CNAS policy brief

[omarali50]

The new CNAS policy brief is up at

http://www.cnas.org/node/3578

my comment on it was: I think the paper is generally on target. And I too think that a stable Afghanistan is NOT impossible, but would take hard work, which the US may not be willing to do (or capable of doing? one has to consider that imperial decay may already be past the point of no return).
Some commentators feel that this overstates the importance of the "af-pak haven" for AQ. While it is true that AQ does not really NEED a haven to continue as a terrorist group, a victory in Afghanistan would make a huge difference to their prospects. The difference is the difference between Baader-Meinhoff and a serious worldwide threat. Defeat in Afghanistan would make the whole AQ project seem even more of a fantasy and a cultish fringe act. They would still get the occasional Saudi willing to walk around with explosives up his butt, but such nutcases would not have wide support in the Muslim community (which would see them as dangerous crazies, not a serious alternative to the current crop of corrupt "leaders"). On the other hand, if the US goes down to defeat in Af-pak, it would translate into a huge boost to the jihadi project. They would have proven their point: they got a superpower to walk into their trap and they defeated the superpower. Palestinians and others Muslim communities with grievances (real AND imagined) do not have to regard these people as medieval crazy morons who are more dangerous to their own community than they are a threat to US-Israel. Instead, they can see them as a real alternative to all the "corrupt puppets" the US has supported all over the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of Muslims will start thinking afresh about joining the cause or at least hedging their bets. Maybe no dominoes will actually fall, but many dominoes will have to be rescued using brute force, nasty tactics and extreme violence. Baader Meinhoff never got that far.....

[William F. Owen]

The new CNAS policy brief is up at

http://www.cnas.org/node/3578

my comment on it was: I think the paper is generally on target. And I too think that a stable Afghanistan is NOT impossible, but would take hard work, which the US may not be willing to do (or capable of doing? one has to consider that imperial decay may already be past the point of no return).

So why not just back the Karzai Government in a civil war against all who oppose it? One of the great weaknesses of the CNAS brand of COIN is the assumption that the Insurgents have some point that requires redress. Who says?

Why this fascination with some theoretical construct called "New COIN" instead of accepting US policy as being fixed on the need to create and sustain a Government acceptable to the regime in Washington, and backing them with all possible resources to win? Military equipment and training of the type needed is dirt cheap compared to deploying 90,000 men for the 10 years.

CNAS sadly sees the answer to all military problems (and it is!) as "COIN."

[tequila]

So why not just back the Karzai Government in a civil war against all who oppose it?

How would a massive civil war result in a stable Afghanistan?


Military equipment and training of the type needed is dirt cheap compared to deploying 90,000 men for the 10 years.


What is the type of equipment/training needed for an Afghan civil war that would result in a stable Afghanistan, as opposed to a COIN fight, and why would it be cheaper?

[omarali50]

I think both of you (William Owen and Tequila) have a point. And I dont see why the two are mutually exclusive? Of course the US has to back the Afghan regime (with or without Karzai) in a civil war. Isnt that what they are doing right now? (clumsily and less than efficiently, so William does have a point; they need to be able to say what they are doing and not get lost in Bull#### all the time; which is why I mentioned imperial decay).
And when you are supporting a govt against an insurgent force, isnt that "COIN"?
The fact is, the US may end up doing a LOT of what it is doing right now even if it was official policy to take William's advice in toto. The difference would be in internal clarity and the ability to cut through bull####. Unfortunately, this may not be easy to fix because it may be a system-wide failure. I was a pediatrician before I became an academic subspecialist, and I can tell you, sometimes the system just seems incapable of using common sense. Once some BS idea like "foster parents are ALWAYS superior to orphanages" or "national health is a socialist nightmare" (to mention two wrong beliefs from two different ends of the spectrum) gets in place, it generates its own corrupt constituency and its own fog of bull#### and somteimes nothing can make it change except system-wide collapse. This sounds completely irrelevant to our discussion, but I assure you, it is the same general phenomenon.....And I am afraid "freedom lovers" can be fooled or co-opted by corruption and BS just as easily as "do-gooders" ...

[William F. Owen]

How would a massive civil war result in a stable Afghanistan?
A massive civil war would not, but I think it is already a civil war. If the US and NATO left, would the Taliban take over? - Well if the answer is probably, there is little benefit in describing the problem as an Insurgency.
My point is that you pick a side and resource it to win.


What is the type of equipment/training needed for an Afghan civil war that would result in a stable Afghanistan, as opposed to a COIN fight, and why would it be cheaper?
If your question is what equipment types and training do I propose to best enable the government forces to defeat the Taliban, I can give you answers but you are looking at a long list, and you are missing the point.

Is it dead Americans or dead Afghans that are greater policy drivers? America has money. What it may lack is the political will to make the policy work. Spend gold, not blood.

[slapout9]

Unfortunately, this may not be easy to fix because it may be a system-wide failure. I was a pediatrician before I became an academic subspecialist, and I can tell you, sometimes the system just seems incapable of using common sense. Once some BS idea like "foster parents are ALWAYS superior to orphanages" or "national health is a socialist nightmare" (to mention two wrong beliefs from two different ends of the spectrum) gets in place, it generates its own corrupt constituency and its own fog of bull#### and somteimes nothing can make it change except system-wide collapse. This sounds completely irrelevant to our discussion, but I assure you, it is the same general phenomenon.....And I am afraid "freedom lovers" can be fooled or co-opted by corruption and BS just as easily as "do-gooders" ...


I agree with you 100% doctors are often great systems thinkers and they would be great COIN fighters because of it. COIN is a lot like Infection Control!:)

[Old Eagle]

The problem of simply backing our a$$hole against "theirs" is that it seldom leads to a long term, let alone permanent solution. We have indeed done this numerous times in the past, often with disastrous results. These operations often turn into festering sores that cost enormous amounts of resources, fail to accomplish national objectives (which is what this is all about), and sometimes lead to much worse situations than the status quo ante. And, of course, during the entire process, we sully those values that much of the rest of the world admires about us.

[tequila]

Is it dead Americans or dead Afghans that are greater policy drivers? America has money. What it may lack is the political will to make the policy work. Spend gold, not blood.

So the idea being, arm and train whatever Afghans will join the government lavishly so they can fight a real civil war to the knife against the Taliban?

How do you get around the problem of local actor commitment when you signal that your own is failing by withdrawing forces?

[William F. Owen]

So the idea being, arm and train whatever Afghans will join the government lavishly so they can fight a real civil war to the knife against the Taliban?

How do you get around the problem of local actor commitment when you signal that your own is failing by withdrawing forces?

Tequila, you can go on grossly mis-representing my point of view, but it isn't really helping. I never used the term "real civil war". The issue is a civil war. That term makes no technical judgement as to the levels or precise applications of force required - so I never implied anything "lavish" either.
Did I mention withdrawal? No, but obviously you do not withdraw until the policy is sufficiently well advanced as to appear and remain credible.

a.) Is or is not the US Policy to create and sustain a Pro-US Government in Afghanistan?

b.) Is the main opposition to the Pro-US Government a collection of armed factions essentially trying to restore the regime in place before US intervention?

Like it or not, the US is already backing one faction against the other and is already attempting to build up the ANA.
My point is that this reality should become the explicit statement of policy! Pick a side, resource it to win.

[tequila]

Wilf,

Really not trying to misstate your position, only to understand it. Frankly I'm having a hard time picking out how your position differs from current policy.

[omarali50]

It probably does not differ from current policy, but it is an appeal to make "current policy" much more specific and clear. Let everyone repeat every morning: "the US is in Aghanistan to shore up a friendly govt and help defeat a nasty insurgency" (and we are doing that because thats what we promised to do, thats what suits our regional interests and thats how we keep AQ out of af-pak, etc etc).. see how that instantly ends the nonsense where the CinC is still trying to make up his mind about what the mission is....
(Maybe the "making up his mind" thing is part of some clever psyops operation, but that sounds like giving him too much credit). There IS confusion and it needs to end soon or the mission (whatever it is) becomes much harder.

[William F. Owen]

It probably does not differ from current policy, but it is an appeal to make "current policy" much more specific and clear. Let everyone repeat every morning: "the US is in Aghanistan to shore up a friendly govt and help defeat a nasty insurgency" (and we are doing that because thats what we promised to do, thats what suits our regional interests and thats how we keep AQ out of af-pak, etc etc).. see how that instantly ends the nonsense where the CinC is still trying to make up his mind about what the mission is....

Eloquently stated, and I could have saved myself time, by saying exactly that. So thank you.

...and PS: If I have the figures right - and they should be checked, the US is spending $6-7 billion per month in Afghanistan. The entire IDF defence budget for 2009 is about $18 billion. So IF those figures are correct, then there is a very strong indication that funds could be better spent. - and that indication remains, even if the figures are 50% wrong.

[slapout9]

It probably does not differ from current policy, but it is an appeal to make "current policy" much more specific and clear. Let everyone repeat every morning: "the US is in Aghanistan to shore up a friendly govt and help defeat a nasty insurgency" (and we are doing that because thats what we promised to do, thats what suits our regional interests and thats how we keep AQ out of af-pak, etc etc).. see how that instantly ends the nonsense where the CinC is still trying to make up his mind about what the mission is....
(Maybe the "making up his mind" thing is part of some clever psyops operation, but that sounds like giving him too much credit). There IS confusion and it needs to end soon or the mission (whatever it is) becomes much harder.

That is outstanding! Maybe you could go to Washington and teach them how to talk like that:)

[tequila]

"the US is in Aghanistan to shore up a friendly govt and help defeat a nasty insurgency" (and we are doing that because thats what we promised to do, thats what suits our regional interests and thats how we keep AQ out of af-pak, etc etc)..

I don't think anyone disagrees about that. Now how do you do it?

Does this require American forces in significant numbers or not?

Very reasonable and intelligent and well-intentioned people can disagree about whether American forces help or hurt this goal.

[davidbfpo]

Nearly a year old, but makes good points: http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/23/world/fg-aushev23

A more recent comment I have is:
Our mission was never to win. The Soviet Army was sent in to prop up a corrupt regime and the AFG leadership was all too happy to stand back, stay in the safety of their guarded compounds in Kabul, and let the Russians do the fighting for them. "They refused to do anything for the benefit of the people. In his mind, "from the perspective of the average Afghan, little has changed since".

As I have said before when each ISAF soldier on patrol has an Afghan (ANA, ANP etc) beside him then I will be convinced to stay. Yes, there are big problems with Afghanisation - as discussed elsewhere. The recent election fraud does not help.

Tequila asked:
Does this require American forces in significant numbers or not?

To shore up and help defeat does not need more US troops, yes to trainers and no to GPF. Yes, said from a faraway armchair.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

I don't think anyone disagrees about that. Now how do you do it?

Does this require American forces in significant numbers or not?

Very reasonable and intelligent and well-intentioned people can disagree about whether American forces help or hurt this goal.

I think the key words are "help them" not do it "for them".

[Entropy]

I'll disagree with this:


"the US is in Aghanistan to shore up a friendly govt and help defeat a nasty insurgency" (and we are doing that because thats what we promised to do, thats what suits our regional interests and thats how we keep AQ out of af-pak, etc etc)

I think there are some obvious problems with it:

1. How does propping up an Afghan government keep AQ out of the "pak" part of af-pak?

2. Why is it assumed that an Afghan government will be able to keep AQ out of the "af" part of "af-pak" since Pakistan is not able to keep AQ out of the Pak part? Let's assume nation-building is successful - is there any reason to believe an Afghan government will be able to really control all of its territory to prevent AQ from operating on Afghan soil? After all, the Pakistani government is much more powerful, much more capable and is unable to do that on their side of the border.

3. It assumes that Pakistan wants what we want for Afghanistan and there seems to be a lot of evidence that is not the case.

[MikeF]

After all, the Pakistani government is much more powerful, much more capable and is unable to do that on their side of the border.

Unwilling may a more accurate term. They have the capability, but in the past, the did not view AQ as an existential threat. They were/are more concerned with India. Hopefully, that'll change.

Mike

[Entropy]

Unwilling may a more accurate term. They have the capability, but in the past, the did not view AQ as an existential threat. They were/are more concerned with India. Hopefully, that'll change.


To an extent, you're right. Pakistan still administers those areas using the same methods (and the same law, actually) that the British developed in the late 19th Century. But I think there is a real lack of capability for them to control these areas. They are not even able to control Swat anymore, for example, and that was once a peaceful area. I think a lot of their reluctance to try to actively control the frontier areas is because they know their own limits.

[slapout9]

1. How does propping up an Afghan government keep AQ out of the "pak" part of af-pak?

3. It assumes that Pakistan wants what we want for Afghanistan and there seems to be a lot of evidence that is not the case.

Those are really good questions. Maybe that is why our Drones are so busy....we will have to do the Pak part?

[tequila]

They are not even able to control Swat anymore, for example, and that was once a peaceful area. I think a lot of their reluctance to try to actively control the frontier areas is because they know their own limits.

Well, I think that is a bit far. There have been some attacks in Swat and undoubtedly some Taliban still left there, but heck there are attacks in Lahore and Islamabad as well --- the Pak Army still controls those cities. The relatively successful resettlement of refugees into Swat (as well as the surfeit of dead bodies showing up on roadsides, blamed on the Pak security services) shows that the Pak Army has made some progress in settling in and securing Swat.

I don't think it's so much a question of limits as political capital and will. The, shall we say, energetic response to insurgencies in Baluchistan and East Pakistan previously show that the Pakistani Army is perfectly willing to deploy massive force to perceived insurgent threats. The problem is that politically the Pashtun population in Pakistan is not seen in the same way as the marginal, unruly Baluchs. Pashtuns are far more integrated in the national polity and are seen as a "loyal" population by the military and the power structure (excepting MQM-type Mohajir fanatics in Karachi, of course), as opposed to Sindhis and Baloch. Pashtuns serve in the Army and the officer corps out of proportion with their population. This plus the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets and the longtime use of tribals for war in Kashmir conditions the Pak military to look at Pashtuns in a certain way.

That being said, the continued terror attacks inside Pakistan are definitely altering the political situation. As ugly as they are, they are only hurting the TTP's cause inside Pakistan. Public support for the Army is only rising with each attack.

[Entropy]

I agree with you to a certain extent, but the Baluch's are not actively administered either and outside of a few areas there is little official government presence. So while the Pak Army certainly can go on a punitive campaign if things get bad enough that wouldn't equate to central government control. And the Pak Army in some cases hasn't done so well fighting in the Pashtun areas.

So I think the lack of will is at least partly because they (Pakistan) think it's simply not worth it to fight a bloody conflict for what would be temporary effect.

[omarali50]

I'll disagree with this:



I think there are some obvious problems with it:

1. How does propping up an Afghan government keep AQ out of the "pak" part of af-pak?

2. Why is it assumed that an Afghan government will be able to keep AQ out of the "af" part of "af-pak" since Pakistan is not able to keep AQ out of the Pak part? Let's assume nation-building is successful - is there any reason to believe an Afghan government will be able to really control all of its territory to prevent AQ from operating on Afghan soil? After all, the Pakistani government is much more powerful, much more capable and is unable to do that on their side of the border.

3. It assumes that Pakistan wants what we want for Afghanistan and there seems to be a lot of evidence that is not the case.

I think point three is accurate but the first two imply that completely vaporizing every nutcase is somehow part of the plan. That will never happen. Terrorists will continue to carry out isolated terrorist acts even if EVERYTHING goes well (whatever "goes well" is taken to mean). In my opinion, the US knows (or should know) that the big prize is Pakistan. Its an internationally connected, large, populous nation with significant technological abilities, a modern army and about 50 nuclear bombs (which probably work more reliably than the 37 that India has). Afghanistan is a sideshow in comparison. A barely functional regime that can keep control of the country with modest foreign assistance is about the best you can hope for in the foreseeable future in Afghanistan and THAT WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH. Arabs wandering into it to find "alqaeda" will be more likely to find some kidnapper who will sell them to the highest bidder. It will not be an international threat. On the other hand, Pakistan has a military and an intelligence agency that is barely one degree of separation away from Jihadi terrorism right now and could slip back into full jihadi mode if the pressure is off. Arabs and Western Muslims who wander into Pakistan find airports, hotels, madressas with longstanding arab links, and remote regions where their dream of jihad training and blowing themselves up can be pursued in a land with internet connections and at least 37 mechanical engineers with bright ideas about the next butt bomb. What is keeping all this from going back to the good old days of the nineties is a war next door where America is involved and keeps asking the ISI to "do more". Leave Afghanistan and the vast Jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan, built up over two decades, will feel vindicated and will want all their priviliges back AND an army that still likes the idea of using these jihadis as their proxies will take the first opportunity to "stop fighting America's war" and will go back to its policy of supporting one set of jihadis to conquer Afghanistan ('strategic depth") and another to conquer India ("manifest destiny"). A lot of people have a few drinks with Musharraf and feel like this army could never have anything in common with the jihadis anymore. Those people have no idea that Musharraf was drinking the same scotch when he was actively running the jihadi operation 10 years ago. Others feel like the army cannot forgive those who have killed its own officers and men in the last few years. These others are also mistaken. The army does not like the fact that officers and men have lost their lives in this struggle, but 98% of them feel that its all America's fault anyway.
Dont believe me? withdraw and see what happens...