The Strategic Corporal

[SWJED]

This is a special forum - reserved for tactical discussions on the day-to-day things our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, Coasties and their coalition counterparts have learned in the conduct of Small Wars...

[SWJED]

The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield - The Nexus Between the USMC's Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2005/Szepesy.pdf) by James Szepesy. Tufts University Master's Thesis, March 2005.


The modern international security environment has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. The nature of the battlefield has changed from rural to urban. New technology promises tremendous capabilities, and there are new actors on the scene. These changes have had an impact on the approaches used by U.S. security instruments to implement U.S. policy. The U.S. Marine Corps identified the changing battlefield in the later half of the 1990s and articulated its vision of future warfare as the Three Block War.

Concurrent to Marine Corps’ development of the Three Block War was an explosive growth in information technology developments. The end of the Cold War, budgetary pressures, changing face of war, and technological advancements at the start of the 21st Century generated tremendous pressure upon the US military establishment to adapt. Emerging from these pressures was a desire to operationalize the information technology advancements realized at the end of the 20th Century in what is being called Network Centric Warfare.

These two vectors, refining the Three Block War model and Network Centric Warfare, have come to be important elements to the strategies and tactics used to fight in Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as well as components to the consequent debate about the appropriate structure and composition of the U.S. military for the 21st Century.

[Stratiotes]

Interesting. But, I'm not sure I understand how it has been decided that the emerging battlefield is more urban than rural. Iraq, perhaps. But not Afghanistan. I'm just not certain there is more evidence toward urban warfare now than there was before or less evidence of rural than there was before. Is there really a change based on data or is it a largely untested perception? And, is the data based on a changing definition of what urban and rural are or is it a static definition we used to compare the past with now? Just curious because it is something I've heard before but I just don't know that the evidence/data supports the assertion.

[Stu-6]

More of the world is becoming urban. A century ago most of the population was involved in agriculture, rural guerillas had a ready supply of men and material, this is no longer the case. Also modern weapons give the established state forces a huge advantage in most terrain, the complexity of a city along with the collateral damage factor evens the playing field.

[Stratiotes]

More of the world is becoming urban. A century ago most of the population was involved in agriculture, rural guerillas had a ready supply of men and material, this is no longer the case. Also modern weapons give the established state forces a huge advantage in most terrain, the complexity of a city along with the collateral damage factor evens the playing field.

I understand how the logic would seem to imply that we should expect more urban warfare - but I wondered if there was any data to support that assumption since I haven't seen it. The war in Iraq is predominantly urban but the wars in south and central Americas seem to have been predominantly rural. The war in Afghanistan is also predominantly rural. The Balkans conflicts have been predominatly rural too I believe. I just wondered if the data supported the presuppositions and I'm still not sure it does.

As for the advantages, I'm not so sure technology has really given a significant advantage. I think people are smarter than most technology and tend to figure out ways to thwart technological changes rather quickly. At least, that seems to be the case historically. Technological advances in weapons are, at best, a very temporary advantage it would seem.

[DDilegge]

I've collected some background info and studies for you on our urban operations (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/urbanoperations.htm) page. It's all there and supports what smart people have been saying about the future over the last two decades.

More info can be found on the SASO (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/security.htm), Transition (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/transition.htm), COIN (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/counterinsurgency.htm), Threat (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/threat.htm), Interagency (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/interagency.htm), Chechnya (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/chechnya.htm), Somalia (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/somalia.htm) and other pages in the SWJ Reference Library (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/reference.htm).

[Stratiotes]

Thanks, I appreciate the effort and I am familiar with some of those works.

My problem is this - from the ones I've read there seems to be an accepted conventional wisdom that wars will be more urban. I know a lot of the people saying that are smarter than I am for certain. But, dumb as I am I still find it difficult to accept conventional wisdom when I have not seen the raw data to support that wisdom. Are you aware of any studies based on the raw data? I'm afraid I did not find any such data in sampling of the articles you've mentioned - only the opinions of experts who tend to accept it as a given without questioning the assertion. They may be right and I would tend to believe that they being smarter than myself are right - I just haven't been convinced from their opinions alone. I'd like to see the same data they are looking at. From what I have seen, I do not see a trend evolving there. I see some evidence of the contrary, as I said.

What I would hope to find one day is somebody who did the analysis to come up with some numbers like:

1960 - There were 1300 rural COIN ops and 500 urban
1961 - 1400 rural and 800 urban
:
:
1990 - 700 rural and 1000 urban
:
:
2005 - 300 rural and 1400 urban

If I saw something like that, then I could see for myself that there did seem to be a trend toward one more than the other. So far, I haven't seen any such analysis. What I have seen so far is the opinion of "experts" and however highly I value that expert, it is still just an opinion without supporting data and therefore somewhat suspect.

[GorTex6]

The future warrior should be tactically mobile, morally responsible, lightly equipped, culturally-centric, witty, and capable of making a sound decision without a technological cloak for micromanagement.

[Fabius Maximus]

The “strategic corporal” seems to me an unlikely concept for a large force, such as the US Army, to achieve in practice. Nice dream, though.

The following excerpt is from my review of the FMFM 1-A at
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/thoughts_on_fmfm_1-a.htm


“Fourth Generation war demands not only the strategic corporal, but the moral corporal as well, enlisted Marines who think about every action they take in terms of its moral effects.”
William Lind, et al, "FMFM 1-A" page 8
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_25_05.htm

This seems implausible given the age, experience, and training of the average US Marine corporal, now or in any likely future. The courts martial of NCOs for mistreatment of Iraq prisoners suggest that we need more hands-on lieutenants and less freedom of action for corporals.

We’ll be lucky to get an adequate number of First Lieutenants with such cross-cultural knowledge, capable of acting with such sophisticated strategic and moral reasoning.

This illustrates a difficulty of recommendations given in FMFM 1-A. All wargame scenarios have easy solutions if one can conjure up sufficient resources. FMFM 1-A aspires to a US Marine Corps with the training and attributes of our elite Special Ops units.

With an army of such men we could pacify Iraq. Equally so, with the Battlestar Galactica or Starship Enterprise the Germans could have won WWII.

It’s not enough to dream of ways we can win. How can we evolve our current military apparatus to get there from here?

[Strickland]

The strategic corporal concept is not only relevant, but a requirement in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. While it increases the burden of leadership, and on recruit instructors, this is a price worth paying. Those individuals who claim that this is a "bridge too far" or "beyond reasonable expectations" are most likely the same individuals who believe that enlisting 37 and 39 years olds in the Army after bribing them with staggering enlistment bonuses is a good idea, that the National Guard is an elite fighting force, and that the abuses at Abu Gharib are unavoidable.

[Stratiotes]

I think it is possible but requires a paradigm shift in our culture. We are, I think, still clinging to the old notion of creating automotons who follow orders above all else. Instead of rewarding initiative, we tend to look for where to pin the blame when things go wrong making individuals more afraid of failure than they are hungry for success. Instead of the attitude "he who risks wins" we seem to more often remember "he who risks might fail!" So we put the burden on the corporal to be strategic all the while implying that taking risks is not tolerated except when it works…implying that when it doesn't work, heads will roll. Rewards often come to those who make no decisions on their own. I think it is possible and essential as Major S. but it will be very difficult to achieve in our present culture. I think there have been improvements since I left the military back in the mid-80's but, from what I've seen since, the progress has been relatively slow in most services. Of course, all of that is simply my perception so I could be wrong - but I think it’s a perception shared by quite a few.

[GorTex6]

that the National Guard is an elite fighting force,

There were some elite forces in the guard, but the geriatric fatbastard good ole' boy network disbanded them. :mad:

[Fabius Maximus]

Excerpt from
"Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?"
by Fabius Maximus.
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_maximus_militia-1.pdf


Unfortunately there ... is a natural tendency to propose expanding on our strengths rather than addressing our weaknesses, taking us further down a dead end road.

Note recent articles ... describing programs to improve the training of US troops, in the hope that we can win by fielding troops in which – to caricature it – each NCO and officer has the skills of Green Beret.

Imagine a force of multilingual troops, all of whose leaders have a sophisticated understanding of foreign cultures, and ability to not only lead US troops but also navigate within foreign communities – gathering and using intelligence, playing both its elites and common people as an experienced angler does trout.

At some point this becomes a search for the “super soldier serum” familiar to all who read Captain America comic books. ...

We already have some of the best-trained soldiers that America has ever fielded, certainly among the best trained and educated in world history. Is increasing their effectiveness by adding even more intellectual skills the best course, or have passed the point of diminishing returns to training?

However desirable a goal, adding to our strengths detracts attention from critical weaknesses in our current force structure. Seeking to increase our troops training and skills is nice, but the process has severe and perhaps immediate limits.

[Stratiotes]

I guess it depends on how we're defining "strategic corporal." I never thought the idea of making every soldier a green beret as feasible - but I have thought we can teach them some rudimentary knowledge of culture and language in the area where they are going to be assigned prior to sending them there.

They don't have to be fluent but if they can say more than "Tell me where you hid the weapons of mass destruction!" and a few expletives in the native language, it would be quite helpful. :)

And I'm not even thinking so much in terms of language and culture skills or even physical fitness. I'm thinking more along the lines of being able to think beyond carrying out the letter of his orders and more to carrying out the intent of those orders instead. Rather than blindly following what his Captain says, he should have the ability to know what his Captain's intent was and if following his orders strictly will result in that intent or might backfire in a later situation where his Captain cannot be there to correct him. I know that's a lot to ask too but surely we can do something more than we have in the past toward that end.

[GorTex6]

We wasted our six month train up sitting around at ranges and waiting for ammo to arrive. We were trained by incompetent idiot reservists that were more concerned with "going through the sequences" and "checking the box". What a waste of time and money; we could have had been immersed in cultural communication classes and language training at university level instruction, but instead were fed the same ethnocentric dogma and Jominian hubris. Our scenerios had Killeen's finest ghetto thugs (from a temp agency) acting a COBs(civilians on the battlefield); they had no fuc&ing clue about Iraqi culture nor even gave a rats ass. They just half assed through the day to get a paycheck.

FTA (http://www.dangerzonejobs.com/artman/publish/index.shtml)

[Stratiotes]

Gortex,

You confirm what I have suspected for some time. We ask you guys to do a peace-keeping mission but give you only rudimentary or no skills at all suited for that purpose. When it comes to killing and breaking things, I think our training is second to none - but when it comes to creating soldier-diplomats we fall on our faces. I temper what I say since I do not have the first hand experience, I appreciate your passion because it suits an individual that can speak first hand on the matter.

Given that, I gather language and culture skills would be useful to you. Can you elaborate on those a bit and tell us some of the lessons you have learned the hard way? Obviously you cannot go into details of particular operations but if you can be generic and still give enough detail I am interested.

[DDilegge]

We ask you guys to do a peace-keeping mission but give you only rudimentary or no skills at all suited for that purpose.

Not quite true. While I am more familiar with Marine Corps Training, there has been a lot of progress by both the Army and USMC in reference to SASO training. Broad sweeping statements like the one you made do injustice to the efforts by many to train for the complex "Three Block War" scenario.

Don't buy into the hype that all of our military leadership "doesn’t get it" - they do.

Moreover, considering the current op-tempo (deployment rate) I opine that our trainers are doing a damn fine job with minimal time and resources.

Consider that before 9-11 our forces were required to fight two major theater wars simultaneously while also putting out brush fires (Small Wars). There are only so many training hours in a day and only so many resources to replicate real world scenarios... Could they have been doing more prior to Iraq? Probably yes, but the military is adapting as fast as current conditions allow.

[CPT Holzbach]

Given that, I gather language and culture skills would be useful to you. Can you elaborate on those a bit and tell us some of the lessons you have learned the hard way? Obviously you cannot go into details of particular operations but if you can be generic and still give enough detail I am interested.

I have a few suggestions. First and foremost, you cannot have too much language training. Anyone who has ever had a customer come into their place of work who speaks little to no English understands how aggravating it is when someone you have to work with doesnt speak the local language. Now, imagine that customer has a gun and authority over you. Just makes the situation more exasperating. Terps are a pain in the ass to work with. Some are fantastic, many are not. Either way, the ability to speak the language is a huge advantage that cannot be overstated. It makes the job easier, and impresses the local nationals. Officers should receive intensive training in this, at all levels. Every officer in a leadership position, from platoon leader to division commander, will interact with locals regularly. We dont need to stand around and "supervise" the NCOs training the soldiers. They got it. We should be in language class. However, NCOs, especially those in team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant type positions, must also have heavy language instruction. And right out the window must go the old attitude of "I just train soldiers and kill people". Not anymore. For the soldiers, they need language training too, but theirs does not need to be too extensive. The basics of everyday communication are fine. Yes, no, please, thank you, courteous greetings, and common sense phrases that relate to life on a patrol, such as stop or halt, lay down, hands behind your back/on your head, etc. The soldiers wont be the diplomats out there.

Secondly, as far as culture goes, its the same story. What kills me is that this is not hard or time consuming to teach. Whats hard is the bizarre array of tribes and clans and families and imams and sheiks and loyalties that need to be understood. Knock yourself out, S-2! But culture is NOT HARD. Especially for the soldiers. For them, its far more about what they DONT do than what they do. DONT stare at women or ever touch them for any reason short of saving life and limb. DONT show the soles of your feet. DONT let the search dog go through the room with the Koran in it. DONT make the "ok" hand gesture or call someone over by curling your finger, etc etc. Whats more needed for them, is NCOs who will stomp their guts out for breaking the basic rules of courtesy. It absolutly cannot be tolerated. And the officers cannot tolerate it in themselves or their NCOs. The soldiers will follow your example and mirror your contempt. If the soldiers understand that they should act in Iraq almost like they would have acted in 1950s America, that helps a lot. A formal, courteous society. Culture is easy to understand. Oh, and leaders should have to eat the local food before they ever deploy. They should be introduced to chi (sweet tea), which actually quite a lot of guys end up really liking, and they should be made to eat Iraqi food as well. Now its also important to understand that the Iraqis know that we are Americans and come from a very different culture. They dont expect us to act like honorary Iraqis or something. Thats why what you DONT do is so imprtant. Just dont insult anyone; make no new enemies. But your still the guest in their country, and basic courtesy will be shown to you and expected from you.

And third, an understanding of the concept of insurgency is crucial. I had to tell my platoon, a mortar platoon, on several occasions (especially after one of my guys got killed), that no, shelling Zone 23 with HE and WP will NOT accomplish anything. The people will not give us information. We cannot bully the people into complying. Passive support of insurgents is still support for insurgents, but just keeping your mouth shut or claiming ignorance is not illegal. If soldiers have a basic understanding of what kind of fight their going into, it will help just as much as knowing some of the language and understanding the culture.

[Stratiotes]

Not quite true. While I am more familiar with Marine Corps Training, there has been a lot of progress by both the Army and USMC in reference to SASO training. Broad sweeping statements like the one you made do injustice to the efforts by many to train for the complex "Three Block War" scenario.

Don't buy into the hype that all of our military leadership "doesn’t get it" - they do.


That's good to know - I am glad to be corrected on that issue.

[Stu-6]

CPT Holzbach comments are right on the money. As an enlisted infantry solider I was with the first group of US troops to go into Bosnia, training in peacekeeping was superficial, and language and cultural training was nonexistent. There were only a handful enlisted troops of in the entire company that had any real understand of the history and culture of the region and the only reason we did is because we had dug up a few books on the subject on our on initiative. The really sad part about that was there were a lot of soldiers who would have been really interested if anyone had carried enough to try to teach them.

[NDD]

I have a few suggestions. First and foremost, you cannot have too much language training. Anyone who has ever had a customer come into their place of work who speaks little to no English understands how aggravating it is when someone you have to work with doesnt speak the local language. Now, imagine that customer has a gun and authority over you. Just makes the situation more exasperating. Terps are a pain in the ass to work with. Some are fantastic, many are not. Either way, the ability to speak the language is a huge advantage that cannot be overstated. It makes the job easier, and impresses the local nationals. Officers should receive intensive training in this, at all levels. Every officer in a leadership position, from platoon leader to division commander, will interact with locals regularly. We dont need to stand around and "supervise" the NCOs training the soldiers. They got it. We should be in language class. However, NCOs, especially those in team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant type positions, must also have heavy language instruction. And right out the window must go the old attitude of "I just train soldiers and kill people". Not anymore. For the soldiers, they need language training too, but theirs does not need to be too extensive. The basics of everyday communication are fine. Yes, no, please, thank you, courteous greetings, and common sense phrases that relate to life on a patrol, such as stop or halt, lay down, hands behind your back/on your head, etc. The soldiers wont be the diplomats out there.

Secondly, as far as culture goes, its the same story. What kills me is that this is not hard or time consuming to teach. Whats hard is the bizarre array of tribes and clans and families and imams and sheiks and loyalties that need to be understood. Knock yourself out, S-2! But culture is NOT HARD. Especially for the soldiers. For them, its far more about what they DONT do than what they do. DONT stare at women or ever touch them for any reason short of saving life and limb. DONT show the soles of your feet. DONT let the search dog go through the room with the Koran in it. DONT make the "ok" hand gesture or call someone over by curling your finger, etc etc. Whats more needed for them, is NCOs who will stomp their guts out for breaking the basic rules of courtesy. It absolutly cannot be tolerated. And the officers cannot tolerate it in themselves or their NCOs. The soldiers will follow your example and mirror your contempt. If the soldiers understand that they should act in Iraq almost like they would have acted in 1950s America, that helps a lot. A formal, courteous society. Culture is easy to understand. Oh, and leaders should have to eat the local food before they ever deploy. They should be introduced to chi (sweet tea), which actually quite a lot of guys end up really liking, and they should be made to eat Iraqi food as well. Now its also important to understand that the Iraqis know that we are Americans and come from a very different culture. They dont expect us to act like honorary Iraqis or something. Thats why what you DONT do is so imprtant. Just dont insult anyone; make no new enemies. But your still the guest in their country, and basic courtesy will be shown to you and expected from you.

And third, an understanding of the concept of insurgency is crucial. I had to tell my platoon, a mortar platoon, on several occasions (especially after one of my guys got killed), that no, shelling Zone 23 with HE and WP will NOT accomplish anything. The people will not give us information. We cannot bully the people into complying. Passive support of insurgents is still support for insurgents, but just keeping your mouth shut or claiming ignorance is not illegal. If soldiers have a basic understanding of what kind of fight their going into, it will help just as much as knowing some of the language and understanding the culture.


Here ya go Sir:
The Dark Side (http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/sfas/SFmenu.html)

Come on over...:cool:

[GorTex6]

www.warrior-mentor.com (http://www.warrior-mentor.com)

[Xenophon]

This thread seems to have become more of a debate on military training but I want to address the Strategic Corporal not as a good or bad concept but as an inevitable one.

In fact, it's the most recent evolution in a centuries-long process. As technological advancements have allowed the individual soldier to command more and more firepower and destructive force, strategic decision making has been pushed down the chain of command. In ancient times, the consul, general, or king would be making the strategic decisions on the battlefield. During the Napoleonic era, battalions were the major actors on the battlefield. Through WWI and WWII it moved from the company to the platoon level and in Vietnam, squad sized patrols were the most common deployment. Responsibility for immediate decision making on the battefield has steadily been pushed down the chain of command. Now it's moving to the fire team level.

But it's not just being driven by the technological capabilities of the military, but by the requirements put on it. We do not have enough boots for counterinsurgency warfare, and autonomous, independent fire teams will be able to cover a larger area, enabling us to do more warfighting with less people. Fighting small cells of terrorists with a platoon is like trying swat flies with a hammer. But spread that hammer out and you've got a much better chance of squashing bugs.

Now I'm not saying we're capable of pulling this off right now. For one thing, our communications equipment is going to have to get smaller and easier, even if it sacrifices some security. And we're definitly going to have to make major changes in the way we train people. As it stands, our training and education is woefully inadequete. Hell, I can vouch that our training in the Marine Corps is almost inadequete to even have strategic lieutenants. And we get six months of leadership training before we do anything, Army lieutenants get nothing. That and the Army's size makes me think this is not the concept for them (they haven't even figured out that EVERYONE needs combat training, not just grunts), but there needs to be a move in the strategic corporal direction. Even though it requires major paradigm shifts in both the military and in society. History is replete with examples of what happens to those who are unwilling to change. We're going to be fighting insurgents and guerillas more in the future than anything else. Mao said that the population is the sea in which the guerilla swims. The strategic corporal is going to be the shark.

[Xenophon]

Anyone out there read that? I was hoping I'd get some feedback.

I also wrote an essay on it on my blog at xenophonblog.blogspot.com

[Fabius Maximus]

Well, as the one who started this thread, I disagree.

I gave my points of disagreement at the start, but will recap specific to your post.

1. Is the US soldier on patrol in Iraq doing much different than a Roman centurian on Patrol in Israel circa 50 AD? Does the extra firepower help? True, he can call down firepower to destroy the neighborhood -- making enemies by the hundreds. As could the Centurian, although it would take longer.

2. Does improved communication empower the corporal, or the opposite? Does better commo move authority up or down the chain? Clearly the local commander -- the capain on a ship, an area commander, or an ambassador -- has suffered a great loss of autonomy since 1900.

3. Are our NCOs in line units becomming more or less educated and capable? It's not clear, but I doubt that there is great improvement vs. 1960 for the Army. Esp. with respect to ability to understand foreign cultures -- probably not even with respect to understanding our own culture. If recognition of rap tunes or other US culture "Trivia Persuit" could make Strategic Corporals, we'd be set.

I would be interested to see data on this.

[GorTex6]

Are our NCOs in line units becomming more or less educated and capable?

In the army guard side, the rank of e-5 is now what e-4 should be- I have never seen so many e-5s. They are conditionally promoted, meaning that they have to attend PLDC within a year of their date of rank; if deployed, they have a year after REFRAD(think years!). PLDC has also been decreased from 4 weeks to 2 on the active side. E-6s are conditionally promoted for BNCOC. I have also yet to see anyone legitimately pass a freakin APFT-H&W/tape in a long time(too chickensht to hold a fatbastards feet to the fire). Despite lipservice to regulations, promotions are accually based on behind closed door "drug deals" and "good ol' boy" politics. :mad:

[Xenophon]

Fabius Maximus

1. I'd agree that they are doing much the same thing. But even without the added firepower available to the Corporal, decision making is being pushed down to the absolute lowest level. Look at the case of Pfc. Lynddie England. A PFC normally would only be involved in the tactical level of war. But her participation in the Abu Ghraib scandal greatly hurt our strategic considerations. Or look at the Marine Lance Corporal who allegedly shot an injured Iraqi and the media scandal that followed it. Situations like this prove that, due to any number of factors, every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine is a strategic player on the battlefield. Whether we like it or not, or intended it to be this way or not, corporals have now become a strategic asset. It's up to us to properly train and prepare them so that they can succeed in that role.

2. I must have stated my reasoning for better comm poorly. I don't believe comm abilities will empower the Corporal at all. But if a fire team is going to be an independent actor on the battlefield, they need to have comm with higher. Our current assets are insufficient to this task.

3. I agree our NCOs are probably getting letting capable. But due to new realities of warfare, we need to reverse this trend.

[Reid Bessenger]

I was concerned to read the assessment of the quality of junior noncomissioned officers above. I don't agree with it. I see a pervasive and opposite trend. I don't disagree with anyone else's assessment of the folks they see, but I know that whatever else it is, the trend is not universally negative.

The inevitablity of the operative Strategic Corporal was addressed above. That's the point I think - it's happening. The issue is more about how do we facilitate the success of the strategic corporal than it is about how can we possibly make every corporal comparable to SF in maturity, education, training and capablility.

[Strickland]

For those that believe the strategic corporal concept is a bridge too far, or places unnecessary burdens on limited resources to include the Marines and soldiers themselves, please take note. During a recent meeting of 20 veterans of OIF, OEF, Somalia, and the Balkans, ALL agreed that we must demand more from our junior enlisted personnel. In addition, all agreed that this concept was neither unnecessary, nor placed unrealistic expectations on our junior troops. Many suggested that those that held negative views about the potential of this concept were handicapped by experiences with the Draftee Army of the 60s and 70s.

[jct]

1. Is the US soldier on patrol in Iraq doing much different than a Roman centurian on Patrol in Israel circa 50 AD? Does the extra firepower help? True, he can call down firepower to destroy the neighborhood -- making enemies by the hundreds. As could the Centurian, although it would take longer.


One big difference between a US soldier in Iraq and the Roman centurian on patrol is the 24/7 news coverage that rapidly spreads news around the globe. The Roman soldier could destroy a neighborhood, but video of the aftermath would not flash around the world within hours, inflaming world opinion. The Corporal's actions can much more easily influence world opinion in a negative manner. I would emphasize negative because positive actions often receive no press or quickly move off of the front page.

[GorTex6]

For those that believe the strategic corporal concept is a bridge too far, or places unnecessary burdens on limited resources to include the Marines and soldiers themselves, please take note. During a recent meeting of 20 veterans of OIF, OEF, Somalia, and the Balkans, ALL agreed that we must demand more from our junior enlisted personnel. In addition, all agreed that this concept was neither unnecessary, nor placed unrealistic expectations on our junior troops. Many suggested that those that held negative views about the potential of this concept were handicapped by experiences with the Draftee Army of the 60s and 70s.

"More often than not the line soldiers are unaware of what is happening or supposed to happen. They Rely on NCOs and officers in all eventualities. They are trainied to fight as cogs in an intricate and vast machine embracing perhaps millions like themselves"
-Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, 1956

[Xenophon]

"Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets."- General George S. Patton

[SSG Rock]

I must admit, unfortunately, that within the Army NCO Corps, too much emphasis was placed on civilian education, holding the right duty positions, getting a perfect NCOER etc, for too long. I fell for it, and I ended up becoming a very small member of the NCO Corps with an MA, I completed my masters program as an E6. I languished at E6 for a long time, and was picked up for E7 after I had made the decision to retire. This is a topic for another thread, but IMHO, Brigade level commanders should be given the authority to promote staff sergeants to sergeant first class had that been a reality when I became eligible for E7, my brigade commander would have promoted me immediately, the centralized promotion system is broken and we are not promoting the best candidates. During my last six or seven years on AD, I definately saw a decrease in the quality of the NCO Corps, not that they weren't capable, but emphasis for promotion was misguided. Promotion to SFC should be based almost solely on core competence and MOS skills, less so on job positions and NCOERs, there are not enough duty positions for all NCOs to get a fair shot, I'm sure the officer corps suffers from the same problem to a somewhat smaller scale. NCO quality decline is not the fault of junior and mid level NCOs, (they hunger for more responsibility) but due to their leaders. For some reason, at least here at Fort Leavenworth, the Sergeants Majors that I had contact with acted more like officers then NCOs and they expected everything except traditional NCO behavior from the NCOs under their charge and when I was on AD, my fellow NCOs sincerely felt there was nobody in their corner and that the senior NCOs on post were derilect in this duty. It was maddening for me to watch NCOs get called on the carpet time after time to explain themselves in simple leadership matters such as conducting a barracks party because his Soldiers living quarters were below standard or writing a negative counseling statement for missing a formation etc. Another, more serious problem is, senior officers have also lost touch with the duties and responsibilities of the NCO. The zero tolerance atmosphere impeded the NCO in carrying out his duties, phasing out the SQT, especially the hands on portion, and a generally risk averse officer corps have all had a detrimental impact on the NCO Corps. It has been a while since I have been in a combat unit, and I assume these problems exist in those units as well although to a lesser degree perhaps, but that it is still a detriment to TO&E units as well. If the Army wants its NCOs to be NCOs then they have to give them the authority we had in the 1980s. I think the Army would be served well in putting more faith in the NCO Corps as well as the autonomy to run their little corner of the Army.

[Steve Blair]

It's interesting to watch the army rehash this, especially when one looks back to the Army after the Civil War. At that time, the NCOs had heavy company-level responsibilities, and were looked upon in many cases as the backbone of their units. These NCOs were not, generally speaking, formally educated, but they were repositories of military information and skill that many officers relied on. They often took out patrols on their own, and in the case of first sergeants at times commanded the company when all their assigned officers were absent.

[Jugurtha]

I don't want to hijack this thread even further than it already is but working with the British and Australian armies and their enlisted rank structure made me think about ours. Their corporals were much more mature and able than most of the Marine corporals that I have worked with; about on par with a Marine sergeant. Having a private-corporal-whatever structure makes more sense to me when E1-E3 in any service do the same job. Keep 'em at private until they earn corporal; 4 years of staring at the same rank may be an incentive...

On that note, 2nd LT and 1st LT are redundant as well. ;)

[SSG Rock]

It's interesting to watch the army rehash this, especially when one looks back to the Army after the Civil War. At that time, the NCOs had heavy company-level responsibilities, and were looked upon in many cases as the backbone of their units. These NCOs were not, generally speaking, formally educated, but they were repositories of military information and skill that many officers relied on. They often took out patrols on their own, and in the case of first sergeants at times commanded the company when all their assigned officers were absent.

Precisely! What is the benefit of a staff sergeant with a masters degree? If I had not been counseld by my mentors that getting a civilian education would increase my promotion potential, I probably would have waited untill later to do it. The NCO Corps does not necessarily need a college education, we don't need an NCO Corps whose formal education mirrors the Officer Corps. There should be a very clear divide in the roles of the officer and NCO, thats what makes the Army work. The Officers need to get an education so they can discuss doctrine, theory, write campaign plans and etc. The NCO needs to spend his time becoming an expert at every task he must supervise his Soldiers perform and taking care of the health, welfare and training of those Soldiers, period.

[nichols]

IMHO...

The Strategic Corporal is not about education level, ability to call a 9 line, or level of responsibility. It's about making dynamic decisions NOW in context of the Commander's Intent without having to wait for authorization.

[Steve Blair]

At the risk of flogging the proverbial dead horse here, I think one of the main tenants of the strategic corporal idea that tends to get lost is its external impact. By this I mean that, given the immediacy of media, what used to be a routine decision (or non-decision) by a corporal can have an immediate and at times strategic impact. It's not so much a matter of formal education as it is making people aware that in today's environment their decisions (or, again, non-decisions) can have an impact that is much wider than they might assume.

[fas_et_gloria]

Gents, first post here, so I hope I'm not going to step on too many toes.

It occurs to me that from my reading of the thread thus far, that there is a distinction between the strategic corporal being discussed and that envisaged by Krulac. His point, surely, is not that we need to train our soldiers and junior commanders to act in a strategicly positive way as an end in itself: rather he is proposing that the globalisation of information exchange means that the actions of any soldier are going to have strategic consequences no matter whether the Chain of Command actively prepares and trains our junior leaders for the role. Especially in the current assymetric environment, the actions of the section commander/squad leader (depending on which side of the pond you start...) are inevitably going to have strategic consequences.

The televisation of the death of Mohammed al-Durah by IDF fire at the begining of the Al-Aqsa intifada is a case in point. Arguably, the current events in the ME would not be taking place had the junior leader at the time had other options for dealing with stone-throwing youths than .762 calibre ones.

[SWJED]

Gents, first post here, so I hope I'm not going to step on too many toes.

It occurs to me that from my reading of the thread thus far, that there is a distinction between the strategic corporal being discussed and that envisaged by Krulac. His point, surely, is not that we need to train our soldiers and junior commanders to act in a strategicly positive way as an end in itself: rather he is proposing that the globalisation of information exchange means that the actions of any soldier are going to have strategic consequences no matter whether the Chain of Command actively prepares and trains our junior leaders for the role. Especially in the current assymetric environment, the actions of the section commander/squad leader (depending on which side of the pond you start...) are inevitably going to have strategic consequences.

The televisation of the death of Mohammed al-Durah by IDF fire at the begining of the Al-Aqsa intifada is a case in point. Arguably, the current events in the ME would not be taking place had the junior leader at the time had other options for dealing with stone-throwing youths than .762 calibre ones.

I think the vast majority here would agree with you - maybe it just wasn't expressed as such. We explored this issue during Joint Urban Warrior 06 (USMC - JFCOM program). Participants included representatives from the US Army, USMC, British Army, Royal Marines, Australian Army, Canadian Army, French Army, Netherlands Army, Israeli Army, German Army, New Zealand Army, and other ground forces. Issues ranged from training, professional education for SNCO's and NCO's, age and maturity, balancing warfighting skills with other skill sets, capabilities (organizational, doctrinal and technological) and of course the implications of today’s 24 / 7 instant news environment. Your comment on the globalization of information and its effects were echoed by the vast majority of the participants.

Where it gets much more complicated is developing and implementing solutions to improved "Strategic Corporal" capabilities (after careful examination to gauge "true value") along the lines of those other issues I listed above.

Many schools of thought abound and can be taken to extremes at times - from doing nothing because there are no real solutions to training conventional forces to Special Forces standards. Neither of these two extremes is viable though... That’s why this issue will be top and center as the major theme for Joint Urban Warrior 07.

[Tom Odom]

The issue goes beyond that of individual soldier training; in some ways the issue relates directly to the key word, "individual". Training and development systems focus on individuals and we develop good Soldiers and ultimately great leaders. The problem is that they never practice their skils at the level where they gained them. The result is we do not increase the collective experience of our units so that the "strategic corporal" idea can grow in the fertile ground of an experienced company, platoon, and even squad.

See my article in Mil Review May-June 2005.

Best
Tom

[nichols]

From my limited perspective.

The key is in a clearly articulated Commander's Intent. When the CO can give a no kidding operationally sound intent and Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word understands that intent then you have the Strategic Corporal.

The only thing that high speed low drag schools will guarantee is the T-shirt.

Invest time and effort in learning the art of the Commander's Intent.

[SWJED]

Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/odom.pdf) by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates, Retired; Command Sergeant Major Jack Hardwick, U.S. Army, Retired; and Specialist First Class Robert Ehrlich, U.S. Army.

[SWJED]

Some would argue a clearly articulated commander's intent would be better served with 23 - 24 year-old small unit leaders with more training, education and experience as well as maturity vice 19 -20 year olds.

The age of NCOs serving in our usual coalition partner’s forces is older – and they have more experience under their belt. Yes, I know we have PFCs, LCpls and Cpls on their second and third combat tours – but what has that gotten us? Some would submit a worn-out force and one that has led to some of the damning strategic consequences of tactical actions – Abu Graib and Haditha are but two examples. Yes, I understand that incidents like this are committed by a slim minority of the force and the vast majority perform heroically - but that minority still has the potential to completely derail any chances of executing successful Small Wars - and in particular COIN. Can't we find a way to weed them out before the damage is done?

Moreover, why should the majority be required to learn the hard way?

An often unsympathetic – sometimes hostile mainstream media as well as the IO efforts of our foes compounds this situation.

Others would argue that the problem is not with the Strategic Corporal - but with the next higher leadership level up through and including the SECDEF. That argument partially supports the commander's intent thesis. I suspect that it is more than just a clearly articulated commander's intent - that other capabilities would give the Strategic Corporal more tools in his kit to carry out that intent - and in the absence of a clearly defined end-state and / or commander's intent carry-on successfully in a complex and changing operational environment that includes asymmetric foes in close proximity to the local populace.

Don’t get me wrong, as I most certainly do not have an answer to this. An older force has a lot of implications for U.S. military conventional forces. A seasoned force from a smaller pool and increased longevity and retention rates are but a few of the variables we would have to overcome. Training and education costs are another consideration.

The Strategic Corporal is here to stay – whether we like it or not – it is not something we can wish away or apply simple solutions to as we plod along in this IO-rich environment.

I take exception to the view that training and education would be a waste of effort.

That said, I am purposely stirring up the pot here and enjoin this board to begin posting possible solutions for debate – we all seem to have a handle on the problem set and apparently many of us are struggling to find answers.

[slapout9]

A Strategic corporal is more like a cop to me. Police officers are trained to make life and death decisions from day one. We have to do this without waiting for an operations order or some officer (supervisor) to tell us what to do. We have a lot of experience with doing it on camera, both good and bad. In the 28 articles for COIN and many other COIN writings you always here about acting like a beat cop. Do you know how to act like a beat cop??Do you know what a beat cop would do?? From what I have seen(which is limited )you have alot to learn. It hurts me to see such brave soldiers/marines get into such sh** because nobody has ever trained them on other options.


One way to start is this. Cops don't think Ends,Ways,and Means we think Motive,Means,and Opportunity!!! We don't think about total victory we think about control to a reasonable level.

OK now everybody take a shot!!(joke)

[nichols]

Some would argue a clearly articulated commander's intent would be better served with 23 - 24 year-old small unit leaders with more training, education and experience as well as maturity vice 19 -20 year olds.

If a commander's intent type statement can work with a properly prepared 12 year old, it can work with a properly prepared 19-20 year old. The training and education piece is what we as an institution are lacking.

Eyeballs........snap sir!!!!!!!

Sir, the private doesn't know sir!?!?!

From front to rear, count off!!!!!!!!!!

This is my rifle, there are many like it.................

SMEAC, BAMCIS, ADDRAC, METT T, IA Drills, TTPs, 6 line, 9 line.........

Marines, today's period of instruction is on the AN PRC 119.............

There is no requirement for the Marine to THINK in the above examples. This system worked great for a large draft army, it doesn't work in today's environment.

Von Stueben had it figured out during the Revolutionary War, you need to tell the American soldier "why."

Why don't we push critical thinking in bootcamp?
Why don't we push executive level thinking at the L/Cpl level?

Because, we are lazy. It is a lot easier to have the Marine blurt out Situation, Mission, Execution, Admin & logistics, Command & signal then to explain how the current enemy/friendly situation could effect the mission and ultimately the commander's intent.

What determines how a Marine becomes situational aware?

Perception = something is happening........
Comprehension = the alarm clock went off.....is this familiar?
Projection = if I turn it off, I get to sleep longer......
Prediction = if I sleep longer, I could get fired......
Decision = go to work

Our training takes the Marine to the Comprehension stage and then turns him loose with immediate action type decision making. This is the point where experience plays a critical function. Without teaching critical thinking he doesn't care about familiarity. His decision could very well be based on Hollywood, Soldier of Fortune, Sea Stories, video game.........

[Tom Odom]

I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my background.

My key point is that we cannot teach or train experience. Maybe someday we will be able to "insert" it via brain chip. But in the interim, training, educating, and "experiencing" is an individual track, not a unit collective track. More unit stability is a good start.

But I believe that the Army (and I can't speak for the Corps) has wasted the rank of Major for too long. A successful young Captain who succeeds at company command can wait more than a decade before that officer commands a battalion. I believe Majors should command companies, Captains, platoons, and that Lieutenants lead sections of 2 squads. Army squads (again speaking heretically) are too small. Operating in sections would go a long way toward strengthening units below platoon.

We need to strengthen our NCOs and get away from making the NCO corps do the resume march of individual checkmarks that has long plagued the officer corps. Senior NCOs (E7 and up) should be rewarded and encouraged to remain tactical as long as possible. I would love to see the day when a platoon daddy was an E8 and a first sergeant an E9. Above that I would make SGMs and CSMs warrants like the Brits do.

All of this I would see as building years of critical experience into small units versus simply producing experienced leaders whose advancement removes that experience from small units.

I stand ready to be led to the stake; who has a match?

Best
Tom

[nichols]

I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my.........................to the stake; who has a match?


Sir, I find myself in disagreement with you on your enlisted structure. The Army changed the SquadLeader to a SSgt after WW II as an incentive, I might be wrong on this.:o

Could be that slowing down the enlisted ranks promotion but increasing the pay based on time in service vice time in grade could help.

With that said, I'm done working for today, reading your book excerpt gave me some flashbacks of Bangui.....I'm off to the MCA Bookstore to get a copy.

[SWJED]

The training and education piece is what we as an institution are lacking.

Our training takes the Marine to the Comprehension stage and then turns him loose with immediate action type decision making. This is the point where experience plays a critical function. Without teaching critical thinking he doesn't care about familiarity. His decision could very well be based on Hollywood, Soldier of Fortune, Sea Stories, video game.........

This was also discussed heavily in JUW 06 - The need for more of the "how to think" about fluid and complex situations instead of “templated solutions on what to think".

At this event it was our pleasure to have Brigadier Rod West (Australian Army) as one of our senior mentors. He talked about the value of "scenario-general" training over what we seem to do best - "scenario-specific" training. I thought that was a very valid point. Scenario-general training - with a range of problems to solve.

This also proved true in my dealings with the Corps’ Project Metropolis experimentation that resulted in the USMC Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package. Readers Digest version – the only Battalion Landing Team that received the package prior to OIF thought that the range of complex, and seemingly “off-the-map”, situations (scenarios) that were thrown their way were in the category of “yea fine – but we’ll never see this…”

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (Project Metropolis Team) sent a lessons learned team to Iraq after this same battalion completed the “March Up” to Baghdad. Funny thing, their assessment was - yep – we did not see the scenarios MCWL gave us – but sure enough the program sure taught us how to think and deal with the unexpected…

That said, kudos to Mojave Viper (USMC training at 29 Palms) and the JRTC (US Army training at Ft. Polk) - it is my understanding that they, and others have picked up on the scenario-general... Let's hope all ground forces get this type of training and after it is all said and done - not s***-canned like some of the Vietnam-era lessons learned, programs and training programs were.

[Tom Odom]

Nick,

Yep they did. The Army also wisely look at the Marine Raiders structure using team leaders under those squad leaders. Our squad has varied over the years from 10+ to today's 9. I believe 9 is too light. I alo believe in the tactical superiority of "3" versus 2, be that 3 as a "buddy team" versus 2 as a buddy team or 3 maneuver/support elements versus 2. 3 inherently has greater depth and flexibility than 2.

Structure in the squads in that article came from very intense and repetitive discussions with the senior NCOs listed as co-authors.

Overall my point remains the same: we demand (not ask) much more of our small units in terms of fighting on a complex battlefield. We also have much fewer infantry and they are getting increasingly complex missions. We must look at adding capabilities and experience.

I never did Bangui though some of my friends did.

Best
Tom

[Uboat509]

I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my background.

My key point is that we cannot teach or train experience. Maybe someday we will be able to "insert" it via brain chip. But in the interim, training, educating, and "experiencing" is an individual track, not a unit collective track. More unit stability is a good start.

But I believe that the Army (and I can't speak for the Corps) has wasted the rank of Major for too long. A successful young Captain who succeeds at company command can wait more than a decade before that officer commands a battalion. I believe Majors should command companies, Captains, platoons, and that Lieutenants lead sections of 2 squads. Army squads (again speaking heretically) are too small. Operating in sections would go a long way toward strengthening units below platoon.

We need to strengthen our NCOs and get away from making the NCO corps do the resume march of individual checkmarks that has long plagued the officer corps. Senior NCOs (E7 and up) should be rewarded and encouraged to remain tactical as long as possible. I would love to see the day when a platoon daddy was an E8 and a first sergeant an E9. Above that I would make SGMs and CSMs warrants like the Brits do.

All of this I would see as building years of critical experience into small units versus simply producing experienced leaders whose advancement removes that experience from small units.

I stand ready to be led to the stake; who has a match?

Best
Tom

You are describing the rank structure for an SF company. The commander is a Major and his senior enlisted adviser is a Sergeant Major. Each of the teams is lead by a Master Sergeant and his senior commissioned adviser is a Captain. Of course SF does not have Lieutenants. Certainly, this structure could work in the the conventional army but with the Lieutenants as assistant platoon leaders rather than leading squads.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

This is also creeping back towards the "Old Army" organization, which was fairly NCO heavy by today's standards. And again, you saw NCOs with a great deal of responsibility and authority. A Frontier Army company first sergeant was selected by the company commander and confirmed by the regimental commander, not based on checklists but on demonstrated ability. And a good thing, too, since that first sergeant more often than not ended up commanding the company if (as was all too common) all the officers were absent.

[Uboat509]

Over reliance on officers has been a weakness in many military organizations throughout the world and history. The solution to our problems today is NOT more officers and more micromanagement which is what will you will get by adding more officers or pushing them down to lower levels of command like squads. Doing that will weaken the NCO corps and no professional army can afford to do that. One of the best assignments I had on the conventional army was as an infantry fire teamleader in 1/509. The is the OPFOR at JRTC. During the Low Intensity Combat phase of each rotation the each fire team would be given its own sector where the teamleader would have significant autonomy. We would be given specific missions from time to time particularly toward the end of the phase but mostly we just had a commanders intent and specific parameters to work within. My point is that many of those E4 E5 fire teamleaders excelled in that situation. There is a tendency in the conventional army toward group think and a strict adherence to very specific guidelines. Initiative is encouraged but only in certain directions. In other words a subordinate leader may be expected to take the initiative to do what his higher would have told him to do anyway but not to do something on his own. Part of what makes SF good at what they do is the training that they receive, of course, but also it is the mindset. In SF the ability to work autonomously with little guidance is not only encouraged, it is required. I believe that in part at least, the NCO corps has lost focus. NCOnet is a prime example of this. If you go to the COIN forum there you will find a few topics with generally few replies whereas in other forums you can find long scholarly discussions about whether or not pens should be visible in the ACUs or detailed discussions on the minutia of uniform regs. Not all NCOs are like this by far but there are enough in influential positions that I believe that there has been a shift in the culture of some organizations from NCOs as trainers and leaders first to NCOs as guardians of the regulations first. This is what fosters the strict adherence to the letter of the reg rather than its intent and the unwillingness or inability to act autonomously. That is what we need to fix, not Lieutenants as squad leaders. That's my opinion anyway.

SFC W

[Razor]

Xenophon, I've only recently joined this board, so forgive me if I come across as a wet-behind-the-ears contrarian, but while reading one of your posts on this thread I found some information to which I wanted to provide a respectful counterpoint.


Hell, I can vouch that our training in the Marine Corps is almost inadequete to even have strategic lieutenants. And we get six months of leadership training before we do anything, Army lieutenants get nothing.

As a former US Army infantry officer, I'd disagree that we received no leadership training prior to leading our first platoon. If you want, I suppose you can discount the four years of pre-commissioning general leadership training that both ROTC and service academy cadets receive, as its not always combat leadershp specific, but I believe that in terms of basic leadership principles, its not as ineffective as some would like to claim, and is delivered over a rather long period, with significant reinforcement of fundamental skills and concepts.

Following commissioning, an infantry officer (this is my area of experience, so I will relate to this specific officer branch training) attends a 4-month long Infantry Officer Basic Course. Following this, a vast majority of infantry 2LTs attend the US Army Ranger Course, a rather intense 61-day leadership training program. I would argue, therefore, that new Army infantry 2LTs do indeed receive general, branch-specific, and combat oriented leadership training prior to reporting to their first operational unit.


...(they haven't even figured out that EVERYONE needs combat training, not just grunts)...

That actually isn't true, either. The Army has created a 7-week long, combat oriented leadership course for new 2LTs of every Army branch called Basic Officer Leadership Course II. It is an attempt to ensure that regardless of branch (transportation, quartermaster, finance, etc.), all new platoon leaders receive basic infantry-related combat skills training at the squad and platoon level prior to training in their specialty branch. You can find more information on BOLC II at: https://www.infantry.army.mil/BOLC/content/mission.htm

Certainly, this isn't the desired objective state for new officer leadership training, but I believe its a step in the right direction.

[nichols]

There is no doubt that the Officer side of the house gets leadership training in all services.

The Corps has a pretty good system with The Basic School followed by MOS school. By the time the officer gets to the fleet he or she has had the leadership training & education pieces, how they apply it is a different subject.

Slight rudder adjustment.

now back to Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word.....

Rudy goes to Boot Camp and is trained to follow orders, his Drill Instructors have the training schedule in their covers that breaks down the day into micro-managed minutes.

Rudy is taught history, first aid, and what it is to be a Marine.

Rudy reports to his MOS school (non infantry Marines first attend a very basic infantry course called MCT) Rudy is infantry so he finds himself at SOI still not getting the word. Rudy is still following orders, no critical thinking involved. If Rudy decides to question the validity of this or that concept he is usually given a name like Private Brain or something of that nature. He isn't ridiculed but his place in life is pretty pointed out as being in the third rank.

Rudy is now checking into his first fleet unit for he is a full fledged Infantry Marine with his red & gold libo jacket. What will Rudy notice?

Chances are he will see micro-management (traditional C2) in effect. The Plt Commander will be leading him in PT, check writing, inspections.......

Rudy will probably take note that the NCOs are treated better but he really won't be able to explain how.

Rudy has a few of choices; reading/studying military history, get married, buy a car, live payday to payday buying beer/pizza......

The next morning Rudy will again see the Plt Commander micro managing or the NCO saying "because the CO/1st Sgt said so." Rudy will then go back into the third rank.

The mirace of all of the Rudyisms is that we still manage to have some unbelievable outstanding NCOs that break out of the third rank.

[Xenophon]

IMHO...

The Strategic Corporal is not about education level, ability to call a 9 line, or level of responsibility. It's about making dynamic decisions NOW in context of the Commander's Intent without having to wait for authorization.

That's exactly what it's about. However, we need to provide Marines with the information and training to make good decisions within the context of Commander's Intent.

I see your point, Razor, and agree that the Army is moving in the right direction. But I'm pretty much going through one of your BOLC III's right now here at Ft. Sill, and the 135 Army Lieutenants in my company do not support your argument. ROTC training is all well and good, but not all officers get it. I have no doubt that infantry officers do receive good training, but again, that's a minority in the Army. I can tell you that these artillery officers are getting nothing in the leadership and decision making training here. BOLC II is a waste of time, these Lieutenants don't even know how to interact with superior officers, one of them stood up (after being told to stand) and asked the Battalion Commander if artillery BOLC III "sucked" as much as he'd heard. The Marines were absolutely appalled. Their attitudes are horrible. We tried to get the soldiers in our platoon to PT in boots and utes and flak jackets. They literally said, "We dont' want to because it's hot in Oklahoma and that won't help with the PFT." And these are officers who will be in charge of enlisted soldiers' lives.

But you're infantry and maybe the Army, rightfully so, has focused on the development of its infantry officers first. I certainly hope so. It certainly wasn't a cheap stab at the Army, although I don't buy that a 5 week course does the job of transitioning a person into a professional officer. Same goes for ROTC training and infantry training that only a minority of officers receive. You're only as strong as your weakest link.

[Steve Blair]

Over reliance on officers has been a weakness in many military organizations throughout the world and history. The solution to our problems today is NOT more officers and more micromanagement which is what will you will get by adding more officers or pushing them down to lower levels of command like squads. Doing that will weaken the NCO corps and no professional army can afford to do that. One of the best assignments I had on the conventional army was as an infantry fire teamleader in 1/509. The is the OPFOR at JRTC. During the Low Intensity Combat phase of each rotation the each fire team would be given its own sector where the teamleader would have significant autonomy. We would be given specific missions from time to time particularly toward the end of the phase but mostly we just had a commanders intent and specific parameters to work within. My point is that many of those E4 E5 fire teamleaders excelled in that situation. There is a tendency in the conventional army toward group think and a strict adherence to very specific guidelines. Initiative is encouraged but only in certain directions. In other words a subordinate leader may be expected to take the initiative to do what his higher would have told him to do anyway but not to do something on his own. Part of what makes SF good at what they do is the training that they receive, of course, but also it is the mindset. In SF the ability to work autonomously with little guidance is not only encouraged, it is required. I believe that in part at least, the NCO corps has lost focus. NCOnet is a prime example of this. If you go to the COIN forum there you will find a few topics with generally few replies whereas in other forums you can find long scholarly discussions about whether or not pens should be visible in the ACUs or detailed discussions on the minutia of uniform regs. Not all NCOs are like this by far but there are enough in influential positions that I believe that there has been a shift in the culture of some organizations from NCOs as trainers and leaders first to NCOs as guardians of the regulations first. This is what fosters the strict adherence to the letter of the reg rather than its intent and the unwillingness or inability to act autonomously. That is what we need to fix, not Lieutenants as squad leaders. That's my opinion anyway.

SFC W

I believe that the answer isn't shoving higher-ranking officers lower down the food chain. All that would do (in reality) is create more micro-managing and even more jockeying for command positions than exists now. I also believe that it would take the weight out of the NCOs that come up under such a system, as they'd be so used to being 'lead' by officers that they would have precious little incentive to develop the needed skills on their own. In a related vein, one reason you may see NCOs becoming the guardians of regulations is that their officers tend to rotate through faster and thus they end up being the pillar that gets the unit through each inspection. In the heavy peacetime mentality getting Outstandings on inspections can often be more valued than having a well-led unit. Obviously that's a generalization, but the mentality does tend to creep in.

At some point in the culture, maybe during Vietnam, we seem to have stopped trusting our NCOs to actually lead and relegated them to more administrative roles. Again, something of a generalization but it clearly does happen in many instances. I see that every day working with the Air Force. It produces good technicians, but poor leaders simply because they are never really expected to lead for the most part (with some exceptions based on AFSC, of course) until they reach E-8. Then *boom* instant leader time! It of course doesn't work. It's a shame, and a trend that must be reversed if we're to be successful in the coming conflicts.

[RTK]

The bottom line on strategic corporals is this:

Can you find the guy who can take commander's intent, key tasks, and endstate and run with it? The onus is on the leader to make a realistic, feasible, and reasonable intent and endstate backed up by quantifiable tasks that are achievable.

Empowering the young professionals below you to accomplish your end by whatever ethical and moral means possible is the essence of the strategic corporal. The young soldier who takes his job seriously, is professional, and, above all, competent, can do this with great ease if he's allowed to by his superiors.

In practicality, this works best when you don't have a micromanaging neolith in the position of greater responsibility; rather, someone confident enough of his own abilities as a leader to not get involved in every last detail and, most importantly, someone who knows his soldiers well enough to understand their strengths and weaknesses and place them in positions where they'll flourish.

[Vojnik]

That's exactly what it's about. However, we need to provide Marines with the information and training to make good decisions within the context of Commander's Intent.

I see your point, Razor, and agree that the Army is moving in the right direction. But I'm pretty much going through one of your BOLC III's right now here at Ft. Sill, and the 135 Army Lieutenants in my company do not support your argument. ROTC training is all well and good, but not all officers get it. I have no doubt that infantry officers do receive good training, but again, that's a minority in the Army. I can tell you that these artillery officers are getting nothing in the leadership and decision making training here. BOLC II is a waste of time, these Lieutenants don't even know how to interact with superior officers, one of them stood up (after being told to stand) and asked the Battalion Commander if artillery BOLC III "sucked" as much as he'd heard. The Marines were absolutely appalled. Their attitudes are horrible. We tried to get the soldiers in our platoon to PT in boots and utes and flak jackets. They literally said, "We dont' want to because it's hot in Oklahoma and that won't help with the PFT." And these are officers who will be in charge of enlisted soldiers' lives.

But you're infantry and maybe the Army, rightfully so, has focused on the development of its infantry officers first. I certainly hope so. It certainly wasn't a cheap stab at the Army, although I don't buy that a 5 week course does the job of transitioning a person into a professional officer. Same goes for ROTC training and infantry training that only a minority of officers receive. You're only as strong as your weakest link.

Perhaps the solution is are more comprehensive commissioning and training system for junior Officers? Maybe an equivilent of Sandhurst?

[RTK]

Is it the responsiblity of the big Army to train the junior officers as to the finer points of warfare or the gaining units? How much additional training do you recommend? At what point do you write the kid off as a piss poor leader?

I've seen some stellar PLs. I've also seen PLs I wouldn't put in charge of the mess hall, let alone allow their soldiers to drag them through combat. I would recommend it is the responisbility of company commanders and senior NCOs within that young officer's platoon to mold him or her into being a combat leader.

I will admit that the younger generation is having a pretty hard time of knowing where their place is. I've written recently on the subject as it relates to generational effects of coddling, instant gratification through things as simple as 24 hour news or video games, and reasonable expectation. As a microcosm of sociey, it is reasonable to believe that certain elements of the miltary, particularly the newly indoctrinated custodians of authority, would be subject to difficulties adapting to a regimented lifestyle such as is the hallmark of military service.

What do we do with these young "leaders" when we find that for reasons good, bad, or indifferent they have joined the military with less than altruistic intentions and clearly cannot understand the culture? Do we conduct an ad hoc version of natural selection and thank them for their service and let them on their way? Do we continue to attempt to mold them and drag them along? Do we promote them with the hopes that added responisbility by virtue of rank will increase their own personal awareness as to the severity of their profession? One could argue that we're doing a combination of all of these down at the company and platoon level.

To paraphrase George Orwell "All animals are equal. Some animals are more equal than others."

[Jimbo]

I think we have to put it on the unit when the people arrie in it. The BOLC idea is good. The intnetnt behind it was for the officers of all branches to get a chance to work together, and more importantly to set the tone of aht the Army is all about (war, not admin). Of course, there are issues with this. LT's are trained by captains and senior NCO's.

The problem with the startegc corporal concept is the NCO development system, much of which has been enumerated in earlier posts. As an officer, I think that NCO's need to focus on being NCO's, not college students or block checking gurus. I think the fix for this is in the SGM/CSM area. if the E-9's can start to focus on what will make their "subordinates" successful in the contemporary operating environment, instead of focusing on block checking for career progression. I have seen alot of good junior and senior NCO's trying to do the right thing as far as training, but there is always the 2,000lb E-9 gorilla out there.

[RTK]

As a troop commander, it was my responsibility to teach, coach, and mentor my platoon leaders. Through continual assessment of their capabilities, limitations, and in providing feedback, part of my job was to observe and guide marked improvement in their performance over time. It's okay for the lieutenant to make mistakes, so long as the same mistakes are not repeated every other day. Failure for the lieutenant to improve his/her performance meant, to me, one of two things:
1. I was not providing good enough feedback through direction, counselling, OPORDs, commander's intent, or end state.

or...

2. The kid was an idiot and just didn't get it.

In the context of possibility #1, I always would assume this first, in that I was not providing for that young lieutenants professional development. I'd talk to his PSG and my 1SG and look for alternative methods of development that I hadn't used yet. If this lack of professional growth continued to occur, I'd give solution #1 one more shot (unless a gross negligence or inability to lead was identified). Again, if this failed, then I'd resort to assumption #2, which meant he was going to go work on a staff and stay as far away from soldiers as possible.

This happened to me once as a commander, and when it was all said and done, after numerous attempts to right this kid's leadership ability he had to go. It didn't come as a surprise to him, as it was placed numerous times in writing that a failure to adapt would result in his continued employment elsewhere.

We don't counsel our soldiers enough anymore. Particularly on the officer side of the house, some feel there are better things to do than to conduct the once a month counselling session. A few rely too heavily on it. The point is to find that happy medium. A young officer who is eager to learn and do well will adapt well, unless he simply doesn't have any leadership potential. It's up to us as their rating officers and mentors to teach, coach and mentor them into becoming successful platoon leaders and, later, commanders.

[979797]

I believe that the "strategic corporal" will further erode with the new Army land-warrior system that is to be fielded in the near future. It is another step towards total information integration that feeds directly into a distant TOC where a battle will be managed by a battalion or even brigade commander.

Eventually, I believe, every fighter will simply be a soldier carrying a weapons system and a live video-link with the BC literally telling individuals to "look over there more closely" or "engage that target". You will eliminate the real need for a frontline leader and the PL will merely be a "future BC in training".

Maybe that's the cynic in me...

[Fabius Maximus]

As the guy who started this thread, I am impressed with the responses. Many of these show deep understanding and experience with today's militiary.

Two comments, deliberately too simple for sake of clarity.

1. It's a terrible idea. The need for a "strategic corporal" stems from bad tacics.

In the 21st century we're fighting -- we might spend most of our time fighting -- insurgents. Experienced street warriors with modern weapons.

Their tactical doctrine is the simplest possible.

If our people have to perform complex mental calculas during a firefight, we best stock up on body bags and US flags.

A prerequisite for success in these wars might be simple mission orders. Complex directives equal hopeless, guaranteed to fail, wars.


2. The Special Forces have people capable of operating at this level.

We'll never have an army of SF. It's a contradiction in terms. A few lessons from the SF have broad applicability, but must be considered with care.


3. Relationship of officers and NCO's.

This is the fascinating hidden thread in these posts.

What fraction of people in a volunteer army are officer material -- officers not in a sense of having technical skills (e.g., doctors) but capable of leading soldiers.

The traditional answer is 5%. We have aprox 10% -- very rough, excluding the technical folks who are not leaders.

Imagine this: reduce the officer corps to 5%. What happens to the role of NCO? Note the reference to US Army history when we had fewer officers.

Do we need more experienced NCO's? Better educated (e.g. college, book learning)? Pick one, as I doubt we'll get both.

[120mm]

The problem with any talk of officer reduction, is that the Army, when reducing officer strength, traditionally gets rid of the good officers while protecting the bad. After every major role, the officers promoted for merit have had to hit the road.

I don't trust the army to execute that plan.

[RTK]

To hinge off this, I, along with a friend of mine, am working on a project to provide the US Army and Marine Corps with a book that captures tactical lessons learned in combat. This project is intend to transcend branch of service, as the Transportation Corps soldier may have as much to lend on convoy operations as the Civil Affairs officer has to bilateral engagement as the infantry or armor soldier has to direct fire engagements. We're looking for some submissions. That's where you come in.

Attached is the concept brief and an example. There is imagery attached to the vignette, though including such would not meet the council's filespace requirements. Feedback is welcome. So are submissions. I must say, however, that we're in more need of submissions than feedback, so fire away. Thanks.

[jcustis]

Discussion of the strategic corporal, specifically his training and education, can be shaped by leaning back on Clausewitz's concept of coup d'oeil, or "stroke of the eye".

From an online Air and Space Power Journal article by Majors Caraccilo and Pothin: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Caraccilo2.html


The 19th Century military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote that, "the aspect of war that always attracted the greatest attention is the engagement."1 To gain and maintain the initiative, as Bergerud states above, is based on the commander’s ability to make quick and knowledgeable decisions. Clausewitz calls this quick recognition of the truth the commander’s coup d’oeil or intuition. It is the leader’s ability to recognize at the precise moment in battle the truth, or in other words, a high level of situational awareness "that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection."2

I think many confuse the concept of the strategic corporal because they feel the military is trying to hoist responsibilities on them typically appropriate to a platoon commander. I would agree that even within the Marine Corps, we confuse the issue to some extent.

In the realm of a strategic corporal's decision-making process, perhaps we need to focus on developing his cou d'oeil, or ability to recognize the pattern of what is happening before him. When I was an infantry officer in training, pattern recognition was a theme used to justify the volume of reading required of us, as well as the repeated iterations we conducted on the sand-table.

Having said this, I'd like to offer a question in this thread: Are the tactical lessons we are looking for actually supporting pattern recognition?