Wilf Bait: The Clausewitz Delusion [Archive]

Cavguy

10-11-2009, 03:22 PM

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer) has this boo (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136)k coming out next month. He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

He's let some of it fly in my classes so far, my opinion is he has created a strawman of Clausewitz and the whole center of gravity concept. He believes the trinity only applied in his era, and is irrelevant.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
by Stephen L. Melton
http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136
Product Description

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

Klugzilla

10-11-2009, 03:54 PM

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

tequila

10-11-2009, 04:08 PM

Schmedlap

10-11-2009, 04:12 PM

The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.
Given his background and yours (in terms of level of responsibility), does it feel like you're being scolded by a four-year-old? Just curious, because I've always wondered how I would react in a situation like that. Thankfully, it hasn't happened yet.

Tom Odom

10-11-2009, 04:19 PM

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Neil

I just wonder whether he has ever had the opportunity to see even 5% destruction of a population.

I have seen 10% and could see using the Sherman mantra were we taking on N Korea. But as his book relates to Iraq and Afghanistan, I would point out that the side that did kill 10% of the population, lost the war.

Tom

Ken White

10-11-2009, 04:38 PM

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer)...He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it. (emphasis added /kw)The part in bold, that is. Sounds like an ignorant and unduly arrogant twit I once knew. He's best ignored to the extent possible with an attitude like that. Why on earth would Leavenworth hire people like that to 'instruct' field grades? :confused:

As for his premise. There's a time and a place for Sherman rules -- there's also a time an place for a Mosby or a Morgan and several levels in between. Clausewitz did not have all the answers. Neither did John Boyd or Sun Tzu. Subadai for his time may have but he didn't write books about it -- he did it. My suspicion is that S.L. Melton will not have as many answers as the others who did write.

MikeF

10-11-2009, 04:59 PM

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

That was one of the good things about the Defense Analysis department at NPS. We weren't considered students more like co-equals with different lessons to both teach and learn. The academics taught us the theories, and we confirmed/denied based off our practice. Much better learning environment.

As we studied Rick's Fiasco and other big strategic events going back to the Cuban Missle Crisis, I was struck that President Bush did not have a guy to point to hold responsible for Iraq or the overall GWOT. In our current structure, you have the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, DoD, Centcom, CPA, CJSOTF-AP, JSOC, and the MNF-I Commander. Everyone is in charge, but no one is in charge. This structure almost forecast us to muddle through big foreign policy decisions. By 2006, Bush finally had Patraeus to hold responsible for success or failure.

Before we bash Clausewitz, I think we should look at fixing Unity of Command.

v/r

Mike

Rex Brynen

10-11-2009, 06:14 PM

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I think you're confusing it with the success of the Rwandan government/Interahamwe against the RPF (10%+ of the population killed).

M-A Lagrange

10-11-2009, 06:23 PM

And why not even more... lets kill every body. Then we are sure their is no one to interfere.

William F. Owen

10-11-2009, 06:32 PM

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

Thanks Neil. I'd also suggest some of the bigger dogs in the SWC Pack give it a once over, and Taiko as well. IRRC he is doing his PhD on Clausewitz and is a fellow Clausewitian.
My immeadiate and unfounded reaction is that he has not actually read of understood Clausewitz, but I shall await evidence before passing judgement! :D

I am actually dealing with a very similar situation here at home, where a respected author has assigned to CvC a whole lot of things he never said or even meant to say. The real issue is usually a poor understanding of CvC rather then CvC being wrong.

Does anyone have a .pdf review copy? :)

Cavguy

10-11-2009, 07:07 PM

I probably shouldn't have included the bit about the personal spat. Direct any inquiries on that to PM or my email. I was in a snarky mood that day, so perhaps being sniped at by the know-it-all young guy didn't sit right to a retired (O-5/O-6?). So blame can rest here as well, but my other instructors seem to handle being challenged on facts a little bit better.

That said, I am not well read (above the surface) on CvC, so I posted it here to see what the reactions were.

A friend on facebook asked the relevant question - "crap, if we kill this guy, we will go over 15 percent..."

I've been mulling over my thoughts on the subject, I haven't really ever denied that under the right conditions the "kill em all" method of COIN is effective, but I also maintain it's irrelevant to the task because we simply won't do it because of the evolution of values related to human rights. It's related to my Lyall/Wilson critique of comparing COIN 1800-1945 to later, because international norms as to what is acceptable (for a liberal democracy) have changed so drastically when compared to the challenges of COIN in the post-cold war world.

Fuchs

10-11-2009, 08:04 PM

Did it ever come to mind that killing foreign civilians might be a direct cost (disadvantage) to the own country?

That's a price for victory that many (most?) citizens won't be willing to pay, and that counts a lot in a democracy.

Rampage and mass killing sounds a lot like a self-defeating strategy to me.
Who's going to call a genocidal war a victory nowadays?

I can imagine other ways of winning a war than disarming the enemy, but an extremely victim-intensive approach doesn't convince me unless it's about really crazy scenarios like actual invasion/bombing of a nuclear power's homeland.

Bob's World

10-11-2009, 08:31 PM

Wow.

While I believe, based on what Cavguy laid out, what points of logic this guy has lashed his theory to, I would offer (gently, so that he does not assume that I am lecturing him), that he is making several very dangerous assumptions by misidentifying the material facts of the historical cases he draws his conclusions from. Easy to do, I see it a lot, and probably do it myself more than I know.

We see the same thing in Afghanistan today. People see ineffective governance and an insurgency, and, by deducing "effectiveness" of government to be the material factor set out to cure it to end the insurgency.

This guy sees a similar correlation, apparently in civilian casualties and wins and losses.

There are lessons to be drawn from his work if all one walks away with is a realization that first and second theories, much like first and second reports, are typically wrong. His next book should be better.

Bill Moore

10-11-2009, 09:51 PM

Posted by Cavguy,

He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

You had me hooked at first, I wanted to buy this guy a case of beer.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Even more interested, he is challenging our politically correct version of war with a dose of reality.

The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Then he shot himself in the foot, he demonstrated he didn't have any spine whatsoever, so while he can talk about Sherman, he'll never be a Sherman.

Still look forward to reading the book (thanks for the post), he isn't the only author who has questioned the negative impact of Clausewitz on our doctrine development. I admire Clausewitz, he was a intellectual giant in his time. Some, even much of what he wrote still holds true today, but to say there is nothing more to know about war (which some do) is dangerously misleading.

slapout9

10-11-2009, 10:23 PM

Cavguy

10-12-2009, 01:06 AM

Here's some more details from his lecture that were missing from the OP:

1) Theory that a certain percentage has to die. Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

2) Ease of entry=harder insurgency. War weariness is a big factor.

3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)

4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.

Best as I can recall on the arguments half. Will have to wait for the book. A number of counter-arguments were brought up in class, along the lines of the above, both historical challenges (cases it didn't work), and moral challenges (who's signing up to mass murder civilians?), as well as a sense the version of Clausewitz he challenges is a strawman constructed for that purpose. I have the feeling that CvC is like the Bible, you can interpret what you want out of him, which is kind of a supporting argument for Mr. Melton's thesis in a roundabout way. However, he sees a lot of sympathy for the Jominian formula of war.

Ken White

10-12-2009, 02:22 AM

that Clausewitz has had undue affect on US thinking -- more correctly, the Germans have had undue effect on US military thinking and practice. The Germans and Clausewitz got a lot of stuff right and they do things that work for them. Unfortunately, we adopted some of their practices that do not work well for us. One prime example is our generalist approach to officer education and management. It works for the Germans because they have a great General Staff corps. We do not have that so it doesn't work nearly as well for us. :mad:

I agree with Melton that the center of gravity thing is vastly overused -- I do not agree with him that Jomini had much to offer and I suspect Billy Sherman had no use for Jomini either. The formulaic approach has not worked for the US Army in the many variations I've seen tried over the last 60 plus years. We're stil trying to do that to convince Congress we use objective measures to promote people... :wry:

Slap, I hear you on making war on the rich -- problem is that the poor get caught up in that and suffer even more while the rich tend to float out and survive. Sherman and Carl both were superior in their wars and their times. We just live in a different time.

I do agree that we are capable of doing our own thing and that we do better when we stop trying to copy others. Winston Churchill said "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried all other options." What Winston missed is that we try the methods of others, find out they don't work for us and then finally cobble together an American way of doing it. We need to stop trying to imitate others. We are not they. They are not we. They are wee, we are not...

Steve the Planner

10-12-2009, 02:47 AM

March to the Sea

I'm taken with Slap's comments on making war on the rich.

One day, as I walked through Al Rasheed hotel, a deputy governor from northern Iraq insisted I meet with a Shiek and have my picture taken. It would assure my safety throughout the north.

Met this resplendently dressed Omar Sharif-turned-Saudi Multi-millionaire. Very nice chap. Plenty of US credentials, and free as bird to travel wherever he liked. Afterwards, I scurried off to find out who he was. Not on anybody's charts, but I figured it out easily enough. He was the head of oil smuggling operations around Bayji, probably in for a visit from Jordan/Syria or wherever.

We never touched the moneyed class in Iraq, cause they operate from across the borders. Open borders were not a part of Clauswitz's milieu, but there is the long story of the House of Rothschild. Napolean, to fund his Russian escapade, needed to sieze the treasury of the richest man in Europe, the Elector of Hesse (A fortune made from mercenary work just like Prince). The Elector wisely moved the money to the Rothschild's basement in Frankfurt, and they made so much for him while holding it that he could clip coupons. Napolean didn't fair so well...

My take on the Clauswitz assault follows Mike F: Unity of Command.

I think the fighting part went fine. Where we blinked, and blew it was all on the civil side. I suspect that the political imperative to turn it over too quick (pass the political hot potato of "occupier") kept us from actually occupying decisively, and, for both countries, that's where we went wrong.

Do we act decisively to re-occupy the central government as one option not on the table in current discussions. And what would come next????

Schmedlap

10-12-2009, 03:51 AM

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.
When I read that, I didn't interpret that as, "let's all sign up to slaughter civilians," nor did I read it as him advocating "kill x% in order to achieve Y effect." I assumed that he was looking at examples in which total war concluded with a definitive surrender. For example, total war with Japan resulted in lots of dead civilians, but resulted in a comparatively orderly transition from a country mobilized for war to a country demobilizing for peace. I think a good case can be made that this was partly due to the people having their will crushed (although having the emperor tell them to put the kibosh on the kamikazes probably didn't hurt, either).

I think the hole in his theory - from what little I have gleaned from it without reading the book - is how you make it work in practice. Are we supposed to goad adversaries into total war, so that we can fight on our terms?

William F. Owen

10-12-2009, 05:22 AM

1) Theory that a certain percentage has to die. Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.
Clausewitz would agree. Speaks to the setting forth of policy, and trinity of people, leaders and military.
2) Ease of entry=harder insurgency. War weariness is a big factor.
Again Clausewitz would agree. War is Politics.
3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)
So CoG do exist. A CoG is that from which the enemy draws all his strength. Can a CoG be targeted? Different thing entirely. CoG do exist. You sometimes cannot find them or use them, but CvCs identification or conceptualisation is extremely useful.
4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.
Absolute Rubbish! If anyone really believes that, then they never read CvC. He would also seem to have fallen foul of not realising that CvC never talked about how. He talked about "why" in the broadest sense.
Hannibal never got his decisive battle either - but Wellington did! Read CvC. He explains it!
Will have to wait for the book. A number of counter-arguments were brought up in class, along the lines of the above, both historical challenges (cases it didn't work), and moral challenges (who's signing up to mass murder civilians?), as well as a sense the version of Clausewitz he challenges is a strawman constructed for that purpose.
I am waiting, but it seems to me that he is setting up CvC on a the basis of what people think he said, versus what he actually said and meant. If he is, then it's intellectually lazy, and misleading.
Moreover war is not about killing. I assuredly involves killing, indeed it is defined by it, but killing is merely one instrument, and war itself is entirely instrumental.
I have the feeling that CvC is like the Bible, you can interpret what you want out of him, which is kind of a supporting argument for Mr. Melton's thesis in a roundabout way. However, he sees a lot of sympathy for the Jominian formula of war.
Well where I am, we have entire groups of learned men, who just study the Torah and many other sacred texts - and argue all day and for many years. :eek:

I do not cling to CvC as a sacred text, but until I read and studied "On War" I really had very little idea as to what the aims and purpose of Warfare were.
CvC does need to be held to rigour and holding CvC to rigour is the best way to learn about what he wrote.

slapout9

10-12-2009, 12:30 PM

Do we act decisively to re-occupy the central government as one option not on the table in current discussions. And what would come next????

In the South it was called Reconstruction and because Lincoln still had the power to create Greenbacks it was not going to cost the American taxpayer one red cent.....just like he financed the Civil War. That was the greatest lesson of all that has been completely passed over by so called Historians and Ph'd types. In fact it was an Army Colonel that showed him how to do it and it was so successful that some say Lincoln was assassinated for it.

Bob's World

10-12-2009, 12:31 PM

slapout9

10-12-2009, 12:33 PM

Slap, I hear you on making war on the rich -- problem is that the poor get caught up in that and suffer even more while the rich tend to float out and survive. Sherman and Carl both were superior in their wars and their times. We just live in a different time.

I do agree that we are capable of doing our own thing and that we do better when we stop trying to copy others. Winston Churchill said "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried all other options." What Winston missed is that we try the methods of others, find out they don't work for us and then finally cobble together an American way of doing it. We need to stop trying to imitate others. We are not they. They are not we. They are wee, we are not...

Ken, it is true that the poor suffer but they are going to suffer anyway.....but when the rich start to suffer all the sudden peace starts breaking out all over the place.

William F. Owen

10-12-2009, 12:39 PM

Because all wars are unique based upon the totality of the circumstances; and wars between states are a very different category than wars within states. The American Civil War was not an insurgency; it was a clear break along geographic, cultural, and political lines. It truly was a "War between the states" not a "war within the states." I add this, because many like to hold up our civil war as an example of the invalidation of the American principle of of the right to insurgency codified in our Declaration of Independence.
Was the US Civil War a "Hybrid War?" - Were any of the actions by Irregulars, part of an insurgency? Was is a "Complex War" or a simple War?

Kind of begs the question as to why we don't opt for a unitary model of war? :wry:

Bob's World

10-12-2009, 01:31 PM

Was the US Civil War a "Hybrid War?" - Were any of the actions by Irregulars, part of an insurgency? Was is a "Complex War" or a simple War?

Kind of begs the question as to why we don't opt for a unitary model of war? :wry:

And always have been. I just don't know how this whole "hybrid" fad helps anything, and here is why: As I look at warfare, the key to determining how to best resolve a conflict is to understand the purposes of the combatants first, then their tactics.

Tactics are something you must deal with, but the design of your operation must be shaped to address the opponents purpose for action. Certainly an insurgency and a state on state war can and will likely employ a mix of approaches to achieve their desired ends. This is human nature. But the combatants are both the protectors of ones political positions; and the means to get to ones political objectives. Understanding the political objectives and the role of the populace as the human terrain in which the conflict is taking place is critical.

So, for me, I toss "hybrid warfare" up onto the same shelf where you have (rightfully) tossed 4GW. Both are simply efforts to describe what we don't understand in terms that we do understand; and IMO, both are off track. War is constantly evolving and never changing (paradox) and is almost always hybrid in execution. Understanding the political perspective and objective of one's opponent gets you closer to determining how to best prevent them from getting to what they seek, and in turn disrupt or defeat the support to their own operation.

M-A Lagrange

10-12-2009, 02:36 PM

4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.

Absolute Rubbish! If anyone really believes that, then they never read CvC. He would also seem to have fallen foul of not realising that CvC never talked about how. He talked about "why" in the broadest sense.
Hannibal never got his decisive battle either - but Wellington did! Read CvC. He explains it!

Do not want to add a cocorico here but Austerlitz was a decisive battle, at least for some times... Just like Waterloo. At least, Napoleon forced the British to put foot on the continent.
I am not that specialist of Clausewitz but he made the theory of the decisive battle almost at the same time Napoleon was conducting his wars.
You cannot deny the influence of Napoleon wars on Clausewitz work. The breaking point is clearly coming from Napoleon campaigns. At least the historicall context explains how there is a before and an after Napoleon just like there is a before and an after Clausewitz in the western/European understanding and conduct of war. (For both).
Little short as assumption. And this does not give a blank check to conduct mass casualties wars. Far from it.
As said Tom, does the guy have an idea of what is a 10% population losses? I believe in the first shock phase, so the stunning effect avoid any complication during the hold and stabilization phase.
Makes a lot of people! Just for that, the argument cannot stand.

Bob's World

10-12-2009, 02:41 PM

Also critical to take into account in such discussions is if one is discussing:

A. How to win a battle,

B. How to win a campaign,

C. How to win a war,

D. How to prevail in a nation's overall objective across a span of peace and wars.

I would offer that each is very different and must be considered uniquely as well. A common mistake seems to be not to differentiate at all, or to apply what might be logical to one to another where it may not apply as well.

Steve Blair

10-12-2009, 02:43 PM

Sorry, Cavguy, but your instructor lost me the exact second he refused to engage in a meaningful discussion of his ideas with you. That's what good educators are supposed to do. He also seems to ignore (as many do) the impact of our own army's organization on any attempt to absorb a German (or French) staff system. The great split between the Staff and Line prior to Root's modifications (and others that came about after the Spanish-American War) left deep scars, and I do think that it really hampered how we looked at and developed a staff. This is especially true when it's combined to the traditionally low opinion held by the body politic of a standing military.

And I agree with Bob...not all wars are the same. One of my side projects (that I might actually finish someday...) is an examination of officers who served successfully in the Civil War and then transitioned to fighting Indians. It's an interesting adaptation to look at.

Ron Humphrey

10-12-2009, 02:55 PM

Ken, it is true that the poor suffer but they are going to suffer anyway.....but when the rich start to suffer all the sudden peace starts breaking out all over the place.

Gotta be careful with that one. Quite often if things get rough the rich simply relocate and the poor get stuck not only suffering but having to figure out how to dig themselves out on their own (Sans large influx of fundage from aforementioned rich). It's a fairly delicate balance.

On a different note

Niel , I wonder what your esteemed professors opinion is of the CSI paper written by Paret and Moran
CVC- Two letters on Strategy?

Steve the Planner

10-12-2009, 03:11 PM

Slapout:

"In the South it was called Reconstruction and because Lincoln still had the power to create Greenbacks it was not going to cost the American taxpayer one red cent.....just like he financed the Civil War. That was the greatest lesson of all that has been completely passed over by so called Historians and Ph'd types. In fact it was an Army Colonel that showed him how to do it and it was so successful that some say Lincoln was assassinated for it."

The problem in Afghanistan arises out of the constitution which, arguably applies.

If the elections are, at the least, "challenged" to the extent that no clear winner is yet certifiable, then who sits at the head of Afghanistan's government?

As I understand it, past President Kharzai is likely to achieve, in the end, a fractious, but minimal victory, while his challengers can not must a majority.

On the table is the theory of a Unity Government, but putting that in practice is a whole different matter.

The UN, as I understand it, has the authority to decertify the election and move for "something else." Thus, the big portent of Eide and Galbraith.

The implicit suggestion, at present, is that (1) the present constitutional and national structure, whether as adopted or as applied, will not produce a positive result for Afghan's as a whole, nor further NATO/US objectives in stability; and (2) it may be time for a revisit to the structure, whether styled as a constitutional convention, national debate, loya jirga, or whatever.

What lessons, if any, have Afghans learned from the recent experience, and how would they propose to address it?

If, in order to answer that question, an Interim Government needs to be put in place, I believe the UN mandate provides for that radical surgery. Is it necessary?

Ron Humphrey

10-12-2009, 03:48 PM

to a lesson that hopefully would have been learned from our Iraq experience.

If one plans to hands the reigns over to a stable local govt you must have those reigns firmly in hand yourself in order to do so. We don't want to occupy and thats not necessarily a bad thing but you sure as heck have to own something to be able to give it away.

Probably way to much of an oversimplification but still...

Steve the Planner

10-12-2009, 05:41 PM

Ron:

Right.

In dumb-ass civilian terms, it might be termed a "gap" in the title chain.

Something about 'you can't convey what you don't own."

Steve

William F. Owen

10-12-2009, 05:45 PM

I am not that specialist of Clausewitz but he made the theory of the decisive battle almost at the same time Napoleon was conducting his wars.
You cannot deny the influence of Napoleon wars on Clausewitz work. The breaking point is clearly coming from Napoleon campaigns. At least the historicall context explains how there is a before and an after Napoleon just like there is a before and an after Clausewitz in the western/European understanding and conduct of war.
I am not a specialist in Clausewitz either. I merely read and studied him to the degree I believe is useful, and as a minimum to understanding what he actually said and did not say.

Clausewitz did not say talk about THE decisive battle. He talked about the need for Decisive battles that gained you benefit in terms of strategy.

He also made broad useful observations, such as only Major engagements can bring about Major success - so don't plan for small tactical actions to have major strategic payoffs! - that they might, does not mean you should plan for them to do so.

IMO, (and others) what he was cautioning people against was continually irrelevant tactical action that gained no strategic benefit. EG: Hannibal.

Yes, CvC was writing soon after the time of Napoleon but he was also strongly influenced by Roman and Greek military history, as well as a whole range of other European Wars and Rebellion against the Crown in the Americas.

slapout9

10-12-2009, 06:52 PM

STP, I don't think we can Re-occupy A'stan because we never occupied it in the first place, which is part of the problem. I don't understand this theory of starting a war with someone and then thinking that if you have an election right in the middle of the war that everything will be alright:confused::confused:

Now we have an illegitimate government that is receiving huge amounts of financial aid from the US while we do the fighting and the dying....WTF?

Also Sherman had an IED problem to, you know how he solved it? He had the civilians who would not tell him where the torpedo's(that is what they called land mines in the Civil War) were march down the road in front of his columns! The IED problem was solved real quick. Put that in an IO campaign for A'stan......I know we can't do that but we should......tie rich folks to the of front Humvee"s and search for IED's.....hey that sorta rhymes.:)

Also the first thing Sherman did was prepare a SPECIAL TAX MAP and his march to sea went right through the richest parts of Georgia where he collected his food and supplies and burned bridges,tore up rail roads and knocked down telegraphs. In short he made the rich folks poor and feel pain, he did not target civilians directly he targeted their support system more than anything. Victory because he new how to make a good Systems Map;)

MattC86

10-12-2009, 07:11 PM

Grant will likely always be my favorite US General. One of his greatest accomplishments that he receives little credit for is the strategy to target the will of the Southern populace as his main effort (to which he tasked Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas; and ultimately Sheridan in the Shenandoah to execute), while he supervised Meade in the supporting, but critical effort of defeating Lee's Army and taking Richmond (in that order).

He, IMO, was the first leader to not only understand that merely killing soldiers or capturing capitals was enough in wars between nations, as it had been in the West for generations in wars between Kingdoms.

Pardon my interjection, but I was under the impression that this was not correct - Grant's initial attitude towards Sherman after the latter proposed the March to the Sea was one of trepidation; that Sherman should first destroy Johnston/Hood's army before heading on his swath of destruction, or even head for Mobile. Sherman gradually convinced Grant he could not only pull this off, but the objective Grant really wanted - destruction of the Confederate Army in the West - could be done by Gen. George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga (as indeed happened).

I was similarly under the impression that Grant saw the destruction of Confederate armies as his goal, but that he came to see what Sherman was doing as the flip side of the same coin - that grinding Confederate armies to powder reinforced the helplessness civilians felt in the path of Sherman, and vice versa.

Aside from the torturous history lesson (my apologies if I am wrong), can I ask what is NOT Clausewitzian about Sherman's actions? Just as the Confederates targeted the Union will to continue, Sherman realized he had a golden opportunity to return the favor. His writing is littered with references to destroying the will of the enemy to resist. I feel like the calculated brutality this guy promotes is just another way of achieving victory in the competition of wills. . .he's being Clausewitzian without even realizing it.

Not to mention Sherman's March didn't kill 8-10% or whatever of the population - it burned and stole but did not often rape and murder. That was the intent. Sherman was also not one for pitched battles of annihilation as Grant was. So I don't know where this guy is getting his ideas or his facts, but the whole premise as Cavguy describes it seems absurd.

Matt

slapout9

10-12-2009, 07:15 PM

Matt86, you ain't wrong....you be jamming:D

MikeF

10-12-2009, 07:22 PM

Also Sherman had an IED problem to, you know how he solved it? He had the civilians who would not tell him where the torpedo's(that is what they called land mines in the Civil War) were march down the road in front of his columns! The IED problem was solved real quick. Put that in an IO campaign for A'stan......I know we can't do that but we should......tie rich folks to the of front Humvee"s and search for IED's.....hey that sorta rhymes.:)

Also the first thing Sherman did was prepare a SPECIAL TAX MAP and his march to sea went right through the richest parts of Georgia where he collected his food and supplies and burned bridges,tore up rail roads and knocked down telegraphs. In short he made the rich folks poor and feel pain, he did not target civilians directly he targeted their support system more than anything. Victory because he new how to make a good Systems Map;)

One of the quickest things you learn in a combat zone is how much emotions effect actions. War is personal, and it cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical equation or engineering problem.

Two examples.

1. The scene in Band of Brothers the day after Echo Company discovered the concentration camp. They declare martial law and force the adjacent neighbors to clean the camp and bury the bodies. Echo Company used shame as an instrument of resolve. The other option would be to kill ever person in that town as punishment. I'm sure it crossed their minds.

2. In May 2007, after a raid, we discovered the videos of public beheadings in our town. Not knowing exactly how to react, I decided to force all the village elders to watch the video with me standing over telling them how utterly wrong and inhumane it was. I chose to use shame. In that instance, it worked. There was a lot of crying sheiks that day.

v/r

Mike

Steve Blair

10-12-2009, 07:26 PM

Firn

10-12-2009, 07:47 PM

It is pretty hard to create only through Cavguy's post an sensible image of the critic of CvC offered by the lector.

His approval of Sherman and the description of his book seem to indicate that he is somehow irritated by the importance of the foreigner CvC in the military of the USA. The preview on Amazon really sounds like a personal rant, doesn't it?

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

Perhaps the digital ink is spent better elsewhere...

Firn

MattC86

10-12-2009, 08:07 PM

Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.

Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.

Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.

I don't think I suggested (at least I hope I didn't) that Grant opposed it and Sherman won him over - only that he showed some resistance to the grand scale of what Sherman was planning. He worried if it was feasible with Hood maneuvering in Sherman's rear - remember, during the Siege of Vicksburg, he sent Sherman to Jackson to guard against Johnston's possible relief expedition.

No argument with any of what you said, though. I wonder if the phenomenon you notice is the result of minimal contact with the Southern population by officers and men fighting with the Army of the Potomac?

Getting back to the topic at hand, Firn is probably right, it seems a bit premature to judge the entire book and argument based on these snippets, but coming from Cavguy and the publisher's own description at Amazon, it does seem highly suspect.

Matt

Cavguy

10-12-2009, 08:35 PM

Firn

10-12-2009, 08:57 PM

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

You have my respect for stressing that point during the lecture. Such a number may sound pretty understandable and agreeable on paper but as you said it will in practice be very bloody. Killing in the process of the pacification of Afghanistan up to 18% of the population or 8.600.000 humans doesn't seem to fit the purpose of the current mission.

Leaving that aside I guess we will have to wait for that book to see if it provides something useful. The perception so far is not a good one, but it might be overridden by the qualities of the book.

Firn

Ken White

10-12-2009, 09:20 PM

Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.It was a growing pain sort of thing. Both were fair Generals, neither was great. Thomas and Buford were both better, just not in the right place at the right time.

Any General that says as Grant did "I propose to fight it out on this line if it take all summer" has some problems as a tactician, particularly considering it was said immediately after he got a really bloody nose with 17,000 casualties in The Wilderness and was in process of getting zapped again at Spotsylvania with another 18,000 casualties. His claim to fame is actually that he had more troops to throw away than did his opponents-- and he surely did that.

A strategist he was not. Good writer, though...

Schmedlap

10-12-2009, 10:26 PM

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.
Are you sure that is the logical implication? If it was, then okay, maybe he's crazy.

I suspect that he was looking at cases where that much of the population was killed - in large part because it was a total war - and he then drew a link between that beat down and the willingness to submit. If that was his thought process, then I don't think that the logical implication is a mass murder COA.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

10-12-2009, 11:22 PM

Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide. :D

Grant knew that he had to hit Lee again and again since the ANV was the CoG, not so much Richmond. So he hit him hard at the Wilderness. When the Federals broke off the attack Lee (and many Federal officers) was sure Grant would withdraw. He didn't, he moved to his left. This threw Lee off his game a bit but he rallied well to block Grant at Spotsylvania. So it went until U.S. stole a march on Bobby and crossed the James, but his Corps were slow in taking Petersburg and so the siege began. Grant lost about 55,000 (which were fewer men than the Federals had lost in the three previous years trying to do the same thing) to Lee's 33,000, the key being the Union casualties were a smaller % of overall forces. Since Sherman at the same time was “making Georgia howl” there could be no shifting of Confederate forces between the theaters. Also, when Early threatened Washington Grant failed to react as previous commanders had; which was to withdraw and rush north. He kept focused on Lee.

Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest. Grant had considered going west of Richmond with the same strategy but it would have unacceptably lengthen his supply line. He also factored in the desire that one of his attacks might break through to Richmond. Both Grant and Lee knew that a prolonged siege (whether around Richmond or Petersburg) would end the war in favor of the North.

Agree that neither Grant nor Sherman was a “great captain” per say, but neither was Lee (he was too Virginia centric and at times overly aggressive for the resources available to the CSA). In the aggregate, when one totals Grant's losses from Beaumont to Appomattox he lost fewer men numerically (and effectively won the war in the western theater in 1863) than Lee incurred from Seven Pines to Appomattox. Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?

Ken White

10-12-2009, 11:49 PM

Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide. :DNah, your aim's off -- if you aimed...

I probably woulda fit for the Union. However, I don't drink Kool Aid; that's sugary stuff for all you kids...;)Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest...True -- Grant wasted him away and continually slipped to the SE. No great strategy but an admittedly effective one.neither was Lee Nor did I say he was -- I cited Thomas and Buford, both Union. Only Jackson whom I did not mention comes close to being great for the South. He was better than any of the others save possibly Buford and both of them died too young. John Gordon and Forrest may have become great with more experience; they didn't get it so they don't make it to greatness (whatever that is)...Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing.I hope not, that's the American way; has been in every war we've won and the two we lost (both due to really bad Generals; one northerner, one southerner). In any event, I didn't say it was bad, just that it was what he did -- which you corroborate. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?No, nor did I say he should have -- I just said he wasn't a particularly great General and named two northerners (one from Kentucky, one from Virgina ;) )who were better. I think you're picking a fight where none need exist -- that ain't good Generalship. :D

Umar Al-Mokhtār

10-13-2009, 12:36 AM

than to pick a fight with you...didn't you actually serve in the late unpleasantness? :D

Buford probably would have proven to be great, he was far and away the best cavalry commander on either side. Thomas was solid, and shrewd since he deftly avoided taking a major command. It would have been interesting how things would have played out if the roles of Thomas and Sherman had been reversed.

Other picks would be Reynolds and Cleburne who, like Buford, were also cut down before their time.

My aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head. :eek:

I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie. ;)

Ken White

10-13-2009, 03:16 AM

than to pick a fight with you...didn't you actually serve in the late unpleasantness? Alas no, then in my 61st reincarnation, I was advising Wu Wen Chen, late Warlord and ruler of Guiyang at the time. Pity, I could've had fun ragging G.A. Custer...:DMy aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head. Hmm. Sounds like yours and mine been communicatin' somehow... :wry:I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie. Good stuff, I'm told, can't do Scotch. Results of a weekend foray in Oceanside in 1951 which entailed quantities of White Horse (I know, I know - but on a Corporal's pay back then, choice was limited... :() and did not end well; there was minor illness involved. Haven't much desire for it since.

Fortunately, there is bourbon. ;)

Tom Odom

10-13-2009, 05:45 AM

Ron:

Right.

In dumb-ass civilian terms, it might be termed a "gap" in the title chain.

Something about 'you can't convey what you don't own."

Steve

Except in the case of con men.

Elected or appointed, matters not a whit

Them that are transferred and them that accept

Are both screwed in equal parts

By the con men arranging the transfer

Tom

Rifleman

10-13-2009, 05:57 AM

One of my side projects (that I might actually finish someday...) is an examination of officers who served successfully in the Civil War and then transitioned to fighting Indians. It's an interesting adaptation to look at.

As you work on that project don't forget that the plains tribes were largely subjugated because the buffalo were eliminated. The buffalo gave them everything they needed: food, shelter, clothing, even a theology. When the buffalo was gone they got in line fast for blankets and beef.

It's enough to make a body think that the buffalo was one of them there Clauswitzian centers of gravity that I keep hearing about.

M-A Lagrange

10-13-2009, 07:34 AM

Clausewitz did not say talk about THE decisive battle. He talked about the need for Decisive battles that gained you benefit in terms of strategy.

Well, here we have a dialectic/translation problem. I was not talking about THE decisive battle but using the as in French where “the” would mean “a”.
Also, I believe this could be debated but I did not read CvC in German.
But I have to admit that benefits from Waterloo were longer term than Austerlitz on the political side. But the benefits from Austerlitz were larger at its time. (more countries involved, larger impact in European powers…).

Just to add some spices to the discussion. Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

Closer from us, I can see where such statement that “mass killings benefits” could come from.
I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
The 2006 summer war was a defeat and Israel needed to reaffirm its military supremacy. So they did conduct Castle Lead.
I have no idea of the ratio of population killed among Palestinian. But IDF maintained a 1/10 ratio if you melt civilian+armed population for the Palestinian. (Roughly 1 IDF for 10 Palestinian). And, as you said, Israel gained some time.

Was it a decisive battle? Personally I would not go that way. The Rand studies about Israel cycle of violence have shown that basically Israel is buying 11 month of peace between each round of terror/war.
On a regional scale? Well, that can be debate also since Iran has shown capacity to produce continental range weapons.
On the hostage scene? Yes most probably.

But does that really balance the bad image that Israel did built during the operation? Did that worst the lost of credit among the international opinion (even in West)? That is not that clear. Just for this I would say that the statement of killing plenty, even combatants, would be somehow fault. It just shows a theoretical understanding of war. Also, CvC did not write about stabilization and stabilization was much easier at his time. Well may be not in Spain.

In war among the people and with the increase of education of the population (civilian + military + international opinion) such assumption based on terror is almost an immediate political loss. So the benefits from an operation or war that kills many civilian (the figure should not be count in %) has more disadvantages than advantages.

Or the guy is just crazy.

William F. Owen

10-13-2009, 08:57 AM

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.
...so you might want to point that out on this thread here, because this is very relevant! - http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8647

I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
Good luck with that. Ever met an Israeli? :D

Joking aside, Israel has a very simple view of strategy. It is the use of force to maintain the state, at all and any cost. It does not have to be perfect or even good. It just has to work, and it does. No one expects "Peace" anytime soon. Relative security is good enough.
Economy growing, population growing, and 3 years since a serious war = all good.

The Israeli population (as opposed to political elite) also cares very little for what others think. The only condemnation that had any impact at all during Cast Lead was that from the Turkish Islamist Party!

Steve Blair

10-13-2009, 01:45 PM

As you work on that project don't forget that the plains tribes were largely subjugated because the buffalo were eliminated. The buffalo gave them everything they needed: food, shelter, clothing, even a theology. When the buffalo was gone they got in line fast for blankets and beef.

It's enough to make a body think that the buffalo was one of them there Clauswitzian centers of gravity that I keep hearing about.

Granted we're diverting from topic here, but I do understand that. But it also varies from tribe to tribe. The groups most impacted by the demise of the buffalo were the Plains tribes...the loss of buffalo didn't do squat to the social support systems of the Southwestern tribes (Navajo, Apache, Yavapai, and so on). And some of the tribes had their resistance broken before the buffalo were removed from the equation (the Comanche are a good example, as are the Kiowa).

I'll hush now....the Indian Wars are one of my main focal areas, so I could bore folks to death with tons of trivia.....

Fuchs

10-13-2009, 09:14 PM

Just to add some spices to the discussion. Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

Maybe it's been too many months that I read Clausewitz for the last time, but I'm sure that he wrote in German. So he wasn't using the word "decisive", and that eliminates my problems with the fuzzy definition.

The German words "Entscheidung" (decision) and ("entscheidend" (supposedly "decisive") may have evolved over 170 years, adding another potential problem.

Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
So despite I didn't read his book recently I'm quite confident that he wouldn't have called the battle of the Marne a Entscheidungsschlacht (ex post) - except maybe ex ante (then still only being potentially entscheidend).

The same applies to the Tannenberg battle (Eastern Prussia 1914), of course.

William F. Owen

10-14-2009, 06:07 AM

Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
I think it's ex-ante use if valid. The Battle of Marne stopped the Germans surrounding Paris, as they had in 1870 - in that sense it had decisive results.

In contrast, Verdun and the Somme were far less decisive - even though decision was sought.

I have always taken CvCs point to be that you should not seek battle unless you aim to do some serious damage to the enemy, and for that damage to contribute your setting forth of policy.

M-A Lagrange

10-14-2009, 06:23 AM

Maybe it's been too many months that I read Clausewitz for the last time, but I'm sure that he wrote in German. So he wasn't using the word "decisive", and that eliminates my problems with the fuzzy definition.

The German words "Entscheidung" (decision) and ("entscheidend" (supposedly "decisive") may have evolved over 170 years, adding another potential problem.

Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
So despite I didn't read his book recently I'm quite confident that he wouldn't have called the battle of the Marne a Entscheidungsschlacht (ex post) - except maybe ex ante (then still only being potentially entscheidend).

The same applies to the Tannenberg battle (Eastern Prussia 1914), of course.

Well, my german is little old as is my reading of CvC. And to had some complexity, I did read it in French not in English neither in German.
But my point was more that you cannot blame anyone for not having a/the decisive battle (as it goes with the comon understanding).
My example of Marne was more that what was a desperate move became a tactical victory with strategic unseen consequences. They used cars to transport troops for nearly the first time. And beat the germans in speed to rally troops. There was no plan no vision, nothing more. Let be franc. Marne is good luck.

The only decisive battle (entering in that definition of THE battle that CHANGES everything) I ever see is Stalingrad. There it is clear that it has been a strategical turn point of the whole affair. But once again, you start with a defeat and the desperate resistance of forces that have the only option of die or win.

CvC is the western guy who pointed very simple things that apply to almost every level in analysing, preparing, conducting war. The only one I see before is Sun Tzu. Makes few centuries difference. Being upset that this man is influencing all western reflection on war is misplaced. The real question to explain what happened to US since Corea is may be else where. And concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, it is certainly not in saying CvC is overused and let kill everybody that you will come with a smart answer to the question: where did it all go wrong?
In addition the whole idea of "humiliating" the ennemy... Well that is exactly why iraky and afghany are much upsed. Not talking about the whole arab world. So may be humiliating people is just good for training during classes. After, when you start to invade and geopardise the life of millions of people, may be it is not a such good idea. Let look at the issue in a smart way or at least a different way.

Firn

11-11-2009, 06:35 PM

CvC is the western guy who pointed very simple things that apply to almost every level in analysing, preparing, conducting war. The only one I see before is Sun Tzu. Makes few centuries difference. Being upset that this man is influencing all western reflection on war is misplaced. The real question to explain what happened to US since Corea is may be else where. And concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, it is certainly not in saying CvC is overused and let kill everybody that you will come with a smart answer to the question: where did it all go wrong?

In addition the whole idea of "humiliating" the ennemy... Well that is exactly why iraky and afghany are much upsed. Not talking about the whole arab world. So may be humiliating people is just good for training during classes. After, when you start to invade and geopardise the life of millions of people, may be it is not a such good idea. Let look at the issue in a smart way or at least a different way.

Note the discussion in this topic (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6743&page=7).

IMHO one of the most important contribuitions of CvC is the exposure of the ambiguous nature of war. It can be seen and used as an instrument of the political forces but the unpredictable course of it can exert greatest influence on the same political forces and much more. In this sense the sheer presence of foreign troops on native soil can be reason enough to fight them. The troops, good instruments in the hand of a selfviewed good force are thus a big part of the problem by their simple existence. It might be a stupid emotional response, but it can be a very strong one, especially if reinforced by a radical system of beliefs.

This reminds me a bit on the words of a famous mountaineer. IIRC he was asked why so many humans try to climb the highest peaks despite the grave risks. His laconic answer? Because they are.

Firn

Tukhachevskii

11-12-2009, 09:29 AM

The only decisive battle (entering in that definition of THE battle that CHANGES everything) I ever see is Stalingrad. There it is clear that it has been a strategical turn point of the whole affair.

This interests me personally, which is not to say that the thread sent me to sleep, but purely because I remember having a discussion about the ost front at Uni where we had to think Clausewiztically (!). Was Stalingrad really a decisive battle? and by what critieria? Calling it the strategic turning point of the whole affair (?) confuses me somewhat. Do we mean by the whole affair Operation Blau (the offensive into the Causcaus to cut off Stalin's fuel lines of communication) or do we mean by the whole affair the entire eastern front campaign or even World War II in toto? Apologies if this query is idiotic (I am after all a lowly civilian:o) but at Uni I personally fought (verbally of course) for Operation Typhoon being the decisive battle (for the Soviets) in that it prevented the Werhmacht from achieving its primary strategic objective for the winter (i.e., Moscow), bought the Soviet side a respite in which to reinforce and soldify its defences and reorganise the armed forces. In other words, why not Kursk? Why not D-DAY which prevented the Wehrmacht from concentrating on the east and fight the dreaded two front war (three including Italy)?

Firn

11-13-2009, 06:47 PM

Well this is of course a difficult question.

Starting the war hoping to bring the rotten building of communism down with one mighty kick was of couse a major factor in the whole campaign. There were a great deal of other factors for the specific start for the specific campaign, real, immagined or perceived ones which ranged from territory to ressources and the fear of the Red threat. But I would not call the decision to start the war or the whole campaign the decisive battle, at least not when you closely follow CvC. In this regard he is more stringent.

If we are inclined to speculation we could include Dunkirk in the list of potential decisive battles. With so many british POW in German hands after such a crushing victory a diplomatic solution in the West might have been achievable. In the end every battle you listed brings us into the realm of speculation because every other outcome brings great uncertainty.

Firn

Elric

11-13-2009, 07:53 PM

Here's some more details from his lecture that were missing from the OP:

1) Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

What of the mass bombings of English and German cities in WWII?

3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)

CoGs do not exist, yet the perception is a CoG... :confused: Been laying off the coffee again? Perception is reality, no matter the ground truth. Where the US falls down is monitoring and responding to the word on the street. Search for "Baghdad Mosquito" for an interesting approach to it. Dedicated HUMIT would be preferred, but who has enough teams in sector to do it

Elric

11-13-2009, 08:11 PM

1) Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

What of the mass bombings of English and German cities in WWII?

Is it so much military capitulation as the ability of the population to decide that the cause is not worth the effort? Its a mix of the "warrior caste" with the security apparatus. Think of the STASI and the East German Army. Without the threat of bayonets, the STASI didn't have anywhere the menace that they used to.

slapout9

11-13-2009, 08:59 PM

A Parameters article from 1994 by SWC Steve Metz on CvC's funeral.:eek:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/1994/1994%2095%20review%20essay%20metz.pdf

slapout9

11-14-2009, 12:58 AM

Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.

I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".

My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

Niel

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Cavguy

11-14-2009, 02:09 AM

William F. Owen

11-14-2009, 07:37 AM

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

Well I'll certainly buy the book, but what is written above is pure garbage.

a.) The US did not "settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz." after Vietnam. CvC wrote about WAR, very little on "WARFARE."

b.) War is very distinct from Warfare. The "Clausewitz Delusion" is almost certainly a product of not having understood Clausewitz. - that's the problem that has afflicted 99% of his critics.

c.) To attribute the US being poor at Warfare to CvC is an argument almost impossible to make, but I'll wait and see.

Firn

11-14-2009, 07:53 AM

Cavguy do you have any class handouts or anything you can post from the class with references? I can't remember where I read it but doing WW2 there were supposedly calculations that we had to be prepared to inflict between 25% to 50% total causalities on Japan in order to get a total surrender, if that is correct the statistic may some merit to it. This is very CvC since he said the main aim is to DISARM the enemy.....if the enemy want wear unifroms but has guns and you intend to disarm them then you will have to kill a lot of so called civilians.

Well if we look at both WWI and WWII we see that the death of civilians both can or might not play an important part in the surrender of the enemy. In WWI we had huge internal unrest in all four continental empires - war doesn't stop the political processes, far from it. To a bigger and a smaller degree they decided in concert with other factors the war. Civilian casualities caused by the enemy direct actions were rather small, certainly under 1% for the central empires. However the revolutions and unrests sparked a very bloody civil war in Russia and was followed by the Armenian Genocide.

But the Central Powers asked for peace because they knew that given the increasing inbalance of ressources in the mid or long term their military power would not be sufficient to avoid the destruction of their ability to defend themselves.

In WWII the Sovietunion lost over the duration of the war almost 10% of their civilian population but refused to give up. Given the huge ressources the ability to wage war was intact at every point and was even increasing. Nazi Germany refused to give up until the leader of the regime which held the society in an iron grip shot himself, even if most of the territory was overun, the cities bombed into ruins and the military situation was already hopeless two years earlier. The civilian casualities were great but even percentage wise far smaller than the Soviet ones. France even capitulated with comparable tiny civilian casualities, as did Poland.

So we can see that things depend on huge amount of factors and are impossible to predict. Frankly if the author argues with so high and fixed percentages than he seems to be very naive or not honest. Now I'm almost ready to buy the book the get proven otherwise.

Firn

slapout9

11-14-2009, 02:35 PM

Now I'm almost ready to buy the book the get proven otherwise.

Firn

Probably the best answer:wry:

Steve Blair

11-16-2009, 01:49 PM

It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War

This statement alone almost made me spew coffee through my nose. I wasn't aware that "making it up as we go" qualified as a method of offensive war.:wry:

Tom Odom

11-17-2009, 06:21 AM

This statement alone almost made me spew coffee through my nose. I wasn't aware that "making it up as we go" qualified as a method of offensive war.:wry:

Sure...it's called extemporaneous warfare

it's built on the assumption that if you are guessing what to do next, so is the enemy

kinda like Alfred E. Neumann meets Carl von C...:D

John Grenier

06-13-2010, 11:50 PM

Pete

06-16-2010, 03:18 AM

Well where I am, we have entire groups of learned men, who just study the Torah and many other sacred texts - and argue all day and for many years. :eek:
Were Wilf one of those scholars of arcane texts he'd probably have his very own thread in the Trigger Puller forum on the efficacy of the Jawbone of an Ass as a weapon of war. His thread would include discusssion on the proposed basis of issue of the Jawbone, Ass within the standard infantry company, as well as the recommended MOS to repair the Jawbone, Ass at the direct and general support levels of maintenance.

William F. Owen

06-16-2010, 01:06 PM

Were Wilf one of those scholars of arcane texts he'd probably have his very own thread in the Trigger Puller forum on the efficacy of the Jawbone of an Ass as a weapon of war. His thread would include discusssion on the proposed basis of issue of the Jawbone, Ass within the standard infantry company, as well as the recommended MOS to repair the Jawbone, Ass at the direct and general support levels of maintenance.

Well you do need lots of Jawbones. I'll also take any Ass I can get! :eek:

mmx1

12-22-2010, 04:19 AM

For those uninclined to buy the book, he makes a brief(er) version of his argument in the latest issue of JFQ

http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

mmx1

12-22-2010, 06:01 AM

Though on further review (I came across this thread while curious about the book cited at the top), neither Sherman, Clausewitz, or an argument for total war appear in the JFQ piece. Instead his argument here is a much tamer "offensive war requires subsequent military governance".

Still, I find his argument for militarizing strategy by making the Joint Chiefs a centralized combatant command a questionable application of the World War II model to the regional problems of today.

Cavguy

12-22-2010, 07:16 AM

Having Mr. Melton as my tactics instructor the past year -

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.

A simplified version of his book.

William F. Owen

12-22-2010, 10:49 AM

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.
Strongly concur. So would Carl.
He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Same again.
Thus he advocates an attritional campaign prior to any occupation operation. He does not advocate attrition in all things, but cites "maneuver warfare" as appropriate for limited and raiding war, not occupation war because it does not break the will of the populace to carry the fight.
As there is no functional difference between "attrition" and "manoeuvre" I can't see the issue here. For example, raiding is aimed at causing attrition.

Bob's World

12-22-2010, 12:37 PM

We also went into Germany expecting the German people to fight us for every inch of ground; whereas we went into Iraq expecting to be greeted like the the guys who liberated Paris. Query: Did we have master plan for rebuilding France?? I suspect we didn't.

Most problems in life are foreseeable if you have your eyes open and are looking at things with a clear perspective. On Iraq, there was no room for clear perspectives, those voices where shouted down, ignored, or simply mowed over. (Speaking from one working on the Army staff during the period that the concept of going into Iraq first came up and watching in shocked amazement as it developed...)

slapout9

12-22-2010, 01:40 PM

Sherman, was my kind of General wherever he could he made War against Rich civilians which was the real key to victory. He understood it is about breaking the will of the State no so much about breaking the will of the Army. He destroyed the Civilian Infrastructure (he choose CvC type 2 War) that caused the Government, the People and the Army to ALL collapse, because the Civilian Infrastructure of Food,Weapons,Recruits is the real key to most Wars IMO............And Karl Marx wrote about this as a reporter in London before it happened:eek:, he actually said that Georgia was the Center of Gravity along with about 300,000 rich slave owners. Economic analysis is vastly underrated as a Strategic and Criminal analysis tool IMO. OK I am done now:D

slapout9

12-22-2010, 03:53 PM

Interesting way to do COIN with the idea of establishing Economic Advantage.

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap

Dayuhan

12-23-2010, 03:49 AM

His main point is that none of the Iraq governance/occupation debacle should have been a mystery. We planned for 3 years prior to 1945 how we would govern Germany, and it paid off, with similar planning for Japan. If we had started with our 1945 governance regs/books we would have been better off.

He notes that before a country can be effectively occupied its will must be broken, and that our decisive/CoG effort against the Iraqi military failed to break the will of the population prior to occupation.

Certainly the planning for the governance and occupation of Iraq was woefully inadequate and based on some astonishingly inappropriate assumptions... but comparisons to Germany and Japan are unlikely to be useful. The same qualities that made Germany and Japan formidable opponents in war made them excellent candidates for organized reconstruction; likewise the same qualities that made Iraq such a failure at war made it an extremely poor candidate. The obvious difference - the extreme ethnic and sectarian divisions and the hostility produced by extended and brutal minority rule - is only the most obvious of many.

I suspect that failure to break the will of the population to resist our occupation was less an issue than our failure to accurately assess the will of the various sectors of the populace to kill each other.

Xenophon67

03-16-2011, 05:00 AM

"However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits, however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If, therefore, its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter XXVI

Perhaps the Taliban do not fit exactly into the 'people's war' mold, however, I think this mainly unread chapter holds some weight when discussing the validity of CvC in Afghanistan.

Clearly, the number of dead civilians will not determine victory - absurd. Body counts...attrition...where is Bob McNamara when you need him?

Center of Gravity - elusive no doubt, lost in the fog of war, once 'found' does planning and execution fall victim to friction and the opportunity lost again - perhaps. CoGs do exist, they are viable, yet to muster the resources and especially the will to relentlessly attack them is another matter altogether.

Regardless of the means - the way to reach an end state is to make the 'atmosphere too dangerous' and to take the 'air' away.... Enough with the metaphors.

Population-centric COIN advocates need to rethink the CoG identification of the civilians as the singular source of Taliban power.

However costly (and probably unrealistic) it might be to seal off/control the border- it must be done. Simultaneously, totally eradicate the poppy fields. Then the Taliban are truly without air to breath, the very essence that gives them strength is gone.

"From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Sealing off the border (Algeria-Maurice Line) stops the influx of insurgents, arms and transport of opium. Destruction of the opium eliminates the money to pay the insurgents, buy the arms and bribe officials. Even if this effort is not totally successful it will lead to a culminating point whereby an 'overthrow' can occur, their resources denied to them, their air gone - a dangerous atmosphere indeed.

Victory - well how about after the overthrow an opponent 'pinned' to the ground. Perhaps it is best to talk about management of the conflict, on our terms, in our favor.

Good posts - very thought provoking. I am going back to scour CvC.....

kowalskil

04-21-2011, 10:20 PM

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I do not think they benefitted from that war. In fact, it contributed to the end of the USSR.

Ludwik Kowalski
.

Bill Moore

04-21-2011, 11:32 PM

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Oppressive and brutal COIN operations have been proven to work repeatedly, while half stepping has a very bad track record of success. I'm not advocating we forfeit our morals to crush another country's insurgent problem, but to claim that they "can't" kill their way out of the situation is misleading. In most cases they certainly can, but to do so would be a violation of international law and norms, a Pyrrhic victory, so we encourage them to pursue other strategies.

davidbfpo

08-29-2011, 07:33 PM

Hat tip to Zenpundit for linking a talk our Wilf gave in May 2011, enjoy:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4288

Scroll down to bottom of the article.

Bill Moore

08-30-2011, 04:48 PM

David, thanks for the link, it was an interesting presentation. Although he probably posted in SWJ, I just don't recall seeing it, but his comment that war changes very slowly, but politics change all the time (thus shaping the way the war is fought) was helpful to me in framing the debate.

OfTheTroops

08-31-2011, 09:25 PM

Just a fledgling but did he not just id the COG as attrition of x percent of the population. Upon attaining said attrition the will of the enemy will be broken.

And Punitive campaigns are not Sherman's (American) strategy its Rome's strategery.

As for external actors modifying a people. Isnt that what conquerors do. I am pretty sure as you all have said post mcarthur japan, post Iskander iraq hell Istanbul now Constantinople Constantinople is now Istanbul

May the right ways find the right ends(ours). And politically total war is a high state of war That table sets itself. If the cold war went hot we woulda seen total war. It has to be costly for the people to find it necessary.

tequila

08-31-2011, 11:46 PM

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Note that the Soviets had already decided to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1985 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%203%201985-10-17%20Chernyaev%20Diary.pdf), before the introduction of the Stinger missile. To put it in terms of American politics, they'd already reached their Tet '68 moment and were groping towards "Vietnamization".

Bill Moore

08-31-2011, 11:59 PM

tequila, I was aware of that, but I don't think the reason was due to anything like a Tet offensive, but rather a realization that no good was going to come out of a continued occupation. The Soviets didn't suffer any major military defeats prior to 85 that I can recall. People object strongly when I propose we had similiar (far from identical) strategies, and while they didn't call it clear, hold and build, I can interpret their actions as such. They also had pockets of success, just we did.

According to a former KGB agent, the Soviets reportedly reached out the U.S. asking for some relief in Afghanistan, claiming that the West (to include the USSR) faced a common threat from Islamists. If true, they called that one correctly.