:18 PM
What I'd rather avoid is Means + Ways = Ends = Strategy. There may be times when it is all you can do based on resources - got it, but its not where I would want to be as it generally means you don't have the initiative, and/or are subject to whim and fancy (or bias and agenda)

Best, Rob
Hi Rob,
It seems to me this is what we are doing right now? Agree yes/no...comments.

Also I don't think A'stan is exactly a traditional COIN type fight and may get us into trouble....has gotten us into trouble.

Rob Thornton
09-22-2009, 12:11 AM
John raises an important issue in #3 - that political leadership and military leaders may have different understandings about strategy and about each others role in it, and that those different understandings may lead to some difference in expectations.

I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings.

Best, Rob

Steve the Planner
09-22-2009, 01:28 AM
Rob's on track:

"I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings."

The questions that stem from this cultural void remain unanswered. What are we really trying to accomplish? Some people know from their perspectives, but, in listening to Sec. Clinton on BBC tonight, it seems that things are still a bit up in the air---an ongoing new study.

The General is one point of data among many other smart people.

Steve

slapout9
09-22-2009, 01:53 AM
John raises an important issue in #3 - that political leadership and military leaders may have different understandings about strategy and about each others role in it, and that those different understandings may lead to some difference in expectations.

I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings.

Best, Rob

Rob, anyone,
I just saw a short clip from a weekend tv show with the President. After being asked a question he expressed some concern about how A'stan links to leading to the real enemy AQ, as in if we are successful in A'stan we will still have to deal with AQ. I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

MikeF
09-22-2009, 02:07 AM
Rob, anyone,
I just saw a short clip from a weekend tv show with the President. After being asked a question he expressed some concern about how A'stan links to leading to the real enemy AQ, as in if we are successful in A'stan we will still have to deal with AQ. I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

Slap,

This question is one that has confused me throughout this debate. GEN McChrystal was quoted a week or two ago stating that there was NO indication of AQ presence in Afghanistan. The proponents of continued or ramped-up operations in A'stan contend that if we leave then AQ will come back. I don't see the link or relevance to the overall objective of defeating AQ. If we need to help A'stan b/c it's the right thing to do, then say that.

v/r

Mike

Rob Thornton
09-22-2009, 02:59 AM
Hi Slap, I might totally miss answering your question - so sorry in advance.

There is usually more than one way to approach a problem, or a set of conditions you are trying to change. There are usually pros and cons associated with all of them, and there is usually some degree of risk.

I think even something that might appear as a fairly straight forward objective could prove complex depending on how one defined it, and translated it into operational requirements. It all depends on how far the executive direction that is/was provided says to go - or how well it was defined. That direction may be informed from a number of places to include military and civilian advice. It may also be considerate of other policy objectives that in some cases may be at odds or in competition with each other. Or it might not be defined at all, or in such a way that it provides ambiguous direction and as such others are left to define it as they think best.

So while I've seen some comments from pundits that General (Ret) Krulak's recommendations could not possibly succeed I'd say that depends on what you are trying to achieve - strategic context matters. I'd equally remark that the comments that say the only way to succeed is to proceed in the other vein are also qualified only by the context in which they are defining success.

Conditions and Objectives should drive requirements. However the policy end and the desired conditions which support it are defined, when the "ways" are acknowledged and agreed upon by the executive authority to achieve that end and its associated conditions then there would seem to be an obligation to either provide the means required or revisit the "ends" and "ways".

There is something to the phrase - that if you don't like the answer, (those who provide direction) should not ask the question, or at least be prepared to revisit it.

That is probably not a good answer, and I'm sorry. There may not be a good answer, but I'd rather tell you that then say there is only one way.

Best, Rob

slapout9
09-22-2009, 03:07 AM
That is probably not a good answer, and I'm sorry. There may not be a good answer, but I'd rather tell you that then say there is only one way.

Best, Rob

Rob, what concerns me is putting the enemy in a position where there is no good answer....is good strategy.....unfortunetly it is being done to us,not by us.:eek:

John T. Fishel
09-22-2009, 11:26 AM
is read the whole assessment. McChrystal makes a very complex but effective case, IMHO.
Mike, I suspect that the "quote" was a misquote because that is NOT what he says in the assessment. In fact, he says clearly that AQ is there; is closely aligned with one of the 3 Taliban factions all of whom collaborate in a realtively loose coalition.
Talk about confusion! I heard Carl Levin on NPR yesterday saying he fully agreed with McChrystal but seemingly coming to the conclusion that we should infuse trainers but no more combat troops or not until there are Afghan troops sufficiently trained....

Cheers

JohnT

marct
09-22-2009, 02:37 PM
In some ways, my twisted (and highly visual) mind has been generating a series of random game rules for "Whack-A-Mole". The current version of the rules seems to state that you can whack a Taliban mole if and only if it is seen in close proximity to an AQ mole. This would mean, by rule inversion, that the mission is a "success" if there are no AQ moles left in play, regardless of how many Taliban (or other) moles are still around.

Given that new AQ moles can be generated by a 10 year old sitting at a computer anywhere in the world and proclaiming their "allegiance" to AQ, one does have to wonder.....

Leaving off the mole analog and imagery, there are certain key grand strategic (GS) conditions (actually feedback loops) that do not seem to be included as metrics in the strategic level but, IMHO, should be.


What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?

Three historical event spaces keep popping into my mind: the campaigns of Pyrrhus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhus_of_Epirus), the polarization of the late Roman Republic under Marius (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaius_Marius) and Sulla (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Cornelius_Sulla), and the "restoration (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principate)" of the Republic under Octavian (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustus) (Augustus).

MikeF
09-22-2009, 03:02 PM
Mike, I suspect that the "quote" was a misquote because that is NOT what he says in the assessment. In fact, he says clearly that AQ is there; is closely aligned with one of the 3 Taliban factions all of whom collaborate in a realtively loose coalition.


John- The remarks (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8547348) were made on 9/11 at the Hague:


The top commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan said Friday he sees no signs of a major al-Qaida presence in the country, but says the terror group still maintains close links to insurgents...

"I do not see indications of a large al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan now," McChrystal told reporters at the Dutch Defense Ministry, where he met military officials.

But he warned that Osama bin Laden's network still maintains contact with insurgents and seeks to use areas of Afghanistan they control as bases.

"I do believe that al-Qaida intends to retain those relationships because they believe it is symbiotic ... where the Taliban has success, that provides a sanctuary from which al-Qaida can operate transnationally," he added.

Certainly, AQ has influence in A'stan. I'm starting to try and develop what AQ's strategy is for the Long War.

Assumption 1: Both sides view this conflict as a Long War.

Assumption 2: Iraq and A'stan are the INITIAL battles in this war.

Assumption 3: AQ realizes they lost Iraq.

Assumption 4: AQ adjusted strategy.

New Strategy: Transition into a war of exhaustion. Suck US into A'stan and Pakistan. Begin repositioning forces to Somalia, SE Asia, and other safehavens. As US COIN operations succeed over X amount of years (through high cost in both blood and treasure), main body moves and US is forced to follow. Eventually US quits fighting.

Endstate: US quits, and AQ can begin planning to conduct UW campaign in Saudi Arabia (the overall objective). Historians write it off as US winning battles and not the war.

That's what I would do.

So, now, I am wondering as I've wondered for the last eight years:

What is our strategy to defeat AQ?

Thoughts?

v/r

Mike

John T. Fishel
09-22-2009, 03:02 PM
Lordy, Marc, y'all are sure all over the hysterical map!:cool:

Good questions. I'm not sure that Mc Chrystal and his team tackled them all but they did address some of your MOE (metrics). What I am sure they did was apply the classic FAS test of strategy to their thinking - that is, they questioned the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of their strategic construct. McChrystal's answer was that his strategy would achieve the stated mission objectives if it was applied. To be successful, it would need additional resources and, initially, would result in larger US and NATO casualties. But with support from the President and his team, he could achieve measurable progress before public support ran out. They (the MOE you suggest) are also issues to be addressed in the NSC system and ultimately by the President. I'm afraid that my level of confidence in how he is addressing them and will address them is not very high.:(

Cheers

JohnT

marct
09-22-2009, 03:11 PM
Hi John,


Lordy, Marc, y'all are sure all over the hysterical map!:cool:

LOL - I told you that I view GS as a different type of thinking :D!


Good questions. I'm not sure that Mc Chrystal and his team tackled them all but they did address some of your MOE (metrics). What I am sure they did was apply the classic FAS test of strategy to their thinking - that is, they questioned the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of their strategic construct. McChrystal's answer was that his strategy would achieve the stated mission objectives if it was applied. To be successful, it would need additional resources and, initially, would result in larger US and NATO casualties. But with support from the President and his team, he could achieve measurable progress before public support ran out.

Agreed. I've gone through his assessment now, and I'm pretty impressed by it. Sure, i have some quibbles with it - I think it is still to geographically based for example - but that is somewhat moot. The key resources he needs, however, are not only the old "men and materiel" but, more importantly, political resources which are something that cannot be drawn from general stores :wry:.


They (the MOE you suggest) are also issues to be addressed in the NSC system and ultimately by the President. I'm afraid that my level of confidence in how he is addressing them and will address them is not very high.:(

Agreed, although i would say that the venue for such assessment goes well beyond the US to include all of the NATO nations involved since the levels on the feedback loops change with each country and over time.

carl
09-22-2009, 03:19 PM
I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

Steve:

To carry your analogy a bit further, parasites only flourish when they have the proper host. If they pick the wrong host, no more parasite. Taliban run Afghanistan was a close to perfect host. The border areas of Pakistan are pretty good too because of their remoteness, semi-anarchic state, Pathan mores and, a big and, a Pakistani army that tolerates or even encourages the parasite. Those conditions would not be found easily anywhere else, especially in western countries.

reed11b
09-22-2009, 04:23 PM
Good analogy Carl. Next step in that line of thought is to look where else those conditions may appy and try to prevent AQ from getting established there. Somalia and some other muslim african countries come to mind. If we wait until AQ is pushed out of A-stan, it will be too late. No "peace" dividend for a while yet.
Reed

Steve the Planner
09-22-2009, 05:13 PM
It started as a simple exercise in bring more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Now, we have shifted to an AQI focus that is transnational, and only secondary to Taliban in Afghanistan (to the extent they would provide a base for AQI).

Unfortunately, I am now hearing two potentially discrete objectives: (1) pursue AQI including in places that may be attractive refuges; (2) stabilize and improve self-governance in Afghanistan (via a new Army).

Last night, I caught CNN Andersen Cooper: Micheal Were and Peter Bergen argued for a major military increase to fight Taliban in Afghanistan; discussion included buying off warlords as an off-set to more troop deployments. Rory Stewart argued for a downscaled US/NATO mission to just AQI prevention, building a long-term development relationship to improve actual Afghan's lives, and, implicitly, an Afghanization of the internal/external conflicts.

Like Brezinzki's warning that sending more troops will incur more wrath and opposition to the "foreign occupier", and the debate over whether this is a COIN problem which can only be addressed by a COIN solution (based on the COIN staffing model, it all seems pretty complicated---but not in the military realm.

I agree with the opinion that the assessment says, if it is a military problem, here is what we need, but the crying out gap in that report is the political one.

What are we trying to achieve in Afghanistan?

My guess, and it follows some of Rory Stewart's approach, is that if our goal is to assure a permanant, long-term relationship with an adequately powerful governance group capable of limiting AQI influence over time, we may be talking warlords, Talib accommodation, and many other Afghanizations yet to be discussed here in the apppropriate depth.

The above-referenced long-term relationship is precisely what we failed to achieve in Iraq, and why I'll keep my gorillas boxes in the garage for the next round.

How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?

There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.

Steve

Ken White
09-22-2009, 05:25 PM
The People of Afghanistan -- the nominal focal point of a COIN campaign -- are not our focal point, they are an ancillary issue. So this, as Slap says, is not really a COIN Campaign.

The US political process has never, does not now and is unlikely to ever support the truly coherent planning that Steve would like or the grand strategy that Marc would like. We tend to wallow about and generally end up doing more good than harm...

MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.

The Marines version of strategy is realistic -- you have an end goal, you have means and from that you craft a way. The Army version is idealistic and incapable of execution at an international level in most cases because you will never have all the means at your disposal; you have to do with what you have. I suspect that the 'policy maker' -- the civilian politicians -- have a variant the reads:"Ends+Ways+MeansMade Avaliable+Escape route=Strategy." I'm unsure that the three versions can be decently merged but I'd opt for the Marine version as being best for everyone...

Marc suggests metrics. The word to me implies relatively provable factual data points to facilitate logical decision making. He suggests:
1. What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
2. What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
3. What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
4. What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?Since we are not looking at logical decisions but rather at political decisions, I respectfully suggest that each of those collections of metrics are not amenable to realistic numeration or positive/negative assessments but require rather nuanced and probably quite lengthy summaries -- and all of which will be subject to interpretation and /or spin by various wheels in the policy establishments (plural) as it would appear best for them. The President may have been a community organizer but as Steve said, he thus should be aware of the capabilities and the limitations of political intercourse (word advisedly used...).

Which is where we are. We went to Afghanistan to rid the world of Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, the principal policy makers did not comprehend the fact that it is not going to be destroyed -- it's not even going to be defeated, best we can do is disrupt and deter. That's what we're doing reasonably well and we'll get better at that. After we got there, we blew several attempts to "get Bin Laden" (which we weren't, correctly, all that serious about anyway) and someone or something convinced G.W. Bush to say we would stay and 'fix' Afghanistan regardless.

Thus we're there as a result of a flawed strategy that the Armed Forces / DoD did not particularly want to implement because they knew the potential problems, knew the civilian establishment would accept little or no responsibility for what they had ordered and that establishment would constantly change the rules. They also suspected they would be tasked to do things that were not their job in the process -- all that has come to pass.

Steve cites Rory Stewart who I believe has better insights than most and should be listened to. Steve then asks:
How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?Haven't been in that area for almost forty years but I suspect the Afghans haven't changed all that much. My guess in answer to his question is that you cannot and it is foolish to try...

What many in the Armed Forces want out of this is a military win. Not going to happen; never was. Most know that but the system demands that they try so they at least get credit for a draw. They will stay and do their best with what they are given but would much rather be elsewhere...

What most Western politicians want is a political win, a semi-viable Afghan state that they can chalk up a at least a tilted draw and which will not be significant problems until they're long out of office -- after that, they don't care. Not an ounce. For now, they'd just rather be elsewhere...

So it is now realized that we are not going to beat AQ, at least not in Afghanistan and thus we merely want to be sort of sure they won't resettle there until our disrupt and deter works better -- and it will. That leaves us with a need to 'fix' Afghanistan to some extent for several valid reasons.

The problem is that sounds nice but if properly done will be a multi-generational effort and neither the US or NATO are going to do that. We just want an acceptable outcome and the people of Afghanistan are not a major consideration. They never were. We will do as well by them as we can in order to achieve for The US and NATO and Pakistan and Afghanistan (in that order) an acceptable outcome. How do we get an acceptable outcome? What is an acceptable outcome?

We haven't figured that out as far as can be publicly ascertained at this time. Add to that there is NO 'right answer' but instead many alternatives of varying complexity and cost with even more potential variance in results. That's why no one can say what we are going to do...

Which, IMO, is to be expected and is better than trying to do something that simply cannot be done within the human, political and financial constraints extant. IOW, the means in the fullest sense are constrained, they always were and failure to consider those factors placed us in an unenviable position.

Ken White
09-22-2009, 05:35 PM
There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.Even the Politicians that ignore that intuitive concept and some reasonably sound military advice to avoid doing that and go ahead and order it done anyway...

The question is how do you get them -- the Pols -- to clean up their act?

That's your planning problem.

Greyhawk
09-22-2009, 05:38 PM
Writes (http://www.quattozone.com/2009/09/watchmen-picking-fight.html)


This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan.

Read the whole thing - I think that quote is key but there's much there of interest.

Steve the Planner
09-22-2009, 05:53 PM
Now, we are dealing with reality.

The scope of the mission that, in my opinion, is politically sustainable is disruption and deterrence of a known bad guy (AQI) which is a transnational movement, rather than a country.

In April 2008, I came home on leave from Iraq, and everybody at the neighborhood cocktail parties wanted to know anything I would tell them about Iraq---it was issue No. 1 in a very republican, conservative, very DoD neighborhood (near Ft. Meade).

In September 2000, nobody wanted to know anything but "When are you going to be home?" The war lost most public support during the election run-up, and was flattened by the economic issues.

The US public's taste for crooked governments, competing tribes, and unresolved centuries-old civil wars is simply gone. Doesn't mean the risk is gone, but a democracy has inherent inefficiencies.

Within the theory versus practice gap, I am pretty sure that, from what is going on locally (regardless of my interests), the Summer of 2008 broke the back of unlimited US interest in fighting a global war on terror. Now, it is back to a highly bounded reality of accomplishing the most important US security objectives with a set of resources that must continually be downscaled.

It is within that context that the President and NSC must figure out what to do next.

It is also in that context that I remember the Petreaus/Crocker hearings where one congresswoman was asking the details of the numbers of the Sons of Iraq program---how much does it cost per person to buy these guys off?

My belief was that her questions were heading in the direction of our old lessons with the Barbary Pirates. How much does the US have to pay to move goods unmolested in the world?

I suspect the answer, which I assume some smart folks are actively pursuing as we speak, is being negotiated somewhere, with the folks likely to be able to deliver. Problem, of course, is that you always have to pay tribute, and the amount increases as fast as health coverage costs.

So every now and then, you have to show your "partners" that there is some off-setting risk in asking for too much. I expect that the threat of a full-scale assault (anywhere) would be met with derision, but what things do we bring to the negotiation table? Disruption and Deterrence measures?

Steve

Ken White
09-22-2009, 05:55 PM
Albeit more concisely... :D

Referring to Greyhawks linked post (Steve types faster than I do...).

Dueling strategeries, the American way of War. Probably means the system works, just not rapidly or ever to everyone's satisfaction. Those contretemps are even older than the Revolution. Always has two sides, Executive and Legislative. Sometimes like now adds a third, Executive (Military). Very rarely even the Judicial weighs in. Or the Public (even more rarely). :cool:

The guy in Greyhawk's linked article does have one money quote with respect to the Media:
Questions like these show a reflexive craving for controversy and a bewildering ignorance...True dat...:D

carl
09-22-2009, 06:08 PM
Good analogy Carl. Next step in that line of thought is to look where else those conditions may appy and try to prevent AQ from getting established there. Somalia and some other muslim african countries come to mind. If we wait until AQ is pushed out of A-stan, it will be too late. No "peace" dividend for a while yet.
Reed

Reed: I wonder if those conditions exist anywhere else. Somaliland and Puntland might not let them in and south Somalia is such a mess that they might not find any real refuge there. Sudan kicked Osama out once already. The others I don't that much about but the big important ones seem to be fairly effective police states and the small ones are really remote. Maybe if AQ could be squeezed out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, there wouldn't be any place else to go.

MikeF
09-23-2009, 12:21 AM
MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.

Ken,

Your guess is probably correct; however, I think that this "realization" is a little short-sided. To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy. The CTC at USMA amongst others have done an tremendous job interpreting captured and public documents, but we fail to analyze. I would suggest this marker should be our start point:

1. Who is our enemy?
2. What do they want to accomplish?
3. How will they maneuver to seize their main objectives?

Or simply put, as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.

In my mind, this answer is the beginning of defining the problem. Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions. SWJ is the only forum that comes close with Slapout and Bob's World's discussions.

In the end, we can create a modern nation-state in both Iraq and A'stan that are both friendly towards the US, but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.

v/r

Mike

Ken White
09-23-2009, 03:11 AM
...To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy.I think there may be more analysis than you suspect. The problem is that it's inconclusive but it is still being worked.
...as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.Yeah, I've heard that, unfortunately or fortunately viewpoint dependent, I've discovered that one can't even know their friends as well as they know themselves, much less their enemies -- and, know what, that shortfall only complicates things a small amount. Quite small.

I think only in books and movies is that dictum workable; on the ground, it's extremely difficult and rarely provides any insights that significantly change the course of war.

A thorough historical review will show that most battles in the modern era were or are meeting engagements -- that's pretty much true at all levels from minor tactical to the strategic. So all you have to do is be better at correct (note NOT rapid; the OODA loops foolishness is fast draw stuff) response and you're ahead. If you've got a good sense of your opponent OR you've got good scouts, you can get a bit further ahead. Perhaps if you really knew him you could win easily -- but then if you really knew him, there might not be any cause for hostilities... :wry:

Yet hostilities are a constant, maybe mostly because we don't understand each other nearly as well as the Sociologists would prefer. Fortunately, it's also been my observation through the last 60 plus years that we have never known our enemy very well but happily, they always seem to be a little more discombobulated than we are. :D
Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions.Good questions but I certainly have no answers. I had a long discussion not too long ago with Wilf and 120mm with them taking the position that there were no cultural differences that preclude understanding others. They're entitled to their opinions but I disagreed. That disagreement was more than a bit based on the fact that I've fought people from at least four other cultures and neither I nor my superiors up to the national level really understood the opponents.
but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.Totally true. I suspect only time will really solve that...:wry:

slapout9
09-23-2009, 03:18 AM
Ken,

Your guess is probably correct; however, I think that this "realization" is a little short-sided. To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy. The CTC at USMA amongst others have done an tremendous job interpreting captured and public documents, but we fail to analyze. I would suggest this marker should be our start point:

1. Who is our enemy?
2. What do they want to accomplish?
3. How will they maneuver to seize their main objectives?

Or simply put, as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.

In my mind, this answer is the beginning of defining the problem. Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions. SWJ is the only forum that comes close with Slapout and Bob's World's discussions.

In the end, we can create a modern nation-state in both Iraq and A'stan that are both friendly towards the US, but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.

v/r

Mike

Hi Mike, sorry for the late response but have been busy. We must be Channeling I sent a PM to Rob last night saying the same thing. In fact I have been saying what you bring up ever since I have been here. SBW is good stuff.:) AQ has a Strategy .....we don't! UBL has consistently said he is going to bleed us and bankrupt us. He hasn't deviated one bit from that and he is winning!

Yes, the Objective is Saudi Arabia....always has been. UBL leads an Arab Guerrilla Army that camps out on other peoples property, hoping to divert and drain US strenght....he is simply taking the Strategic view of the longest way around is the shortest way home. UBL wants revenge so much I have never even heard him call it Saudi Arabia......he usually says the land of the two holy Mosques.

Strategy is M.O.M....understand his Motive, understand his Methods and you see how he exploits numerous Opportunities. He can target like nobody's business and we better wake up and realize that or we are going to be...may be in deep trouble.

Steve the Planner
09-23-2009, 03:39 AM
Mike's jewel encrusted comments:

"The CTC at USMA amongst others have done an tremendous job interpreting captured and public documents, but we fail to analyze."

It took two months in Iraq in early 2008 to put together a basic economic systems model for Northern Iraq that helped to prioritize reconstruction strategies.

With the UN Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBS) Team, we were pulling so much detailed data about populations, sub-populations, tribes, ethnic groups, minorities, IDPs, government services, etc., we couldn't process it all. I left in December with terra drives full of data. We put it all together for the UN, but couldn't find a US agency to take it, but I saw a lot of the bad data we have been using. All the info was there. Nobody had put it together. Lots of capture, not much analysis.

Back to strange metrics: Do we track the growth of crooks and war profiteers, and their drag on our efforts? Somebody recently suggested an embargo on Iran's importation of refined gasoline products. All I could think of was the gas mafia we all had to deal with in Iraq, and the amount of soldiers killed because of them.

In grad school in the mid-1980s, the issue was Deindustrialization, and the proposed tools were Central Planning ala Japan, Robert Reich, etc... It never took long to realize the flaws and failures in those systems. Instead, successes, such as they appear, lie in planning and feedback response strategies for open ended interactive economic and social systems.

According to recent stats, Afghanistan is following regional patterns of major urbanization, now reaching over 50% of the population in urban areas. That's the start of urban, modern state preconditions (notwithstanding that we still think of the place as rural), but with that urbanization comes a host of opportunities, risks, complexities, etc... The game is always changing, as are the definitions of friends, enemies, success, targets.

We can shoot bad guys until our hunting license expires, and we get thrown out, but shooting them makes more bad guys, and sometimes, those bad guys become "allies."

Like you, I find that this blog always has somebody who can both knock big holes in my soemtimes lazy thoughts, and teach me a lot in the process.

Steve

MikeF
09-23-2009, 04:06 AM
Ken, there is little that you and I disagree with; however, this may be one.


I think there may be more analysis than you suspect.

Actually, I've posed the question to members of the NSC through JSOC. They were often left confounded and asking me for answers b/c they had not read enough, and yes, I had a high enough clearance to engage.


The problem is that it's inconclusive but it is still being worked.Yeah, I've heard that, unfortunately or fortunately viewpoint dependent, I've discovered that one can't even know their friends as well as they know themselves, much less their enemies -- and, know what, that shortfall only complicates things a small amount. Quite small.

Honestly, it's not being worked. Everyone is hamstrung by the immediate threats in A'stan and Iraq.

You must remember. The Patraeus "think tank" of the surge and the CNAS appointees are mostly graduates of the USMA class of 2000. I met them when we were all 18 in Advanced Calculus. I know them well.

Bottom line-No one is focusing on AQ despite the rhetoric. The overwhelming problem remains that we have not defined the problem set.

v/r

Mike

MikeF
09-23-2009, 04:14 AM
AQ has a Strategy .....we don't! UBL has consistently said he is going to bleed us and bankrupt us. He hasn't deviated one bit from that and he is winning!

Slap, I gave my 20's to this fight, lost my share of good men, and I'll be damned if I quit now. It is time for us to confront UBL.

v/r

Mike

slapout9
09-23-2009, 04:27 AM
Slap, I gave my 20's to this fight, lost my share of good men, and I'll be damned if I quit now. It is time for us to confront UBL.

v/r

Mike

I didn't say nothing about quiting........time for an Air Campaign.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=puQehcuhVIw&feature=related

MikeF
09-23-2009, 04:31 AM
I didn't say nothing about quiting........time for an Air Campaign.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=puQehcuhVIw&feature=related

I didn't expect anything less, but you have to hear this duo by my two favorite artist...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B56UjiLuWkk

v/r

Mike

Surferbeetle
09-23-2009, 04:38 AM
Everyone is hamstrung by the immediate threats in A'stan and Iraq.

Tonight's FAZ (http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0CCA23BC3D3C4C78914F85BED3B53F3C/Doc~E9706D1C9CA7C4D1DB3547266B6DDC171~ATpl~Ecommon ~Scontent.html): BG Vollmer, Regional Commander North (http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html) says Germany needs to train 2,500 afghan policemen over the winter to help hold Kunduz, Deutsch politico's and others are slugging it out; one estimate for associated costs is 9 million for 2 years...(small beer given Dr. Stiglitz's estimate (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702846.html))

Some tunes & a video to try and keep things light (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLvR5NiCPb0) (Weezer & Warren Miller)

slapout9
09-23-2009, 04:47 AM
I didn't expect anything less, but you have to hear this duo by my two favorite artist...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B56UjiLuWkk

v/r

Mike

Yea, I am a big Kenny fan but had not heard that one, thanks. I Like Gary Allen to.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3_7ph6XK-g

Ken White
09-23-2009, 04:50 AM
Rarely.:D


Actually, I've posed the question to members of the NSC through JSOC. They were often left confounded and asking me for answers b/c they had not read enough, and yes, I had a high enough clearance to engage.that doesn't surprise me in the least -- though I would suggest you're asking questions at the policy level where they cannot be bothered to know any details. I know of an analyst at DIA who's pretty knowledgeable and there are others around at lower levels.

The problem is not that "we" do not know, the problem is that the power structure is too egocentric to be concerned. Truth is also that they are not a significant issue. Same thing has occurred in all our wars since WW II. :eek:
Honestly, it's not being worked. Everyone is hamstrung by the immediate threats in A'stan and Iraq.At the execution level, that's the way of the world. Think of your Troop at Bragg and your foci there -- then consider your focus in Iraq.
Bottom line-No one is focusing on AQ despite the rhetoric. The overwhelming problem remains that we have not defined the problem set.We rarely if ever do define the problem set to any real degree of specificity.

Recall my comment above about not even really knowing ones friends. With that in mind, check the Op-Ed at the LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen.html?partner=rss&emc=rss). I would be willing to bet large sums that someone in State sent up a red flag on the issue and the Date. The NSC crowd could care less. I also believe effort is being expended on AQ, JI, Hezbollah and a slew of others. NSC crowd isn't cioncerned about them either. They are concerned about the multiple threats we face.

Quoth Slap :
...AQ has a Strategy .....we don't! UBL has consistently said he is going to bleed us and bankrupt us. He hasn't deviated one bit from that and he is winning!I have heard that also, only difference between Slap and I is that I don't think he's winning. Not even close. AQ is not the enemy, they are only one small, not terribly effective crowd in a much larger crowd of folks who dislike the US and do not wish us well. They are not nearly as dangerous and not nearly as bothersome as Hezbollah to name just one other. Nor are they as close to us as still others or as wealthy as still others.

Slap is right that they are focused and dedicated, they have a motive and a plan -- but they do not have the means to do what they say. They are only one aspect of twenty or so of concern to us strategically at this time. Slap also points out they target well. So-so, it seems -- yet if they overreach, a likely occurrence, all they'll do is hack off a whole lot of Americans. That's never a good plan; we tend to get stupid...

A single enemy makes it easy to focus ones effort, ala the Cold War or even WW II and most of the wars after that which were all Cold War influenced. Today, the enemy is multi faceted and multi polar; there are a bunch of them.

Spend too much effort focused on one and you'll miss what the others are up to. I believe the NSC is aware of that. I know others are...

MikeF
09-23-2009, 05:05 AM
At the execution level, that's the way of the world. Think of your Troop at Bragg and your foci there -- then consider your focus in Iraq.We rarely if ever do define the problem set to any real degree of specificity.

Good points. I've been privy to things way outside my lane, and I realize that I'm not a SME on strategy. Mostly, I'll state an opinion or ask questions to to get smarter.

IMO, anyone that actually grasps the problem understands that it is bigger than any one individual. That's one of the beauty's of SWJ- we can discuss things to find better resolutions.

All the way Ken :D

v/r

Mike

MikeF
09-23-2009, 05:15 AM
Back to my original question:

What is our strategy against AQ?

Compare that with our current projected cost in A'stan and Iraq given that a 2-year surge in A'stan will be impotent. COIN or nation-building(whatever you want to call it) will take decades. I don't know the answers.

v/r

Mike

Ken White
09-23-2009, 06:06 AM
available is to decapitate the leadership as it morphs, go after financial backers and sources and generally engage in a long term squeeze play that is mostly not military but Intel and Finance led and was last time I noticed, estimated to be in effective year four of a 20 plus year effort. The only military aspect at this time is AQ in Iraq and the small elements in Afghanistan. While some SOF may get involved as in Somalia recently, the Predator missile strikes in Afghanistan seem to belong to OGA. Plenty of fun for everyone. :wry:

However, I still say they're a relatively small portion of the effort; they just aren't that important except from a revenge standpoint and they really don't have a great deal of capability at this time. They're trying to change that and I know that's being watched.

MikeF
09-23-2009, 06:22 AM
available is to decapitate the leadership as it morphs, go after financial backers and sources and generally engage in a long term squeeze play that is mostly not military but Intel and Finance led and was last time I noticed, estimated to be in effective year four of a 20 plus year effort. The only military aspect at this time is AQ in Iraq and the small elements in Afghanistan. While some SOF may get involved as in Somalia recently, the Predator missile strikes in Afghanistan seem to belong to OGA. Plenty of fun for everyone. :wry:

However, I still say they're a relatively small portion of the effort; they just aren't that important except from a revenge standpoint and they really don't have a great deal of capability at this time. They're trying to change that and I know that's being watched.

If that's the strategy/answer, then it sounds more like a global police action rather than a military one. We should lower our risk threshold (Dalton Fury in Tora Bora being the best public example), increase expeditionary treasury dept dudes (In Iraq circa 2005, there was a total of 2, I think that's changed), and turn the fight over to the FBI, CIA, and SOCOM. We're not doing that.

Instead, we have a military answer- COIN with the mission-creep of nation-building towards the worst areas of the world.

As my Papaw would put, that dog don't hunt.

v/r

Mike

John T. Fishel
09-23-2009, 12:09 PM
Ken, I suspect you are right that most post WWII wars have been characterized by meeting engagments including the war in El Salvador - which is where I'm going with this.

By1987, the ESAF, govt, and the US had developed a holistic COIN strategy that included political and economic reform and development - the development strategy had evolved from the 1983-84 National Plan to Unidos Para Reconstruir 85 - 87 to Municipios en Accion after 87; from centralized phased to decentrralized. The corresponding military strategy had three parts:
1. Protect infrastructure - a prime target of the FMLN - which also meant protecting the population because the infrastructure was located where they lived. This aspect of the strategy involved the most troops but was limited to regular brigades and miilitary detachments and Civil Defense (local militia) units.
2. 24/7 patrols by Immediate Reaction Bn in areas of FMLN concentration characterized by meeting engagements. The objective was to keep the FMLN off balance and constantly on the move. Since these bn were operating in thirds - one third in the field, one third recovering, one third preparing to go back - they were rested compared to the guerrillas.
3. Intel targeted operations by the national Special Operations Group (GOE) and similar operations by brigade long range patrol elements focused on specific identified concetrations of FMLN leaders and fighters.

Together this national pol-econ-mil strategy won the war. Clearly, El Salvador is NOT Afghanistan or Iraq but we can certainly learn and adapt that which is appropriate. It is also useful to note that it took between 8 and 10 years to get all elements of the strategy in place. It is equally important that the big picture really was not clear to any single individual at the time. I never heard the military strategy described as I just described it by anybody - US or ESAF - while I was in country conducting the Combined ESAF Assessment (87-88) and I was talking with the MOD, the C3, the US Ambassador, and the MILGP commander along with the Southcom J3 who headed the team. Nevertheless, that is what was actually happening on the ground.

Cheers

JohnT

Surferbeetle
09-23-2009, 03:13 PM
Together this national pol-econ-mil strategy won the war. Clearly, El Salvador is NOT Afghanistan or Iraq but we can certainly learn and adapt that which is appropriate. It is also useful to note that it took between 8 and 10 years to get all elements of the strategy in place. It is equally important that the big picture really was not clear to any single individual at the time. I never heard the military strategy described as I just described it by anybody - US or ESAF - while I was in country conducting the Combined ESAF Assessment (87-88) and I was talking with the MOD, the C3, the US Ambassador, and the MILGP commander along with the Southcom J3 who headed the team. Nevertheless, that is what was actually happening on the ground.

John/Dr. F/Sir,

As a fellow CA-bubba I recognize parts of your pol-econ-mil strategy from my time in Mosul, and saw some old echos of the El Salvador fight during a VETRETE there. During OIF 1 in Mosul we were able to reach large numbers of the populace and engage through the pol-econ-mil spectrum. As a result of this we reaped the benefits resulting from a greater mass of combined numbers (US & Iraqi) working to stabilize the area. My observation was that both US and Iraqi cultures were committed to centralized control however...later that summer de-bathification and disbanding the Army were some pretty serious below the belt shots to what we were doing...security deteriorated and the pol-econ side followed. There were still some older FMLN warriors around whom I bumped into during my visit to El Salvador. The FMLN had a distinct vision of themselves but they were peacefully pushing the pol-econ side of things in the small area that I observed. Peaceful integration is a worthy goal and I see the outcome as a success.

Mike F,

Darwinian competition analogies and riffs from ecology, business, and calculus may also be of use when considering our way forward. Plants are slower and easier to watch than animals. Plants fight by being optimized for certain conditions, growing larger than their competitors so that they can gather more nutrients & water, minimize their competitor’s access to nutrients & water, and produce more phytotoxins which inhibit the growth of competitors. Plants also work within ecosystems through such strategies as symbiosis and succession. Marketing teaches systematic examination of an organization’s internal environment, a customer’s environment, and the external environment to include competitors in order to look for and act upon advantages. Described here in a few short sentences it is very difficult to convey the benefits of understanding aspects of ecology and business and then applying them to our fight. Nonetheless those two subjects have been of use to me in my small sphere of influence and I highlight them for your consideration as we consider how to apply our calculus experiences to break things up into small manageable pieces and examine them for slope changes and areas under the curve, sometimes across several dimensions...while thinking about the hope and promise of the first sentence of my diffy q (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_equation) book: "This book is about how to predict the future." Perhaps we can describe the way forward with cobb-douglas demand functions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobb%E2%80%93Douglas) and optimization strategy’s (http://reference.wolfram.com/mathematica/tutorial/ConstrainedOptimizationGlobalNumerical.html#851833 21) in partnership with our old standby,:eek: wielders of chicken bones (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augur)?

John T. Fishel
09-23-2009, 04:01 PM
To me, the ultimate success of the El Sal strategy was the election last year of an FMLN president and his peaceful assumption of office. I saw this foreshadowed in a 2000 conference in El Sal where FMLN and aRENA legislators had forged friendships and working relationships.

On decentralization: Amb Ed Corr was the father of the MEA plan that decentralized development - at least on the US side. In his article on mil-mil contacts in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (vol 10 # 2) John Waghelstein who commaned the first big Milgp in 82-83 and was godfather of the original national plan, credits MEA with being the right approach.

Me, with my CA hat, am a strong advocate of local level development planning. Villagers really do know what they need better than the central govt.

Cheers

JohnT

MikeF
09-23-2009, 05:02 PM
Boards packed up as I'm waiting to PCS.

Surferbeetle- I think I ran myself in circles discussing things w Ken last night so I'm gonna have to hold off a couple of days before trying to process the Darwin analogy. I've studied evolutionary stable system and how animals compete for natural resources, but I haven't really looked in to the stuff you posted.

v/r

Mike

Ken White
09-23-2009, 05:33 PM
...turn the fight over to the FBI, CIA, and SOCOM. We're not doing that.

Instead, we have a military answer- COIN with the mission-creep of nation-building towards the worst areas of the world.

As my Papaw would put, that dog don't hunt.Yep, he got that right.

The USG initial reaction to 9/11 was to say that was exactly what was going to happen (SOCOM was given the worldwide mission) and then, to remove the Taliban and AQ in bulk from Afghanistan and depart. Removal of Saddam for many reasons (of which I'm convinced WMD was not one) was added, again with a rapid departure. the rapid departures got canceled; whether for humanitarian or deeper political reasons I know not -- nor do I care; I disagreed with staying but no one asked me and it happened so it's reality, the reasons are relatively inconsequential at this stage. We're there.

What does matter is that both Iraq (a message to the broader ME as well as a major and smart strategic disruptor to AQ) and Afghanistan were flawed in execution by an Army that had deliberately not trained to occupy and stabilize another nation in an attempt to influence national policy (hopefully, we won't try that again...) and we got stuck deeper in both places due to a lack of capability. Thus the strategic effect was blunted but not disastrously so in Iraq and probably not in Afghanistan -- too early to tell, really, for either place.

The problem today is that attacks in both nation were and are totally peripheral to Al Qaeda -- yet due to poor PR work by both the Bush and Obama admins and the incompetence of most news media folks, the three separate issues have become conflated in the eyes of too many.

That conflation creates confusion -- in high places.

However, the thing to remember is that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan have much to do with AQ.

As I said earlier, that has dawned on the new administration who had the two thoroughly intermingled / conmingled / confuesd in their little minds (all politicians have little minds...) and they are now looking for the sign (LINK) (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.lumink.com/products/images/exit_signs.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.lumink.com/products/photoluminescent_exit_signs.shtml&usg=__wEDth5eIZPeJragshpYhYwqIhWQ=&h=281&w=280&sz=8&hl=en&start=14&um=1&tbnid=F6fKdxanmT9TSM:&tbnh=114&tbnw=114&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dexit%2Bsigns%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfir efox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1).

If I were a cynic, I'd say that the Army has laid down a marker; the Admin will decide the cost is not supportable and changes will occur prior to November 2010 and even bigger changes prior to November 2012.

Fortunately, I'm not a cynic. We'll see what happens...:D

P.S.

John T's right, as usual, on multiple counts.

What happened there could be adapted to Afghanistan and likely will be to an extent. It did take almost 10 years to have an effect -- and in Afghanistan, a far larger and more difficult environment, we're just starting to recover from the LINK (http://www.answers.com/topic/holding-action) (which, in a sense, did as much harm as good -- as they often predictably and acceptably do) and implement -- it would take in excess of 20 years IMO to accomplish any where near what was done in El Salvador. Not sure we have the stomach for that...

We plan things in excruciating detail but due to generally badly flawed intel, an egotistical disregard for other cultures by many in high place even when they are warned of the potential problems and our marginal state of training (I feel charitable today :rolleyes:) it's wasted effort. The failures those three flaws induce all impact at once so we end up discarding the plan and cobbling together Plan's B-M as we we blunder along. Fortunately, we do that well and we generally do a better job than our opponents. :cool:

But Afghanistan really has little to do with AQ...

slapout9
09-23-2009, 08:56 PM
Quoth Slap :I have heard that also, only difference between Slap and I is that I don't think he's winning. Not even close.

If he is alive he is winning. He broke into our house and killed our family. So we need Kill Bill Laden Vol. 2 The incident at two Towers on 911 needs to become a legend of we Killed Bill Laden.....We deserve our revenge and he deserves to die! So where's Bill?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSR7xRGBnOE

davidbfpo
09-23-2009, 10:19 PM
A good review article by Steve Coll, on why Afghanistan is important: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/09/afghanistan-india.html#entry-more


In this war, we have two important interests: One is largely uncontroversial: The reduction of Al Qaeda to a nuisance or less. The second American interest in the war, however, is by some margin the more important and enduring one. Yet it is also a more complex subject...The United States has a deep interest in the emergence of a stable, modernizing, economically integrated, peaceful South Asia....Why does the Afghan war figure in this assessment today? The Taliban are a backward-looking threat to the near-term stability of South Asia—in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and, as the Mumbai attacks demonstrated, occasionally in India..... these regional American interests at issue in the Afghan war are very powerful; to confirm this, consider the alternative of Pakistan’s failure at the Taliban’s hands.

Grand Strategy no less: reduce AQ's threat and keep South Asia from war.

davidbfpo

John T. Fishel
09-23-2009, 11:15 PM
is Steve Coll and on the mark IMO. :cool:

Cheers

JohnT

slapout9
09-23-2009, 11:39 PM
is Steve Coll and on the mark IMO. :cool:

Cheers

JohnT

John, David,take a look at all the attacks that he says AQ was resonsible for including the recent attack in India, that dosen't seem like an organization that is just a nusance.:eek: Seems like one that is becoming far more dangerous.

slapout9
09-23-2009, 11:58 PM
Steve:

To carry your analogy a bit further, parasites only flourish when they have the proper host. If they pick the wrong host, no more parasite. Tali ban run Afghanistan was a close to perfect host. The border areas of Pakistan are pretty good too because of their remoteness, semi-anarchic state, Pathan mores and, a big and, a Pakistani army that tolerates or even encourages the parasite. Those conditions would not be found easily anywhere else, especially in western countries.

Hi Carl, sorry for responding late. Once a parasite attach's itself to the host you have to get it off or the host will begin a slow decline or submit to regulation or control by the parasite.:eek: A very bad situation in nature with animals including people. If AQ becomes the regulator of the Talliban you can not save them by making them stronger.....you will end killing the host to get to the parasite.:eek:

Steve the Planner
09-24-2009, 12:24 AM
The thing that so many folks seem to overlook is that Pakistan is just one piece of the puzzle.

India, for itself, has direct reasons to actively engaged in the Taliban threat, as do other neighbors (China).

But Coll's pointing to India and other nations on the path to modernization highlights the fact that these movements were internally driven, and are inter-generational endeavors.

Steve

Ken White
09-24-2009, 12:35 AM
John, David,take a look at all the attacks that he says AQ was resonsible for including the recent attack in India, that dosen't seem like an organization that is just a nusance.:eek: Seems like one that is becoming far more dangerous.I'm sure they want to become more dangerous but the truth is they're becoming less dangerous.

Check the LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_organisations_in_India). The boys in AQ are only number 30 on a list of terrorist organizations in India. The Assamese and the Communists do far more damage. The Mumbai attack was not AQ but another Muslim fundamentalist crew from Pakistan.

Pol-Mil FSO
09-24-2009, 01:03 AM
A somewhat tardy post related to Dr. Fishel's El Salvador comments:

In a 1988 visit to eastern El Salvador, I accompanied Ambassador Walker as a junior officer horse holder. In San Miguel, we heard 3d Brigade Commander Colonel Ponce tell us that he was more interested in protecting the population than killing guerrillas, and that he preferred turning a guerrilla to killing him. We saw this policy in action when we flew up to San Francisco Gotera, the capital of Morazan Department. Colonel Barrera, the Military Detachment Commander in Morazan, showed us a FMLN fighter who had surrendered to ESAF troops. Colonel Barrera told us that that the fighter had been a guest at the cuartel for a week and had been receiving food and shelter with no attempt at interrogation. They were waiting for the fighter to cooperate, something that they predicted would happen soon, given the good treatment and the fact that his ex-companeros were convinced that he had gone over to the other side.

It may be a somewhat simplistic formulation, but it seems to me that the ESAF COIN strategy evolved from killing the villagers whom they believed to support the guerrillas in the early 1980's, to chasing guerrillas during the middle 1980's, to considering the population as the center of gravity in the late 1980's.

jmm99
09-24-2009, 01:18 AM
Of Ken's signs, I like this one (attached) - modified by some shooping artistry to show the order of magnitude difference between policy and strategy; and that policy can drive a diametrically opposed exit state from that suggested by the best strategy.

Where Steve Coll will end up with his series and his "yes or no" answer, I don't know. But, if we (US, and for that matter the various ISAF partners) are indeed considering the best policy; and, as a smaller part, a strategy for the Indian Ocean littorals; and, as a smaller part of that, a strategy for Astan, we should look to the map and the nations that have interests in that region.

I see at least a dozen regional powers on those littorals and the associated continental land masses - some are genuine global powers. I will agree with Coll that the US and the ISAF partners have "interests" in the Indian Ocean region. Labelling them "vital, deep, etc." is not especially helpful.

My take: The salient question is what are the relative interests of the countries we can see on the map - and the relative interests of those countries that do not appear on the map. To turn Marx on his head, from each according to his interests; to each according to his interests.

How do others here see the relative interests of the countries on the map - and the relative interests of those countries that do not appear on the map (e.g., the US and the ISAF partners) ?

John T. Fishel
09-24-2009, 01:39 AM
Not only did the ESAF change over time but individuals did as well. I will be forever impressed and in awe of the American Ambassadors. the MILGP Commanders and those who worked for them, and, especially, the ESAF officers who with all their faults who fought a hard war, learned and changed and adjusted to peace.

Are there comparable military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan?

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
09-24-2009, 01:55 AM
Good point, the List of terrorist organisations in India (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_organisations_in_India). It illustrates the deficiency, if practice were applied to the rhetoric, of the term "GWOT".

As to AQ as a "nuisance", I suppose I agree based on a totally rational analysis from both the military and law enforcement standpoint. But, let us have one successful attack by AQ directly, or via an AQ-supported group, and the public perception will not regard "nuisance" as an appropriate term. I prefer the wording that AQ is a "threat".

Certainly, it is far from a threat to the nation's existence. By comparison, the US suffered over 113,000 accidental deaths in 2005 (http://commonlaw.findlaw.com/2007/06/accidental_deat.html). Those dwarfed the 9/11 totals. The folks' reactions to what is considered "normal" (accidental deaths) and what is considered "abnormal" (terrorist attacks) are quite different. And the folks' and their politicians' reactions are what drives policy.

Regards to all

Mike

And Ken, I missed your smiling persona for a few days. Thought I'd have to send out the St. Bernard (with brandy - yum, yum to me) or the Kentucky bloodhound (with I. W. Harper - also OK).

jmm99
09-24-2009, 02:19 AM
Not long ago, Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at Astan governance and Rule of Law. As part of that task, I looked at a number of reports and assessments (most of which are pure agitprop, IMHO).

The Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) issued three assessment reports on the justice systems in four fairly secure provinces in 2007:

Assessment of the Justice Sector in Kunduz Province (http://www.jssp-afghanistan.com/Reports%20and%20Publications/Assessment_of_the_Justice_Sector_in_Kunduz_Provinc e_Oct_2007.pdf), Oct 2007 (37 pages)

The State of Regional Justice Systems in Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar (http://www.jssp-afghanistan.com/Reports%20and%20Publications/The_State_of_Regional_Justice_Systems_in_Balkh_Her a_and_Nangarhar_%20Dec_2006.pdf), Dec 2006 (79 pages)

Assessment of Provincial Defense Capabilities (http://www.jssp-afghanistan.com/Reports%20and%20Publications/Assessment_of_Provincial_Defense_Capabilities_Sept _2007.pdf), Sept 2007 (70 pages)

The reports (which primarily focused on criminal justice - judges, prosecutors & police) were bleak. Since then, the JSSP has not updated the assessments; although it has released a number of PR "shorts".

The criminal portion of a justice system is important; but in the long term, the civil portion of the system is more important because it directly or indirectly affects far more people. Astan's 4 provinces in their formal justice system in 2007 flunked the criminal justice tests; the civil justice system seemed non-existent in any formal sense.

The ability of the two sheep barterers to resolve the "defective sheep" issue, or the issue of which rock marks the property line, is but a minor blip in the geo-political issues which are the major foci of interest. The comment by GEN McChrystal that the Taliban have set up "Shadow Governments" is not encouraging. If the Taliban can provide acceptable justice to the little sheepherders and property owners, it will go a long way to preempt the role of the national government.

So, in answer to JTF's question:


Are there comparable military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan?

Not in the four provinces studied by JSSP.

No cheers about this, but it seems to be factual.

Mike

tequila
09-24-2009, 02:20 AM
John, David,take a look at all the attacks that he says AQ was resonsible for including the recent attack in India, that dosen't seem like an organization that is just a nusance. Seems like one that is becoming far more dangerous.


Except the Taliban has never attacked an Indian target. Frankly I have my doubts about their responsibility for the Indian embassy bombing --- the Pak security services (through the Haqqanis, perhaps?) are my bet, and they, not the Taliban or the Afghan war, are the key barrier to Coll's vision IMO.

Coll's article is a bit Pollyannish for my liking. Yes, economic growth and modernization in India is a wonderful thing, and bringing millions out of poverty. But India is a huge place, and growth is very unevenly distributed even there. Growth alone cannot bring peace --- at its worst, it can sometimes harden sectarian and class lines if not equitably distributed. Witness the spread of the violent Naxalite movement in India's rural areas even as India has grown more prosperous.

A more prosperous and powerful India has the potential to bring South Asia forward --- it could also spark an ever more paranoid and militant response from Pakistan's military elites, already aware of the quite substantial gap between their own capability and India's. Moreover the conflicts Coll describes were accelerated and made more violent by the Cold War, and its end deflated them especially in Central and South America --- the India/Pakistan divide is entirely homegrown, and more deeply entrenched in the mindset of its elites. There is no equivalent in sight to the Berlin Wall coming down on the subcontinent, and there won't be as long as a significant wing of the Pakistani security services engages in spoiler attacks such as the Kargil War, the attack on the Indian parliament, the Mumbai attacks, etc.

slapout9
09-24-2009, 02:34 AM
Except the Taliban has never attacked an Indian target.

If I read the article right Coll was saying AQ attacked India not the Taliban.

Ken White
09-24-2009, 02:42 AM
India and elsewhere.

Steve the Planner
09-24-2009, 03:49 AM
India was not attacked by Taliban, but it still has to concern itself with them---as they relate to the region in general and Pakistan in particular (not to mention Kashmir, and, perhaps some crazy Samarra-inspired attack on somewhere like Amritsar). Still, they have more immediate and domestic fish to fry, of which AQ is just one.

China has the more direct concerns with Afghanistan & the Taliban both to the South where the new China-financed port is going to be closely related to everything in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to the North where its border provinces abut Taliban areas (talk about formidable geography though).


As much as anything, the boundary disputes for India are with China, as shown on the Kashmir map.

http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/printpage/kashmirprint.htm

Pol-Mil FSO
09-24-2009, 04:11 AM
The only Afghan leader with whom I had sufficient interaction to form any evidence-based opinions was the former governor of Kandahar Province, Assadullah Khalid. Although I am in the minority, I liked the guy and thought he turned in a creditable performance in an impossible job. He certainly was better than the two persons who have held the job since he was replaced (due to pressure from the international community).

Steve the Planner
09-24-2009, 04:17 AM
From June 24 Wall Street Journal (The China-India Border Brawl) re the constant squabbles over borders (including Kashmir) :


"But what riles India most is China's incursion into its backyard and the belief China is surrounding the subcontinent with its "string of pearls" -- Chinese "investments" in naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts along the southern coast of Asia. There are port facilities in Bangladesh and radar and refueling stations in Burma. Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan now all host Chinese "projects;" China's crown jewel is the Pakistani deepwater port of Gwadar."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html

And we think the only problems are in AfPak. As jmm notes, it is a big interconnected region. There are long-standing historical conflicts completely unrelated to immediate US interests in that region.

Steve the Planner
09-24-2009, 04:31 AM
Sep 22 WSJ

India's Minister Urges Political Settlement in Afghanistan

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125364105273431343.html?mod=sphere_ts&mod=sphere_wd


"If there are internal differences within Afghanistan I think the people of Afghanistan, the leaders of Afghanistan, will sort it out by themselves," Mr. Krishna said.

India is heavily invested in Afghanistan, particularly infrastructure projects such as roads, hospitals, schools and the new parliament building in Kabul. In all, Indian reconstruction aid totals $1.2 billion. Mr. Krishna said the investment was worth the risk despite the continued conflict.

"Afghanistan as a nation has to grow," he said. "They have come through a process of holding elections. Giving democracy a try, they have succeeded."

He downplayed the findings of electoral fraud, noting the U.S. election fracas in Florida in 2000. "It happens in every election, [that results are] questioned," Mr. Krishna said.

Mr. Krishna dismissed suggestions that India's growing involvement in Afghanistan is intended to encircle Pakistan, a fear prevalent in some circles in Pakistan. "I think that is a baseless allegation," he said.

slapout9
09-24-2009, 05:37 AM
From June 24 Wall Street Journal (The China-India Border Brawl) re the constant squabbles over borders (including Kashmir) :

"But what riles India most is China's incursion into its backyard and the belief China is surrounding the subcontinent with its "string of pearls" -- Chinese "investments" in naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts along the southern coast of Asia. There are port facilities in Bangladesh and radar and refueling stations in Burma. Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan now all host Chinese "projects;" China's crown jewel is the Pakistani deepwater port of Gwadar."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html

And we think the only problems are in AfPak. As jmm notes, it is a big interconnected region. There are long-standing historical conflicts completely unrelated to immediate US interests in that region.


Yep,Follow the Oil, follow the pipelines,follow the map, and follow the money.

slapout9
09-24-2009, 06:02 AM
Per Pepe Escabar

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AN5a9WomVqs&feature=channel

Steve the Planner
09-24-2009, 12:22 PM
Jamestown Foundation has a great interview with LTG Hadi Khalid, former Dep Min of Interior. Fascinating from many perspectives.


HK: After Bonn, it was decided that Afghanistan should have 62,000 national policemen. During my work in the MOI, our international donors wanted the number increased to 82,000 and now there is talk of raising the membership to 96,000, including local militias, which I think is a terrible idea. It is better to have a small, qualified force than a barely outfitted, cumbersome one. But the donors do not listen to us, they make these decisions without consulting us.

HK: The United States must “Afghanize” the situation here. Afghanization is the only way forward. Afghans want to have an alliance with the United States because without such an ally, we cannot survive. Our neighbors will swallow us up and our internal problems will also swallow us. The U.S. must genuinely empower our army, police and intelligence services to make our forces the frontline in Afghanistan.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35504&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=42ad11eccd

It provides an Afghan take on each border challenges, including Iran, the stans and China.

He argues for substantial Afghanization, but with the caveat that, due to their weak tax base, it must be paid for by foreign aid.

At the least, this is a very good data point for the Big Game issues still playing out.

His point that the neighbors would swallow up Afghanistan is really interesting in the context of neighboring interests and affiliations. I assume he is indirectly referring to the many "countries" of Afghanistan which Rory Stewart notes in vintage british colonial reports. Funny how these enduring ideas are well-understood by the locals, but not by us.

Steve

slapout9
09-24-2009, 12:56 PM
His point that the neighbors would swallow up Afghanistan is really interesting in the context of neighboring interests and affiliations. I assume he is indirectly referring to the many "countries" of Afghanistan which Rory Stewart notes in vintage british colonial reports. Funny how these enduring ideas are well-understood by the locals, but not by us.

Steve

Good article.

MikeF
09-24-2009, 04:48 PM
A good article describing the larger issues of SE Asia. Note previously posted yesterday (Post 71).

Thinking about Afghanistan (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/23/thinking_about_afghanistan)Steve Coll
Foreign Policy


At the risk of trying the patience of those who seek from Afghan wonks a short yes-or-no opinion about General McChrystal’s assessment of the war and his argument for more U.S. troops pronto, I thought I would try a series of posts this week that seek some distance from the political heat surrounding President Obama’s first (but presumably not his only) excruciating decision as commander-in-chief. I’ll circle around to the yes-or-no, but gradually.

I have been scratching my head about the President’s Afghan dilemma since mid-summer. My progress with this puzzle has been limited. The decisions he now faces are so complex that the first difficulty is to define the problem correctly. The President made clear during his weekend TV blitz that he understands this. One place to start is with a basic question: What vital U.S. national security interests are at issue in the Afghan war?