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William F. Owen
10-12-2009, 09:04 AM
How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939)

This is very much worth reading, but careful reading. It slaughters, or maims, a few sacred cows so emotional reactions are likely.

Having said that, I am becoming increasingly impressed with this guy Kelly. If anyone knows him, please pass it on.

Spud
10-12-2009, 10:35 AM
Had a four-hour session with him today ... honestly he's one of the only things keeping me sane at the moment

Jas

Tom Odom
10-12-2009, 12:02 PM
I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:


Recent western military exploits in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and EastTimor, all represent, if not strategic failure, at least failures of strategy.

Rwanda was not a failure of strategy. It was a failure of moral courage. Period.

As for the "Leavenworth Heresy", I differ on what the authors purport to have happened at CGSC. I happened to be there in Bell Hall when the discussions were underway. The 1986 version of 100-5 and the use of the operational level of war was to embed and expand the role of the Corps as a military formation.

Same for the description of the end of Gulf War I. Was there confusion? Certainly. Did the overall objective get lost in the muddle? Perhaps but not in theater; the drift into quasi-support for the southern uprising.

My bottom line: if you believe that CvC is the military oracle, you will probably like the monograph. But the use of history is weak and slanted to begin with; I give it a C.

Tom

William F. Owen
10-12-2009, 12:23 PM
My bottom line: if you believe that CvC is the military oracle, you will probably like the monograph. But the use of history is weak and slanted to begin with; I give it a C.


So overall Tom, you believe that our understanding of the Operational Level of War and our sense of it's relationship to strategy is largely sound and correct?

Why I like the monograph, - quibbles such as citing Fuller's Plan 1919 aside and quite a few other, - is it shows the largely weak foundations of what some think Operations actually are.

I'm currently reading Hamley's 1909 text on Operations (Hamley not mentioned or cited! Another quibble) and have wondered how on earth we went from there to here. - this monograph answers a lot of those questions.

Tom Odom
10-12-2009, 12:54 PM
So overall Tom, you believe that our understanding of the Operational Level of War and our sense of it's relationship to strategy is largely sound and correct?

You are putting words in my mouth; I said the authors' depiction of how that term emerged and its intent at the time are flawed.

Who is "our"? I am comfortable in my understanding and many of the leaders around me. Where I see disconnects are in the interagency process and the ever-present gap between the military and the non-military. The supposed paper and thought trail that the authors seem to want to address targets that gap and frankly they are hunting the wrong fox.

If someone is stupid enough to proclaim there are no sectarian issues in Iraq, the best understanding of CvC, Jomini, or any other theorist will not fix that. You cannot fix stupidity; you can only endure it, contain it, or maneuver around it.

Tom

Ken White
10-12-2009, 04:44 PM
and one could argue that Bosnia and Kosovo were not strategic failures, rather the former another failure of moral courage and the latter getting schnookered and buying into a line of BS. East Timor seems to me to fall between those two poles. The rest were what they're tagged as...

I agree that your version of the US espousal of "The Operational Level of War" was the stated reason but I also suggest it was a specifically European theater and counter Soviet oriented construct which is not universally applicable -- and we have a bad tendency to make our 'doctrine' work even if all of it may not fit a given situation. There was also a flag officer space justification effort involved IIRC. I would contend that in both Afghanistan and Iraq the theater or nation IS the operational level of war. We can be pretty inflexible nowadays. Didn't use to be true, yet another bad habit we picked up post Viet Nam.

I think their principal point is summed up with this quote:
"By taking a hierarchical view and linking discrete responsibilities to specifc levels of command, we risk degrading the intimacy of the conversation among ends, ways, and means, making it easier for strategy to make unreasonable demands; for example, in Iraq in 2003-2006, with ways overtaking ends; or in 1950, MacArthur’s precipitate pursuit to the Yalu, with tactics to taking on a life of its own. " (Pg 10 Document / Pg 18 of the .pdf... emphasis added /kw)The heirarchial view issue...

As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.

Tom Odom
10-13-2009, 06:15 AM
As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.

Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is. The authors are taking US Army doctrine out of context and applying it in a larger sense to the entire security structure of the United States government. You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.

If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that. Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.

The issue is much larger and it hinges on interagency--as I stated below--and one that I deal with every day of the week. We have not and I fear will not ever get a system that gets beyond the muddle through when it comes to strategy and the political. We are very much in the middle of a classic case of muddling through on strategy when it comes to Afghanistan and frankly we only reached the strategic level by default.

Creating levels of war does not help but does not necessarily create that failure. And doing so in the the Cold War as a way of clarifying an new doctrine within the Army is not the original sin that created strategic failure in the US system of waging war. That they offered MacArthur as a case in point should have clued them that their argument was off by more than three decades. On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.

Again I give it a C.

Tom

William F. Owen
10-13-2009, 09:24 AM
Again I give it a C.


And it may merit a C. Since most of the contemporary writing on the "Operational level" may merit an F in my view, I think we might move forward on that basis. I posted the paper to provoke discussion, not applause.

I find this paper very annoying since it beat me to the punch on a whole bunch of stuff - but frankly as long as the stuff is out there, I care not who's name is on it.

My major concerns are that "some people" have elevated the idea of "The Operational level" way beyond it's originally intended purpose of delivering forces to battle, under the most advantageous conditions and then being able to effectively exploiting success as and when it occurs. EG: Napoleons failure to pursue and destroy Blucher at Ligny had very real strategic consequences, at Waterloo. Destroying Blucher was a strategic imperative. It was a failure of strategy, not operations.

I am not saying put the Operational Level back in the box. I am saying let's have a clear, simple and explicit understanding as to what it is, because at the moment current idea may be an obstacle to understanding. The understanding I am looking for is "what uses of force advances my strategy" (political aims)

Tom Odom
10-13-2009, 09:47 AM
I am not saying put the Operational Level back in the box. I am saying let's have a clear, simple and explicit understanding as to what it is, because at the moment current idea may be an obstacle to understanding. The understanding I am looking for is "what uses of force advances my strategy" (political aims)

Wilf,

A noble sentiment and fine for application inside the uniformed services. But that dog simply does not hunt--or at least trail effectively--beyond the edge of the military services. He stops at the interagency boundary. You know what I do as a POLAD--I offer political advice to my commander and his staff. To do that effectively, you at least have to understand what the unit does, what its mission entails, and how it is organized.

My predecessor was an administrative type with no field experence, let alone experience with the military. That did not matter if you see the POLAD as simply an errand boy for whatever crosses the embassy's collective mind. It matters terribly if you expect a POLAD to actually advise.

We can talk this until we are blue in the face. And we can come to a complete agreement. Our agreement simply has no effect in bridging that interagency gap. The result is the constant application of "muddle through" under which the temporarary, the expeditious, and the extemporary serve as the threads of US strategy. Put another way, we don't do strategic menus; we only do tailgate parties.

Tom

M-A Lagrange
10-13-2009, 09:55 AM
On Wilf advice I am copying this comment I did on the threat on Clausewitz delusion:

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

I do not see too much where it falls in the discussion. This is mainly due to the fact that I did not have time to read the paper Wilf is talking about. But I did spot it when it came on the web and it is on my data bank. I am currently more occupied (for obvious professional reasons) in reading stuff on stabilisation. (SSI and US Peace Instituts (and some others) but also French and others stabilisation doctrine...).

My assumption would be that tactical decisive advantage do not give you a decisive strategic advantage as old dogma have to be review.
Iraq would be for me the case. US did take the capital but did not won the war at that very moment.

This would come in echo with the French troops return of experience from Afghanistan too.
Technology is not THE advantage for them. It is a good tool but too much technology brings new limits.
As example: the cyber trooper is now limited by the range of the network.
I believe the French are still (and I think it is quite relevant) very much in the old school "rustique" scheme. In clear: few technology (may be old) but with time and operation validation that does not impose you to compensate limits with additional troops. And new technologies that bring an added value to old onces but still allow you to perform the previous operations. (See the CESAR battery or Leclerc tank).
The old dilema of trusting/supporting the guy on the ground or the technocrate in the HQ most probably.
But still I need to read the paper first.

William F. Owen
10-13-2009, 11:22 AM
On Wilf advice I am copying this comment I did on the threat on Clausewitz delusion:

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

My take is that it was a battle that had strategic effect - thus decisive. It cost the Germans the War in terms of wining in 1914. The Marne does show a shortening of the gap between tactical success and strategic consequence. The operational issues, are those that enabled that tactical success. Merely example.

Ken White
10-13-2009, 04:57 PM
Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is... You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.Nope. You misconstrued the initial 'we.' While I thought what I said was clear, perhaps it was not. There were two distinct items in that paragraph of mine you quoted. Here it is again:

""As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""(emphasis added / kw)

The items in bold apply to the US Army, those underlined to the broader US government; two separate 'we's there. I agree with you on the interagency and US strategy issue. However, I still think the Army is remiss, doctrinally rigid and has a tendency to tailor its 'doctrine' to the exigencies of the day.
If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that.I agree but I didn't read their paper that way. Also, this:
... Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.I didn't get that from it. I did get that the operational level as the US has adapted it is a distractor -- and while you may not, I totally agree with that. As I said, we're awfully inflexible. Not least because of this:
...On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.The problem being that our adaptation of levels has not stopped the squad leaders in the sky -- it has encouraged them. Now that guy doesn't even have to leave air conditioned comfort and get in a bird that can be shot down, he can simply watch a video feed while three nations away...:mad:
Again I give it a C.That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so. ""I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""

The Army cannot fix the strategic issue as you say -- the Army can and should fix the issues of over centralization 'squad leader in the sky;' inflexibility; and excessive orthodoxy.

Tom Odom
10-14-2009, 06:18 AM
Ken

As you said,

That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so.

I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive. Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.

First from the authors:


More specifically, the misunderstanding of the role of operational art as proselytized in FM 100-5 and the creation of an “Operational Level of War”
have led to an independent layer of command that has usurped the role of strategy and thereby resistedthe role that the civilian leadership should play incampaign planning.

That is an interpretation stated as fact. I would say just the opposite. If encroachment has occured, it has been stimulated by a vacuum at the strategic and political level. Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.

Second from the authors:


In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of war”—assumed the responsibility for campaign planning and, by reducing the political leadership to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

You cannot reduce something that is not there in the first place. The lack of strategic guidance, thought, art or even just consideration is a long standing issue, one that predated both versions of 100-5 (82 and 86). If the authors had said that 100-5 did not fix the issue of winning battles versus winning wars they would have been correct. What they said, however, was that it created the problem, as in "The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom

wm
10-14-2009, 12:16 PM
Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

When the only game in town is the close in fight, then of course leaders will want to watch it closely. But, because they have this manual that tells them they have to be prepared for the deep battle as well, they need to have another horde of staffers around to do that prep work too. And so grew the HQs to such a size that we now need to remove a maneuver battalion from our BCT structures to have enough folks to man the Army's staffs.

When I was an LT, I had this interesting discussion with a crusty old colonel. He told me that the Army had its leadership structure all backwards. He thought that the hardest job for an Army officer was to be a platoon leader yet the Army put the least experienced guys in that position. I suggested to him that what we had at the platoon level probably worked pretty well--the exuberance of youth could provide some "out of the box" suggestions for solving a tactical problem, but that exuberance would be tempered by the judgement and experience of a senior NCO platoon sergeant. I then suggested that maybe we ought to figure out how to get some of that youthful exuberance and willingness to try something different infused into more senior headquarters. It might break us out of being tied to mind-numbing processes rather than seeking innovative solutions. The colonel shook his head and told me I'd never make it in the Army because I had too much creative thought and the "system" broke those who tried to buck it.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 01:43 PM
WM Excellent post!

It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?

Rob Thornton
10-14-2009, 03:23 PM
I've come to beleive the operational level of war is the linking of a series of objectives as they relate to a desired (strategic) end, and the arranging of resources and capabilities in time and space to achieve those objectives. The tactical actions then are those understood to be required to acheive said operational objectives, or those that occur as a result of pursuing the operational objective.

Those tactical sctions may not always be the ones you anicpated, but if there is resistance then it stands to reason that some type of tactical action will be required. I'd also note that loss of a given tactical action does not mean the end cannot be fulfilled, or even that some part of the operational objective may not be fulfilled, but tactical success does make a positive differnce (as long as it does not operationally exhaust you).

For a great example I think you could look at Grant's Wilderness campaign, and consider "Cold Harbor". Certainly a bad tactical outcome for Union Forces, however Grant was able to continue afterwards and soon secured City Point, set up a masive LOG base, and then contained Lee's Forces (as well as forcing the Confederate govt to flee Richmond. Grant also fulfilled the strategic end of destroying the Army of N. Virginia, occupying the Conf. capital and getting Lee to surrender.

If all of Grant's tactical actions had ended in failure that halted his operational momentum, or allowed Lee's army to escape, a subsequent campaign may have been required.

ref. the article Wilf brought up, I think its great for discussion. I think there can be a real danger in it happening, but historically it seems most likely when strategic concepts and defined policy end are absent or ambiguous (it could be we just don't really know what we want, or prefer to keep options open) - however, we tend to be action oriented, and there also seems to be some basis for expectations for us to be so.

Best, Rob

Tom Odom
10-14-2009, 03:30 PM
Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.



WM

If the issue you are describing is centralization, no issues with your points regarding the effects of 100-5 on centralization.

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.


And Wilf: Where's my blind spot?

That would be at the operational level :D

Tom

Rob Thornton
10-14-2009, 03:34 PM
quote of the year.


Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

Ken White
10-14-2009, 03:39 PM
I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive.True -- but only in that you caught their flaw in assigning blame to 100-5 and went to work on that, thus ,IMO, missing the broader points that you acknowledge are a problem -- and the point that we have become very (dangerously???) doctrinaire.
Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.Herring perhaps. Sympotomatic? I'd say absolutely. We adopted 'the operational level' for a variety of reasons -- none particularly compelling, IMO (YMMV) and we tend to try to apply it where it is inappropriate because we're slaves to the book...:(
Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.I sadly suggest that truth is partly due to the fact that the Armed Forces (as a result of mutual distaste) have not attempted (deigned?) to give strategic advice to a DoS and several Administrations who were, umm, not particularly friendly, toward the Services. I'm not sure how to fix that but I think we need to try...
In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp...we are as you know doing just the opposite.We've beat this stud to death but I don't disagree with a thing you said -- other than your first line on the thread:
I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:...I understand that but at my age, I've found out that I neglected a lot of good ideas due to having the same attitude and I've lately become inured to putting up- with some often specious arguments to still extract some idea with a bit of merit. I even look up dumb stuff to see what people are up to. The old bit about even a stopped clock being right twice a day sort of applies.

I'd say they arrived at the right destination by the wrong route and that happens often.

Keep on pushin' ;)

wm
10-14-2009, 04:36 PM
But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.

Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades. Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)



It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?
Wilf,
First thanks for the kudos. On to your "blind spot." I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration. While a "deep attack" still envolves maneuvering forces, which I view as largely a matter of strategy, it also contains a direct lethal strike/engagement component, which I submit is the sine qua non of tactics. Maybe not a blind spot--more a Hegelian synthesis that you, as a CvC adherent, ought to be able to appreciate

Chris Nunn
10-14-2009, 04:40 PM
I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why. If you like the DIME model, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0 are really only a subset of the M--the failue of the USG to have a true strategic (i.e. longer term that the 1 year mandate of the NSS) plan is probably a huge contributing cause. The rest of the USG is not fully integrated into the strategic plan and therefore strategy devolves into the land of operations. The authors conclusions--specifically the CvC arguments about war and politics--I think are valid, but by laying the blame at the feet of the operational level they miss the true issues in contemporary warfare linking politics, strategy, and tactics.

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 04:58 PM
I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration.

Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

Fuchs
10-14-2009, 05:04 PM
The Operational level is the tactical level of corps and theater headquarters.

wm
10-14-2009, 05:17 PM
Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

I concur that some of the stuff about operational art is probably muddy thinking. We could probably make a case that it is really still just tactics--i.e., fire and movement/maneuver--but the distances are greatly expanded--not that big an issue given the improved capability to communicate over the longer distances and thereby view/direct the action.

The first part of your post however equivocates on the meaning of operations. I think the basic 1909 point is to distinguish the strategic and tactical issue in military operations from issues in support of those operations (in the manufacturing world I think the distinction is between operations, as production, and support as logistics, sales, HR and all the other stuff military folks lump under combat service support). The other sense of operations in your post applies to classes of activities used to execute a military event, such as a river crossing operation as a way of maneuvering on or near the battlefield, covering force operations as a way of hiding your tactical dispositions from an enemy and channeling its attack into a desirable (on your part) location for the defensive tactics you intend to use.

Ken White
10-14-2009, 05:22 PM
The Operational level is the tactical level of corps and theater headquarters.has a tendency to get bogged down with minutia and adopt the latest, best thing as the holy grail. The authors of the monograph point out -- not too cleanly -- that our fetish with 'the operational level' tends to make us try to apply it where it isn't appropriate. Their problem is that since they apparently were not there when the Army adopted the 'operational art' and probably have little experience around the institution that is the US army (as opposed to the people in that Army), they misread our inability to apply what's needed when it's needed as a flawed adaptation instead of what it is; inflexibility and an excessively slavish approach to 'doctrine.' They pointed their attack upstream instead of downstream where it's more appropriate.

(With a note that we, the people in the Army aren't that inflexible or slavish -- but the institution is. Very much so. Sadly :( )

Tom Odom
10-15-2009, 06:52 AM
I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.



I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion. Did you read the paper?


Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades.

While that might be true, it has nothing to do with the absence of strategy on the Department of State or any other national agency. You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.


Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)

Certainly military leaders fill the void; that in itself while not ideal does not mean that FM 100-5 1986 and the operational level of war instigated or justified that encroachment. Voids get filled as you say. But in the case of operational art as it was laid out in the FM 100-5 in 1986 and as it provides the theme for this monograph, it had no role in "devouring strategy." The issue predated the supposed cause.

Beyond that, roger on inherent tendencies to micro-manage. We focus on leader development and as those leaders advance in grade, many continue to believe they were the best (fill in the blank) that ever walked the earth, a belief that mandates that they micro-manage for to not do so would be a personal failure. We add to that tendency by creating C2 systems that encourage leaders to abuse the capabilities systems, and we continue to build ever larger staffs to somehow take advantage of the same "manpower" saving C2 systems.

Tom

wm
10-15-2009, 01:30 PM
I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion.
I believe that Chris Nunn had it right with this post:

I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why.
I was trying to cash out how it happens that the authors' claim, quoted by Chris above, may have come to pass.
100-5 had little to do with strategy at the national/interagency level. Nor should it have done so in my opinion. It was an Army doctrinal publication that ought to have explicated how the Army "operates" to complete, successfully, the missions it is directed to perform as a part of the execution of national strategy in a given conflict.

Strategy comes in many different flavors, which is why it may be preceded with different adjectival constructions like "national," "economic," "diplomatic," and "military." One might expect to find some discussions on military strategy in an Army doctrinal publication devoted to a high level discussion of the various ways of conducting military operations but to include in such an Army document a discussion of how to work an inter-agency approach to accomplish a national objective seems inappropriate. Perhaps a publication called Military Strategy would be more apropos, but it too would not resolve the lack of a national strategy lamented by the authors.

You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.To iterate from above, I was trying to point out possible causes for a lack of national strategic thinking within the Army. One may be due to the fact that Army leaders are spending too much time being tacticians. As a result they do not have enough time left over to practice and perfect their strategic level thinking. I will not rehearse the other two alternatives previously posted.

Tom Odom
10-16-2009, 05:51 AM
To iterate from above, I was trying to point out possible causes for a lack of national strategic thinking within the Army. One may be due to the fact that Army leaders are spending too much time being tacticians. As a result they do not have enough time left over to practice and perfect their strategic level thinking. I will not rehearse the other two alternatives previously posted.

That is another longstanding issue and another pet rock. Certainly selection for attendance at the War College plays into that as the key qualification os tactician, one each battalion commander. Most of them will never deal with strategy again and the ones that go on to GO will learn by doing. It always struck me that FAOs--the real ones who go out into their AOs--deal with strategy and politics constantly, yet at best can hope to make the correspondence list.

Still I will say that overall I remain very satisfied with the strategic thinking exhibited by most practicing senior leaders; where national stragegy gets skewed is the absence of equivalent civilian thinkers with equivalent practical experience,

Tom

Chris jM
05-05-2010, 08:37 AM
I followed this debate with interest at the time, and have a question to put forward relating to the existence of an operational level of war. Although I'm resurrecting a dormant thread, my question seems to fit in with the original logic of the article, if not the subsequent debate. One disclaimer is that while I have read the article posted at the start of this thread twice, I struggle to understand more than 20% of what was being said - it really was not subaltern-proof, what with the lack of pictures, long words and lack of powerpoint animations! As such please excuse and point out any obvious errors of fact or logic I may have made.

My basic question is that is it possible to measure or identify an operational level of war? I'm not hoping to create artificial and thus meaningless labels around the inherently chaotic activity of war, but the whole label of an 'operational' level of war seems very vague in doctrinal definitions. The reason I want to do this is that my army seems determined on 'strategising' every single act we undertake - the strategic corporal means a Platoon HQ must be a strategic entity, therefore the entirety of a Bn HQ is strategic, so on and so forth. It's a rather self-defeating process as it gets us nowhere bar inflating the self-importance of some, but it's a difficult proposition to argue against.

Also, if it were possible to identify where the operational level of war exists, it would also be possible through historical analysis to identify the evolution of operations and check the validity of the points raised in the original paper.

To remain within the conventional framework of the tactical/ operational/ strategic level of war, I consider the following to be as accurate a measure of each level as is possible:

The Tactical Level of War - identified by military elements that interact directly with the enemy, terrain and/ or civilian elements as part of their core function.

The Operational Level of War - identified by military elements that achieve their tasks solely within their own chain of command.

Thus, this level receives direction from the strategic level and enacts it through the tactical elements in a two-way process whereby they filter tactical information and assessments to the strategic level.

The Strategic Level of War - err, the level above that of the operational? I'm lost as how to qualify a strategic level of war and am spectacularly unqualified to do so, but that to me is less important in the current debate as defining an operational level of war.

Does the above framework hold any merit? It should be relatively easy to identify in historical analysis those levels of command that worked solely within their own chain of command and this, in my definition, constituted the operational link between the tactical and the strategic.

My understanding of the levels of war is very incomplete and fragmented but I would appreciate any feedback as this is a topic of personal and professional interest to me.

William F. Owen
05-05-2010, 11:34 AM
My basic question is that is it possible to measure or identify an operational level of war? I'm not hoping to create artificial and thus meaningless labels around the inherently chaotic activity of war, but the whole label of an 'operational' level of war seems very vague in doctrinal definitions. The reason I want to do this is that my army seems determined on 'strategising' every single act we undertake - the strategic corporal means a Platoon HQ must be a strategic entity, therefore the entirety of a Bn HQ is strategic, so on and so forth. It's a rather self-defeating process as it gets us nowhere bar inflating the self-importance of some, but it's a difficult proposition to argue against.

I do not think there is an "Operational Level." I think it's rubbish and have thought so for some time. - and especially since reading Naveh and Simpkin who were both professed to be experts in understanding and describing it.
What the Russians coined as the "Operational Level" was basically "Formation and Divisional Tactics."

PhilR
05-05-2010, 01:34 PM
The operational level is something that may be worthwhile in theory, but not in practice. I think examining all the linkages between setting national ends/ways/means (strategy if you like) all the way down to low-level actions (tactical, if you must) is well worth a lifetime of study and thought. Its useful to have definitions and categories for this theory and useful to argue about how all this interacts. For my part, I don't see "operational" as a "level" inserted between the strategy and tactics, but rather a connecting file or "nervous system" between national actions of setting goals and apportioning resources, and lower level concepts to use/arrange those resources to achieve the goals. Maybe its not operational, but rather “lower strategy,” or even “higher tactical.” I'm not sure, but I know there are connections and understanding the connections is critical to creating something coherent and effective.

"In practice", senior officials and commanders should not deal in terms of the theory, but in terms of the reality facing them. The theory can provide clues on the connections and considerations they should take into account. However, what is really important is the mission they are given, the resources they have, the environment they are in, the other actors they have to coordinate with, etc. Putting the levels of war into doctrine has led to many of the problems addressed in the SSI document such as commands either acting or failing to act based on their self-defined (or doctrine-defined) placement in the levels of war hierarchy. In my mind, the U.S. Navy has proceeded furthest in this area, to their detriment, by creating a table that aligns levels of war with specific command levels (NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War). However, as identified in the SSI pub, other commands have used “operational level” as either excuse or justification to plan and execute outside of what the reality of their situation would recommend.
Phil Ridderhof USMC

Ken White
05-05-2010, 01:43 PM
LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=84647&postcount=23).

I tend to agree with Wilf and PhilR, there is no such thing as an Operational level but it's not a major issue. If one just has to use the term for some reason, I believe Fuchs is correct. It was and is a Continental European construct and applicable to warfare there. It, as a term and concept, can be elsewhere employed but it is subject to dangerous misuse.

The Operational level of war applies to the Theater level and their employment of subordinate commands (be they Armies, Corps or Divisions) and it applies in only major conventional force on force combat (that does not preclude the use of SOF or irregular warfare as Operational assets or techniques). Operational level methodology entails maneuvering major formations in consonance with strategic aims in order to facilitate tactical success. Anything other than that is either Strategic or tactical.

Militarily, lacking a major conflict against a peer force, virtually all effort is going to be tactical as, in the West, we emphasize civilian control of the military. Strategy thus becomes the responsibility of the Government (hopefully, with military advice if the armed forces are to be employed) and the Forces are or should be responsible only for Operational and Tactical employment in the execution of that strategy.

One thing for sure, no Corporal or Platoon is going to be Operational or Strategic. That's a dumb and dangerous misnomer. Situation dependent, a Battalion might be a strategic force. More likely, a Brigade, Task Force, Division or Corps with a General Officer commanding can be but such a force is unlikely to need or even be able to employ Operational level methodology.

Error occurs when one attempts to apply Operational level concepts and methodology to inappropriate settings. To wit, the Coalition in Afghanistan. Afghanistan itself IS the operational level for this war. Strategy put us there, everything done there is tactical.

In most western COIN efforts, the nation involved is the de facto Operational level, it becomes the Theater as operations will generally be limited to that nation only and maneuver of large formations will not be necessary -- or even desirable. Strategy places forces in that nation, all that then transpires there is tactical. Tactical operations, as always, can have strategic effect. Similarly, Strategic decisions can have tactical effects. Rules of engagement developed politically for example. Or a decision to not deploy or use certain military assets, equipment or units. Conversely, a political decision that forces the use of certain elements can have an effect.

Operational decisions can have strategic and / or tactical effects. An effort to employ Operational level processes in an inappropriate setting can also have strategic and tactical effects and they will almost always be adverse. See Afghanistan...

slapout9
05-05-2010, 02:58 PM
Instead of calling it the Operational level, didn't we used to call them Campaigns? Or is that something else? Campaigning sounds more military, Operation sounds like you are going to the Hospital.

Ken White
05-05-2010, 03:05 PM
Instead of calling it the Operational level, didn't we used to call them Campaigns? Or is that something else?Europe and all things European in the 80s... :rolleyes:

Kiwigrunt
05-05-2010, 08:33 PM
Instead of calling it the Operational level, didn't we used to call them Campaigns? Or is that something else? Campaigning sounds more military, Operation sounds like you are going to the Hospital.

Except that within campaigns you would have operations, like Operation Overlord or Operation Market.:confused:

Fuchs
05-05-2010, 08:41 PM
...and those operations were really battles.


The term "Operation" has found a very wide meaning in the past 70 years. It used to be confined to military theory and physicians, but it's been applied much wider since then.

The Bundeswehr began to apply it to pretty much every planned combat action. I'm not sure when this began, but I know examples from '95 and I suspect that it's a post-Cold War thing.

Ken White
05-05-2010, 09:10 PM
Operations can be the title or part thereof of an office, officer or other entity. Operation __(insert name here)___ can be whatever anyone wants it to be as Fuchs says. The Operational level of war is just that. operations (small 'o') are what units do... ;)

operations (small 'o') are also performed by computer programs and subsets thereof... :D

To preclude confusion, I suggest re-titling 'The Operational level of war' to 'the Mediocre level of war' (based on the number of Corps Commanders relieved over the years...). :wry:

Which brings up a question. How can COIN be the 'graduate level of war' (which is fallacious, it's the middle school level of war -- chaos and hormones driving pettiness and all round immaturity to new new levels) with no Operational level per se? * :o


* GO make work employment ala Field Forces / XXIV Corps in Viet Nam and similar later examples do not count.

Fuchs
05-05-2010, 09:13 PM
I don't think that COIN has no operational level. It's just not being used because people are too stubborn and not daring enough.

see PM

Ken White
05-05-2010, 10:24 PM
We can differ. I don't think it has an operational level in the traditional sense and I do think Operational level techniques are being used in COIN -- both in Afghanistan and Iraq -- or, more correctly, misused. Badly...

Partly for the reasons you state, partly due to the ability of insurgents to become farmers until the pressure goes away...

GI Zhou
05-06-2010, 12:37 AM
The paper neds a rewrite and to substantiate the argument. It fails to substantaite its claims in the introduction or even explain them.

East Timor was not a failure of military strategy, and it was too small to claim any theory of an operational art. It failed because the poltical groups in East Timor, who were split along differing lines of personalities long before independence, were usurped by Mari Alkatiri's FRETLIN group. Threw the East Timorese political parties plans into disarray. There are other reasons I am happy to explain off line.

The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.

GI Zhou
05-06-2010, 12:52 AM
Chris jM - Your views are hoew the originators of it envisaged it, in their writings. They are real turgid read. One view I wa stold by an Australian practicioner/theorist is that the Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles.

The Russian originators fought multiple conficts on different fronts juggling forces between several large fronts across the whole of the Soviet Union - eight time zones. It involved both internal and external threats, conventional manoeuvre warafre, counter insurgency operations, indeopendent groups like the Czech Legion, foreign intervention, juggling its forces on separate fronts involving offensives, retreats, withdrawals whiulst rying to secure a working government.

The theories held up in the period 1941 - 1945. The operational arts looks at a series of fronts inside the whole conflict.

Bob's World
05-06-2010, 01:31 AM
"Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles."

I like that. This is a topic in general that I find more amusing than particularly helpful. When I worked at a 2-star HQ embedded in a 4-Star HQ, the guys down the hall all thought they were "strategists" because their boss wore 4-stars.

Reminds me of when I was an LT, and a lot of Infantry peers thought they were tough because they were infantry, and a lot of artillery peers thought they were smart because they were artillery.

I guess bottom line on that is that I figure the man makes the badge, and not the other way around, but many don't have much but the badge, so they cling to that.

"Strategy" has lay and professional definitions; and both are employed within the military ("What is your strategy for writing a strategy for operations in Afghanistan"?) You just have to shrug it off and not get too wrapped up over the "WTF" factor of such a comment.

But tactics do get to the matter at hand, and are requred at all levels. I like the warfighting/winning construct for operational art; and for me, Strategy is the larger understanding of the dynamics at work with in which all of this takes place, with a corresponding framework based on that understanding, that allows one to have a sense of if their operational art is apt to take them anyplace they want to go in a manner that they actually want to arrive there; and also to guage if the tactics employed posesses any unintended effects that may well be very detrimental as well.

Personally, and this is me, I spend a lot of time on the "understanding" part of strategy. I think its important, but too often it gets a quick brush, as there are always more urgent matters to attend to.

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 04:37 AM
One view I wa stold by an Australian practicioner/theorist is that the Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles.
I submit that "Operational Art" is - as the Soviets described it - the art of conducting operations. The "art" of wining wars is most definitely strategy.

The theories held up in the period 1941 - 1945. The operational arts looks at a series of fronts inside the whole conflict.
...and that's my major beef. I am not sure the Theories did hold up. There is a chasm between Soviet Theory and Practice. Yes they won - as vast cost, with huge numerical superiority.


The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.
Depends where you start the clock. A.A. Sveckhin's 1927 paper is for some reason commonly cited, but as concerns someone talking about solving the "problem", but it's Triandafillov's 1929 "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies," is, IMO the actual starting point.
- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

Chris jM
05-06-2010, 10:03 AM
From Wilf: I do not think there is an "Operational Level." I think it's rubbish and have thought so for some time.
I understand your view and that of the authors of the original monograph in that we may be eroding good tactics and good strategy by needlessly imposing another layer to warfighting. On the other hand, could we become so reductionist on the subject of war that we prohibit the creation of any framework that assists us?

Having read the contributions to the argument I’m going to succumb to hubris and argue that the definition of operations I put forward (The Operational Level of War - identified by military elements that achieve their tasks solely within their own chain of command) is both accurate and useful. I do feel somewhat heartened in that I’m at least getting to grips with what was initially conceived of by the original Soviet theorists according to GI Zhou, so if I’m wrong at least I am not alone in my errors. NB: I am doing this to be the devil's advocate while I try to reason my own way through the Operational riddle, and being doctrinally-brainwashed it's easier for me to argue for an Op level while weighing up the argument complete.

Firstly, what is the alternative to the Operational level? A tactical level of war exists – that is evident. How, then, do we link the tactical undertakings of a force to the strategic objectives? If we claim (as the ‘Alien’ authors do) that tactics should interact directly with the strategic level and be viewed more as campaigning (a series of tactical activities rolled together simultaneously or sequentially is my understanding of this term as they used it) we are creating a ‘grand tactical’ level of war. It’s not pure tactics in that the physical tactical undertaking is generating second-order effects. It’s one thing killing, destroying and seizing and another converting those achievements into an end-state imposed upon an enemy or third party (i.e. converting ways into means). Battlefield victory does not make a war won, and the art of using battles to win wars – as was eloquently stated – is required.

Therefore there will always be the need for command chain to ensure that tactical activities are conforming to the military objectives being pursued. If I’m correct we are either looking at this activity being viewed as part of the tactical level – what I have termed ‘grand tactics’ for my own identification – or the doctrinally correct ‘operational level’. ‘Grand tactics’ implies that the tactical level is self-directing and self-regulating; that is the tactical commanders deal with both the ways and means. ‘Operational’ implies that a separate, distinct level of command deals with the ‘means’ level of ‘ends-ways-means’.

Tactical activities can be dealt with by applied drills and scientifically-based principles (suppression, combined arms, etc) while strategy needs to be treated as a unique undertaking at each turn given the unique and mind-bogglingly complex array of problems and potential consequences encountered when one deals with large, varied groups of people inherent at this level. The Operational level deals largely with second order effects, converting the direct actions achieved by a tactical level undertaking into an objectives that works towards the strategic ends.

Thus it seems to me that an Operational level of war exists in theory and should also in practise. I would disclaimer this that with my definition of an Operational level working solely within one’s own command chain is, due to being removed from direct feedback of tactical events (rather receiving only the feedback of tactical outcomes) and from strategic considerations, extremely vulnerable to inefficiencies and bad practices. Minus direct and immediate feedback the Operational level has very little evolutionary incentive to evolve towards best practices until it is too late.

As an interesting side-note, the Israeli offensive in 1967 (the Six Day War) did not have an operation ‘name’. From the IDF’s director of operations at the time:


We’ve got a plan for everything – even for capturing the North Pole. The plans are like bricks. They can be used one by one to build up for a structure as the situation develops. We don’t go in for pre-conceived, and therefore inflexible, master plans.’ Gen Weizmann

Excellent Operational level conduct or excellent campaigning at the Tactical level? :wry:

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 10:31 AM
On the other hand, could we become so reductionist on the subject of war that we prohibit the creation of any framework that assists us?
By making it simpler, more robust and flexible. Tactics are essentially "teaching." - that is what they flow from, so they are also tied to a level of command and planning. A Platoon commander used "Platoon Tactics." A Brigade Commander can use "Formation" or "Brigade Tactics." if you actually boil all the Soviet waffle down, that is what you get.

Firstly, what is the alternative to the Operational level? A tactical level of war exists – that is evident. How, then, do we link the tactical undertakings of a force to the strategic objectives?
In 1909, with vast million man armies, there were Tactics, Strategy and Operations. Operations ensured that battles/tactics took place at a time and place relevant to the strategy - so basically Operations was the conduct of Campaigns. - See Gallipoli or the Dardenalles.

Battlefield victory does not make a war won, and the art of using battles to win wars – as was eloquently stated – is required.
Wars are won by successful strategy. The military contribution to strategy is the destruction/defeat of the enemies military means. Essentially all this means is that the result of each battle has got to contribute to the next. D'erlon's failure to destroy Blucher at Ligny, meant Napoleon lost Waterloo.


Therefore there will always be the need for command chain to ensure that tactical activities are conforming to the military objectives being pursued. Concur. Something Hannibal might have wanted to look into!

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

GI Zhou
05-06-2010, 12:34 PM
Wilf you wrote:
Depends where you start the clock.

A.A. Sveckhin's 1927 paper is for some reason commonly cited, but as concerns someone talking about solving the "problem", but it's Triandafillov's 1929 "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies," is, IMO the actual starting point.
- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

I have to disagree with you. This is taken from my PhD so sorry for the dry tone:

Soviet staff officers, utilising their experiences during the 1919-1920 Civil War, first espoused the operational level of war in the mid-1920s. The nascent Red Army was involved in fighting on many fronts, and both strategy and tactics did not cover this type of conflict. The concept of the operational art was advanced by Alecsandr A. Svechin, who in 1926 was a member of the Frunze Academy and the Red Army Staff Academy. The concept was developed further by a number of theorists in the 1930s and received its full definition in the Red Army’s Polvei Ustav (Field Regulations) of 1936.

Using the idea of successive operations, Svechin explained operational art thus:

The concept of the operational art was advanced by Alecsandr A. Svechin, who in 1926 was a member of the Frunze Academy and the Red Army Staff Academy. The concept was developed further by a number of theorists in the 1930s and received its full definition in the Red Army’s Polvei Ustav (Field Regulations) of 1936. Using the idea of successive operations, Svechin explained operational art thus:


. . . tactical creativity is governed by operational art. Combat operations are not self contained, they are only the basic material from which an operation is formed. Only in very infrequent cases can one rely on achieving the ultimate goal of combat operations in a single battle. Normally this path is broken into a series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different areas in a theatre and differ significantly from one another due to the differences between the immediate goals one’s forces strive for.

He further wrote:


An operation is a conglomerate of quite different actions: namely, drawing up the plan of the operation; logistical preparations; concentrating one’s forces at the starting position; building defensive fortifications; marching; fighting battles which lead to the encirclement or destruction of a portion of the hostile forces and the forced withdrawal of other hostile forces, either as a result of a direct envelopment or as a result of a preliminary breakthrough, and to the capture or holding of a certain line or geographical area. Tactics and administration are the material and the success of the development of an operation depends on both the successful solution of individual tactical problems by the forces and the provision of all the material they need to conduct an operation without interruption until the ultimate goal is achieved. On the basis of the goal of an operation, operational art sets forth a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements. Operational art also dictates the basic line of conduct of an operation, depending on the material available, the time which may be deployed for battle on a certain front, and finally on the nature of the operation itself. We cannot acknowledge the full superiority of objective battlefield conditions over our will. Combat operations are only one aspect of the greater whole represented by an operation, and the nature of the planned operation.


In the immediate post-civil war period, Soviet Russian military academicians, staff and commanders set up associations to study military science, under the guidance of the Communist Party. One area that was of particular concern to the Military Studies Society of the Red Army was how to articulate as doctrine forms of combat action as well as the restructuring of the armed forces to match these changes in military thought. Two leaders of this school of thought were S.S. Kamanev, the commander of the Red Army from 1919-1924 and M.N. Tukhachevsky. Kamanev wrote:


In spite of all victorious fights before the battle, the fate of the campaign will be decided in the very last battle – Interim defeats in a campaign, however serious they may be, subsequently will be viewed as ‘individual episodes’ – In the warfare of modern large armies, defeat of the enemy results from the sum of continuous and planned victories on all fronts, . . . the uninterrupted conduct of operations is the main condition of victory.

In 1926 Tukhachevsky wrote:


Modern tactics are characterised primarily by organisation of battle, presuming coordination of various branches of troops. Modern strategy embraces its former meaning: that is the ‘tactics of a theatre of military operations.’ However this definition is complicated by the fact that strategy prepares for battle, but it also participates in and influences the course of battle. Modern operations involve the concentration of forces necessary to strike a blow, and the infliction of continual and uninterrupted blows of these forces against the enemy throughout an extremely deep area. The nature of modern weapons and the modern battle is such that it is impossible to destroy the enemy’s manpower by one blow in a one day battle. Battle in a modern operation stretches out into a series of battles not only along the front but also in depth until that time when the enemy has been struck by a final annihilating blow or when the offensive forces are exhausted. In that regard, modern tactics of a theatre of military operations are tremendously more complex by the inescapable condition mentioned above that the strategic commander cannot personally organise combat.

In all my readings I never came across the term 'Deep Battle' . From memory this is a US Army term which is used to describe the area 70 to 150km behind the FEBA (old term I know). To strike at the second echelon. It is certainly not what Soviet officers were talking about. A series of successive battles in disparate sections along many fronts.

However I really do believe, to quote a mentor and friend, we are over intellectualising something which is quite simple. We are all arguing over the same thing, from a different viewpoint. :(

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 01:23 PM
I have to disagree with you. This is taken from my PhD so sorry for the dry tone:
Not sure what you are disagreeing with, but I would be interested to read your PhD.

I am pretty well aware of how the Soviets tried to explain the idea - which is why I remain unconvinced. You are right that the term "Deep Battle" is never used. IMO, it actually comes from Simpkin's book on Tukhachesvsky. - which is why is said,

- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

Sure AA Svechkin may up with the all terminology, but what about the actual practice? I've only read the paper attributed to Svechkin, in the 1927 "Strategiya," - and it's pretty rambling stuff, and the definitions are not good.
He does not tackle the real issues that Triandiffolov does. IMO, Triandiffolov gets the ball rolling in a practical way - a year later, and may have written it well before. You have to split and encircle enemy armies, to destroy them across their "depth." Like it or not, "Deep Battle" is how the Soviet attack into the enemies depth is described.

Now I do not believe that PU-36 is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle," because it's actually pretty banal stuff. I do not think it is actually anything much to do with Operational Art either, but it is supposed to be the practical guidance laid out by Tukhachesvsky. If you know or can prove he didn't write it, then sing out.

Steve Blair
05-06-2010, 01:48 PM
Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

Sherman was actually tactically weak, so using him for this isn't really a good example. Sheridan was a much stronger tactical commander, IMO, than Sherman. So maybe Sherman's a better example of the "operational" level....;)

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 01:52 PM
GI Zhou, In terms of clarity, let me state my thesis, then you can re-butt.

a.) AA Svechkin wrote a not very good paper with some definitions in. I am not aware of any particularly insightful work he does after that.

b.) Triandifflov wrote a not entirely original book, which was a practical expression of how to destroy/defeat very large armies - the problem Svechkin was talking about.

c.) Regardless of the terms, what is contained in PU-36 is not demonstrative of something called "Operational Art".

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 01:55 PM
Sherman was actually tactically weak, so using him for this isn't really a good example. Sheridan was a much stronger tactical commander, IMO, than Sherman. So maybe Sherman's a better example of the "operational" level....;)
Eyh... :rolleyes: well he delivered his tactically weak stuff where it has strategically useful, by virtue of "Operations." Operations are vital - but that does not make an "operational level of war."

Tukhachevskii
05-06-2010, 03:10 PM
...of my days at Uni came flooding back after reading some of the above posts (I had a particular fondness for Soviet Military Thought; hence my moniker:cool:). I understand, wholly, the confusion around the Operational level of war; even my lecturers had trouble defining this one. Personally, I prefer Svechin's definition because of its pragmatic rather than dogmatic/doctrinal bent;


"tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path"

In Soviet military science and strategic thought any physical combat between units of any size was defined as a "tactical action" regarding boi (combat /fighting in the literal sense). Operations loosely refered to all the competencies, manoevres, resource allocations, planning and logistics required to get a particular unit to a particular location to secure a particular objective or acheive a particular mission. Soviet Divisional, Army, Army Group and Front level forward detachments (anything from coy to Reg/Div in size) regardless of the manourvere they were conducting (tactical forward reconnaissance, seizure of a bridge, an OMG, etc) were considered to be engaged in tactics once in actual contact with the enemy.

Confusingly, Edward Luttwak (http://www.jstor.org/pss/2538420) defined operational art and the operational level of war as that doman within which units tasked with strategic objectives conducted "relational manouvre" prior to their units shaking out and engaging in tactical level actions to attain their missions. (I have a pdf if anyone is interested enough to bother requesting it)

The way I figure it, Operational art, concerns the unification of tactical actions and their harmonisation with strategic requirements through the campaign. Operational art, therefore, (or, at least from what I was taught) concerns campaigns (multiple battles and objectives) whereas tactics concerns singular engagements. The old school definition for what we now call the operational level was "grand tactics". I think there's a clue in there somewhere.

Anyway, here are some other texts which may help/hinder/cloud further understanding;

David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art of War: Part I" (www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/1987/1987%20jablonsky.pdf) and "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part 2" (www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1987/1987%20jablonsky%20part%20ii.pdf) in Parameters, 1987.

J. J. Schnieder, "Origins of Operational Art" (www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/1989/1989%20schneider.pdf) in Parameters, 1987.

John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level" (da.mod.uk/defac/publications/jk.pdf), RUSI.

Col. M. R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art" (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf).

See also, Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?" (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Dunn.htm), who defines operational art as ...

...The Operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. it is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

This has probably confused things terribly but then again, in the spirit of my namesake, why not?:D

GI Zhou
05-06-2010, 05:37 PM
In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.

My refences are:

Svechin, A.A. Strategy, East View Publications, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 68. This is a translation of his 1927 work, Strategiia, printed in Moscow by Voennyi vestnick.

Kamanev, S.S. ‘Ocherednye voennye zadachi’, (Successive military objectives), in Voprosy strategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940) , Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 149 – 152cited in Glantz, D.M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 21; and

Tukhachevsky, M.N. ‘Voina’ (War,), 1926, in Voprosystrategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940),Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 104-105, cited in Glantz, op. cit., p. 22.

Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.

Secondly could someone show me how to do use the quotation boxes please.(Mod's note PM sent earlier).

Cheers,

GI Zhou 0337 hrs

Tukhachevskii
05-06-2010, 06:13 PM
In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24,

IMO, this is a very problematic book. Simpkin knew his stuff, undoubtedly, but it's the use to which he put said stuff that raise numerous issues for me at least.

Pete
05-06-2010, 06:34 PM
Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces! Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name! This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

Steve Blair
05-06-2010, 06:39 PM
Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces. Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the ssame name. This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

I think it depends on whose comments and threads you follow, Pete. I (for one) have been deeply concerned by the (strong) possibility that the Army would repeat the post-Vietnam mistake of burying Small Wars training. While mine may be a minority concern, it is one that others here do share (with their own reasons and reasoning, to be sure, as well as their own takes on the situation and possible solutions). Prolific posters do not necessarily indicate a consensus opinion on this or any other forum.

Entropy
05-06-2010, 07:21 PM
Wilf,


Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

I don't really have a dog in this argument about levels of war, but to play the devil's advocate, could not the "operational level" be the coordination of various bureaucratic fighting organizations toward strategy fulfillment? In other words, "joint" and "coalition" operations may constitute an "operational level" of war - the coordination of different forces which use different equipment, tactics and doctrine all toward a common purpose?

Ken White
05-06-2010, 08:06 PM
Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum.All sorts of stuff... :rolleyes:
I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces!Seems to me that dissecting FM 3-24 would be totally consistent with your "address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine" comment...

I for one said it was deficient in that it was too long, too esoteric and roamed into policy matters not the Armed forces business among other things. A number of suggestions for improvement have been offered by many. :confused:

Several here got involved in getting the Army to allow comments to several new manuals in open forum here. I don't recall your contributions to that effort, so could you remind if you partook or not?
Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name!I think you missed a number of things.

- This thread started last year with a link to a monograph published by internationally respected military thinkers 16 Sep 09. That's fairly current. In that monograph, the authors contend that the US Army lost the bubble by getting wrapped around 'the operational art.' A contention with which I agree. Whats' your opinion?

- That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the Monograph . Those all ceased last October with Comment #28. None of the 27 additional comments in the current sub-thread started by ChrisJM yesterday address FM 100-5 -- except yours... :D
This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!Well, we could discuss WW I in greater detail I guess...;)

Neat thing is that participation is not mandatory.

GI Zhou
05-06-2010, 08:37 PM
In 1993 my brother was in Saint Petersburg as a guest of the then new government. He was with a group of very senior officers who offered a toast. One officer offered the toast to the government. he was over ruled with the expression, (censored) the government, TO THE TSAR! My brother felt distinctly uncomfortable, as we are republicans, being our forefathers were Fenians and all. Selected by the best British judges on the first assisted migration scheme to Australia.

Lest anyone thinks that Afghanistan or Iraq were/are small wars per se, how many tens of billions and tens of thousands of soldiers have been or have set foot in country. How many soldiers are in Afghanistan now? To me that is a pretty big war.

It is on many fronts, with different players, and at stake is no less than the survival of the state. Many of the issues that faced Lenin, Trotsky et al.

Many people, well officers, grappled with what term to describe hunting small groupos of insurgents bent on causing havoc in isolated areas. Low Level Conflict was one until one is reminded the entire Australian Defence Force was deployed. All that training and doctrine paid dividends in the 1990s onwards, from East Timor onwards.

Pete
05-06-2010, 11:16 PM
That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the monograph.

Ken, you and I discussed the operational level of war and its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644&page=4
) a few months ago. (Gosh, when a first sergeant has got your number it can turn into a long, long tour of duty ... )

Chris jM
05-07-2010, 12:42 AM
By making it simpler, more robust and flexible. Tactics are essentially "teaching." - that is what they flow from, so they are also tied to a level of command and planning.

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level."

Gotcha - or at least got the basis of your objections to the Operational on a simplistic level. I'm going to be interested in reading further on this subject when time allows (as such, thanks for the small bibliography Tukhachevskii - looks like a good list to start with) with the anti-Operational view fixed in mind.

I do hope that everyone here realizes that when I fail my next promotion course after I deliberately disregard the Operational Level of War and thus go against prime doctrine, I shall be naming and blaming you all!

Ken White
05-07-2010, 02:54 AM
Ken, you and I discussed the operational level of war and its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644&page=4
) a few months ago. (Gosh, when a first sergeant has got your number it can turn into a long, long tour of duty ... )though I'm unsure what that has to with your post in this current sub-thread.

Does that mean you and I were wrong for discussing a manual that has been several times superceded? Or does it mean that since we discussed it on one thread, no one should, especially in a different context, do so on another? Or that no one should criticize doctrinal pubs unless they offer radical and innovative suggestions for change (I can offer about 500 of those. If they have to possess a reasonable chance of being adopted, I might produce two or three). :eek:

I asked two questions; If you'd offered any suggestions for doctrinal change and I asked for your opinion on the contention that the US Army lost the bubble by getting wrapped around 'the operational art.' If you posted the link to say you'd already done that, we can differ -- all that you did in that previous discussion was provide links and a short tutorial on Air Land battle, you did not give your opinion on the issue... :wry:

You said earlier:
Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine.Several of us have stated that the 'Operational level of war' is a flaw in US doctrine and are willing to discuss that and to give our own opinions as opposed to quoting someone else. Your earlier comments were a neat tutorial and a couple of links to elsewhere but no 'Pete' opinions can be discerned, you neither panned the concept or defended it. You provide a lot of links to other Blogs -- which most of us can find on our own -- but you rarely state an opinion or engage in a discussion on the merits of an issue. I'm unsure how that addresses deficiencies in doctrine. Seems to me that if you want to discuss doctrinal deficiencies, you have an option and the ability to do that... ;)

William F. Owen
05-07-2010, 05:36 AM
In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.
I have this book on my desk and know it well. I submit Simpkin is wrong.


Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.
On way

William F. Owen
05-07-2010, 05:49 AM
Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine.
I submit we do and have. It's just a bit quiet at the moment.

This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!
Huh??? How so? Do not confuse refusing to buy into the latest silly idea with clinging needlessly to the past. A lot of old stuff worked. A lot did not.

Want radical reform? If I was king, FM3-24, FM3-0 and a few others would all be torched and we'd have a "year zero back to basics," - because now you have all the young turks and some old ones buying into claptrap like "Design!"

William F. Owen
05-07-2010, 05:57 AM
Wilf,
I don't really have a dog in this argument
Get a dog. Chap can't go wrong with a good dog!

about levels of war, but to play the devil's advocate, could not the "operational level" be the coordination of various bureaucratic fighting organizations toward strategy fulfillment? In other words, "joint" and "coalition" operations may constitute an "operational level" of war - the coordination of different forces which use different equipment, tactics and doctrine all toward a common purpose?
You could. How would it help? It would still fall foul of confusing strategy with tactics. IMO Operations assure that tactics take place in at the right time and place to fulfil the military contribution to strategy - so to get back the Falklands, Battle Group attacks had to take place, on the Falklands. -Thus you have "Operation Corporate."

Pete
05-07-2010, 11:19 PM
It would be interesting to see how the current version of Field Manual 3-0 defines the operational level of war in relation to the other two levels. An earlier edition of the manual had a murky and verbose definition, as though the authors of the draft manual tried to use as many comments as possible received during the staff review process. Like a case of "too many cooks spoiling the broth," possibly the original definition was fairly cogent until numerous comments on DA Form 2028 were incorporated. I'd also be curious to see how the operational level is defined in Bundeswehr manual 100-100, Command and Control in Battle, since consistency with that manual is said to have been the original reason for the change to FM 100-5 many years ago. It would be a bit like knowing what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they wrote the Second Amendment.

Fuchs
05-08-2010, 12:05 AM
I'm not sure that TF has such a definition (and it's restricted anyway).
It's got (in the Dec 2000 version) rather a kind of job description for the operational leadership:

The operational leadership generates missions and orders for the tactical leadership on the basis of military-strategic demands/targets.
It then goes on about how to do that. This part is mostly about analysis and logistics.

Why did you call the "TF" (Truppenführung) "Command and Control in battle"?
That's a horrible translation. Truppenführung could be much better translated as "leading troops", "troops leadership" or similar.

Truppen = troops, Führung = Leadership

Führung is much more than command and control!

Pete
05-08-2010, 12:31 AM
Fuchs, that's the translation used by an American writer in a journal article I quoted and provided a link to in Message 59 of this thread. I know what Truppenführung means, approximately, but it wasn't used in the article.

Fuchs
05-08-2010, 09:42 AM
It's not only a list operational art standards as is (or was - I didn't read the recent one) FM Operations and not a military ideology statement like the "Warfighting" FM. It begins - just as the classic 30's TF - with a thorough chapter on how to lead men, the expectations for a military leader, what leaders need to take into account and the first two pages of chapter B continue with what's the art of leadership.

Only afterwards you see the standard stuff of operational art, some traces of the '96 "Freie Operationen"/"Operationen in der Tiefe" (Willmann) incl. air mechanisation fashions, standard stuff on tactics and MOOTW chapters.

There's an emphasis on leadership, and that's about the only thing that still makes TF a t least a bit special (I've got many gripes with this FM).

William F. Owen
05-08-2010, 10:08 AM
Truppenführung Part 1 1933 and Truppenführung Part 2 1934, are IMO, near, if not the gold standard of how to create and write doctrine. It is a whole world apart from the utter drivel seen in some recent FMs.

It is explicitly meant to be read, understood and used. Something some current doctrine writers seem not to understand.

Fuchs
05-08-2010, 01:18 PM
...and it fits into a hip pocket. I have a 1936 edition of part I.


Maybe a law text-like approach to FMs would help nowadays. The law people have their law text and a (in theory non-binding) commentary. The reader can read the commentary if he doesn't get the law text or wants details.

A wiki approach could help as well.

ryanmleigh
06-24-2010, 06:51 PM
It would be interesting to see how the current version of Field Manual 3-0 defines the operational level of war in relation to the other two levels.

JP 3-0 (2008): Operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

FM 3-0 (2008): The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define that end state. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Probably not much help or any clearer than previously discussed.