FOB Keating attack repulsed [Archive]

gh_uk

10-04-2009, 05:58 AM

From the NYT (http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/10/04/world/international-afghanistan-violence.html?ref=global-home):

KABUL, Oct. 4 (Reuters) - Eight U.S. troops were killed in battle after tribal militia attacked two combat outposts in a remote area in eastern Afghanistan, the military said on Sunday, the deadliest battle for U.S. troops in more than a year.

Two Afghan soldiers were also killed in the battle, which took place in a remote area from which U.S. forces had already announced plans to withdraw as part of commander General Stanley McChrystal's strategy to focus his forces on population centres.

Saturday's attacks were launched by militia in Nuristan province from a local mosque and a nearby village on two joint NATO and Afghan outposts, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force said. The NATO troops in the area are American.

"My heart goes out to the families of those we have lost and to their fellow soldiers who remained to finish the fight," Colonel Randy George, commander of the U.S. force in the eastern mountain area bordering Pakistan, said in the statement.

"This was a complex attack in a difficult area. Both the U.S. and Afghan soldiers fought bravely together. I am extremely proud of their professionalism and bravery."

The statement added: "coalition forces' previously announced plans to depart the area as part of a broader realignment to protect larger populations remains unchanged."

Tribal militia?

William F. Owen

10-04-2009, 11:34 AM

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8289200.stm

BBC, so can't speak to the actual accuracy, but here it is.

Schmedlap

10-04-2009, 03:01 PM

Dang. I was hoping that this thread would serve a placeholder to shoot down any rumors. I guess it's for real.

This, too, just popped up a few minutes ago...

Militant fighters streaming from a village and a mosque attacked a pair of remote outposts near the Pakistan border, killing eight American soldiers and as many as seven Afghan forces in one of the fiercest gunbattles of the troubled eight-year war.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the deadliest attack for coalition forces since a similar raid in July 2008 killed nine American soldiers in the same mountainous region known as a haven for al-Qaida militants. The U.S. has already said it plans to leave the remote area to focus on Afghan population centres.

via canoe.ca (http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2009/10/03/11278526-ap.html)More at the link.

Yon said (about eight hours ago) that casualties were still coming in, even though the attack had occurred quite a while earlier. I don't know if that means walking wounded stayed behind to maintain security or if that is the reason for the disparity in ANSF casualty figures.

Kevin23

10-04-2009, 05:33 PM

Eight American soldiers and two Afghan troops have been killed in the deadliest attack on coalition troops for more than a year, officials say.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8289200.stm

I think this is yet another incident that goes to show that a change of tactics and strategy is needed in this part of Afghanistan.

My thoughts are also with the familes of the fallen.

Schmedlap

10-04-2009, 07:09 PM

I think this is yet another incident that goes to show that a change of tactics and strategy is needed in this part of Afghanistan.

How so? Eight US and 7 Afghan KIA after an onslaught by around 100 or so attackers who apparently know what they're doing? That seems like a pretty good performance by the good guys. I guess it depends on one's perspective. I suspect that many Americans think that wars can and should be lopsided affairs like in the movies.

Westhawk

10-04-2009, 07:22 PM

According to press reports, Gen McChrystal ordered such outposts in Nuristan province closed, in order to focus troops in populated areas. It seems likely that the Taliban mounted this attack to create the impression that they are driving the U.S. Army out. We will see if they succeed with this information operation.

As that IO battle percolates, McChrystal, whose stock price is probably dropping in the West Wing, will no doubt be asked a few questions:

1) Why the delay closing the eastern outposts? Any plans to accelerate the closures now? And how will that look?

2) Any connection between your new rules of engagement and the Taliban's ability to organize this attack?

3) The President's objective is to “to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda.” Yet you plan on abandoning the positions in Afghanistan that are closest to the al Qaeda senior leadership's suspected positions in Pakistan and al Qaeda's principle infiltration routes into Afghanistan. How will this strategy achieve the President's objective?

---

Let us pause for a moment to remember the fallen, their families, and their friends.

-Robert Haddick

Kevin23

10-04-2009, 08:07 PM

See also, earlier thread: Breaking News in Afghanistan? "Considerable" casualties? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8577)

Moderators might want to combine the two. (Or just delete my thread, because it was a "breaking news" item that is no longer breaking - Kevin asserts a point for discussion that can go somewhere).

On that point of discussion:

How so? Eight US and 7 Afghan KIA after an onslaught by around 100 or so attackers who apparently know what they're doing? That seems like a pretty good performance by the good guys. I guess it depends on one's perspective. I suspect that many Americans think that wars can and should be lopsided affairs like in the movies.

My mistake, I didn't see that a thread on this had already been started.

I guess in terms of my comments, I thought the attack just drove home the need to reassess the situation in Afghanistan.

Ken White

10-04-2009, 10:08 PM

As that IO battle percolates, McChrystal, whose stock price is probably dropping in the West Wing...Good MSM snark line, poor serious comment IMO. Dana Milbank will love it, tho'... :D

All of the questions you pose will likely be asked by the ignorant (read MSM, Congress, WH Staffers) so for you to surface them in that vein as a preemptive effort to those yo-yos is worthwhile. If, OTOH, they are posed as serious questions, they are a terrible indictment of the Prez and his crew or who ever would ask such relatively inane questions.

"How will that look?" look? :rolleyes:

Any connection between the ROE and the Talibs ability to attack? That's like asking if our presence in Afghanistan has any connection. 'When did you stop beating your wife, General McChrystal...'
...How will this strategy achieve the President's objective?How well can you mix tactics and strategery... :wry:

Greyhawk

10-05-2009, 12:23 AM

How so? Eight US and 7 Afghan KIA after an onslaught by around 100 or so attackers who apparently know what they're doing? That seems like a pretty good performance by the good guys. I guess it depends on one's perspective. I suspect that many Americans think that wars can and should be lopsided affairs like in the movies.

If our objective were to hold ground or attrit enemy this would be a clear win. But there are obvious questions to be raised here about COIN...

...except those questions would fall into the same category with those Ken discusses.

Because we aren't doing COIN in Nuristan, not in any real sense. We are defending remote outposts (and little beyond the Hescos) and awaiting decisions from far away. (There's part of the answer Westhawks' "1) Why the delay closing the eastern outposts?") Wait long enough and bad things happen. Bad things happen and decisions are impacted....

Greyhawk

10-05-2009, 12:44 AM

We were not waiting for something bad to happen; something bad happened while we were waiting for clarity on exactly what direction we would be going.

That lesson will be lost in the resulting noise.

Cavguy

10-05-2009, 04:06 AM

Got an email from a friend who is on a ETT with the ANA that there had been a large fight yesterday. He was of course vague due to OPSEC, but he isn't the type to send such an email b/c of a run of the mill fight. It's his 3d tour as well, so it must have been something.

I suspect the first reports are perhaps understating the complexity/scope/duration of the attack. And a good catch that it may be tied to Taliban IO about moving out of the remote outposts, which I called for awhile ago. We weren't really accomplishing much out there anyway. Classic case of GEN McCrystal's dilemma on "60 Minutes", where yes, things were getting better, but not at the rate they needed to be.

jcustis

10-05-2009, 04:14 AM

3) The President's objective is to “to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda.” Yet you plan on abandoning the positions in Afghanistan that are closest to the al Qaeda senior leadership's suspected positions in Pakistan and al Qaeda's principle infiltration routes into Afghanistan. How will this strategy achieve the President's objective?

I would argue that being "close to" suspected positions in no way means that those COPs influenced a thing. Anyone asking McChrystal this line of questioning doesn't get it all.

I am reminded of the Portuguese in Mozambique, who enjoyed relative mobility when they decided to saunter forth, but spent an unbalanced amount of time secluded in their COPs. The results were almost predictable.

Disrupting Al Qaeda is definitely germane to the discussion right now. Are we still after AQ at all, considering the instability we see in the country? Are they operating in AFG with the impunity they once enjoyed?

Cavguy

10-05-2009, 04:29 AM

3) The President's objective is to “to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda.” Yet you plan on abandoning the positions in Afghanistan that are closest to the al Qaeda senior leadership's suspected positions in Pakistan and al Qaeda's principle infiltration routes into Afghanistan. How will this strategy achieve the President's objective?

Bob, ever read Street without Joy (http://www.amazon.com/Street-Without-Joy-Bernard-Fall/dp/0811717003)? Shows the (lack of) value of undermanned outposts in bad country. These posts had little/nothing to do with AQIZ targeting. We still have ways to get there without these outposts, which have become logistical/tactical challenges and are having precisely the opposite effect on the population they intended because of lack of force structure to do more than really protect themselves ...

Schmedlap

10-05-2009, 04:30 AM

It has been said that we "took our eye off the ball" in Afghanistan when we allocated resources to Iraq. In reality, we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan for the decade plus that preceded 9/11. I wonder what future threats we are neglecting right now.

Ken White

10-05-2009, 05:28 AM

at the LINK (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.lanierbb.com/images/bb_region_maps/south_america.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.lanierbb.com/Latin_America/&h=639&w=591&sz=9&tbnid=8QAFAJBmXWs4DM:&tbnh=137&tbnw=127&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dsouth%2Band%2Bcentral%2Bamerica%2Bmap&usg=__dd720Nunszavo10rc1UMzKPnP0s=&ei=d4PJSobKCYHkM)

davidbfpo

10-05-2009, 11:31 AM

Within The Times report is this, not seen in the US reports on SWJ Blog:

The insurgents seized at least 35 Afghan policemen whose fate last night remained unclear.http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6860616.ece

I note all the reports refer to two outposts, one ANP and one US Army & ANA? Or were the ANP seized at the mosque? The ANP and ANA elsewhere have used local mosques for Friday prayers (IIRC Korengal Valley) and the attackers swarmed out of the mosque and village. Mmmm.

Not good for "Afghanisation" and recruitment, let alone retention.

davidbfpo

Entropy

10-05-2009, 01:54 PM

Here's some open source info I've gathered:

The action took place in and around the village of Kamdesh. Fob Keating is on the outskirts.

I read about two outposts as well. In addition to FOB Keating, there is a COP on the ridgeline above the village/FOB called Warheit. I've also read there was an ANP post in the village itself. It's not clear, but it looks like the ANP post in the village was overrun and then the enemy forces turned and attempted to take FOB Keating. 20-30 ANP are missing, presumably captured, but there's also the possibility some defected. It's also not clear where the US soldiers were killed - at the ANP post or at Keating.

It also appears the enemy forces utilized tactics commonly seen in this area and were able to use weather and good opsec to mass for the attack (something I think is similar to what happened at Wanat). I think Cavguy is completely correct that the initial reports may be understating several aspects of the attack. Keating was built a few years ago - it wasn't partially-built like Wanat.

As for Nuristan in general, it is, IMO, a high-risk, low-reward area for a COIN operation. It is one of the most isolated and backward areas in Afghanistan and one that has never felt much sway from any kind of central or outside authority. There isn't much gain for us there IMO.

Schmedlap

10-05-2009, 02:23 PM

Foust gives an interesting insight on Nuristan and on the specific area where this occurred: http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/10/04/higs-are-pigs-2/

MikeF

10-05-2009, 04:13 PM

Bob, ever read Street without Joy (http://www.amazon.com/Street-Without-Joy-Bernard-Fall/dp/0811717003)? Shows the (lack of) value of undermanned outposts in bad country. These posts had little/nothing to do with AQIZ targeting. We still have ways to get there without these outposts, which have become logistical/tactical challenges and are having precisely the opposite effect on the population they intended because of lack of force structure to do more than really protect themselves ...

This may be one of the few times that I disagree with Niel. I think we should look at reinforcing Nuristan. Here's my take reposted from the front page. Looking forward to feedback or disagreement. I think it's an important thing to discuss.

Mike's World of COIN

First, my heart goes out to the unit and the families of the Fallen in Nuristan. I have been in that situation before, and I understand the psychological and morale effects of everyone involved.

Second, we have the opportunity to effect the IO war with this battle. Back in 2007, my sister company experienced an attack on their patrol base in Sadah, Iraq. Nine paratroopers died and another 20 were wounded. I wrote about the events leading up to it in "Love and Hate" for SWJ. Seventy-two hours prior, I had lunch with the AQ leadership and offered an ultimatum: 1. Peace, 2. Destruction. They chose the latter and answered with that attack.

Sadah was unimportant in our scheme of maneuver. It was a mere foothold into the DRV so I could seize Zaganiyah, the military key terrain. C Troop was one week from leaving that patrol base in order to prepare for further clearance up the Diyala River. We were a shaping effort to a supporting effort, and our force ration was 300 paratroopers for a population of 100,000.

Immediately after the attack, COL David Sutherland, CDR 3/1 BCT, and LTC Andrew Poppas, CDR 5-73, rushed to the scene. I sent a platoon plus to secure the scene and dig through the ruble trying to recover anyone still alive. For twleve hours, we listened as battle rosters were called. Every once in a while, a medic would think that he had found a pulse or the hint of breathing. We would hold our breathe and pray until the casualty was finally pronounced dead.

Simultaneously, I took my remaining platoon and we tracked down the videographer killing him in a late night raid- My biggest fear was a video hitting the web of an American Patrol Base getting destroyed.

The command team made a decision. F*ck the plan, things changed, and we were staying. We rebuilt the patrol base, reinforced the area with two american platoons and an Iraqi battalion. Our actions were our IO message.

In the short term, attacks soared up to twelve a day on my troop. Sixty days later, we pacified the area and violence went to almost zero.

Sometimes, we have to allow the events on the ground to help shape our actions. This battle could be one of those moments. For a moment, we could forget the debate on A'stan strategy, COIN v/s CT, and make a stand in Nuranistan.

Send a battalion or brigade there. Let everyone in the province know you are staying the course. Taunt the enemy. Send broadcast proclaiming that AQ/Taliban are weak. Challenge them to come to Nuranistan to die.

Be the biggest Tribe.

v/r

Mike

omarali50

10-05-2009, 04:33 PM

Mike,
Ignoring the "big picture" (whether the US should be there in the first place and what victory may look like overall), you are perfectly correct in tactical terms and one hopes that a capable and determined army would have officers trained to think like this. The single most effective response would indeed be to go in full force and stay, but I dont think that is going to happen.. Are there other options? Just pulling out would give them a big propaganda victory, but is it possible to pull out but still send the message that there will be payback and eventually THIS army will win? I am asking as an amateur with no knowledge of the local area (and little knowledge of the nuts and bolts of modern war). What would an alternative "second best" strategy look like? Drones? raids? blockade? what?

Cavguy

10-05-2009, 04:39 PM

The command team made a decision. F*ck the plan, things changed, and we were staying. We rebuilt the patrol base, reinforced the area with two american platoons and an Iraqi battalion. Our actions were our IO message.

...

In the short term, attacks soared up to twelve a day on my troop. Sixty days later, we pacified the area and violence went to almost zero.

Sometimes, we have to allow the events on the ground to help shape our actions. This battle could be one of those moments. For a moment, we could forget the debate on A'stan strategy, COIN v/s CT, and make a stand in Nuranistan.

Send a battalion or brigade there. Let everyone in the province know you are staying the course. Taunt the enemy. Send broadcast proclaiming that AQ/Taliban are weak. Challenge them to come to Nuranistan to die.

Be the biggest Tribe.

Mike,

You and I had very similar experiences in Iraq (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinintalafar.pdf). I had a patrol base in a very bad area attacked VBIED which wounded four only 48h after establishing it. We established a second (structure was unsafe after the bomb) nearby and carried forward. Two months later sector was secure - zero attacks. So my initial reaction was the same as yours. I would normally agree but my studies have led me to conclude that these are very different contexts.

I've been reading about and talking to lots of guys stationed in this area - here's the difference:

1) Locals are Afghan equivilants of hillbillies who don't like *any* foreigners. These are not urbane, (comparitively) civilized Iraqis of Diyala.

2) We don't posess enough force to be credible. It would take many more troops to even begin to impose our will on the population. The police were obviously unable to stand up for themselves and more importantly we couldn't protect them. Even if we did have the force, right now the pressing need is to turn the tide in places like Khost, Gardez, Herat, and Kandahar, where the Taliban is threatening once completely safe areas.

3) The only way to operate here is by CH-47 resuppy at night - because of the threat. Wedidn't face a (significantly) vulnerable supply line in Iraq, where a well planned enemy attack could negate your ability to CASEVAC and resuppy.

4) Taliban has freedom of movement and family ties in the population. This is home turf. Unlike Iraq, the insurgents aren't unpopular or bringing a foreign ideology. In Iraq the majority of people wanted return to "normal" - meaning security. The Afghans in this area just want us the hell out and to be left alone. Big difference.

5) The amount of force required to "fight it out" there is an opportunity cost. Even if we apply extra support and succeed - the population there isn't decisive to the overall campaign in any way - it doesn't influence or move any other group. Security in Nuristan won't likely have spillover effects anywhere else because of physical and logistical isolation from the rest of the country. It would be similar to expecting the security/perception of NYC to be changed based on how well you did COIN in West Virginia. No linkages to the center of Afghanistan. If the goal is to keep AQIZ attritted, there are better ways to do that than operating out of fixed, vulnerable outposts.

Given that the major cities are under heavy threat, the resources (in my opinion) dedicated to maintaining these outposts would be better applied in more strategically vital area than endless battle in an area with very little (if any) prospects of success.

I think the location/culture/context of this particular place and area make it different, from my current understanding. As always, I stand ready to be challenged.

omarali50

10-05-2009, 04:45 PM

Cavguy,
your assessment of the locals seems accurate to me and would be a good reason NOT to try Mike's response. But do you think some response is needed or would it be OK to just pull out and say good riddance to Nuristan? Would that have any impact further out in Afghanistan or is it such an isolated place that Hikmatyar could have himself crowned King Emperor and it would make no difference at all?

tequila

10-05-2009, 04:51 PM

MikeF,

My instinct says that you're absolutely right.

My rational side argues that not a little bit of that instinct is based on the emotional desire for payback. More importantly, since despite all the media attention we are still in an economy-of-force mission for Afghanistan, what areas will be shorted to pay for a brigade in Nuristan? Do we want to be that kind of reactive force, piling into whatever area where the enemy chooses to hurt us badly? Would it really be worth it to us that much to dominate Nuristan, vs. protecting Kabul or Badghis or Kunduz?

MikeF

10-05-2009, 04:59 PM

Mike,

You and I had very similar experiences in Iraq (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinintalafar.pdf). I had a patrol base in a very bad area attacked VBIED which wounded four only 48h after establishing it. We established a second (structure was unsat after the bomb) nearby and carried forward. Two months later sector was secure - zero attacks. So my initial reaction was the same as yours. I would normally agree but my studies have led me to conclude that these are very different contexts.

I've been reading about and talking to lots of guys stationed in this area - here's the difference:

1) Locals are Afghan equivilants of hillbillies who don't like *any* foreigners. These are not urbane, (comparitively) civilized Iraqis of Diyala.

2) We don't posess enough force to be credible. It would take many more troops to even begin to impose our will on the population. The police were obviously unable to stand up for themselves and more importantly we couldn't protect them. Even if we did have the force, right now the pressing need is to turn the tide in places like Khost, Gardez, Herat, and Kandahar, where the Taliban is threatening once completely safe areas.

3) The only way to operate here is by CH-47 resuppy at night - because of the threat. Wedidn't face a (significantly) vulnerable supply line in Iraq, where a well planned enemy attack could negate your ability to CASEVAC and resuppy.

4) Taliban has freedom of movement and family ties in the population. This is home turf. Unlike Iraq, the insurgents aren't unpopular or bringing a foreign ideology. In Iraq the majority of people wanted return to "normal" - meaning security. The Afghans in this area just want us the hell out and to be left alone. Big difference.

5) The amount of force required to "fight it out" there is an opportunity cost. Even if we apply extra support and succeed - the population there isn't decisive to the overall campaign in any way - it doesn't influence or move any other group. Security in Nuristan won't likely have spillover effects anywhere else because of physical and logistical isolation from the rest of the country. It would be similar to expecting the security/perception of NYC to be changed based on how well you did COIN in West Virginia. No linkages to the center of Afghanistan. If the goal is to keep AQIZ attritted, there are better ways to do that than operating out of fixed, vulnerable outposts.

Given that the major cities are under heavy threat, the resources (in my opinion) dedicated to maintaining these outposts would be better applied in more strategically vital area than endless battle in an area with very little (if any) prospects of success.

I think the location/culture/context of this particular place and area make it different, from my current understanding. As always, I stand ready to be challenged.

Niel,

You maybe right. I'm suggesting holding it through the winter. Here's my thoughts (double-tapping from the front page). As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.

During the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), then COL Bruce Clark arrived at St. Vith, a key junction for track and motorized units, to find an American Army confused, panicking, and some retreating. He took charge, assembling infantrymen, tankers, cooks, and mechanics, establishing a hasty defense, he held St. Vith for several days until Patton's 3rd Army showed up. His actions proved decisive in the overall battle.

I think his actions apply- here's why.

In one of the articles I read (Foust I think), shadow governments, training camps, and denied areas were suggested. Additionally, we know it's a gateway for fighters coming from Pakistan. (Nuristan could be more important than we think).

If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.

Then, we can re-evaluate the situation and determine if the area requires more or less force. If we need to reposition, we can leave proclaiming the Taliban/AQ were too cowardly to fight.

v/r

Mike

Ken White

10-05-2009, 05:10 PM

a map recon and then apply some basic METT-TC considerations.

The US, NATO, other Coalition Members and the Afghan government do not and will not have enough force to do the population centric COIN thing.

Moving Coalition Forces to the population centers will cede those Afghans, predominately Pushtuns who do NOT live in the centers and are the bulk of the population in the south where the problems are, to the opponent.

Platoon and Company sized outposts can always be overrun by the ability of the opponents to mass flexibly and covertly.

If you apply adequate force in Area A, the bad guys will simply go to Area B, knowing you do not have enough people to cover the region. Move to Area B and they'll go to C, cover all three and they go to City X -- they will always be more flexible than you and they will always have people who know the terrain intimately.

Thus, other than continued pointless frittering away of troops in overrun outposts there are two basic options. Fewer outposts with massive backup forces a short helicopter ride away (with all the military and political problems and shortfalls that entails) or careful selection of choke points to interdict the movement of the opponent -- we and they can only do so much with given terrain -- and a whole lot of foot and light vehicle mobile hunting teams on our part.

My perception is that the we will do neither. We do not have the force to do the first and the force we do have is inadequately trained to do the second.
Sixty years of over emphasis on Armor has had an adverse impact on us. We have forgotten how to fight on foot.

We've also forgotten, unbelievably, that installations and that's what we're building -- installations in a COIN fight, fer chissakes, :rolleyes: -- are static and invite attack and that if they are located in a Valley, the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...). :mad:

We are playing to the strengths of our opponents.

Infanteer

10-05-2009, 05:33 PM

We've also forgotten, unbelievably, that installations and that's what we're building -- installations in a COIN fight, fer chissakes, :rolleyes: -- are static and invite attack and that if they are located in a Valley, the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...). :mad:

We are playing to the strengths of our opponents.

To quote Robert DeNiro in the movie Heat:

A guy told me one time, "Don't let yourself get attached to anything you are not willing to walk out on in 30 seconds flat if you feel the heat around the corner." Now, if you're on me and you gotta move when I move, how do you expect to keep a... a marriage?

Just change marriage to installation....

IntelTrooper

10-05-2009, 05:34 PM

If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

I'm not sure about this. If there are genuinely friendly villages, we can probably reinforce areas where CF can cover them, but in eastern Nuristan I'm under the impression that those are few and far between.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

Also, as to Ken's comment, totally agree. If we're already resupplying via rotary wing, why not put the base in a tactically sound position?

Rebecca White

10-05-2009, 05:39 PM

An old article that describes Camp Keating in Nurestan:
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/02/27/afghanistan/index.html

From the article:

From the pine- and cedar-lined mountain slope that loomed over the base, several insurgents were firing down on us

I believe this is the same outpost that was attacked on Saturday - just manned by a different unit two years later.

Ken, you said:

the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...).

I had just finished skimming that salon article when I read your comment. I had been thinking something very similar.

Thanks for the discussion.

My heart, too, goes out to the family and friends of the fallen.

MikeF

10-05-2009, 05:41 PM

I'm not sure about this. If there are genuinely friendly villages, we can probably reinforce areas where CF can cover them, but in eastern Nuristan I'm under the impression that those are few and far between.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

Also, as to Ken's comment, totally agree. If we're already resupplying via rotary wing, why not put the base in a tactically sound position?

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here :cool:

On a side note, I'd be willing to get on a plane tonight and head out to hold Nuristan.

v/r

Mike

Entropy

10-05-2009, 05:43 PM

Niel,
If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.

First, here's some good background on Nuristan (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/07/13/why-nuristan-matters/).

Mike, the locals have always been hostile to our presence and they are not worried about the local "Taliban" coming in and burning them out. We are not protecting the population from the Taliban since the population pretty much support most of the insurgent forces.

Secondly, there isn't much of a shadow government to dismantle. This area is controlled by local tribes and powerbrokers, not a Pashtun shadow-government.

Third is the terrain. As Neil indicated there isn't any infrastructure and the population is highly diffused. There are 24 major villages in Kamdesh district with a total population of only around 20k people (The entire province only has an estimated 100k population). Getting from one village to another requires walking (or helos) and can take all day and our forces are almost always ambushed when they leave the wire. We simply don't have the resources to keep an adequate force there and what we have there now is not remotely adequate for interdicting infiltration routes.

IMO, our presence there is counter-productive. Better to pull-out and attempt to rent some local powerbrokers to combat the infiltration, though that probably won't have a huge effect.

Entropy

10-05-2009, 05:47 PM

omarali50

10-05-2009, 06:08 PM

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here :cool:

On a side note, I'd be willing to get on a plane tonight and head out to hold Nuristan.

v/r

Mike

Thats exactly the thinking anyone would value in a cavalry officer, but taking a step back: are there alternatives in between pulling out and going all in? I ask because I get the impression that the place cannot be held easily and is not worth the intense effort it would take to hold it (even if the resources were available). But just pulling out may hand Gulbuddin too much of a victory. What (if anything) could be done while pulling out? Not necessarily in Nuristan, but even beyond (I am assuming Gulbuddin acid-thrower is not personally holed up in some village in Nuristan??)..

Ken White

10-05-2009, 06:09 PM

1) Locals are Afghan equivilants of hillbillies who don't like *any* foreigners. These are not urbane, (comparitively) civilized Iraqis of Diyala.that is a far more accurate and significant comment than many will believe...
2) We don't posess enough force to be credible.Or the force we do have isn't as credible as we'd like to think it is... :(
4) Taliban has freedom of movement and family ties in the population. This is home turf. The Afghans in this area just want us the hell out and to be left alone. Big difference.Yes!
5)...If the goal is to keep AQIZ attritted, there are better ways to do that than operating out of fixed, vulnerable outposts..................Money quote!.............

As you know, I'm not in whole hearted agreement on the cities due to the 1st, 2d and 4th items you cited but your post is excellent. My disagreement is immaterial, McChrystal apparently agree with you to an extent so that may be what occurs. I just hope he is not transferring too much of Iraq to a very different rural / urban milieu.

Mike's idea will work, so will yours. The most important thing is to realize that due to your item 2 (and my follow on comment to it) we are not going to turn this thing into achievement of the stated -- not necessarily the actual -- goals in Afghanistan. Thus, in the interim, we simply need to do what we are doing but get better at the Tactical side of things.

My impression, second hand that it is, is that we are getting less good instead of better on that count. That can be attributed, IMO, to lack of strategic AND operational clarity and to over emphasis on force protection ILO tactical agility (that does not bode well for any future...). The operational clarity may get fixed, the strategic element is unlikely to and the Tactical side seems as though it's teaching some really bad habits. Hesco Barriers are neat and a good military engineering innovation. MRAPS are not neat and are not good military innovations. Both are very dangerous to their users...

IntelTrooper

10-05-2009, 06:13 PM

MikeF

10-05-2009, 08:55 PM

Entropy- thanks for the links and background.

You're a good man, sir.

IntelTrooper- no man is an island particularly in a small war. Any commander that does not recognize that is either stupid or caught up in his own ego. This thread reminds me of the "huddles" I had with my PLs, PSGs, and SLs a long time ago. Heated debates to find truth.

Ken said to Niel:

Mike's idea will work, so will yours. The most important thing is to realize that due to your item 2 (and my follow on comment to it) we are not going to turn this thing into achievement of the stated -- not necessarily the actual -- goals in Afghanistan. Thus, in the interim, we simply need to do what we are doing but get better at the Tactical side of things.

I think we just developed the best COA for our reaction to Nuristan. In the short term, reinforce as I suggested to prove a point and hold through the winter. Second, do a map recon and analysis as Ken suggested. Use METT-TC. Third, consider Niel's points- "Is this worth it?"

Niel's points should drive the operational actions and subsequent strategy in the spring.

On the backside of any US led COIN operation, we must consider the fall-out. This article had me thinking all weekend. Niel, your AO, so I'd appreciate your thoughts and feeback on the accuracy.

In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/02/AR2009100205346.html)
Anthony Shadid
Washington Post

RAMADI, Iraq -- There was once a swagger to the scotch-swilling, insurgent-fighting Raed Sabah. He was known as Sheik Raed to his sycophants. Tribesmen who relied on his largess called him the same. So did his fighters, who joined the Americans and helped crush the insurgency in Anbar province.

Sabah still likes his scotch -- Johnnie Walker Black, with Red Bull on the rocks -- but these days, as the Americans withdraw from western Iraq, he has lost his swagger. His neighbors now deride him as an American stooge; they have nicknamed his alley "The Street of the Lackeys."

"The Americans left without even saying goodbye. Not one of them," Sabah said in his villa in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, once the cradle of Iraq's insurgency. "Even when we called them, we got a message that the line had been disconnected."

Nowhere is the U.S. departure from Iraq more visible than in Anbar, where the 27 bases and outposts less than a year ago have dwindled to three today. Far less money is being spent. Since November, more than two-thirds of combat troops have departed. In their wake is a blend of cynicism and bitterness, frustration and fear among many of the tribal leaders who fought with the troops against the insurgents, a tableau of emotion that may color the American legacy in a region that has stood as the U.S. military's single greatest success in the war. Pragmatism, the Americans call their departure. Desertion, their erstwhile allies answer.

MikeF

10-05-2009, 09:31 PM

Since Slap hasn't applied the appropriate music:(

Cookie Jar (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66jpwLSxZrw)

v/r

Mike

Infanteer

10-05-2009, 11:01 PM

Thus, other than continued pointless frittering away of troops in overrun outposts there are two basic options. Fewer outposts with massive backup forces a short helicopter ride away (with all the military and political problems and shortfalls that entails) or careful selection of choke points to interdict the movement of the opponent -- we and they can only do so much with given terrain -- and a whole lot of foot and light vehicle mobile hunting teams on our part.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

On the topic of FOBs/COPs/Platoon Houses, why does "troops with the locals" necessarily have to have some sort of tactical infrastructure. How about a good old laager? A fellow Platoon Commander said that an established Patrol Base would last about 72 hours before the local insurgents started to figure out what was up.

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.

Ken White

10-05-2009, 11:47 PM

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.Less than 24 will leave them unable to do a decent recon and it will also not allow your troops to get into a routine. Keeps the opponent off balance which is where we should always try to place him.

Battalion I was in during the fun and frolic in Viet Nam had several firm rules -- one was no more than 24 hours for anyone, anywhere. We never got attacked in a static position. Most of us routinely moved after 12 hours or so. Another was a quarter of strength on patrols during the day and on ambushes at night -- we never got surprised. Other than two meeting engagements and one major operation where we were supposed to be holding force at the open end of a Valley and were awaited and pounced upon by the entire 18B NVA Regiment who had pulled a neat head fake on the Intel folks, we initiated every contact while I was there -- including the one where Kelly's Platoon chased a Troop of Black Gibbons for about five kilometers before the Gibbons decided they were tired of playing and took to the trees... :D

It just is not that hard to do it right. It really isn't. This stuff is easy, hard physically to do it right but the brain side is easy...

Schmedlap

10-06-2009, 12:34 AM

As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.
Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

MikeF

10-06-2009, 01:00 AM

Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

Sad but true.

Along with Ken's comments on the bureacracy and institution. Take a look at the 15,000 soldiers on LSAA- pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.

Just my two cents for what it's worth.

Maybe I'm that naive...and, I haven't even seen Kabul or Khandarhar.

v/r

Mike

yamiyugikun

10-06-2009, 01:01 AM

When I read about the casualities, I was very sad. I saw an article in the L.A. Times about how Gen. McChrystal's strategy was meant to avoid casualities like that. I also saw on the cover of Time magazine, newest October issue at my work today, a picture of a wounded US soldier on a stretcher. Then there was a series of pictures showing the lives of US troops in Afghanistan. You folks in the military are very brave to go through such grueling living situations like having a lack of water, etc...

MikeF

10-06-2009, 01:04 AM

The current situation is about 50 soldiers in a patrol base in gateway for AQ from Pakistan. Is that all the soldiers we can muster of an Army of 1.5 million and a population of 350 million?

50 men to bridge the gap?

I think not.

Still, I'd rather be with those 50 men than in LSAA, Monterey, or DC.

v/r

Mike

Ken White

10-06-2009, 02:52 AM

...pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...

We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether... :(

Sad. Scary.

J.C.

10-06-2009, 02:59 AM

It's been a while since my last post but, I recently returned from AF. We sent elements in and around the mountianous regions on the AF/PAK border to target fighter camps. It is very unforgiving terrian and even with resources was a challanging enviroment to fight in, however we did have some good effects from going in and clearing out targeted areas where we were.

I don't belive that the COPS in this area where or will produce the desired effect they were put in place for. DA agianst fighter camps and targeted strikes would produce greater effects. If I am catching the wind right closing these isolated outpost down and pushing those forces to more populated areas to conduct a COIN mission will pay greater dividens in the long run.

Along the mountianous regoins near the AF/PAK border we will not when hearts or minds, but we may with the greater application of force be able to cut some of the supply lines and flow of FF and destroy key training nodes in the region and provide some breathing room for forces on the ground.

MikeF

10-06-2009, 03:05 AM

Cavguy

10-06-2009, 03:30 AM

From an article dated Sept 22 (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/22/politics/washingtonpost/main5329199.shtml): (emphasis mine)

At Combat Outpost Lowell, about 110 U.S. and Afghan troops regularly visit the village of Kamu, which is right outside the base and has approximately 70 men. But the troops aren't able to patrol any of the other villages in the area, some of which are less than two miles away, because the security in the area is too precarious and the terrain surrounding their base is too rugged.

U.S. and Afghan forces at Combat Outpost Keating, also in Nurestan, are even more constrained. The base is about one mile from the Taliban-controlled village of Kamdesh, but more than 100 U.S. and Afghan troops there haven't set foot in the village in more than three months. On rare occasions, the elders from the local shura, or council, will come and discuss reconstruction projects with troops at the outpost.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

And this:

It seems this is COP Keating, occupied by 3-61 Cavalry, part of TF Mountain Warrior. From surveying all the open sources, it seems the COP outside the village was overrun and set on fire prior to being re-taken, and is now mostly burnt to the ground. The overall fight lasted approx 18h. Close air support was liberally used to support the troops. I recommend ABC's website because they have a reporter in the AO and also some information I couldn't find elsewhere. Heartening story below:

http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8754347

Exclusive: Wounded U.S. Soldiers Refused to Leave Taliban Fight
Afghan Attacks: Darkness, Smoke Forced Medevac Doctors to Work by Touch
By KAREN RUSSO

KAMDESH, Afghanistan Oct. 5, 2009—

ABC News' Karen Russo was the only reporter to get to the scene of this weekend's bloody firefight between U.S. troops and hundreds of Taliban insurgents when she went in on a MEDEVAC helicopter. Here is her report:

Flying into the besieged Afghan base

during a nighttime firefight this weekend was a harrowing mix of overwhelming noise, stomach dropping maneuvers and shadows hurrying through the gloom.

When the chopper lifted off moments later with three wounded soldiers, it left behind others who were wounded but refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone so they could return to fight with their buddies.

Fighting raged at two remote U.S. outposts near the Pakistan border this weekend, that left eight U.S. soldiers dead and 24 wounded. The battle was fought from Friday night through Sunday as hundreds of Taliban insurgents and their allies tried to overrun the Americans.

During the fighting, the insurgents succeeded in breaching the outer defense of the base at times before being repelled with the help of attack helicopters, fighter jets and drones. It was the bloodiest battle in a year for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

During the fight, the MEDEVAC team at a nearby base waited - with both patience and frustration. MEDEVAC teams are known for flying into some of the most deadly areas in the world
to rescue injured soldiers. MEDEVAC helicopters are unarmed so they often need supporting aircraft to protect them, and sometimes the cover of darkness is their only defense.

On Saturday night, the team finally received the go-ahead as the sun set. Within moments of receiving the call, we rushed to the helicopter and quickly sped to the outposts.

As we were flying into the attack space, the MEDEVAC team with one medic and a doctor were preparing for the oncoming patients, setting up IV's, pulling out medical equipment and making other last minute preparations.

Apache helicopter gunships escorted us as we neared the combat zone to ensure our safety as we hovered at 10,000 feet awaiting word to descend. When word came, we plummeted in a corkscrew manner, making the descent in a matter of seconds, landing in a valley at the bottom of steep mountains. It felt very vulnerable to attack.

One of the pilots said that even though he had night vision goggles and ordinarily he can see in that sort of situation, because the fighting was intense there was so much smoke it was actually fogged over and it was difficult for him to see. Fortunately he could make out the landing zone, but it was touch and go.

Doctors in MEDEVAC Chopper Work By Touch.

Once on the ground, I hopped out of the chopper, but could see little other than smoke wafting through the moonlight, likely from a fire that was burning much of the base. Then I could make out the shadows of soldiers as they carried the wounded towards the helicopter.

Any noise of the conflict was drowned out by the propellers of the helicopter. The area smelled of burned out pine trees something one solider described as "death and hell."

Three wounded soldiers, one U.S. and two Afghan, were carried down the steep incline and quickly placed on the helicopter.

Some of the injured refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone and continued to fight despite their wounds, according to soldiers at the base. Soldiers told the MEDEVAC crew that troops were donating blood during the battle, so it could be transfused into wounded comrades.

Between the gloom of night and the smoke, it was too dark to see much and the roar of the chopper made it almost impossible to hear commands.

I was quickly sort of touched by a crew member to get on the flight. I hopped on and even before I was on, the medical team was already working on the wounded.

Doctors wore night vision goggles, but still found it difficult to see. One doctor said it was like working by touch.

We were on the ground for a little more than five minutes, but in the chaos of noise and darkness, it felt like it could have been anything from 30 seconds to 30 minutes.

Moments later, the chopper lifted into the air and flew to the nearest medical facility. Despite the heroism of the crew, one of the soldiers died after reaching the facility. It wasn't immediately announced whether the soldier who died was American or Afghan.

Copyright © 2009 ABC News Internet Ventures

Bill Moore

10-06-2009, 04:21 AM

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

This type of stupidity is "still" much too common within our senior NCO and Officer ranks. While we have all types, I admire the senior NCOs who enforce standards that matter such as maintaining physical fitness, combat skills, and taking care of Soldiers (pay, mail, discipline [not moronic uniform regulations], advising the commander on the men's readiness/morale, etc.). There are plenty of good ones out there, don't let this idiot taint your impression of the NCO Corps. Although I agree, after 8 plus years in combat, you would have thought we would have purged these weaker links.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

Well said. I'm sure the critics will keep jumping out of the wood work over this fire fight, but it appears to me the leadership identified the problem and were in the process of fixing it. Unfortunately, it takes time to plan the logistics and the IO message to support closing the COP. While news articles can be misleading, it appears that the troops handled themselves well, and based on the amount of fire support that "apparently" was available, it doesn't sound like the rules of engagement argument has any legs (as though it ever did). It's combat and ugly stuff happens. If we repeat the same mistakes, then voice your discontent. Losing any Soldier is tragic, losing eight Soldiers in one fire fight is esceptionally painful, but we didn't lose the battle nor the war. Our men held the line, give them the credit they're due.

Rank amateur

10-06-2009, 04:35 PM

I've been meaning to write a post about it, but one of the major differences between Iraq and Afghanistan is population diffusion. In general, the number of counterinsurgents needed increases the more diffuse a population is.

And terrain. And no history of effective central government. And a history of successfulyl resisting COIN efforts. And sanctuary in Pakistan.

82redleg

10-06-2009, 07:46 PM

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was ....
Sad. Scary.

The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.

Ken White

10-06-2009, 08:29 PM

The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.I totally agree. I've been both a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime in and in combat; three Bns, two Bdes. The Bde CSM is a totally wasted slot. A Bde CSM has a lot of negative influence but very little positive capability unless many factors hit just right. I had more positive influence as a Bde Ops SGM --also both in peacetime and in combat -- than I did as a Bde CSM -- and in both Bdes I was fortunate in being able to work for very fine Colonels and in both I was the Ops guy who became the CSM (that worked often for many people until the number of CSMs grew to its current proportions. I'm old... :D).

A Bn Ops Sgt (I also disagree with making them SGMs) is too busy so at Bn the CSM makes sense. At Bde, with the larger (too large?) staff, the Ops SGM has adequate time to counsel COLs who are about to step on something and they can also arrange troop help stuff better than can their counterparts at Bn.

The CSMs are generally a waste at Bde; above Bde they literally have no function and some have a terrible propensity to concentrate on eyewash and little else -- except their next job...

I'll caveat all that by saying that a portion of that relative lack of merit is in many senses a function of how the guy is employed; the Army has not directed adequate responsibilities to and for the job, so in most cases, the guy or gal writes his or her own job description. Some do that better than others. Some Commanders give them far more to do and place far more trust in them than others. I have literally been directed to take command of a Company in a fire fight and OTOH, been barely listened to (in peacetime by a fair LTC who was an Aviator on a ground tour and who almost certainly had a really poor Platoon sergeant when he was a 2LT...:o).

It can be fixed and improved significantly. First and easiest by making those guys (and 1SGs) the unit trainers. Not responsible for training, that's the Cdr -- but trainers; doers and subordinate directors. That's still a band-aid. The entire personnel system still reflects 17th century practice and WW I methodologies. It and the pay system are in need of major overhaul. We need to be able to reward or pay people more without applying the Peter Principle and promoting them past their optimum level. That and moving them too often contribute to a lack of trust up and down the chain...

Fuchs

10-06-2009, 11:05 PM

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much.

The enemy would have massed against another base instead.

Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts.

Many more outposts at double ordinary strength won't do much either (except risking to alienate more indigenous folks) - the enemy could mass against a convoy instead.

More powerful convoys don't help much because convoys are stretched by definition and always have weak spots. All those troops in-country need also more supply than today, so more convoys - or longer ones.

And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Kiwigrunt

10-07-2009, 12:18 AM

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

Ken White

10-07-2009, 01:43 AM

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...All true.
Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.Yes...

Rank amateur

10-07-2009, 01:46 AM

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

I don't think it's strategy so much as terrain. There's a reason all the other counter insurgents failed too. Np one can cover all the terrain.

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.
(http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghanistan.us.deadly.fight/index.html)

From CNN:

The United States now believes that about 200 insurgents -- mostly local fighters, with some Taliban organizers and leaders -- had been planning the attack for days, hiding mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns in the mountains. Sources said the Taliban may have been watching the troops make preparations to depart and launched their attack at a time of vulnerability.

http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghanistan.us.deadly.fight/art.afghanistan.courtesy.jpg

Forward Operating Base Keating, seen in 2007, is surrounded by tall ridge lines.

Ken White

10-07-2009, 02:19 AM

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.True. That's what happens when you don't conduct patrols. Not that the US Army hasn't learned that lesson literally thousands of times before... :(

Michael C

10-08-2009, 04:28 AM

And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.

As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).

Fuchs

10-08-2009, 06:14 AM

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

It doesn't alienate the population much if you kill a super-corrupt police chief (who had been assigned to his post from far away) by blowing up his house with him and his family.

Entropy

10-09-2009, 10:51 PM

Looks like the base was abandoned: (http://apnews.myway.com/article/20091009/D9B7HP4G0.html)

KABUL (AP) - U.S. forces have withdrawn from an isolated base in eastern Afghanistan that insurgents attacked last week in one of the deadliest battles of the war for U.S. troops, the NATO-led coalition said Friday.

The pullout from the Kamdesh outpost near the Pakistani border is likely to embolden insurgent fighters in the region. The Taliban swiftly claimed "victory" for forcing the coalition to leave and said they had raised their flag above the town.

The withdrawal, however, had been planned well before the Oct. 3 battle and is part of a wider strategy outlined by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has said for months he plans to shut down such isolated strongholds to focus on more heavily populated areas in an effort to protect civilians.

Schmedlap

10-10-2009, 12:32 PM

Interview with Soldiers involved in the fight: http://www.youtube.com/ISAFMEDIA#p/f/4/movYzOxeKso

Entropy

10-10-2009, 04:36 PM

Another interview over at Tom Rick's place. (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/10/the_battle_of_cop_keating_an_earwitness_account)

Ken White

10-10-2009, 05:53 PM

We've also forgotten, unbelievably, that installations and that's what we're building -- installations in a COIN fight, fer chissakes, -- are static and invite attack and that if they are located in a Valley, the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...).

We are playing to the strengths of our opponents.

Ooops, Think I did mention that. 'Scuse the redundancy...

I have it on pretty good authority that several months ago, the question was surfaced upstream "Why does this COP exist, this is a dumb thing in a dumb place." :rolleyes:

Let me add today that at Ricks site, the picture shows a 'watch tower' thingy built atop a Hesco barrier. In the former and late unlamented SE Asia War Games those were called "RPG Magnets." I can't think why... :eek:

Not to mention that one at COP Keating is about 200 meters from a blinding turn in a brushy cliff, a virtual invitation to disaster. There are those that like to think we are a well trained Army -- that picture alone puts the lie to that myth...

I have also been told that since patrolling is dangerous (AMAZING NEW MILITARY DISCOVERY. Who knew?) some decided that the smart way to 'get the Taliban' was to place these COPs out and about and draw the Talibs to attack and thus do them in with 'fires.' That's not dangerous? If that's true, it is beyond abysmally stupid. Many including some who were supposed to know better at the direction of some others who obviously did not know better also tried that in Viet Nam -- how did that work out for us?

This is basic stuff. Good SPCs know better than this...

Is this the only Army in the world that insists on revisiting its mistakes to see if they can do worse this time...:mad:

davidbfpo

10-10-2009, 08:16 PM

From Ken: Is this the only Army in the world that insists on revisiting its mistakes to see if they can do worse this time...

No, it appears to be a fault in many armies. British military history has many examples from the colonial e.g. Boer Wars to full scale wars, notably WW1. In a hierachical and professional structure - you know far better than I - that lessons can be identified, not learnt and few want to listen "upstairs".

davidbfpo

Bill Moore

10-10-2009, 09:23 PM

I have it on pretty good authority that several months ago, the question was surfaced upstream "Why does this COP exist, this is a dumb thing in a dumb place."

I agree with the dumb place comment based on what I have read, but why is it a dumb thing in your opinion? I think COPs are essential in COIN; however, like in any conflict location is everything. Key terrain is not an empty term, it actually means something, and in this case it appears the COP was surrounded by key terrain.

Just because this particular COP was poorly designed, doesn't mean we shouldn't establish COPs. How business is executed at COPs is how your force protection issues are addressed. In theory if you saturate the area with patrols with patrols 24/7, then the COP is not overly vulnerable. It is just a locaton that patrols on occassion and not all at once go back to refit, take their casualties etc. It should be the C2 and log node basically, not a Ft. Apache where the bad guys have free reign outside the walls. Of course that means we'll have less COPs, because they need adequate manning to maintain this 24/7 presence outside the wire. Where does that take us? IMO back to the oil spot strategy. Start relatively small, consolidate your gains and then expand. If you expand contiguously you won't allow the enemy any space between the seams to undermine your previous gains.

I don't think COPs in themselves are a flawed concept, I just think we're executing them incorrectly. We're pushing them into the middle of enemy terrority, instead of expanding out from neutralized zones, so in effect as stated they're not focused on protecting the populace, they're focused on protecting themselves (out of necessity). That doesn't achieve much from an operational and strategic view.

Perhaps instead of rushing, we need to slow the train down, consolidate and gradually push out with the main forces that are securing the population. We have forces that can execute deep patrols (much like the SAS did during Malaysia) to disrupt the enemy in the outlying areas. No new ideas here, just haven't seen them discussed yet.

Ken White

10-10-2009, 10:24 PM

I think COPs are dumb mostly because I've never seen them accomplish the goals usually stated for their existence (with the exception below) and due to the fact I spent a lot of time in 1966 as a member of the USARV Fire Brigade running about all over I, II and II Corps Tactical Zones rescuing ODAs in strange places (ably assisted by the far more productrive Mike Forces, I might add). ;)

Having said that, I agree that COPs in the right places are a net benefit in a COIN support operation -- my gripe is they are frequently put in dumb places where there is no one is going to win the first heart or mind and are there to simply draw flies and be RPG Magnets -- the exception I mentioned. That works. It worked in Viet Nam more often than not and I suspect it's worked in Afghanistan more often that not. For that matter, it worked at Wanat last year and at Keating last month real small friendly casualty count and massive bad guy killed count. Yay!

For what?

Didn't change a thing. It works but it is operationally a waste of time and effort. In COIN ops, killing bad guys doesn't do you that much good -- so why bother?

Then let's address your poor design issue. Yep, it was. If I had the money, I'd hire a team to go take Hesco® out of business -- they are making it too easy to learn some really bad habits -- and we are doing that. You say:
I don't think COPs in themselves are a flawed concept, I just think we're executing them incorrectly. We're pushing them into the middle of enemy terrority, instead of expanding out from neutralized zones, so in effect as stated they're not focused on protecting the populace, they're focused on protecting themselves (out of necessity). That doesn't achieve much from an operational and strategic view.Exactly. Add to that tactically inept design, really poor tactical placement and you have a recipe for screwups...

You also say:
We have forces that can execute deep patrols (much like the SAS did during Malaysia) to disrupt the enemy in the outlying areas. No new ideas here, just haven't seen them discussed yet.I totally agree -- but I betcha we differ on who ought to be doing those patrols while the Cadillacs do Cadillac things... :D

Bill Moore

10-10-2009, 10:52 PM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuZd5X11Ow8

Allegedly this is a video of an attack on a U.S. COP in N. Afghanistan. In my opinion it supports Ken's comments about the Hesko mentality. It "appears" that our guys were basically being hammered by mortar and rocket fire (then a large VBIED), while being forced to wait on air support to hopefully locate and neutralize their attackers, so from my armchair watching a video it seems like a terrrible way to fight, thus I can understand the frustration that the troops expressed.

It doesn't mean it wasn't there, but I didn't see any artillery or mortars returning fire from our camp?

No secret to anyone this terrain is very advantageous to the guerrilla fighter. I'm not sure what a perfect COP would look like in Afghanistan.

I totally agree -- but I betcha we differ on who ought to be doing those patrols while the Cadillacs do Cadillac things

Ken, not so sure we would disagree, the best trained for the unilateral disruption patrols are probably Marine Recon and good U.S. Army light units. For the more serious deep targets (deliberate raids) the more specialized SOF. For the combined disruption activities I would push for SF, as you suggested indirectly there are some good lessons from the Vietnam era on what SF could do (Mike Forces being one of them).

The larger percentage of SF Cadillacs could be well suited to work the consolidation operations after larger forces cleared the area of larger enemy combat units. SF would then work with local security forces to root out the underground and provide security to development efforts as combat forces extend the oil spot. This would be the decisive phase. The younger studs would (this is missing 'not' I think) like it, but years later looking back on it with grayer hair they would realize their role was critical.

Ken White

10-11-2009, 12:13 AM

Noting that you had to specify Marine recon and 'good' US Army light units. I'd only suggest that Marine Rifle Companies and average or even poor US Army Light Units ought to be able to do that mission, they did it really pretty well only 40 years ago -- with a few draftees to boot. That you had to specify is an indicator of just how poor our current training regimen in a supposedly professional force happens to be. :(

Further, the fact that many turf battles intrude on too many things added to your comments on the front page re: the personnel system are also adverse factors that need to be changed... :mad:

carl

10-11-2009, 01:29 AM

I have 1 observation and two questions from reading this thread.

I read a book by Andrew Skeen and he suggested that the Pathans were at their absolutely most dangerous when you were retreating from a position. I guess this action shows that.

My first question is prompted by the photos of the base in question. It looks to be at the bottom of a very narrow, steep and close valley. How much more difficult does that kind of terrain make it to effectively deliver supporting fires, fixed wing, rotary wing and artillery? I figure it must hinder it some but I don't how much.

Secondly, does anybody know what percentage of infantry fights in Afghanistan are initiated by our side and what percentage are initiated by the other side?

davidbfpo

10-11-2009, 12:05 PM

Carl cited Skeen's book and this is the short items on the "What Are you Reading' thread:
'Lessons in Imperial Rule: Instructions for British Infantrymen on the Indian Frontier' by General Sir Andrew Skeen (Re-published in 2008 by Frontline Books, part of Pen and Sword Books; originally published in 1932 and the fouth edition in 1939).

The new introduction by Dr Robert Johnson, Oxford University sets the context and the contemporary relevance.

From my reading of Imperial "policing" in NWFP and FATA fixed posts were along strategic highways and at keypoints only. Having visited the Khyber Pass, Peshawar and the Swat Valley it was easy to see where Imperial era fixed posts were - many still in use by the Pakistanis. The Imperial army knew mountain warfare well and in campaigning went for the higher ground - even after the RAF had the capability to observe and attack.

Even larger fixed bases let alone smaller, guard posts would be sniped at night and there are superb stories of these attacks in other NWFP books.

I would speculate that a post in a similar place to the Nuristan COP would have been temporary, only used in a punitive campaign and piquetted on the surrounding terrain.

Gaining local co-operation and "fixing" the enemy was done by very different methods, not by such a COP.

davidbfpo

http://www.amazon.com/LESSONS-IMPERIAL-RULE-Instructions-Infantrymen/dp/184832507X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255298034&sr=8-1

jcustis

10-12-2009, 08:28 AM

I am perplexed why the Army would set up a staged interview about the incident in basically a clean room, with those Soldiers providing their perspective. They handled themselves well, but what is the Army getting at? That we can take some licks, go back to the FOB for a shower, pop the top on an O'Douls, and get a nice haircut before recounting the chain of events?

I know we are in a new media age and all, so maybe I am just having a hard time understanding the intent, but those clips on the ISAF youtube page about the COP fight pretty much de-motivated me as I watched.

I'm really, really perplexed.

ETA: I think I get it now. This is indeed IO, akin to the "Buy More War Bonds" campaigns of the last world war, and more focused on support back home than anything else.

Firn

10-12-2009, 08:16 PM

The interviews were handled pretty well by the soldiers and the interviewer. Of course both sides belonged to the same team and of course it was prepared accordingly. It could provide insight for the western media, sadly it all comes a bit late.

That insurgents can launch concentrated and coordinated attacks under certain regional and local circumstances comes not as a big surprise. This has happened time and time again, in Spain's guerilla struggle against the French or in Vietnam.

According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.

Understanding this danger of a small war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult to execute. The will to keep a strong presence in Nuristan too is perfectly understandable, but with the way things are there and the amount of moral and tangible force available it is not possible to sustain it in the current way.

A very bitter truth is that trying to have the troops physically close to the CoG aka populance pushed them in the specific situation more and more away from it. The soldiers were seemingly put in the hand of the enemy like a small hedgehog. Stingy enough to avoid the crushing, but unable to move and act and with the terms dictated by the enemy.

Firn

Schmedlap

10-12-2009, 10:20 PM

The interview didn't strike me as having any target audience. How many people - other than us - are really going to sit down and watch 30 to 40 minutes of this stuff and have any idea what they are talking about?

jcustis

10-13-2009, 12:39 AM

I would modify my comments in the face of what you wrote schmedlap. Good point, and you're right...outside of trooping survivors out in front of the camera, there runs the risk of zero context unless you are an observer and looking to hear/see something specific.

davidbfpo

10-13-2009, 04:59 PM

Yet again an Imperial (British Empire in India) lesson to be read and hat tip to the UK blogsite (again): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/10/we-have-been-there-before.html

There are links to other sources within. maybe worthy of a new thread, but for once left here - as the current Afghan thread.

I do wonder whether the Pakistani military remember this too? Imperial history is still part of the tradition and army units have kept their old Imperial names, head dress and more (not the consumption of alcohol).

Moved to a new thread for discussion: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8665

davidbfpo

tequila

10-13-2009, 05:23 PM

IMO the Pak Army retains far too much of the British attitude towards the FATA. The system for "controlling" FATA remained much the same as during British times (political agents = political agents, Waziristan Scouts = Frontier Corps), and the level of development roughly similar. Small wonder that the problems remain the same.

tequila

10-13-2009, 06:14 PM

If it's not posted yet, Tom Ricks has posted some third-hand scoop (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/10/the_battle_of_cop_keating_an_earwitness_account)on the battle of COP Keating.

Pete

02-06-2010, 12:00 AM

Probe finds Afghan outpost left vulnerable to attack

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, February 5, 2010; 9:35 AM

KABUL -- Delays in closing a remote U.S. military outpost in eastern Afghanistan increased the vulnerability of the base, where eight American soldiers were killed during a prolonged siege by 300 insurgents last October, according to a summary of a military investigation released Friday.

The attack on Combat Outpost Keating in the Kamdesh district of Nurestan province was one of the worst insurgent attacks against American troops in Afghanistan. It came to symbolize the dangers of posting small groups of soldiers in sparsely populated areas of the country, something commanders have moved away from under a new strategy to protect more populous areas.

The investigation into the attack, led by Maj. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, drew on interviews from about 140 people either at the outpost or who had information about the attack. The inquiry found that the roughly 60 soldiers stationed there fought courageously, killing about 150 insurgents as they defended their base.

But the report also said those soldiers were stationed in a place of "no tactical or strategic value" and said critical intelligence and surveillance capabilities that could have helped them prevent such an onslaught had been diverted to other missions.

With limited manpower and located in a ravine surrounded by steep hillsides, the mission for Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry had devolved into protecting their base, Swan concluded. During their five months at the outpost they were attacked about 47 times, three times as often as the unit that came before them, the report found.

"As a result, the chain of command decided to close the remote outpost as soon as it could," the report said.

But a scheduled closure between July and August 2009 was delayed because the equipment needed to haul away base supplies, and to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence, was sent to another operation in Barg-e-Matal and to search for a missing soldier in southern Afghanistan, the report said.

"The delayed closing of COP Keating is important as it contributed to a mindset of imminent closure that served to impede improvements in force protection on the COP," the report said. "There were inadequate measures taken by the chain of command, resulting in an attractive target for enemy fighters."

The report said commanders should have done more to improve the base's defenses and to analyze intelligence reports that the enemy was planning a major assault. It recommended that the squadron commander overseeing the outpost receive a letter of reprimand. Military officials said the brigade commander was given a letter of admonishment, a less severe punishment.

The letters are part of a new push by top military brass to hold commanders accountable for major incidents in which troops are killed or wounded.

The attack on Oct. 3 began at 5:58 a.m. with a deluge of insurgent gunfire and mortars from all sides and a simultaneous attack on another nearby American outpost that limited the U.S. soldier's ability to fire mortars in return. Afghan soldiers helping to guard the outpost couldn't hold their positions and insurgents entered the base in three locations, the report said. U.S. soldiers eventually regained the momentum with the help of fighter jets and Apache helicopters. In addition to the eight soldiers killed, 22 were wounded.

"Members of B Troop upheld the highest standards of warrior ethics and professionalism and distinguished themselves with conspicuous gallantry, courage, and bravery under the heavy enemy fire that surrounded them," said a statement from the U.S. military that accompanied the summary report.

After the U.S. soldiers had regained control of their outpost, they began withdrawing from Combat Outpost Keating. By Oct. 6, three days after the attack, they destroyed what was left of the base to prevent insurgents from taking it over.

Note: The Washington Post website requires users to register and because of that a link to the story would not have worked for most people on this forum.

milnews.ca

02-06-2010, 02:52 AM

All releaseable COP Keating report material, obtained straight from from USFOR-A Public Affairs, downloadable here (http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/attachments_2010_02_05.zip) (HONKIN' 2.63 MB .zip file containing 16 PDFs). Feel free to share as well.

Pete

02-06-2010, 04:26 AM

Do infantry lieutenants get any training on on the basic principles of the design of field fortifications during their Basic Course? How about infantry NCOs during their NCOES? I don't remember any training on the subject in my field artillery schools, except for how to dig the DePuy fighting position when I was enlisted. I doubt that engineers or contractors will always be there when these positions need to be constructed. The most recent version of Field Manual 5-103, Survivability, that I've been able to find is from 1985, and I doubt it has anything about Hesco barriers or some of the other prefabricated stuff now in use. It may be one of the manuals that few people read. Field fortification used to be quite an art during the Vauban days of the 19th century and earlier.

AmericanPride

02-06-2010, 02:58 PM

In my opinion, the focus on what we did wrong (real or perceived, but all in hindsight) seems to distract from what the enemy did right. The "faults", "errors", "blunders", "problems" seem to be disproportionately narrowed to exclude the sophistication of an experienced and dynamic insurgency. It seems to me that the running perception is that the enemy stumbled around until they found a weakness and ran with it rather than developing a deliberate plan to assess and attack the COP with the intention of fulfilling their operational/strategic objectives. I'm not saying mistakes were not made on the ground (real or perceived), but only that the enemy has a his own design which he is pursuing that obviously significantly influences this event.

jcustis

02-06-2010, 06:04 PM

qp4

02-06-2010, 06:09 PM

The most recent version of Field Manual 5-103, Survivability, that I've been able to find is from 1985, and I doubt it has anything about Hesco barriers or some of the other prefabricated stuff now in use. It may be one of the manuals that few people read.

There are several published books specifically on building COPs and small FOBs. They fully diagram and layout designs using Hescos (how many Hesco blocks does it take to stop an Opel full of fertilizer?). And yes, no one reads them.

CMF 19 doesn't teach crap on fortification, but we're the mounted guys, so it would figure.

v/r,
qp4

AmericanPride

02-06-2010, 06:26 PM

"Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home.
He knows only The Cause.

Still want to quit?"

I won't make any claims to how widespread it is, but I have experienced on multiple occasions either a complete ignorance of the capacity, resilience, and experience of the Afghan insurgency or an injurious under-estimation of their abilities. This is of course not to be confused with issues of legal or moral legitimacy, but we must recognize the fact that the insurgency has managed to effectively destroy a COP and nearly overran a vehicle patrol base (FM 3-90 defines destroy as "physically [rendering] an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted."; and for awareness, defeat is defined as "when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight" and "the defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action").

Is there difficulty in the Army/military/American culture in accepting that an enemy is capable of inflicting serious harm on us without our having made a serious or grave mistake that enables them to do so? Is the Afghan insurgency so weak that it's successes can only come from when we make mistakes? Does this affect our capacity to make accurate assessments of the situation and to craft effective COAs?

Kiwigrunt

02-06-2010, 08:29 PM

Is there difficulty in the Army/military/American culture in accepting that an enemy is capable of inflicting serious harm on us without our having made a serious or grave mistake that enables them to do so? Is the Afghan insurgency so weak that it's successes can only come from when we make mistakes? Does this affect our capacity to make accurate assessments of the situation and to craft effective COAs?

Good point.
To what extent does this ‘difficulty in our culture’ allow us to only see every incident that leaves casualties on our side as a defeat or disaster, exacerbated of course by our very aversion to risk and casualties. At the tactical level, was COP Keating really that much of a defeat? Sure, 8 KIA is tragic. But the comparative statistics don’t actually look that bad given that the Taliban lost about 150. And as for the loss of the post it depends on how much value we choose to adhere to that particular piece of turf. I realise that this is looking purely at numbers but compare it to other defeats like those caused by IEDs. Look at any IED incident or combination of them where the casualty count is similar and see what damage we were able to inflict in return. (I say ‘we’ in the broadest sense; it doesn’t include yours truly from behind my laptop)

So perhaps we could even take that a step further and reverse our view on this. Given that the enemy tends to have the initiative most of the time anyway, would an increased use of these COPs not be a way to draw them out and meet them head on? And then the ‘true believers’ can do the humping with heavy weights. And when they operate in larger groups like this they should in a sense be easier to deal with as the battle becomes more ‘conventional’.
With other words, give them bait and reason to group up and take the battle to us.

Just some simplistic thoughts…

Pete

02-06-2010, 08:39 PM

CMF 19 doesn't teach crap on fortification, but we're the mounted guys, so it would figure.
The construction of field fortifications might well be one of those subjects that goes against the grain of the American way of warfare, with our preference for offensive operations to achieve decisive results--we prefer the style of J.E.B. Stuart riding around the Union army and Patton chasing the Wehrmacht across France rather than digging in and waiting for the enemy to come to us. That having been said, we've fortified a lot of places in Korea, Vietnam, and during the current wars. Some of the photographs of them look like the proverbial house that Jack built, especially some of the ridgetop forts built when the Korean War was in its final static phase. If we have to build fortifications from time to time we may as well do it right, and a few hours of instruction in the Basic and Career courses might help to prevent some of the more egregious mistakes from being made.

PhilR

02-06-2010, 08:58 PM

We were very good in Vietnam at rapidly constructing defendable firebases. The knowledge and background is there. With all the time we've spent (and are planning to spend) in Afghanistan, I'd hope we'd be breaking out those lessons from the past. There are basics of fields of fire, etc. This is not unique to Afghanistan. the history of small wars is one of small outposts or columns being overwhelmed by an irregular force who has the temporary advantage of surprise and mass. If you think in terms of raid, which was what this was, the Taliban acheived a period of relative superiority within which ti achieve its objectives, then withdrew as that window collapsed, as it naturally does (I'd recommend McRaven's SpecOps as a great read on the theory of raids--he's also the current commander of JSOC).
In terms of the tactical effect, from what I understand, one of the shortcomings was how long it took for reinforcements or external fire support to arrive. I'd be curious on the thinking that went into that planning. We can look at the situation in one of two ways: either the COP is to be rescued with reinforcements and fires directed at saving the perimeter itself, or the enemy massing is looked on as an opportunity, and we maneuver our reaction force and fires to cut him off from his planned withdrawal.
The latter option requires more flexibility in response, but is also has the opportunity to also turn the tables on the information/perception loss we suffered. As it was, even with the casualty mismatch, it appears the enemy not only had the initiative in engaging, but in disengaging as well.
s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

jcustis

02-06-2010, 09:02 PM

Good point.
To what extent does this ‘difficulty in our culture’ allow us to only see every incident that leaves casualties on our side as a defeat or disaster, exacerbated of course by our very aversion to risk and casualties. At the tactical level, was COP Keating really that much of a defeat? Sure, 8 KIA is tragic. But the comparative statistics don’t actually look that bad given that the Taliban lost about 150. And as for the loss of the post it depends on how much value we choose to adhere to that particular piece of turf. I realise that this is looking purely at numbers but compare it to other defeats like those caused by IEDs. Look at any IED incident or combination of them where the casualty count is similar and see what damage we were able to inflict in return. (I say ‘we’ in the broadest sense; it doesn’t include yours truly from behind my laptop)

So perhaps we could even take that a step further and reverse our view on this. Given that the enemy tends to have the initiative most of the time anyway, would an increased use of these COPs not be a way to draw them out and meet them head on? And then the ‘true believers’ can do the humping with heavy weights. And when they operate in larger groups like this they should in a sense be easier to deal with as the battle becomes more ‘conventional’.
With other words, give them bait and reason to group up and take the battle to us.

Just some simplistic thoughts…

Might work...for a short while and through a few successes, but then what? I don't think the Taliban are going to continue to push a protracted strategy of trying to isolate a COP and destroy it at the risk of losing several fighters. They'd rather choke off our lines of communication and just IED the re-supply convoys.

This also sounds like the strategy employed with regard to defending Khe Sanh:

"As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all he needed to know was that PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Making the prospect even more enticing was that the Combat Base was in an unpopulated area where American firepower could be fully brought to bear without having to worry about civilian casualties. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions."

I'm not so sure that a mobile and fluid enemy such as the Taliban is too concerned with waging a war of COPs.

Ken White

02-06-2010, 10:37 PM

This also sounds like the strategy employed with regard to defending Khe Sanh...Khe Sanh and the A Shau were a couple of many attempts to coax the VC and / or the NVA -- the two were not synonymous nor always cooperating effectively -- into big battles. Never really worked. Fighting a European war in SEA. :mad:
I'm not so sure that a mobile and fluid enemy such as the Taliban is too concerned with waging a war of COPs.That's the real 'yep' from me. They hit a target of opportunity and will when they can. Too much ado about a very small fight that didn't come off nearly as bad as too many seem to think. It's war, doo doo occurs and the bad guys will continue to do that, they'll accrue more minor successes. Likely also will accrue a better outcome than they deserve due simply to the fact it's their turf... :rolleyes:

Pete's right, we do not do field fortifications at all well -- nor are we particularly good on defense. However, I don't think it's a good idea to train for defense other than superficially as we now do for a number of reasons -- not in our aggressive psyche and not least because 'environmental' concerns preclude real digging on most bases and posts. That digging is necessary if you want to train it properly. We don't have the patience to do it right and we fight hard enough to do an acceptable job defending most of the time. :cool:

Though we probably could stop building really stupid RPG targets:

PhilR

02-07-2010, 12:37 AM

I agree that the Taliban won’t fight a “war of COPs”, but to a degree, that’s the physical reality of the ISAF/GoA fight. To get to the population, we need to be among them. Since the idea of patrols from large remote bases has been discredited as ineffective (commuting to war), what we see (I imagine if I looked at a detailed map of our forces) is a host of smaller COPs spread out across the country. From there we conduct patrols (hopefully that’s the main function/reason).

I was somewhat troubled when this story first hit the news a few months ago because some of the reasoning being used on why these outposts were where they were sounded right out of the Khe Sanh playbook—by providing attractive targets, these outposts drew insurgents away from more critical populated areas and provided an opportunity to employ our advantages in firepower. I don’t know if this was actual planning, or after-the fact rationalizing. If it was the part of a deliberate plan, it doesn’t appear that we thought it through to ensure we could actually effectively employ that firepower and ability to maneuver/mass quickly (time/space calculations).

If the COPs are a reality, I agree with Ken that we need to be prepared to lose one every now and then—not based on gross incompetence, but by the nature of risk and the fact that the goddess of war does not always smile on us. However, understanding that kind of risk and likely bad occurrence from time to time, we ought to have our PA/Information plan set, as well as expectation management. Unfortunately, we are in a situation of expectation management, especially at home, that any action of more than a few dead or wounded is seen as a gross tactical mistake worthy of investigation and fault-finding.

I’m not stating that there is or isn’t fault in this case. I think it is worthy of study and reflection for how the larger campaign design either supports these outposts having a positive function, or how it can place them in untenable positions regardless of how well or poorly the perimeter is constructed. In the end, I’d state that the lack of popular support meant the lack of meaningful intel. The question is how to garner any popular support, even if minimal, without first establishing yourself in strength?

As an addendum, on the subject ofour COIN approach, I’m guessing that there is the additional option of small teams embedded in tribes or other governing structures. That could work. I’d say that if the political/social structure of governing supports a less static and visible place of governance, then this will work. However, at some point, the GoA must establish governing facilities that both symbolize and exercise their governing power. For example, the vaunted Combined Action Platoons(CAPs) in Vietnam took two main forms. The first was the compound CAP, where the CAP located itself, with its PF platoon and usually local government officials in a compound. This was usually coordinated in with the local battlespace owner for fire support and reinforcements (QRF), when/if there was a major attack. The other type of CAP was the mobile CAP which basically was on patrol 24/7 in its area of operations. It moved around constantly, depending upon its survival through the inability of VC to accurately predict where it would be, or even find it (at night). The mobile CAP was very effective in many instances in throwing the insurgents off and taking the initiative. However useful it was from a military sense, however, it was seen a sign of weakness in the political sense. Without an identifiable place to govern from, the local GVN looked like they lived in fear of the VC (which they did). At some point, the government had to establish a visible place to govern from in order to be legitimate.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

Pete

02-07-2010, 01:05 AM

carl

02-07-2010, 04:32 AM

The construction of field fortifications might well be one of those subjects that goes against the grain of the American way of warfare, with our preference for offensive operations to achieve decisive results--we prefer the style of J.E.B. Stuart riding around the Union army and Patton chasing the Wehrmacht across France rather than digging in and waiting for the enemy to come to us.

Americans may not prefer to make field fortifications, but we have been very good at it in the past. In the later part of the Civil War if either side was given the time, and not much was needed, they constructed field fortifications that were extremely difficult to take. This may seem a minor point to note but it does show that we have been good at doing what needs to be done at the time.

jcustis

02-07-2010, 04:36 AM

When I look at the image in the link below I can't imagine why TRADOC would be averse to the idea of presenting more instruction on the construction of field fortifications. If I recall correctly the original Fort Monroe was designed by a French officer of engineers who found himself unemployed after the battle of Waterloo. :wry:

http://lh5.ggpht.com/_vXzyHAWg2g8/RyF6MemOG5I/AAAAAAAAAWo/d2DWUiDHCD0/Fort+Monroe+Russian+Aerial.gif

Building fortifications are sort of what our combatt engineers are for, eh?

Let's say a COP is built That affords proximity to a village/town of a few kilometers. What does it really do for us, the counterinsurgent?

Pete

02-07-2010, 05:39 AM

Jon, my posting of that image was a bit of horsing around on my part--it's Fort Monroe, Virginia, the current headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The old fort was designed by a French engineer officer, Simon Bernard, who had earlier been Napoleon's aide-de-camp. The Army will soon vacate the installation and the old fort will be taken over by the National Park Service.

The building of fortifications is indeed a combat engineer mission, but the decision on whether or not to build them and site selection are made by maneuver commanders. What these outposts do as a minimum is provide a relatively safe place for soldiers to sleep in when they're not out patrolling as well as provide a location for command and control and the storage of supplies and equipment. In the real world most of the construction is often done by the unit that will be occupying the position, so it would make sense if fundamentals like good fields of fire and observation were taken into account before positions are dug. That's why I think a few hours of instruction on the basic principles of field fortification would be a good idea in schools for junior officers.

William F. Owen

02-07-2010, 06:26 AM

Pete
That's why I think a few hours of instruction on the basic principles of field fortification would be a good idea in schools for junior officers.

Not something you can learn in a few hours, but training and education in this subject is essential and always has been.
How long does it take to train a Mortar Platoon Commander? Well learning how to site and construct FOBs/COPs takes way more skill than commanding a mortar platoon. Siting and construction is really something that should include formation level staffs.

Pete

02-07-2010, 06:44 AM

You're right, Wilf, but as I said a bit earlier in the thread defensive operations seem to go against the American way of war. Field fortification is a relatively neglected subject outside of combat engineer circles.

jcustis

02-07-2010, 06:48 AM

I am scratching my head right now because I am not seeing all the difficulty of which you guys are speaking.

If I'm going to position a COP, I conduct a leader's reconnaissance with ASCOPE in mind for the "C" in METT-TC, look at the task requirements (is it a laager for patrols only, a semi-permanent site for PRT and USAID enablers, etc.?) and consider the basic defensive position requirements. inherent in any static defense.

It is not like were are making water here guys, but rather more along the lines of constructing a patrol harbor site with direct fire barriers and some IDF protection, but that's pretty much it. What is so difficult that a basically trained officer can't open a pub with a few technical drawings detailing dimensions, and get started, even if he is not an engineer?

Engineers can tell us the calculated time to construct a COP based on soil composition and HESCO fill rates, but once you work a few barriers, the rest are really very easy to deal with.

Now, if I had to incorporate a Taco Bell Express into the site, that might take a bit more work, but it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days. :cool:

Pete

02-07-2010, 07:13 AM

Jon, it ain't rocket science, but the engagements at COP Keating and Wanat as well as the photos Ken White posted above show that some of these fortifications leave a lot to be desired. By the way, did you attend Bates College? I ran across your name on a college newsletter when I Googled your fire team article. I have family in the Bangor area.

jcustis

02-07-2010, 07:26 AM

Yup, they left a lot to be desired, and I would offer the counterpoint that despite any knowledge base, a degree of give a f*ck and follow-through is still required to make designs, hopes, and wishes a reality. Either that or there was a striking reliance on fire superiority to win the day should any attack come.

A brief review of youtube videos posted by the various units to rotate through COP Keating show some pretty impressive displays of firepower being sprayed into the hills, but to what effect?

With just a little bit more coordination and smarts in a few areas, the bad guys are going to start to really negate our advantages in air-delivered fires. It's a tangent, but watching those videos made me sit back and rub my chin. Due to the mission behind COP Keating (locating the local PRT, from what I have read IIRC), there were probably few other suitable locations in the first place, so the answer seems to lie less in what they should have done to improve the position, and more in what could have been done to mitigate the inherent limitations. A lot more troops dedicate to patrolling the surroundings immediately come to mind.

And yes, I did attend Bates. Batman doesn't normally reveal the location to the Bat Cave, but you guys are slowly whittling down what anonymity does exist out there for me. ; )

William F. Owen

02-07-2010, 07:56 AM

I think you to have differentiate two things here.

a.) Placing a position to protect something that has no choice as to where it is. -Vehicle check point, Police station, power plant, etc.

b.) Positioning a FOB/COP in a way that not only makes it defendable and useful, but also means it supports the operations it is part of. The requirements for a well defended position and a patrol based that actually supports part of Formation level patrol plan, are not the same.

jcustis

02-07-2010, 08:56 AM

The requirements for a well defended position and a patrol based that actually supports part of Formation level patrol plan, are not the same.

Okay, they are not the same, but please elaborate on the differences. I'm still not clear on what degree of skill is purportedly required to breath life into a COP/FOB, defense, whatever...

C2 to the outside world, good fields of fire and observation, basic drainage and life support systems, and yes, a plan for supporting patrols, are requisites. They are not beyond the skill of a basically-trained infantry officer or mortar platoon leader though.

Truth in lending...I do not support the notion that distributed COPs are the answer, and tend to side with the idea that we can do better with temporary coils when re-arm/refit is required, but keep our forces highly mobile and at a state of alert and readiness that allows for fast response to any threats that might cause surprise. Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on. I think this can fit portions of the Afghanistan terrain fairly well, and can be sustained indefinitely, regardless whether it is LAV, HMMWV, MRAp (ugh...:rolleyes:) or dismounted based.

Infanteer

02-07-2010, 11:46 AM

I am scratching my head right now because I am not seeing all the difficulty of which you guys are speaking.

Thank you. You are either well-sited or you aren't. If you aren't well sited for whatever reason (as Wilf alludes to) then you best take measures to offset that disadvantage (an OP comes to mind).

Now, if I had to incorporate a Taco Bell Express into the site, that might take a bit more work, but it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days. :cool:

Really - good to hear, although you wouldn't know it from wandering around KAF. The TGI Fridays - a sit-down restaurant for 300 people - just opened and they have something else going up beside it. :rolleyes:

Truth in lending...I do not support the notion that distributed COPs are the answer, and tend to side with the idea that we can do better with temporary coils when re-arm/refit is required, but keep our forces highly mobile and at a state of alert and readiness that allows for fast response to any threats that might cause surprise. Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on. I think this can fit portions of the Afghanistan terrain fairly well, and can be sustained indefinitely, regardless whether it is LAV, HMMWV, MRAp (ugh...) or dismounted based.

I think that's only half the equation. Galula mentioned "Mobile Forces" and "Static Forces" and the requirement for both. Having freedom to maneuver (the "Heat" principle of never getting involved with anything that you can't get away from in 5 minutes - that movie rocked) and being a roving death machine is cool, but it doesn't get you far with the population you are trying to "counterinsurge" when they know you'll be gone in 24 hours and the insurgent will be back with his knives out when you leave.

William F. Owen

02-07-2010, 02:39 PM

Okay, they are not the same, but please elaborate on the differences.
The difference is essentially the nature of the purpose. Often you do not get a choice as to where to set up, if you are going to fulfil the mission the commander gives you. If your location is part of a lager effort, then that aim of that larger effort may be secondary to what is good ground to defend.
If I need to access a road, a village, either physically and/or by observation, 24 hours a day, and even when the snows lies thick, I may have to settle for ground that does not offer the best tactical defence, but relies on other activities to ameliorate the disadvantage. - I knows it all pretty obvious, but real life rarely allows you just to pick the best spot to defend.

C2 to the outside world, good fields of fire and observation, basic drainage and life support systems, and yes, a plan for supporting patrols, are requisites. They are not beyond the skill of a basically-trained infantry officer or mortar platoon leader though. Concur, but all those things are subject to compromises.

Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on.
Again concur, but that may not fulfil the actual requirement for a village to a physical presence which the local population are demanding, and the formation commander wishes to address.

All I am saying is that there are a hole host of conditions and contexts which may preclude you picking the ideal spot. I am not suggesting we forgive stupid things being done because folks clearly didn't think about it.

PhilR

02-07-2010, 03:24 PM

I’m somewhat surprised that in this whole discussion, the classic, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift has not been referenced. While the weapons have changed some of the tactical fundamentals, the whole exercise of thinking through a likely (or unlikely) enemy attack is relevant to this, or any defensive position.

As JCustis states, it should be simple tactics in laying out a competent defensive position. While you might not be able to pick the ideal spot (up higher?) because it negates the purpose of the outpost itself, my memory of laying out tactical defenses is that a primary method is to get in places and observe from the enemy’s point of view and along his likely routes of approach. Its not just a simple case of fields of fire. In a form of “red teaming”, I’d have either my platoon sergeant or a good squad leader think up a plan to defeat the position, then use that information to improve it (of course back then we were worried more about mech, artillery and infantry combined).

While I agree with Jon on the preference for mobile forces, as I put in an earlier post, and Infanteer also addresses, to protect the population and support legitimacy, there will have to be static positions and forces to defend them. Understanding that this is not a war of attrition, I am still interested to hear how we are combining the mobile and the static, when the enemy chooses to expose himself. These type of COP attacks should be to our advantage, and not just to pile on fires.

I agree with Bing West’s propositions made elsewhere in SWJ that while we can’t always control the initiative in engaging the enemy, we should be doing better in preventing him from disengaging at will. This is not incumbent on our force in contact necessarily having better mobility (the gear-load issue), but by having a tactical construct that we can maneuver on that engaged enemy with other forces—using positional advantage from mutual support, or even using our wheeled or air mobility to place forces in position. This a fundamentally different approach from using a QRF to reinforce a unit in contact, or emerely to pile on fires at the point of contact.

I’m waiting to hear that we are developing a “Pinkerton” capability—not Pinkerton as the reality of the somewhat bumbling detective agency, but Pinkerton from “Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid” who relentlessly pursue the outlaws (“Who are those guys?”). This is the type of capability that western nations have used successfully in the past. We don’t necessarily need to “out-Afghan” the Taliban, but use our material and mobility advantages to support a relentless pursuit. This takes resources, however, that cannot be doing other things and it takes dedication to stay on the trail over a significant amount of time.

Phil Ridderhof

William F. Owen

02-07-2010, 04:10 PM

As JCustis states, it should be simple tactics in laying out a competent defensive position.

Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.

PhilR

02-07-2010, 04:53 PM

Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.

You're correct, and I failed to make that distinction in my post. I'd add that laying out the COP itself is only one piece of the entire defensive battle, if it is conceived as such. I'd still assert that the COP specifically lends itself to some basic principles of fields of fire, observation, fortified postions, etc.

However, as you state, the defensive plan must take into account the larger context and purpose. Its here that the Duffer's Drift approach of thinking through the entire situation, and thinking about how reaction forces and reinforcements are introduced into that battle, become critical aspects. The defensive battle is much more than the COP itself and planned correctly, sets the conditions for successful offensive action (counterattack and pursuit).
s/f
Phil Ridderhof

jcustis

02-07-2010, 10:17 PM

Again concur, but that may not fulfil the actual requirement for a village to a physical presence which the local population are demanding, and the formation commander wishes to address.

I think this is the precise mindset that misses the point. Are we assuming that the local population wants/needs that physical presence? Have we asked them what they want, and how the siting of a COP might influence the various cultural or economic

I'm not advocating being a Km away from the village one day, and then three villages over the next day. I'm thinking more along the lines of being on one side of the village one day, and then moving to the other side of the wadi that bisects it at dusk, and laagering on the other side during the coming night, all the while patrolling and making presence known during the witching hours.

When the Jan '09 provincial elections where occuring in Ninevah Province, we were asked by the IA commander for the area to be visible, but stay out of the towns as much as possible and allow his forces to work the issue. It was easier and tactically more sound to position LAV platoons/sections in overwatch of specific villages, where they were able to pick up and shift with very short notice. That's a very fluid and mobile capacity that you don't get with a COP, because it requires manpower to hold it if a quick reaction force has to sally forth to respond to a threat. We could have maintained influence through more aggressive patrolling if the situation warranted it, but just the perception of our presence went a long way to influencing the people to get out and vote. We do not have the boots on the ground to be COP centric, methinks, even if we are close to the towns/villages and populated areas. I believe COPs cause a cocoon effect at the worst time, and it is an effect that is more difficult to shift out of once it sets in.

Granted, this worked primarily because of the terrain that afforded good fields of fire with little effort, and the lack of a significant canal network to contend with. Infanteer and I have been exchanging PMs about his current experience in Afghanistan, since he is in a LAV-based unit as well, and things work differently for him due to the terrain. He and his troops has put the saddles away temporarily in favor of a more dismounted approach, and that works well because of many considerations he has to contend with.

I will relent that COPs are more likely required for the perceived welfare of our coalition partners who don't have the logistics, institutional memory or training, or will to stay out afield for long stretches of time. And yes, with the IA general mentioned above, you could time our joint ops with certain regularity. About 1600ish, they were packing up their inner cordon and search elements and heading home, regardless of whether the operation was completed and the entire area searched effectively.

Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.

We still have not submitted these matters to any sort of rigour here, as you would say...

What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.

And to answer the rhetorical of what a competent defensive position is, my definition is any defensive preparation made with a deliberate approach that considers the desired effects of friendly weapon systems and maneuver (CATK for example) and the desired counter to enemy weapon systems or maneuver. It can be based on a checklist or SOP, or a more elaborate staff planning process, but it all comes down to making the synergy of combined arms work so that the enemy is forced to abandon a particular course of action, or take on a course of action that actually supports friendly action (like squeezing him into a kill sack).

Schmedlap

02-07-2010, 10:36 PM

WTF?????:confused:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1036&stc=1&d=1265495769

Ken White

02-07-2010, 11:09 PM

Ain't he cute? :D

Or were you addressing the RPG Magnet. That's what we called em in Veet Nam -- proving that we don't learn lessons well...

P.S. Or he could be USAF...

William F. Owen

02-08-2010, 07:15 AM

What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.
There are similarities taken in the broadest sense of defence.
However, I submit that with a COP and/or FOB, you have fixed site, and the enemy know where you are. Indeed they can have you under continuous observation. Routine may include base plate checks - something unique to a FOB/COP.
More over the base has to serve the purpose for which it was intended.

Defeating an enemy battle group is going to be done over several kilometres depth, and you will be trading ground to set up successive attacks on him. Under no circumstances are you going to sit in a fixed position, unless it is a very well dug-in and hidden hide, from where you will be cued into separate fire positions, to engage/ambush the enemy. If you are totally dismounted then the management and caching of stores and ammunition, also requires unique consideration, as does counter-attacking. Under no circumstances will you let the enemy detect you or sit still so he can dump the RAG on you.

Schmedlap

02-08-2010, 10:45 PM

Or were you addressing the RPG Magnet. That's what we called em in Veet Nam -- proving that we don't learn lessons well...

The magnet. Nobody could possibly be dumb enough to think that jenga tower is providing overhead cover from anything other than rain and sunlight - or much cover in the way of direct fire. If it was constructed for the former reason, then who is the "work harder - not smarter" doofus who thought that the best way to get some shade was to fill umpteen sandbags and stack them up like that?

Ken White

02-09-2010, 02:02 AM

Beats me -- what I cannot figure out is why any halfway decent Buck Sergeant tolerates that kind of 'structure.' Much less ANY of his superiors...

Though perhaps they did a rotation through theNTC to learn how to 'do it right...' :mad:

Pete

03-13-2010, 10:37 PM

Report: Silver Star recipient among officers reprimanded for mistakes at Wanat

Stars and Stripes
Mideast edition
Saturday, March 13, 2010

Three Army officers who were members of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team have received letters of reprimand for decisions made before the deadly Battle of Wanat, including one officer who received a Silver Star for his actions that day, according to a report by CBS News.

CBS News identifies Silver Star recipient Capt. Matthew Myer, a company commander — and the senior officer on site for most of the battle — as one of the officers to be reprimanded. ABC News identified the other two officers as Col. Bill Ostlund, a former battalion commander, and Col. “Chip” Preysler, the former brigade commander.

Although this engagement need not have happened, I couldn't blame the recipients of these letters of reprimand if they feel cynical. It's a bit like saying after the fact that instead of putting up with a bad situation they should have complained about it more. The remainder of the story can be read by clicking here (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=68653).

Schmedlap

03-14-2010, 12:03 AM

I've long wondered what it takes to not get promoted to Major, other than ETS. I'll be curious to see if this truly is a "career-ender."

Pete

03-31-2010, 08:11 PM

... it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days.
From The Times, London, March 30, 2010:

No longer will the fighter pilots at Bagram or Kandahar airfields be able to ring Pizza Hut to deliver. Once General McChrystal has his way, the Whoppers will be off the menu: Burger Kings at both locations are to close. Even the newly opened TGI Friday’s on the boardwalk in Kandahar is to close its doors once its contract expires.

“This is a war zone, not an amusement park,” wrote Command Sergeant-Major Michael T. Hall in a military blog.

To read the entire article click here (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7080774.ece).

JMA

04-01-2010, 06:11 AM

From The Times, London, March 30, 2010:

To read the entire article click here (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7080774.ece).

I don't follow the logic here. Why should military men in a war zone not have access to some good old junk food and the odd beer at the appropriate time? Any fool can be and make others uncomfortable. I would ask these people to provide three or even one good reason why this has a negative impact on military performance. We came back to a warm shower, a beer and a plate for hot food. Now if we had the choice as to whether we wanted a burger or whatever it would have made it a whole lot better.

jcustis

04-02-2010, 12:10 AM

I don't follow the logic here. Why should military men in a war zone not have access to some good old junk food and the odd beer at the appropriate time? Any fool can be and make others uncomfortable. I would ask these people to provide three or even one good reason why this has a negative impact on military performance. We came back to a warm shower, a beer and a plate for hot food. Now if we had the choice as to whether we wanted a burger or whatever it would have made it a whole lot better.

Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.

Our tooth-to-tail ratio in Iraq was out of whack, and it showed when you could get 31 flavors of ice cream. Troops are not being denied a decent meal and sustenance, but the rest of the stuff McCrystal is trying to weed out was just over the top in the first place.

Ken White

04-02-2010, 12:49 AM

I also agree you don't have to practice being miserable but we've gone about fifty paces past that. It's okay to take care of the troops; Westmorleand did it well -- perhaps too well -- in Viet Nam. I always figured he knew he was in a no win situation and decided to take as good care of people as he could under the circumstances but we over did it there and in Desert Storm and in these two we've definitely gone too far, way too far. Though I believe at least part of that is the due to the same sort of logic; we ain't gonna win but we'll make it comfortable for you... :rolleyes:

Troops in the base camps don't need to live as rough as Joe the Grunt -- but they don't need to live like they're not at war either. That is every bit as inimical (if not more so) to decent performance and morale for both the REMFs and the grunts as no amenities at all.

Schmedlap

04-02-2010, 01:07 AM

... they don't need to live like they're not at war either. That is every bit as inimical (if not more so) to decent performance and morale for both the REMFs and the grunts as no amenities at all.

That is treading very close to Schmedlap Truth (http://www.schmedlap.com/Truths.aspx) number 2: The morale value of a reward or luxury is inversely proportional to the amount of planning and organization necessary to provide it.

According to this guy (http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=103105F), these changes are only about 5 years overdue...

Small units of soldiers and Marines in Iraq are working around the clock to capture or kill our enemies while safeguarding civilians and infrastructure. These are the people whom we tend to envision when we think of veterans, yet they represent a minority of the troops in Iraq. On our larger base camps, much larger numbers of soldiers, airmen, and Marines are working the same 9 to 5 duty hours that they work back home... While our troops who patrol the streets of Iraqi cities are more lethal, suffer fewer casualties, and cause fewer civilian casualties and collateral damage than in wars past, the troops in secure areas are becoming exponentially less efficient, turning our base camps into money pits into which our tax dollars quickly disappear. Peruse the publications (http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=pubs/pubs_main.php) put out by the military Public Affairs Offices in Iraq and you will see countless examples of our defense budget and manpower being put to gratuitous waste... There are radio stations, restaurants, coffee shops, beauty salons, massage parlors, and even post exchanges that sell lingerie, condoms, cologne, and perfume. On some base camps, most notably Camp (http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/03/12/us_troops_living_large_in_iraq/) Liberty (http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050208/news_1n8food.html), Camp (http://www.army.com/news/articles/article_041205_06.html) Victory (http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dispatches/stories/062205), and Logistics (http://www.afnews.af.mil/iraq/balad/102904-miler-balad.htm) Support (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_121604_Robin,00.html) Area (http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Stories/02_05/47.htm) Anaconda (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_102704_LSA,00.html), civilian attire is nearly as common as the starched military uniforms -- even among the troops -- and the pool, volleyball courts, and basketball courts are packed all day long... Contrary to the sacrifices and hardships that most Americans envision our troops to be making, most of our troops are being only slightly inconvenienced by their tour in Iraq.Some of the links in the quoted text are now defunct, the ones that still work are a hoot. For some that don't work - you can see in the url the title, which itself is hilarious "US Troops Living Large in Iraq".

On a slight tangent, I can't help but notice that the author seemed to "get COIN" (protect the populace, avoid damage to infrastructure, etc) even though that article was written in 2005, before 3-24 allegedly revealed new truths to us.

JMA

04-02-2010, 05:56 AM

Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.

Our tooth-to-tail ratio in Iraq was out of whack, and it showed when you could get 31 flavors of ice cream. Troops are not being denied a decent meal and sustenance, but the rest of the stuff McCrystal is trying to weed out was just over the top in the first place.

Getting too fat? For a soldier on active service how is that possible in the first place. Today we dig out those old company photos from the 1970s to proven that grandad did once have a 32" waist.

Maybe the hardworking troops are being penalised because the staff, admin and logisitcs types who live in the operations area losing it? If you live and work in a place where you can have a row of junk food outlets then you can have a gym and you can have fitness tests and send the failures home in disgrace.

So I say again when we were extracted after a big combat operation if we able to give the troops a pizza or a burger and let him wash that down with a choice of 31 flavours of ice cream and later a few beers that would have been perfect. There were many times in the 100 degree plus dry heat of the Zambezi Valley that I dreamed of a milkshake. Odd occasion we had cold cokes delivered with a 7 day rat resupply (at least they were cold when they left base) we enjoyed that and buried the bottles afterwards. (Its the little things that mean so much you know)

Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?

JMA

04-02-2010, 06:10 AM

That is treading very close to Schmedlap Truth (http://www.schmedlap.com/Truths.aspx) number 2: The morale value of a reward or luxury is inversely proportional to the amount of planning and organization necessary to provide it.

I like those points you make. Not sure I agree fully with number 2 though (for reasons stated elsewhere). But then again what we considered a reward or luxury 30 years ago in a small African backwater is nowhere near what is possible and maybe even demanded by today's troops.

JMA

04-02-2010, 06:18 AM

Troops in the base camps don't need to live as rough as Joe the Grunt -- but they don't need to live like they're not at war either. That is every bit as inimical (if not more so) to decent performance and morale for both the REMFs and the grunts as no amenities at all.

So the problem is confined to the base camps then?

jcustis

04-02-2010, 02:20 PM

So the problem is confined to the base camps then?

Yes, that problem is all about the bigger bases.

Ken White

04-02-2010, 08:20 PM

Getting too fat? For a soldier on active service how is that possible in the first place.It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service. :rolleyes:
...If you live and work in a place where you can have a row of junk food outlets then you can have a gym and you can have fitness tests and send the failures home in disgrace.Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.
Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big. For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though. :wry:
But then again what we considered a reward or luxury 30 years ago in a small African backwater is nowhere near what is possible and maybe even demanded by today's troops.Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event... :cool:

JMA

04-02-2010, 09:06 PM

It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service. :rolleyes:Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big. For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though. :wry:Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event... :cool:

I submit we have identified the problem. Now how to solve it? Is it solvable?

Ken White

04-03-2010, 12:37 AM

Pete

04-03-2010, 01:35 AM

Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.
Can anyone here tell which guy is the Marine in this photo (http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wExpT4-LAPw/SuYrDIrGy1I/AAAAAAAAAR4/sNwjcMpWExc/s1600-h/army-strong-hooooah_72pxfs.jpg)? :o

Schmedlap

04-03-2010, 02:02 AM

Can anyone here tell which guy is the Marine in this photo (http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wExpT4-LAPw/SuYrDIrGy1I/AAAAAAAAAR4/sNwjcMpWExc/s1600-h/army-strong-hooooah_72pxfs.jpg)? :o

Yeah. The guy with the clean uniform, who looks like he took a shower recently, and is eating a meal in a DFAC. Well, I guess that describes everyone in the photo.

JMA

04-03-2010, 09:00 AM

will we solve it?

I suspect not, lacking a major war. The US governmental system is purposely, slow, infinitely variable due to political whim and a short electoral cycle. It is also tilted toward maximum freedom and individual choice. While that latter attribute has been ameliorated to an extent by communitarian requirements, the other three factors still exist and mitigate any rigorous much less draconian tightening of disciplinary measures. :eek:

We tend to do that only when confronted with a really big emergency or an existential war -- and we've only had one of those, the American Civil War. WW II was a close second. All the others, including Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation was effectively at peace and just parts of the Armed Forces went to war. Even the Pentagon doesn't really go to war, at least they have not since 1945... :wry:

So we'll piddle around the edges but change little -- until we believe we have to do so. Then we will do it and it'll work out okay. No big thing, it's terribly inefficient but in spite of mediocre training and odd rules the kids will make it work until then. And there will be a 'then.' :cool:

The Rhodesian forces were lumbering along with the old Brit colonial pattern as well. It took the birth of the Selous Scouts to break the mold. Firstly as their cover (for their pseudo work) was that they were a combat tracking unit in came the beards and all and the uniforms were all cammo.

Then 'Uncle Ron' Reid-Daly (first commander of the Selous Scouts) was an ex-RSM (Regimental Sergeant Major) so the strict officer NCO structure became a little less formal.

Basically Reid-Daly as able to cut through all the crap and do only what worked (not flawless as any Selous Scout will tell you but a hell of a lot better than units shackled by so-called tradition.)

And as the RLI became almost totally deployed on Fire Force the RLI adapted accordingly. We had to, people were dying and we had to get better and smarter at what we were doing so the holy cows were discarded one by one. And of course the Selous Scouts had attracted most of the best senior NCOs from the RLI and this had a significant impact.

So maybe such units may be the bridging force between the current traditional units and formations deployed in Afghanistan and the final hand over to the Afghan army which should be considered? Perhaps with a progressive integration of Afghans?

JMA

04-03-2010, 09:23 AM

I would like to comment upon this in more detail. I would preface this by saying I really don't have a solution to the Afghanistan situation but am able to ask some questions. If the questions make for discomfort please resist the temptation to shoot the messenger.

It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service.

If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.

:rolleyes:Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.

Gee, well you make your own bed you must lie in it. But there must be a way around this? What percent of support 'troops' are obese?

Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big.

Are they happy with this role? I'm sure those who have some fight left in them would be valuable to the units doing the actual fighting?

For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though.

That's a damn shame.

:wry:Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event... :cool:

I understand as it appears similar to my experience... but once again I say any fool can be uncomfortable.

82redleg

04-03-2010, 01:02 PM

If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanOrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

JMA

04-03-2010, 01:54 PM

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanOrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.

JMA

04-03-2010, 01:56 PM

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.

"EN route clearance companies" are these engineers? What do they do?

jmm99

04-03-2010, 02:49 PM

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan (http://yooperpage.blogspot.com/2008/11/1421st-107th-deployed-to-afghanistan.html):

Wednesday, November 26, 2008
1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan

More than 100 members of the Michigan National Guard’s 1431st Engineer Company–former members of the 107th- Company A, are preparing for deployment to Afghanistan.

They will meet at the Calumet Armory on Friday, Nov. 28 to prepare for a Nov. 30 departure to Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg, MS. The Baraga and Calumet armories were separated from the 107th Engineer Company and given their own identity, the 1431st Engineer Sapper Company.

They will train for approximately two months at Camp Shelby before they deploy to Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan they will provide route and convoy clearance and security during their tour.

and U.P. troops coming home (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?list=194550&id=380891) (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?id=426069) (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home (http://www.upnorthlive.com/news/story.aspx?id=381943):

By Brad Soroka
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 at 7:57 p.m.

CALUMET -- They're the 1431st Engineer Sapper Company; between them: 42 Purple Hearts, 26 Bronze Stars and one newborn baby.

So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

Cavguy

04-03-2010, 03:19 PM

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

I always get annoyed when people compare the "tooth to tail" ratio of the USMC to the Army, and neglect that the USMC is incapable of above RCT level logistical support over time. The USMC logistics elements dont do theater sustainment. The Army performs that function for the USMC. That skews the overall ratio greatly. It's easy to dismiss "support troops", but without them combat units can't operate.

(Not targeting you 82redleg, just an FYI for the board)

Pete

04-03-2010, 10:36 PM

Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?
It's been 25 years since I was in the Army so my observations may be a bit out of date, but as I saw it the role of command sergeants major at battalion level and higher in the U.S. Army was rather nebulous. Their main duty description was to serve as the commander's chief advisor on matters relating to NCOs and other enlisted personnel; other than that his duties were pretty much as the commanding officer chose to define them. In addition to monitoring enlisted selections for leadership schools, promotions and disciplinary issues, as Ken pointed out they often focused on uniforms, haircuts, the barracks and the police (tidying up) of the unit's area. One thing they are certainly not are the hellfire-and-brimstone type of sergeant major the British Army is famous for. It also seemed to me that the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy turned them into homespun philosophers who go on and on about how "the young soldier" adapts to his new military environment. What is really needed is a better definition of their duties, responsibilities and authority, even if it infringes a bit on the traditional prerogatives of company/battery commanders and first sergeants. Perhaps Ken may have something to add because he knows a lot more about this subject than I do.

82redleg

04-04-2010, 12:13 AM

JMM- yes, that is what I meant by EN route clearance companies. They are very much tooth, but are outside the BCTs, so I couldn't easily count them from open source. I also don't count the helo crews as tail, since they are conducting a necessary mission, usually outside the wire, every day.

JMA- everything from the necessary but mundane (fuel handlers, mechanics, etc) to inteligence analysts, to watchstanders/RTOs in command posts, to planners, to civil-military coordination, to finance/personnel/mail clerks, to running the garrisons (thats what the bigger FOBs are) to you-name-it.

Some of it has to be done in theater, some could be done stateside. Some of it could be curtailed (I've yet to see a finance unit that keeps the hours of an infantry unit), but are necessary if overmanned. Some is just plain superfluous.

Cavguy- roger all. I was thinking more of at the tactical level (I don't know how many trigger pullers are in a USMC RCT vs others), but your point is even more valid at the operational/strategice level of logistics- the USMC simply doesn't have it (by design, not an attack) because the Army does it for them.

Fuchs

04-04-2010, 12:17 AM

Ken White

04-04-2010, 12:49 AM

The Rhodesian forces were lumbering along with the old Brit colonial pattern as well. It took the birth of the Selous Scouts to break the mold...So maybe such units may be the bridging force between the current traditional units and formations deployed in Afghanistan and the final hand over to the Afghan army which should be considered? Perhaps with a progressive integration of Afghans?The problem is that politicians do not want to do that sort of thing in peacetime -- the Mothers of the Troops get all upset at a 1 or 2% killed loss in realistic training. As I said elsewhere, make no mistake, the US is at peace and has been since 1945. In the war that ended then, a near existential thing as was your war existential for you, we did the same thing, formed units ad hoc and charged them with producing results. Commanders who did not produce were fired and quickly. The rules change quickly and harshly. Can't do that in peacetime; tradition and protecting the institution get in the way -- and the politics of it all are not helpful.

The Selous Scouts and their roles and missions have been discussed here and a search should show the threads. However, the US is highly unlikely to use those techniques, successful as they are, for a variety of reasons. So we'll bumble along in Afghanistan, realize a medium level of success and depart. That's okay, no one ever really wins an insurgency, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. That's what we wanted going in and we'll get it on the way out.

That said, I'll reiterate that in an existential war, the nice stuff goes out the window and we can be as effective as anyone and more so than most. We just need a real reason to do that, otherwise we just want to argue amongst ourselves and ponder Jesse James (the modern one, not the outlaw).
I would like to comment upon this in more detail. I would preface this by saying I really don't have a solution to the Afghanistan situation but am able to ask some questions. If the questions make for discomfort please resist the temptation to shoot the messenger.No reason to shoot anyone for sensible questions. Non-sensible ones might require a second or two of thought... :D
If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.No. It is not at all outrageous, it's fairly typical today. Check this whole, short thread on the topic: (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95156&postcount=1). You might also ponder who else can put 150,000 troops in Iraq and 40,000+ in Afghanistan from another continent 12,000 miles away and sustain them. That capability comes with a cost.
Gee, well you make your own bed you must lie in it. But there must be a way around this? What percent of support 'troops' are obese?Nah, not really, Politicians make the beds we all have to lie in; US, Rhodesia, south Africa, UK. Makes little difference what country, all do dumb things. not the same things perhaps, but still dumb.

To answer your question, Obese about 5-10% on a guess (none morbidly so); simply overweight another 10% or so and marginally heavy about 10 more -- that means 70± % are okay. In the US population at large, we've got BIG problem (pun intended) (LINK) (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50863H20090109). That's what happens when you have too much money and too much free time. The interesting thing is that we've had the problem for about 25-30 years and got to be a laughing stock to the rest of the world -- who are now catching up. ;) (LINK) (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/hea_obe-health-obesity). In South Africa you do a bit better: LINK. (http://www.nature.com/oby/journal/v10/n10/fig_tab/oby2002141t7.html#figure-title) Also, we've already started cracking down on the excess, it was allowed to slide to keep troop numbers up with on and off deployments. now that we're able to one on and two offm the housekeeping will get caught up.
Are they happy with this role? I'm sure those who have some fight left in them would be valuable to the units doing the actual fighting?My guess would about half the Sergeant Majors are happy with it, it becomes a bureaucratic sinecure sort of thing -- and make no mistake, we are very bureaucratic. Plus most are in their forties when one realizes one is not immortal and that things break easily in field service. Of the other half, about half of those aren't happy with it but accept it for one reason or another; that leaves one lonely fourth -- or about the 20% I mentioned earlier -- that actively try to improve the tactical and technical performance of their units.

I believe Bertrand Russell commented that 80% of the work in the world is done by 20% of the people or words to that effect.

Pete's comment elsewhere is pretty accurate; we have effectively tried to create a slightly different category of NCO. It may work; I'm skeptical but we'll have to wait and see.

Yes, it is a damn shame but, like the tooth to tail ratio it also is more typical of other Armies than many are prepared to acknowledge, particularly Armies from wealthy western nations. All Armies have their problems. This LINK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2129563.stm) is old but I suspect if that problem has gone away, there are others equally debilitating...
I understand as it appears similar to my experience... but once again I say any fool can be uncomfortable.Once again I suggest you're missing the point, possibly because the excess has to be seen to be believed. I spent almost 30 years as an Infantryman, believe me when I say that the Base Camps in theoretical war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq feature a far higher standard of comfort and convenience than I saw on my last peacetime tour in Korea in 1975 and in some respects exceeds the levels I can obtain today as an old retired Dude in the at peace United States.

Not a question of being uncomfortable -- it is a question of removing excessive comfort producing items that provide for what can only be called a cosseted existence. American have a bad tendency to overdo everything. We're not talking about removing good food, the gyms or soft drinks and the occasional beer or air conditioned billets, they stay. We're talking about taking away civilian fast food outlets and shopping facilities that exceed the per capita availability factor for most American cities.

Those Fast Food outlets by the way are a significant contributor to that obesity in the rear problem (pun again intended).

Ken White

04-04-2010, 01:15 AM

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.Aviation units maintain and fly aircraft; Engineers build stuff; Artillery shoots guns and rockets, Medical units keep the 'died of wounds' rate down in single figures, a worldwide wartime first; Supply and maintenance units do those things; Signal units provide comms; Military Police provide law enforcement, security and do convoy escort, Intelligence Brigades provide intel and operate some UAVs / drones (other are owned by combat units but the folks operating them are support types, not riflemen), SF do both combat and support stuff; Transportation types move stuff and people.

Combat units have mechanics and cooks who are support types. The significant US fixed wing and helicopter presence, with aircraft from all services requires a lot of maintainers, armers and fuelers to support 24 hour operations. Not to mention control tower operators...

Don't forget that the armed forces of the US are providing people to assist in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provincial_Reconstruction_Team) -- and these guys: LINK (http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/07/073109-Ambassador.aspx). All sorts of stuff going on there. Those US numbers also include the Air Force (fihters, transports and helicopters plus crews and support folks) and the Navy (yes, a lot Navy types there; all the Marine Medical Corpsmen and Doctors are Navy, as are the Chaplains).

P.S

In addition to the big military support package, there are a host of civilian contractors also supporting the effort. :D

Modern warfare is expensive and expansive... :cool:

jmm99

04-04-2010, 01:32 AM

from Fuchs
I know only one definition of tooth/tail in the military realm.

Tooth are those who are meant to shoot at the enemy as a unit.
Tail are those who are only meant to shoot at the enemy in self-defence.

What is the source for your definition, other than Fuchs, On War ?

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.

Regards

Mike

Ken White

04-04-2010, 01:54 AM

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.Or did, once upon a time. :cool:

I don't know where on the anatomy to place these guys who'll operate a drone and shoot Hellfires at the unholy... LINK. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQ-1C_Warrior) :confused: :wry:

jmm99

04-04-2010, 02:08 AM

I know you did (many klicks downrange) - seem to recall some Whitean comment re: lurpie purpose in effect is to observe, not to make contact.

By Fuchs' definition, the remote drone operator is "tooth", as one of "those who are meant to shoot at the enemy as a unit".

I don't know where to fit them into the definitional game. But, I'm happy we have them, despite the fact that many lawyers througout the World punditize that kind of direct action is illegal.

Regards

Mike

Schmedlap

04-04-2010, 03:34 AM

I know you did (many klicks downrange) - seem to recall some Whitean comment re: lurpie purpose in effect is to observe, not to make contact.

Reminds me of a funny story (well, I think it's funny). We had a LRS-D unit attached to us in 2005 for a few days. For our purposes, they were simply a handful of shooters who were available, of which we were always in short supply, given our outrageous mission set. They understood this well in advance - that they were provisional infantrymen for whom we would use for some surveillance type stuff if necessary, but most likely would be used in the role that we use other fire teams.

One day the LRS team was manning an OP (our OPs generally observed and reported, but often ambushed people who were emplacing IEDs or engaged in other tomfoolery). They PID'd some individuals whom we were looking to kill/capture. The nearest friendly element to them was 2 km away and the individuals spotted were about to drive away in a vehicle that looked like just about every other vehicle in the city. I had just returned to our patrol base and walked into the CP when my CO was instructing them to kill the individuals for fear that they would escape and blend into the populace.

Their response was classic LRS: "if we do that, our position will be compromised." :confused: *

My CO just stared at the radio for a few seconds, then all of us exchanged baffled glances at one another for a few more seconds before the CO repeated his order with more explicit guidance and some humorously more obscene justification for why his orders should be followed in light of their concerns.

* - Our QRF generally responded to a TIC at that distance in about 2 minutes - plenty of time for, as I recall, what was a six-man team; twice the size of most of our elements in sector

Pete

04-04-2010, 03:44 AM

Perhaps a better way of distinguishing the tooth from the tail is to call them the combat arms and the support arms. The latter category is further subdivided into combat support branches and combat service support ones; I once knew the difference between the two but now it escapes me.

Ken White

04-04-2010, 03:50 AM

and reconnaissance / surveillance action requires a different mindset and training.

As does SF FID / UW work and DA... :cool:

It really pays to use the right tool for the job. The US Army's fetish for 'general purpose (GP)' units and equipment inculcated by Leslie McNair is a really bad idea. The US army's fetish for GP personnel, one size, one rank fits all is a far worse idea.

Buying equipment and selecting people suited for for specific jobs and training them to do that job is not impossible, it isn't even difficult. We have just elected to not do that -- and it's become a habit.

That said, I suspect once the boss broke the surveill mindset all worked out okay...:D

Pete

04-04-2010, 04:10 AM

In justice to McNair, though, it was probably easier to equip and train an Army of almost 100 divisions by cranking out standard trianglar infantry and armor divisions cookie-cutter style rather than having an eclectic assortment of TOEs and MTOEs, all with their various unique features.

Ken White

04-04-2010, 05:11 AM

an things have changed. Made sense in WW II, today -- not so much but old habits die hard...

JMA

04-04-2010, 07:26 AM

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan (http://yooperpage.blogspot.com/2008/11/1421st-107th-deployed-to-afghanistan.html):

and U.P. troops coming home (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?list=194550&id=380891) (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?id=426069) (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home (http://www.upnorthlive.com/news/story.aspx?id=381943):

So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

JMA

04-04-2010, 07:28 AM

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanOrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

JMA

04-04-2010, 08:04 AM

Aviation units maintain and fly aircraft; Engineers build stuff; Artillery shoots guns and rockets, Medical units keep the 'died of wounds' rate down in single figures, a worldwide wartime first; Supply and maintenance units do those things; Signal units provide comms; Military Police provide law enforcement, security and do convoy escort, Intelligence Brigades provide intel and operate some UAVs / drones (other are owned by combat units but the folks operating them are support types, not riflemen), SF do both combat and support stuff; Transportation types move stuff and people.

Combat units have mechanics and cooks who are support types. The significant US fixed wing and helicopter presence, with aircraft from all services requires a lot of maintainers, armers and fuelers to support 24 hour operations. Not to mention control tower operators...

Don't forget that the armed forces of the US are providing people to assist in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provincial_Reconstruction_Team) -- and these guys: LINK (http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/07/073109-Ambassador.aspx). All sorts of stuff going on there. Those US numbers also include the Air Force (fihters, transports and helicopters plus crews and support folks) and the Navy (yes, a lot Navy types there; all the Marine Medical Corpsmen and Doctors are Navy, as are the Chaplains).

P.S

In addition to the big military support package, there are a host of civilian contractors also supporting the effort. :D

Modern warfare is expensive and expansive... :cool:

Hi Ken, thanks for the reply again.

This all started with your comment "It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service."

I then (in error it seems) made the leap from converting "folks in the rear" to "support" staff.

Maybe too I was distracted by this quote from elsewhere from a certain Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn:

"The strength of one U.S. Army infantry brigade consists of two to four battalions with the strength typically ranging from between 1,500 to 3,500 personnel. It is usually commanded by a brigadier general or a colonel. A U.S. Army brigade with its assigned personnel and support units will vary with the mission and type of unit. A U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade consists of between 10,000 to 13,000 U.S. Marines. It is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of one infantry regiment and support units. Individual aviation squadrons are task organized to support the mission. In wars that the U.S. have been involved in since the end of World War II; the ratio of U.S. combat troops to combat service support and support have gone from 4 support soldiers to 1 infantryman to 7 support soldiers to 1 infantryman in Iraq and Afghanistan" http://tinyurl.com/yeabfz2

JMA

04-04-2010, 08:23 AM

It's been 25 years since I was in the Army so my observations may be a bit out of date, but as I saw it the role of command sergeants major at battalion level and higher in the U.S. Army was rather nebulous. Their main duty description was to serve as the commander's chief advisor on matters relating to NCOs and other enlisted personnel; other than that his duties were pretty much as the commanding officer chose to define them. In addition to monitoring enlisted selections for leadership schools, promotions and disciplinary issues, as Ken pointed out they often focused on uniforms, haircuts, the barracks and the police (tidying up) of the unit's area. One thing they are certainly not are the hellfire-and-brimstone type of sergeant major the British Army is famous for. It also seemed to me that the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy turned them into homespun philosophers who go on and on about how "the young soldier" adapts to his new military environment. What is really needed is a better definition of their duties, responsibilities and authority, even if it infringes a bit on the traditional prerogatives of company/battery commanders and first sergeants. Perhaps Ken may have something to add because he knows a lot more about this subject than I do.

I accept that the "hellfire-and-brimstone type of sergeant major the British Army is famous for" ends at battalion level. After that it is probably a few "quiet" postings to allow them to see out their time until retirement.

JMA

04-04-2010, 08:30 AM

JMA- everything from the necessary but mundane (fuel handlers, mechanics, etc) to inteligence analysts, to watchstanders/RTOs in command posts, to planners, to civil-military coordination, to finance/personnel/mail clerks, to running the garrisons (thats what the bigger FOBs are) to you-name-it.

Some of it has to be done in theater, some could be done stateside. Some of it could be curtailed (I've yet to see a finance unit that keeps the hours of an infantry unit), but are necessary if overmanned. Some is just plain superfluous.

What percentage of the numbers are superfluous then?

JMA

04-04-2010, 09:54 AM

If I may break this conversation down into separate parts.

The problem is that politicians do not want to do that sort of thing in peacetime -- the Mothers of the Troops get all upset at a 1 or 2% killed loss in realistic training. As I said elsewhere, make no mistake, the US is at peace and has been since 1945. In the war that ended then, a near existential thing as was your war existential for you, we did the same thing, formed units ad hoc and charged them with producing results. Commanders who did not produce were fired and quickly. The rules change quickly and harshly. Can't do that in peacetime; tradition and protecting the institution get in the way -- and the politics of it all are not helpful.

The Selous Scouts and their roles and missions have been discussed here and a search should show the threads. However, the US is highly unlikely to use those techniques, successful as they are, for a variety of reasons. So we'll bumble along in Afghanistan, realize a medium level of success and depart. That's okay, no one ever really wins an insurgency, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. That's what we wanted going in and we'll get it on the way out.

The first is the formation of irregular units to wage the war in the manner it is needed. It is easy to blame the politicians at every turn when it may well be more a case that the 'traditional' units and formations will not want control over the war to slip from their fingers. (I'm not sure what the death rate during training has to do with this though). Yes I understand to change the role of existing units would be well nigh impossible that is why I am drifting towards the idea of the formation of new 'special' units which can be disbanded as fast as they have been formed if the direction of the war changes or the political situation home and in Afghanistan demands. Remember that if there is to be a political solution in Afghanistan it will depend on the internal politics of Afghanistan and not what happens in Washington.

I use the Selous Scouts as merely an example how necessary the departure from 'traditional' thinking and behaviour probably is for any form of success in Afghanistan - both military and political. The creation of such units I believe will have the necessary shock effect on the existing troops in Afghanistan.

The formation of the Selous Scouts stripped out most of the best senior NCOs out of the RLI and they drew their African soldiers from the RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) it hurt these units and there some initial complaint. It was the SAS who felt the most threatened (see the book "The Special Air Service - Rhodesia - the men speak" ISBN 978-0-9814321-2-0) as they also lost men to the Scouts (this is not my opinion, read the book).

So when the SAS were tasked with additional work and complained they were too busy with other tasks or that they were understaffed they were told "OK then we'll give the task to the Scouts". The SAS had to come to terms with the fact that few other than themselves gave a damn what the unit had done in Aden or Malaya. The SAS spoke of 'opposition' (as it were only this tiny unit that mattered). A classic was as told by then Maj Brian Robinson OC SAS in his own words in the book that when on occasion he was placed under operational command of the RLI and Lt Col Dave Parker was in the process of tasking him, he kept replying "That's really not an SAS job, sir." This led to the final word from Lt Col Parker "Brian, I don't know what is or isn't a SAS job but why don't you take you Squadron and f**k off back to Salisbury". Wake up call!

Now the inter service rivalry and the lack of cooperation among the US forces is similar but on a massive scale it appears.

I'm not sure it is ethical for force commanders to "bumble along" while taking causalities. They really appear to need to do some serious soul searching.

jmm99

04-04-2010, 12:39 PM

from JMA
So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

Yes. A video and Powerpoint linked here re: 1431 Sappers in Astan (http://www.107thengineers.org/1431/AfghanInfo.asp).

That unit goes back to WWI (107th Engineers), reorganized recently to reflect combat engineering specialization and to allow deployment by individual companies (from May 2008 Bull Sheet (http://www.107thengineers.org/BullSheets/BS52-May08.pdf)):

Reorganization of the 107th Engineer Battalion

Over the last few years the Army has been going through a “transformation” and fighting the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The MI Army National Guard and the 107th Engineer Battalion have been affected by this initiative.

In the Engineer branch there are no longer any “organic battalions.” An organic battalion was an organization where there was an HHC and lettered line companies. In time of war the whole battalion was to mobilize as a whole, like the WW II days. Those of you who have followed the battalion’s activities in the last few years know that there have been half dozen partial mobilizations of the battalion’s personnel to support the GWOT.

Now the battalion is no longer an organic battalion. Each company is a separate mobilization entity with a number designation and can/will be called to active duty individually by company. This reorganization of the battalion and deactivation of other UP units is detailed in the table below.

HSC, 107th Engineer Battalion will be the peacetime command and control headquarters for all the UP units.

Old Name - New Name - Location

HHC - Headquarter & Support Co (HSC) - Ishpeming. This is the Bn HQ, “S” sections, and most of the other HHC sections.

New unit - Field Support Co (FSC) - Ishpeming. This company is basically the maintenance and transportation sections.

Co A - 1431st Engr Co (Sapper) - Calumet & Det 1, Co A Det 1, 1431st En Co - Baraga

Co B - 1432nd Engr Co (Horizontal const) - Iron River & Det 1, Co B Det 1, 1432nd - Kingsford

Co C - 1430th Engr Co (Vertical const) - Gladstone & New unit Det 1, 1430th - Marquette

1437th - same name and mission [* JMM: 1437th Multi-Role Bridge Company] - Sault Ste. Marie

So, combat engineers can be the tip of the spear or very much rear echelon builders - depends on the speciality and mission.

Regards

Mike

Fuchs

04-04-2010, 12:59 PM

What is the source for your definition, other than Fuchs, On War ?

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.
I knew these terms for way too long to remember the source.

And yes, LRS is tail. They provide a service (recce info) that's more similar to a service provided by image interpreters on a different continent (recce info) than the similarity between infantry and armour jobs.

You may not be pleased by this idea, but that seems to be due to a prejudice against the tail.

Effective and lean parts of the tail are just as good as combat troops. the excesses of the tail are the problem (combat troops personnel excesses are no problem because casualties and other reasons delete them quickly).

jmm99

04-04-2010, 01:09 PM

for or against teeth or tails. The concept of supported and supporting seems more useful as a generalization; and then focus on whether the unit is necessary, desirable or why is it there at all. All of this tooth and tail stuff is context sensitive - so, putting precise definitions and numbers to it suggests (to me) that teeth will be chasing tails. :D

Regards

Mike

Cavguy

04-04-2010, 02:07 PM

So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

Yep. Do a great job of it too.

Cavguy

04-04-2010, 02:09 PM

I knew these terms for way too long to remember the source.

And yes, LRS is tail. They provide a service (recce info) that's more similar to a service provided by image interpreters on a different continent (recce info) than the similarity between infantry and armour jobs.

Having been a recce scout, there is no similarity between a forward recon element that does fight for info when necessary and image interpreters on a different continent. Surprised you would make such an analogy.

Fuchs

04-04-2010, 02:13 PM

Having been a recce scout, there is no similarity between a forward recon element that does fight for info when necessary and image interpreters on a different continent. Surprised you would make such an analogy.

I wrote explicitly about the service they provide to combat troops; recce info.

There's no similarity of the job between a tank driver and an infantryman either; that tells nothing about whether they're in the same group (tooth or tail) or not.

82redleg

04-04-2010, 02:41 PM

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

JMA

04-04-2010, 05:40 PM

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

OK so enter the civilian contractors. That's another story then.

The question this probably then, do the 7 actually assist each soldier to fight more effectively?

jmm99

04-04-2010, 07:52 PM

in the tooth and tail area. A brave or foolish man (perhaps being Irish accounted for it) did a study of Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R): John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations,The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 23, Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (2007). The Occasional Papers are here (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/longWarOccasionalPaperSeries.asp#title); but the .pdf link to McGrath's paper ain't a-working. :(

Strarting with the AEF in WWI, he came up with a 105 page monograph. Now, tooth to tail stuff is not Industrial Management 101 and cannot be reduced to a motion and time study. For example, he placed all of the AEF's Corps of Engineers in the combat component because (p.56, note 2):

2. The AEF maintained a force of nondivisional Corps of Engineers units consisting of 241,613 troops, representing 12 percent of the total AEF force. Categorizing this force is problematic. I have chosen to place the whole engineer element in the combat category, but undoubtedly, at least some of this force belongs in the logistical category as the engineers also maintained the railroads. However, determining what portion of the 241,613 belonged in which category would require a level of research beyond the scope of this work. The placement of the 241,613 in the combat category is, therefore noted. Accordingly, up to 13 percent of the total of combat troops could possibly be placed in the logistical category instead. See “The Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces,” 8; COL Carl Schmidt, “The Operational Slice in Two World Wars,” Military Review 31 (October 1951), 56.

However, McGrath provides his methodology throughout, and comes up with a number of charts and graphs. A comparison in the combat category over the years is found on page 103 (Table B-2. Theater Comparisons by Category):

AEF 1918 - 53%
ETO 1945 - 39%
Korea/Japan 1953 - 33%
Vietnam 1968 - 35%
Germany 1974 - 27%
KTO 1991 - 30%
Iraq 2005 (military in country only) - 40%
Iraq 2005 (incl. Kuwait & contractors) - 25%

Note these are "T3R" for theatre deployed forces, not for the Army as a whole. The 30%-70% combat to non-combat (82redleg & Ken White) pretty much hit on the head the last 2 decades of deployments.

Here is his graph showing combat % of the Army as a whole:

1064

So, here we see much lower "T3R" - as low as ~ 1:15. Perhaps that's where the 1:7 ratio derives ?

Regards

Mike

Working link to McGrath paper is here at CGSC (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf).

JMA

04-04-2010, 09:45 PM

Yes. A video and Powerpoint linked here re: 1431 Sappers in Astan (http://www.107thengineers.org/1431/AfghanInfo.asp).

That unit goes back to WWI (107th Engineers), reorganized recently to reflect combat engineering specialization and to allow deployment by individual companies (from May 2008 Bull Sheet (http://www.107thengineers.org/BullSheets/BS52-May08.pdf)):

So, combat engineers can be the tip of the spear or very much rear echelon builders - depends on the speciality and mission.

Regards

Mike

This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

JMA

04-04-2010, 10:07 PM

To answer your question, Obese about 5-10% on a guess (none morbidly so); simply overweight another 10% or so and marginally heavy about 10 more -- that means 70± % are okay. In the US population at large, we've got BIG problem (pun intended) (LINK) (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50863H20090109). That's what happens when you have too much money and too much free time. The interesting thing is that we've had the problem for about 25-30 years and got to be a laughing stock to the rest of the world -- who are now catching up. ;) (LINK) (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/hea_obe-health-obesity). In South Africa you do a bit better: LINK. (http://www.nature.com/oby/journal/v10/n10/fig_tab/oby2002141t7.html#figure-title) Also, we've already started cracking down on the excess, it was allowed to slide to keep troop numbers up with on and off deployments. now that we're able to one on and two offm the housekeeping will get caught up.

The stats you post indicate that in South Africa the white population shares the same obesity levels as the US. So what significance does that have? We are talking fat soldiers in Afghanistan here and the availability of junk food to rear echelon troops.

The 'new' South African defence force is made up of quotas of soldiers from the old forces and the various "liberation" forces. The sad fact is that the army is in a sorry state. When you put an army together on the following basis what do you expect: (not mentioned is the requirement to comprise 30% females)

"It's composition must be 34.15% ex-SADF, 24.48% civilian, 14.14% ex-MK (ANC military wing), 10.06% from former Bantustan armies, 5.5% ex-Apla (PAC military wing), 2.61% ex-IFP militia. The remaining 9.27% must consist of members who joined since April 1994."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/army.htm

Obesity is the least of the problems right now.

Ken White

04-04-2010, 11:48 PM

The stats you post indicate that in South Africa the white population shares the same obesity levels as the US. So what significance does that have? We are talking fat soldiers in Afghanistan here and the availability of junk food to rear echelon troops.I gave my guess on the troop overweight problem; I'm sure there are figures on the internet somewhere but I also see no point in searching for them as they'd change by the day.

I provided the national stats partly for comparison of the troop guess to nominal US national stats and partly to emphasize my point that 20 years ago the US had an obesity problem; the rest of the world is now catching up.

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.
The 'new' South African defence force is made up of quotas of soldiers from the old forces and the various "liberation" forces. The sad fact is that the army is in a sorry state. When you put an army together on the following basis what do you expect: (not mentioned is the requirement to comprise 30% females).No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

jmm99

04-05-2010, 01:56 AM

from JMA
This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

From Army Times, Military to combat IEDs on multiple fronts (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/army_ieds_092809w/) (from summer 2009, when the 1431 Sappers were one of several companies contributing to route clearance):

U.S. works to stem rise in Afghanistan casualties
By Michelle Tan - Staff writer
Posted : Tuesday Sep 29, 2009 15:35:12 EDT

The U.S. military is taking a multi-pronged approach to battling the rising threat of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, particularly in the southern part of the country.

“We’ve basically seen the number of IEDs double over a one-year period,” said Rear Adm. Michael Tillotson, the deputy J-3 for CentCom. “But ... we’ve [also] put a lot more forces out there also.”

There were 810 IED incidents there in August compared with 420 during the same month in 2008.
......
Of the IED incidents, 51 percent of the bombs were found and cleared, about 30 percent were effective — which means the bomb resulted in casualties or loss of equipment — and about 20 percent were ineffective, Tillotson said.
......
Route clearance packages, made up largely of engineers, explosive ordnance disposal experts and those who provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are among the types of troops the U.S. will continue to grow in Afghanistan, Tillotson said.

He added that the military has already added a battalion’s worth of EOD forces in the south and increased the number of route clearance packages.

“It’s an increase in engineers and EOD forces in order to take care of the devices,” he said. “It’s an increase in [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] to get a better idea of what the enemy is doing to ensure we’re interdicting and make sure we’re getting to the left of boom.”

So, about 50% success given 2009 IED levels and anti-IED force levels.

That being said, the SovComs also mounted a strong route clearance effort. From DoD Buzz, Afghan IEDs Hammered Soviets (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/15/afghan-ieds-hammered-soviets/#axzz0kBYwNIxP) (Dec 2009):

By Greg Grant Tuesday,
December 15th, 2009 12:17 pm

When Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced creation of yet another counter-IED Pentagon task force, he was clearly frustrated with the inability of the military, the intelligence agencies and industry to come up with answers to the simple yet devastatingly effective roadside bomb as the IED war shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan.

The number of IED “incidents” in Afghanistan, defined as IEDs either found before detonating or actual IED attacks, have jumped from around 100 a month during 2006 to over 800 a month this past summer; in August IED incidents topped 1,000. In 2006, 41 U.S. and NATO troops were killed by IEDs. So far this year, 260 coalition troops have been killed by IEDs, according to the web site icasualties.com that tracks troop casualties. IED casualties in Afghanistan don’t approach those of Iraq during the height of the fighting there when some days saw 100 IED incidents, but the trend lines are headed in the wrong direction. As more troops arrive, casualties are sure to increase.
....
Route clearance was a high priority and the Soviets sent specialized combat engineer units to Afghanistan equipped with mine sniffing dogs (that often proved effective), electronic mine detectors (which reports said didn’t work very well) and tanks fitted with mine plows, rollers and flails. Opening roads to convoys became major combat operations that involved up to a battalion’s worth of combat power, including helicopter borne units and extensive close air support. The engineers were kept busy throughout the war and became more skilled as their experience increased: in 1980, engineers cleared 1,032 mines and IEDs; in 1986, they cleared 35,650 mines and IEDs. Yet, the Mujaheddin were highly adaptive and continually created new IED tactics that remained a step ahead of the Soviet learning curve. (much more in article) ....

Thus, for every action, an opposite reaction - and so it goes. Sappers are but a partial answer.

Regards

Mike

Cavguy

04-05-2010, 04:35 AM

This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

Sort of. They clear routes so convoys can travel safer. They don't target IED cells or do COIN for the long win. But yes, we hit many less IED's because of route clearance teams.

JMA

04-05-2010, 06:55 AM

Sort of. They clear routes so convoys can travel safer. They don't target IED cells or do COIN for the long win. But yes, we hit many less IED's because of route clearance teams.

This pre-clearance of routes together with road use only when absolutely necessary is the best bet (I guess)

JMA

04-05-2010, 07:04 AM

From Army Times, Military to combat IEDs on multiple fronts (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/army_ieds_092809w/) (from summer 2009, when the 1431 Sappers were one of several companies contributing to route clearance):

So, about 50% success given 2009 IED levels and anti-IED force levels.

That being said, the SovComs also mounted a strong route clearance effort. From DoD Buzz, Afghan IEDs Hammered Soviets (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/15/afghan-ieds-hammered-soviets/#axzz0kBYwNIxP) (Dec 2009):

Thus, for every action, an opposite reaction - and so it goes. Sappers are but a partial answer.

Regards

Mike

50% success rate for the TB which translates into what in terms of loss of life and limb for the troops?

I would have thought that by now the "brass" would have applied the same level of preventive instructions for vehicle movement as they do for actions where civilians may be caught on the 'crossfire'.

Do troops on the ground have to get authority from the higher HQ before they can take a vehicle out on the road? No? Then it appears the life of a soldier is pretty cheap then.

JMA

04-05-2010, 07:14 AM

I gave my guess on the troop overweight problem; I'm sure there are figures on the internet somewhere but I also see no point in searching for them as they'd change by the day.

I provided the national stats partly for comparison of the troop guess to nominal US national stats and partly to emphasize my point that 20 years ago the US had an obesity problem; the rest of the world is now catching up.

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

And what I'm saying is that the South African defence force has enough problems with implementing quotas and dealing with rampant HIV infection that IF obesity is a problem it is a minor one in the greater scheme of things.

However, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has taken steps to deal with obesity... http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/201032384737387514.html

JMA

04-05-2010, 07:27 AM

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

Firstly lets get one thing straight I was born in South Africa and on return in 1980 from Rhodesia did 2 and a half years in the Paras (called parabats) and was happy to leave (for a variety of reasons). I have had absolutely no contact with the SADF since then and quite frankly have no interest in the direction the SADF is going. Don't think they (note the use of 'they') can get a few battalions together for peacekeeping duties (certainly not of HIV negative troops) so there is no nerve to try and tickle in that regard.

I don't expect the SADF to attend to the problems they have probably because they don't see them as problems in the first place and because the politicians probably see the army as a place to park off old "freedom fighters" where they can get paid and eventually a pension and avoid the same problem Mugabe had with his ex-combatants which precipitated the economic collapse of Zimbabwe.

But when an army is at war or it sends its young soldiers to a far off war the government and senior military staff have a 'duty of care' towards these men (and women). There is no excuse for military incompetence at the highest levels which leads to the unnecessary deaths of young men and women.

82redleg

04-05-2010, 12:17 PM

But when an army is at war or it sends its young soldiers to a far off war the government and senior military staff have a 'duty of care' towards these men (and women). There is no excuse for military incompetence at the highest levels which leads to the unnecessary deaths of young men and women.

If there is any incompetence, it is on the part of the civilian leadership that started a war without defining the endstate, moved the endstate numerous times (all without real definition- although a step in the right direction, what exactly does "destroy, disrupt and dismantle" mean) and then deliberately and consistantly under-resourced the effort and made no effort to mobilize the nation's resources.

I've never met anyone in the service that actively tried to be a screw up. Everyone is doing the best within the constraints and resources available.

Uboat509

04-05-2010, 01:06 PM

First of all, blaming Burger King and Anthony's Pizza for fat service members is like blaming Glock and Springfield Armory for violent crime. I have yet to see a service member who was forced to eat at these establishments on a regular basis nor have I seen service members repeatedly denied access to a dining facility, assuming they had their mandated reflective belts. I have also seen the food choices in the dining facility and if you are bound and determined to be a fat sack of crap then you will find plenty to assist you there. I honestly doubt that that many service members suddenly became fat while assigned to a FOB. Most of those who became fat there probably were on their way and simply found an excuse to stop doing PT.

Second, I am not sure the point of all the "tooth to tail" arguments. If you look strictly at the numbers, it's easy to draw the conclusion that we are waaaay over-supporting our troops. If, however, you look at the support being provided, it paints, in my mind at least, a different picture. Certainly there is waste and probably a good deal of fraud to go along with it but just looking at raw numbers (70%-30%)and saying that we are being wasteful is poor analysis. What would you have us drop? It's easy to point at AAFES and throw all sorts of stones, some of them deserved but how much of that 70% figure is AAFES and things like it? Let's say we get rid of all of that, what does the ratio become then? 69-31? 68-32 maybe? Now I'm not going to argue whether or not it makes financial sense to have the support ratio we do, that is well out of my lane. But how does all this support hurt the mission? And again, what would you have us get rid of?

I suspect that some people are under the impression that reducing the size of the "tail" will increase the size of the "tooth" (teeth?). That just isn't the case. You can increase the ratio of tooth to tail but increasing the actual number of "teeth" on the ground is a whole different issue. Support units are not, by and large, staffed by people who wanted to but could not get into combat arms. Less support guys on the ground does not equate to more shooters on the ground, it just means less support.

jmm99

04-05-2010, 03:47 PM

from JMA
[1] 50% success rate for the TB which translates into what in terms of loss of life and limb for the troops?

[2] I would have thought that by now the "brass" would have applied the same level of preventive instructions for vehicle movement as they do for actions where civilians may be caught on the 'crossfire'.

[3] Do troops on the ground have to get authority from the higher HQ before they can take a vehicle out on the road? No? Then it appears the life of a soldier is pretty cheap then.

First question is answered approximately in articles (post #167 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=96110&postcount=167)) for 2009. About 800 IED incidents per month, of which 30% are "effective" (military or civilian personal injury and/or property damage; out of 100% planted, 50% are neutralized and 20% are not "effective") - so, 240 "effectives" per month. About 260 Coalition KIA from IEDs for 2009 (article date 15 Dec 2009) - so, about 1 Coalition KIA from 10 "effectives". No idea as to WIAs (5x to 10x more ?).

The remainining two questions are for Cavguy or anyone else who wants to answer them.

Regards

Mike

82redleg

04-05-2010, 10:21 PM

First of all, blaming Burger King and Anthony's Pizza for fat service members is like blaming Glock and Springfield Armory for violent crime....

Second, I am not sure the point of all the "tooth to tail" arguments...

I suspect that some people are under the impression that reducing the size of the "tail" will increase the size of the "tooth" (teeth?). That just isn't the case....

Uboat, this post isn't totally directed at you, but your post made me think of it, so...

All your points are correct. Also, at least part of GEN McChrystal's decision was based on the fact that, given the limited inflow available into Afghanistan, the input required to support the myriad of AAFES concessions, etc, conflicted with the true requirements of getting the increased material needed to support the surge. Given this, I don't think any of the other discussions (tooth-v-tail, "luxury" for the large FOBs, etc) are even relevant. You have a limited supply line, you have to prioritize. First is ammo, food, water (if required), CL 8 and POL; second is the rest of the classes of supply that you need to continue to function; third is the "necessary" comforts that make a 12-15 month tour bearable (yeah, we could live like animals for that time, but why if we don't have to)- showers, CL 4 for living/working/eating area, MWR (internet/phones, gyms); everything else has to come after that, and if there is a conflict, the priority is easy to see.

JMA

04-28-2010, 07:32 PM

Uboat, this post isn't totally directed at you, but your post made me think of it, so...

All your points are correct. Also, at least part of GEN McChrystal's decision was based on the fact that, given the limited inflow available into Afghanistan, the input required to support the myriad of AAFES concessions, etc, conflicted with the true requirements of getting the increased material needed to support the surge. Given this, I don't think any of the other discussions (tooth-v-tail, "luxury" for the large FOBs, etc) are even relevant. You have a limited supply line, you have to prioritize. First is ammo, food, water (if required), CL 8 and POL; second is the rest of the classes of supply that you need to continue to function; third is the "necessary" comforts that make a 12-15 month tour bearable (yeah, we could live like animals for that time, but why if we don't have to)- showers, CL 4 for living/working/eating area, MWR (internet/phones, gyms); everything else has to come after that, and if there is a conflict, the priority is easy to see.

As they say... any fool can make himself uncomfortable. But then again the guys who make the decisions about the troops not being allowed to forget where they are would be living in comparative splendor.

JMA

05-25-2010, 08:08 PM

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan (http://yooperpage.blogspot.com/2008/11/1421st-107th-deployed-to-afghanistan.html):

and U.P. troops coming home (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?list=194550&id=380891) (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?id=426069) (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home (http://www.upnorthlive.com/news/story.aspx?id=381943):

So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

I did miss this one Mike, is this your unit?

jmm99

05-26-2010, 01:37 AM

jmm99

05-26-2010, 04:26 PM

JMA: if you were asking, am I or was I a member of the 1431 Sapppers, the answer is negative. We (or at least many of us here) still have the "small town" American view of our NG units as being all part of the family.

Cheers

Mike

JMA

05-26-2010, 06:38 PM

the 1431 Sappers are the "Copper Country's Own" (that coy based at the Calumet Armory about 10 mi North of me). The heritage goes back to the Houghton County Volunteers who fought in the Civil War. My best friend, when he retired, was acting topkick for the H&HC of the parent Bn (based at Ishpeming about 75 mi South of here).

Regards

Mike

Thanks Mike, would be interested at some point to hear how the guardsmen coped on the job after 2 mths preliminary training before jumping in the deep end.

jmm99

05-26-2010, 08:57 PM

from all appearances, in a dangerous business: 42 Purple Hearts, 26 Bronze Stars (http://www.upnorthlive.com/news/story.aspx?id=381943) (roughly 115-person unit).

A few Husky Herald newsletters give some idea of the morale (and are safe, haivng all been scanned for OpSec):

January, 2009 (http://www.107thengineers.org/1431/HuskyHerald/HuskyHeraldJan2009Edit-corrected.pdf) (Training)

March/April, 2009 (http://www.107thengineers.org/1431/HuskyHerald/Husky%20Herald%20Mar%2009.pdf) (In Country)

September, 2009 (http://www.107thengineers.org/1431/HuskyHerald/HUSKY%20HERALD%20SEPT%2009.pdf) (Tour Ending)

From the first one, CPT Tom LaFave (CO), on training:

So far the training here has gone well, we are well ahead of what I had expected when we left, and I know that we are getting better training than we had the last time we went to Iraq.

Of course, you have to realize that people from the Copper Country are like the Gurkhas who were overjoyed that parachutes would be issued for their first jump. :D

And this from one of our 2009 casualities - from Stars & Stripes, Landstuhl sees more casualties from Afghanistan than Iraq (http://www.stripes.com/news/landstuhl-sees-more-casualties-from-afghanistan-than-iraq-1.93677):

Army Staff Sgt. Derek VanBuren is just one of the 100-plus, battle-wounded troops from Afghanistan treated at Landstuhl this month.

The 29-year-old from Negaunee, Mich., suffered shrapnel wounds to his shoulders July 19 when a rocket-propelled grenade struck his Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle during a route-clearance mission in Paktika province. Also wounded in the blast were the truck’s gunner, Spc. John French, and driver Spc. David Smith, who kept pressure on VanBuren’s wound while continuing to drive.

The firefight lasted 60 minutes, VanBuren said.

VanBuren’s unit, the 1431st Engineer Company from the Michigan National Guard, got to Afghanistan in January and action began picking up in the spring, he said.

“When we got into that contact, it was very routine for us to deal with it because it’s been happening,” VanBuren said. “We’re used to it.”

As they say: Good as Done.

Regards

Mike

JMA

06-07-2010, 08:50 AM

from all appearances, in a dangerous business: 42 Purple Hearts, 26 Bronze Stars (http://www.upnorthlive.com/news/story.aspx?id=381943) (roughly 115-person unit).

I must admit that was some 'tour'!

40% wounded, 20% bravery medals. How many KIA?

I'll bet those guys have some stories to tell.

jmm99

06-07-2010, 03:39 PM

for which, everyone was thankful.

Regards

Mike

JMA

06-08-2010, 09:56 PM

for which, everyone was thankful.

Regards

Mike

No KIA?

jmm99

06-09-2010, 01:54 AM

among our sappers from their tour in Astan - repeat, zero KIAs.

Just over two dozen Michigan residents have been killed in Astan, 2002-2010 Michigan casualties in Afghanistan (http://www.freep.com/article/20080303/NEWS06/303030001/2002-2010-Michigan-casualties-in-Afghanistan). However, that list omits at least one KIA with Michigan connections. Here's the rest of that story.

Back to some ancient history. The Sapper Company and its sibling units are "descended" from the 107th Engineers, a WWI combat engineering battalion formed in 1917 on the Michigan Tech campus and officered entirely by Michigan Tech grads. Michigan Tech was then the Michigan College of Mining and Technology (now Michigan Technological University), whose mascot is the silver husky - so, the Sappers' newsletter, the "Husky Herald".

The 107th Engineers continues to the present as our NG Bn. Meanwhile, in the 1920s, a college ROTC program was started at Michigan Tech and linked to the Army Corps of Engineers. In fact, until 1974, Tech ROTC graduates were generally commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. All of this is laid out in the article, History of Military Science at MTU (http://www.armyrotc.mtu.edu/ourHistory.htm) (check out the uniforms in the photo of the 1928 cadets - perhaps, picked up used from the black & tans of Irish Civil War fame ?).

In 1975, John Hall graduated from Tech, became a colonel in the Army and fathered a son Ben. The latter (then 1LT Ben Hall (http://www.armyrotc.mtu.edu/alumni.htm)) died in Astan in 2007, from MTU Alumni Relations (http://www.mtu.edu/alumni/notables/profiles/Benjamin-Hall.html):

Benjamin Hall graduated with a bachelor's degree in social sciences. He served as the cadet battalion commander in the Tech Army ROTC program and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the US Army.

A paratrooper and an army ranger, Hall was deployed to Afghanistan with 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade. Hall was killed in action on July 31, 2007. He was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star for heroism and the Purple Heart.

Born in Texas, the son of army colonel and Tech alumnus John Hall '75, Hall moved around a lot as a child but throughout his life remained fixed on achievement. At Tech, he majored in social science and earned many awards in the ROTC program. He earned the rating of Distinguished Military Graduate, and ranked among the top cadets across the nation when he graduated.

He continued to excel while on active duty. He earned the Army's Combat Infantry Badge and Expert Infantry Badge; was one of only twenty-two soldiers in the 173rd Airborne Brigade to be awarded the title of True Blue; and was instrumental in creating a new infantry company, called Destined, in his regiment.

His family remembers him as "giving and humble - the type of guy people were drawn to." Hall is survived by his parents, two sisters, and a brother, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

In 2008, Hall's family accepted the Outstanding Young Alumni Award in his honor.

Excerpted from Michigan Tech Magazine, Fall 2008

Rest in Peace.

Mike