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William F. Owen
10-20-2009, 06:04 AM
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/09/30/about-light-infantry-tactics-and-the-tactical-challenges-in-afghanistan/

By Sven Ortman - someone well known to most folks here. Interesting stuff and very well worth reading in my opinion.

Wargames Mark
10-21-2009, 11:56 PM
I'm not familiar with Jäger tactics, but I have some thoughts on the ROE issue.

If I understand correctly, insurgents in Afghanistan are pretty good at setting up engagements to leverage ISAF constraints regarding avoidance of civilian casualties. I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols. The enemy has chosen the time and place of the battle and may engage from a populated place or structure of cultural significance.

If this view is accurate, then even the use of direct fire can be expected to cause civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. I am thinking especially of suppressive fire from automatic weapons. Since some actions are necessary even to break contact, then a certain amount of harm is unavoidable (it's a war).

If the enemy is good at setting up ambushes and understands how to take advantage of our forces' ROE, then it is generally to be expected that he will cause casualties.

While I do not subscribe to the good-deeds-über-alles school of COIN, I recognize that restrictive ROE in COIN are indeed necessary. I think I understand the point of view, strategy, and tactics of the enemy. My conclusion is that it might not be new tactics that our Infantry require, but rather a more realistic view of warfare that our civilian public requires - people are going to get hurt and killed. New technologies and adjustments to TTPs may help take the edge off. Clever officers and NCOs who can think effectively under stress are critical as well. But in the end, I think that the public just has to get it through their heads that war is war and there is price not only to freedom, but to security.

Additional:

Whether we're talking about ambushes, IEDs, or ambushes initiated with IEDs, the actions in response to contact are not where the meat is. The important thing is network defeat. Take it to the enemy - squeeze every last bit of information from every contact with him and have smart people who are trained and paying attention create the situational understanding to facilitate effective targeting of those elements that the enemy can least afford to lose.

tequila
10-22-2009, 12:55 AM
I'm in agreement with Ken's prescription on American tolerance for casualties. Americans have a high tolerance for casualties when and if one can see visible progress. Americans do not like casualties in the service of what looks like "more of the same" or a long, drawn-out struggle.

carl
10-26-2009, 04:27 PM
I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols.

From what I have read this is mostly the case (I hope I am mistaken). It raises the question-Why are they ambushing us? Why aren't we ambushing them?

These are simple but important questions. Why is it like this?

Ken White
10-26-2009, 05:00 PM
These are simple but important questions. Why is it like this?They are ambushing us because they are patient, they know the terrain, they are hill people who were raised in and have finely honed senses of their environment, knowing the culture intimately they can hide amongst the people, they have great tactical flexibility, they are not impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, they have no media determined to point out every error or presumed error and they have a few good leaders who are well experienced and tactically competent and who are not risk averse.

We OTOH are not ambushing them as often as we should because we are too impatient, most units do not know the terrain and are not allowed to patrol adequately to learn it, we are predominately urban and have little sense of rugged rural terrain and the skills needed to survive in that environment, we are vastly different than most of the local people and do not fit in at all in most cases plus generally do not understand and, more importantly, dislike, the local culture -- and they sense this. We also do not have much tactical flexibility, are impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, have international media determined to point out every error or presumed error and even make up some errors if necessary, and have too few good leaders who are experienced, tactically competent and who are not terribly risk averse.

If you insist on simple overarching answers -- marginal training, lack of flexibility and risk aversion. Not necessarily in that order...:(

carl
10-26-2009, 05:53 PM
Thanks Ken. I prefer the detailed explanation, and am saddened by it.

Can the situation be changed? Or, in other words, will the changes required happen, be encouraged or even thought about? Is it even viewed as important?

Ken White
10-26-2009, 06:33 PM
will be changed because many in the Army and Marines sense that the goal they have been given by our political leadership (both the current and previous administrations) is not really achievable, therefor they will do their duty while trying to avoid losses which requires risk aversion. They will also try to protect their institutions from bad press, thus being even more risk averse.

Further, as you look at our adverse factors in that laundry list above, some of those cannot be changed. The theory that an organization (or any group of people) can and will do what it's told is ridiculous -- but a lot of people really seem to believe it. :confused:

We have a number of strengths but they can be and often are misapplied by trying to do the wrong thing at the wrong time in the wrong place. We do not play to our strengths and tend to misapply them. That's a macro view of the micro view that they ambush us and we don't ambush them. :wry:

The required modifications to training and TTP are highly unlikely barring two drivers; a politically directed change of mission AND a significant improvement in the way the media does business. My guess is that there will be incremental improvements by the armed forces but major change is improbable as both required drivers are unlikely. The second factor impacts the first and it is highly unlikely to change in time (if ever). :rolleyes:

I'm sure it's been thought about and I suspect that there are many who could and would make the necessary changes on our part but the system opposes that. A bureaucracy resists change...

As for important, depends on which school of thought you ascribe to; the COIN or 'anything but COIN' variant. The former think it is important while the latter outnumber them and do not think it is important. You can see who's winning that argument. That goes back to my first comment, the sensing of an unachievable or unrealistic goal. That drives a lot of things...

People are pesky. They will insist on thinking and not receiving purported wisdom from above as divine guidance...:D

carl
10-26-2009, 07:36 PM
"I doubt it"

I suspected that would be the answer.:(

I have another question. I believe we, you and your comrades, learned how to ambush them in VN. Is that widely known amongst contemporary Soldiers/Marines? If not, should it be and if it were would that make a difference now? If people now knew it could be done and has been done by Americans, would they be more inclined to aspire to doing it?

Forgive my naivete in this next comment, but as a civilian, I would have hoped people would think this important just as matter of professionalism, ie "Their infantry is doing better than our infantry in this aspect of infantry warfare. We should change that."

Fuchs
10-26-2009, 08:29 PM
The identification problem (how to know they're Taliban before they open fire?) and the shadowing problem (patrols being shadowed by unarmed scouts once they leave their base) also play into the ambush problem.


I personally wouldn't worry very much about the ambush problem as long as they're poor shots, though. It's pretty much movement to contact, and the contact is very weak by European standards. A competent enemy would have crushed many platoons and companies by now.

Patrols should always do their job in packs; two or three patrol squads or platoons with some spacing (like 1 km). That enables a lot of manoeuvre even after one team got fixed. It also complicates the OPFOR's intelligence job.

Ken White
10-26-2009, 08:47 PM
"Their infantry is doing better than our infantry in this aspect of infantry warfare. We should change that."Their infantry isn't really doing better, it is just radically different. Not really asymmetrically different but systemically so (they get in as many ruts and bad habits as do we...). Some of those differences are to their advantage and some are to our advantage.

It would be great if we improved our training -- and that is happening, if slowly -- and it'd be even better if we weren't so risk averse but we come from a risk averse society so that's not likely to change. All things considered, ambushes can make a splash with our ignorant media and they have some limited propaganda value but they are not going to change the course of the effort in Afghanistan. Most of the nominal shortfalls we have are societally induced and will not likely change, others are goal and perception related and may change.

Either way, they are likely to be the initiators of contact more often than are we but that will not make much difference other than in the perceptions of some. This infantry isn't really better than ours, it's not bad at all but it's not as good as ours -- it just has some non bureaucratic and home team advantages that will not change and do not need to do so...

carl
10-29-2009, 03:20 AM
Ken and Fuchs:

Do you think there is a psychological aspect to this shortfall in our ops in that because of it, people are more inclined to think that the mission given or implied is less achievable? If for the last 3 years, we had initiated most of the contacts would people, both military but maybe more importantly civilian, be less inclined to think Afghan a hopeless task? Like Ken says this may mostly be important in the perceptions of some but maybe those perceptions are more important than we think.

The other side of that coin is the perception of the Taliban. If we were the ones doing the ambushing, how much would that affect their confidence and determination? If they knew that most of the time the first indication of our presence was that "sudden burst of fire", would they be so eager?

I just thought of the local villagers too. They keep score. If they see our guys always being hit from ambush and not ambushing back, it must affect their calculations.

What do you guys think?

Nevyan
04-18-2010, 07:52 PM
I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols. The enemy has chosen the time and place of the battle and may engage from a populated place or structure of cultural significance.

You are slightly incorrect in your describing an ambush.

In an Ambush you set the Place and the enemy sets the Time.

In a Raid you set the Time and the enemy sets the Place.

Ken White
04-18-2010, 09:12 PM
In an Ambush you set the Place and the enemy sets the Time.Correct if "you" are executing the ambush but even then a marginally competent enemy can avoid ever setting the time...

OTOH, if the enemy sets the ambush, he has picked the place and you can and should avoid giving him the time.

Even better is to entice him to set up an ambush in a really bad location (while avoiding having that happen to you)
In a Raid you set the Time and the enemy sets the Place.True in a sense. Then again if you raid where your enemy wishes you to do so you may encounter an ambush. ;)

You can also raid a place where you allow the enemy to set the time -- to his disadvantage, of course...

Rules of thumb are good -- tactical flexibility and originality are better.

Here's another rule of thumb: In low intensity warfare, if the other guy initiates more contacts through whatever method than you do -- you're doing something wrong.

carl
04-19-2010, 02:38 AM
Here's another rule of thumb: In low intensity warfare, if the other guy initiates more contacts through whatever method than you do -- you're doing something wrong.

Is there any information available as to who is initiating more contacts in Afghanistan, us or them?

Chris jM
04-20-2010, 09:31 AM
An article that is relevant to the discussion - Application of the Classic Light Infantry Model in Afghanistan by Captain J. D. Winfrey.

It was one of the lead articles in the Dec 09 Marine Corp Gazette - for those like me without a subscription, the essay it is based upon can be found here: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510287&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Basically, it boils down to 'more and better patrolling' using the concept of adaptable, resource-light infantry.

I did like his differentiation between 'line' and 'light' infantry which is something I have never come across before and appeals to my uneducated perception of force structures. In saying that I have always been confused between the American 'Ranger' classification and 'Light Infantry' title, never really seeing where one was different to the other.

On the same note, I saw an article on the FELIN soldier today (the French soldier modernisation programme) and there is no way you would describe them as light!

Fuchs
04-20-2010, 04:06 PM
There's a long history of "light infantry".

The distinction began when body armour and discipline were introduced (especially in Greece and its cultural influence zone, including Italy).
Skirmishers were quite important in the last generations before Alexander the Great. They were elusive enough to avoid decisive close combat (few horsemen in Greece) and armed with ranged weapons (slings, javelins or bows). Such skirmishers were quite quick on their feet and thus also useful for foraging, attacking enemies on mountain peaks and pursuit.

The idea of "light" infantry has other strong examples in the 18th century; less-disciplined Austro-Hungarian border militia infantry ("Grenzer") and German Jäger ("hunters") skirmishers. The standard line infantry weapons of the time were terribly inaccurate muzzle-loaded smoothbore muskets. Muzzle-loaded rifles were slower firing (unable to stop infantry charges), expensive and required more skills.
Units with recruits of forester descent were raised and equipped with rifles in order to produce skirmishers and because they (due to an elite status and privileges) did not desert as easily as normal line infantry. Army leaders avoided to march line infantry through forest areas, sending them to forage or on picket duty because they deserted too easily (much of Germany is mostly covered by forests, though!).

Technology changed and line infantry got breech-loaded rifles that fires accurate and quick. The line infantry also got more loyal thanks to nationalism and became able to do what light infantry was able to do before.
Light infantry morphed (with breaks) to "sharpshooters" and "snipers".

It's similar with the Stoßtruppen and Arditi of WWI; innovative at their time (and nowadays labelled as "light infantry", especially the Stoßtruppen), but their advantages were either obsolete or incorporated into line infantry till mid-WW2.


To sum it up; "light" infantry was post-Renaissance pretty much the vanguard in infantry development. The line infantry absorbed light infantry traits over time (without really being "lightweight").

Sylvan
04-20-2010, 04:46 PM
Are tough. We tried several different ways to get into ambush positions without being compromised. In the absence of air assault, you are really limited. Every goat herder has a cell phone and anybody leaving a FOB is instantly known. We did drive-by drop offs, dismounted humps out of the FOB, false mechanical break downs and the best results we got were meeting engagements. While the ambush position themselves were never attacked, we never made contact after getting into position. Patrolling is critical, but the integration of ISR/Air and ground is where real success lies in Afghanistan. Otherwise, you are largely wasting time from a kinetic viewpoint. The act of patrolling is still critical, however for its own COIN value.

Ken White
04-20-2010, 06:19 PM
Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...:rolleyes:

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down... ;)

Sylvan
04-21-2010, 12:00 AM
Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...:rolleyes:

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down... ;)

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

Ken White
04-21-2010, 12:37 AM
Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.Some places in VN, yes, however most, probably about 2/3 to 3/4 at that time, not so on the out of sight. Not all triple canopy and mangrove swamps. Great deal of primary rain forest and even more ag and scrub land... :wry:

Also true on the Farmers. However, in Veet Nam as is true in those parts of the 'Stan without global comm, Farmers most always have kids who are used to doing what they're told... :rolleyes:

Every war brings its own unique problems -- and solutions. :cool:

William F. Owen
04-21-2010, 04:54 AM
Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.
True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

Infanteer
04-21-2010, 08:21 AM
From my viewpoint, insurgent tactics in alot of areas in southern Afghanistan along with the nature of the terrain don't lend themselves to ambushes. Due to roaming death in the skies, insurgents walking around with weapons are likely to die from a Hellfire long before they stumble into a well-sited killzone. For this reason, they don't really walk around openly with weapons much which makes it hard to ambush insurgents. Others may have noticed different, but these were my observations. I understand that the terrain in RC(E) lends itself to open insurgent movement and small-unit ambushes have been much more successful.

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

JMA
04-22-2010, 09:42 AM
As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

Water? Why are the Light Infantry going to be required to walk around for days on end? Light Infantry by simple definition means they do not have the integral heavy support weapons and they have a light vehicle footprint. This of course does not mean that their mobility cannot be provided by choppers and their supporting weapons by air delivery. Find a target deal with it then move on.

JMA
04-22-2010, 09:45 AM
They are ambushing us because they are patient, they know the terrain, they are hill people who were raised in and have finely honed senses of their environment, knowing the culture intimately they can hide amongst the people, they have great tactical flexibility, they are not impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, they have no media determined to point out every error or presumed error and they have a few good leaders who are well experienced and tactically competent and who are not risk averse.

Yes we are playing to their strength and showing an abject failure to display a thorough knowledge of enemy and terrain.

We see vehicle patrols and foot patrols blundering into ambushes all the time. Stupidity. Playing into the TB's hands.

JMA
04-22-2010, 09:48 AM
True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

Ken White
04-22-2010, 01:43 PM
Yes we are playing to their strength and showing an abject failure to display a thorough knowledge of enemy and terrain.Hopefully by some means other than media reports -- those squirrels rarely get much right; they need to sell advertising and blood sells , success does not.
We see vehicle patrols and foot patrols blundering into ambushes all the time. Stupidity. Playing into the TB's hands.Define all the time?

William F. Owen
04-22-2010, 03:03 PM
How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?
Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

JMA
04-22-2010, 03:08 PM
Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.

There must be some reason for the reported lack of night action?

Ken White
04-22-2010, 04:23 PM
because most reporters don't want to go out at night and few that do have night vision devices, night actions do not make good stories and they can't get good pictures or video clips

JMA
04-25-2010, 08:11 AM
because most reporters don't want to go out at night and few that do have night vision devices, night actions do not make good stories and they can't get good pictures or video clips

I would have thought that the tracer and the flashes would make for wonderful TV?

Where are the Taliban at night? Other than IED work what would they typically be doing?

JMA
04-25-2010, 08:16 AM
Hopefully by some means other than media reports -- those squirrels rarely get much right; they need to sell advertising and blood sells , success does not.Define all the time?

There is no blood that comes with success? Depends I suppose whose bodies get stacked up after the battle. If its a success then it should be their blood and their bodies, yes?

tankersteve
04-25-2010, 11:54 AM
While this is probably not the norm, it is about as good as it gets in Afghanistan. CPT Howell was my counterpart at NTC. He didn't learn anything from me that allowed his unit to do this. Including the PFC and the selector lever...:D

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04...agewanted=1&_r=3&hpw (Reporter Tyler Hicks, NYT)


KORANGAL OUTPOST, Afghanistan — Only the lead insurgents were disciplined as they walked along the ridge. They moved carefully, with weapons ready and at least five yards between each man, the soldiers who surprised them said. Last week, members of Second Platoon, Company B, surprised a Taliban column and killed at least 13.


Fight by fight, the infantryman’s war in Afghanistan is often waged on the Taliban’s terms. Insurgents ambush convoys and patrols from high ridges or long ranges and slip away as the Americans, weighed down by equipment, return fire and call for air and artillery support. Last week a patrol from the First Infantry Division reversed the routine....

Once the soldiers reached the ridge’s crest, almost 6,000 feet above sea level on the side of a peak called Sautalu Sar, they found fresh footprints on the trails, and parapets of rock from where Taliban fighters often fire rifles and rocket-propelled grenades down onto this outpost...

In all, the soldiers found eight bodies on the crest. They photographed them to try to identify them later, and collected their weapons, ammunition, radios and papers. Then the patrol swept down a gully where a pilot said he saw more insurgents hiding.

Ken White
04-25-2010, 01:01 PM
One has no clue what is happening watching an infantry night fight on a screen...

Even one involved in such a fight without night vision gear has little more clue. :D
There is no blood that comes with success? Depends I suppose whose bodies get stacked up after the battle. If its a success then it should be their blood and their bodies, yes?It is -- however, the US government will take but not ordinarily show such pictures and while the reporters and photographers who are there will show them, it's been my observation in a couple of other wars that Reporters are generally not around when bad firefights occur. Funny how that happens. Of course, there are exceptions but they are rare.

Note that Tanker Steve's quote is by a reporter telling the story of an ambush where he was not present and he almost certainly was not given permission to print the pictures the unit took, though he probably was allowed to see them. That one was just one of many and a reporter happened to hear of it, probably because it was allegedly that particular unit's first successful ambush on this deployment and he likely overheard some Troop chatter and checked it out -- so it makes the news. Most do not...

The opposition, OTOH, makes it a point to show picture and videos of any opposing dead. We don't sell by body count (or even release them, other than for a brief period that got quickly ended), they do. Different standards of conduct, rightly or wrongly and approach to the 'information war' angle. Western 'sensitivity' is a wonderful thing... :wry:

William F. Owen
04-25-2010, 02:24 PM
While this is probably not the norm, it is about as good as it gets in Afghanistan. CPT Howell was my counterpart at NTC. He didn't learn anything from me that allowed his unit to do this. Including the PFC and the selector lever...:D

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04...agewanted=1&_r=3&hpw

While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

Ken White
04-25-2010, 04:04 PM
b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.Though my wife insists I'm still acting like a boy even she acknowledges that voice commands in combat are a no-no, too much chance for misunderstanding and that it is best if that initiating fire is somehow distinctive...:D

Fuchs
04-25-2010, 04:11 PM
While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

The text may be inaccurate.
According to its description, the ambush was a rather simple one. A picket, a few remotely controlled directional frag mines and firing from one position plus a bit pursuit.

No L-shaped ambush or other more complicated patterns, no control of flight direction with 2nd ambush. The Plt Ldr faced probably too many unknowns and/or the small unit hadn't much training/experience in ambushing.

Sylvan
04-25-2010, 05:18 PM
The text may be inaccurate.
According to its description, the ambush was a rather simple one. A picket, a few remotely controlled directional frag mines and firing from one position plus a bit pursuit.

No L-shaped ambush or other more complicated patterns, no control of flight direction with 2nd ambush. The Plt Ldr faced probably too many unknowns and/or the small unit hadn't much training/experience in ambushing.
Sounds like they weren't really in place.
30 seconds after settle down and the TB came?
I would say the writer, with no military experience, couldn't really relay what he was told in interviews.

If they had claymores set, you initiate with claymores. Even LTs know this.

Regardless, good on them. Maintain your principles and good things will happen.
This will reverberate with the Taliban a lot more than 1-26.

JMA
04-25-2010, 05:59 PM
While not wishing to Monday Morning Quarterback, or second guess those who were there, but...

a.) So they killed 13 or of 26? OK, better then nothing, but that is far less than a well executed ambush is suppose to achieve. Maybe there would good reasons. I was just surprised. Sure, not everyone can match Ralph Rodd and RT Florida, with 100+ dead in one ambush.

b.) Back when I was a boy you NEVER initiated an ambush by voice. ALWAYS and ONLY by fire.

You are correct and I read this account with growing horror. This as it is told is a real case study of how not to do it. Remember one thing and that is when someone gets to talk to a number of the grunt participants then one gets the chance to cut through the crap that is contained in the official versions.

Yea, and I'll bet Pvt. First Class Troy Pacini-Harvey's mother is hoping he will be released from the stockade before Christmas.

William F. Owen
04-25-2010, 06:27 PM
Sounds like they weren't really in place.
30 seconds after settle down and the TB came?
.

So probably an "Off track Snap-ambush?" - in which case dropping 50% of the bad guys is pretty good.

JMA
04-25-2010, 06:30 PM
One has no clue what is happening watching an infantry night fight on a screen...

It would make for great TV though. What I'm saying is that if the troops were in fact operating at night at platoon strength at any regularity then we would have footage from the embedded media.


Even one involved in such a fight without night vision gear has little more clue.

I've been there and done that. If they fire at you get to see where they are (as do they if you do) if they move you hear them and can frag them. And the winner is... he who can keep his head in a time of utter confusion and the survivors are... those who change their firing positions after firing a few rounds.


:DIt is -- however, the US government will take but not ordinarily show such pictures and while the reporters and photographers who are there will show them, it's been my observation in a couple of other wars that Reporters are generally not around when bad firefights occur. Funny how that happens. Of course, there are exceptions but they are rare.

'Bad' as in when there are more own forces casualties?


Note that Tanker Steve's quote is by a reporter telling the story of an ambush where he was not present and he almost certainly was not given permission to print the pictures the unit took, though he probably was allowed to see them. That one was just one of many and a reporter happened to hear of it, probably because it was allegedly that particular unit's first successful ambush on this deployment and he likely overheard some Troop chatter and checked it out -- so it makes the news. Most do not...

It seems it was the first positive result in the area so they (the military) need to milk it for all the propaganda value it may have. They probably want to concentrate on the 13 kills in one contact and can handle to 'minor' criticism that comes from the whole truth getting out.


The opposition, OTOH, makes it a point to show picture and videos of any opposing dead. We don't sell by body count (or even release them, other than for a brief period that got quickly ended), they do. Different standards of conduct, rightly or wrongly and approach to the 'information war' angle. Western 'sensitivity' is a wonderful thing... :wry:

Well we in Rhodesia got the media angle wrong. We allowed so few TV crews to accompany troops on operations (especially the big camp attacks) that we left ourselves open to the allegations we had taken out refugee camps. The first time the tame media hangers-on arrived was after the scene had been suitably 'stage-managed'. Having been on these ops we used to wonder where they got the childrens bodies from.

The message was simple, make the facts available otherwise only their version will be shown.

Interesting though that after the ceasefire I met a political commissar who survived a camp attack I was on (probably by breaking the world land speed record) and he was boasting that they had shot down ten helicopters that day. I asked him how that was possible as the camp was merely a unarmed civilian refugee camp being fed by UNHCR... wasn't it?

JMA
04-25-2010, 06:41 PM
So probably an "Off track Snap-ambush?" - in which case dropping 50% of the bad guys is pretty good.

Don't think so, they dug holes (never heard of that) put out claymores and placed out a listening patrol. That takes some time.

JMA
04-25-2010, 06:47 PM
The text may be inaccurate.
According to its description, the ambush was a rather simple one. A picket, a few remotely controlled directional frag mines and firing from one position plus a bit pursuit.

No L-shaped ambush or other more complicated patterns, no control of flight direction with 2nd ambush. The Plt Ldr faced probably too many unknowns and/or the small unit hadn't much training/experience in ambushing.

To be fair to these guys it was said that they were on a ridge line with steep fall off. The listening post would have been the cut off group but at 100m maybe too close and at ten foot off the path they were either idiots or it was a razor back ridge.

JMA
04-25-2010, 07:03 PM
While this is probably not the norm, it is about as good as it gets in Afghanistan. CPT Howell was my counterpart at NTC. He didn't learn anything from me that allowed his unit to do this. Including the PFC and the selector lever...:D

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04...agewanted=1&_r=3&hpw (Reporter Tyler Hicks, NYT)

Trimming the post is a bugger as going to the New York Times site requires membership. OK so saved by my browser memory I note something of interest in that scouts using night-vision locted five TB hiding. Now what about the aircraft that came over head? Do Apaches have thermal? Is it legitimate to expect the Apaches to search out the TB among the rocks? Follow them back up the hill etc etc?

Ken White
04-25-2010, 08:08 PM
... What I'm saying is that if the troops were in fact operating at night at platoon strength at any regularity then we would have footage from the embedded media.How do you arrive at that conclusion? There are about 200± Rifle Platoons plus Scout Platoons, LRS units and SOF elements in Afghanistan. I do not know how many Journalists are there but I suspect the number is far smaller; all of them are not embedded with Infantry units and all of them do not elect to go out with patrols -- nor, often are they allowed to (not for censorship purposes -- other than the SOF folks who are paranoid about OpSec -- but because the Army is leery about getting them injured). I talk to folks who are there now and there's much that does not make the news for both good and bad reasons. The good primarily concerns OpSec, the bad the fact that the US Army and media have a strong distrust of each other.
I've been there and done that.So have millions of us.
'Bad' as in when there are more own forces casualties?Can't help it can you. :rolleyes:

Nah, body count is irrelevant. We don't like to be seen bragging (if their KIA count is higher) or complaining (if our KIA count is higher). We learned that the hard way in Korea (the media will misrepresent and play for the gora angle...), relearned it in Viet Nam, relearned it yet again in this series of conflicts. We're a sensitive caring if slow learning Army. ;)
It seems it was the first positive result in the area so they (the military) need to milk it for all the propaganda value it may have. They probably want to concentrate on the 13 kills in one contact and can handle to 'minor' criticism that comes from the whole truth getting out.Really ignorant allegation. I mentioned, as did the reporter, that it was the first big success for that Platoon. We do not know how long they've been there, nor do we know what previous or other units in the same area did. In short, we don't know enough to comment intelligently about the action. As you just proved. You can of course make rather silly and biased comments with no factual basis if you wish. Innuendo occasionally works. :rolleyes:
...Having been on these ops we used to wonder where they got the childrens bodies from.Not just in Rhodesia, it happened in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Iraq and it happens now in Afghanistan. Not much the west can -- or will -- do about it.
The message was simple, make the facts available otherwise only their version will be shown.That's a simplistic message. If the Armed Force do it, they'll be accused of propaganda. If embedded reporters do it, they frequently get accused of being 'co-opted' by the forces. There will never be enough reporters who are not embedded to do even a marginal job of reporting -- if they could be trusted to be objective. Our experience in Viet Nam and Iraq was that such objectivity was not as common as one would hope, the Afghan conflict looks la bit better -- only because it's smaller and far fewer journalists are there...

Ken White
04-25-2010, 08:12 PM
Do Apaches have thermal? Is it legitimate to expect the Apaches to search out the TB among the rocks? Follow them back up the hill etc etc?Yes. Depends on time on station and whether the folks on the ground could give a search area and the Apache flight pattern. No way to know without having been there.

JMA
04-25-2010, 08:52 PM
How do you arrive at that conclusion? There are about 200± Rifle Platoons plus Scout Platoons, LRS units and SOF elements in Afghanistan. I do not know how many Journalists are there but I suspect the number is far smaller; all of them are not embedded with Infantry units and all of them do not elect to go out with patrols -- nor, often are they allowed to (not for censorship purposes -- other than the SOF folks who are paranoid about OpSec -- but because the Army is leery about getting them injured). I talk to folks who are there now and there's much that does not make the news for both good and bad reasons. The good primarily concerns OpSec, the bad the fact that the US Army and media have a strong distrust of each other.

All the information I have from different sources informs me that very few if any night ops are being carried out by non special forces units. They seem to have the kit to do it so there must surely be some serious questions asked of commanders.


Nah, body count is irrelevant. We don't like to be seen bragging (if their KIA count is higher) or complaining (if our KIA count is higher). We learned that the hard way in Korea (the media will misrepresent and play for the gora angle...), relearned it in Viet Nam, relearned it yet again in this series of conflicts. We're a sensitive caring if slow learning Army. ;)

Body count is irrelevant?

On a flight a while ago I found myself next to a British couple who when we discussed Afghanistan their point was that they only see and hear of the bodies of Brit soldiers being brought back and nothing of the Taliban dead. I did not have the heart to tell then that 80% of Brit casualties are through IEDs where they don't even see the TB let alone kill any of them. If the Brits were indeed killing the TB then it would slip out into the media one way or the other.


I mentioned, as did the reporter, that it was the first big success for that Platoon. We do not know how long they've been there, nor do we know what previous or other units in the same area did. In short, we don't know enough to comment intelligently about the action...

OK so I need to quote for you then:

"The patrol, Second Platoon of Company B, was in a place where no Americans had spent a night for years, and it seemed that the Afghans did not expect danger. "

"Second Platoon, Company B has endured one of the most arduous assignments in Afghanistan. Eight of the platoon’s soldiers have been wounded in nine months of fighting in the valley, part of a bitter contest for control of a small and sparsely populated area. Three others have been killed."

"“It’s the first time most of us have even seen the guys who were shooting at us,” said Sgt. Thomas Horvath, 21."

So yes by all accounts it had been a really s###ty tour so far for that platoon. Glad they could salvage something out of it in the end.


Not just in Rhodesia, it happened in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Iraq and it happens now in Afghanistan. Not much the west can -- or will -- do about it.That's a simplistic message. If the Armed Force do it, they'll be accused of propaganda. If embedded reporters do it, they frequently get accused of being 'co-opted' by the forces. There will never be enough reporters who are not embedded to do even a marginal job of reporting -- if they could be trusted to be objective. Our experience in Viet Nam and Iraq was that such objectivity was not as common as one would hope, the Afghan conflict looks la bit better -- only because it's smaller and far fewer journalists are there...

It is of intense interest to the rest of the world that the US can put a man on the moon but can't figure out how to facilitate a free and accurate flow of information to the media. So who is screwing this up? Is it the military themselves or politicians?

JMA
04-25-2010, 08:57 PM
Yes. Depends on time on station and whether the folks on the ground could give a search area and the Apache flight pattern. No way to know without having been there.

Not talking necessarily about that particular incident. In general terms could thermal imaging equipment in choppers or other cheaper aircraft (in terms of cost per flying hour) be employed on night surveillance tasks? Has it been tried?

jmm99
04-25-2010, 11:17 PM
from JMA
Not talking necessarily about that particular incident. In general terms could thermal imaging equipment in choppers or other cheaper aircraft (in terms of cost per flying hour) be employed on night surveillance tasks? Has it been tried?

Somewhere here at SWC, within the past year, there is a link to a night video (from an Apache TADS ?) focusing in on a Tal squad advancing toward a Coalition ground unit. The point of the post (IIRC) was how many "Captain, may I"s were required before the gunship could engage. It eventually did engage, as did the ground unit - all on the linked video.

Regards

Mike

JMA
04-26-2010, 01:54 AM
Somewhere here at SWC, within the past year, there is a link to a night video (from an Apache TADS ?) focusing in on a Tal squad advancing toward a Coalition ground unit. The point of the post (IIRC) was how many "Captain, may I"s were required before the gunship could engage. It eventually did engage, as did the ground unit - all on the linked video.

Regards

Mike

I would love to see that. I understand the own forces carry a gizmo that allows the chopper to identify them. What's all the 'May I's' for? Confirm they are not civies or own forces and are indeed hostiles then let rip. Must be very frustrating for the air-crews and the ground forces.

Ken White
04-26-2010, 02:07 AM
In general terms could thermal imaging equipment in choppers or other cheaper aircraft (in terms of cost per flying hour) be employed on night surveillance tasks? Has it been tried?Aside from the Apache, the number of UAVs (Drones) operated by the Army, the Air Force, the Marines and the CIA approach 30,000 hours net flying time per month in Afghanistan. All three services plus the Navy also operate fixed wing aircraft ranging from the RC/EC 135, E8 (Both 707 like acft) and P3 (the Navy maritime patrol acft which has significant overland capability) and a slew of Beechcraft King Airs modified for surveillance. Most have infrared and or millimetric wave and MTI radar and other sensors. Aerostats are here and there. That's all just US, other nations also contribute UAV, fixed and rotary wing assets.

There's little ground in Afghanistan that doesn't have nightly coverage of some sort or, for areas not under fairly constant observation -- it's a big country,about half the size of ZA -- places that can be reached and covered fairly quickly. Aerial Surveillance is heavy, patrols are out nightly, long range surveillance patrol are out days at a time -- most of that in in the news but you have to hunt for it, it's not catchy enough for the major media

All of that is open source and readily available in any of the internet search engines. For example, Google 'Aerial Surveillance Afghanistan' (LINK) (http://www.google.com/search?q=aerial+surveillance+Afghanistan&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a) and you get 50K hits.

Your constant queries on very basic facts most here deem common knowledge are interesting. One could suspect that a significant lack of knowledge and research coupled with apparent reliance on inefficient news media coverage might leave you with some hesitancy to assume you understand what is happening in Afghanistan -- and how to fix it... :confused:

Of course, one has been wrong before...:D

Ken White
04-26-2010, 02:53 AM
All the information I have from different sources informs me that very few if any night ops are being carried out by non special forces units. They seem to have the kit to do it so there must surely be some serious questions asked of commanders.Serving people who've been there and are there now disagree totally with your sources. I'm not even going to waste time on that specious argument. Aside from the Opsec issue, neither of us can prove anything.
Body count is irrelevant?In the context of US military photos and their release, yes.
... I did not have the heart to tell then that 80% of Brit casualties are through IEDs where they don't even see the TB let alone kill any of them. If the Brits were indeed killing the TB then it would slip out into the media one way or the other.I cannot speak for the British. I can tell you that in my opinion, that's a specious number, the assumption that no enemy is seen or killed is highly questionable and this (LINK) (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3735981.ece) article from the Times gives me the option of believing it or believing your innuendo. Guess which one wins. :rolleyes:
OK so I need to quote for you then..."The patrol, Second Platoon of Company B, was in a place where no Americans had spent a night for years, and it seemed that the Afghans did not expect danger. "

"Second Platoon, Company B has endured one of the most arduous assignments in Afghanistan. Eight of the platoon’s soldiers have been wounded in nine months of fighting in the valley, part of a bitter contest for control of a small and sparsely populated area. Three others have been killed."

"“It’s the first time most of us have even seen the guys who were shooting at us,” said Sgt. Thomas Horvath, 21."Sigh. Amateurs are so much fun. First item. I doubt the platoon or even the Battalion involved would really know that no one had been there in year. Think about it. They might not have been there before, there's no guarantee that even another company from the same Battalion had not been. Even if true, it proves absolutely nothing about activity in the surrounding area or by other units through out Afghanistan. The fact that no one, no unit has spent the night on a particular piece of ground proves nothing except that patch of ground is likely to be free of trash. I'd be disappointed if a unit did spend the night where others had -- that's called establishing a pattern... :eek:

A Platoon of 40 or there about in a space of nine months has 3 KIA and 8 WIA. That's an average casualty rate of rate of .001 per day. When it gets to a Korea or Viet Nam like average of about ten times that, then it might be called arduous. By some. I doubt I would but I'd need to know a lot more to make anywhere near a valid determination.

If they have not seen the enemy before, that sounds like they were getting shot at from people who are better at hiding in rocks then the Platoon was in finding those people. It also sounds like the Platoon may be getting better at its job. Given the low key combat tempo in Afghanistan, nine months may be a bit long -- but only a bit...

"By all accounts?" You only have one account, that from a Reporter, one that's been tampered with by an Editor and one that may or may not be accurate. Your standard of proof is awesome. :wry:
It is of intense interest to the rest of the world that the US can put a man on the moon but can't figure out how to facilitate a free and accurate flow of information to the media. So who is screwing this up? Is it the military themselves or politicians?You left out the media. Add them in and my choice would be 'all of them in about equal parts.' I might give a slight preponderance of blame to the media who in my view have an unduly skewed view of their power and role. But only slight...

The Politicians come next because they are capable of and do drive some media reportage. The military is far from blameless, they do some really dumb stuff, media wise (and generally...) -- as I said, there's a LOT of distrust between the Armed Forces and the media -- and both of those mistrust the Politicians (who return the favor...).

A British Colonel not long ago told my son that the US media makes us out to be a bunch of clowns and he knows we are not but has a hard time convincing those who have not worked with us. I have to agree. We have never been 'popular' for a variety of valid and invalid reasons. I've been traveling the world since 1947, we were unpopular then and it has been up and down since -- Viet Nam was about the lowest point, Iraq and today don't even come close. I'd say today, we rate about where we did after Korea. After the tumultuous Sixties, our media tilted leftward and then got bought by the US entertainment industry who are more interested in pushing their entertainers and celebrities than they are in news. Bad stuff...:mad:

Ken White
04-26-2010, 03:02 AM
I would love to see that.Easily found by entering 'apache' and 'video' in the search box found in the uppermost Blue strip on this page.

LINK (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/01/71134/troops-told-to-stop-taliban-pursuit.html).

Ken White
04-26-2010, 03:05 AM
Don't think so, they dug holes (never heard of that) put out claymores and placed out a listening patrol. That takes some time.Kicking out listening posts should be automatic. Seems a hasty ambush to me, not a planned ambush. Hard to say unless one was there.

Fuchs
04-26-2010, 10:50 AM
Your constant queries on very basic facts most here deem common knowledge are interesting. One could suspect that a significant lack of knowledge and research coupled with apparent reliance on inefficient news media coverage might leave you with some hesitancy to assume you understand what is happening in Afghanistan -- and how to fix it... :confused:

This must not be his fault or the media's at all.
I've encountered the worst misinformations about military hardware among both journalists and soldiers. Others tend to shut up unless they played a videogame that mentioned something related.

The quantity of urban legends, simplifications and other misinformation in the (German) armed services is astonishing, for example. Sometimes you shouldn't even trust specialists in their own trade (because all too often, their education/training was too specific and they can often merely repeat what they were told - or worse). There's also the problem that a certain dosage of optimism is injected into soldiers (exception: NBC troops) in order to motivate them - this leads to wrong judgements as well.

You assume the (common) knowledge level of people with very diverse experiences or great interest in the topic. That's not really "common knowledge" in my opinion.


Last but not least, I doubt that anyone really understands what happens in AFG. This is difficult even with a lag of a couple years and insider (one side insider only!) knowledge. Even those who think of themselves as experts should be aware that their understnading and knowledge is necessarily far from perfect.

JMA
04-26-2010, 10:53 AM
Easily found by entering 'apache' and 'video' in the search box found in the uppermost Blue strip on this page.

LINK (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/01/71134/troops-told-to-stop-taliban-pursuit.html).

What would I do without you Ken ;-)

JMA
04-26-2010, 11:00 AM
Kicking out listening posts should be automatic. Seems a hasty ambush to me, not a planned ambush. Hard to say unless one was there.

Steady now Ken.

I refer you you to "CHAPTER 10 PATROLLING; Section II. TYPES OF PATROLS" in FM 3-21-9

" Hasty Ambush. A platoon or squad conducts a hasty ambush when it makes visual contact with an enemy force and has time to establish an ambush without being detected."

Ken White
04-26-2010, 05:37 PM
It is written by people in heated and air conditioned offices who may once have done a few things -- or not -- but whose guiding light is to make their boss happy. Everyone should be aware of the doctrine so that it can be intelligently modified as needed.

A hasty ambush is any ambush that was not planned and rehearsed on similar ground.

I'd also point out that the action described in the article meets your quote; the Platoon as you earlier pointed out had established a defensive position, that got converted into an 'ambush' (actually, a sort of ambush but so called by sloppy doctrinal and media interpretation). Sounds hasty to me... :D

As for this:
What would I do without you Ken ;-) Your own research and searches??? :wry:

It'd also help keep Fuchs off my back... :D

Ken White
04-26-2010, 05:55 PM
You assume the (common) knowledge level of people with very diverse experiences or great interest in the topic. That's not really "common knowledge" in my opinion.I agree. that's why I said specifically; "Your constant queries on very basic facts most here deem common knowledge are interesting."(emphasis added /kw). I applied that to most -- not all -- poster on this Board and to the basic stuff...

I tend to avoid commenting on issues unless I have some knowledge gained by direct and repeated personal experience in multiple environments (a one time thing can be an anomaly) and / or I've seen reports from at least three, preferably competing, reasonably reliable sources. I also generally try to contain my biases (of which I have a bunch... :rolleyes:) and to avoid politics, generic slams and stereotyping with little basis in fact.

I don't expect everyone to adhere to that goal -- regrettably, even I don't hit it constantly but I do try. What I'd like to see is is most posters head in that direction...
Last but not least, I doubt that anyone really understands what happens in AFG. This is difficult even with a lag of a couple years and insider (one side insider only!) knowledge. Even those who think of themselves as experts should be aware that their understnading and knowledge is necessarily far from perfect.With that I totally agree, no caveats. I will point out, though, that also applies to most wars, most places. Onkel Carl's friction abounds... :wry:

Sylvan
04-26-2010, 07:08 PM
I agree. that's why I said specifically; "Your constant queries on very basic facts most here deem common knowledge are interesting."(emphasis added /kw). I applied that to most -- not all -- poster on this Board and to the basic stuff...

I tend to avoid commenting on issues unless I have some knowledge gained by direct and repeated personal experience in multiple environments (a one time thing can be an anomaly) and / or I've seen reports from at least three, preferably competing, reasonably reliable sources. I also generally try to contain my biases (of which I have a bunch... :rolleyes:) and to avoid politics, generic slams and stereotyping with little basis in fact.

I don't expect everyone to adhere to that goal -- regrettably, even I don't hit it constantly but I do try. What I'd like to see is is most posters head in that direction...With that I totally agree, no caveats. I will point out, though, that also applies to most wars, most places. Onkel Carl's friction abounds... :wry:

You want humor?
Read the sworn statements from all the participants in a TIC.
I can't get a gunner and driver to agree upon what happened.

JMA
04-27-2010, 11:38 AM
It is written by people in heated and air conditioned offices who may once have done a few things -- or not -- but whose guiding light is to make their boss happy. Everyone should be aware of the doctrine so that it can be intelligently modified as needed.

A hasty ambush is any ambush that was not planned and rehearsed on similar ground.

I'd also point out that the action described in the article meets your quote; the Platoon as you earlier pointed out had established a defensive position, that got converted into an 'ambush' (actually, a sort of ambush but so called by sloppy doctrinal and media interpretation). Sounds hasty to me... :D

As for this:Your own research and searches??? :wry:

It'd also help keep Fuchs off my back... :D



Oh dear. It seems that when confronted with the facts you would rather throw the manual out the window than accept that you were out on the definition. Sad.

...oh, and the personal stuff Ken, its water off a ducks back.

JMA
04-27-2010, 11:43 AM
This must not be his fault or the media's at all.
I've encountered the worst misinformations about military hardware among both journalists and soldiers. Others tend to shut up unless they played a videogame that mentioned something related.

For the little it is worth I am somewhat disappointed at your lack of intuition.

Would you agree that questions can be asked with at least two purposes in mind. One to learn something from the answer and second to see if the person asked the question knows what the hell HE is talking about.

I have in the short while I have been here received some very 'illuminating' answers to some very basic questions.

Fuchs
04-27-2010, 12:09 PM
For the little it is worth I am somewhat disappointed at your lack of intuition.

Would you agree that questions can be asked with at least two purposes in mind. One to learn something from the answer and second to see if the person asked the question knows what the hell HE is talking about.

I have in the short while I have been here received some very 'illuminating' answers to some very basic questions.

Trust me when I admit that I underestimate the competence of others more often than I overestimate it.
Nobody can guess correctly all the time. ;)

Uboat509
04-27-2010, 12:54 PM
Oh dear. It seems that when confronted with the facts you would rather throw the manual out the window than accept that you were out on the definition. Sad.

...oh, and the personal stuff Ken, its water off a ducks back.

Which "facts" did you confront him with? A single source media report? Really? That's what you've got to "confront" a man with 20+ years and two wars worth of experience? Arrogance and disrespect aren't helping you make your point.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 01:29 PM
Lieutenants confronting me with books for over 50 years.:D

Generally without thinking about what the books say and what really happens on the ground. Or realizing they're only embarrassing themselves. :eek:

JMA
04-27-2010, 01:33 PM
Which "facts" did you confront him with? A single source media report? Really? That's what you've got to "confront" a man with 20+ years and two wars worth of experience? Arrogance and disrespect aren't helping you make your point.

Excuse me.

This matter is purely in relation to what is a "hasty ambush". There is nothing in that article to support his position and when the definition further proved him to be in error he just threw the manual out the window.

But... that article is an absolute gem of information about the quality of that particular units soldiering. Now you can respond in two ways. Blame everything on the reporter or say, hey, we need to look a little deeper into this matter, we have some work to do.

JMA
04-27-2010, 01:36 PM
Lieutenants confronting me with books for over 50 years.:D

Generally without thinking about what the books say and what really happens on the ground. Or realizing they're only embarrassing themselves. :eek:

Perhaps you were a lieutenant once yourself. I remember the lessons I learned as a lieutenant as much as I did later.

Ken, I am starting to find this hilarious. You make a minor error over a definition and then just can't find it in you to say oops, yes I slipped up there.

MikeF
04-27-2010, 01:36 PM
Excuse me.

This matter is purely in relation to what is a "hasty ambush". There is nothing in that article to support his position and when the definition further proved him to be in error he just threw the manual out the window.

But... that article is an absolute gem of information about the quality of that particular units soldiering. Now you can respond in two ways. Blame everything on the reporter or say, hey, we need to look a little deeper into this matter, we have some work to do.

Naw, it's about as prolific as a commentator telling a quarterback that he just needs to score more touchdowns in order to win the game.

JMA
04-27-2010, 01:39 PM
Naw, it's about as prolific as a commentator telling a quarterback that he just needs to score more touchdowns in order to win the game.

Prolific?

Infanteer
04-27-2010, 01:44 PM
All the information I have from different sources informs me that very few if any night ops are being carried out by non special forces units.

Wrong.

MikeF
04-27-2010, 01:45 PM
Prolific?

Prolific- highly productive. Producing ideas or works frequently in large quantities.

Synonyms- Productive, creative, inexhaustible, fertile, fruitful

Antonyms- unproductive

JMA
04-27-2010, 01:47 PM
Wrong.

I would be happy if someone could set me straight on this point. No ones seems able to do so.

JMA
04-27-2010, 01:48 PM
Prolific- highly productive. Producing ideas or works frequently in large quantities.

Synonyms- Productive, creative, inexhaustible, fertile, fruitful

Antonyms- unproductive

Yes I know that but was hoping you used it incorrectly in that analogy. Care to make a translation into simple English please?

Steve Blair
04-27-2010, 01:55 PM
Yes I know that but was hoping you used it incorrectly in that analogy. Care to make a translation into simple English please?

Pretty simple: stating the obvious. Unless Mike has some deeper connotations in mind?;)

Ken White
04-27-2010, 02:01 PM
Ken, I am starting to find this hilarious. You make a minor error over a definition and then just can't find it in you to say oops, yes I slipped up there.I cheerfully admit errors; I ordinarily do not acknowledge pedantic corrections and two cent 'gotcha' as errors if they are insignificant -- and this one is all that...:D
Perhaps you were a lieutenant once yourself. I remember the lessons I learned as a lieutenant as much as I did later.Er, no, I was never a Lieutenant. I always worked for a living. ;)

Trained a bunch, the majority who went to be successful Colonels and above. Then I worked for the Army as a civilian trainer, 45 years all told; that's called masochism. :wry:

Steve Blair
04-27-2010, 02:04 PM
Ok, folks. Let's all take a deep breath, have some more coffee (or whatever your beverage of choice is for your current time zone), and cut back on the snarkiness (bitchiness and sniping for those who don't often use the term). There's intelligent discussion to be had here if we take a moment to find it again.

Thanks.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 02:08 PM
I would be happy if someone could set me straight on this point. No ones seems able to do so.here to entertain you. You worry about casualties but ask for details that are available on the internet to a great extent but that need not be collected to give someone lurking on this board some information that might aid the bad guys.

While there's little real and current information due to OpSec concerns, there's adequate information on the net to produce a far better picture than you seem to have but no one is going to do your research for you, either.

ADDENDUM: One of the Posting Rules contained in the FAQ (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_forums) states:

"This is a public forum. You agree that you will not discuss details of current operations that could compromise or disadvantage lawful combatants, and you will not discuss classified material." The large number of currently serving and former military people posting her perhaps mean excessive caution in that regard but that's the way it is.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 02:10 PM
I'd have left off my last line above.

ADDED: Removed it, forgot the edit function...

JMA
04-27-2010, 03:57 PM
Pretty simple: stating the obvious. Unless Mike has some deeper connotations in mind?;)

The word quarterback is not in the vocabulary out here in the colonies.

JMA
04-27-2010, 03:59 PM
I cheerfully admit errors; I ordinarily do not acknowledge pedantic corrections and two cent 'gotcha' as errors if they are insignificant -- and this one is all that...:DEr, no, I was never a Lieutenant. I always worked for a living. ;)

Trained a bunch, the majority who went to be successful Colonels and above. Then I worked for the Army as a civilian trainer, 45 years all told; that's called masochism. :wry:

OK gotcha... did you ever get to do any operational para jumps?

JMA
04-27-2010, 04:07 PM
here to entertain you. You worry about casualties but ask for details that are available on the internet to a great extent but that need not be collected to give someone lurking on this board some information that might aid the bad guys.

While there's little real and current information due to OpSec concerns, there's adequate information on the net to produce a far better picture than you seem to have but no one is going to do your research for you, either.

ADDENDUM: One of the Posting Rules contained in the FAQ (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_forums) states:

"This is a public forum. You agree that you will not discuss details of current operations that could compromise or disadvantage lawful combatants, and you will not discuss classified material." The large number of currently serving and former military people posting her perhaps mean excessive caution in that regard but that's the way it is.

There is absolutely nothing being said here which may compromise opsec. The information that I have which may do so would never be posted to a public forum such as this.

As far as research goes. I can do my own and seeing how others reply to my questions sometimes I get a cut and paste from some other source. Meaning I don't like to get tied down in discussions with 5-min goggle experts.

Ken White
04-27-2010, 04:40 PM
There is absolutely nothing being said here which may compromise opsec.though not from a lack of leading questions...
The information that I have which may do so would never be posted to a public forum such as this.Good for you. Answers to some queries will never be posted here for the same reason.
Meaning I don't like to get tied down in discussions with 5-min goggle experts.Fascinating. A cut and paste like this? LINK. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97283&postcount=56) :D

The answer to your other question is Yes but let's not get into a childish "Mine is bigger than yours..." which has absolutely nothing to do with anything in this thread. Focus, JM, focus... ;)

JMA
04-27-2010, 05:02 PM
though not from a lack of leading questions...

OMG... I'm a spy.


Good for you. Answers to some queries will never be posted here for the same reason.

...or maybe because people don't have an answer?

Steve Blair
04-27-2010, 05:16 PM
Gentlemen,

Deep breaths all around. I don't see this particular line of thought adding anything to the topic of this thread. We're also getting dangerously close to the personal attacks portion of the program, which are against the ROE here. For those who need a reminder, see the link (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_conduct). I refer specifically to the "be polite" portion of the program.

Keep it civil and focused on issues, or infractions will follow. Last warning.