New essay: “The Shadow COA or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68"

[kotkinjs1]

Light bathroom reading....

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/10/21/how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-nsc-68/

A little shameless self-promotion. :) I'd appreciate any constructive feedback.

Essay primarily focuses on a way ahead for the US Government in Central Asia by dissecting flawed political-military strategic assumptions to date. It then ties this together to a new understanding of geopolitics and global challenges to generate a new grand strategy by modernizing Kennan’s writings for the 21st century.

The essay covers four main points:

1) That although GEN McChrystal’s assessment calls for one of two courses of action in Afghanistan, there is a third, more suitable course not being debated;
2) That current plans and concepts developed after 9/11 are, in fact, causing many of the national security issues we face now and will in the future;
3) Argument against the conventional wisdom that Afghanistan or wars like it are a vital national interest (as a point to formulate a subsequent US grand strategy);
4) Proposal and recommendations for a new grand strategy.


The views expressed are my own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

[Hacksaw]

I plan to read if for no other reason the title plays on my unending love of the movie and George C. Scott's analysis of a cave gap:D

[Ken White]

With respect to your four points:

1) I think there are many more than three courses of action and we do not know what is being debated at the decision level. My personal view is that we should not stay indefinitely but that we cannot leave too precipitously -- or by any announced date. Credibility is in the eye of the beholder and many beholders do not share your western view of what's important.

2) A correct statement but in part caused by simply a need to use what was available -- I see nothing in your paper that truly addresses that practical shortfall. You do attempt to sidestep the capability issue but I'm not all sure that is possible. A 'grand strategy' require a marriage of ways, means and ends. You provide an idealized -- and perhaps not totally achievable - end but do not discuss ways and the all important means.

3) Agree Afghanistan is not a vital national interest. It is, however, an important national interest. As an aside, comparison of Viet Nam and Afghanistan are, as you say, superfluous -- but I suggest the allusions to British and Russian experience there are equally flawed.

4) Americans can do grand strategy as you say; there are hundreds of examples of that. However, the American political system is decidedly inimical to a grand strategy. I have on this board many times made the point that the 'Cold War' was not nearly the monolithic good thing / grand strategy some appear to like to believe. Got to be careful which myths you subscribe to. You really need to figure out how to fix the interface of a 'grand strategy' and the US political process -- specifically, elections every 2,4, 6 and 8 years that can significantly change directions -- as occurred repeatedly during the Cold war (simply look at canceled weapons systems...). I believe that interface needs to effected and cleaned before you push too much grand strategy. If you really want it to work, that is...

I'd also argue that DoD does not by any means excel in direct actions necessary against imminent threats. In fact, the track record in that is far from good. MDMP is a terrible strait jacket and it totally discourages innovation. Our practice of having 'Planners' is also dangerous. Bunch of guys sitting around in air conditioned comfort and absolutely no situational awareness in far too many cases end up prematurely second guessing guys who are on the ground doing the work. Afghanistan offers numerous examples of that and the terrible flaws it engenders. Flaws that get people killed unnecessarily. That stupidity did not end with Shah i Kot in 2002...

That's a nice, idealistic paper. Not least your prescription for getting the SCO, India and Iran on board for a program that is inimical to all their interests. I'm curious to know why you think they might want to do that without also insuring that the Great Satan takes a hit or two? You might also want to look far more deeply at the idea that bad governance causes insurgency or the like. That, as the Scots say, is 'Not proven.' Far from it.

* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

[slapout9]

Major Kotkins, I read your paper on that other thread where it was posted:wry: Ahhh it might be just a little bit to idealistic.....but you are thinking differently. So do you have anything else written?






* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

Some Strategic Stuff Here.

[slapout9]

Hacksaw, we must prevent the Mine Shaft Gap!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iesXUFOlWC0&feature=related

[jmm99]

of the Piggly-Wiggly Gap. :D

This:


from Ken
* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

seems brilliant in concept - eliminates the "Transition Gap" (;)) between operational planning and tactical execution.

What would it look like ? E.g., MAGTF "A" under OpCell A command for current operation; MAGTF "B" under OpCell B command for next operation ?

I can visualize something akin in my profession. Trial Team A does trial; Trial Team B does appeal. There it depends on how much redundancy can you afford. Usually, the same lawyers both plan and execute the trial and the appeal. Since law is a micro-affair compared to a military effort, this example is not claimed to be transferrable.

-------------------------
To be frank, MAJ Kotkin's article left me struggling for understanding.

The Cold War containment strategy (as opposed to the alternative roll-back strategy) was aimed at containment of communism (the threat). It had its instances of armed conflicts; but, in the end, boiled down to an ideological and economic struggle - in their terms, more of the Political Struggle than the Military Struggle. The Sovs also made more mistakes than we made.

What is the present threat that we are to contain ?

What military efforts should be used to implement that containment ?

What political efforts should be used to implement that containment ?

Since I've been a consistent member of the "Never Again but School" (credits: the two Daves, Kilcullen & Petraeus) since the Korean War, a change in approach from both the Cold War and the New World Order would not break my heart.

But, I genuinely do not understand the salient thrust of the article. Thus, I can scarcely critique the article.

Regards to all, including MAJ Kotkin - sorry to be so dense.

Mike

[Ken White]

What would it look like ? E.g., MAGTF "A" under OpCell A command for current operation; MAGTF "B" under OpCell B command for next operation ?MAGTF "A" has two Ops cells and no planning cell in their S3 shop; same applies to MAGTF "B" -- and to I MEF and 2/6 Marines. Or III Corps, 1st CavDiv and 2/7 Cav.

At higher levels, use the Two Fleet concept -- the ships and their crews generally stayed in theater but due to maintenance and other things, were not constantly in contact. The Fleet Headquarters and Staff OTOH could get worn to a frazzle very quickly dependent upon OpTempo so the Staffs rotated and when Halsey and his crew were in charge, it was Third Fleet; when Spruance was there it was Fifth Fleet. Both worked for Nimitz and Pacific command while Seventh Fleet worked for southwest Pacific command and MacArthur. The latter had a lower tempo and did not need to rotate fleet commands.

Of course it helped in WW II that there was a broad plan, a strategy if you will. Thus the change in command styles did not have too detrimental an effect...
I can visualize something akin in my profession. Trial Team A does trial; Trial Team B does appeal. There it depends on how much redundancy can you afford...Given the size of today's military staffs, that's easily affordable in the Armed forces of today... :rolleyes:

[jmm99]

I got the visual from the two "fleets" (different names for the same fleet) - and then could work it down to the 2/6. So, it could work at macro and micro levels.

Best

Mike

[kotkinjs1]

Mr. White,

Think I get the gist of your first response; if I could try and clarify what I understand to help me think through the issues you raised:

"Credibility is in the eye of the beholder and many beholders do not share your western view of what's important."
When does pursuing courses of action to take into account another's perspective or viewpoint turn from maintaining credibility in their eyes on one hand to pushing up against your own culminating point or being led around and following the spasmodic demands of a foreign public or, even worse, strategy of the enemy itself on the other? At some point, and I think we're quickly approaching that point, we need to do what's right for us. And doing 'right for us' can still be nested inside what's right, geopolitically for other actors with shared interests.

".... see nothing in your paper that truly addresses that practical shortfall. You do attempt to sidestep the capability issue..... A 'grand strategy' require a marriage of ways, means and ends. You provide an idealized -- and perhaps not totally achievable - end but do not discuss ways and the all important means.
The shortfall I tried to address is the continuation of a global campaign plan designed for one specific threat at one specific time still being used in perpetuity. That we still operate under a series of CONPLANS drafted in the wake of 9/11 while the environment changes around us is to the point of being nonsensical. Those very plans and the military threat-based lens through which we look at the world does not address relevant issues. The ends are the same as postulated by current policy; ways and means cannot be military led adventures in nation-building; they need to be a harmonizing of State and AID along with a (much) lower military presense. On the bigger scale, the economic and political points that jm99 referenced from Kennan are the ways and means.

3) at the strategic level, all three past histories (Victorian British and Soviet in AFG, and US in Vietnam) provide lessons. I'm not looking for a mirror image to tell us what to do next, and not simply relying on the 'graveyard of empires' phrase because it is usually referenced in a tactical or operational argument. But at the strategic level and for the political and military decisions made, all three are of value.

4) Point taken and understood; I've got no solution or advice on that - only that we need good strategic leadership. There will always be the buying of votes, the military-industrial complex, short-sighted and careerist politicians (just as there are in uniform) who fail to see what is truly important. It gets back to crafting a cogent policy on what is important to us in the long run (i.e., not getting into an Ideological pissing contest with various groups of criminals) to build a strategy off of that the American people and their elected representative can get and stick behind.

"I'd also argue that DoD does not by any means excel in direct actions necessary against imminent threats. In fact, the track record in that is far from good."
I might disagree here but I think the failures of the Clinton and early Bush administrations were not military or intelligence failures (to prevent attacks or hit HVTs) but political failures. Agree, MDMP is far too linear and hence the focus and shift to Operational Design. That's not a panacea for planners but it does allow for more innovation and holistic approaches.

"I'm curious to know why you think they might want to do that without also insuring that the Great Satan takes a hit or two?"
We probably would but that's diplomacy. It doesn't need to be a zero-sum game.

"You might also want to look far more deeply at the idea that bad governance causes insurgency or the like."
Sorry, I've been too corrupted by Bob's World. :D I know he probably disagrees with some of my arguments and assertions for the current 'war,' but I still subscribe to that theory for most, if not all, insurgencies.

And briefly, to jmm99; understand it's a stretch to revive NSC-68 to the present day but:

"What is the present threat that we are to contain?"
"Jihadistan" and the assumption that what happens politically inside AFG or PAK matters to us. Illiterate zeolots aren't going to get the keys to Pakistan's nukes. If the nukes are somehow "stolen," well, I just think that the strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost end up being cheaper in the long run than pumping $7.5B into a country who's national interests are not mutual to ours.

"What military efforts should be used to implement that containment?"
None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.

"What political efforts should be used to implement that containment?"
That's the key; the other aspects of DIME are more appropriate. If we 'got real' with our traditional 'partners,' akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say come to mind, and truly work with Russia, India, China, and Iran, there is a better way ahead but it requires an open and honest way of dealing with them to reach shared interests. Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.

[slapout9]

"What military efforts should be used to implement that containment?"
None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.

"What political efforts should be used to implement that containment?"
That's the key; the other aspects of DIME are more appropriate. If we 'got real' with our traditional 'partners,' akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say come to mind, and truly work with Russia, India, China, and Iran, there is a better way ahead but it requires an open and honest way of dealing with them to reach shared interests. Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.

Some interesting stuff there,can you expand on those two items ?

[Major Riptdie]

* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision.

The root problem here seems to be a disconnect between planners and reality. This is not new, having been previously called "Fog of War", "Friction" , "Know the Enemy, Know Yourself", etc. There are other ways to enhance the situational awareness of those planning operations without a wholesale remodel of the staff.

Still, I do see merits in your solution (possibly at lower echelons). I also see some potential problems.

First, this assumes contiguous operations with definitive start and stop times, presumably when the whistle would blow and Team A would stand up and Team B would sit down. This is not always the case, especially in what I would call "Counter" Operations - counter-sniper, counter-IED, counter-terrorist, and even a popular one called counter-insurgency. The word "counter" being key because it implies reacting to enemy action, and thus having ceded the initiative. The wisdom of making such operations the mainstay of your strategy is debatable (and beyond this discussion). Attempting to figure out when Team A stops and Team B starts may be problematic during "counter" operations.

Second, it seems that your solution may lend itself to operations at the tactical level, since that is really where the operations cell plays a direct role in the execution (i.e. command and control) of an operation. At the operational and strategic levels, however, I would argue that the primary function of OPS is not to directly command and control (having the Division or Corps Commander in your truck, tank, or cockpit is annoying), but rather to maintain situational awareness to feed operational and strategic planning.

Your fundamental contention stands - planners without situational awareness are like blind men. They are trying to solve problems they don't fully understand. However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.

MR

[MikeF]

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision....Your fundamental contention stands - planners without situational awareness are like blind men. They are trying to solve problems they don't fully understand. However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.

It's a form of cognitive dissonance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance). In his blog (http://www.schmedlap.com/weblog/Latest.aspx), Schmedlap summed up the problems that many of us faced back in May/June 2003 well,


We have seen what happens when the tough questions are not asked. I saw it up close and personal when I arrived in Baghdad in April 2003 and was tasked with providing security for an entire district of Baghdad with 43 Soldiers, including myself. I still remember talking to a CA officer in Baghdad who tried to reassure me, tongue-in-cheek, that all was well.

“Don’t worry,” he said, “BDE’s CA plan is nested in Division’s.”
“What’s Division’s CA plan?” I asked.
“Division’s CA plan is to wait for BDE to think of something.”

I like Ken's idea, and I'd take it a step further. During the future planning process, the planners should take David Kilcullen's lead- leave the windowless rooms, jump on an aircraft, and visit the patrol bases to take in all the sights and sounds of the current fight from the commander on the ground. I'm sure they would return with different views that would only assist their planning in a vacuum.

Mintzberg would call that skipping/bypassing the dysfunctional vertical, stove-pipe communications system.

I'll provide my own example. Back in Feb 2007, when we were planning re-entry into the DRV, I briefed my BDE CDR on the current situation in Zag (about a 50% version of what I published in the Break Point (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/50-few.pdf)). When I was done explaining how AQI had taking over Zaganiyah, my BDE CDR replied,

"Mike, my S2 tells me that Zaganiyah is controlled by JAM."

I replied, "Sir, when was the last time that she went there? Um, Never? The 5000 Shia in Zag were expelled or murdered a month ago."

Imagine if the future planners had visited Wanat a year ago. There probably would have been a bit more urgency in the withdrawal from Nuristan.

We've seen a gross lack of responsibility and accountability in these two wars.

v/r

Mike

[Gian P Gentile]

yeah Hack, you are slipping! "Caves" instead of mineshaft gaps; that would have never happened back in the days of Sams.

gian

[Ken White]

...When does pursuing courses of action to take into account another's perspective or viewpoint turn from maintaining credibility in their eyes on one hand to pushing up against your own culminating point or being led around and following the spasmodic demands of a foreign public or, even worse, strategy of the enemy itself on the other? At some point, and I think we're quickly approaching that point, we need to do what's right for us. And doing 'right for us' can still be nested inside what's right, geopolitically for other actors with shared interests.Excellent points. In order, I think that tipping point is very much situation dependent and is almost certainly the proverbial moving target -- thus it is easy to err in both directions in the process of determining if it is near or present depending upon ones situational awareness and risk assessment capability added to one's aversion to risk. Three items to be considered in the current situation are that our 'credibility' is cited by the current opponent as a major issue; what is right for us is in the eye of the beholder and many do not agree with your assessment that said point is near; lastly, the heroin issue...

So yes, we need to do what's right for us, no question. We can differ on what that might be at this time. As for nesting inside what's right, geopolitically for other actors with shared interests, one has to be quite cautious in assessing what those shared interest truly are -- if they exist at all...
The shortfall I tried to address is the continuation of a global campaign plan designed for one specific threat at one specific time still being used in perpetuity...they need to be a harmonizing of State and AID along with a (much) lower military presense.I do not disagree with your premises -- I was pointing out that you have not addressed the impact of the US political system on your goals and that, lacking that, said goals are unlikely to be achievable. That crops up again below.
On the bigger scale, the economic and political points that jm99 referenced from Kennan are the ways and means.The esteemed Counsellor known as jmm99 said:"The Cold War containment strategy (as opposed to the alternative roll-back strategy) was aimed at containment of communism (the threat). It had its instances of armed conflicts; but, in the end, boiled down to an ideological and economic struggle - in their terms, more of the Political Struggle than the Military Struggle. The Sovs also made more mistakes than we made." True that -- however, I've been confused over the last eight or nine years by the many scholars who have surfaced 'containment' as an option by one major point -- how do you contain an ideology that has no infrastructure to threaten and which, due to that lack, happens to vastly more flexible and nimble than we are? What, precisely are your ways and means to do that?
.. But at the strategic level and for the political and military decisions made, all three are of value.I suggest that if that is true, one should be careful to avoid cherry picking items to arrive at a foregone conclusion. :D
... (i.e., not getting into an Ideological pissing contest with various groups of criminals) to build a strategy off of that the American people and their elected representative can get and stick behind.I hate to be an old cynic but good luck with that. Seriously... :wry:

I also suggest that the contest was started by others and is more than ideological and that some of the players are more than criminals. Those two factors make a difference -- not least in US public opinion.

I might disagree here but I think the failures of the Clinton and early Bush administrations were not military or intelligence failures (to prevent attacks or hit HVTs) but political failures. Agree, MDMP is far too linear and hence the focus and shift to Operational Design. That's not a panacea for planners but it does allow for more innovation and holistic approaches.My frame of reference went back far beyond the two Administrations you cite. My experience from Korea through Desert Storm says we are not well trained or educated, we are slaves to dogma and we are terribly inflexible -- ergo we invariably over react to situations and we do not excel at eliminating threats, far too often we exacerbate problems by that over reaction. That is a judgment based on military and intelligence performance AND the political aspect -- all three are interdependent -- which must be 'fixed' for your goals to be achieved. So to get where you want to go; you must first fix the political system of the US or figure out a way to flank it to get where you wish to go; improve the Intel community; improve the Armed Forces at all levels from the strategic to the tactical, we don't excel at nearly as much as we think we do. Far from it. MDMP and the fact operational design has to be 'adopted' are proof of our shortcomings. :rolleyes:
We probably would but that's diplomacy. It doesn't need to be a zero-sum game.True but doesn't the intensity of the possible hit(s) versus the potential gain merit consideration? Seems to me an objective and detailed cost-benefit analysis would be required rather then blithely assuming it'll work out. Again, I'd suggest the US public opinion might have to be a consideration.
Sorry, I've been too corrupted by Bob's World. I know he probably disagrees with some of my arguments and assertions for the current 'war,' but I still subscribe to that theory for most, if not all, insurgencies.Bob and I also differ on that score, I'm flexible enough to accept 'most' but draw the line at all, having played games in a couple where governance was not the real (but in one case was the stated) reason. I also have raised with him the triple dichotomy of saying bad governance is the cause and at the same time saying that the governance others choose is none of our business and that we can stop most of these things by judicious use of diplomacy and SF... :D
If the nukes are somehow "stolen," well, I just think that the strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost end up being cheaper in the long run than pumping $7.5B into a country who's national interests are not mutual to ours.Are those the only considerations?
None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.If by war you mean the GWOT etc., I agree. If you mean Afghanistan, true but that fact is transcended by the fact that we elected to stay after extracting our pound of flesh when we should not have done so. That is also fact, we are there and you cannot wish it away. You can ignore the intangible issues if you wish, not everyone will do so. Figure out why NATO and some other Nations agreed to get involved there and are mostly statying...
Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.I do not believe that's a true statement. Change threat to competitor and I would agree. Really. Ponder that. It's important...

[Ken White]

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision.Been there done that -- seen it work in peace and war.
There are other ways to enhance the situational awareness of those planning operations without a wholesale remodel of the staff.True -- why aren't they used? :(
Still, I do see merits in your solution (possibly at lower echelons)...If you mean Bde and below in combat, I agree. I'd do away with the Division, useless level IMO, A Corps should be able to control up to nine BCTs with no problem. Corps probably needs planners -- but they also should have dual Ops teams.
First, this assumes contiguous operations with definitive start and stop times, presumably when the whistle would blow and Team A would stand up and Team B would sit down.Not in mid to high intensity combat. Just adapt it to other control measures.
...The word "counter" being key because it implies reacting to enemy action, and thus having ceded the initiative. The wisdom of making such operations the mainstay of your strategy is debatable (and beyond this discussion). Attempting to figure out when Team A stops and Team B starts may be problematic during "counter" operations.Agreed, as all such operations entail adaptation, this is just one more. The intensity and degree of stasis are the guiding factors.

I also strongly suggest that a tenet of our future doctrine and training should be an orientation that emphasizes and trains to be the intitiator of action in such operations -- reacting to the enemy is a losing game. Yes, I understand the difficulties and I know that good units can do the initiating...
Second, it seems that your solution may lend itself to operations at the tactical level, since that is really where the operations cell plays a direct role in the execution (i.e. command and control) of an operation. At the operational and strategic levels, however, I would argue that the primary function of OPS is not to directly command and control (having the Division or Corps Commander in your truck, tank, or cockpit is annoying), but rather to maintain situational awareness to feed operational and strategic planning.First, I suggest that having a Bn S3 or Cdr or even in some cases, a Co Cdr in your tank is just as annoying -- and more importantly, distracting -- as is a Corps Cdr (we can dispense with Div Cdrs...). Secondly when the Bn Staff's need to maintain situational awareness, exacerbated by the foolishness at the major TCs, get into the 'Car 54, where are you?' mode -- which it does way too frequently -- they are not helping. Impatience and lack of trust in subordinates will not last in a real war so why do we encourage it in training and in 'counter' operations? :confused:

Having pontificated, I strongly agree that in combat, as you say, the focus of the staff should by upward, not downward. They should be gathering information and feeding it upstream and they should not be doing this by hassling the operating units due to a fear of being asked a question they cannot answer. That is a significant training and PME shortfall. Very significant.
However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.Always true, all generalizations are subject to situational modifications. I suggest that better training coupled with the always critical assessment of the METT-TC factors can handle those adaptations. :wry:

[jmm99]

from Kot
And briefly, to jmm99; understand it's a stretch to revive NSC-68 to the present day but:

It might not be a stretch to revive "containment" (but then we need to know what that present-day containment looks like); just as it might not be a stretch to revive "roll-back" (but then we need to know what that present-day "roll-back" looks like).

I still do not have a clear picture of what you are proposing, but some aspects are becoming clearer. Please understand that I am not expressing distaste for some of your rhetoric; and I welcome new approaches to problems, especially where the problems are, on some levels, in the words of a young French officer from 55+ years ago, "What a hopeless mess."

Taking these one by one:


"What is the present threat that we are to contain?"

"Jihadistan" and the assumption that what happens politically inside AFG or PAK matters to us. Illiterate zeolots aren't going to get the keys to Pakistan's nukes. If the nukes are somehow "stolen," well, I just think that the strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost end up being cheaper in the long run than pumping $7.5B into a country who's national interests are not mutual to ours.

As a definition of a threat, I find this incomprehensible - I glean nothing from this that defines a threat to the US; except by assuming what you might mean and speculating from there (which I won't do).


"What military efforts should be used to implement that containment?"

None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.

I thought you were going in that direction; but again what is the problem that's not militrary in nature ? I have to at least see the problem before I can develop a solution. Non-military solutions are my first choice anyway. But, unless you explain the problem in nice, clear terms, I cannot see the problem you see. I'd prefer not to guess at the problem, make "assumptions" and from them make a "strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost".

Next one:


"What political efforts should be used to implement that containment?"

That's the key; the other aspects of DIME are more appropriate. If we 'got real' with our traditional 'partners,' akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say come to mind, and truly work with Russia, India, China, and Iran, there is a better way ahead but it requires an open and honest way of dealing with them to reach shared interests. Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.

OK, I"ve removed the "M" from DIME, which leaves me with a DIE strategy. I don't recognize the states akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say, but I do recognize the major Indian Ocean powers - Australia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; two interested Muslim powers, Turkey and Egypt; and Russia and China (whose birds have global reach).

So, what are the political efforts that we should be aiming at those powers. E.g., should we act like daddy, or nanny ?

Or, should we simply say, folks you have a piss pot mess developing which is going to harm each of you far more than it will harm us. So, it's up to you to fix it, if you think it's a problem. You can have our "good offices" (a "D" term) if you want them; but if you don't, that's OK with us also.

I really don't know where you are aiming between those two quite different courses of action.

Regards

Mike

[Entropy]

Maj. Kotkin,

I think your essay is excellent, well written and makes some very compelling arguments. Well done. Since I'm a contrarian, however, I'll take issue with the following:


As a nation, we are well versed in promoting U.S. values and principles, but when our words are judged against actions, the populations of the world find them failing. To fix this, two points are in order. First, we cannot coddle and support authoritarian or unjust regimes which create the very future threats that would do us harm simply to get what we need from their soil (which is a vital national interest).

and


If we as a nation are to honestly promote a theory of true national security, it will be to rebuild our credible influence lost through the unilateral years when the ends were perceived to justify the means. We can do this by serving the sitting governments with „warning orders‟ that we will no longer stand as a buffer between them on their thrones and in their secured compounds from their disenfranchised populaces.

This is an idea that Bob's World has put forward here a few times. Here are the problems with this argument, as I see them:

First, I don't think we were less unilateral during the Cold War. We had no problems overthrowing democratically elected leftist governments (as well as those who threatened our economic interests), supporting anti-communist dictatorships and performing all sorts of nasty business which was contrary to the ideal that America is supposed to represent and the words we espoused. In short, I don't see that there was a time when America's first priority was promoting its values and interests by matching words to our actions (Maybe Ken has some perspective on this?). It seems to me that after the Cold War, the only thing that changed was the lack of a great power to hinder our efforts on one hand, and an end to our perceived need to promote anti-communist governments. One might argue that we became less unilateral - after all, were we still in the Cold War we'd likely see substantial US efforts to overthrow the current governments in Venezuela and Bolivia in pursuit of our effort to contain communism.

Secondly, let's look at two specific examples: Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In both cases we have interests that are in conflict, which is actually the rule rather than the exception for US foreign policy, in my opinion. For SA, oil is, like it or not, the world's most important strategic resource. A stable supply, even at a high price, is necessary to keep the US and world economy running. SA is one of the principle and probably most important supplier of this resource, therefore we have a vital interest in protecting that supply. On the other hand, we do want to see self-determination and democratic reform in countries like SA. The problem is that promoting the latter interest is likely to negatively impact the former interest. How do reconcile the desire for better governance in SA and the need to maintain a stable supply of oil? I would argue that issuing "warning orders" is not unlikely to provide a balanced approach. It may be that those two interests are incompatible in SA and we must choose one or the other. In that case, which interest is more vital?

The case of Egypt is a bit more complicated. Egypt is geographically strategic (for obvious reasons) and so it's context is similar to SA. We'd like better governance, but the flow of trade through the Suez is also critically important. In addition, however, we are obligated to support Egypt through treaty as a consequence of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Again the problem is reconciling two conflicting interests. I'm not sure how serving a warning order is a viable solution.

Finally, your argument makes the assumption that "better governance" in those countries will reduce the risk to the US. I'm not sure that is a safe assumption to make. Iran, for example, has much better governance today than it did under the Shah, yet it is considered a hostile power. Better governance could easily bring a similar result in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

My overall point is that there are cases where vital national interests trump other interests, some of which can be "vital" as well. The threat of SA-based radicalism is judged to be less important than the threat of oil-supply induced economic disruptions. The threat of a radicalized Egyptian populace is judged to be less than disruption of access to the Suez and a potential resumption of Egyptian-Israeli hostilities. I think to make your case you need to explain why improving governance (particularly through the threat of ending or reducing US support) is the way to go, or explain how such a strategy can mitigate the risk to those other vital interests.

[Ken White]

Entropy:
"...I don't see that there was a time when America's first priority was promoting its values and interests by matching words to our actions (Maybe Ken has some perspective on this?)."Your turn will come... :D

But I agree. We have never done that and while a few politicians over the last 200 plus years have occasionally talked that idea up, it has never really taken hold. My belief is that it will not ever do so due to both the political system / process and simple human nature. Not a problem in my view; our base instincts are better than most... :cool:

[Entropy]

Ken,

Sorry, didn't mean to abuse your wisdom :)

[slapout9]

Secondly, let's look at two specific examples: Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In both cases we have interests that are in conflict, which is actually the rule rather than the exception for US foreign policy, in my opinion. For SA, oil is, like it or not, the world's most important strategic resource. A stable supply, even at a high price, is necessary to keep the US and world economy running. SA is one of the principle and probably most important supplier of this resource, therefore we have a vital interest in protecting that supply. On the other hand, we do want to see self-determination and democratic reform in countries like SA. The problem is that promoting the latter interest is likely to negatively impact the former interest. How do reconcile the desire for better governance in SA and the need to maintain a stable supply of oil? I would argue that issuing "warning orders" is not unlikely to provide a balanced approach. It may be that those two interests are incompatible in SA and we must choose one or the other. In that case, which interest is more vital?




Uh Huh, the greatest failure of all is a failure to develop an Energy Policy......which we don't have to this day. Largely because rich folks and MNC's don't want one, to much money would be lost:mad:

[Ken White]

Old age ≠ wisdom; old age ≤ old age+mileage. If you're lucky... :wry:

[Entropy]

Uh Huh, the greatest failure of all is a failure to develop an Energy Policy......which we don't have to this day. Largely because rich folks and MNC's don't want one, to much money would be lost:mad:

Exactly. So I think if one wants to end support for Saudi Arabia (or any other government we want to change), then you first have to make them strategically less relevant.

[slapout9]

Exactly. So I think if one wants to end support for Saudi Arabia (or any other government we want to change), then you first have to make them strategically less relevant.

You got that right and there was such a plan and still is. When I was a kid I lived in one of the first totally electric sub-devisions built. Part of the marketing plan was cheap abundant electricity and how that was going to be done was through Nuclear Reactors often called Atomic back then. In the late Presidential Campaign John McCain talked about this, if I remember about 34 Nuclear Power plants would provide all the electrical needs for the US for the next 50 years. If Oil even survived it would only be used for portable power needs. So why didn't this happen........so called vested interest couldn't make enough money:mad:

[Ken White]

so called vested interest couldn't make enough money:mad:A lot more of it is the anti-nuke brigade fearmongers, NIMBYs and enviroperturbed.

[slapout9]

A lot more of it is the anti-nuke brigade fearmongers, NIMBYs and enviroperturbed.

Thats true but them creatures hadn't been invented back than, so let them freeze in the dark and eat berries and nuts. I want you tube and Bar B Que and my AC:D

[Ken White]

However, these two things, back to back, invented the nuke scare: LINK, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_China_Syndrome) LINK. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident) -- that last one has this line: "The accident was followed by a cessation of new nuclear plant construction in the US." Thirty years ago...

Crooks and idiots -- hard to tell which are worse. But I'm with you on the BBQ and AC. :D

[Bob's World]

A couple of thoughts:

1. As I scanned the article there was a CvC reference about "the purpose of war is to defeat the enemy." I think I prefer more of a Sun Tzu approach, in that the purpose is to prevail, and if possible to do so without ever fighting your enemy at all. Kind of like the Old bull and young bull looking down at the pasture full of cows... (Just checking to see if Ken is still following this thread :))

2. As to "containment" I remain of the opinion that much of our trouble today derives from continuing to keep in place a wide spectrum of very controlling policies and relationships derived over years of engagement for the purpose of "containing" the Soviets (whose demise I believe was brought on more by the same information age and empowerment of the populaces of Eastern Europe that is now empowering the populaces of the Middle East to challenge external controls as well). I also think there is tremendous insight in Eisenhower's perspective that containment worked in two directions: One to contain the Soviets; the other to contain ourselves. The irony is the purpose for the first direction ended, yet we kept those mechanisms in place; but the purpose for the second direction, if anything increased, and we lifted those self-constraints completely. So my argument for containment is to understand this two-part process and to fix the part we clung to, and to pick back up the part we dropped.

3. I have been thinking a lot about competition and interests lately. The "Friend/Foe" construct just isn't very conducive to clear thinking (As President Washington warned in his rightfully famous outgoing remarks so long ago). To consider one a Friend is to create an assumption that what they do won't harm you. To consider one an enemy is to see potential harm in everything they do. That is such playground BS. To see all as competitors though, all with interests of their own, and to look at each party in each situation through a lens of shared and competing interests makes for a much cleaner way to identify threats, risks, and opportunities. China is a competitor, but so is Canada. Certainly we have more shared interests with one than the other, but focus on that, not a knee-jerk friend or foe analysis.
Iran also is a competitor. We have shared interests in Afghanistan that we cannot address because we are so fixated on them as a foe and the interests we conflict over as to there right to employ nuclear deterrence as we do.

So, in short, containment of ourselves good, containment of others bad; seeing others as friends or foe bad, seeing all as competitors with whom we must compete, good.

GM didn't compete when it was number one, and laughed off rising challengers. Now they are bankrupt. One might want to consider that is highly unlikely that any of our current "friends" will bail the US out if we ignore that warning and follow a similar route.

[slapout9]

A couple of thoughts:

1. As I scanned the article there was a CvC reference about "the purpose of war is to defeat the enemy." I think I prefer more of a Sun Tzu approach, in that the purpose is to prevail, and if possible to do so without ever fighting your enemy at all. Kind of like the Old bull and young bull looking down at the pasture full of cows... (Just checking to see if Ken is still following this thread :))




Part of SBW is realizing that the CvC fundamental definition of War is wrong.....It is not just the use of Force but the use of force or FRAUD to achieve your objective. FRAUD can defeat/destroy a govenrment as well or better than force.

[Ken White]

...Kind of like the Old bull and young bull looking down at the pasture full of cows... (Just checking to see if Ken is still following this thread :))

2...So my argument for containment is to understand this two-part process and to fix the part we clung to, and to pick back up the part we dropped.Good idea. Now, if we can just get the policy establishment engaged...
3. I have been thinking a lot about competition and interests lately...To consider one a Friend is to create an assumption that what they do won't harm you. To consider one an enemy is to see potential harm in everything they do...To see all as competitors though, all with interests of their own, and to look at each party in each situation through a lens of shared and competing interests makes for a much cleaner way to identify threats, risks, and opportunities. China is a competitor, but so is Canada. Certainly we have more shared interests with one than the other, but focus on that, not a knee-jerk friend or foe analysis...You have posted some good ideas on this board over the year you've been posting here -- that's one of the better thoughts. Competitors. As I told Jeremy up above: ""Change threat to competitor and I would agree. Really. Ponder that. It's important...""
GM didn't compete when it was number one, and laughed off rising challengers. Now they are bankrupt. One might want to consider that is highly unlikely that any of our current "friends" will bail the US out if we ignore that warning and follow a similar route.True dat.

The Shadow Amanuensis

[Ken White]

Part of SBW is realizing that the CvC fundamental definition of War is wrong.....It is not just the use of Force but the use of force or FRAUD to achieve your objective. FRAUD can defeat/destroy a govenrment as well or better than force.old age and treachery...:D