Eaton fires broadside at Cheney [Archive]

Abu Suleyman

10-22-2009, 08:32 PM

Once again fuchs, you have struck at our American system, and I for one am wounded to the core.

This indeed is a demonstration of what is wrong with America, although perhaps not in the way that you meant to illustrate. My question is, who on earth thought that this was a response to anything? Based upon reading MG Eaton’s statement, he gives no indication that he has even read what former-Vice President Cheney said. Given that his current ‘prominence’ derives primarily from being an outspoken critic of George Bush, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Eaton)I would be fairly surprised if he did. It seems as though this was a hip pocket statement to be whipped out whenever anyone in the past administration dared to voice dissent. Indeed, the provenance of the site on which this ‘response’ was posted (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Network)is politically interesting, and perhaps relevant.

However, while it is easy to mock MG Eaton, he is not wholly responsible for the piss poor response, assuming that he wrote it. After all he is just following the grand tradition of military argumentation. For those who have not followed the link allow me to summarize “P1: You suck. P2: You Suck. P3: Here is my resume. P4: Therefore I am right.” I have seen this exact argument unfold over everything from work orders to national strategy and it always is the same. In fact, I am fairly sure that every single person in the military has had someone when arguing say “Well, if you had (been in combat/to ranger school/ in SF/ in supply/the right clearance) you would understand.” I have actually seen a conversation where one person was unaware of the resume of the other and they cycled through four of five ‘accomplishments’ before they found one they could rely upon. Indeed, I tell my non-military colleagues, that you know when you have won the argument when out comes the ‘combat’ card.

A real response would have raised points that Dick Cheney had made, and then refuted them with facts. This response is nothing more than an ad hominem attack on Cheney. But it doesn’t matter how wrong someone is, if her facts are right and her logic is sound, odds are in favor of her being right. Instead, in most political discourse, we get sophistry and logical fallacies left and right. It gets even worse when dealing with military issues.

Finally, while I am not defending Dick Cheney at all, my main take away from his speech was that the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement (http://vetsforobama.org/2008/06/17/gen-wesley-clark-on-obamas-superior-judgement-and-mccains-foreign-policy-experience/), be ready day one (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1420026611.html?dids=1420026611:1420026611&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Jan+29%2C+2008&author=Anne+E+Kornblut%3B+Shailagh+Murray+-+Washington+Post+Staff+Writers&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Obama+Ready+on+%27Day+One%2C%27+Kennedy+Says&pqatl=google), will listen to his generals (http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/obama/839220,obamaweb031208.article), and already issued the Afghanistan plan (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29898698/). I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing. If time were such an issue, then perhaps we could put Health Care (http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare/), Global Warming (http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed7/idUSN2230400), The Olympics (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33054595/ns/politics-white_house/), Harvard Professors (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23gates.html)et al. on the back burner for a couple of weeks, and sort this out. After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President (http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html#section2).

tequila

10-22-2009, 08:55 PM

After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President (http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html#section2).

This is an interesting argument.

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?

Abu Suleyman

10-22-2009, 09:14 PM

This is an interesting argument.

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?

Perhaps none, but lives are a scarce resource. If they die while waiting for a strategy, then it is wasted. At least, if they die once a strategy is in place they are contributing to that strategy, and to our knowledge of whether that strategy will work.

Schmedlap

10-22-2009, 09:18 PM

I have actually seen a conversation where one person was unaware of the resume of the other and they cycled through four of five ‘accomplishments’ before they found one they could rely upon. Indeed, I tell my non-military colleagues, that you know when you have won the argument when out comes the ‘combat’ card.
It's even more fun when you only reveal the resume to certain people and then someone else tries to use it against you.

Example: Someone informs you that "maybe your opinion would change if you'd ever been to combat." This is great fun when you simply reply, "yeah, maybe," and leave it at that, when 10 people within earshot know that you've done about three years in Iraq but the person who makes the lame argument doesn't know... but finds out a week later.:D

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?
26

Fuchs

10-22-2009, 09:26 PM

Afghanistan is very low priority in Germany and I am under the impression that it isn't even near top priority in the U.S. as well.
That is in my opinion a justified prioritization, if the numbers I've read about annual preventable deaths of ill-insured or uninsured patients are anywhere near correct. AQ would not kill that many U.S. citizens ever (much less the Taliban).

I despise ad hominem attacks (I've had my share as the target and usually expose them), but this doesn't exactly look like one. Cheney had a history of involvement in the conflict and the Bush/Cheney administration did reject a troops increase requested by McKiernan in 2008, right? So that's no good background for Cheney to criticize the current situation.

Cheney gets media attention due to the fact that he was in office as Vice President until recently, so his credentials-enabled publicity basically offers his credentials as a target.

Overall, the thread probably belonged more into the historical sub-forum, though.

tequila

10-22-2009, 09:29 PM

It's even more fun when you only reveal the resume to certain people and then someone else tries to use it against you.

My immensely interesting and varied biography tells me that the true number of lives saved will be 17. But this number skyrockets to 19 if the President delays a further week.

At least, if they die once a strategy is in place they are contributing to that strategy, and to our knowledge of whether that strategy will work.

Do you really believe this?

The gunner who dies because his hummvee rolls over while dodging an IED blast won't have contributed one whit to our knowledge of whether or not the strategy is working, and his death or life will not acquire any more meaning or lose any because of whatever strategic directive was in effect at the time. My friends who died in Iraq in 2007 did not die any more meaningful or meaningless deaths than my friends who died in 2005 because the strategy changed.

Schmedlap

10-22-2009, 09:58 PM

My immensely interesting and varied biography tells me that the true number of lives saved will be 17. But this number skyrockets to 19 if the President delays a further week.
If you haven't been to Airborne School then you have no idea.

John T. Fishel

10-23-2009, 11:39 AM

I have been concerned for a long time that we make too much of "force protection" in a volunteer armed force. Since 1973 we have all volunteered to fight for our country even unto death for "good" foreign policies or "bad" - but we ceased to be a conscript force at that time (I know it took a number of years for the draftees to flow out of the system completely). So, while casualties are always tragic and more so if they are unnecessary, I have believed that we (the US govt and public) make too much of them. But Abu Suleyman makes an economic argument - a correct one IMHO - that casualties need to be taken itno account in making decisions etc. Thanks for the Econ 101 reminder:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

Bill Moore

10-23-2009, 12:19 PM

we make too much of "force protection" in a volunteer armed force

Concur that we do tend to let the media manipulate policy too easily with issues that are not germane to the strategy. Not to be cold, because I'm far from it, but the number of casualties should have very little to do with determining whether or not we're achieving our objective or not.

If they die while waiting for a strategy, then it is wasted. At least, if they die once a strategy is in place they are contributing to that strategy, and to our knowledge of whether that strategy will work.

I think we have a strategy now that the guys on the ground are executing (without adequate resources), so the issue is whether the strategy will change, and if it doesn't will the current strategy be adequately resourced?

This means we're at decision point and the enemy is trying hard to influence that decision. IMO the longer we drag out the decision process the harder the enemy will hit us in an attempt to influence the decision.

Fuchs

10-23-2009, 01:14 PM

I have been concerned for a long time that we make too much of "force protection" in a volunteer armed force.

I'd phrase it differently:

It's a mistake to allow citizens/politicians to request for safety of troops in a war zone without exposing it as B.S..

Too many people generate and play with the illusion that certain policies could create safety for the troops.

Abu Suleyman

10-23-2009, 02:35 PM

But Abu Suleyman makes an economic argument - a correct one IMHO - that casualties need to be taken itno account in making decisions etc. Thanks for the Econ 101 reminder:cool:

I couldn't have said it that well myself. Thanks.

tequila

10-23-2009, 02:56 PM

But Abu Suleyman makes an economic argument - a correct one IMHO - that casualties need to be taken itno account in making decisions etc.

How?

Should we make decisions more quickly under the theory that no matter the strategy chosen, at least the speed of the decision will result in some sort of additional meaning for troop deaths, or will generate greater understanding of the strategy's effectiveness?

How does this relate to Econ 101?

John T. Fishel

10-23-2009, 04:10 PM

It's a resourcing argument. People - troops are a scarce resource in the all volunteer force. So, you must ask whether expending that scarce resource in a particular conflict is worth it. Remember that all strategies consist of ends (objectives) ways (COA) and means (resources) in some combination. We test a strategy by the FAS test which answers the following questions:
1. If I follow the indicated COA will I achieve my objective? (suitability)
2. Can I carry out this COA (thereby achieving my objective) with the resources available or that can be made available? (Feasiblity)
3. Are the costs of this COA acceptable in financial, material, personnel, and moral terms? (Acceptability).
If the answer is no to any of the questions then the strategy must be changed.

Cheers

JohnT

PS so, it's more than Econ 101, it is also a strategic argument.

Fuchs

10-23-2009, 04:21 PM

Americans are really annoying to me with their "Econ101", I'm so happy there's no translation for it in German language.
There's no such thing as Econ101 according to my university-educated economist knowledge. Economics laymen use that word just way too often when they want to create the impression that what they're talking about is not disputable. Truly annoying (no offense intended in this particular discussion)

I would object to the use of the term "scarce resources" in context of soldier casualties. It's extremely off, misleading and simply ethically unacceptable.

I advise to use terms like "harm to society" instead, for soldiers are still members of the society, not one of its possessions.
The harm is also done no matter how many are (and whether there are any) in a replacements pool.

Schmedlap

10-23-2009, 04:34 PM

It's usually microeconomics.
Econ 101
(http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=course+schedule+econ101)

Fuchs

10-23-2009, 04:47 PM

Lol, funnily, I've encountered it in context of micro for the very first time today. Most of the time people annoy me with "Econ101" in regard to national economics (macro) and I wasn't able to find a definition anywhere.

Well, we call it "Mikroökonomie I" then.

Tom Odom

10-23-2009, 04:54 PM

Americans are really annoying to me with their "Econ101", I'm so happy there's no translation for it in German language.
There's no such thing as Econ101 according to my university-educated economist knowledge. Economics laymen use that word just way too often when they want to create the impression that what they're talking about is not disputable. Truly annoying (no offense intended in this particular discussion)

Econ 101 is slang for economics 101 as in entry-level economics or basic economics. Anyone who has ever been exposed to econ 101 or 601 for that matter knows that everything in econ is disputable.

Adding a disclaimer at the end does not absolve you of posting a truly annoying comment.

Tom

tequila

10-23-2009, 04:55 PM

PS so, it's more than Econ 101, it is also a strategic argument.

Except Abu Suleyman's argument doesn't seem predicated on resource constraint. We're not going to run out of soldiers or Marines anytime soon.

The argument appears to be that MORE soldiers or Marines are dying / are going to die than would otherwise be the case because the President is taking his time to make a strategic decision. This strikes me as silly, especially given the time it would take for any additional forces to deploy.

Bill Moore argues that the enemy may strike harder to influence the President, but this does not appear to be happening, and one could just as easily argue the other side --- the enemy could ratchet down their campaign in order to appear to pose less of a threat in order to avoid a troop increase.

Old Eagle

10-24-2009, 01:05 AM

Doch. Wirtschaftswissenschaft -- Grundkurs/Einfuehrung usw, usf.

John T. Fishel

10-24-2009, 02:18 AM

learn to speak about what you know and ask about what you don't know. The Americans here all understand what is meant by the shorthand term, Econ 101 (although the course I took was labelled Econ 1). I suspect the Canadians here would know the meaning of the shorthand as well. Others have explained the term to you so I don't have to.

Tequila, troops - that is trained troops - ARE a scarce resource. We simply don't have enough in theater to do what GEN McChrystal wants to do. In his analysis, he needs more of that scarce resource. From what I have read, we can come up with about 40k in relatively short order and still have troops available for other contingencies. But this number will stress the regenerative capacity of the Army and Marines. If we need more for this or some other contingency, where do we get them and what risk do we assume if we don't? The economists call this an analysis of "opportunity costs." BTW, although I usually make fun of economists for assuming away all the really important variables, in this case they really do make a contribution to our understanding of both the immediate problem and a useful link to the political cultural problem that we call (shorthand again) being casualty averse.

Cheers

JohnT

Greyhawk

10-24-2009, 03:48 AM

...that troops were still at Keating (and other remote locales) because a final decision on strategy/resources had not yet been made. The plan to depart those locations goes back a ways (iirc one year, at least), but the final "do it" button was never pushed. The reason for that has never been clearly stated, though a post-battle WaPo account says it was due to everything but indecisiveness (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/04/AR2009100400778.html).

KABUL, Oct. 4 -- U.S. commanders had been planning since late last year to abandon the small combat outpost in mountainous eastern Afghanistan where eight U.S. soldiers died Saturday in a fierce insurgent assault.

The pullout, part of a strategy of withdrawing from sparsely populated areas where the United States lacks the troops to expel Taliban forces and to support the local Afghan government, has been repeatedly delayed by a shortage of cargo helicopters, Afghan politics and military bureaucracy, U.S. military officials said.

Greyhawk

10-24-2009, 04:08 AM

Eaton on Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/25/AR2006092501114.html), to the the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, September 2006: "We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short".

Eaton on Iraq (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nW2XW1Lb_qw&feature=player_embedded), May 2007: "Now our military is overcommitted, and America is less secure. Mr. President, you're being told we need serious diplomacy, not escalation, and you're still not listening."

Abu Suleyman

10-24-2009, 04:36 AM

Except Abu Suleyman's argument doesn't seem predicated on resource constraint. We're not going to run out of soldiers or Marines anytime soon.

There are plenty of things that we are not going to run out of, perhaps ever in meaningful terms, but which still fall within the constraints of scarcity. Scarcity does not necessarily mean impending exhaustion of supply, but the presence of a limit, however large or small, and the value that we place on things because of said limit. In the case of lives, their innate value, which I initially feared was I had portrayed too lightly, is at least one of the major reasons we should spend our blood wisely.

Nonetheless, all military excursions are ones where we exchange blood and treasure for ... something. If we already know that we are not going to get what we want with the current strategy, we should immediately change direction. While we may not be able to get to the correct strategy directly, we should at least be exchanging our blood and treasure for the information of what might work eventually.

Think of the patrol that walks into an ambush. They know that they cannot stay where they are at, nor can they keep doing what they are doing. some of them will probably be killed no matter what they do, they will certainly be destroyed if they continue on their current course. While flanking left may not be the correct solution to resolve the problem, it will 1) buy them (a little) time and 2) give them information about how to resolve the problem ("oh, good their line end here" or "Nope, looks like they are on the right side" etc.). God help the patrol who in a similar situation the leader says "Let us take a moment to consider our direction carefully before we act," because many of them will soon meet him.

Schmedlap

10-24-2009, 05:21 AM

Eaton had a crap reputation even prior to 9/11. He was one of the few senior officers outside of my chain of command whom I had actually heard of when I was a 2LT in 2000.

Fuchs

10-24-2009, 08:36 AM

I encountered "Econ101" many times and it never made sense. I don't recall it ever being used in my presence for a basics course in economics . The others always used it to assert that their economic favourite idea was undisputable and correct.

Stuff like
"stimulus packages are always a good thing, that's Econ101", for example.

So blame me for misunderstanding the term if you want, but I blame those who distorted its meaning instead.

Doch. Wirtschaftswissenschaft -- Grundkurs/Einfuehrung usw, usf.

It's usually divided into BWL/VWL or Mikroökonomie/Makroökonomie. Wirtschaftswissenschaft is a degree programme, not a course afaik.

Intro courses are of marginal value in a discussion*. Intro course content is especially not basic truth, but instead it's a fundament (often used to teach method, not so much content) and the end product usually looks very different than the fundament suggested.

*: The Solow model (~Makroökonomie II) is one of the few really useful contents from early economic studies, as it helps to quickly explain (superficially) the quick post-WW2 recovery in former Axis countries.

Tom Odom

10-24-2009, 10:59 AM

jkm_101_fso

10-24-2009, 02:25 PM

Eaton had a crap reputation even prior to 9/11. He was one of the few senior officers outside of my chain of command whom I had actually heard of when I was a 2LT in 2000.

My old roomate at Campbell told me that Eaton "ruined Ranger school" and was a "sworn enemy" of the RTB.

tequila

10-24-2009, 03:00 PM

Think of the patrol that walks into an ambush. They know that they cannot stay where they are at, nor can they keep doing what they are doing. some of them will probably be killed no matter what they do, they will certainly be destroyed if they continue on their current course. While flanking left may not be the correct solution to resolve the problem, it will 1) buy them (a little) time and 2) give them information about how to resolve the problem ("oh, good their line end here" or "Nope, looks like they are on the right side" etc.). God help the patrol who in a similar situation the leader says "Let us take a moment to consider our direction carefully before we act," because many of them will soon meet him.

Except it's a very, very far stretch to compare a tactical situation to a decision about strategy.

Again, please tell me how many troops are going to die because the President is taking a few weeks to actually analyze and decide what the proper course ahead should be, as opposed to deciding according to when you think he should?

Entropy

10-24-2009, 03:27 PM

I think, for this war, the many months its taking to develop a strategy is not as bad as it could be. I don't think, for example, that political leaders could take that amount of time in a conflict like WWII. We can, in this conflict, more easily maintain the status quo while our leadership works through the strategy problem.

Still, in general, the sooner a strategy is formulated the better, because it's not as if the enemy is sitting still waiting for us.

Schmedlap

10-24-2009, 03:29 PM

My old roomate at Campbell told me that Eaton "ruined Ranger school" and was a "sworn enemy" of the RTB.
That was part of it.

Bill Moore

10-24-2009, 04:07 PM

I think, for this war, the many months its taking to develop a strategy is not as bad as it could be. I don't think, for example, that political leaders could take that amount of time in a conflict like WWII.

During WWII it was a hard fight to develop any consensus on our strategy in Europe, where we should open the first front, should we next go to Italy or the heartland, how do we divide the goodies between the allies, etc. In the Pacific Theater there was also considerable debate between Army and Navy approaches. In the Korean conflict there was considerable debate as in Vietnam, so what exactly is different?

The answer is 24/7 news, blogs, twitter, etc. that have to push hype to stay in business. Look beyond the hype and consider that strategic decisions are obviously of strategic importance and will impact our nation in a variety of ways (security, economically, etc.), so I think we can wait a few more days/weeks to get the best answer rather than rushing to support or deny GEN McCrystal's proposed strategy. We have national interests outside of Afghanistan also, so those who actually see and understand the bigger picture have to weigh the risk of surging in Afghan to those interests. I think we need to give it a break. War is hell, war is complex, and it has always been that way, and the nations (and world's) best minds should debate the issue fully. A tactical commander must make tactical decisions quickly, but strategic leaders generally do not, and they definitely don't for an insurgency in Afghanistan.

John T. Fishel

10-24-2009, 04:54 PM

if it takes longer to decide on strategy but rather what the risks are to achieving our objectives. We know - as much as can be known - what it takes to defeat an insurgency. We have solid quantitiative and qualitative evidence. We know, for a fact, that a strategy built around a purely (or mainly) enemy centric approach will fail in Afghanistan on numerous counts. We can predict, with reasonable accuracy, what will happen if troop strength is not increased and we rely more and more on targeted drone strikes - and it is not a positive outcome. With a little less assurance, we can predict a negative outcome if additional troops are fed in too small increments over too long a time - we fail. So, the presidential decision is really whether the strategy GEN McChrystal has proposed meets the Acceptability component of the FAS test. Essentially, if it does not - if President Obama chooses not to resource it properly - then we must choose not merely a different strategy but a totally different objective and build a strategy to achieve it. I, for one, am not sure that any other objective is acceptable, nor am I sure it would be feasible. In the end, if we want to achievethe objective stated by President Obama, we really need to give GEN McChrystal the resources he says he needs. So, this debate over resouces is the wrong debate. The debate needs to be over ends/objectives. IMO changing the objective means accepting defeat.

On that cheery note...

JohnT

Ken White

10-24-2009, 05:04 PM

Except it's a very, very far stretch to compare a tactical situation to a decision about strategy.Principles are principles and time is time. The parameters are different but the compressed time tactically is simple relaxed or more time strategically
Again, please tell me how many troops are going to die because the President is taking a few weeks to actually analyze and decide what the proper course ahead should be, as opposed to deciding according to when you think he should?Hobson's choice? Unanswerable question as you know.

Moot point in any event. The Prez will take his time and make a decision -- it is highly unlikely to change much on the ground no matter what that decision is. It is an almost certain fact that if we remain in Afghanistan, there will be more casualties. The prime determinant of the number of those will most likely be time followed by enemy activity and own actions as contributors. The enemy activity cannot be predicted with any reliability and it is, regrettably, probably going to drive the latter consideration. Bill Moore said it well:
"I think we need to give it a break. War is hell, war is complex, and it has always been that way, and the nations (and world's) best minds should debate the issue fully. A tactical commander must make tactical decisions quickly, but strategic leaders generally do not, and they definitely don't for an insurgency in Afghanistan."This discussion of time / strategy is more politically than operationally pertinent.

ADDED: That statement by me in on way contravenes that just above by John T. Fishel. We're both correct as a change in strategy will be a political decision. ;)

slapout9

10-24-2009, 06:07 PM

I think Economics 101 is a very good analogy as it relates to the Means portion of the Strategy equation. In Econ 101 you learn about Supply and Demand, if your Strategy requires a certain demand for People,Guns and Money and you don't establish a reliable Supply Mechanism to maintain the appropriate level. Then you just guaranteed the outcome......which is one you want like;)

Shek

10-24-2009, 06:16 PM

Finally, while I am not defending Dick Cheney at all, my main take away from his speech was that the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement (http://vetsforobama.org/2008/06/17/gen-wesley-clark-on-obamas-superior-judgement-and-mccains-foreign-policy-experience/), be ready day one (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1420026611.html?dids=1420026611:1420026611&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Jan+29%2C+2008&author=Anne+E+Kornblut%3B+Shailagh+Murray+-+Washington+Post+Staff+Writers&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Obama+Ready+on+%27Day+One%2C%27+Kennedy+Says&pqatl=google), will listen to his generals (http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/obama/839220,obamaweb031208.article), and already issued the Afghanistan plan (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29898698/). I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing. If time were such an issue, then perhaps we could put Health Care (http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare/), Global Warming (http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed7/idUSN2230400), The Olympics (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33054595/ns/politics-white_house/), Harvard Professors (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23gates.html)et al. on the back burner for a couple of weeks, and sort this out. After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President (http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html#section2).

Abu S,

A few points/questions:

1. If the President made a decision two weeks ago to adopt a troop increase, when would the first brigade be available to deploy? Would it be time now? Would it be the brigade that just got pulled off the hook for Iraq? Would it be a different brigade based on matching task org with the required mission in Afghanistan? I'm not looking at a specific answer as we'd then be traveling down the OPSEC path, but it's quite possible that waiting for several weeks/months doesn't change anything at all.

2. If the assessment determines that the current strategy is the way forward based on the value of the object in view, the means required to work towards the object, and the risk that the strategy takes on, then how does the timing change anything?

3. Here's a potential scenario: The administration has already made their decision, but is delaying a pro-forma decision and is instead continuing to "deliberate" so that it builds political support for the decision. Doing this ensures that GEN McChrystal will be able to prosecute the strategy without major domestical political hindrance unless the 2010 elections create a mandate for "change." Not doing so means that the heat of the 2010 elections only gives GEN McChrystal six months to demonstrate success or else we abandon a superior strategy.

All of the above scenarios lead to the conclusion that an immediately executed decision may not change anything and in fact, may even cost more lives. What we are forgetting here is that strategy is not made and executed in a vacuum, but that domestic politics plays a role (and it should, after all, war is about pursuing policy/political objectives) both in shaping the strategy and assessing the strategy.

In fact, I'd offer that calls to make an immediate decision may actually harm the process. Right or wrong, the reality is that a quick decision could appear to be the result of the administration kowtowing to the military and the GOP, which only stands to discredit Obama amongst the base and make it less likely for a strategy to have staying power as it is executed.

Ken White

10-24-2009, 06:24 PM

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing... :D

Shek

10-24-2009, 06:30 PM

Nonetheless, all military excursions are ones where we exchange blood and treasure for ... something. If we already know that we are not going to get what we want with the current strategy, we should immediately change direction. While we may not be able to get to the correct strategy directly, we should at least be exchanging our blood and treasure for the information of what might work eventually.

A few more comments :)

1. "Immediately" in the context of national decisions takes a long time. It's like trying to turn a zodiac (tactical) vs. a supertanker (strategy). Furthermore, to be logical, you should change direction based on comparing the new vs. the old, not simply drawing up a new and then go charging after it. I don't know exactly how long GEN McChrystal had to draw up his assessment, but given that it was a few months, how long is sufficient for the NSC to digest it?

2. We have an assessment from an operational commander. Resourcing him means that those resources aren't available to other operational/theater commanders. What are the unintended consequences? North Korean adventurism? Chinese adventurism? Shia or Sunni adventurism in Iraq? It's simply not a matter of just rubberstamping GEN McChrystal's report, but looking at the second and third order effects.

3. Strategy isn't a binary approach - either you can achieve your OBJs or not. Instead, it's along a probabilistic continuum and the question is do we accept the risk. So it's not a question as you state that "we are not going to get what we want," but rather, what is the risk that "we are not going to get what we want" and is that acceptable or not based on the means spent. We should be careful in making absolute statements when assessing strategy.

Shek

10-24-2009, 06:31 PM

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing... :D

Oops, need to change the location. Gravitation pull has pulled me closer to the Beltway :eek:

Fuchs

10-24-2009, 07:20 PM

There is also the possibility that Obama will wait with the press release (or *shock* even with the decision) till some NATO meeting this winter.

Ken White

10-25-2009, 12:02 AM

Oops, need to change the location. Gravitation pull has pulled me closer to the Beltway :eek:Sometimes the system pays back with a decent tour after building or ancillary time. :D

slapout9

10-25-2009, 12:51 AM

So, this debate over resouces is the wrong debate. The debate needs to be over ends/objectives. IMO changing the objective means accepting defeat.

On that cheery note...

JohnT

Hi John, yes that is the real question. Even more so on the grand strategy level. This apparent policy of invading countries because their terrain was used as a launching platform for an attack can get us into a lot of trouble. Instead of whack a mole it is turning into whack a country. I don't see how that can be in our long term best interest. Thoughts on this? from anyone? Any merit to this line of reasoning or did I fall off the boat:eek:

John T. Fishel

10-25-2009, 01:24 AM

Different invasion rules for countries with real governments and thos without. You really can hold a govt responsible for its actions - if that govt has effective control of (most of) its sovreign territory, eg Panama or Iraq. But if there is no real govt - Somalia and Afghanistan in 2001 - then you are playing by different rules. Deterrance is a real policy when there is a govt - it is indeed an option for say Iran. But deterrance is not an option for an Afghanistan or a Somalia.

Cheers

JohnT

slapout9

10-25-2009, 01:29 AM

Ken White

10-25-2009, 01:37 AM

For those chaotic neighborhoods, we need the capability (which is easy, already have the gear and people, just need to train 'em better) and the WILL (the hard item...) to go in a do some minor destruction and havoc stuff then leave quickly. Have to get some more gear and train up some more people to do the covert entry surgical stuff but we can do that as well. :wry:

Need to be prepared to leave some bodies and possibly prisoners behind. Goes with the territory; not doing that is nice, it also is a relative rarity. Only the last three wars failed to produce bunches of both.

Creating more chaos, sowing hate and discontent is a USA specialty, we do that well... ;)

P.S.

I agree with you, Slap, on the be careful where you go and why -- we lost the bubble on that...

P.P.S

No, the public won't get upset (other than the usual suspects who get upset at practically everything and cannot believe everyone isn't nice) -- IF the raids are successful.

jmm99

10-25-2009, 03:13 AM

Perhaps, we should spend less time on "COIN" theory and practice; and more time on Raid Operations theory and practice - e.g 1993 FMFM 7-32, Raid Operations (http://www.marines.cc/content/view/82/56/) (3 parts, pubs are in numerical order - so about 1/2 down the page).

From which (File 2, Chap 1), this nugget:

Nothing is so devastating as to pounce upon the enemy in the dark, smite him hip and thigh, and vanish silently into the dark.

Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate
Burma, 1943

Best to all

Mike

John T. Fishel

10-25-2009, 11:04 AM

Hi Mike--

Some of the argument about how to fight COIN - enemy v population centric - is simply nonsense. You can't win a COIN without defeating the insurgent whether he is the Continental Army and Congress (yes Marc, it was an insurgency;)), Sendero Luminoso, the FMLN, the Taliban, or AQ. That point was well made by Sir Robert Thompson reflecting on Malaya. COIN is, after all, war and war is messy, as Gian Gentile keeps on reminding us - correctly, I might add. Wingate, therefore was absolutely right, for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. The critical tactics of the ESAF fight against the FMLN were the GOE (Special Operations Group) intelligence driven raids against specific FMLN targets. Those raids were high pay off actions compared to the equally necessary 24/7 patrols of the Immediate Reaction Battalions, and the fixed site defenses of the regular brigades. What makes COIN different is that the purpose of all these actions is to provide room and time to develop legitimate governance in an environment that is secure for the population. In other words, you can't conduct a population centric COIN without waging an enemy centric fight. It isn't a question of either/or but of how you integrate both.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White

10-25-2009, 04:24 PM

strategic raids for those nations like Afghanistan and Somalia where the disadvantages to intervention in the conventional sense and / or a COIN effort outweigh the advantages. That per your earlier comment:
But if there is no real govt - Somalia and Afghanistan in 2001 - then you are playing by different rules. Deterrance is a real policy when there is a govt - it is indeed an option for say Iran. But deterrance is not an option for an Afghanistan or a Somalia.Thus he, I believe, is referring to raids in lieu of, as opposed to an adjunct in, COIN efforts

jmm99

10-25-2009, 08:42 PM

Not necessarily "raids in lieu of, as opposed to an adjunct in, COIN efforts", since one portion of a larger country may be more suitable for raiding and another may not - the latter perhaps more suitable to "best practices COIN". I'll attempt to explain.

The overriding concept is that "best practices COIN" requires an emphasis on the political effort (the DIE effort, if you want an acronym); and that effort must be mounted by indigenous civilian forces (call them civic action teams, if you want). Those teams need a secure area in which to operate. That security preferably would be provided by indigenous military forces; but could be provided by external forces (so long as they can integrate their efforts with the political efforts, as JTF correctly concludes; e.g., ES).

Please bear with this little dialogue piece between two French officers during the First Indochina War, after their unit (6th Spahis) had spent much of a week clearing a village and adjacent area of Viet Minh (well, not quite completely, as the dialogue suggests). It makes a point as the two officers discuss a five person civic action team, all Vietnamese, who had just joined them and who now had to "hold and build". The conversation is from Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy (http://www.amazon.com/Street-Without-Joy-Bernard-Fall/dp/0811717003), pp.154-155):

MAJ Derrieu: Funny, they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we've just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals which - let's face it - they are in many cases.

LT Dujardin: That may be so, but I wouldn't care to be in his shoes tonight when we pull out. He's going to stay right here in the house which the Commie commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with the four other guys of his administrative team, with the nearest [military] post 300 metres away. Hell, I'll bet he won't even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway.

MAJ: He probably will, and he'll immediately lose face with the population and become useless.

LT: And if he doesn't, he'll probably be dead by tomorrow, and just as useless. In any case, there goes the whole psychological effect of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from now. What a hopeless mess.

The bottom line is that the civilian political effort requires a secure area, or at the least a semi-secured (semi-denied) area - where its success is far from insured. The Indochina episode was from Operation Camargue (1953), which had no lasting effect.

So, the civilian political effort does require military support and the military capabilities to force the guerrilla forces from their requisite offensive tactics into a defensive mode. The answers on how to do that (e.g., disrupt the snipers, prevent the ambushes and IEDs) are military matters beyond my ken (non-capitalized ;)).

As to raids, my logic suggests their primary utility is in denied areas. That may be a nation or a region, where national governance (and local governance, except by the guerrilla-connected "shadow government) are FUBAR or near-FUBAR. Somalia and parts of Astan are good examples (noted by both Ken and JTF). Of course, raids and patrols (the two constructs tend to merge at the small unit level) can also be offensive tools in a semi-secured (semi-denied) area.

In short, raids and a limited "COIN" effort by us (a limited FID effort by us, as in El Salvador, appeals to me more) are alternatives to full "nation building". In Astan, "full nation building" is beyond our capabilities (and a sci-fi jump for the Astan national government). In fact, for a limited "COIN" effort to have a decent probability of resulting in an "acceptable" outcome, the 60-80K force enhancement is probably realistic.

My own position is currently of the "We are there, dammit" school (applies to both Iraq and Astan), which requires an answer to whether political and military cababilities exist to reach an "acceptable" outcome and then withdraw. If the answer is negative to either the political or military cababilities, then withdrawal should be ASAP.

My position in general - that is, do we intervene in a country at all - is of the "Never Again, but" school, where raids (and limited FID) are often more acceptable options - than intervention via large military GPFs. Neither of my positions was popular during the Vietnam War, and I took flak from both sides of the coin (couldn't resist :) ). So be it.

Since John mentioned Robert Thompson, a brief aside (but relevant). I usually read non-fiction books by looking at the ToC and then jumping to chapters that look interesting. If the book is good, I then read it through. Anyway, a few weeks ago, I happened to read Thompson's Preface to Defeating Communist Insurgency. There I found his reading list started with:

1. Jim Corbett's The Man-Eating Leopards of Rudraprayag (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195622561/ref=pd_lpo_k2_dp_sr_3?pf_rd_p=486539851&pf_rd_s=lpo-top-stripe-1&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_i=0195622553&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=0P7QVBN07JX7RNBMY503) (1947) and Man-Eaters of Kumaan (http://www.amazon.com/Man-Eaters-Kumaon-Oxford-India-Paperbacks/dp/0195622553) (1944). I read both from the library eons ago - and quite a few others about man-eating animals (which intrigue me for some reason). Anyway, the bottom line there consists of "raids and patrols", but also common-sense self-defense measures by the locals.

2. Philip Woodruff's The Men Who Ruled India (http://www.amazon.com/MEN-WHO-RULED-INDIA-GUARDIANS/dp/B0010K3RFO/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1256502238&sr=1-1) (2v. 1953 & 1954). I haven't read that, but Thompson finds it corresponds to his concept that the administrative and other non-military efforts outweigh the military efforts, even though military efforts are often first addressed and attain a primacy in many "COIN" efforts. Of course, you have to have an administrative structure for that to even begin to work.

A long explanation, but that is where I am coming from.

PS: JTF - my assigned homework project re: flag officers and the Appointment Clause is coming along. In due course, as they say. :)

Bob's World

10-25-2009, 09:36 PM

Those who hope for a quiet winter and spring in Afghanistan will probably be sorely disappointed.

Taliban coffers are full (the better to hire fighters and buy IEDs with), and they watch the debate within America (heck, probably within SWJ) with great interest. Smart money is that they will push hard to see which way this will tip.

As to the throwing of political rocks, well, that's all that is. In an arena filled with soooo many glass houses you'd think they'd be more careful, but each thinks his own house is immune to shattering as they hurl away at their neighbors.

My take is that Bin Laden is symptom, a man of his time and place (much like Adolf Hitler in that regard). If not him, it would be someone else taking up the cause, if not AQ, it would be some other organization. They, like the terrorism tactics they employ, are merely symptoms of the much larger underlying problems that give them rise. But no one wants to address those, as their roots are certainly linked to America as strongly as they are to anything and anyone else. Certainly no politician seems willing to take them on.

So, President Clinton in his term largely ignored the symptoms, and allowed them to fester. He certainly did little to address the root causes.

This allowed a growing problem to fall directly in the lap of President Bush, who if anything, over engaged the symptoms, but continued to allow the root causes to fester and go largely misdiagnosed and unaddressed.

Now all of this falls to President Obama, and all anyone can talk about is how he in his turn will engage these symptoms. While the symptoms must be dealt with (and are certainly more urgent than addressing a health care system that will continue to muddle along), I believe it is high time that we all elevate our discourse, and lower our sights, to engage the root causes that are giving rise to the many disparate nationalist insurgent movements in the greater Middle East and Africa; and the larger binding overarching concerns that enables a bin Laden and his AQ organization to urge them to support his common cause in the course of seeking their separate ones.

Its time to move forward, leave others to complain of rashes and aches, and what works best to treat them, and sign up for the hard painful task of going after the underlying cancers that could ultimately kill this patient.

Ken White

10-25-2009, 10:15 PM

...They, like the terrorism tactics they employ, are merely symptoms of the much larger underlying problems that give them rise. But no one wants to address those, as their roots are certainly linked to America as strongly as they are to anything and anyone else. Certainly no politician seems willing to take them on.That's the political reality I keep reminding you will get in the way of your approach. You cannot appeal to the common sense and decency of a politician -- you have to attract his or her greed or thirst for power.

Recall your competitor proposition.

You've got the right idea but a really bad sales pitch. :wry:

jmm99

10-25-2009, 11:44 PM

whether it be legal, political or military. So, as to this ...

from BW
.... I believe it is high time that we all elevate our discourse, and lower our sights, to engage the root causes that are giving rise to the many disparate nationalist insurgent movements in the greater Middle East and Africa....

why don't you start something like so:

1. Identify each of the "the many disparate nationalist insurgent movements in the greater Middle East and Africa" which you see as relevant and material.

2. As to each such movement you identify, identify "the root causes that are giving rise" to each such movement.

I'd prefer not to guess and to speculate about whatever tangible underlies your rhetoric, which is quite good and quite lawyerly. :)

Best

Mike

slapout9

10-26-2009, 03:00 AM

That's the political reality I keep reminding you will get in the way of your approach. You cannot appeal to the common sense and decency of a politician -- you have to attract his or her greed or thirst for power.

That is so true.....depressing but true.

Bob's World

10-26-2009, 01:39 PM

whether it be legal, political or military. So, as to this ...

why don't you start something like so:

1. Identify each of the "the many disparate nationalist insurgent movements in the greater Middle East and Africa" which you see as relevant and material.

2. As to each such movement you identify, identify "the root causes that are giving rise" to each such movement.

I'd prefer not to guess and to speculate about whatever tangible underlies your rhetoric, which is quite good and quite lawyerly. :)

Best

Mike

http://en.alkarama.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=93%3Aarticles&id=82%3Aus-allies-in-middle-east-accused-of-rights-abuses&Itemid=221

(This gives insights into perceptions of poor governance and US influence over many of those troubled relationships)

http://killinghope.org/bblum6/overthrow.htm

(The Cold War was a busy era for the US, exerting a scheme of controlling engagement as part of an overall Strategy of Containment of the Soviets; and pursuit of US interests of access to resources and markets)

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/America+&+the+Middle+East:+U.S.+involvement+in+the+Mideast+ goes+back+...-a099982763

(interesting paragraph in the middle of this refering to the 1945 meeting between King Ibn Saud and Roosevelt and a deal to grant U.S. recognition of the legitimacy of the 13YO country of Saudi Arabia in exchange for a primary role in developing their oil industry. This is put one of several countries that the U.S. did not overthrow, but played a major role in the establishment of.)

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/15-Oct-2008/Foreign-fighters-in-Afghanistan-are-Pakistanis-and-Arabs-US-commander

http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/10/30/foreign_fighters_bolster_taliban/

Doing a simple correlation of where human rights abuses are prevelant, where US has manipulated or backed governments, and then layering on where the foreign fighters (best seen as a node of the AQ UW network, manned with individual replacements from insurgent populaces in a variety of Muslim countries) come from.

One also has to be willing to step back from policy and intel rhetoric that conflates all of this as a "global insurgency" or that tends to either recognize or label many nationalist insurgent movements as "AQ" simply becuase they are influenced by AQ and or supported by AQ.

I also recommend study of US Cold War engagement in general and also general works on US involvement over the years in the Middle East. Like this article from 1991: ( I actually hadn't seen this prior to just now, but it recognizes 10 years prior to 9/11 the same thing I see 8 years after)

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1019

"After 70 years of broken Western promises regarding Arab independence, it should not be surprising that the West is viewed with suspicion and hostility by the populations (as opposed to some of the political regimes) of the Middle East.[3] The United States, as the heir to British imperialism in the region, has been a frequent object of suspicion. Since the end of World War II, the United States, like the European colonial powers before it, has been unable to resist becoming entangled in the region's political conflicts. Driven by a desire to keep the vast oil reserves in hands friendly to the United States, a wish to keep out potential rivals (such as the Soviet Union), opposition to neutrality in the cold war, and domestic political considerations, the United States has compiled a record of tragedy in the Middle East. The most recent part of that record, which includes U.S. alliances with Iraq to counter Iran and then with Iran and Syria to counter Iraq, illustrates a theme that has been played in Washington for the last 45 years."

Just step back from the "terror" spin. There is plenty of info out there

SteveMetz

10-26-2009, 03:16 PM

the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement be ready day one will listen to his generals and already issued the Afghanistan plan[/URL]. I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing.

My thoughts on t (http://www.tnr.com/article/world/the-hurry-offense)his.

jmm99

10-26-2009, 05:20 PM

Bob's World

10-26-2009, 06:21 PM

Somehow, you and I have to get into the same chapter, if not on the same page. So, in that endeavor, what follows is a snip from an email to someone on what perhaps is common ground.

---------------------------
Anyway, that's a segue into AQ waging unconventional warfare on a global basis (COL Jones' concept, which I have appropriated - wink); rather than AQ being a "global insurgency" as some want to define it. Not to get into Warden's Ring Theories too far, but here is how I visualize it:

10 Ring - AQ Leadership

9-6 Rings - AQ middlemen - could be their special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings) - all networked back and forth (general counter tactic is to find and neutralize the nodes).

5-1 Rings - Insurgent groups which share common belief systems, common enemies, etc., which can be supported by the AQ SF (as the chatter is about Mr Zazi - see my last post in War Crimes). While these groups can be targeted in one way or the other, we are shooting at the rings that at most give us a score of 50.

0 Ring (outside the target rings) would include parallel thinkers who mimic insurgent tactics, but who are not linked to any of the target rings (e.g., DC snipers). And, of course, the people who have nothing to do with either side, and the people who are anti-AQ, etc.

But, as COL Bob says, there ain't no counter unconventional warfare doctrine - but plenty of counter-insurgency doctrines.
-------------------------------

The email itself then goes on with a long blah-blah about insurgency warfare vs unconventional warfare in Vietnam which is omitted here.

The above is not a set of problem solutions, but a way of visualizing problems to a former half-assed target shooter.

Your thoughts ?

Regards

Mike

Several key thoughts:

1. Ensure that you make it clear that you are not dividing a single "threat" into bands, but rather using bands to highlight and differentiate distinct, but related intities that combine to make a common problem.

2. To apply "Defeat-Disrupt-Deter" I would apply Defeat to the 10-ring; Disrupt to the 6-9 rings; and Deter to your 1-5 rings.

3. You may want to make your "Target" look more like a Dartboard than a Bullseye to help clearly communicate that even within each ring there are esential differences that must be addressed uniquely.

4. Strategic success lies in the 1-5 rings, as this is the base of support that makes the whole thing work. The soulution-set for this ring must also be rooted far more in Civilian led policy than anything the security community would offer in support. Take these rings away and the rest withers (though like a weed, is prepared to spring back to life if nurtured by conditions of poor governance as assessed by each of these distinct populaces own perspectives).

jmm99

10-27-2009, 05:18 AM

than to discourse apart - ships passing in the night are not productive. That having been said, let's go through your points.

from BW
1. Ensure that you make it clear that you are not dividing a single "threat" into bands, but rather using bands to highlight and differentiate distinct, but related entities that combine to make a common problem.

The 10-ring is self-explanatory. It is not static, but folks in more lower rings may jump up; and folks in that ring may move down to lower rings. E.g., the guy who was running the middleman, who was running Zazi according to DoJ, was an AQ top finance man who was shifted into Astan operations. Rather than a dartboard, I'd view the construct more in terms of quantum chemistry or physics where particles move back and forth between energy levels (quantum jumps).

My 9-6 rings (4 rings) were based on positing four different components which I somewhat arbitrarily assigned to AQ: special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings). Any particular component is not assigned to a specific ring, but can jump between rings - closer to or further from the leadership ring, or closer to or further from the "insurgent" groups in rings 5-1.

My 5-1 rings were completely arbitrary - simply to fill out a 10-ring target. Again, there will be quantum jumps between rings, moving closer or further away from the AQ "groups & teams" (rings 9-6).

Keep in mind that all of these folks are loosely networked (a given because of the jumps between rings) and fluid. Hence, nodes and connections will always exist, but they will appear to be transitory. That's why the Internet is a key element. E.g., as an example, a webpage is here today, but gone tomorrow; however, another webpage will exist somewhere, which will key folks into the new url address.

In short, we are dealing with an open, complex system which is resilient to linear tactics or effects based operations.

from BW
2. To apply "Defeat-Disrupt-Deter" I would apply Defeat to the 10-ring; Disrupt to the 6-9 rings; and Deter to your 1-5 rings.

I'd view this a bit differently, but we might end up the same. As to the 10-ring, "Defeat" is the ultimate objective and obvious. But, a clear head or heart shot is unlikely (although we almost had one at Tora Bora, and several times before 9/11). If we get one, fine; but don't count on it.

Moreover, in reading Zawahiri's Knights' discussion of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the publicly known figures (in AQ's case, UBL & Zawahiri) are not necessarily AQ's real top figures - there may be a small number of "shadow partners" who are very secure. If that sounds conspiratorial, it is - AQ is a conspiracy.

On that theme, you crack a conspiracy by identifying it and cracking it from the outside in. The principal attack, which will be time-consuming, is to attack rings 9-6 (their "groups and teams") - realizing we are shooting at a moving and jumping target. So, "Disrupt" is probably as good as any tag word for that process.

As to the 5-1 rings (the "domestic insurgents"), the major practical problem to "Deter" is the sheer variety of motives and causes for what are in effect brush fires. Huge amounts of energy, lives, money and lost opportunities are eaten up in putting out brush fires (e.g, Vietnam, Iraq and Astan). In the end, at best, you will be shooting 50/100 by taking on the 5-1 rings (ave. is 2.5). The average in taking on the 9-6 rings is 7.5.

from BW
3. You may want to make your "Target" look more like a Dartboard than a Bullseye to help clearly communicate that even within each ring there are esential differences that must be addressed uniquely.

I think the concept of quantum jumps handles the interchanges between rings by the varied "particles" in the rings. Just think of the visual patterns illustrating quantum mechanics and quantum chemistry. You need not the higher math.

from BW
4. Strategic success lies in the 1-5 rings, as this is the base of support that makes the whole thing work. The soulution-set for this ring must also be rooted far more in Civilian led policy than anything the security community would offer in support. Take these rings away and the rest withers (though like a weed, is prepared to spring back to life if nurtured by conditions of poor governance as assessed by each of these distinct populaces own perspectives).

No, strategic success vs. AQ lies in disruption of the 9-6 rings (the higher value targets, albeit not the highest value target) - their "groups and teams". How would you disrupt SOCOM ? Not a question to be answered publicly, but that is the counterpart analogy.

There are non-"M" things that could be done (the "DIE" options), and that we probably could agree on, that would help a "Deter" strategy in rings 5-1; and perhaps even more so in ring 0 - which is the far larger part of the World (and from which rings 5-1 come). However, those are tied up in what considers the better (note I didn't say "best", which is Utopian) Worldview that the US should have in the future. That is a more difficult geo-political topic.

Your thoughts ?

Regards as always

Mike

Bob's World

10-27-2009, 01:15 PM

I probably wouldn't use a ring construct myself, as too many would apply Warden targeting to it, or as bad, draw too many similarities between players placed within the same ring. But as I said, it can be helpful, so long as one understands the players it is placing in the rings, rather than using the rings to understand the players...

As to "Defeat" on AQSL. This is a debate that I continue to irritate the "Capture/Kill" gang with. C/K can never be more than a supporting effort to any defeat strategy, and that true "defeat" of a political, non-state UW HQ like AQ comes when you rob them of their base of support by out competing them to take away the rationale for their existence. If you simply remove this HQ without doing so it will be replaced by a new, more sophisticated organization (evolution), and if you take out leaders they are easily replaced as well (and the intel guys rarely do a good job of laying out the pros and cons of keeping a guy in place vice who is likely to replace him, etc. So a huge aspect of Defeat of AQ lies in the "Deter" of the nationalist insurgent movements.

Deter: Not our job to help every f'd up government in the world either suppress or support its populace more effectively. Some governments just really need to evolve or be replaced from within, and insurgency, like forest fire, is a great, though harsh, way to clear out the dead wood, disease, and insects.

No, the primary focus of the US in this deter ring should be to target the perception that the US is responsible in some way for either the government as a whole, or the specific failures of the government that are eating at the populace. This is why the hair stands up on the back of my neck when I see everybody jumping on the SFA bandwagon with a focus on the training and equipping aspect of it. Those should be seen primarily as vehicles to get you access in general to work on the development of professionalism through the conduit of the security forces; all very very carefully tailored in execution to enhance US credibility and influence with the people, while mitigating any perceptions of undue US influence and control over the government. Tricky business this, and no place for well intended, highly motivated armatures that have their focus on the wrong purpose for their action.

Disrupting the network is just good suppressive fires. You can never break it so long as there is a target audience of supportive populaces out there, but you can attrit its effectiveness and need to do so.

A good case study is that of the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group). This is a nationalist insurgency in Libya that primarily wants to rid Libya of the Qadhafi government. They have their roots in Libyans who traveled to Afg to fight the Soviets, and employ an Islamism ideology to support their movement. They associate with AQ as they buy into their larger purpose of reducing Western influence in the region and return to a purer form of Islam, but also try to distance themselves from AQ as well. They accept AQ support, and were the number 2 (behind Saudi Arabia) provider of manpower to the "foreign fighter node" of the AQ network operating in Iraq.

Many look at Qadhafi's recent recanting of his sins against the West as good, and his pledge to assist the US and UK in their war on terror as a good thing. Looked at just a little harder one sees, that like the Saudis, when he pledges to help with the war on terror, what he is really getting is a green light to brutally suppress his own insurgent populace in the name of "GWOT," in exchange for Western support of his regime, and worse, strengthening the rationale of those same insurgent populaces to target the US in the process.

What the West should do is accept Qadhafi’s offer, but contingent upon him meeting with leaders of key populace groups in his country, to include those labeled as "terrorists" by our intel guys, and opening communications and designing and implementing governmental reforms. Any SFA with Libya should be designed with this in mind and focused far more on enabling the reforms rather than on helping Qadhafi’s attempts to crush the LIFG.

Also, it is critical that we do not anoint or recognize movements such as the LIFG as "AQ." As this strengthens the perceptions of legitimacy, purpose, and effectiveness of the AQSL. BL, is that our goal should be for the Libyan populace, to include LIFG, to see the West as the enabler of good governance rather than an obstacle to the same. All of this must be supported by an overall policy and strategic communications on a grand scheme of reducing Western influence over the populaces and governments of the region.

(Note, any change of governance, be it Qadhafi in Libya, or the Saudis in Arabia, must be in perception and fact an internal affair; and we must support and endorse whomever prevails. If you don't have a ballot box that works, sometimes the only way a populace can trend toward self-determination and greater democracy is through popular insurgency or military coups...messy business, but we've been there ourselves, so should be more empathetic of those who seek to follow our lead)

Many say "Too hard, too idealistic, too much inertia in what we're doing to change."

To those I say fine, you've made your choice; enjoy your GWOT, because you just signed up for a lifetime supply of it.

slapout9

10-27-2009, 02:35 PM

As to "Defeat" on AQSL. This is a debate that I continue to irritate the "Capture/Kill" gang with. C/K can never be more than a supporting effort to any defeat strategy, and that true "defeat" of a political, non-state UW HQ like AQ comes when you rob them of their base of support by out competing them to take away the rationale for their existence.

Which is exactly what you would learn if you did Warden's ring analysis. In his theory there are always at least 2 systems that have to be analyzed, they are your system and the larger environmental system in which the enemy operates. The larger system is where you can affect(cause) the smaller system to achieve the desired effect(result). That is why in older versions of his work you will see 5 ring charts placed side by side or one on top of the other to see possible collision points between the systems. And you will also learn that often the best way to affect one system is by acting through another system which at first glance may appear unrelated.

Bob's World

10-27-2009, 02:47 PM

slapout9

10-27-2009, 03:10 PM

Slap, I'll take your word for it. I'm happy to make strong postions on things I have spent a lot of time doing or thinking about, but Warden's rings are something I am merely aquainted with.

Any tool that help visualize and break down a complex problem is good. I just caution that the best tool applied incorrectly or to any problem that happens to come up, is likely to fall short. So, "proceed with caution," but by all means proceed!

Bob, much of what you say is in direct alignment with Warden.....you just use different terminology. The problem goes to his original article "The Enemy As A System" people naturally just jump to thinking that if they just analyze the Enemy that everything will work out. It want.

To expand a little the largest system to be analyzed is he what he calls the Market system as opposed to calling it the environmental system. If you think of it that way you will begin to see just how big and complex the support structure can be for an insurgency. Most war theories never dreamed of having to contend with the fact that somebody could get a wire transfer over the internet and order supples and have them shipped to them by UPS and then go blow somebody up and report back to a higher authority over a cell phone.

Which is why I say the moment you begin to think of A'stan as a country as opposed to part of a larger Market System and develop a strategy based upon that thinking you have already lost.

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 03:35 PM

Which is exactly what you would learn if you did Warden's ring analysis.

Colonel John Warden's use of five concentric rings to represent relative importance of targets associated with each ring from inner to outer as Leadership, System Essentials, Infrastructure, Population, and last the Fielded Military is an arbitrary model that has two fatal flaws.

First, it ignores the enemy—in Clausewitzian speak it ignores the “clash of wills”; the enemy always gets a vote, so targeting only five elements in a rigid prioritized format allows the enemy to take advantage of our predictability and does not provide for those enemies (like al Qaeda) who refuse to organize to support this model.

Second and more critically, the Warden five rings model does not support achieving the political goal. Colonel Warden tells us always to target these same five categories irrespective to the political goal.

Major Bill Jakola

slapout9

10-27-2009, 04:09 PM

Colonel John Warden's use of five concentric rings to represent relative importance of targets associated with each ring from inner to outer as Leadership, System Essentials, Infrastructure, Population, and last the Fielded Military is an arbitrary model that has two fatal flaws.

First, it ignores the enemy—in Clausewitzian speak it ignores the “clash of wills”; the enemy always gets a vote, so targeting only five elements in a rigid prioritized format allows the enemy to take advantage of our predictability and does not provide for those enemies (like al Qaeda) who refuse to organize to support this model.

Second and more critically, the Warden five rings model does not support achieving the political goal. Colonel Warden tells us always to target these same five categories irrespective to the political goal.

Major Bill Jakola

Hi Bill,
Point 1: Glad you brought that up because this where most people get stuck.......You never ever just choose one ring!!!! You want to attack all 5 if possible. You want to attack the Whole System in Parallel for the simple reason that the enemy will respond....in an uncertain environment and unpredictable environment.......so your best option to reduce the uncertainty is to attack the whole system and reduce his future options.

Point 2: It assumes the Politcal Objective will be given to the military arm of government at which time you choose military targets that will support the Polical Objective. Which is step one of his system "Design The Future".

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 04:23 PM

Hi Bill,
Point 1: Glad you brought that up because this where most people get stuck.......You never ever just choose one ring!!!! You want to attack all 5 if possible. You want to attack the Whole System in Parallel for the simple reason that the enemy will respond....in an uncertain environment and unpredictable environment.......so your best option to reduce the uncertainty is to attack the whole system and reduce his future options.

Point 2: It assumes the Politcal Objective will be given to the military arm of government at which time you choose military targets that will support the Polical Objective. Which is step one of his system "Design The Future".

Slap,

There is not one scintilla of proof that attacking the whole system in parallel will cause the enemy to "respond" or "reduce his future options"?
Also again Colonel Warden's model is arbitrary and is not the “whole system”.

Major Bill Jakola

slapout9

10-27-2009, 04:29 PM

Slap,

There is not one scintilla of proof that attacking the whole system in parallel will cause the enemy to "respond" or "reduce his future options"?
Also again Colonel Warden's model is arbitrary and is not the “whole system”.

Major Bill Jakola

We did it almost perfect in Afghan invasion one and then we never finished the job.....we went to Iraq.

Point 2 What would you consider the whole system? Did you read my previous post about how you have to start with the larger system, not the enemy system?

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 04:46 PM

We did it almost perfect in Afghan invasion one and then we never finished the job.....we went to Iraq.

Point 2 What would you consider the whole system? Did you read my previous post about how you have to start with the larger system, not the enemy system?

Yes, I read your systems approach; and, you’re your fine conclusion “I don't see how that can be in our long term best interest.”
Here, you perfectly capture the flaw in Colonel Warden’s line of thought. He does not tie our interests with a strategy. He simply provides a check list that we are to use for all situations; very similar to “invading countries because their terrain was used as a launching platform”. Why target things that do not support our interests?

Major Bill jakola

slapout9

10-27-2009, 05:02 PM

Here, you perfectly capture the flaw in Colonel Warden’s line of thought. He does not tie our interests with a strategy. He simply provides a check list that we are to use for all situations; very similar to “invading countries because their terrain was used as a launching platform”. Why target things that do not support our interests?

Major Bill jakola

Point 1:The tieing of interest with strategy happens in step 3 Campaigning.

Point 2: Why target things that do not support our interest......you shouldn't! At least not in a lethal way, you may very well want to target them in a non-leathl way.
Don't blame the model because of poor political judgement. In fact Warden and the Air Force in general have warned about Terrain Centric Thinking.

Ken White

10-27-2009, 05:09 PM

Any tool that help visualize and break down a complex problem is good. I just caution that the best tool applied incorrectly or to any problem that happens to come up, is likely to fall short. So, "proceed with caution," but by all means proceed!Couldn't agree more...:wry:

Ken White

10-27-2009, 05:11 PM

We did it almost perfect in Afghan invasion one and then we never finished the job.....we went to Iraq.had we not gone to Iraq?

slapout9

10-27-2009, 05:19 PM

had we not gone to Iraq?

Nothing.

Ken White

10-27-2009, 05:46 PM

Surferbeetle

10-27-2009, 05:48 PM

...throwing out the bathwater.

Colonel John Warden's use of five concentric rings to represent relative importance of targets associated with each ring from inner to outer as Leadership, System Essentials, Infrastructure, Population, and last the Fielded Military is an arbitrary model that has two fatal flaws.

Just because are no grand unified theories of physics, engineering, or war for that matter does not mean that discrete models of system components fail to a provide a certain utility. Many of us make a good living understanding when and when not to apply various models to describe various circumstances. Clearly stating assumptions and limitations up front is one way to define the parameters under which models apply and allow for the benefits resulting from peer review as to the applicability of the model to the circumstance.

I would be interested to hear if you are advocating for the silver bullet CvC solution or...

Major Bill Jakola

Bill,

I, like many here, prefer it when posters keep their military rank to themselves when presenting ideas and opinions in this forum; doing so allows the poster's contributions to stand or fall upon merit without the undue influence that rank brings to a post. Places like BCKS are examples of how posting rank can stifle discussion, and believe it or not there is life beyond our rank :wry:

Best,

Steve

slapout9

10-27-2009, 06:08 PM

Not very illuminating though. I only asked because you said "...we never finished the job." implying we should have done something different. I agree with that, I just wondered what you thought should have happened...

Ken, wasn't trying to be flip. Didn't know what else to say. Warden thought it was a mistake(Iraq) from the beginning so he would not have gone. Relative to A'stan he thought and thinks Pakistan is the real issue.

My personal view, it (911) should have been handled as an LE problem.....go after the people that caused the problem, regardless of where they are. Which in many cases would have to have envolved the Military, but I would have done something as described in Killing Pablo in which the DEA 5 rings model was used, which was one of the first LE adaptions of Warden's model which is how I found out about it in the first place. And later how I adapted the model to domestic violence/stalking cases.......which I posted here several years ago (gee long time) you was here, you saw it......I think?:confused: Fits right in with Bob's World post a lot.

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 06:09 PM

...throwing out the bathwater.

Bill,

I, like many here, prefer it when posters keep their military rank to themselves when presenting ideas and opinions in this forum; doing so allows the poster's contributions to stand or fall upon merit without the undue influence that rank brings to a post. Places like BCKS are examples of how posting rank can stifle discussion, and believe it or not there is life beyond our rank :wry:

Best,

Steve

Steve,

Thanks for the tip; I will drop the rank.

Bill Jakola

Steve the Planner

10-27-2009, 06:27 PM

Surfer's comment:

"Just because are no grand unified theories of physics, engineering, or war for that matter does not mean that discrete models of system components fail to a provide a certain utility. Many of us make a good living understanding when and when not to apply various models to describe various circumstances. Clearly stating assumptions and limitations up front is one way to define the parameters under which models apply and allow for the benefits resulting from peer review as to the applicability of the model to the circumstance."

Five concentric rings??? Let's see. A lot of this looks like Christhaller's Central Place theory and Gravity Models routinely used to establish retail real estate locations based on intersecting background competitive demand factors over a non-isotropic plan, offset by intersecting resource and transportation patterns.

Let's see? Maybe like a regional transportation systems dynamics model showing the interaction of influences like land use/population, demand, feedback loops, optimizations, and causal factors across a metropolitan area over, say a decade, with linkages to resource, political and environmental factors on a jurisdictional basis?

Whether modeling weather, flow characteristics, traffic, demographics, or resource planning, we all have seen plenty of models that can indicate plenty of things. At grad school (Hopkins), I had a professor for Quantitative Methods that insisted we develop multi-factor input/out models with a calculator and show your work. He was not trying to teach us to do the math, but to understand the elements, structure and interaction of the model. GIGO.

And all that is without the complexity of human factors.

Steve

slapout9

10-27-2009, 06:33 PM

STP, looks alot like ASCOPE in the COIN Tactics FM to.

jmm99

10-27-2009, 06:41 PM

If Jakola is Finnish, just sign Bill the Finlander. Finlanders are never wrong, even if they are only half-Finlanders. :D

If Finnish, Kippis; if otherwise, Cheers

Mikko

Surferbeetle

10-27-2009, 06:53 PM

Five concentric rings??? Let's see. A lot of this looks like Christhaller's Central Place theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_place_theory) and Gravity Models (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_model) routinely used to establish retail real estate locations based on intersecting background competitive demand factors over a non-isotropic plan, offset by intersecting resource and transportation patterns.

Let's see? Maybe like a regional transportation systems dynamics model showing the interaction of influences like land use/population, demand, feedback loops, optimizations, and causal factors across a metropolitan area over, say a decade, with linkages to resource, political and environmental factors on a jurisdictional basis?

Whether modeling weather, flow characteristics, traffic, demographics, or resource planning, we all have seen plenty of models that can indicate plenty of things. At grad school (Hopkins), I had a professor for Quantitative Methods that insisted we develop multi-factor input/out models with a calculator and show your work. He was not trying to teach us to do the math, but to understand the elements, structure and interaction of the model. GIGO.

And all that is without the complexity of human factors.

Steve,

Greatly appreciate the post; as always you add interesting things to consider. Complexity...

Some of my reading this week has included a paper by Andreas Sandburg (http://en.scientificcommons.org/anders_sandberg) (Models of Development, January 21, 2003)

The central question of development is: how does structure emerge from a structureless state without an external organizing force? The answer
seems to be that self-organizing processes are able to produce complex
structures from simple initial states. In biological systems a major factor
appears to be diusion of chemical factors guiding growth or dieren-
tiation. The interaction between dierent diusible factors can create
pattern forming instabilities giving rise to dierentiation of initially ho-
mogeneous tissue. By following gradients axons can connect with the right
target cells, setting up neural networks. This paper is a review of models
of biological pattern formation and development.

USAID Value Chain Analysis Case Studies (Date Sector report and value chain development program, by Rocky Walsborn (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADP536.pdf))

Iraq is now in a position to modernize the date industry by moving up the value chain, from production to the end market. The value chain divides into four key elements or stages in the handling of dates:

...and QEPM (http://www.google.com/books?id=CpPEYzvonCEC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false) modeling...

Do you have any how to reference links for using your cited models in GIS?

slapout9

10-27-2009, 07:05 PM

Major Bill, here is 1997 Air Force study, go to chapter 3 and it has a good 5 rings analysis of a terrorist organization. Thought it might help you understand the utility of the model in a better way.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 07:05 PM

If Jakola is Finnish, just sign Bill the Finlander. Finlanders are never wrong, even if they are only half-Finlanders. :D

If Finnish, Kippis; if otherwise, Cheers

Mikko

Mikko,

Terve, yes I am half Finn; and, I almost always let the stubborn Finn in me rule.

Bill the Half-Finn Jakola

Bill Jakola

10-27-2009, 07:06 PM

Steve the Planner

10-27-2009, 07:11 PM

Last May, I had the opportunity to spend some time with Prof. John Adams in Minneapolis. He is probably one of the foremost experts in Economic Geography as relates to regional growth.

We discussed, at some length, the US approach to reconstruction versus the approaches that our schooling and research tells us will work.

I've read so many of those USAID sectoral value chain reports that I hope you will forgive me for skipping another one.

Last week, I was reading old documents about Louis Berger's work on mapping out the Iraqi electrical system in two months in 2003. A heroic effort, but, as I found out when I read the 2007 "Electricity Master Plans" from other consulting firms in Iraq, they were all relying on the same quick fly-bye done by Berger in 2003. Amazing that anyone could think that these kinds of quickie windshield tours, whether for dates or power, can actually provide anything other than a general guide...

My read of the dates business is that Iraqis know/knew more about dates that any American will ever learn. Their problems were in the systems that had been destroyed but not replaced. Give them electricity, water and mobility to market, and a little seed capital and market assistance, and they can restart their own date businesses without millions of dollars of US taxpayer assistance.

Steve