Do Soldiers Fight for a Cause?

[War Hammer]

Heralding S.L.A Marshall and other studies from World War II it seems that the United States Army and Western scholars have concluded that soldiers do not fight for a cause but for their brothers in battle.

Does the statement that soldiers only fight for their brothers in battle really apply to non-Western militiaries? We would be guilty of mirrior imaging if we supposed to this to be true in all cases.

In particular what does our guerrilla enemy fight for? Can we really presume that the lone suicide bomber is fighting for his bro in the foxhole next to him?

Why is that revolutionaries from Maoists to Islamists say that ideological fervor is the most important element in creating a soldier yet we deny this very premise?

Al-Suri, author of The Global Call for Islamic Resistance argues
that ideological training is the number one factor in creating a competenet Islamic soldier.

Brynjar Lia stated:


The decisive factor for successful jihadi training is the moral motivation and the desire to fight, not knowledge in the use of arms, al-Suri asserts. If the ideological program is not fully digested and the mental preparation is absent, weapons training is of no use.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1001

[Schmedlap]

I think American Soldiers join the military for a cause. Once they start getting shot at, their pack mentality sets in.

I suspect it is the same for other cultures. I don't think that is transposing our values on them. I think it is human nature for men to defend their pack. The pack identity becomes clear when one pack tries to kill the other.

[Bill Moore]

There were subsequent studies that indicated these studies were biased and didn't paint a complete picture. It was determined that U.S. Soldiers fight for a variety of reasons (ideology, revenge, peer pressure, glory, economic reasons, pack mentality, etc.) that vary person by person and as Schmedlap pointed out by time and location.

Unfortunately these studies are never questioned and they become urban legends in our force. It would be interesting to see how many other myths have shaped our policy and doctrine over the years (such as you have to have 3:1 odds when you're attacking). History tells us otherwise, but the myth persists.

[William F. Owen]

It would be interesting to see how many other myths have shaped our policy and doctrine over the years (such as you have to have 3:1 odds when you're attacking). History tells us otherwise, but the myth persists.
Myth and legend within the military could fill several books. It's actually easier to track what is based on actual evidence. Myth and legend are uniquely powerful within militaries, and a lot of thinking reflects purely myth - Manoeuvre Warfare is based on Myth. 4gw is entirely myth based.

[M-A Lagrange]

Why soldiers - now - would fight for a cause?

The ones who are actually having a real cause to defend are the insurgents. They fight for whatever reason (free a country, establish the world of god, get access to money...) but they are the ones engaging themselves for a cause.

Imposing as a axiom that Western soldiers are fighting for a cause is just part of the "political" process of justifying the use of violence by West under the philisophy of a Just War. (Do not mistake me, each and every men or women joining the army may do it for a cause, not just for scholarship or money).

Denying to the enemy the fact that he is actually fighting for a cause is just part of the process of denying him the right to be a Just Opponent.

By denying to the opponant the right to defend a cause (just or not) we are trying to denie his status of soldier and, in the best case, assimilate him to an outlaw. This process, in the end, leads to the denial of war prisoner status and the justification of unfair, unlawfull, unjust means to conduct war.

[Bill Moore]

The ones who are actually having a real cause to defend are the insurgents. They fight for whatever reason (free a country, establish the world of god, get access to money...) but they are the ones engaging themselves for a cause.

Actually there are academics that would argue this, Dave Kilcullen being one in his book "Accidental Guerrillas". Generally (and since we're not addressing a specific conflict we have to speak in generalities) there are a percentage of hard core believers on both sides, and percentage in the middle that are drug into the fight for other than ideological reasons (perhaps pay or they're coerced). Granted there normally are true believers in every insurgency, but not all.


Imposing as a axiom that Western soldiers are fighting for a cause is just part of the "political" process of justifying the use of violence by West under the philisophy of a Just War. (Do not mistake me, each and every men or women joining the army may do it for a cause, not just for scholarship or money).

Every country, every militant force must convince its followers and supporters that they're fighting for a just cause to remain politically viable. This is not simply a western trait.


Denying to the enemy the fact that he is actually fighting for a cause is just part of the process of denying him the right to be a Just Opponent.

By denying to the opponant the right to defend a cause (just or not) we are trying to denie his status of soldier and, in the best case, assimilate him to an outlaw. This process, in the end, leads to the denial of war prisoner status and the justification of unfair, unlawfull, unjust means to conduct war.

In every conflict we have used derogatory terms to define our enemy, the dehumanizaton process is important, because it loosens our moral constraints against killing them (Japs, Jerries, Gooks, Ragheads, Skinnies, etc.).

Your point about denying prisoner of war status is a sore point with many and frequently debated by law scholars and those with political agendas on both the left and the right, and I suspect no one has really come up with the right answer because laws as the west knows them are the fruit grown by States, not non-state actors. So when a non-state actor declares war on us, we're left scratching our heads and we're still trying to clarify what it means. However, it is clear to many of us we couldn't effectively fight this type of enemy within the pre-911 legal framework.

[M-A Lagrange]

there are a percentage of hard core believers on both sides, and percentage in the middle that are drug into the fight for other than ideological reasons (perhaps pay or they're coerced). Granted there normally are true believers in every insurgency, but not all.

Sorry, but we are talking about professionals in western armies. I do not deny to any of them to fight for a cause but the status of professional is by definition lower the "cause" engagement. (do not miss understand me, I am not under estimating personnal engagement).

For insurgents, the cause is the main point as they have to build the both the object/project to defend or to fight for and the means. But I agree that you can have casual insurgents but no accidental insurgencies. Their again, reducing insurgent movement to banditry is reducing the political problem that caused the people to take arms.

This is linked with the denial of the justness of the adversary cause. I do not say we have to agree with our opponants but we have to achknowledge the fact that they do have also a just cause, especially in insurgencies. Or rather, like Schmitt, that we are facing a just opponent.
The question of jus at bellum is no more relevant in actual conflicts (apart from Bin Laden hunt) as there are no more ideological confrotation.

Through colonial and prehemptive war, "the good guys" have lost the monopole of Jus. So, yes, every side has the feeling or believes they are fighting a just war for a just cause but this is based no more on moral values but on political statement. So the justness of insurgents' cause will always look moraly more attractive.


However, it is clear to many of us we couldn't effectively fight this type of enemy within the pre-911 legal framework.:mad:

However 9/11 has never been a blank check for war crimes and use of torture. Geneva Convention were and are still applicable before and after 9/11. Jus in Bello is what makes the honor of the combattant. Recognizing the adversary as a jus opponant with rights is what preserves the justness of your cause. Otherwise, there are no difference between a soldier and a criminal.

[Abu Suleyman]

There were subsequent studies that indicated these studies were biased and didn't paint a complete picture.

I have heard this a lot, but no one ever cites the studies. I don't doubt what you are saying is true, but I would like some citations if you have them.

[Bill Moore]

However 9/11 has never been a blank check for war crimes and use of torture. Geneva Convention were and are still applicable before and after 9/11. Jus in Bello is what makes the honor of the combattant. Recognizing the adversary as a jus opponant with rights is what preserves the justness of your cause. Otherwise, there are no difference between a soldier and a criminal.

My point wasn't to justify torture, but to accept that targeted killing, extra-ordinary renditions, surveillance programs, etc. that may not have been on the books as legal activities prior to 9/11 (I'm not sure), are needed tools now that need to fall within our legal framework.

Back to your point about the difference between a Soldier a criminal, not all, but many of those non-state actors we're fighting consistently engage in "criminal" acts of the worst kind against us and their own people, yet it seems they're immune from being criticized, so if in fact we're fighting criminals who not respect the laws of war, then do the laws of war apply? That has been the issue from day one as I understand it.

[Bill Moore]

I have heard this a lot, but no one ever cites the studies. I don't doubt what you are saying is true, but I would like some citations if you have them.

Abu, I am not arguing against the sound finding that unit cohesion plays a "critical" role (interpret as trust in your comrades), but it is not the sole reason that men fight. Men in cohesive units fight better.

In addition to the comments below, I would add that men join organizations where they are likely to share a common ideology. If you look at the performance of the Army in the latter years of the Vietnam conflict there were some units that had terrible discipline and combat records (Soldiers fragging their officers, desertion rates, etc.). I ain't no scientist, but I think it is because collectively as a unit they didn't believe the war (they'd lost their ideological base for fighting), and group/organizational behavior reinforced the bad discipline. The Soldiers that went into Afghanistan in 2001 were ideologically motivated and their ideology was reinforced by their comrades.

IMO men fight for a confluence of reasons, not just because their comrades are there next to them.

http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/army/a/soldiersfight_2.htm


Stouffer argued that ideology, patriotism, or fighting for the cause were not major factors in combat motivation. “Surprisingly, many soldiers in Iraq were motivated by patriotic ideals,” Wong said.

Liberating the people and bringing freedom were common themes in describing combat motivation, the report stated.

Wong credits today’s volunteer Army having “more politically savvy” soldiers as the reason for the change. He said today’s more educated soldiers have a better understanding of the overall mission and provide a “truly professional army.”

There is link at the end of the article to the actual study.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6865359.ece#


Many feel that they are risking their lives — and that colleagues have died — for a futile mission and an Afghan population that does nothing to help them, the chaplains told The Times in their makeshift chapel on this fortress-like base in a dusty, brown valley southwest of Kabul.


“We’re lost — that’s how I feel. I’m not exactly sure why we’re here,” said Specialist Raquime Mercer, 20, whose closest friend was shot dead by a renegade Afghan policeman last Friday. “I need a clear-cut purpose if I’m going to get hurt out here or if I’m going to die.”

Sergeant Christopher Hughes, 37, from Detroit, has lost six colleagues and survived two roadside bombs. Asked if the mission was worthwhile, he replied: “If I knew exactly what the mission was, probably so, but I don’t.”

[M-A Lagrange]

targeted killing, extra-ordinary renditions, surveillance programs, etc. that may not have been on the books as legal activities prior to 9/11 (I'm not sure), are needed tools now that need to fall within our legal framework.

I am not so sure, Wilf could probably give a clearer answer on that (or we may debate it angrily…), but as far as I know this is not against Geneva conventions as long as you have a lawful target. As far as I know targeted killing of combatants are not illegal and never were. Otherwise most of the commando ops would have been illegal… What is illegal and will harm your cause inside and outside is the killing of innocents or the practice of collective punishment…


if in fact we're fighting criminals who not respect the laws of war, then do the laws of war apply?

Yes the law of war applies, why should it not? :confused:
The question is not the practice of war by the opponent but your practice of war.
Denying the fact that you are bound to law of war because your opponent does not respect it would come, in a simplified way, to accept that police practice terror on citizens because criminals do.
The law of war is not only protecting the opponent or the civilian, it is also (and it comes from) the honourable way to practice violence as a soldier. The first attempt of modern law of war has been to protect soldiers. Going back to council de trente in middle age, the first European written law of war has been to restrict the use of arbalests as it was a too powerful weapon that was too harmful for the combatants… The Oxford and then after La Haye law of war have for aim to protect combatants from immoral weapons. First Geneva Convention (before 1949) is based on the observation of the absence of rescue for wounded soldiers. The 1949 Geneva Convention and additional Protocols are protecting incapacitated soldiers, prisoner first. Then they are extendent to civilian population among war and to non state combatants.
But a just way to practice war does not warranty that you are fighting for a just cause.

The just cause is linked to the moral stake you are defending. Modern wars, especially small wars (not even talking of COIN, the only reference of COIN to a jus cause is Laurence d’Arabie), are based on political statement of what is a jus cause. This comes mainly from WWII in which the jus cause was clearly established.
But also, it comes from the criminalisation of war.
If war is a crime, it is no more the violent opposition between two (or more) jus hostis (just opponents) but the opposition of a defender of the “Right/Law” against a criminal. In COIN this is clearly counter productive. As long as you undermine you adversary with denying him the respect due to combatant, then you are building heros. They even can start without a cause and end up, like Zapata, as symbols of freedom…


“Surprisingly, many soldiers in Iraq were motivated by patriotic ideals,”

Patriotism is a cause, for sure. But it does not make it a just cause.


“more educated soldiers have a better understanding of the overall mission and provide a “truly professional army.”

Then the cause has to be just otherwise you have in fact a bench of genius monkeys. Or you have trained people that have been cheated and the day they realise they are being taken for donkeys you are in deep troubles.

[William F. Owen]

I am not so sure, Wilf could probably give a clearer answer on that (or we may debate it angrily…), but as far as I know this is not against Geneva conventions as long as you have a lawful target. As far as I know targeted killing of combatants are not illegal and never were.

I am in no way qualified to answer the question as to legality. JMM has got to be the man on that one.

I would also suggest that sometimes, you need to kill more than just combatants. Political leaderships being one, and unarmed (woman with a cell-phone) reconnaissance being another.

[Bill Moore]

I am in no way qualified to answer the question as to legality. JMM has got to be the man on that one.

I would also suggest that sometimes, you need to kill more than just combatants. Political leaderships being one, and unarmed (woman with a cell-phone) reconnaissance being another.

It is your straight shooting common sense that I love, but eventually I intend to sell you some IW stuff :D.

Getting back to the real issue, you hit the nail on the head once again, and thus supported (probably unintentionally) my argument that our current targeting focus, which is focused on the militants and the bomb makers is far from complete. We need to identify the underground political structure and neutralize it with equal priority, to include their propagandists.


The question is not the practice of war by the opponent but your practice of war.

I disagree, the Geneva Convention is an "agreement" between potential warring parties; sort of a quid pro quo thing. I realize there are rules of law beyond the Geneva Convention, but if your enemy fails to follow anything resembling a set of rules of conduct (murdering civilians intentionally, using human shields, terrribly mutating their prisoners, etc.), then why are we obligated to treat them like Soldiers? I'm not advocating whole sale slaughter or torture, but simply that they haven't earned the right of being treated like a legal combatant.

I got you, we did some stupid stuff on "rare" occassions, and of course those events were magnified in the media a 1,000 fold. You would think the undisciplined kids in Abu Grab (sp?) reflected the majority of our military instead the aberration that it actually was.

The first casualty of war is the truth, and this is just one example.

I'm not an advocate for torture, or even abuse, but I am an advocate for killing those non-shooting insurgents/terrorists who post videos on the web that inflame hate and recruitment to the radical side as much as I support killing those who are emplacing IEDs. Those videos translate into lethal fires over time.


Then the cause has to be just otherwise you have in fact a bench of genius monkeys. Or you have trained people that have been cheated and the day they realise they are being taken for donkeys you are in deep troubles.

With the exception of your use of "monkeys" I agree, and I think we experienced that in Vietnam, and perhaps other conflicts. In Afghanistan our cause is trust (our methods may be off track, but the reason we're there is beyond question).

I realize the media circus undermines our efforts in any conflict. When the conflict is new, all the reporters are patriots and report on the great things we're doing, but after awhile that isn't news worthy and the angle of the story changes (they're looking for dirt). At the same time they start ignoring the atrocities that our enemy commits on a daily basis. IMO this is a key reason we don't well in long conflicts.

I don't think the media does it intentionally, but rather they focus on the negative because the negative is "news", and by definition the news is a current event (relative term) that stands out from the norm. If the audience would understand that what they're seeing is aberrations and that is why it is being reporting we wouldn't have the perception that the U.S. military is out of control and breaking the law.

On the other hand, the fact that terrorists commit atrocities on a daily basis isn't news, so it doesn't get reported. If a terrorist risked his/her life to same an innocent civilian that would be news worthy. The asymmetry is there for everyone to see if they would just look.

There are none so blind as those who won't see (Italian philosopher).

[M-A Lagrange]

I am in no way qualified to answer the question as to legality.
Sorry Wilf if I brought you in the debate for a bad reason. Though you may have something to say.


With the exception of your use of "monkeys" I agree
Sorry, it is a literal translation of a French expression to say that you understand. No offense.



I disagree, the Geneva Convention is an "agreement" between potential warring parties; sort of a quid pro quo thing. I realize there are rules of law beyond the Geneva Convention, but if your enemy fails to follow anything resembling a set of rules of conduct (murdering civilians intentionally, using human shields, terrribly mutating their prisoners, etc.), then why are we obligated to treat them like Soldiers? I'm not advocating whole sale slaughter or torture, but simply that they haven't earned the right of being treated like a legal combatant.

Geneva Convention are not conventions between fighters. They are conventions on how to conduct war. The fact that the opponent does not follow them is not a reason to not follow it as US or other government who ratified the GC are bound to respect the GC. And after, it is a question of your honour as a soldier that is at stake. You have to disobey an unlawful order, in the letter and the spirit. (Raw translation of French soldier manual). I believe that you have the same.

The question you address is in fact the recognition of the opponent as a jus hostis: a lawful enemy. But still, as I said previously, it is not because delinquents are not following the law that police has the right to break it. It is all the point in the “humanitarian” conduct of war. I would rather say the Human way to conduct war. (if it is possible)


I am an advocate for killing those non-shooting insurgents/terrorists who post videos on the web that inflame hate and recruitment to the radical side as much as I support killing those who are emplacing IEDs.


Political leaderships being one, and unarmed (woman with a cell-phone) reconnaissance being another.

Here the distinction between lawful target and unlawful target takes all its sense. A woman doing recognition ops is a lawful target just as a spy (consider the spy status is defined and law applicable to them in GC). A child soldier is a lawful target. The boy carrying the gun of his dad on the way to an attack is more unclear but on a pure legal point: it is not a lawful target. (How to make the difference? Good question, especially under fire)
But on the other hand the propagandists are civilians if they do not conduct active recruitment. The reporters are not lawful targets and are protected by laws and GC. Why should it be different for the enemy? The question is all about active participation in a military operation. Hosting people when you do not know they are enemies does not make you a criminal. Organising the rest and recover of enemies makes you an active actor of the conflict. Killing is may be not the best solution.

Killing politicians is even less clear. If you kill a political or religious leader, then you recognise them as combatants. So you cannot claim that it is unlawful to target your politicians and religious leaders or opinion makers. Then you open the Pandora box for civilian killing.
If the cause you are defending is justice… Then you are counter productive. If you catch them and trial them, then you are more productive as you show that you practice what you defend.

[William F. Owen]

....but eventually I intend to sell you some IW stuff :D.
...and I intend to resist you! :)


We need to identify the underground political structure and neutralize it with equal priority, to include their propagandists.
Concur absolutely. War is a setting forth of policy, so killing those making policy is entirely logical. Killing the IO and Cyber weenies is the best way to counter IO and Cyber Ops - if you think they need countering!


Sorry Wilf if I brought you in the debate for a bad reason. Though you may have something to say.

No apology necessary. I do have things to say, but I tend (not always) to limit my pontificating to subjects where I feel I have some relative area of expertise.

[M-A Lagrange]

No apology necessary. I do have things to say, but I tend (not always) to limit my pontificating to subjects where I feel I have some relative area of expertise.

I smell some kind of mockery... Especially from a man who was most probably on the other side of the front during summer 2006.
I served as private during some time and made the choice to joint the relief side.
Spending 10 years in war zones conducting emergency operations in the worst dirty wars is all about engagement.
I have seen the blue helmet doing nothing and let civilian being killed because they did not feel their engagement as soldiers was to respect their mission or mandate (What ever you call it). On relief side the choice of engagement for a cause is even lower. I watched the same idiots crying for military protections and endangering populations by conducting stupid relief operations for budgetary reasons.

The question of Jus is all what is left now days for those who want to have an active positive role in war (either as soldiers or relief workers).
As the causes defended (even in humanitarian field) are more than questionable nowadays, then what is left is the way you conduct your operations.
If the cause you defend is defended through unjust actions then you loose the political battle and your cause is no more just. (Would that not echoes Clausewitz statement on the aim of war?)
Respect of laws of war is applicable not only for soldiers but were first made to protect soldiers. And engagement as soldier is all about protection in the end; isn’t it?
Otherwise, being a soldier or a relief worker is just being one variable in a Jomini arithmetic calculation. And then cause of engagement is an empty question.

[slapout9]

Getting back to the real issue, you hit the nail on the head once again, and thus supported (probably unintentionally) my argument that our current targeting focus, which is focused on the militants and the bomb makers is far from complete. We need to identify the underground political structure and neutralize it with equal priority, to include their propagandists.



Exactly, when you attack the enemy as a system you will win.....if you don't you want! Some of the first attacks against Pablo Escabar(can't spell:) were his attorneys/judges and bankers and their homes and fancy cars, anyone and anything used to support him was subject to end up on a target list.

[jmm99]

and thanks for the plug:


from Wilf:
I am in no way qualified to answer the question as to legality. JMM has got to be the man on that one.

but right now I'm suffering from a bit of "burn out" on questions "COIN" and the applicability of the Laws of War and Rule of Law to "COIN".

I can spot the issues (of which there are many): but I also am somewhat overwhelmed by the confusion of "answers". For the most part, I've tried to report the various "rules" as they are developing and the cases as they have been decided, without an attempt to develop a cohesive system.

A large problems-solutions set area involves "transitions" - that is, situations where the Laws of War and Rule of Law switch - sometimes seemingly on a dime. We know the basic priniciples - the definition of the "enemy" and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (the latter in general as the "people", but also more specifically as to distinguishing between enemy combatants and enemy non-combatants).

Yes, an enemy combatant is the guy who is shooting at you; but how do you stop him before he gets into that position - or before he sets the IED. Those are both military and legal questions; and, unless the answers are on the same page, we will continue to see contradictions which will lead to good people getting killed. That is one "transition" situation of many.

We probably could use a seminar on the interfaces between military (and paramilitary, including law enforcement) operations and "the law" (whether Laws of War or Rule of Law) in terms of guerrilla warfare and the larger political infrastructure that supports its guerrilla fighters - and on the many "transitions" that can occur in that context.

Best to all

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Yes, an enemy combatant is the guy who is shooting at you; but how do you stop him before he gets into that position - or before he sets the IED. Those are both military and legal questions; and, unless the answers are on the same page, we will continue to see contradictions which will lead to good people getting killed. That is one "transition" situation of many.

We probably could use a seminar on the interfaces between military (and paramilitary, including law enforcement) operations and "the law" (whether Laws of War or Rule of Law) in terms of guerrilla warfare and the larger political infrastructure that supports its guerrilla fighters - and on the many "transitions" that can occur in that context.

jmm99, thanks for your input, but if I interpreted your post correctly you're stating there is considerable gray area in the legal domain, so I ask you and your legal friends to be sympathetic, better yet empathetic, with the men and women who are on point fighting this war. They can't get clear answers in a timely manner on their left and right limits to determine what is and isn't permissiable by law (who's law, what law, but wait, we have another law that allows this...).

Somewhere there is also the unwritten law of common sense, I think we were all familiar with it at one time. If you know where we misplaced it please let me know. :rolleyes:

[Kiwigrunt]

Somewhere there is also the unwritten law of common sense, I think we were all familiar with it at one time. If you know where we misplaced it please let me know. :rolleyes:

Here (http://annewhitfield.blogspot.com/2007/12/london-times-obituary-of-late-mr-common.html) are the remains.....:mad:

[M-A Lagrange]

They can't get clear answers in a timely manner on their left and right limits to determine what is and isn't permissiable by law (who's law, what law, but wait, we have another law that allows this...).

There are in deed few grey areas in law of war. You have the 1907 La Haye law of war + disarmament treaties + Geneva Convention and additional protocols. That is all! And it is enough. US laws are not recognised internationally, it is a fact. After you can play on the weapons you use like Israel but I would not advise to risk too much on that side.

Then comes the judgements of international court for Yougoslavia, Rwanda and the Court of Rome… Their articles, especially the Status of Rome gives the definition of their jurisdiction and mandate. (Definition of a war crime, genocide, crime against humanity...). And previous judging will tell you where lies the responsibility of the soldier and the commander during operation. One of them even states and gives the juridical definition of what is a conflict.

The basic is the definition of a combatant is: an organised group of armed persons with a chain of command. No need of uniform, no need of doctrine, political statement or what ever. The simple thing is that does apply to all is war zone. You are conducting military operations: then you are in a war zone. You are conducting a civilian counter terrorist operation: then you are in a civilian zone. It is quick and short but if you have this in mind, then it helps a lot to avoid doing stupid stuff.

The problem comes to unarmed active supporters. They do not fall under the definition of combatant. They fall under Geneva Conventions as civilians to be treated with respect but, as stated in the Geneva Convention: civilian judiciary still applies.
Someone that is conducting active intelligence or logistical support to insurgents or terrorist groups or bandits is accountable in front of a civil trial.
Also, the active participation of civilian and mercenaries are included into Geneva conventions.
As I said previously, killing the person is not forbidden as you may extend the definition of active participation to military operation but could be counter productive. But putting such people on trial offers them a tribune, you will react. Yes and that is the point because it also gives you a tribune to show that you do respect rule of law (what you are fighting for, your cause).
Common sense as a lot to do here. You kill a woman with 10 kids because one of them (including the woman) is giving details on your movements… Then the symbol is worst than the benefits. You arrest the one that is involved (including the woman) then the benefits and the symbol are on your side.

But I would agree with Slapout 9: targeting the physical properties is easier and much easier to handle legally.
But here again, you destroy the computers of a cybercafé... fine. You kill all the heads of cattle of a family/village... Not fine. You cannot destroy what is the basic source of survival of people. Also, this will be interpreted as collective punishment which is banned by GC + Law of War.
Israel applied that policy (more or less...) concerning palestinian state capacity to function. They did destroy physically all walls, computers, chairs, tables...
Common sense again… Make sure the symbol stay on your side. Closing a shop with legal documentation and having immediate presentation to a judge with hard evidence will have a deeper positive impact than destroying the place.
I would say that for civilian, the statement 10-2=20 does also apply. As simple as that.
And do not forget that where ever you are, the domestic laws of the host country are the one which will apply first after Geneva Convention and La Haye law of war.

[War Hammer]

I think the main difference here is that the insurgent movement trains its fighter to be ideologically motivated and in the political goal for which he is fighting. And the ideological training takes up a substantial portion of the training. How much political or ideological training do Western or COIN soldiers get?

I think the Taliban has survived this long because of their ideological training and belief in the cause for that they are fighting. I like this quote from Professional Soldiers forum

"Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home.
He knows only The Cause.

Still want to quit?"

NousDefionsDoc
www.professionalsoldiers.com

[jmm99]

An excellent quote from a QP. And, an equally good question by you:


How much political or ideological training do Western or COIN soldiers get?

as to which, I also would like to see an answer and some discourse.

My follow up question would be: Positing the premise that the political effort is an important effort in the total "COIN" picture , who is to execute that effort ?

And, a followup to the followup: In concrete terms, of what should that political effort consist ?

--------------------------

Some have said 80% political, 20% military. My personal view (somewhat legally, but not legalistically, oriented) is that we must deal with a spectrum, as here illustrated:

947

Here is a fill in the blamks matrix, which may be useful:

948

Cheers

Mike

[Bill Moore]

In the case of the U.S. assisting another nation, you would have to develop a matrix for each player, the HN, coalition members, U.S. forces, and the various insurgent groups for a decision maker.

I want to play with your matrix using a couple of different countries (I'll get back with you), because I think it can be useful to identify relevant strengths and weaknesses that need to be addressed.

I think I could make an argument that the U.S. is weakest at the operational, and especially the strategic level, when it comes to the moral (cultural) and mental (political) aspects of the current conflicts we're in. The policy folks that carelessly push democracy, liberal human rights agendas, free markets, and other behavioral changes upon societies that consider these ideas offensive, apparently don't consider he consequences of their actions to determine if they're effective or not, but those of us who have to push these agendas know full well how they create an additional degree of destabilization.

Perhaps surprisingly at the militarily I think we think we have a better appreciation at the strategic level, since at the tactical level we're generally victorious, but we don't understand that has those victories have little to do with achieving our objectives in this conflict (at least with the strategy we have been using). It is hard to grasp that strategically you're in a rough spot, when you just finished conducting your fourth successful raid in one week.

I look at our enemy in one country (neither Iraq or Afghanistan) and I can see they have no capability at the strategic level and very little at the operational level, and at the tactical level they have lost the moral and mental high ground, yet they hang in there? Something to do with family ties, something to do with corruption at every level, something to do with a poorly trained and equipped military force that can't or won't finish the fight, and other factors. The matrix is helpful, but it is only that.

[jmm99]

Exactly:


In the case of the U.S. assisting another nation, you would have to develop a matrix for each player, the HN, coalition members, U.S. forces, and the various insurgent groups for a decision maker.

I want to play with your matrix using a couple of different countries (I'll get back with you), because I think it can be useful to identify relevant strengths and weaknesses that need to be addressed.

That would be great. And, agreed on this:


The matrix is helpful, but it is only that.

Regards

Mike

[MikeF]

In the case of the U.S. assisting another nation, you would have to develop a matrix for each player, the HN, coalition members, U.S. forces, and the various insurgent groups for a decision maker.


Someone in the Phillipines (JSOTF or PACOM) already did that to figure out a general measure of when and how to interdict. X axis was skill of the military (low to high). Y axis was will of the military (low to high). Depending on where the country's assessment fell, a commander could determine the appropriate mission.

For example,

1. Great Britain- High, High. We conduct joint training exercises with them to enhance BOTH militaries.

2. Phillipines- Medium, Medium. We conduct FID.

3. Iraq- Low, Low. We conduct occupation OR we decide not to engage b/c of cost-benefit analysis.

Mike

[slapout9]

In the case of the U.S. assisting another nation, you would have to develop a matrix for each player, the HN, coalition members, U.S. forces, and the various insurgent groups for a decision maker.

I want to play with your matrix using a couple of different countries (I'll get back with you), because I think it can be useful to identify relevant strengths and weaknesses that need to be addressed.

I think I could make an argument that the U.S. is weakest at the operational, and especially the strategic level, when it comes to the moral (cultural) and mental (political) aspects of the current conflicts we're in. The policy folks that carelessly push democracy, liberal human rights agendas, free markets, and other behavioral changes upon societies that consider these ideas offensive, apparently don't consider he consequences of their actions to determine if they're effective or not, but those of us who have to push these agendas know full well how they create an additional degree of destabilization.

Perhaps surprisingly at the militarily I think we think we have a better appreciation at the strategic level, since at the tactical level we're generally victorious, but we don't understand that has those victories have little to do with achieving our objectives in this conflict (at least with the strategy we have been using). It is hard to grasp that strategically you're in a rough spot, when you just finished conducting your fourth successful raid in one week.

I look at our enemy in one country (neither Iraq or Afghanistan) and I can see they have no capability at the strategic level and very little at the operational level, and at the tactical level they have lost the moral and mental high ground, yet they hang in there? Something to do with family ties, something to do with corruption at every level, something to do with a poorly trained and equipped military force that can't or won't finish the fight, and other factors. The matrix is helpful, but it is only that.

Bill Lind uses that matrix in his lectures on 4GW. Talks about it a lot in some of his post on DNI.

[jmm99]

Could you supply links to items discussed if you have them somewhat readily on hand. RSVP.

Thanks

Mike

[MikeF]

Could you supply links to items discussed if you have them somewhat readily on hand. RSVP.

I'll have to dig it up. I'm off to watch "Men who stare at goats," so find your zen and maybe I can send it to you telepathicaly.

[jmm99]

Your mind is linked via my version of Vulcan telepathy - nothing particularly odd that I've found so far. ;)

That being said, you owe us a non-telepathic review of that movie in its thread.

Have fun at the theatre.

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Mike F,


Someone in the Phillipines (JSOTF or PACOM) already did that to figure out a general measure of when and how to interdict. X axis was skill of the military (low to high). Y axis was will of the military (low to high). Depending on where the country's assessment fell, a commander could determine the appropriate mission.

Mike, every JSOTF and JTF has their models for determining where to inderdict, but I think the matrix that JMM proposed is not so much a targeting tool, but rather a tool to help provide context and identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various players. To some extent that will help inform the targeting process, but I think it is bigger than a targeting model. More to follow, but I want to use historical cases rather than ongoing missions to avoid potential OPSEC damage.

[slapout9]

Could you supply links to items discussed if you have them somewhat readily on hand. RSVP.

Thanks

Mike

Mike, try this link and then use their search thread. Lind has a lot of material there. The one I was thinking of dealt with a lecture to The Royal Marines if I remember correctly, but you should be able to find something there.

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/

[MikeF]

Mike, every JSOTF and JTF has their models for determining where to inderdict, but I think the matrix that JMM proposed is not so much a targeting tool, but rather a tool to help provide context and identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various players. To some extent that will help inform the targeting process, but I think it is bigger than a targeting model. More to follow, but I want to use historical cases rather than ongoing missions to avoid potential OPSEC damage.

Bill,

No OPSEC or targeting tool here- just a heuristic tool to better understand FID/SFA. I should have been more explicit about that. I only mentioned the unit b/c it wasn't my original thought.

I like it b/c it helps visualize what you need to do. For instance, will you just conduct training of units in rear areas? Will you deploy forward to assist with command and control? Will you combat advise and follow in with the indigenous force clearing the room?

Lots of variables to consider.

Mike

[jmm99]

Bill Lind definitely discusses the same kind of matrix in e.g., his "FMs", 2009 fmfm_1-a.pdf & 2009 fmfm_3-25_counterinsurgency.pdf - both at DNI. It may go back to Boyd for all I know. I didn't source it when I saved it.

In any event, it's pretty generic and it's what's put into the boxes that counts.

The colored Political-Military Struggle chart is my concoction. The idea came from a cartoon on a long-term Dow chart showing the Bear and the Bull wrestling.

[slapout9]

Bill Lind definitely discusses the same kind of matrix in e.g., his "FMs", 2009 fmfm_1-a.pdf & 2009 fmfm_3-25_counterinsurgency.pdf - both at DNI. It may go back to Boyd for all I know. I didn't source it when I saved it.

In any event, it's pretty generic and it's what's put into the boxes that counts.

The colored Political-Military Struggle chart is my concoction. The idea came from a cartoon on a long-term Dow chart showing the Bear and the Bull wrestling.

jmm99, I have know idea who the source is either. Just new Lind talked about it and had some experience with it. But as you say it is what goes in the box that matters.

[Dayuhan]

There are some fundamental differences between the insurgent and a soldier in a western army, and they have an obvious impact on motivation.

An insurgent generally signs up to fight in a specific fight - the one going on in his area. Whether his primary motivation is ideological, religious, financial, etc, he knows when he signs up what fight he'll be fighting.

The Western soldier joins an army that could be deployed to any number of places in the world in the service of any number of causes. The causes we fight for today may not be the causes we fight for tomorrow... beyond generalities like "fighting for your country", western armies fight for whatever cause their government decides to send them to fight for, causes that may at sometimes be less than obvious or less than compelling to the individual soldier. This would have a fairly obvious impact on cause identification in a western army, it seems to me.

[War Hammer]

Dayuhan good point about the Western soldier having to deployed for multiple causes.

For the most part I believe Western armies are taught that men fight for their brothers in battle and not causes. Our enemy trains to fight for a cause. What makes for this discrepancy?

Here is another question. Why do the "Band of Brothers" idealists and SLA Marshall followers fall over themselves when anyone suggests that soldiers do fight for a cause? Who is S.L.A. Marshall to say that the Viet Cong didn't fight for a cause because he interviewed WW2 American vets in Europe who say that they didn't.

I'm not saying there is anything wrong with the "band of brothers" mentality. Rather that there is much evidence that needs to be considered.

S.L.A. Marshall and others never interviewed Evans Carlson's 2nd Raiders Battalion which was ideologically motivated. The 2nd Raiders training ideology flies in the face of everything that the "Band of Brothers" mentality espoused by S.L.A. Marshall. The brotherly bond of the 2nd Raiders was made stronger by their GUNG HO political meetings which were modeled after the Red Chinese self-criticism meetings.

[War Hammer]

Institutionally guerrillas spend a vast majority of training time on ideologically training. This probably goes for the guerrilla that focuses on direct action (i.e. not mobilizing the populace) to those that do focus on mobilizing the population (i.e. Maoist guerrillas).

The West does not. Institutionally we cannot even begin to say we politically train our soldiers on a top down or even bottom up way in the political goal of the war. Evans Carlson to al-Suri in "Global Call to Jihad" have stated that ideologically motivated guerrillas spend a large amount of time training in the political goal of the war.

The secret here lies in the Clausewitzian trinity. The political goal, the reasonable object of the war, unleashes the hatred and animosity in the people. The political goal of the French Revolution unhinged the political fanaticism of the French populace brought all of their destructive power into war.

Why else were the Marxists so attracted to Clausewitz? For he told the secret of the creative nature of war, the power of the people, to create new forms of war that could destroy capitalist institutions. This is what the Red Chinese refer to as the "Spiritual Atom Bomb." The unleashing of the inner spiritual power of war that exists in all human beings. At least thats what the Red Chinese and Vietnamese believed.

A lowly Chinese or Vietnamese farmer, powerless, against oppressive capitalism will become a true soldier when he realizes the political goal of the war. Then all of his energy will be concentrated on destroying the enemy (as all of his thought process is concentrated on the political of the war). Using this same logic we could say that a Taliban fighter unleashes his inner hatred by realizing the political goal of the war. By unleashing his inner hatred, he unleashes his inner creativity to fight and he is motivated to do nothing but fight the war.

Consider these two quotes from SLA Marshall and Evans Carlson


Men do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let their comrades down.General S.L.A. Marshall


Hope for glory will carry some men a long way in battle; pride in the outfit and the desire not to let your buddies down is an even more important force; but the force which impels men to carry on when the going is tough and victory appears to be remote is a deep spiritual conviction in the righteousness of the cause for which he fights...
Brigadier General Evans Carlson U.S.M.C.

[M-A Lagrange]

I was willing to open a new threat but I thought this wuld just fit in that one.

Reading Chaliand Strategy and civilization, it came to me that the common point of various military domination cross history has been, part from weaponry, has always been cohesion.
From Antiquity to WWII, history shows that most of the most efficient armies were based on cohesion. Spartans could count on the guy next to them as he was the neighbor. So could the Suisse carre. This was transcended through the French Revolution and the conscription leading to national armies and the blood bath of WWI and II. The liberation wars were based on the right of people to be free but also on the raise of national identity or, as some would like in the case of African wars, a "racial" identity (Sedar Shengor negritude).
Some how, it seems to me that professional armies always had a counter productive impact on the long run as they loose this feeling of group based on shared identity.
21st century is defectively characterized in western warfare by professional armies. At the opposite, opponents, insurgents as we call them nowadays, are characterized by non professional armies but by strong sense of common identity.
Difficulties faced in Iraq or A-stan seems somehow coming from this lost of identity perception from West.
My first gut feeling is that coalitions do not have common identity nor have pluri-national military organizations as NATO despite having a comon cause.
I do experiment it on daily base through the UN system. Out of the basic UN critic, I feel that it is mainly based on the difficulty, if not impossibility, to achieve cohesion due to the lack of identity. A gap that cause does not replace or compensate.


I really wonder how this community perceives the impact of professionalism vs group/national identity in today and future engagements.

[Bob's World]

Sometimes I wish that every time someone with a Ph.D. or a Star said the word "Ideology" that a stun gun would go off in their shorts. A kind of IAIED (ignorance activated improvised electrical devise).

Why has the insurgency in Afghanistan lasted so long...why do insurgents fight. Because they have all been indoctrinated at "Taliban University"? We need to give these people some credit. They are no more brainwashed auto matrons than we are.

At the lower level, the rank and file, they appear to me based on what I see here today, the people I talk to, and what I have read about the past couple of thousand years of history of these people in this land is that they fight because they belong here and we don't, and we are here, and they also get paid an honest wage to fight us. This is not rocket science. (Ok, everyone out there who just thought "oh yeah, what about the Islamism ideology", please imagine a stun gun going off in your shorts.)

At the higher end, there are those who are on the "ins" in this country, and those who are on the "outs." If you are in the “ins”, you get to place people in the high positions that control influence, power and money. If you are on the” outs”, you get the scraps. Your family gets the scraps; your tribe gets the scraps. So there will always be those on the “outs” who are looking for their opportunity to get on the “ins”. This may happen when an invading Army rolls into town, and you hitch yourself to that army. It has happened over and over again. Or, if you were on the “ins”, and were put on the “outs” by the invading army you look for cracks to chip away at. A great crack to chip away at is if the new government does not possess a legitimacy recognized by the portion of the populace on the outs. Now, they all want on the “ins”, so you don't have to sell this too hard. Besides, there is an invader in your country and he doesn't belong here and you do.

So, what do you do about this?

First, recognize that there are those on the “ins” and those on the “outs” and they are all looking to either cling to being on the “ins” team, or are looking to get off of the “outs” team. And they will tell you whatever you want to hear to make that happen.

Second, look for chinks and fix them. First and foremost is the legitimacy of the “ins” government. Just because it is 'official' is not good enough. Just because you held elections is not good enough. You have to honestly ask " is it legitimate on terms that mean something to THIS populace?" (Hint, the current government is not perceived as legitimate by anyone, yet alone the "outs" team). Find what means something to this populace and employ it. It may mean that the teams adjust. That's ok, they adjust all the time. Just swallow your pride and work with whoever the new, legitimate "ins" team is.

Third. Reduce your presence. Don't surge, don’t retreat, just go home. Not everyone, but enough so that it is clear that you are not here to occupy or manipulate the place.

Three steps to address "why they fight."

Ideology is like COG theory. Its great fun to think and argue about, but in the end it isn't so important what it is, just that you have thought about it and have one that works.

(Note: No Ph.D.s or Flag officers were harmed in the writing of this post.)

[M-A Lagrange]

Sometimes I wish that every time someone with a Ph.D. or a Star said the word "Ideology" that a stun gun would go off in their shorts. A kind of IAIED (ignorance activated improvised electrical devise).

Why has the insurgency in Afghanistan lasted so long...why do insurgents fight. Because they have all been indoctrinated at "Taliban University"? We need to give these people some credit. They are no more brainwashed auto matrons than we are.

At the lower level, the rank and file, they appear to me based on what I see here today, the people I talk to, and what I have read about the past couple of thousand years of history of these people in this land is that they fight because they belong here and we don't, and we are here, and they also get paid an honest wage to fight us. This is not rocket science. (Ok, everyone out there who just thought "oh yeah, what about the Islamism ideology", please imagine a stun gun going off in your shorts.)

(Note: No Ph.D.s or Flag officers were harmed in the writing of this post.)

Dear Bob, (If I may call you bob)

You are very much right. There are no Taliban University. Just as there are no Insurgent University or Rebel University or War Spoilers University. One thing you do point out is that those poeple have support from population. Therefore there is a great cohesion among them.
"Us" (I mean the West in general) are not supported by anyone. How many times did some of us have to re-explain to the just newly arrived guy that: yes he/she is right but he/she does not get the context, the micro level problematic... And then spoils everything because you just can't count on him, not as a person, but as a support a reinforcement of what you are doing and what has been done. Basically "Our" action does not have any kind of cohesion as you reinvent and re explain hot water everyday internally.
Basically, my observation in the field is that so many times we do share a cause (what ever that cause is) but we do not have cohesion. (I do not want even to enter in the debate of is that cause is right or wrong)

My theoritical question (and I believe this is the right place to ask it as it is the theory and futurist threat place), is does that impact us? Is cause enough to bring cohesion?
All of us are great professionals and profesionnal armies do have great cohesion inside, no doubt on that.
But there is a poor cohesion in between each countries, between civilians and military, between corps...
On the other hand, as you pointed out, there is a great cohesion on the opponent side not just because they share a cause but because they share more: history, land, culture... They belong there. They are a group with "natural" cohesion.

And by extension, the question is: does professionalisation of the armies not increase the distance between the people and the fighters (in a large sense) and finaly ends up being counter productive ?
My first impression is that there is more cohesion in the opponant side as they know they do have support from population while there is less cohesion among coalitions (and I am not speaking only about A-stan or Iraq, the problematic is the same in DRC, Sudan or Lebanon) as there is less support from population to the cause. Hezbollah fighters do have the support of their population. While UN troops in DRC do not have the support of their populations and therefore, even if they share a cause, there is less cohesion among the UN troops than the peace spoilers.

PS: no private or low ranked officers have been harmed in the writting of this post neither have been PhD or flag officers.
But I will remember Bob's wish if ever I get to a flag officer or PhD level...

[Bob's World]

A few thoughts.

1. If one desires the support of the populace, one must first support the populace.
(This is true at home and abroad. So go where the populace at home believes you need to go to accomplisth things it believes must be accomplished; and then do them in a manner that is acceptable to the populace of the place you are at.)

2. Every state, organization, individual, etc has "interests." Our friends are those who we have the most shared interests with as individuals. Not so different as countries. But when the most powerful member of the group either starts believing or demanding that his interests are the ones that everyone else must buy into as well, it creates friction.
(The US is bruising and abusing relationships by demanding the pursuit of interests linked to retaining that most powerful status. Those who see it in there interest to be friends with the most powerful will compromise other interests that they have to support that one interest to a point. But there is always a breaking point on this. Popular friction at home often drives that breaking point)

3. Are professional (regular) militaries less of a bell weather of the populace as a whole than unprofessional (irregular) militaries are? Certainly. At the end of the day the professional soldier goes where he is told to go, and does what he is told to do. It is his job. The irregular soldier was either forced against his will to participate (by draft or threat of violence), or was willing to set family and job aside for a period of time to serve for a particular purpose. At the end of the day his job is back at home doing other things. Pros and Cons to both. America has a tremendous Regular force today; no arguments about it. It is augmented by a very professional irregular force. America also has a tremendous history of warfighting with what was primarily an irregular force (pre-Cold War). Is a Marine or Soldier who left all behind "just" to go fight a war less of a Marine or Soldier than one who makes a career out of that Profession? Is a professional Marine or Soldier less of a citizen than the Marine or Soldier who works a civilian profession until such time as a crisis calls for his service? I think no on both counts. But they are different.

4. Home teams always have the advantage; even when playing a good road team.

[Schmedlap]

I think American Soldiers join the military for a cause. Once they start getting shot at, their pack mentality sets in.

I suspect it is the same for other cultures. I don't think that is transposing our values on them. I think it is human nature for men to defend their pack. The pack identity becomes clear when one pack tries to kill the other.

I would add to my earlier post that young men want to see the elephant and prove themselves. That is not a learned desire. It's part of being a teenager and, if one enjoys the experience, lasts well into adulthood. Remember the often-cited anecdote from Kilcullen when he asked the Afghan teens why they attacked the ODA? I saw the same dynamic in my Soldiers when adjacent units requested assistance. Even if we didn't know who the unit was (just a unit passing along the part of the MSR that bordered our AO), they wanted to get in the fight.

[OfTheTroops]

I believe a great deal of "the cause" depends on the narrative. What is the storied past of the group? Who are the heroes of the community? Everyone has their on cause and reasons (comraderie is not the least). I agree with Schmed in fighting or preparing to fight can be a right of passage. What does the culture value? What is the mythology of the groups? The heroes of A-stan defeated the soviets, they were not police or politicians. Why would you wanna be a Soldier when you could be a rapper or pro baller?

Population winning often boils down to our message vs their message and which one resonates and is supported by action.