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J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 01:48 AM
(Moderator added comment: Introductory remarks were on the Hail & Farewell thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8667).

My long-winded introduction is really just to set the stage for my own personal crusade, which is to help communicate the fundamentals of Smart Power at the interpersonal level. Having spent most of my professional life immersed in cultures other than my own (thanks to an incredibly strong and patient wife!), I've experienced countless incidents in which conflict was avoidable or avoided by improved understanding between parties. The members of this council, above most other groups, must be aware of the tragic consequences when innocent lives are tangled up in violent hatreds.

At the same time, we all have to respect the periodic requirement for "necessary violence" (i.e., in response to a suicide bomber's approach to an entry control point).

I write two blogs and a hardcopy column on this important topic. (Those are ConflictInContext.org (http://ConflictInContext.org) and PowerfulPeace.net (http://PowerfulPeace.net) - I'll try to link the column to my profile. Note that the latter is published as "Jack Oatmon".) I'm also writing a book, similarly titled "Powerful Peace", in hopes of reaching readers across the spectrum to "subvert" excess reliance on force. It will be a sort of global hearts-and-minds campaign, intended to leverage the proactive engagement of citizens in the US and beyond.

Okay. With that out of the way...let the opinion attacks begin. :)

jmm99
10-14-2009, 02:51 AM
But why should "the opinion attacks begin" ?

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 03:04 AM
But why should "the opinion attacks begin" ?

Believe me, I'd be plenty happy not to face heavy fire with my very first posting, but I've encountered resistance to Smart Power as being too "touchy-feely". Folks sometimes assume it's an expression of weak passivity, rather than a disciplined focus on balancing hard and soft influence.

Interestingly, most detractors tend to come from outside the SOF world, while my SEAL colleagues and their Army counterparts generally "get it". Similarly, this Small Wars assembly may also be more receptive to the concepts.

jmm99
10-14-2009, 03:23 AM
I didn't get into your blogs for content. Since the post contained nothing exceptionable, I didn't see the controversy. So, in a few bullet points, what is "Smart Power" ?

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 04:33 AM
I didn't get into your blogs for content. Since the post contained nothing exceptionable, I didn't see the controversy. So, in a few bullet points, what is "Smart Power" ?

"Smart power" is a term used in a 2004 Foreign Affairs article by Suzanne Nossel.

She was defining in one phrase a necessary blending of two concepts originally contrasted by Prof. Joseph Nye in the early 1990's. Hillary Clinton (and please note that I'm deliberately apolitical with these references) used the words "smart power" ten times during her confirmation as Sec State. Here is her definition:

"We must use what has been called smart power – the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural - picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy."

Nye first coined the term "soft power" in order to describe a tool he believed the US government had traditionally under-utilized: capitalizing on our natural resource of attraction for other cultures, e.g., Japanese fascination with Elvis, bobby socks and baseball.

He explained that we as an institution tend to lean too habitually on "hard power", or the power of coercion. This doesn't mean only a threat of military force, but also other methods of influencing by force such as economic rewarding/withholding or direct manipulation of foreign domestic affairs (look at the long-term results of our early efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan).

So - smart power was defined in the early 2000's as an effective blending of hard power with the soft power defined in the early 1990's.

Among international experts, as you know, there are huge differences of opinion as to how much the super-powered US government should accommodate the desires or demands of less powerful nations.

Where my work modifies this existing controversy even further is in the assertion that it is possible to reach individuals and groups of individuals at a much lower level and leverage large enough portions of influenced populations to upwardly or outwardly influence local systems like government or terrorism.

To sum up, I emphasize that because conflict is often based in large part on misunderstanding and ignorance, and that because innocents are harmed in such flare-ups of "unnecessary violence", there is a direct burden of peacemaking on those of us who can recognize both the vicious cycle and effective injection points at a much lower and more practical level than traditional statecraft.

It comes down to people first, and genuine humility on our part to ever accomplish real progress. The Brigadier who served as Iraqi liaison officer to MNC-I told me, "We need to be trusted. My men cannot trust the Americans when they can't feel any trust in the first place."

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 05:59 AM
"
He explained that we as an institution tend to lean too habitually on "hard power", or the power of coercion. This doesn't mean only a threat of military force, but also other methods of influencing by force such as economic rewarding/withholding or direct manipulation of foreign domestic affairs (look at the long-term results of our early efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan).

When did normal everyday diplomacy become "smart power"? The instruments of state craft are Diplomacy and Strategy, are they not?

I think we need a bit more 15th-16th Century Venice and Milan, and lot less new words and terms to describe things we have done for 1,000's of years.

Tom Odom
10-14-2009, 06:31 AM
When did normal everyday diplomacy become "smart power"? The instruments of state craft are Diplomacy and Strategy, are they not?

I think we need a bit more 15th-16th Century Venice and Milan, and lot less new words and terms to describe things we have done for 1,000's of years.

That would be opinion attack number one :D

No speako Italiano, Venico, et Milano
Danny Devito Redux

Bill Moore
10-14-2009, 06:52 AM
First off welcome to the council, now put up your dukes:D

I occassionally agree with Wilf against my better judgment and this is one of those times. Smart power is a concept that basically states we should do things smartly instead of being stupid. I agree, but I hope that isn't new.

As for employing all the elements of national power, when haven't we? I can't think of any conflict where we only employed one so called tool?

I thought our tax dollars paid SEALs to lift big weights, swim long distances, and blow things up, now you're confusing me with this smart power stuff....

William F. Owen
10-14-2009, 06:57 AM
That would be opinion attack number one :D


Good point Tom. I am forgetting my manners.... :wry:

SEAL Chap. Welcome to the council. When did normal everyday diplomacy become "smart power"?

Stan
10-14-2009, 08:47 AM
"Smart power" ...

Rob, Welcome Aboard !

I intentionally will refrain from using Smart and State in the same paragraph :wry:

I however really enjoyed the Finnish Institute's use of the term Soft Power regarding Russia's resurgence:


money, media, alliance with the Orthodox church, and even energy


:eek:

Wonder what SecState thinks of that order of precedence ?

Regards, Stan

M-A Lagrange
10-14-2009, 03:36 PM
Hello, welcome,

So now that we have define smart power or agree that everyody disagree on smart power, can we define "stupid power". May be we will have an agreement on what is not smart and what is power.

jmm99
10-14-2009, 04:49 PM
is this ?


Where my work modifies this existing controversy even further is in the assertion that it is possible to reach individuals and groups of individuals at a much lower level and leverage large enough portions of influenced populations to upwardly or outwardly influence local systems like government or terrorism.

This sounds like Saul Alinsky, who has some students here as to his methodology. In any event, you are clearly not talking about state to state diplomacy and application of "soft power", etc., at that level. Are you basically starting at the tactical level of the "Political Struggle" ?

-----------------------

Basically looking at war (organized violence) as being composed of two reciprocal factors: the Military Struggle and the Political Stuggle. As the intensity of the Military Struggle increases, there is less room for the Political Struggle. Conversely as the Military Struggle winds down, the Political Struggle can intensify ("clear, hold and build" would be one example, imperfect as the "build" part might be in any given case).

An open question in my mind is whether intensification of the Political Struggle can de-intensify the Military Struggle. Advocates of Peace Enforcement (Chap 7 of the UN Charter) and "Robust Peacekeeping" (Chap 6-3/4 of the UN Charter) seem to think so.

As I am using the term "Political Struggle", it is a very broad term covering all of the non-military means used in an armed conflict. It has nothing to do with war as a continuation of politics or policy (Politik, as used by CvC) by use of other means, except that both the Military Struggle and the Political Struggle have to have the same end state as determined by Politik.

There is a natural tendency to first go to the Military Struggle (after all, folks are shooting at you or trying to blow you up) - as to which SWC has many experts (not JMM). Since I fit into the "soft side" of the reciprocal equation (the Political Struggle), I tend to look at that more than the other.

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 05:55 PM
Good point Tom. I am forgetting my manners.... :wry:

SEAL Chap. Welcome to the council. When did normal everyday diplomacy become "smart power"?

This is great! An outpouring of love and affection to really make me feel at home. :) Please forgive my delayed re-entry - I'm en route Afghanistan and access is limited.

As I mentioned at the start, what I'm talking about will raise some hackles about touchy-feely or wishful idealism. Unfortunately, we'll also always have an element of miscommunication in play, and I have to constantly check my message first to reduce the amount I inadvertently create.

Several of you are indisputably spot on, stating that effectively balancing diplomacy and force (or "soft" and "hard") are ancient pillars of international influence and don't benefit from a new catchphrase. I want to publicly announce that I'm not educated or qualified to discuss that level beyond casual speculation.

Where I confused the matter is in emphasizing that international aspect, compared to my actual focus on the inter-personal. I'm borrowing from Nye, Nossel and Clinton because their macro expression structurally reflects my micro view.

JMM, you really got closest to what I should have said, with your reference to Saul Alinsky (my first hearing of him - I'll look him up), and where my point gets still more specific than his "political struggle" is that I'm looking down at a still lower level.

Picture the soccer balls and medicines distributed to little smiling Iraqi kids, with their smiling parents looking on. Picture in contrast a personal security detachment roaring through Baghdad, terrifying those same kids and tearing the rearview mirrors off their parents' cars. Each scenario creates a powerful impression among observers. We need to more persistently measure our message, conscious and otherwise, and work to make un-ugly Americanism a natural state.

Do we have to move aggressively in threat situations? Absolutely. Do we (Sgt Smith, or Cpt Jones) frequently overdo this aggression to a lesser or greater degree for a variety of personal or unit reasons? I say yes. This is the crux.

I've spent more years away from my wife and children than I've lived with them. I've sat in the sand and the mud of a dozen nations, sharing meals from a communal pot, and enjoyed the five-star accommodations of a dozen more. I watched the Islamic fundamentalist attacks of 9/11 live over satellite television, while living overseas with Islamic special forces on an extended training mission.

This personal contact with regular people across the globe makes it painfully clear that government-to-government relations are sometimes in perfect disharmony with the actual will of those citizens. I'm not trying to manipulate the will of states and heads of states, here...merely pointing out that like any great leader, if we recognize unique human talents and interests, we can co-opt the willing energy of human resources worldwide. We can leverage these individually to reduce conflict and better protect those in need.

I know this discussion will stretch on, and I am very grateful to all of you who have chimed in with support or, especially, challenge. My primary tool will have to be anecdotal evidence, because our sharing about a little boy with a melted face in Uzbekistan, or an older, retarded child sprawled pathetically in a baby carriage by his begging grandmother, can tear through an academic exercise and focus the heart of each good man or woman on a solvable problem.

For me, it's exactly about those innocent children on every continent, their needless suffering at the apathetic whim of state-to-state maneuvering, and their mind-blowing potential if offered appropriate opportunity. If only one of them is released to share his God-given talents with the world because of my efforts...my life will make a lot of sense.

One more thing - should I move to a new string and stop clogging up this H&F bin? I'm not familiar with the protocols.

M-A Lagrange
10-14-2009, 06:13 PM
Well a guy who watched 9/11 overseas in an islamic republic cannot be that bad. I heard about it around September 15 and could watch it on TV in December my self.
So sorry to have been sarcastic.


Picture the soccer balls and medicines distributed to little smiling Iraqi kids, with their smiling parents looking on. Picture in contrast a personal security detachment roaring through Baghdad, terrifying those same kids and tearing the rearview mirrors off their parents' cars. Each scenario creates a powerful impression among observers. We need to more persistently measure our message, conscious and otherwise, and work to make un-ugly Americanism a natural state.

I would 200% agree with that and not only for USA.
But I will also warn you about the effect of a soldier distributing soccer balls and medecine to population and believing this has no bad effects.
I, myself, believe in the none mixing of activities between military and civilian action in war zones. Does not mean that civilian action cannot support a military objective. But I believe that military trying to carry civilian actions in war zones is as bad as civilians trying to conduct military operations. Each of us have his area of expertise and sometime it can be melte but keeping the apparences of separation does help both sides.

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 06:50 PM
I would 200% agree with that and not only for USA.
But I will also warn you about the effect of a soldier distributing soccer balls and medecine to population and believing this has no bad effects.... Does not mean that civilian action cannot support a military objective. But I believe that military trying to carry civilian actions in war zones is as bad as civilians trying to conduct military operations. Each of us have his area of expertise and sometime it can be melte but keeping the apparences of separation does help both sides.

M-A,

Thank you for your insight. I agree that healthy boundaries between civil and military actors are very important. If professional soldiers become distracted by playing with children, then no one's keeping watch while the bad men approach and everyone loses.

I think an important question is whether we have anything at all precisely resembling a "war zone" between OIF and OEF. In both Iraq, where I spent thirteen months over 2008-2009, and Afghanistan, where I am settling in for a spell, there are no battle lines - only geographic and societal blobs that are less bad and more bad from our various perspectives.

Within those blobs, there are hundreds of thousands of human beings who are in no way involved in taking up arms against "our" side. Each one of them requires some food, some clean water, some adequate shelter...and yet there are others who are actively engaged in killing as many outsiders as possible.

With this scenario in place, the situation obviously demands that we maintain both military and development units in the theater. A simple abandonment of the population's needs will inevitably result in increased hostility toward us. That's the practical application of my "Applied Smart Power" - it is in my own best interest to look out for the interests of those around me. If altruism seems a little too ambiguous, we at least have self interest to fall back on.

What should also be obvious, but isn't effectively put into practice, is the desperate need for unified coordination of all elements with some stake in the game, not just military commanders and civilian chiefs running independent operations according to their very capable, but un-coordinated judgment. Such ops almost always have some detrimental overlap to the best interests of other efforts.

M-A Lagrange
10-14-2009, 07:42 PM
What should also be obvious, but isn't effectively put into practice, is the desperate need for unified coordination of all elements with some stake in the game, not just military commanders and civilian chiefs running independent operations according to their very capable, but un-coordinated judgment. Such ops almost always have some detrimental overlap to the best interests of other efforts.

How to tell you that I do agree.
The funniest in the story is that I am one of those relief workers and my personal life looks just like yours: mud and dirty places in forgotten war zones with less than few weeks at home with my family... THhs just to point out that relief workers and militay have most of the time the same ####ty family life at the end. Therefore boundaries are even thiner than we think.

What you are pointing out is exactly what I would like to see/to be. The main problem is that there is a feeling of being absorbed by the humanitarian community from the military and a feeling of being absorbed by the military by the humanitarian community. Which I believe both true and an opportunity for both.

The real question is who stays in command. And the main blocage does not come from the military but from the humanitarian community. It is "stupid" because humanitarian agencies are having political goals and agenda and are bound to political civilian leaders. But the romantic understanding of humanitarism being independant is still strong while the practical implementation of humanitarism is 200% political. And that is why I stand on a moral approach of war.

I also believe that the fact that humanitarism is based on moral values is somehow scary for soldiers or military bodies. But war is a deep desagreement settled through violence between respectable gents. Or should be. starting from there, humanitarism is just making there to remind the boundaries of respectability (humanity?) and patch the disagreement of that way of settling issues.


I think an important question is whether we have anything at all precisely resembling a "war zone" between OIF and OEF. In both Iraq, where I spent thirteen months over 2008-2009, and Afghanistan, where I am settling in for a spell, there are no battle lines - only geographic and societal blobs that are less bad and more bad from our various perspectives.

Well, looking at history shows that the frontline and clearly define war zone is a myth. I never worked in a place where you have A war zone and A nonwar zone. The only example to tell I am wrong that comes streight to my mind is the WWI. But wars are no more conducted that way.
In somehow, we are all rediscovering the weel and it is mostly because the capacity of relief societies to enter in the very heart of the war has increased. What happend in Swat Valley show also that we are trying to go reverse. But unfortunatly, it is impossible to empty a whole country from its population. And should not be done. That is why, according to me, soldiers have to benefit from the increase of humanitarian laws and concerns. But most look at it as more limits.

Good luck in Afghanistan.

jmm99
10-14-2009, 08:21 PM
Some quick refs. His Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Alinsky). His Playboy interview (http://www.forestcouncil.org/tims_picks/view.php?id=1075) (just before he died in 1972). His last book, Rules for Radicals (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_for_Radicals).

Ms Clinton (when she was Ms Rodham in 1969) wrote her senior thesis (http://www.gopublius.com/HCT/HillaryClintonThesis.pdf) on Alinsky and his methodology. Her conclusion was that ground-up organizing was too slow - and opted for the larger governmental approach.

While Alinsky was a Marxist, his methodology has value (but is not The Bible) in any type of ground-up organizing, even for those of, say, a center-right political bent (e.g., JMM). So, also a lot of Lenin, Mao and Giap re: the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle, which have to be on the same page in order to reach an acceptable (note, I said acceptable) end state.

There must be dozens of existing threads here at SWC which address the concepts of "Smart Power" at its basic level (down to the people and villages). And, COL Jones has yet to chime in on the subject. :)

Best to all

Mike

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2009, 10:21 PM
...This is such an excellent discussion. You two and others are bringing a lot of valuable perspective and information. (You can be sure, though, that I'll be extremely wary about flavoring my Applied Smart Power for conflict reduction with references to a published Marxist! As Paul and John sang, "If you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, ain't nobody gonna listen to you anyhow.")

As a new guy, I still feel bad for tying up our Hail & Farewell bin - is there a moderator or tech wizard who could export the whole thing to another section? Alternatively, would a veteran recommend I open a new thread to pick up the conversation?

davidbfpo
10-14-2009, 10:44 PM
A new thread will appear.

slapout9
10-14-2009, 11:09 PM
As Paul and John sang, "If you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, ain't nobody gonna listen to you anyhow.")


What...... somebody say Paul...John.....The Beatles.....Revolution Live version:)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Imb4tYOk8GE

MikeF
10-14-2009, 11:10 PM
This is what happens when you take a SEAL outta water. They start getting all Dr. Phil and touchy-feely on us. Y'all need to be out hunting pirates. :D

Welcome aboard Rob. I've never met a SEAL that I didn't like or that I wouldn't give a hard time as the opportunity presented itself :cool:.

I'll check out your website and provide some thoughts on "Smart Power." Off the top of my head, I like it. Right now, I'm on a "More FID and Greg Mortensen, Less occupation and GPF" kick. We'll see where that leads.

And, most importantly, good luck down-range.

v/r

Mike

jmm99
10-15-2009, 12:25 AM
from DB
You can be sure, though, that I'll be extremely wary about flavoring my Applied Smart Power for conflict reduction with references to a published Marxist! As Paul and John sang, "If you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, ain't nobody gonna listen to you anyhow."

and I thought it was because others were deaf - too much St. Paul and not enough of Paul et al. Still you have to admit that Lenin, Mao and Giap were winners in their major armed conflicts. :D

and MikeF: I will await your incorporation of "Smart Power" into the General Theory of Few Kinetics. Truly that will be a synthesis of thesis and antithesis (in Marxist terms, of course). Seriously, you've been doing that in your writings long before this. Keep writing. :)

Regards

Mike

MikeF
10-15-2009, 12:45 AM
and MikeF: I will await your incorporation of "Smart Power" into the General Theory of Few Kinetics. Truly that will be a synthesis of thesis and antithesis (in Marxist terms, of course). Seriously, you've been doing that in your writings long before this. Keep writing. :)

Regards

Mike

Mike, glad you picked up on that. I'm actually working things backwards- most write the dissertation then the book. I'm doing the prose first using my experience to challenge Nash Arbitration as I haven't finished the mathematics yet.

It's just like in a divorce. Nash shows the lawyers and judges (arbitrators), how to divide utility (property). Still, the ex-couple is left to deal with the emotions (hate, anger, jealousy, etc...) as the union dissolves. Same rules apply on the state to state level and small wars. Arbitrating conflict resolution or the General Theory of Few's Kinetics:cool:. I'll get there.

Mike

J. Robert DuBois
10-15-2009, 02:52 AM
This is what happens when you take a SEAL outta water. They start getting all Dr. Phil and touchy-feely on us. Y'all need to be out hunting pirates. :D


Mike,

Thanks for the welcome. You're right about the water thing. I feel a mounting sense of anxiety as I deploy farther and farther...and farther...from the beautiful, blue sea! :eek:

William F. Owen
10-15-2009, 05:37 AM
Smart Power?

Not trying to start a fight here, but I'd be a lot happier with a prescise definition equating to general description of activities to judge what is actually being talked about.

...because I am still a bit confused. I do applaud the attempt to recognise that doing stupid things is .... well stupid. These would be being offensive to people undeserving of it, or just behaving badly or even killing people that do not need killing.

Do you really need to explicitly recognise this? Training? Education? Maybe we do, but it has to be prefaced with "You have been stupid because...."


I emphasize that because conflict is often based in large part on misunderstanding and ignorance, and that because innocents are harmed in such flare-ups of "unnecessary violence", there is a direct burden of peacemaking on those of us who can recognize both the vicious cycle and effective injection points at a much lower and more practical level than traditional statecraft.
I dispute that as a useful assertion. It's one possible view, and it is highly context specific. Conflict in not often based in large part on misunderstanding and ignorance. Sometimes it is.
Smart power or even soft power cannot function unless "hard power" is the predominant element in play.

Being fair (not kind. Kind = weak) to the population, rewarding and/or inciting good behaviour, and even offering limited social benefits is mind-numbing common sense - and that is good. All for it, but how does this qualify as "Smart Power?" Why not call "Military Local Government," or even "Local Government."

Steve the Planner
10-15-2009, 06:49 AM
I'm down with the genuine sentiments on the population, but I do have a problem with the slogans.

All these conflict zones have a history of sloganeering from their dictators: Arbeit Macht Frei, etc... but nobody quite knows what the slogans mean.

In my profession (civilian planning), I wrote a feature article for Planning Magazine in 2003 that led with: "Smart Growth is so last year...". Got a lot of editorial questioning ahead of then, but, the mixed messages and bewilderment of Smart Growth had solved within a year. We've already done the Smart XXX thing to no ultimate value.

In December 2007, I brought a copy of "Implementation," by Wildavsky and Pressman, a basic text in planning/public administration that tells the sad story of the Great Society effort to reconstruct Watts after the riots. All the money, all the political will, but no results. The implementation phase failed giving rise to a great teachable moment of what can and can't be done, and how to channel and structure good intentions into viable public solutions.

There were only a handful of Senior Planner/City Managers, and two out of three of us brought the same book. One even taught from the book in courses on public administration.

So we listen to a lot of diplomatic/political slogans on soft power, demo/gov capabilities, etc..., and know that it is about the nuts and bolts of economic, societal, political, and essential services expansions. Slogans and concepts are not implementable.

Last week, we had a Planning Conference in DC, during which the UN Under Secretary of the UN's Habitat Group introduced their new book and initiatives on informal settlements (old phrase: slums) from Africa through Asia. Looked like the map of Africom/Centcom. 50% Urban; 50% of those in informal settlements; 50% under 30 years of age. Serious poverty, lack of services, social instability.

The problem is: How do we systematize implementable solutions to these high-needs areas either before or after they fall to conflict. The root is always poverty, lack of education/services/resources/participation. Less slogans, more implementable solutions, please.

Welcome aboard.

Steve

Tom Odom
10-15-2009, 07:03 AM
Where I confused the matter is in emphasizing that international aspect, compared to my actual focus on the inter-personal. I'm borrowing from Nye, Nossel and Clinton because their macro expression structurally reflects my micro view.

Good starte with Joe Nye; I worked with/for him in Rwanda. I recommend his book, the main thesis I would describe as "we often achieve our greatest effects because of what we are and what we are seen as versus what we do."

Tom

MikeF
10-15-2009, 07:06 AM
Good starte with Joe Nye; I worked with/for him in Rwanda. I recommend his book, the main thesis I would describe as "we often achieve our greatest effects because of what we are and what we are seen as versus what we do."

Tom

Tom,

Serious question.

Is that meant only for the strategic level? On the ground, I lived by Facta non Verba- deeds not words.

Mike

Tom Odom
10-15-2009, 07:10 AM
Tom,

Serious question.

Is that meant only for the strategic level? On the ground, I lived by Facta non Verba- deeds not words.

Mike

No Mike not at all...

Joe Nye's book concentrates on the effects of things that are non-coercive, as in music, books, etc. Note that he classes economics as hard, not soft power

But the same applies at the boots level when coercive measures are in play

Best
Tom

M-A Lagrange
10-15-2009, 12:09 PM
The problem is: How do we systematize implementable solutions to these high-needs areas either before or after they fall to conflict. The root is always poverty, lack of education/services/resources/participation. Less slogans, more implementable solutions, please.

Steve, how to tell you that you are just right.
Actually I am with the UNMIS, may be the biggest failure of the UN since ever in terms of implementation. Here we are just all becoming crazy as no one is implementing anything!
Coming from the NGO were implementing is all, the absence of action due to the fear to take any responsability is just making me mad.

The worst in that story is the more the UN keep that position, the less they are legitimate. My colleages here are 80% african and even them are feeling being screw by the system. Not saying that african are lazy, far from that, but we are in africa and having 80% african expat staff would show some efforts of africa taking care of african problems.

The bottom line problem is not poverty but rather the lack of will and the absence of accountability of that administration. The worst is that it spoils good people by training them to take no actions, no responsability.
But I have been told you cannot push people to feel concern and it is not your job to push for implementation.

Well, if resident coordinators and New York are not feeling concern and not willing to implement... Who else?

Ken White
10-15-2009, 02:32 PM
Looked like the map of Africom/Centcom. 50% Urban; 50% of those in informal settlements; 50% under 30 years of age. Serious poverty, lack of services, social instability.

The problem is: How do we systematize implementable solutions to these high-needs areas either before or after they fall to conflict. The root is always poverty, lack of education/services/resources/participation. Less slogans, more implementable solutions, please.All that would be helpful here...

J. Robert DuBois
10-18-2009, 03:19 AM
Tom,

Serious question.

Is that meant only for the strategic level? On the ground, I lived by Facta non Verba- deeds not words.

Mike

Thanks, Mike et al. (Who is this "Al" guy?)

I've been off the net for a couple of days, waiting fruitlessly in Kuwait for my milair to OEF. While aircraft get downed for maintenance and our pressure cooker of backed-up travelers grows, it's been difficult for us to get away from the terminal to get online.

I mentioned recently in this thread that A) I won't claim to have the education or certificates to discuss international relations proper, although my reference to "smart power" could certainly lead some to that conclusion; and B) that I also don't claim to be stirring up some sort of popular, coordinated uprising among our target population via a variation (that's alliteration) on smart power.

Rather, what I've hoped to express in this introduction to my "Applied" Smart Power is that it's very much a person-to-person matter rather than nation-to-nation; it can in fact lead to serendipitous improvements at a local level, which can spread into larger population/government influence; and that I'm probably going to have to incorporate anecdotal examples from my work in a little over 30 nations instead of diploma-based justification.

Briefly, to get back to Mike's quoted submission, it seems that we're in a theoretical debate about whether it's good to be nice to non-combatants in a conflict zone (it is) or whether words are more important than deeds under the same conditions (they aren't). In fact, what Joe Nye teaches and Tom endorsed is that the "attractive" aspect of soft power is not about hollow rhetoric at all, and absolutely is about practical action and its value in role modeling. I couldn't agree more that deeds, not words, are what counts. It's unfortunate that our dialogue or my expression would indicate otherwise.

So, how about an anecdote as promised? While I was at one of the three bases in Iraq from March 2008 to March 2009, I had the good fortune to become friends with an Arabic interpreter who is originally from Egypt. We'll call him "Kami".

Kami and I worked together on this particular base for several months, and enjoyed having respectful discussions about Islam, to which he is devoted adherent. In fact, he's so "Muslim" that with his big shaggy beard, serene countenance, and "devotee dot" (the darkened spot on the forehead from a lifetime of pressing that skin against the floor in prayer), you might easily mistake him for a brother of Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's partner in hate.

This background material is key to my teaching about applied smart power. By this point you have a picture of my "Islamist" friend in your mind. This picture is inseparably connected to your individual biases, pro or con, about what an Islamist who looks like al Zawahiri is all about. That assumption probably doesn't match what Kami, the three-dimensional human being, is actually all about, as will be evident from the following Paul Harveyesque "rest of the story":

While Kami and I were talking one day, I mentioned one of the initiatives that our host command had undertaken. A young boy in the local community had been diagnosed with an abdominal tumor, and this tumor had grown out of control and threatened to kill him. Our forces arranged to bring the boy and his father inside the base for follow-on transport to a surgical hospital and complete recovery, all courtesy Uncle Sam.

Kami stared at me with his eyes welling up. "Ah," he said. "God bless America!"

! ! !

I won't comment much more on the story, so each reader can interpret its implications for himself. The one thing I will say, though, is that I can think of a huge number of potentially good outcomes when a respected, devout Muslim scholar takes this new attitude to a madrassa filled with impressionable young men, or back to Egypt where he may share tea with a cousin in the original Muslim Brotherhood.

MikeF
10-18-2009, 03:40 AM
Who is this "Al" guy?

Rob,

Al is that bastard that you meet in grad school. You just learn to include him in any context to sound smart. He's like the art dealer in NYC (academics version of a pimp).

As for your story on Kami- wise words...

As to my question to Tom, I had to think about it for a while. As far as small wars go, Tom (and Stan, his better half, senior NCO), are just genious having spent a lifetime in Africa. I've had to put his book on the backburner (as with Slap's recommendation for a movie), but one should listen when they speak. Now, Tom has moved up to the operational/strategic level and is trying to school us on his findings in the same way David Kilcullen did with The Accidental Guerilla. Pay attention to his words....

I've been trying to sort through the game that I played in Zag, you played with Kami, and Tom played in Rwanda....Here is the game.

A crazy game of Texas Hold 'Em Poker with ten players. As usual, you can't see the opponents cards nor effect the dealer; however, in this game, everyone is allowed to hide their pot so you never know if you're the playing from a short stack, in the middle, or the leader.

Mathematically, this game sucks, and I'm not sure how to solve it, but I guess it holds true to what we're dealing with in A'stan/Pakistan.

Stay cool and keep your head down. My advice to you is to listen to the boys on this board as you execute. I'll read up on Smart power this week.

Mike

bourbon
10-19-2009, 04:55 PM
Right now, I'm on a "More FID and Greg Mortensen, Less occupation and GPF" kick. We'll see where that leads.

Mortenson has new book coming out at the end of next month: Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan (http://www.amazon.com/Stones-into-Schools-Promoting-Afghanistan/dp/0670021156/ref=sr_1_13?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246830688&sr=8-13). We should see if we can get an advance review copy for SWJ blog from the publisher.

davidbfpo
10-19-2009, 05:02 PM
Mortenson has new book coming out at the end of next month: Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan (http://www.amazon.com/Stones-into-Schools-Promoting-Afghanistan/dp/0670021156/ref=sr_1_13?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246830688&sr=8-13). We should see if we can get an advance review copy for SWJ blog from the publisher.

Bourbon,

Best person to review this would be Melissa Payson, who has worked on the ground in both places, maybe not in schools and has the perspective needed.

davidbfpo

Stan
10-19-2009, 05:16 PM
....in this game, everyone is allowed to hide their pot so you never know if you're the playing from a short stack, in the middle, or the leader.

Mathematically, this game sucks, and I'm not sure how to solve it, but I guess it holds true to what we're dealing with in A'stan/Pakistan.

Mike

Mike,
I have this freaky feeling you were in Sub-Sahara with us :cool:

Now that I think about Tom's choices for a genocidal pick-up basketball team (US and French players), I actually wished you were with us :D

Thanks for your wit and wisdom as always, and the kind words!

Regards, Stan

M Payson
10-19-2009, 05:28 PM
I've yet to read Three Cups of Tea, been too busy working in Afghanistan and Pakistan to get to it. I will, I will...

I seem to remember hearing that Greg was held captive in North Waziristan. Sounds about right... Canadian Beverly Giesbrecht is still held there, kidnapped last November, though interpreter and driver were released. David Rohde has just started publishing a five-part series in the New York Times on his ordeal.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all

bourbon
10-19-2009, 05:41 PM
Bourbon,

Best person to review this would be Melissa Payson, who has worked on the ground in both places, maybe not in schools and has the perspective needed.

davidbfpo

Sounds good, maybe when the book comes out SWJ blog could have a symposium on it on and get several different perspectives in there. Mike has been preaching the Mortenson evangel for some time now, Mortenson’s first book Three Cups of Tea became a best seller largely from word of mouth praise – much of it from guys just like Mike.

Intel Geek
11-11-2009, 01:25 AM
Sorry to join the discussion so late.

Does anyone know about the Amerika Haus institutions in Germany? I was wondering if they can be used as a model for the Middle East. Setting up an institution to learn about American democracy may seem a little forced to the intended audience, so I was thinking about setting up institutions where locals can learn about things such as American advancements in science and technology*. I'd like to you some of your thoughts.

*In Soft Power by Joseph Nye, he point out that 70% of Muslims polled say they admire U.S. advancement in science and technology.

Dayuhan
11-11-2009, 02:07 AM
I've sat in the sand and the mud of a dozen nations, sharing meals from a communal pot, and enjoyed the five-star accommodations of a dozen more.

I've taken a somewhat different approach... 30 years with the sand and mud (ok, more dust and mud) of a single less developed and conflict-ridden country. Some differences in perspective perhaps. Regarding this one...


"We must use what has been called smart power – the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural - picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy."

... it sounds wonderful, as non-specific motherhood statements generally do. The devil, as always, is in the details. In any given case, our determination of "the right tool, or combination of tools" is likely to be driven primarily by the prejudices and interests of the individuals and institutions making the determination. All too often these determinations are reached with grossly insufficient understanding of the complex interplay of factions, interests, competitions, and infinite detail that prevails in the environments we seek to influence. Above all we suffer from an apparently overpowering urge to see what we want to see and believe those who tell us what we want to hear. As a result, Americans are often stupidest when we seek to be smart.

Wilf's "me shoot-um heap big many bad guy" approach may sound a bit neanderthal, but it has at least the virtue of knowing what it seeks to accomplish, and how.

It's very easy to sling words like "smart power" around... actually using power intelligently, in the sort of environment where we need to do that, is a whole lot more difficult.

William F. Owen
11-11-2009, 08:43 AM
Wilf's "me shoot-um heap big many bad guy" approach may sound a bit neanderthal, but it has at least the virtue of knowing what it seeks to accomplish, and how.


Wow. Ten years of carefully crafted military thought reduce to a bumper sticker. I must be good! :cool:

It's actually more "If you put them down, and they stay down, stop shooting, so as the others will back off." - but yeah. Force gets you stuff, if you want it for reasons force justifies.

Dayuhan
11-11-2009, 09:22 AM
Hey, it's the 21st century... if you can't say it in 140 characters or less, it's not really there at all.

Personally, I'd say there's some stuff force can get you and some stuff it can't get you, and more often than not it's just one part of what you need to do to get what you want, assuming that what you want is gettable - or even desirable - in the first place.

Now I have to work on getting that onto a bumper sticker.

Bill Moore
11-11-2009, 05:36 PM
Posted by Dayuhan,
All too often these determinations are reached with grossly insufficient understanding of the complex interplay of factions, interests, competitions, and infinite detail that prevails in the environments we seek to influence. Above all we suffer from an apparently overpowering urge to see what we want to see and believe those who tell us what we want to hear. As a result, Americans are often stupidest when we seek to be smart.

This statement is brilliant! I always shocked at the number of folks in the beltway that now advocate so called smart or soft power. This implies that prior to this outstanding idea we were advocates of stupid power?

Perhaps I'm being too harsh, but it seems to me that our ego causes considerable problems. In military units you hear our leadership state we're better than we ever were, "we" (read I) fixed the broken army of the Vietnam era, etc. Yet a more careful reading of history may reveal that the Army we had in Vietnam (prior to the large anti-war movement that undermined our force) was superior in many ways to the Army we have today.

Furthermore do we have more less power today as a nation (and as the West in general) than we did during the Cold War?

Diplomacy is now defined by a perverse set of political correct rules that have little to do with reality or our national interests. One simple case in point the West's reaction to Sri Lanka's victory over the Tamil separatist movement, which they won with military power. Now the West is questioning if their methods were perhaps too harsh? Of course it is much more humane to drag a conflict out for years, because militarily decisive solutions are obviously not smart or soft, just effective (at times).

Information is an area where we should excel, but for reasons unknown we disbanded the highly effectively Voice of America program, and we have developed a bureaucratic process for approvals of messages that have in effect left our forces (across the spectrum, diplomatic, military, etc.) paralyzed in this fight. Messages approved in the beltway are so watered down or altered they have lost all credibility or have completely missed the intent in the first place.

Military power should need no further explanation, we can't effectively use it to deny safehaven to the enemy, or to wage a war of attrition even if we desired to (in addition to using other methods that some now call soft power, funny how much more effective soft power can be when you carry a big stick). In fairness there are good reasons in many cases (not all) that the military is constrained, but it is a fallacy in my opinion to simply assume that a more aggressive application of military power can't be effective in some situations.

Economic power has eroded because we have seemed to lost the art of applying it effectively. This warrants a separate post, but we also need to understand we're no longer the only competitor, and one thing that has changed (based on my limited knowledge of history), this is the first time that a non-state actor (except for perhaps the Catholic Church) has had this much economic power based on donations from the Sunni community at large and funds from organized crime.

More later, gotta run....

Dayuhan
11-11-2009, 10:18 PM
I always shocked at the number of folks in the beltway that now advocate so called smart or soft power. This implies that prior to this outstanding idea we were advocates of stupid power?

I don't think the "Smart Power" term is meant to imply that we previously used stupid power... it's a buzzword, selected for immediate impression on an audience that's only half paying attention. What they are trying to communicate would be perhaps better expressed as subtle power vs crude power, but that would be too subtle for the audience.

One problem with the formulation is that power, crude or subtle, is only as smart as those who apply it, and I see no evidence that we're any smarter than we were before. You can apply crude power without being smart, and you can also apply subtle power without being smart, and make a mess either way. Try to be too subtle without an accurate and dispassionate assessment of what you're getting into and all you do is tie yourself in a series of knots.


Perhaps I'm being too harsh, but it seems to me that our ego causes considerable problems. In military units you hear our leadership state we're better than we ever were, "we" (read I) fixed the broken army of the Vietnam era, etc. Yet a more careful reading of history may reveal that the Army we had in Vietnam (prior to the large anti-war movement that undermined our force) was superior in many ways to the Army we have today.

Ego has always been an issue. Whether today's military is or is not superior to that of the early Vietnam years would depend on a number of factors, not least of which would be how we choose to define "superior". In any event I'd argue that the change in the US position relative to the rest of the world has more to do with political and economic factors than with military ones. I'm also not convinced that America has declined economically or politically: the situation has changed because the rest of the world has gained. That's not altogether a bad thing, in fact it's in many ways a good thing, but it does change the game and we have to change with it.



Furthermore do we have more less power today as a nation (and as the West in general) than we did during the Cold War?


You could argue that the West has actually gained power... but so has the non-west, and at a greater rate. Again, this is by no means entirely a bad thing.



Diplomacy is now defined by a perverse set of political correct rules that have little to do with reality or our national interests. One simple case in point the West's reaction to Sri Lanka's victory over the Tamil separatist movement, which they won with military power. Now the West is questioning if their methods were perhaps too harsh? Of course it is much more humane to drag a conflict out for years, because militarily decisive solutions are obviously not smart or soft, just effective (at times).


I dislike political correctness as much as anyone, but we have to recognize that the days when we could simply impose a solution that suits our interests are gone forever. Now it's all about seeking solutions that serve multiple interests, though none will ever be suited perfectly. It's analogous in some ways to the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy. In a dictatorship decisions are quick, simple, and clear; in a democracy they are anything but... but in the long run, which is more stable?



Military power should need no further explanation, we can't effectively use it to deny safehaven to the enemy, or to wage a war of attrition even if we desired to (in addition to using other methods that some now call soft power, funny how much more effective soft power can be when you carry a big stick). In fairness there are good reasons in many cases (not all) that the military is constrained, but it is a fallacy in my opinion to simply assume that a more aggressive application of military power can't be effective in some situations.


All of our current fights are being conducted in other nations, and in each case we are trying to establish a government that will be seen as sovereign, not subordinate to us. This necessarily constrains our military options. If we wanted to run these places as colonies and call the shots ourselves, we'd have more options, but that would raise a new set of problems.



this is the first time that a non-state actor (except for perhaps the Catholic Church) has had this much economic power based on donations from the Sunni community at large and funds from organized crime.


I'm not convinced that AQ really wields significant economic power.

Bill Moore
11-12-2009, 12:39 AM
I'm not convinced that AQ really wields significant economic power.

The fact that non-state actors are supporting (in some cases with State support) effective insurgencies, NGOs that provide medical care and preach violent jihad (it's working, so it is influence, thus power), and build their version of schools (and pay for students around the world to attend them) to further mobilize the 1.3 billion Sunni Umna clearly indicates that non-state actors have considerable economic power. Economic power isn't based on GDP, it based on how much influence you have over the relevant audience with the money you do have. In other words, economic power is not always economic might (if you're constrained from spending your money effectively, it doesn't matter), economic power is the ability to wield your economy capability (whether is $2mill or $2bill) in a way that "influences" the target audience to conform to your desires.

The other side of the coin is that our state based economic power centers are more vulnerable to attack than non-state economic centers of gravity. On the other hand, with the exception of freezing some bank accounts, their sources of economic might through organized crime, world wide donations through informal channels, etc. are much harder to target effectively. I'm a supporter of the argument that non-state actor indirect attacks on our economy (actions that cause us to spend, spend, spend in response) may not be sustainable, but that is open to debate. To avoid stupid spending where we get no return on our investment we need to develop a smart strategy (different than so called smart power).


I don't think the "Smart Power" term is meant to imply that we previously used stupid power... it's a buzzword

You made my point, it is nothing new, just another buzzword; however, the implication is clear, military power is stupid and it won't work. Those who study these matters have always known there are some problems where the military is the correct response and other cases they're simply a supporting arm if they're a player at all. As you look throughout our history you can find several examples of so called smart power. Smart power could actually mean something, it could mean developing our human capital with education, but I'm off on another subject....


In any event I'd argue that the change in the US position relative to the rest of the world has more to do with political and economic factors than with military ones.

No doubt that is true, furthermore we have new threats that our Cold War political-military model is not ideally postured to deal with; however, (and this may not be your intent) you can't separate military power from the evolving economic and political environment, since both define (and constantly redefine) how military power can be employed. My argument that our current (post cold war era) views has severely constrained the military to the point that even if the administration desires a military solution it is not possible. Keep in mind that can change very rapidly, since we all know the last World War (hell, the last war ever according to some) was WWI. We may have to get mean again, and if we do the political environment will probably change to allow that.


I dislike political correctness as much as anyone, but we have to recognize that the days when we could simply impose a solution that suits our interests are gone forever.

I think you missed the mark on this one, due to political correctness we attempt to impose what are perceived as hostile Western solutions that suit our views (not necessarily our interests). If we would wake up and realize we can't always impose our views upon others (unless we're willing to do so by force), then we'll develop more realistic policies. I think we may agree on this one?

Dayuhan
11-12-2009, 08:44 AM
The fact that non-state actors are supporting (in some cases with State support) effective insurgencies, NGOs that provide medical care and preach violent jihad (it's working, so it is influence, thus power), and build their version of schools (and pay for students around the world to attend them) to further mobilize the 1.3 billion Sunni Umna clearly indicates that non-state actors have considerable economic power.

I wouldn't call that economic power, I'd call it the effective application of limited economic resources to the development of ideological power. Semantic difference really, two descriptions of the same phenomenon.



The other side of the coin is that our state based economic power centers are more vulnerable to attack than non-state economic centers of gravity.

Here I'd say that our task is less to attack an economic center of gravity than an ideological center of gravity. if the ideology is effectively undermined and loses its appeal, the economic resources dry up. Since the economic needs of jihad are really quite modest it will be difficult to close them off effectively.



Those who study these matters have always known there are some problems where the military is the correct response and other cases they're simply a supporting arm if they're a player at all. As you look throughout our history you can find several examples of so called smart power. Smart power could actually mean something, it could mean developing our human capital with education, but I'm off on another subject....


To me the danger of the "smart power" construct lies in the assumption that since reliance on military power alone is seen within this construct as "not smart", any introduction of non-military elements will automatically make our use of power "smart". This is completely fallacious: any type of power and any combination of types of power can be used stupidly. There is no smart ratio of hard to soft power that applies universally. Smartness requires a realistic assessment of a problem and the selection of appropriate tools to solve that problem. Some problems may require all hard power, sopme all soft, some a blend, but in any case the outcome is only smart if it represents a realistic solution to the problem, based on an honest, detailed assessment devoid of ideological preconceptions.



I think you missed the mark on this one, due to political correctness we attempt to impose what are perceived as hostile Western solutions that suit our views (not necessarily our interests). If we would wake up and realize we can't always impose our views upon others (unless we're willing to do so by force), then we'll develop more realistic policies. I think we may agree on this one?

Certainly we can agree that realism is desirable, and that ideology and preconception - politically correct or otherwise - generally obstruct realism. I'm sure we'd find a thing or two to disagree about as well, but that's not necessarily a bad thing.

J. Robert DuBois
11-13-2009, 05:05 PM
Gentlemen, the troublemaker is back. I've been all over Afghanistan the past few weeks, usually with very poor or no bandwidth. Thanks to heavier pipes at tonight's base, I am able to re-enter the discussion.

Firstly, I want to thank everyone who's participating in the controversy. This much energy indicates that we're all focused on moving ahead in building security with maximum effectiveness; the argument seems to be about defining what "effective" means for each one. I genuinely respect each one of you for your deep base of experience and dedication to stopping bad guys. With every challenge, my own grasp of Applied Smart Power grows.

The biggest misunderstanding that's coming up repeatedly is the notion that, if we're only "beginning to use smart power" now, we're condemning all our past national efforts as "stupid". Alternatively, some are supposing that "smart power" means other than violent action. That's also off base. Smart Power is about using the most effective tool or combination of tools on a case-by-case basis. It's like our practical application in the SEAL Teams: learn many, many tools, then use what works according to the situation. (I'm pleased to report that, in addition to maintaining the reputation as consummate life-takers, many of my former Teammates are proving to be among the most effective at tribal engagements and developing invaluable relationships with local leaders in Iraq.)

The most useful paraphrase for what I call "applied" smart power so far is from Dayuhan. Ironically, even though he's expertly defining what I'm advocating, I believe his post is in the form of a criticism against the concept of smart power:


To me the danger of the "smart power" construct lies in the assumption that since reliance on military power alone is seen within this construct as "not smart", any introduction of non-military elements will automatically make our use of power "smart". This is completely fallacious: any type of power and any combination of types of power can be used stupidly. There is no smart ratio of hard to soft power that applies universally. Smartness requires a realistic assessment of a problem and the selection of appropriate tools to solve that problem. Some problems may require all hard power, some all soft, some a blend, but in any case the outcome is only smart if it represents a realistic solution to the problem, based on an honest, detailed assessment devoid of ideological preconceptions.


So that's it. What I'm expressing from immediate, ground truth experience in theater is that not enough attention is being given to the human needs of thousands of non-hostiles in OIF and OEF. Of course we have to shoot hostiles. Of course gate sentries have to use lethal force to stop a suicide bomber. But ignoring the crises of unemployment, for just one example, IS in fact stupid power.

Even a twenty-year-old local kid at Kandahar knows the source of much of what we're still fighting about in this forum. I asked him why, despite abuse and atrocities such as the recent marketplace bombing, the Taliban enjoy enough active or passive support to resist the incredible might of the US military. He didn't even pause for a second, but just answered directly: "Because men don't have jobs."

Military-age males, pissed and ashamed that they can't provide for a family, eventually say Screw It, resign themselves to the only game in town, and help the Taliban because they need money.

Think about it: every adult male reading this, whether you're a seven-foot-tall Dutchman from Amsterdam or a four-foot-tall pygmy from the rain forest, shares the identical masculine needs for respect and dignity. You require self respect. I mean, seriously, a quick glance at some of our inflated egos in print should suffice to prove this point.

As an edifying exercise, put yourself in the shoes of one of the thousands of neutral men in these provinces with no income, sick and hungry children, and only a single, solitary option for making a few bucks - the Taliban. A desperate man can easily rationalize that putting a device by the side of a road does not constitute deliberate violence against the Americans. "All I did is dig a hole, and the fundamentalists gave me $200 to live on for a month. Now my daughter can get the medicine for her dysentery."

Put foreign strangers at risk of possible harm, or lose your little girl? Tell me which you would choose. Yes, there is a real thing called stupid power. It lies in an unwillingness to consider all relevant facts in a matter that directly endangers me and my family.

By the way, I've been quoted in Homeland Security Today magazine. The piece on the recent Saudi suicide bomber is page 4 at: http://ipaperus.ipaperus.com/HomelandSecurityToday/November2009/

J. Robert DuBois
11-13-2009, 05:32 PM
Gents, one factor that may be clouding the issue is that I'm not writing about "soft" power, which is a perfectly necessary part of improved security, but about "smart" power (balancing hard and soft).

The title's misleading because we had to break the original thread, and the new one was named from memory and can't be changed. Keep in mind that it should be "Applied Smart Power from a SEAL", to put the discussion in accurate context.

MikeF
11-13-2009, 07:24 PM
Rob,

I checked out your website, and I dig it. You're feeling my mojo. I'm halfway through an essay for SWJ entitled "Social Entrepreneurs and Small Wars." Be on the lookout.

Mike

slapout9
11-13-2009, 08:04 PM
Rob,

I checked out your website, and I dig it. You're feeling my mojo. I'm halfway through an essay for SWJ entitled "Social Entrepreneurs and Small Wars." Be on the lookout.

Mike

Where is the link to the website:confused:

MikeF
11-13-2009, 08:09 PM
Where is the link to the website:confused:

Slap

His first post.

ConflictInContext.org or try http://conflictincontext.wordpress.com/ and PowerfulPeace.net or http://powerfulpeace.net/

And BTW, if you didn't get the hint, I gotta a final draft for peer-review headed your way before I submit it for publication.

Mike

J. Robert DuBois
11-13-2009, 08:16 PM
Rob,

I checked out your website, and I dig it. You're feeling my mojo. I'm halfway through an essay for SWJ entitled "Social Entrepreneurs and Small Wars." Be on the lookout.

Mike

Thanks much for the boost, Mike.

You know, I've got about a million pieces just about ready for prime time. Who do we talk to about publishing in the Journal?

MikeF
11-13-2009, 08:23 PM
Thanks much for the boost, Mike.

You know, I've got about a million pieces just about ready for prime time. Who do we talk to about publishing in the Journal?

Go here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/submit/) and read through the instructions. There's a link to submit. Dave Dillege and others will peer-review your content and publish if it's good. If you want others to give a pre-read, I'd be happy to help. Send me a PM and we can exchange email addresses.

I'm glad your writing. More professionals and practisioners need to.

Firn
11-13-2009, 08:29 PM
I carried for a long time a crazy idea, taken out of Keynes Magnus Opus:


If--for whatever reason--the rate of interest cannot fall as fast as the marginal efficiency of capital would fall with a rate of accumulation corresponding to what the community would choose to save at a rate of interest equal to the marginal efficiency of capital in conditions of full employment, then even a diversion of the desire to hold wealth towards assets, which will in fact yield no economic fruits whatever, will increase economic well-being. In so far as millionaires find their satisfaction in building mighty mansions to contain their bodies when alive and pyramids to shelter them after death, or, repenting of their sins, erect cathedrals and endow monasteries or foreign missions, the day when abundance of capital will interfere with abundance of output may be postponed. "To dig holes in the ground," paid for out of savings, will increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services. It is not reasonable, however, that a sensible community should be content to remain dependent on such fortuitous and often wasteful mitigations when once we understand the influences upon which effective demand depends.

In Afghanistan we have the trouble that men out of work are for understandable reasons easy to recruit to help or fight for the enemy, as Rob said. There has been and there still should be a lot of money around to invest into Afghanistan. There are many excellent projects around, but for a great many reasons they are difficult to implement. But I reckon that the need for good planning and oversight so as to not squander the money does greatly reduce the speed in which things are built and thus the money goes into pockets. So even inefficient and partly questionable yet very laborious activities as pickaxing roads through a valley or paying villagers to pile up walls could do a great deal of good by primary and secundary effects.

First it puts people at work and helps them to bring something home. Secondly they are less likely to support directly the enemy. With the money they earn they can consume what they think to need most. This stimulates the local economy by bringing in earned money and lessening the security threat. Of course this all sounds simple and is still is difficult to do. It will certainly also foster corruption and a host of other problems like inflation but it might be a part of a sensible approach for the most pressing problems. Just thinking as a whole like a drunken sailor and not like an accountant might actually help.


Firn

J. Robert DuBois
11-13-2009, 09:39 PM
Firn,

I support your assertion that we can defeat many ills with one well-placed investment. In fact, I've lifted the below suggestion from the April piece from my "Applied Smart Power" blog, http://conflictincontext.wordpress.com/ and the April article is: http://conflictincontext.wordpress.com/tag/iraq/ It speaks to the holistic problem - and holistic solution - facing us in OIF and OEF.

And yes - it's simplistic. I'm not naive, and I know that some of our invested funds would be skimmed. Some would even be diverted to insurgent uses...but doing something in this direction, and reaping the rewards, makes it worth the cost:

----------------
“I won’t make my wife a prostitute.”

The man quoted is one of thousands of unemployed Iraqi men, living in pathetic conditions through no fault of his own. He needs work, because his family needs food. His options are simple: 1) acquire gainful employment; 2) put his wife to work on her back with no other marketable skills; 3) emplace an improvised explosive device by the side of a road to earn the freelance insurgent “supporter” rate of $150 – and thus feed his family for a month.

On point 1, where there is nearly 30% unemployment (70% in some areas, and 80% for women), he has no opportunities. On point 2, he has taken a stand. Point 3, then, is the only avenue remaining. When our soldier is struck by that IED, what will our response be? Appropriately, we will capture or kill this now-valid “target”, this pitiful actor at the end of his rope, this family’s only possible breadwinner…greatly worsening the lot of a woman and children already in desperate need.

The neighbors won’t fail to notice how this plays out.

For years I have written and spoken about the urgent need for those of us with dominant power to look through the eyes of and engage other populations and individuals as a higher way to reduce the conflict threatening all sides. These struggles will be described in many forms in upcoming Conflict in Context posts, from passive-aggressive hassles around the workplace to taking a much-unwanted knife in the ribs.

Let me offer just one highly preferable alternative to killing the man who puts out a bomb to kill an American to earn $150 to give his daughter some food: let’s give him $300. That’s right; let’s double his income, giving him a one-time, good-deal payout of $300 to care for his family as he chooses.

Next month, let’s offer him the same $300 – only this time, let’s attach a string: he has to sit through vocational rehabilitation classes to learn a trade like electrical work. Heaven knows, this country is in desperate need of qualified electricians to begin patching together a safe and reliable infrastructure!

The third month, let’s attach another string to his $300: let’s make him accompany an electrician as an apprentice, reinforcing the lessons he learned in class.

His fourth month, and every month afterward, we’ll require him to earn his $300 by working as an instructor-electrician and taking out a new apprentice coming up through the same program.

The fifth month, we split the salary cost 50/50 with the Iraqi government and begin to empower it to take over this domestic responsibility.

Within half a year, the Iraqi government is bearing the entire cost of these salaries in exchange for greatly-improved public power distribution and a huge reduction in injuries caused by faulty wiring. No American soldier was killed by the men in this program, because they receive twice the income for a much safer avocation and discover self-respect. No wife is pimped, no child is hungry, and the rebuilding of a society is in full swing.

How do the costs work out? According to conservative estimates, the US government pays more than ten billion dollars a month to run the war in Iraq. If we round down for argument’s sake to nine billion, this rate could pay for thirty million work-study program participants.

There aren’t even thirty million Iraqis in the whole country!

So let’s divert one thousandth of that 9 billion dollars, and we can begin rebuilding the nation with 30,000 men. Or take just one ten-thousandth (0.001%), and start with only 3,000. That’s 3,000 families restored – 3,000 potential bombers eliminated – 3,000 less chances for our soldier to be torn apart. Imagine where this might take us.

Where would we find less than a million dollars to spare? Well, you can start by cutting out the Baskin-Robbins cart here at my dining facility. It is a war, after all. My comrades and I will find some way to bravely carry on without it.

Real, unlimited solutions in the unlimited world of conflict are within reach, if we are willing to use imagination, daring, and the vast reservoir of experience held by security professionals who refuse to step into the box.

slapout9
11-13-2009, 09:55 PM
Slap

His first post.

ConflictInContext.org and PowerfulPeace.net

And BTW, if you didn't get the hint, I gotta a final draft for peer-review headed your way before I submit it for publication.

Mike



Ahhhh.....I knew that:D I was just checking.

I will be looking for your article.:)

Firn
11-14-2009, 10:44 PM
Firn,

I support your assertion that we can defeat many ills with one well-placed investment. In fact, I've lifted the below suggestion from the April piece from my "Applied Smart Power" blog, http://conflictincontext.wordpress.com/ and the April article is: http://conflictincontext.wordpress.com/tag/iraq/ It speaks to the holistic problem - and holistic solution - facing us in OIF and OEF.

And yes - it's simplistic. I'm not naive, and I know that some of our invested funds would be skimmed. Some would even be diverted to insurgent uses...but doing something in this direction, and reaping the rewards, makes it worth the cost:


I'm also pretty sure that likely the majority of the investments will be skimmed. I'm even convinced that we might become the laughing stock of the locals for being naive when paying for such works and courses. It will become an accountant's worst nightmare and the press might blast it and ask how one can blow the taxpayer's money in such a stupid way. But it might just work as intended and play an important part in our overall effort.


So let’s divert one thousandth of that 9 billion dollars, and we can begin rebuilding the nation with 30,000 men. Or take just one ten-thousandth (0.001%), and start with only 3,000. That’s 3,000 families restored – 3,000 potential bombers eliminated – 3,000 less chances for our soldier to be torn apart. Imagine where this might take us.

Where would we find less than a million dollars to spare? Well, you can start by cutting out the Baskin-Robbins cart here at my dining facility. It is a war, after all. My comrades and I will find some way to bravely carry on without it.

Real, unlimited solutions in the unlimited world of conflict are within reach, if we are willing to use imagination, daring, and the vast reservoir of experience held by security professionals who refuse to step into the box.

You put that better in words than me. I would only stress that the intent is not to spend wisely, but to get as much people from the streets and out of the bomb making garages and giving them money which they can spend as they think is best. The secondary effects should help to create the meaningful jobs by stimulating consumer demand.

All in all it is clear that we should try to do directly something good with the money, like building the famous schools and try to plan and oversight it. But the stress should be on spend and not control, because the latter can greatly reduce the impetus of the former. In such cases we should all try to follow the instinct of our inner drunken sailor. I'm pretty sure we all can :D

Firn

Dayuhan
11-18-2009, 12:23 PM
The most useful paraphrase for what I call "applied" smart power so far is from Dayuhan. Ironically, even though he's expertly defining what I'm advocating, I believe his post is in the form of a criticism against the concept of smart power

I should hasten to say that I've nothing against the idea of "smart power"... who could possibly be critical of smartness? I do have concerns about the widespread use of a term, and establishment of a goal, that is so loosely defined and so thoroughly subject to varying interpretation. It is way too easy for such terms to degenerate into meaningless buzzwords: it's easy to use the term and it sounds great in a sound bite, but it's a whole lot harder to determine what exact combination of instruments, in any given circumstance, will constitute smartness.

Another problem is that what any given individual thinks is "smart" at any given time is likely to be determined by pre-existing ideas and prejudices, rather than by any objective criteria. It is very easy for the quest for smartness to devolve into a competition between various prejudices and agendas.

You can say "we need smart power" or "we need effective solutions tailored to the specific problems at hand" or you could say any number of other things, and all would be correct... but I'm not convinced that saying the words brings us closer to accomplishing the goals. That's especially true when the words are being said by people with only a few years on the ground in the environment in question - or even less - and a completely insufficient understanding of what they are attempting to influence.

Too often I've seen foreigners, and most particularly Americans, walk into troubled countries, look around in a circle, instantly identify "the problem", and dive into a marvelously energetic but generally disastrous attempt at a solution. The problem-solving orientation is not entirely a bad thing, but misapplied, or based on assumptions, preconceptions, or excessively rapid deductions it can do enormous damage.

It is certainly true that economic stagnation and unemployment contribute to conflict, in Afghanistan and in many other places. It is true that many conflicts could be ended if economies could be fixed. Unfortunately, fixing an economy is as difficult, complex, and time-consuming as winning a war, often more so, and anyone familiar with development projects around the world will know that ill-considered or hasty efforts at economic development can have all manner of unintended consequences, many of them not good at all.

It is good to be smart, and good to seek smart power. This is easy to say, just like it's easy to say that "security" or "economic development" or "empowering the people" or "self-determination" etc etc are desirable goals. Of course they are desirable goals, this is not news. The problem is figuring how to achieve those goals, and I'm not sure talking about smartness will make us any more effective at that.

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2010, 03:19 AM
Gents,

It's been nearly a year since my last breath in this forum. After finishing the Afghanistan tour I returned to DC...and straight into the cyclone of writing, speaking and managing stuff. How is it that we can find more time to discuss important matters like this when we're at war than when we're nestled snug in our own beds Stateside?

"Applied" smart power has come much clearer since our last Autumn swirl. Now I'll be able to answer the questions and express the message in a more satisfactory way for anyone hoping to understand it. There won't be much meat in this particular posting, but I attended the "Cutting the Fuse" Congressional gathering with Steve Clemons yesterday and in searching out news of it tonight I stumbled happily back into SWC. More will follow.

(You can see the outline for this conference at: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2010/cutting_the_fuse (http://www.newamerica.net/events/2010/cutting_the_fuse))

Put simply - applied smart power (ASP) is like a micro version of the macro concept of "smart power." Smart power is Joseph Nye's international relations theory that coercion and attraction, or hard and soft power, have to be balanced more effectively between states in order to promote cooperation and prevent inadvertent antagonism (inviting unnecessary violence) through excess force.

"Applied" smart power, then, is that aspect of engagement many of us in the Council have already practiced over many continents and many decades - it's the understanding that comes from an American named Rob or a Brit named Andy working side-by-side with a local guy named Ahmet or Sasha or Burhan, building understanding with that person himself, and having that knowledge trickle up toward countrymen...and policy makers. Applying smart power means ratcheting international theory down to become interpersonal activity.

And yet, what is one of the more common complaints from those of us serving in the mud or sand close to our partners? "Those conventional guys back home/in HQ just don't get it! We are screwing up this fight if the locals can't trust us." We see firsthand how counterproductive certain TTPs or SOPs or policies can be in the big picture of mission accomplishment.

To be fair to critics of ASP, this is not easily distilled down to metrics, any more than a federal judge can define pornography...he just "knows it" when he sees it. However, if you think about many of the higher functions of our peculiar race (the humans) like great art, love, or wisdom, they all tend to be a lot harder to define. Any monkey with a paint-by-numbers canvas can paint a picture, but it ain't art without a master behind the brush.

Likewise, any monkey with a gun can shoot when he feels threatened...but a warrior can discern whether that shooting might do him more harm than good.

That's where this discussion is coming from. I was extremely happy to hear similar balance-hard-and-soft points coming from many of yesterday's speakers, including Congressman Brian Baird, Governor Thomas Kean (if you listened to CSPAN you heard my Q&A with both of them) and of course Steve, Bob Pape and Peter Bergen. There is a virtual "surge" of thinking coming, which is meeting in the middle and agreeing with me that no one "side" can have the only right approach. There is a finer solution somewhere amidst the myriad opinions, which unfortunately take on a life of their own (through the magic of personal ego wars) and become the issue instead of addressing the issue.

As threatened earlier, more will follow. Please feel free to begin attacking at your earliest convenience. :)

By the way, if you aren't too numbed by this overview of ASP yet, I would encourage you to review some illustrative articles at what I consider the finest blog in the ether, PowerfulPeace.net (http://PowerfulPeace.Wordpress.com). Coincidentally, I happen to write Powerful Peace, but I like to think I'd consider it the finest even if someone else wrote it.

- Rob

J. Robert DuBois
10-14-2010, 04:59 AM
You can say "we need smart power" or "we need effective solutions tailored to the specific problems at hand" or you could say any number of other things, and all would be correct... but I'm not convinced that saying the words brings us closer to accomplishing the goals. That's especially true when the words are being said by people with only a few years on the ground in the environment in question - or even less - and a completely insufficient understanding of what they are attempting to influence.

Too often I've seen foreigners, and most particularly Americans, walk into troubled countries, look around in a circle, instantly identify "the problem", and dive into a marvelously energetic but generally disastrous attempt at a solution. The problem-solving orientation is not entirely a bad thing, but misapplied, or based on assumptions, preconceptions, or excessively rapid deductions it can do enormous damage.

It is certainly true that economic stagnation and unemployment contribute to conflict, in Afghanistan and in many other places. It is true that many conflicts could be ended if economies could be fixed. Unfortunately, fixing an economy is as difficult, complex, and time-consuming as winning a war, often more so....
Dayuhan,

Is it fair for me to Reply to your well-considered note a full eleven months after you wrote it? This feels a bit like the pace of exchanging letters from war during the 18th century. :)

In any case, I just have to say how very closely your statements land to what it is I'm trying to say. I consider myself at fault if my message isn't coming through, but I just have to keep looking at your challenges to my assertions to find the better way to say it!

From your paragraph 1, above, you suggest that we could say, "We need effective solutions tailored...." That's absolutely true. We could - and should - say that. Then you continue that saying it won't bring us closer to accomplishing the goals. Again, I agree. That's why applied smart power (ASP) has the word "applied" built into it. We have to apply what we understand, not just form committees to debate whether we should form a committee to explore the theories.

The first flows into the second paragraph with regard to the disastrous results possible when Americans barge into a crisis situation with inadequate understanding of the ground truth and inject best intentions that worsen the crisis. Again-again, I agree. It has been the height of self-destructive arrogance to blast in and scrunch a one-size-fits-all American (or British, in centuries past) paradigm onto an unexamined local cultural reality. That's why ASP demands understanding all cultures in play. Understanding the host populations is the only way to have any realistic hope of understanding the problems and thus comprehending possible solutions.

ASP doesn't force solutions into locals' mouths, it listens carefully to those locals' mouths before there can be even the slightest chance of making a meaningful contribution.

I have to quote the final comment from above: "Unfortunately, fixing an economy is as difficult, complex, and time-consuming as winning a war, often more so...."

Let's be coldly objective about the two options described. Let's take the optimistic view that fixing an economy costs exactly the same as winning a war. Which provides the greater value in the end?

We can "win" a war and end up with a shattered economy that implodes the week after we win and fly back to Los Angeles. The result is plainly lose-lose: we again face the threat of radicals streaming out of the freshly-crumbled society and spend the money all over again to win again. Or we can fix an economy and empower the legitimate (an entirely different subject for debate!) government to easily subdue and isolate the enemy force.

In such simple terms, it's painfully clear where the better investment is. It would even be justified to spend more for such a worthy outcome, much like the choice I made this week to spend extra for organic marinara sauce. We invest in things that will provide a greater return. So many of us from the military forces lean toward a forceful solution to problems without taking the moment to consider what our actual best case scenario will be down the line.

I'm not squeamish about the usefulness of killing. Few SEALs would get very far if they came on as conscientious objectors. The question simply isn't on whether to use violence, but where and how much. We have to begin to take the long view and combine it with a selfish view: "What's in it for me...in the long term?"

Dayuhan
10-23-2010, 06:03 AM
Dayuhan,

Is it fair for me to Reply to your well-considered note a full eleven months after you wrote it? This feels a bit like the pace of exchanging letters from war during the 18th century. :)

Fair enough, though it almost went unnoticed... would have if not for casual curiosity over what happened to another thread.

I don't think we're all that far apart on the principles, and what I have to offer are less objections than points of caution. My perspective is possibly different because it comes from a very different background: from aid industry to journalism industry to political/financial analysis industry to going mostly native (10 yrs and counting) in a 3rd world indigenous community (one with an occasional insurgency problem, though the locals see the insurgents as less of a problem than the armed forces that occasionally come round looking for them). That perspective is naturally different from what you'd get from a military background, no more inherently valid, but different.

From that perspective, some points of caution:


That's why applied smart power (ASP) has the word "applied" built into it. We have to apply what we understand, not just form committees to debate whether we should form a committee to explore the theories.

The danger here is our inclination to overrate our own understanding. Any time we think we understand fully it's best to come to a dead stop and reassess, because there's likely a bit of self-deception involved. Again, perspective-based: after 30 years plus in my own chosen 3rd world backwater I've come to believe that the post dangerous point in the newbie learning curve is after 3-5 years in country. Before that they don't understand, but they know they don't understand. About 3 years in they hit a point where they still don't get it but they think they do, and that's when we have the ability to make a really stellar mess.

Nothing wrong with applying what we understand, but we must remember that our understanding is almost always incomplete and may be dangerously flawed. There are almost always going to be factors in any given picture that we don't see or that we don't fully understand. When we see people behaving in ways that seem irrational to us, that's a good time to assume there's something going on that we don't see.


Let's be coldly objective about the two options described. Let's take the optimistic view that fixing an economy costs exactly the same as winning a war. Which provides the greater value in the end?

We can "win" a war and end up with a shattered economy that implodes the week after we win and fly back to Los Angeles. The result is plainly lose-lose: we again face the threat of radicals streaming out of the freshly-crumbled society and spend the money all over again to win again. Or we can fix an economy and empower the legitimate (an entirely different subject for debate!) government to easily subdue and isolate the enemy force.

A coldly objective caution: we don't know how to fix an economy. The development types have been banging their heads on this one for decades, arguing with appallingly verbose passion and filling hundreds of thousands of pages with erudite and incomprehensible discourse, and we still don't have a clue. We know that broken economies can heal, over time. We know that economies can develop, over time. Comparative assessment of successes yields no recipes, though: all we learn is that each case is different and what works in one may not work in another. I can't think of any case, anywhere, where an outside intervening party has successfully "fixed" an economy.

Additional cautions:

Economic repairs are a governance function. Are we prepared to govern Afghanistan? Can we do so effectively? Given that Afghanistan already (sort of) has a government, do they need another? Are we going to replace, compete with, or (yeah, right) complement the existing government?

The obstacles to economic development are often political. Attempting to overcome those obstacles is likely to lead to direct conflict with established local power structures, whether traditional or recently developed, that find the current economic environment congenial. That's not necessarily bad, if we've fully assessed the consequences of that conflict and are prepared to manage them... but have we, and are we?


In such simple terms, it's painfully clear where the better investment is. It would even be justified to spend more for such a worthy outcome

Certainly true, if we have any assurance that the proposed worthy outcome will be achieved. Certainly fixing the Afghan economy would be a very good thing to do, if we could do it. I'm not convinced that we can.

I've nothing against the use of smart power, if we know what is going to be smart in any given circumstance. I'd have to argue, though, for what one might call the smart use of power. That, to me, means that before we even think about understanding the environment in which we propose to use power we have to understand ourselves. We have to know our objectives, and assure that those objectives are clear, practical, and achievable. We have to honestly, even ruthlessly, assess our own will and the commitment of resources that we are prepared to make and sustain.

The smart use of power requires clear, practical, achievable objectives that are proportional to the resources we are willing to commit. If we fail on that level - and I suspect that our effort to establish western-style central government in Afghanistan represents failure on that level - then even the use of very smart power may not get us where we want to be... in essence, that would be the stupid use of smart power. What we want is the smart use of smart power, if that makes any sense at all...

If we've reached a point where the only way we can achieve our objectives is to fix the Afghan economy or transform Afghan society, I'd submit that we do not need a smart way to fix an economy or transform a society: these are things we can't do and shouldn't be trying to do. We need a smarter set of objectives, one that can be achieved by means we actually have at our disposal.

PS: to clarify an apparent discrepancy: 30+ years in this country (mostly), 10 in this community. Too long on both counts according to some, but it works for me!

Pete
10-24-2010, 08:48 PM
Dayuhan, your previous message was both well-reasoned and well-written. However, from time to time there are moral issues that reach the impasse level. During the 19th century they included paying tribute to the Barbary Pirates ("To the shores of Tripoli"), the British forcing the Hindus in India to stop setting widows on fire, and the suppression of the slave trade. Today in Afghanistan there are issues like forced marriages, coerced pederasty, the stoning to death of women, and allowing terrorist groups to operate freely in the area.

Dayuhan
10-25-2010, 01:12 AM
Dayuhan, your previous message was both well-reasoned and well-written. However, from time to time there are moral issues that reach the impasse level. During the 19th century they included paying tribute to the Barbary Pirates ("To the shores of Tripoli"), the British forcing the Hindus in India to stop setting widows on fire, and the suppression of the slave trade. Today in Afghanistan there are issues like forced marriages, coerced pederasty, the stoning to death of women, and allowing terrorist groups to operate freely in the area.

The moral impasse can be the mother of all slippery slopes. If we praise the British for their morality in banning the burning of widows, what shall we say of their use of armed force to open the Chinese market to their shipments of opium?

There's a lot of nastiness in the world. Probably less than there has been at any prior point in human history, but still plenty. Have we a moral obligation to end mass starvation in North Korea? To improve the ghastly conditions of life in Somalia, the Sudan, the Congo, or Zimbabwe? To end forced abortions in China? If tolerating or enabling coerced pederasty is grounds for intervention, should we be contemplating regime change at the Vatican?

I'd submit that the primary moral obligation of the US government is to its populace, and that a large part of that obligation is the need to manage the limited resources provided to that government by that populace carefully and in the interests of that populace. We need to think not only of what we should do, but what we must do and what we can do.

There was certainly a need to do something about the use of Afghanistan as a base by terrorists intent on killing our people. Whether that need to do something required us to try and conjure a western-style government for Afghanistan, to transform Afghan society, or to fix the Afghan economy is another question altogether.

My objection to the "smart power" construct is that it emphasizes the need for smarter ways to pursue objectives, thus de-emphasizing the greater (IMO) need to re-evaluate those objectives. Since we embarked on this thing we call the GWOT we've hung an albatross around our necks by setting vague, unrealistic, and unachievable objectives. We speak of installing governments, building nations, fixing economies, as if these things were structures to be engineered. They aren't. Nations aren't built, nations grow. Economies aren't fixed, they heal. We may be able to help cultivate a nation or to help treat an economy, but the idea of building or fixing or installing is flawed from the start. The engineering metaphors aren't the problem in themselves, but they are a neon sign pointing at the problem.

I don't think we need smarter ways of pursuing stupid objectives. I think we need smarter objectives first, and then smarter ways of pursuing those objectives. Focus first on the smart use of power, and second on the use of smart power.

davidbfpo
04-13-2011, 07:00 PM
A FP Blog 'Argument' piece 'The War on Soft Power' reminded me of this thread, slightly dormant and is sub-titled:
Even the U.S. military doesn't want to cut the State Department and foreign aid budget. So why is Congress playing a dangerous game with America's global influence?

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the_war_on_soft_power?page=0,0

Yes, I know this thread is on Applied Smart Power!

Stan
04-14-2011, 06:36 PM
David,
The programs are indeed long-term and often hard to define. There are but a handful that could even be classified as successful and only after nearly a decade.

The other part of this equation that is not evident to most is, the DOS manages this pot of money and are but a cog in the stymied process that keeps the good programs running. Most of Sub-Sahara’s cash gets dumped into a giant hole with little benefits and certainly no real success stories. The remainder is divided amongst the former east bloc and those who ponder over what to do with a minuscule sum end up with nothing.

The sad truth is the US Military would prefer to control and wisely spend funds on real projects instead of being at the behest of the State Dept. and embassy in the countries in question. Directing smart or soft power is great assuming the individuals charged with such a daunting task in their brief stint abroad know what they are doing or even give a hoot in promoting something that will not bear a medal of honor in the short time they are in that country.

J. Robert DuBois
07-04-2011, 04:46 AM
David,
The programs are indeed long-term and often hard to define. There are but a handful that could even be classified as successful and only after nearly a decade.

The other part of this equation that is not evident to most is, the DOS manages this pot of money and are but a cog in the stymied process that keeps the good programs running. Most of Sub-Sahara’s cash gets dumped into a giant hole with little benefits and certainly no real success stories. The remainder is divided amongst the former east bloc and those who ponder over what to do with a minuscule sum end up with nothing.

The sad truth is the US Military would prefer to control and wisely spend funds on real projects instead of being at the behest of the State Dept. and embassy in the countries in question. Directing smart or soft power is great assuming the individuals charged with such a daunting task in their brief stint abroad know what they are doing or even give a hoot in promoting something that will not bear a medal of honor in the short time they are in that country.

Great arguments, gents. I'm glad the issue was in play as recently as April. For my shameful absence I can only claim that I've been insanely busy trying to get my manuscript done and into my publisher's hands...on the topic of "applied smart power." (Much of the material is available for review now at my "balanced peacemaking from a Navy SEAL" blog, http://PowerfulPeace.net)

I borrowed from your quotes, Stan, because they describe much of the current troubles. I'm a "Senior Defense Policy Advisor" in my day job, but that doesn't mean I can get buy-in from the policy makers when I urge that we move "beyond jammers and armor." (By this phrase I don't intend to demean the absolute importance of CREW systems and armor where appropriate; I mean that if we don't concurrently pursue longer-term programs of value to change the environment that spawns IEDs and insurgents, we will be forever shackled to a futile spiral of CREW and armor superiority.)

On your Para 1: The higher value methods absolutely do take more time. Between changes of administration and the generally fickle and impatient quality of American political will, many such critical programs survive just barely into adolescence, sometimes just inches from where they would begin to "turn a profit."

Para 2: DoS...ugh. Take so many great and talented people, snarled up with so many apathetic people, all stirred up together in antiquated bureaucratic processes, and see how effective even the most promising program might be. Add a budget one tenth that of DoD and Congressional approval for sharing between them, and the challenges are daunting before you even cross the US border! At a recent book event, Joseph Nye told us Bob Gates (a staunch advocate of soft power initiatives) tried to pipe $20B over to Hillary Clinton for just such purposes. When it reached Congress they saw a windfall of "surplus funds," rerouted half of it, and wrote Hillary a check for $10B. :)

Finally, Para 3, Part 1: This is so true - the US military (in very general terms) wants to spend money on "real" projects. Even that choice of phrasing indicates the significant bias against what I consider vastly more important initiatives...again, concurrent with "real" programs so we maintain the immediate needs of force protection and mission readiness.

Para 3, Part 2: Smart or soft power absolutely is great "assuming the individuals charged with...know what they are doing or even give a hoot." Sadly, many of those so charged either don't know or don't care; and I blame me and other advocates, not the unwilling themselves. Communicating great new concepts is not the responsibility of the conveyee.

motorfirebox
07-04-2011, 05:38 AM
Can't believe I only just now found this thread. It is a really, really good read. I don't have anything to contribute myself, but I wanted to quote this portion of a previous post, if only for posterity:

I asked him why, despite abuse and atrocities such as the recent marketplace bombing, the Taliban enjoy enough active or passive support to resist the incredible might of the US military. He didn't even pause for a second, but just answered directly: "Because men don't have jobs."

Military-age males, pissed and ashamed that they can't provide for a family, eventually say Screw It, resign themselves to the only game in town, and help the Taliban because they need money.
It's very frustrating to see this core issue be not just ignored, but completely denied, so frequently.

J. Robert DuBois
07-05-2011, 06:23 PM
Can't believe I only just now found this thread. It is a really, really good read....
It's very frustrating to see this core issue be not just ignored, but completely denied, so frequently.

Thanks for the supportive words, motorfirebox. I'd like to point out to everyone that my intention is NOT to offer yet another "right way" to do war, peacemaking, diplomacy, or building mousetraps. In my opinion, a monumental part of "our" problem in the conflict industry is having a whole bunch of Chiefs with Just The Right Solution...please let me, instead, be one Indian in search of others who can all open their minds to the right bits of every argument and so form a deep and abiding Right that can adapt to reality.

Anti-COINers tease COINdinistas (such as myself) because in some specific events the approach can be "proven" to have failed. COINdinistas lash out against misuse of force as being a main contributer to worsening violence and instability...yet no one can deny that a decisively brutal response has at times been just the right response.

In my opinion, which I consider to be worth exactly 1/Xth of all X of us in the conversation, standing rigidly in a theoretical camp is as destructively useless as partisan political wars that leave a "represented" population underserved while "representatives" seek mainly to serve their personal best interests. I hope to inspire some frank and humble dialogue with a forthcoming book, based on my balanced peacemaking from a Navy SEAL blog at the link, below.

In the end, I believe, an adjustment to our perspective will result in better accomplishing that mission we all agree on: protecting innocent life.

- Rob
PowerfulPeace.net (http://PowerfulPeace.net)

ganulv
07-05-2011, 09:15 PM
Given my admittedly poorly informed point of departure my perception is certainly over-simplified, but when I see the DoD committing itself to USAID-type actions in response to military challenges I have to wonder whether groups and governments in heretofore unproblematic (from the US’s point of view) locales might decide that offering a military challenge to the US is more productive than remaining well-behaved.

Dayuhan
07-05-2011, 10:57 PM
Development, economic reconstruction, and improvement of governance are all legitimate constructs, but I think that some people on the .mil side who are just discovering these constructs vastly underestimate how difficult it is to actually produce development, economic reconstruction, and better governance. The history of development efforts is littered with failures, some of them disastrous... there have probably been more failures than successes.

Building stuff isn't "development", and fixing an economy is probably more difficult and complicated than fighting a war.

I personally don't think it makes a lot of sense to retrain the army to do development work, because if we do that we will seriously compromise the ability of the army to fight wars, which we might need it to do someday. If the army is the only organization we have that has the capacity to do development work in certain locations, we might well question whether that's really what we want to be doing.

J. Robert DuBois
07-06-2011, 03:29 AM
ganulv and Dayuhan,

Thanks for your comments - I think each time we have an exchange of perspectives it illuminates a little better what assumptions might be driving a conversation in different directions.

ganulv, you're spot on that governments, like individuals, will take the path of least resistance. It's just good business to economize wherever possible on costs of money or time or effort. I don't believe we could point to much in OIF/OND or OEF that indicate this dynamic in action, though, because God knows there are plenty of good, old fashioned hatreds and grievance behind the chaos there. In other lands it's entirely possible that regimes overinflate their relative instability if it will net them a larger share of the US national teat...I would, if anyone would trust me with a country. :p

Dayuhan, I'm especially interested in your comment because it really gets to the heart of the matter of responsibilities for the military. You questioned whether it's sensible to train armies for development...and so do I. Armies are designed to break things or, better still, to present a convincing enough capacity for breaking things that nothing ever actually has to get broken.

The screaming, glaring, invisible-in-plain-sight problem is, development must occur for stability to exist. In my country's case, that means the USG must have a development capacity if we are going to take on development. It doesn't mean DoD has to "do" it. I'm saying that every body should perform its role...and our gaping hole in capacity lies in the coordination of those bodies.

If DoS has development responsibility, can DoS carry that out in isolation? USG (the parent) has the responsibility to "teach" DoS and DoD to work together, like any siblings. In an effective system - which I don't believe is an impossible dream - DoS and DoD support one another like a well-oiled machine. Okay, maybe that is a dream, but it's not impossible.

The yin-yang, or soft-hard, or diplomacy-force of DoS-DoD has unrealized potential while our persuasion is poorly integrated with our coercion. May I give one real-world example of lousy coordination? During an assessment in one country which shall remain nameless I sought out the local PRT on a base which shall remain nameless. I wanted to gauge their level of integration and asked what sort of coordination they had with PRT HQ in the capital.

The response? "We don't coordinate with them. They give us a budget and trust us to use it on the right initiatives." In other words, everyone is doing his or her very best...but without coordination our very best results in excess redundancy, wide seams, and wasted resources. And let us not forget that one of our resources is human life.

Quick caveat - this was ONE PRT on ONE base. I have no idea whether it is indicative of the overall system and I would never presume to condemn such. I will, however, declare that this grievous dis-integration is prevalent over my quarter century in war and peace with the DoD, DoS and IC. It's been the one constant, in my observation, that thrives without regard for administration, economy or enemy.

Dayuhan
07-06-2011, 10:55 AM
The screaming, glaring, invisible-in-plain-sight problem is, development must occur for stability to exist. In my country's case, that means the USG must have a development capacity if we are going to take on development. It doesn't mean DoD has to "do" it. I'm saying that every body should perform its role...and our gaping hole in capacity lies in the coordination of those bodies.

Some might say that stability must exist for development to occur... bit of a chicken and egg thing. Either assumption is, for me, oversimplified. Development doesn't always produce stability, in fact it can produce instability, especially in the short term. Development usually threatens people, typically people who have a stake in the existing order, and those people usually resist. Different people and different groups often have radically different ideas of what "development" is or how it should proceed. Attempts at producing rapid and highly visible "development" through the infusion of massive resources have typically failed to produce much in the way of development or stability. Gradual step by slow step development has a higher probability of getting somewhere, but is rarely visible enough to have much impact on an immediate stability issue.

The central question, to me, is what we are actually trying to achieve in any given case. If we're trying to throw money into a bunch of "development" projects to make people think a bad government is good or persuade people to support a government we like, we might as well keep the cash in pocket and go home, because the probability of success approaches zero.


If DoS has development responsibility, can DoS carry that out in isolation? USG (the parent) has the responsibility to "teach" DoS and DoD to work together, like any siblings. In an effective system - which I don't believe is an impossible dream - DoS and DoD support one another like a well-oiled machine. Okay, maybe that is a dream, but it's not impossible.

I'm not sure that DoS and DoD could produce effective development even working seamlessly together, because even DoS/AID is often pretty clueless on the development side. AID is institutionally biased toward centralized, cash-intensive projects involving contractors, often a very inefficient and highly politicized way to proceed. In a lifetime in the developing world I've met a number of AID people who seemed to have a clue, but I've seen very little lasting positive impact from the agency, especially in cases where HN capacity is minimal. "Development aid" is more often wielded as a lever to influence policy or win concessions than with any real hope of producing development.

The sad truth about this development stuff is that even on the development professional side there is very little clear idea of how to reliably produce "development". Nations do develop, but they generally do it on their own, in their own way. I can't think of a case, offhand, where external intervention has directed and produced meaningful "development".

ganulv
07-06-2011, 01:13 PM
Having spent time living in Guatemala near the end of their civil war I became well acquainted with the fact that a lot of dark things are done in the name of stability. I can understand how violence à la night raids in Baghdad in 2006 can have a place in producing stability; a decades long policy of shooting up malnourished peasants protesting being pushed off their smallholdings in the name of stability is harder for me to understand. Which is just to perhaps echo Dayuhan’s point that there are many hows, whys, and time scales related to stability.

J. Robert DuBois
07-08-2011, 02:39 AM
See, now I agree with both of you on the important message of "time" required for an effect. In my observation DoD thinks quick. There's no way to quickly assist a society to stability, because stability is an internal condition. Security, on the other hand, we can establish as fast as we can kill or intimidate the local fighters.

I don't mean to imply that there is a quick, easy fix to complex crises and conflicts. As you've said, there are 360 degrees of perspective and some actually thrive amid the suffering and deprivation. I believe it's important for us in the USG to look at opportunities to evolve our own mindset. Real change takes real time. If we don't maintain a long-term desired endstate while operating today, all the good intentions in the world won't arrive anywhere except by accident.

Finally - we can't disregard the responsibility that a host population has to work for its own brighter future. I'm not an interventionist who says we should cross the world and bring peace and prosperity to all. For many reasons like the few above, that's literally impossible.

Dayuhan
07-09-2011, 10:29 PM
Thinking and acting quickly can be an asset if we're talking about rebuilding stuff that got broken in the course of conflict. That of course is reconstruction, not development, and we have to be aware of the difference.

One critical point at the start of any "development" effort (actually at the start of most things we do) is to realistically assess our goals, meaning strip away all the pretty jargon and look at what we are really trying to accomplish. If the primary purpose of a "development" effort is to make a bad government look good or to persuade people to like the government we think they ought to like, we're looking at a big red flag and might do well to reassess our course before starting on it.

J. Robert DuBois
07-10-2011, 08:33 PM
If the primary purpose of a "development" effort is to make a bad government look good or to persuade people to like the government we think they ought to like, we're looking at a big red flag and might do well to reassess our course before starting on it.

Totally disagree. The US has had a great run of making bad governments look good and persuading people to like the government we think they ought to like! Just look at all our success stories: Hussein, Mubarak, Saleh...oh.

davidbfpo
07-10-2011, 09:32 PM
J.Robert DuBois,

You stated:
The US has had a great run of making bad governments look good and persuading people to like the government we think they ought to like! Just look at all our success stories: Hussein, Mubarak, Saleh...

The choice of names reflects a contemporary focus on Arab and Muslim regions. Since 1945 the USA, sometimes with allies, has done a great deal of 'making' and 'persuading' in other places - nor where development was say in vogue. Places like Greece and Italy, later on and further afield Allende in Chile and Mobutu in Zaire. Many of these places no longer appear in focus.

It would be a mistake if the USA's perceptions of the places for 'making' and 'persuading' were limited to Arab and Muslim regions. Oh yes, what is missing in the calculus? Oil I nearly forgot.

Nor should we overlook the private sector, NGO's or communities. As illustrated by the UK population via charities sending abroad UK Pounds 4.0 billion p.a. or US$6.4 billion more than sent in official aid.

davidbfpo
07-10-2011, 10:00 PM
Hat tip to Zenpundit for re-directing me back to Robert Haddick's weekly column and the tip to a new website by Joseph Fouche. Where I found this appropriate to this thread.


Reasons of state demand that strategically substantive and consequential action be taken from time to time. But the inertia of the system demands that nothing be done within the system to raise an inconvenient stir or distract the American public from its patriotic consumption. This places two constraints on strategically significant action:

It must be small enough to escape sustained public awareness.
It must be big enough to have real strategic effect.

Link:http://fearhonorinterest.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/unhappy-medium-the-perils-of-annoyance-as-your-strategic-default/

Now will 'smart power' work within such constraints?

J. Robert DuBois
07-10-2011, 11:23 PM
The choice of names reflects a contemporary focus on Arab and Muslim regions. Since 1945 the USA, sometimes with allies, has done a great deal of 'making' and 'persuading' in other places - nor where development was say in vogue. Places like Greece and Italy, later on and further afield Allende in Chile and Mobutu in Zaire. Many of these places no longer appear in focus.

It would be a mistake if the USA's perceptions of the places for 'making' and 'persuading' were limited to Arab and Muslim regions. Oh yes, what is missing in the calculus? Oil I nearly forgot.

Nor should we overlook the private sector, NGO's or communities. As illustrated by the UK population via charities sending abroad UK Pounds 4.0 billion p.a. or US$6.4 billion more than sent in official aid.

Absolutely, David - the three names I facetiously put out were convenient to mind as "recent" (in decades) events. I had no intention of highlighting dictatorial Arab/Muslim regimes, but the connection is compelling.

What's more important is that I also had no intention of suggesting that American action abroad is necessarily counterproductive. Heaven forbid I would think that...after all, I'm an actor on that stage! We've done some tremendous things for improvement in global security.

I'm trying to point out the larger dynamic of self-interested (which is an imperative; individuals and states will never deliberately act against their best interests) national actions taken without "thinking it through" for long-term consequences. Governments act a little too much like individuals, in fact, since there is no "US" or "Russia" that takes decisions and acts, but individuals. Individuals can be mad at or irrationally in favor of other leaders, cultures or nations...these motivate decisions that seem right at the time...

As to oil: let's not forget that the US has not apparently acted with oil at the forefront of any of these interventions. I've heard all manner of other reasons, including WMD, democracy, nation-building and human rights. ;)

Dayuhan
07-10-2011, 11:50 PM
Since 1945 the USA, sometimes with allies, has done a great deal of 'making' and 'persuading' in other places - nor where development was say in vogue. Places like Greece and Italy, later on and further afield Allende in Chile and Mobutu in Zaire. Many of these places no longer appear in focus.

This is true, and it's interesting to look at why many of these places are no longer in focus.

Not so long ago Southeast Asia and Latin America were the focus of American attempts to prop up "friendly" governments and destabilize "unfriendly" ones. They were seen as basket cases; the terms "banana republic" and "tinpot dictator" were coined to describe Latin American nations and governments. We poured on both military intervention and "deveopment aid", all calculated to support the governments we liked and exclude those we didn't.

Today, of course, Southeast Asia and Latin America are generally quite peaceful and are chalking up impressive economic growth and development figures. They've a long way to go, undeniably, but there is real and impressive progress. So what happened? Did America rescue them from their benighted squalor with development aid and military intervention to protect them from the bad guys within?

Actually, no. What happened was that we finally left them alone. When the Cold War ended we scaled back intervention and politically driven aid. During the Cold War we'd never have tolerated a Chavez or a Morales, and we'd have been actively subverting a Bachelet, a Kirchner or a da Silva. Without the Cold War paranoia, we've found Chavez and Morales to be minor inconveniences, easily managed, and the more moderate left-side politicians to be quite congenial partners. With less meddling and less aid these regions have actually prospered, and found their own ways to peaceful coexistence.

Possibly something to consider when looking at today's basket cases.

J. Robert DuBois
07-13-2011, 09:36 PM
Not so long ago Southeast Asia and Latin America were the focus of American attempts to prop up "friendly" governments and destabilize "unfriendly" ones. They were seen as basket cases; the terms "banana republic" and "tinpot dictator" were coined to describe Latin American nations and governments. We poured on both military intervention and "development aid," all calculated to support the governments we liked and exclude those we didn't.

Today, of course, Southeast Asia and Latin America are generally quite peaceful and are chalking up impressive economic growth and development figures. They've a long way to go, undeniably, but there is real and impressive progress. So what happened? Did America rescue them from their benighted squalor with development aid and military intervention to protect them from the bad guys within?

Actually, no. What happened was that we finally left them alone.... Without the Cold War paranoia, we've found Chavez and Morales to be minor inconveniences, easily managed.... With less meddling and less aid these regions have actually prospered, and found their own ways to peaceful coexistence.

I like this observation. Your signature line references keeping a population in check through fear of monsters. A "leader" can easily manage his flock through fearmongering, as easily as a comic pulls laughs through potty humor; both are hollow and of a much lower order than their potential.

This comes right back to the original point of this thread! Fearmongering is no more than a form of hard power and, though a necessary tool, hard power does not endure on its own. It's time to move beyond the legacy of management through paranoia. I grew up fearing the "Red Menace" and preparing to "Kill a Commie for Mommy." Artists like Sting cut through that nonsense with songs that told the truth about the Other Side, like "I hope the Russians love their children, too."

I'm pro-intervention, at the right time for the right reasons. Of course, that sounds like non-speak, but like Sting it gets at the truth. Fearmongering made it easy to prop up tin-pots...and those decades have left us with a cumbersome alternate legacy to live down: that of a meddling, uncaring, manipulative power interested in taking and promising and never following through. The future of international interdependence is being revealed day-by-day. In the new reality such a reputation is a severe liability.

Genuine smart power will always consider national best interests, but with more forthright and transparent (and, dare I say, humble?) efforts we can disentangle the snarl of this reputation while actually contributing to local improvements and corresponding, general Improvement.

Dayuhan
07-14-2011, 01:31 AM
Fearmongering made it easy to prop up tin-pots...and those decades have left us with a cumbersome alternate legacy to live down: that of a meddling, uncaring, manipulative power interested in taking and promising and never following through. The future of international interdependence is being revealed day-by-day. In the new reality such a reputation is a severe liability.

Fully agree on that. Of course we actually ended up cultivating that which we feared: in many places the only thing that kept the Communists in play was loathing for the dictator and lack of a peaceful alternative route to change. The perverse symbiosis between rebel and dictator has seldom been more obvious than it was during the cold war, but we didn't see it... because we didn't want to. Anyone who pointed out that we were propping up governments that any one of us would rebel against was dismissed as a sympathizer with evil.


I'm pro-intervention, at the right time for the right reasons...

Genuine smart power will always consider national best interests, but with more forthright and transparent (and, dare I say, humble?) efforts we can disentangle the snarl of this reputation while actually contributing to local improvements and corresponding, general Improvement.

This is where I start to worry. I don't disagree, but I have real doubts about our ability at any given point to reliably determine what is "right" and what is "smart". We have never consciously or intentionally used stupid power or intervened at the wrong time for the wrong reasons. At the times we acted, we believed that we were doing the smart thing and the right thing. We were often wrong. We can easily be wrong again.

Ultimately I think our ability to wisely choose how and when to act depends on both our ability to assess situations and, maybe more important, on our ability to assess ourselves: to cut through inertia, assumption, ideology, ego, and all the other blinders that convince us that wrong is right and stupid is smart. Can we do that? I hope so, but history holds few grounds for optimism.

I worry that once we declare something "smart", our ability to dispassionately assess that course of action will be impaired. That's no reason not to try, of course.

J. Robert DuBois
08-05-2011, 02:05 AM
I don't disagree, but I have real doubts about our ability at any given point to reliably determine what is "right" and what is "smart."

I worry that once we declare something "smart," our ability to dispassionately assess that course of action will be impaired. That's no reason not to try, of course.

Sorry for this extended stay in Absentia! :) I'm on final approach with what I hope to be one of the most important books of the decade on balanced peacemaking, and it devours all of my non-work hours. (Or, more accurately, the book is the most important work I have - but it is severely limited by the work that is currently necessary for simple things like food.)

If I'm reading our comments correctly, I think there's a great deal of overlap on principle and a trend toward disagreement on semantics, i.e., "smart" power. I don't use the word "semantics" to trivialize the difference, though. In fact, it's a very important distinction that may lead to the improved understanding of smart power.

Your excerpted quotes above are, in my opinion, spot on. Some of the worst human abuses occur because someone who possesses some form of "hard" power (national authority, military might or IED) determines that his opinion is "right," his opponents' is wrong, and he has the self-appointed prerogative to use force. I don't want to overuse the cliche that Hitler has become, but...well, someone like Hitler.

The same is true, as you point out, for the term "smart." Once I get it in my head that my approach is smart, it may lead to the unconsciously logical conclusion that any other way is dumb. Maybe it would be helpful to use a generic term like "balanced." Ultimately, what I would like to see on the table is that simply because a nation owns a Department of State and a Department of Defense does not mean that nation is effectively leveraging all of its resources at optimal efficiency and in optimal proportions.

It seems to me that some of us in these fora (not you personally) dismiss discussions of "balancing" our methods for the simple fact that leadership has always involved aspects of diplomatic and military assets. My question to us is, "Then why isn't it working?"

- Rob
PS: How do I set my account to notify me when people reply? I'm an idiot.

J. Robert DuBois
08-05-2011, 02:15 AM
Ultimately I think our ability to wisely choose how and when to act depends on both our ability to assess situations and, maybe more important, on our ability to assess ourselves: to cut through inertia, assumption, ideology, ego, and all the other blinders that convince us that wrong is right and stupid is smart.

PPS: I have a big "Amen!" for this statement of yours. I used a term previously that I think sums it up: Humble. Yet in support of your reservations on all this in practical application, how in God's name can we ensure "humility" among our policy makers? It may be an absolute conundrum when we live in societies that reward those with election who make the most grandiose statements in their campaign promises.

Dayuhan
08-06-2011, 01:53 AM
If I'm reading our comments correctly, I think there's a great deal of overlap on principle and a trend toward disagreement on semantics, i.e., "smart" power. I don't use the word "semantics" to trivialize the difference, though. In fact, it's a very important distinction that may lead to the improved understanding of smart power.

I agree... I don't think we're that far apart on any of this, and what divergence there is comes mostly from seeing the same picture from different perspectives. That to me is a good thing, and one of the useful things about this forum. Still, as always (it's a habit) I find a thing or two to pick on...


Some of the worst human abuses occur because someone who possesses some form of "hard" power (national authority, military might or IED) determines that his opinion is "right," his opponents' is wrong, and he has the self-appointed prerogative to use force. I don't want to overuse the cliche that Hitler has become, but...well, someone like Hitler.

It's certainly true that hard power is easily abused and misused, even with the best of intentions, and that the abuse and misuse of hard power are very visible and very unpleasant. If we're going to think of balancing hard power with soft, though, we have to remember that soft power can also be abused and misused, and that its abuse and misuse can turn an effort intended to alleviate tension and address root causes of conflict into a disaster that exacerbates tension and generates conflict. I've seen that happen a number of times and there are many many cases I haven't seen. That's one reason why I'm wary of turning "soft power" tools like "development" aid over to people who aren't really from the development world, such as those from military or diplomatic backgrounds. Because "development" is so often presumed a priori to be "good" and to be an antidote to violence, people not fully familiar with the history may forget how easily "development" can snap back as a driver of conflict.

That's not meant as criticism of soldiers and diplomats, just as acknowledgement that they don't generally have the training or the expertise to manage development efforts, which is a very difficult task that even development professionals routinely screw up. Realistically, it's not possible to give soldiers and diplomats that training and expertise without compromising their effectiveness in their primary roles. Soft power is a useful tool, but in the hands of people who see its utility but don't see its hazards, it can do as much damage as hard power.

Of course hard and soft power are both necessary and both useful, but we can't fall into the trap of seeing hard power as the harsh side and soft power as the benign mitigating side. If we're not careful and aware, we can make as big a mess with soft power as with hard, and that has to be considered when trying to develop a "smart" balance.


The same is true, as you point out, for the term "smart." Once I get it in my head that my approach is smart, it may lead to the unconsciously logical conclusion that any other way is dumb. Maybe it would be helpful to use a generic term like "balanced."

I like "balanced" better, mostly because to my mind "balance" is something dynamic that has to be constantly assessed and adjusted. Whether or not anyone else draws the same implication is of course an open question!

These three points point me toward another of those things that I get worried about...


Ultimately, what I would like to see on the table is that simply because a nation owns a Department of State and a Department of Defense does not mean that nation is effectively leveraging all of its resources at optimal efficiency and in optimal proportions.


It seems to me that some of us in these fora (not you personally) dismiss discussions of "balancing" our methods for the simple fact that leadership has always involved aspects of diplomatic and military assets. My question to us is, "Then why isn't it working?"


Yet in support of your reservations on all this in practical application, how in God's name can we ensure "humility" among our policy makers? It may be an absolute conundrum when we live in societies that reward those with election who make the most grandiose statements in their campaign promises.

Why isn't it working? Good question, with several possible answers. One possibility is that we're not using the right balance of the right tools, and therefore not achieving our goal. Another possibility, one that I think has been very much in play in recent years, is that we've pursued goals that are unrealistic and impractical, and often shifted our goals in midstream: the justly dreaded "mission creep".

I've been reminded several times on this forum that people from the military side are disinclined to question the goal, and tend instead to focus on the means by which the goal can be achieved. That makes perfect sense and there's absolutely nothing wrong with it. We need to be constantly looking for better tools, better way to use those tools, better ways to balance the various tools at our disposal.

At the same time, especially as we get to the theoretical "Futurists & Theorists" level, we can't let the search for better tools and more balanced use of tools take over to the extent that we stop questioning the goal, or that we forget that success starts with choosing the right goals and not steering the goals off on tangents. No matter how good our tools are and no matter how well we balance their use, if we use them in pursuit of a bad policy, we will still make a mess.

I'm sure our government is not "effectively leveraging all of its resources at optimal efficiency and in optimal proportions", or using the tools at its disposal in an optimally balanced method. Even if we were doing well, there would always be room for improvement and discussion of improvement would still be useful and necessary. I still think that our recent problems stem less from inappropriate or unbalanced use of power than from pursuing vague, nebulous, impractical and ephemeral goals... and that no matter how well we balance our use of power the problems with the goals will remain.

So yes, by all means let's pursue balanced power... but let's also not forget that even the best balance of power will not save us from poorly chosen goals.

I'd be the last to challenge civilian control of the military, but I confess that I'd love to hear someone from the military side say something like this:

"If that's really the goal you want to choose, we will do everything in our power to achieve it... but we would be remiss in our duties if we failed to inform you that in our opinion this is one %$#@ing stupid goal that's going to get us into all kinds of trouble"

Actually I recall Colin Powell saying almost exactly that, in slightly more polite language, about Iraq. Of course nobody listened, but it's always worth the effort.

Again, I don't question the need for smarter, better balanced uses of power in pursuit of goals. I just don't want to let the search for better ways to achieve goals blind us to the need for better selection of goals in the first place. Best way to get out of a hole is not to get in it in the first place. IMO, of course :D


PS: How do I set my account to notify me when people reply? I'm an idiot.

I've never tried it, but I'm guessing "thread tools" up at the top, and then "subscribe to thread".

Looking forward to reading the book, though it might take a while to get to this back-country mountaintop!

J. Robert DuBois
08-17-2011, 01:53 AM
I'm guessing "thread tools" up at the top, and then "subscribe to thread".

Looking forward to reading the book, though it might take a while to get to this back-country mountaintop!

While grateful for the suggestion on subscribing, I find myself dismayed you didn't even make the slightest effort to contradict my assertion that I'm an idiot.

...Ah, well. I suppose I wouldn't have, either. And I know me even better than you do!

This week is HARD CRUNCH week with the manuscript, in which my editor is panting down my neck in perfect harmony with my publisher and agent. I promise to return with more idiocy as soon as the draft is out of my hands and into his. This is a great discussion.

With regard to a copy reaching your mountainesque back-country, however, fret not. I look forward to winging you an inscribed copy post-haste in gratitude for the edifying convo. Will just need a mailing address DM'd!

- Rob

davidbfpo
09-10-2011, 12:05 PM
I missed Secretary Clinton's speech on the 9th, but found a reference on Cryptome. The speech:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/09/172034.htm

A background briefing by 'Senior Administration Official Number One':http://cryptome.org/0005/us-smartpower.htm

Steve the Planner
09-10-2011, 02:36 PM
I was particularly struck by recent comments of new Army Chief Odierno that the US military presence not be too big----which would be an impediment to Iraqi progress for its own self-determination.

A small, belated but very insightful mea culpa to the entire sphere of post-defeat "foreign" activism, under any acronym we care to attach.

In grad school in the 1980s, the buzz word was Industrial Policy. The Japanese centralized control and we did not. The argument went that we must follow their lead or (1) we would be toast, and (2) they would take over the world.

A decade ago, the planning profession became enthralled with the term "Smart Growth," to which, ultimately, every smart, dumb, good or bad idea later became attached, and could be thoroughly argued from each side---to the point of meaninglessness.

I am all for "Smart Power," and generally, smart anything, but I can't seem to extend that to haphazard "Whole-of-Government" approaches, or ill-conceived COIN strategies aimed to locally prop up an ineffective central government, etc...

Smart is as Smart does, but it seems, from recent use, that those who argued it, and plaster "Smart" all over their idea, program, project or policy, do so to mask underlying problems.

In Northern Iraq in early 2008, the bridges were all down across the Tigris, and checkpoints restricted almost every movement. It was obvious that trade could not be restored until bridges were reopened and paths cleared.

That done, the recently released Wiki sitreps from Salah ad Din, for example, showed prices dropping, trade increasing, and business returning---across the board.

There is not a lot of rocket science to this, and no need to attach Smart monikers to most obvious post-conflict problems or solutions.

No matter how you label them, if they are stupid, they will fail.

Bill Moore
09-11-2011, 01:30 AM
I am all for "Smart Power," and generally, smart anything, but I can't seem to extend that to haphazard "Whole-of-Government" approaches, or ill-conceived COIN strategies aimed to locally prop up an ineffective central government, etc...

Smart is as Smart does, but it seems, from recent use, that those who argued it, and plaster "Smart" all over their idea, program, project or policy, do so to mask underlying problems.

These are great comments. I'm personally under the belief that good ole American egos drive this type of discussion. Of course applying power smartly is better than applying stupidly, but simply calling it smart power doesn't make it smart. I have seen little evidence that our government leaders are even half as smart as our founding fathers who actually thought deeply about important topics and had a better understanding of how the world worked then than we do now buried in information overload.

I think you're right, we are masking the underlying problems with our rhetoric and doctrine. The State Department is largely a relic of history and DOD is trying to fix problems that would most likely fix themselves if they just got out the way.

Dayuhan
09-11-2011, 03:31 AM
I didn't see much of substance in the speech or the briefing, mostly broad generalities and motherhood statements... but that's what you expect in a speech. It's hard to argue with using the full range of tools at our disposal, but that's nothing very new, and it seems less a new direction or a new strategy than an effort to highlight a difference from the previous administration's perceived over-reliance on "hard power". "Smart power" seems to me largely a way to imply that the last bunch to sit in the chair were stupid. I wouldn't argue with that proposition, but I've yet to see anything resembling evidence of a smarter proposal, on any level beyond broad generalities and motherhood statements.

It would seem smarter, to me at least, if somebody would explain what they propose to do, on a practical, tangible level, and what exactly makes it smart.

I'd still point out that even the smartest, most balanced, most nuanced mix of powers will be ineffective if applied in pursuit of goals that are poorly chosen and impractical. Smart power starts with smart policy, and that starts with choosing goals wisely. I'm not convinced that we've done that in Afghanistan, to cite one example.

Steve the Planner
09-11-2011, 03:48 PM
Rory Stewart's recent piece in NYT, The Uncontrollable Momentum of War, provides a sobering reminder that an analysis with only one line of investigation, one premise, one perspective, and one outcome is not always the smartest way to proceed.

For all those focused on "measurables" and "metrics" even if via simplistic red, yellow, green colors, I wonder which metrics are following those of Stewart, Semple, etc...

I became a planner because I was interested in the connections between things--linkages to problem causation, and viable solution paths (linked to actual resources, schedules, plans and programs that (realistic means to credible ends)).

My problem with much of this "Smart" stuff is that I only find broken links, paths to no apparent outcomes, and resources applied for no obvious purpose.

Maybe it's just me???

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/opinion/10iht-edstewart10.html

Bill Moore
09-11-2011, 05:12 PM
My problem with much of this "Smart" stuff is that I only find broken links, paths to no apparent outcomes, and resources applied for no obvious purpose.

Maybe it's just me???

Steve, hardly, I think many of us who don't drink the CNAS Kool-Aide feel this way, and I think that is part of the reason our senior leadership wants to see metrics, because their intutition is informing them that what we're doing at great expense to the American people isn't working. Metrics isn't the answer for most of the things we do in the military due to the dynamic situation. There is also the tendency to bias metrics to create the perception that we're on the right path.

Instead of metrics, we should be able to explain why are actions are progressing towards the desired objective, and how that objective ties into our strategic end.

As for planning, I agree with your reasons, and would add that one of our biggest flaws is identifying the real problems, and then identifying which problems "we" need to address and which ones we should ignore. Design is supposed to help us in that regard, but if the planners/designers can't approach design in an unbias manner they'll shape the design to justify their preconceived views (seen it). It is very difficult to overcome our human weaknesses, and even tougher to overcome organizational bias that is reinforced by peer pressure.

Bill Moore
09-11-2011, 05:24 PM
Steve,

Good article, and while it is opinion peace the author obviously has a good understanding of the situation based on his experience in Afghanistan. I'll also post this link on the AFPAK thread.

A couple of interesting excerpts:


When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation. That is obvious to most of us I hope.

In reference to the Carr Center at Harvard:
The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.


At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.

Steve the Planner
09-11-2011, 05:54 PM
Bill:

As to any negative implications as to military, my experience was with Gen. Hertling and his 1AD staff at MND-North in 2007/8.

Most outsiders could never have imagined such a crack, and deeply experienced batch of folks seriously pursuing and accomplishing the objectives assigned to them, and pushing hard past any inconsistencies presented.

I recall a conference at Spiecher in early 2008 where then-MG Hertling flew the Baghdad Embassy staff up to explain the plan to stabilize/reconstruct Iraq, so that his staff could support it. When they realized there was none, all of us set about creating on for Northern Iraq---and implementing it with high-level support to bypass the obvious obstacles.

Read the Wiki cables from Salah ad Din, for example, and you will see measurable reports of goods returning to markets, and pricing dropping. People were getting back to life from the safer routes and repaired bridges courtesy of MND-North with Iraqi cooperation and security. Still dangerous, but functioning. This is not rocket science.

Our mission (forget about the window-dressing) was what Gen Odierno is espousing today---to create enough stability to rapidly turn Iraq over to the Iraqis an rapidly get us out of the middle of the road, both for ours and Iraq's sake. Iraq's infrastructure is, today, as bad as its politics, but fixing them is now, properly, up to Iraqis.

Afghanistan, however, is a different kettle of fish from start to finish. My concern has always been that, first, there is no viable plan, and, second, the options for a commander to create his own and successfully implement it were non-existent.

The flaw was in the strategy (or lack thereof), and no amount of tactics, however well considered, could, on a material and sustainable basis, overcome it.

If, as was the case in Iraq, Ambassador Crocker put out a call for civilian troubleshooters to come and cut the Gordian Knot, I would be there, ponce again, as soon as all the silly pre-deployment details were overcome, but even he has not done that in Afghanistan, with ominous suggestions that, in effect, there really is no Gordian Knot that the US can cut.

It is a very different problem set, in large part because of the lack of indigenous resources and capabilities, not actually enhanced during our tenure (as Stewart notes) despite Herculean efforts by those on the ground.

davidbfpo
04-16-2012, 01:54 PM
Robert Du Bois, who started this thread off has written a book and this thread has details:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15427

davidbfpo
06-23-2012, 04:20 PM
A short tale on video:
former US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asked to reflect on the lessons he had drawn from the US intervention.....Finally, he told a story about how village elders in Kandahar remembered USAID and Peace Corps volunteers from the 1950s, and reflected on ‘those brave Marines who had fought so hard’, who ‘sadly would not be remembered’ so fondly.

Link and scroll down to the third podcast:http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/06/22/eikenberry-lessons-from-afghanistan/

Alas the story is incomplete, so if anyone knows Roger & Bob were that would be neat!

Bill Moore
06-23-2012, 06:17 PM
David, thanks for the link. I think most of us, at least the military old timers, have always accepted this as a truth before we got into the post 9-11 nation building business. We have wore our welcome out, while diplomacy and aid done correctly is not overly intrusive, but since 9/11 I'm not so sure that is true is anymore. It is worth going back to the 50s and really studying our small foot print type engagements. What we call small now almost always includes the words task force, which is often the wrong answer.