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jkm_101_fso
10-27-2009, 01:57 PM
I know the SWJ blog mention this today, but I thought it was worth talking about.

State Dept. diplomat, former Marine, resigns in protest of the war in Afghanistan.

FULL STORY (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/27/official-resigns-protest-afghan-war/)


WASHINGTON -- A former Marine who fought in Iraq, joined the State Department after leaving the military and was a diplomat in a Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan has become the first U.S. official to resign in protest of the Afghan war, the Washington Post reported early Tuesday.

Matthew Hoh, who describes himself as "not some peacenik, pot-smoking hippie who wants everyone to be in love," said he believes the war is simply fueling the insurgency.

"I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan," Hoh wrote in his resignation letter, dated Sept. 10 but published early Tuesday. "I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end."


Hoh's resignation letter (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/ResignationLetter.pdf?sid=ST2009102603447)

Doubt this will become an epidemic...but interesting.

IntelTrooper
10-27-2009, 03:35 PM
I don't understand his point... in one paragraph he says that he doesn't understand why we are fighting the way, and in another paragraph he says "there are still plenty of dudes that need to be killed." Is he advocating the "CT" approach, or what?

tequila
10-27-2009, 04:42 PM
I think he is.


... the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that ... has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate, and traditional ... The Pashtun insurgency ... is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions, and religion by internal and external enemies ...

In both RC East and South, I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

I'm pretty sure he's making the "antibody" argument --- foreign troops and central government forces based in Kabul are foreign antibodies to the Pashtuns, who will naturally fight any attempt to impose such a regime on them. I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.

Schmedlap
10-27-2009, 05:14 PM
I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.
Well, that would explain why this even made the news. A nice counterpoint to administration critics. I'm curious to see what this guy's follow-on job is, in a year or so. Probably a good one.

tequila
10-27-2009, 05:33 PM
This week, Hoh is scheduled to meet with Vice President Biden's foreign policy adviser, Antony Blinken, at Blinken's invitation.

If the United States is to remain in Afghanistan, Hoh said, he would advise a reduction in combat forces.

He also would suggest providing more support for Pakistan, better U.S. communication and propaganda skills to match those of al-Qaeda, and more pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to clean up government corruption -- all options being discussed in White House deliberations.


Sounds like a pro-CT Biden guy to me.

Ken White
10-27-2009, 05:48 PM
and Nod? :D

Steve the Planner
10-27-2009, 05:49 PM
As a former Senior Urban Planning Adviser, Iraq PRT (2007/8), I was a bit taken aback.

I believe what he is saying, at it's core, is that he has lost faith that the military & civilian tools provided, or being considered, are going to create the result sought in Afghanistan.

In that context, my experience in Iraq was that, in general, the US civilian effort was a "lost ball in tall grass," especially at the higher levels, but, having said that, those actual civilian experts who signed up for the Iraq surge did so because we believed that, no matter how screwed up the current activities were, we came over to get the US out of a terrible jam in Iraq.

Especially in Northern Iraq, we always had to fight to get someone with stars on his shoulders to make any big changes and/or get critical projects done---often by-passing the DoS chain of command in Baghdad. What's new about that? All of us came from backgrounds where we had fought for projects in the civilian sector even against stiff political opposition. All experienced civilian experts worth their salt have thick skins, lots of arrows in our backs (the pioneers catch the arrows), and an ability to push past obstacles to get what needs to get done done.

In truth, most of us 50+ year olds were former military, like myself, and were just plain tired of seeing pictures in the paper every morning of kids that looked those for whom we had previously been responsible. So, Ambassador Crocker put out an urgent call for civilian experts to help put Iraq back on its feet---in order to get those troops safely home, and we came to do what we could.

Sure, the handful of us were like a drop of water in a very dry sponge, but we pushed where we could. And many of us, despite having to challenge the bureaucracy to accomplish anything productive, did contribute a lot, and came away from Iraq with a feeling of great accomplishment. Even if, like so many soldiers, our accomplishment was just one drop in a big puddle.

But the Afghan civilian surge always intrigued me because it was, in fact, totally different from Iraq:

Instead of actual US civilian experts (city managers, planners, heath/medical folks, transportation engineers) leaving life and wife behind for a particular urgent mission, the Afghan surge mostly seems to be populated by re-flagged military, or US federal agency staff filling call-up quotas for an otherwise on-going multi-decade effort.

In Iraq, even with security challenges and background animus to the "occupier," there were substantial opportunities for engagement with either a "willing," or a "forced by necessity," relationship between local Iraqis and the US civ/mil structure. This, as Hoh points out, is not the case in many areas.

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

So, here we have a former US Marine officer with strong military experience in Iraq, but none in Afghanistan, foreign or civilian services, dual-hatted as a State Department temporary foreign service officer unable. But unable to adapt and/or find a way through, either by engagement (directly, indirectly) down low or up above.

Even when offered the chance to actively engage the highest levels of civilian strategy, he turns it down.

What do I make of the whole thing? PTSD?

Very confusing.

Steve

Cavguy
10-27-2009, 06:09 PM
Steve,

I was kinda with you until you started psycho-diagnosing. Is anyone opposed to things a PTSD case? COL Gentile may weigh in as some have suggested his criticism of COIN is driven by PTSD.

I will quote from an OIF veteran friend (who shall remain anon) who responded on a closed forum to the same suggestion. He articulated it better than I could:


When you don't like the message, the easiest thing to do is to shoot
the messenger. The second-easiest thing is to undermine his/her
credibility with deductions about how their current views might
reflect "of psychoses or perhaps, a delayed PTSD."

Small wonder that the SecDef noted the stigma of combat stress
yesterday in a speech to the VA/DoD mental health summit: "despite our
best efforts, there is still a stigma associated with seeking help for
psychological injuries." I'm disappointed in the response this story
has received from senior officers with combat experience who ought to
know better.

It may be fair and accurate to argue that this officer sees
Afghanistan through the prism of his Iraq experience. But, I would
suggest that this officer's past experience improves the quality of
his observations today, rather than diminishes them in the manner
suggested. And that it may be possible that this officer's
observations are, in fact, accurate representations of the situation
on the ground in Afghanistan, and that we ought to carefully consider
them as such, notwithstanding any other factors in this officer's
personal life which may have steered him towards a particular career
choice.

IntelTrooper
10-27-2009, 06:18 PM
and Nod? :D

Sailing off somewhere on their own, I imagine.

Steve the Planner
10-27-2009, 06:41 PM
Cavguy:


I was kinda with you until you started psycho-diagnosing. Is anyone opposed to things a PTSD case? COL Gentile may way in as some have suggested his criticism of COIN is driven by PTSD.

Actually, I was trying to play nice. Absent something like that, I can not, in truth, understand why a committed professional would not, at the least, try to push for changes once the doors opened to that.

Too many people have too much on the line for a professional on the ground in Afghanistan to just blast off a letter of complaint on the way out the door, but then, once the letter has an effect, not pursue that...

Just my opinion.

Steve

Note: Prayers out for the wives and mothers who read that article in the Post. I remember what it was like in Spring/Summer 2008 trying to convince (lie to) my wife, as I returned from leave, that I would be safe as a PRT back in Iraq while the Embassy was routinely bombarded and two of our PRT colleagues had just been blown up in Baghdad. Now, the Afghan risks are front page, and a State Department person is quoted as saying "fegedaboudit." Not helpful for those on the ground.

Steve the Planner
10-27-2009, 06:57 PM
Cavguy:

PS to PTSD: Been there. Done that. As I understand it, it is always with you.

Understand the ongoing internalized pressure for "fight or flight," and when to analyze my own responses/reactions to it when the old reptilian brain speaks.

The goal, at best, is to control the personal reaction, and still be functional in your objectives. No?

I am not big on the idea that what doesn't kill you makes you stronger, and certainly aware that PTSD is a risk for anyone. Nonetheless, when I see "fight or flight" responses in a person with the same experience/condition, and especially when they are so strong as to defy the logical opportunities at hand, I always question.

All that notwithstanding that his observations may be correct.

Steve

RYNO
10-27-2009, 08:22 PM
Surmising that the officer in question is suffering from PTSD, as a basis for explaining his statement in resignation, offers nothing constructive to the forum in my view. The fact is he has served his country in two combat zones multiple times this decade, and has earned the right to keep private any personal reasons behind his resignation.

I do think it inappropriate that his resignation letter was published. It's worldwide, immediate access lends additional credence to a view not shared by many.

I do take issue with two points in his letter:

1. I fundamentally disagree with any argument that posits that the occupation is the cause of the insurgency (as an example, that was the completely wrong assumption by many of our senior leaders on Iraq, although I acknowledge the two cases are drastically different) and I also disagree with any argument that compares the Soviet occupation with our current one. We operate differently than the Soviets on so many levels that comparing us to them is often irrevelant and misleading. It is however, helpful to study some of the tactical lessons to be learned from a study of that conflict in preparation for a deployment to Afghanistan (which I am doing now) such as The Bear Went Over the Mountain, The Other Side of the Mountain, or Not A Good Day to Die.

2. I fundamentally disagree with his statement, " a war for which our leaders, uniformed, civilian and elected, have inadequately prepared and resourced our men and women." Pretty bold statement to put out there without citing any evidence.

Now I have to go back to my CGSC reading and take home exam questions.
Ryan D. Seagreaves
MAJ, AR
CGSC Student

Greyhawk
10-27-2009, 08:26 PM
...funny how long some things take to "make the papers".

tequila
10-27-2009, 08:29 PM
It's worldwide, immediate access lends additional credence to a view not shared by many.


I think a lot of people, including many here at SWC, would disagree with you.


I fundamentally disagree with any argument that posits that the occupation is the cause of the insurgency (as an example, that was the completely wrong assumption by many of our senior leaders on Iraq, although I acknowledge the two cases are drastically different) and I also disagree with any argument that compares the Soviet occupation with our current one.

Why?

Ken White
10-27-2009, 08:41 PM
I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.That's far from true:

From the current CIA World Factbook;Urban population: 24% of total population (2008);Rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)

then from Global security:

"As of 2004 the urban population of about 6.4 million, i.e., 30% of the total population, is estimated to double by 2015 at a growth rate twice the average growth rate in the country. More than 70 percent of the urban population is concentrated in six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-ISharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Refugees choose to return to cities for the benefits offered by urban life; the population of Kabul has increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to at least 2.4 million in 2003. (LINK) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/urban.htm)

The UN puts it at 24%.(LINK) (http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?IndicatorID=30&Country=AF)

I'd question all three figures as being high, if anything. The basic problem in planning and civilian expert assistance is that Afghanistan IS rural -- very rural -- and modern American city boys do not know how to play in the country...
Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.Nor do the modern Army's mostly urban and technically skilled folks know precisely how to handle the situation. :wry:
Very confusing.Welcome to Afghanistan... :D

Schmedlap
10-27-2009, 09:43 PM
Anyone know how this resignation letter ended up published at the Washington Post?

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

I have not been among the people to complain about the President's delay in making a decision. I would prefer a well-thought out plan next month rather than a half-assed one today. The old adage about "doing the wrong thing is better than delaying" doesn't apply when you're making a long-term change of plans at this level, imo. But all of this back-and-forth in the media suggests that the decision will be based far more heavily upon the polls and sentiment back home rather than upon the facts on the ground. Otherwise, I don't think we'd be seeing so much of this back and forth trying to shape the public opinion landscape. That is troubling.

Steve the Planner
10-27-2009, 11:53 PM
Ken:

Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.

Problems always exist in what UN Habitat defines as urban, and as informal urban settlements, and what others might define it as. The Afghan Minister's report to the Habitat conference was higher than the sources you cited (CIA Factbook, Global Security). Doesn't mean any of them are very accurate until somebody does some credible counting.

Also, how many people are in Afghanistan? (Somewhere between 26 and 33 million as best as I can understand the disagreements). Makes a big diff in figuring out the percentage urban.

Nice if somebody had some pop figures that meant something.

Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.


I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

One thing that all of us on this board know is that none of us have all the pieces to really finalize anything, except maybe on a collective basis from many different and competing opinions.

I can't imagine that, based on even a heavy tour of one province, a final conclusion as to the whole country, and whole US effort, could be conclusively put forward.

The President is having meaningful and complex presentations from a lot of parties on a lot of different views. Glad when he is done and able to make a final decision, but sounds like it ain't over yet.

Fingers crossed for the right one.

Ken White
10-28-2009, 01:47 AM
Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...:cool:

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...
Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.

"I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action."True.
Fingers crossed for the right one.Also true... :wry:

Pol-Mil FSO
10-28-2009, 02:44 AM
I have to admit I had a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment when I read this article on the net last night, and then saw it again this morning on the front page of the Washington Post. If I threaten to quit, will I get offered a job at several grades above my current rank at Embassy Kabul (not that I would prefer a job there instead of one in the field) or a job in the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office in the State Department? I am very skeptical of the implication that this officer is so much better than other FSOs serving in Afghanistan to merit such offers.

I respect the guy for backing up his convictions with action but I find it hard to believe that he can have everything figured out after only 5-6 months in country, and only 3-4 months at the PRT in Zabul. Given the limited interaction which PRT personnel have with the local population - due to security, cultural, and especially language, barriers - a few months, or even one year, does not present enough opportunities to really get a feel for what a typical rural Pashtun is thinking.

I agree with his observation that every valley is different, especially true in RC East due to terrain. However, I think he is is too quick to draw conclusions from the special case of the Korengal valley to make broader judgments about Pashtun hostility towards ISAF. Again, every province, and sometimes every district, is different. He also offers a keen observation - that is frequently missed by the Embassy and other international community reps living in Kabul - about the stark divide between the westernized urban Afghans (with whom we spend most of our time) and the rural Pashtun villagers (who are the center of gravity in this COIN fight).

I also fault the Washington Post reporter for hyperbole. "Senior civilian representative" in Zabul Province is not all that it appears to be - the guy has been a FSO for only one year (not tenured) and by virtue of his status as a FSO will almost inevitably be considered more senior to the USAID Field Program Officer at the PRT because until very recently almost all of the USAID FPOs at Afghanistan PRTs were contractors on one year appointments. And the third U.S. civilian in Zabul is a U.S. Department of Agriculture employee or contractor, or possibly a State contractor working rule-of-law issues. Finally, he deserves respect for being a Iraq combat veteran, but the same could be said of almost everybody in the Marine Corps with more than 4 years of service.

pjmunson
10-28-2009, 03:23 AM
Long day, long week, probably should not enter the fray but can't help myself. I find some of the comments in this thread to be distasteful at best. I question just how much more of a leg to stand on a (fill in the blank, if the shoe fits, wear it) has than anyone else when putting forward an impassioned assessment of what you see as the strategic reality and what you feel as your moral obligation to point out and to opt out of. People love to throw the complexities of Afghanistan out as a card to discount pretty much anything they don't agree to, and that is getting old. Also, just because this guy is a non-tenured FSO, isn't 50+, may look like people you used to boss around, isn't a "civilian planning expert," etc., doesn't mean that he does not have the intelligence, experience, and insight to point out what he sees as broad strategic inconsistencies. While his letter does touch on some specifics of Afghanistan, it is an operational/strategic level assessment, not a tactical one. Therefore, many of the arguments put forth here to impeach his credentials show that the authors of the comments are actually less qualified to comment on the strategic issues than the author of the very well worded and well thought out letter. If you object to his analysis, rebut his analysis. He may have only been on the ground there for X months, but he, like many others, has been living this dream for nearly a decade. He's had a lot of time to think about it and a lot of ugly examples to contemplate. Again, he's not talking about the specifics of Zabul Province really. He's talking operational to strategic level "what are we doing"? There is a lot of room for disagreement with him, but few of the comments here demonstrate an understanding of what he's saying, much less an effort to counter that at the same level.

Finally, why not take the opportunity to stay on the inside and fix things? A cynic would see the offer to take up a high level position as an attempt to co opt you and your views. Even if he didn't take the offer to be such an attempt, if you don't fundamentally believe in the strategy and policy anymore, then why would you continue to serve it at any level?

In sum, I'm not going to say whether I agree or disagree with him, but I think that, if he truly believes what he wrote, then he is right to have written it and right to have resigned. If he was surrounded by people who were going to cry "PTSD," inexperience, "not tenured," etc. when he voiced his views as opposed to reasoned argument, then I can see why he would not want to stick around, even had he agreed with the grand strategy.

Ken White
10-28-2009, 04:39 AM
Aside from the inappropriate and uncalled for branch off into the PTSD issue, no one really knocked him. One guy did say he disagreed with him and another, a FSO with a year in country, did comment that Hoh would not have time to gather a tremendous amount of knowledge of the country. That's an opinion and not a knock. You can say 'the complexities of Afghanistan' are getting old but they are there, they're not going away because some don't think they are...

Several of us asked why that letter is surfacing at this time -- that is not a reflection on Mr. Hoh at all but rather on the Washington Post and politics inside the beltway.

You said you aren't going to say whether you agree or disagree with him. I'm not bashful; I agree with his thrust but not with some facets of his rationale. That, practically speaking, means I agree with his position.

However, I'm still concerned with Winken's location... :D

wm
10-28-2009, 10:56 AM
that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...:cool:

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...True.Also true... :wry:

Ken,
I would be very hesitant to apply the term "nation" to the area we happen to call Afghanistan. I submit that the first order of business to getting on with business in that part of the world is to recognize that the place is nothing like a nation as Western Europeans understand that term. As I've previously posted, the closest thing to it that we might use as a basis for understanding is the amalgamation of efforts by ancient Greek city states in response to the Persian invasions or to the perceived slight against Menelaus of Sparta when Helen left for Troy with Paris.

Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

Pol-Mil FSO
10-28-2009, 11:07 AM
To make a military analogy about the State Department reaction: suppose Mr. Hoh was a Company Commander in the 2nd MEB in Helmand and decided that the war sucked and notified his chain of command that he was going to resign. He then gets called up to Kabul for a meeting with GEN McChrystal, who offers him a promotion to Colonel and a job on the ISAF HQ staff. When that doesn't work, he gets flown to Tampa for a meeting with GEN Petraeus and an offer of a position (again as a Colonel or maybe even BG) on the CENTCOM staff. Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Finally, I have to go back to my point in a previous post that Afghanistan is an extremely complicated issue that defies easy understanding or comprehension. Maybe it's a generational issue, but my gut reaction is that Mr. Hoh is naive and/or egotistical for having the moral certainty to not only resign but also publicly speak out against USG policy in Afghanistan. (In the WaPo article he states that "I want people in Iowa, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, Listen, I don't think this is right.") I can accept resignation for disagreement with policy, but taking a public position against policy when he hasn't been around long enough to understand all of the nuances is something that I feel to be close to a betrayal of his oath as a commissioned officer in the Foreign Service. But then again, to offer a criticism of Mr. Hoh - and I'd argue that he is now fair game for criticism since he has entered the political arena - it doesn't look to me like he was a Foreign Service Officer long enough to understand the ethos of the Foreign Service nor the messy and ambiguous realities of foreign policy formulation and execution.

Tom Odom
10-28-2009, 11:13 AM
To make a military analogy about the State Department reaction: suppose Mr. Hoh was a Company Commander in the 2nd MEB in Helmand and decided that the war sucked and notified his chain of command that he was going to resign. He then gets called up to Kabul for a meeting with GEN McChrystal, who offers him a promotion to Colonel and a job on the ISAF HQ staff. When that doesn't work, he gets flown to Tampa for a meeting with GEN Petraeus and an offer of a position (again as a Colonel or maybe even BG) on the CENTCOM staff. Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Finally, I have to go back to my point in a previous post that Afghanistan is an extremely complicated issue that defies easy understanding or comprehension. Maybe it's a generational issue, but my gut reaction is that Mr. Hoh is naive and/or egotistical for having the moral certainty to not only resign but also publicly speak out against USG policy in Afghanistan. (In the WaPo article he states that "I want people in Iowa, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, Listen, I don't think this is right.") I can accept resignation for disagreement with policy, but taking a public position against policy when he hasn't been around long enough to understand all of the nuances is something that I feel to be close to a betrayal of his oath as a commissioned officer in the Foreign Service. But then again, to offer a criticism of Mr. Hoh - and I'd argue that he is now fair game for criticism since he has entered the political arena - it doesn't look to me like he was a Foreign Service Officer long enough to understand the ethos of the Foreign Service nor the messy and ambiguous realities of foreign policy formulation and execution.

Well said,

Tom

Bob's World
10-28-2009, 11:37 AM
This guy appears to have performed his duty with honor.

When he couldn't square what he was being told to do with his own personal assessment and values, he risigned when he found his personal and professional honor in conflict. Sadly Afghanistan is a political hot button right now, mostly for reasons that have little to do with either Afghanistan, GWOT, or the larger security concerns of the US, so such statements will be used as fodder in that game of political power between the Dems and Reps.

I see no news here. Hopefully those working on policy for this don't just dismiss this guy for disagreeing, and take a moment to step back and conisder if there are other options than approaches currently on the table for debate. They probably won't though.

Worth remembering is that American interests and security concerns are global and multi-facted, and to keep Afghanistan as whole, as well as the US role there in the proper perspective.

Steve the Planner
10-28-2009, 12:00 PM
PolMil:


I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Actually, as the story emerges, I'm amending my speculation.

First, there are a few online sources, including his online resume:

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/matthew-hoh/4/920/712

and a few articles which suggest that, while a riveting piece of journalism, it does not tell the whole story of who he is or what his role was:

http://washingtonindependent.com/65335/dont-call-matthew-hoh-a-foreign-service-officer

Ranging from "Senior US civilian" to Iraq Hero to mid-level temporary appointee, with four months on the ground in Zabul

Andrew Exum explains that Zabul is one of those uniquely God forsaken places (where "rural" is too urban a term) from which the ability to apply it's Biblical-age lessons to broad strategic assessments of Afghanistan is limited. He suggests that Hoh was beaten down by the experience.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/10/where-rural-too-urban.html

One Examiner story I read suggested instead, after citing interviews with some of his Marine colleagues, suggested that he was, in fact, a political aspirant, but that the letter looked to be soemthing written by someone else for him.

From all that, I can only conclude that there is much more going on than meets the eye with this fellow and his message. We will probably learn more once he sells the rights... or as most suggest, declares for office.

As for the contents of the message, I, too, scratch my head as to how much broad strategy I could surmise about any country based on a small view of an anomalous area during a four month window.

More important to me is that his message, even if correct, was grandstanded in a way calculated to drive national political debate---this from a serving federal appointee. Had he resigned first, or waited til it expired last month, then made a statement, it probably would have been a non-event.

These kinds of grandstanded, out-of-school press events disregard the emotions and fears of relatives of serving members in a way that I personally find disrespectful. Better for the President to review these types of positions, as we all know he is, and make his determination and statement.

If Hoh was a "former" appointee, he was free to make any observation he wanted. But that was not the case.

Cavguy
10-28-2009, 12:05 PM
PolMil:

"I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind")."

Actually, as the story emerges, I'm amending my speculation.

First, there are a few online sources, including his online resume:

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/matthew-hoh/4/920/712

and a few articles which suggest that, while a riveting piece of journalism, it does not tell the whole story of who he is or what his role was:

http://washingtonindependent.com/65335/dont-call-matthew-hoh-a-foreign-service-officer

Ranging from "Senior US civilian" to Iraq Hero to mid-level temporary appointee, with four months on the ground in Zabul

Andrew Exum explains that Zabul is one of those uniquely God forsaken places (where "rural" is too urban a term) from which the ability to apply it's Biblical-age lessons to broad strategic assessments of Afghanistan is limited. He suggests that Hoh was beaten down by the experience.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/10/where-rural-too-urban.html

One Examiner story I read suggested instead, after citing interviews with some of his Marine colleagues, suggested that he was, in fact, a political aspirant, but that the letter looked to be soemthing written by someone else for him.

From all that, I can only conclude that there is much more going on than meets the eye with this fellow and his message. We will probably learn more once he sells the rights... or as most suggest, declares for office.

As for the contents of the message, I, too, scratch my head as to how much broad strategy I could surmise about any country based on a small view of an anomalous area during a four month window.

More important to me is that his message, even if correct, was grandstanded in a way calculated to drive national political debate---this from a serving federal appointee. Had he resigned first, or waited til it expired last month, then made a statement, it probably would have been a non-event.

These kinds of grandstanded, out-of-school press events disregard the emotions and fears of relatives of serving members in a way that I personally find disrespectful. Better for the President to review these types of positions, as we all know he is, and make his determination and statement.

If Hoh was a "former" appointee, he was free to make any observation he wanted. But that was not the case.

1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

2) Memo was dated Sept 10, 2009

3) My understanding is he already left his job a few weeks ago, therefore is not a fed employee.

Steve the Planner
10-28-2009, 12:08 PM
Cavguy:


1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

2) Memo was dated Sept 10, 2009

3) My understanding is he already left his job a few weeks ago, therefore is not a fed employee.

Good points. Learning more as it goes along.

Still trying to figure out from press reports whether he contacted them or they contacted him. (Small point?)

Steve

Steve the Planner
10-28-2009, 12:17 PM
All said and done, I agree with the comments from a recent Guardian post which cites Tom Friedman's latest:


Friedman added a salutary word about priorities for wobblers in Washington and London. "Remember: transform Iraq and it will impact the whole Arab-Muslim world. Change Afghanistan and you just change Afghanistan.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/27/iraq-attacks-elections-us-withdrawal

So where does the US prioritize? For the President and Congress to decide, but, no doubt, with substantial input from very broad, and sometimes international (NATO?) public.

Steve

Fuchs
10-28-2009, 12:34 PM
Was this really the first resigning U.S. official in regard to Afghanistan? I doubt it.

The British had already several high-profile guys giving up (especially diplomats) on Afghanistan.

Entropy
10-28-2009, 01:10 PM
Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?


It sure did with me. However, that doesn't tell us anything about Mr. Hoh, but sure tells us a lot about how our system deals with dissidents in the ranks. My WTF was in reaction how the upper echelons saw his resignation as primarily a political problem to be solved by attempting to turn him into a made man. That doesn't reflect well on Mr. Hoh's superiors, frankly.

The results of this are pretty clear though - anyone who wants to similarly resign now knows their resignation will be publicly exposed and all sorts of people who disagree with the reasoning will make assumptions and engage in ad hominem arguments. I suspect any others out there will now resign quietly because of "family" reasons and not mention policy. Mr. Hoh's career in public service is probably over - who wants to hire someone who, intentionally or not, publicly rocked the boat?

The only thing I want to know about Mr. Hoh is if he just up and resigned or made an attempt to pass his analysis up the chain. If the former, then shame on him, but if the latter....

pjmunson
10-28-2009, 01:34 PM
Maybe I'm upset because I think that instead of continuing to debate this guy, his credibility, and his motives, the supposed professionals here should actually speak to the issue. I don't give a hoot about the ethos of the foreign service and, whether they like it or not, I think that an educated military officer with DoD civilian time can figure out enough about DoS to write a letter about national strategy (not DoS PRT policy) when he's had enough. He's had much more than a few months in the overall foreign policy instrument of the government when you combine DoD and DoS time. And I do understand that Afghanistan is a very complex place. I don't disagree. I do believe that has become a vehicle to dismiss any argument people don't like though. "Oh, he's wrong because he doesn't understand the complexities of Afghanistan." Unstated: "I know better."

Again, where is the debate over his message, rather than him? Or maybe that is "generational"? One of the reasons why this country is politically where it is at right now is because we don't really consider issues anymore. We just attack the messenger. It does piss me off. Maybe I have PTSD.

Schmedlap
10-28-2009, 01:39 PM
1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

Who leaked it?

Added:
Just saw this in the comment section at Kings of War (http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/dr-ellsberg-i-presume/#comment-5059): a commenter under the name of Joshua Foust (whom I suspect is the real one), wrote:

You know, he’s not actually an FSO or even really a U.S. official, but a one-year contract employee. Just to be clear; not a single career FSO has resigned over Afghanistan, despite there being many hundreds there.

Steve Blair
10-28-2009, 02:17 PM
Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

This is why I've been contending for some time that our own experiences in Arizona are perhaps a touch more germane to discussions about Afghanistan than the oh-so-common Vietnam analogies. Even Hoh tried to drag out the Vietnam skeleton (poorly, in my view). All of our major post-CW Indian conflicts were against loose tribal confederations (and the emphasis in that line is on loose, not confederation), and many took place in difficult terrain. Most of the major Apache campaigns took place in rugged, mountainous country and required some major changes in the standard operational templates used at the time. The Modoc campaign was difficult for a number of reasons, terrain being one and poor leadership in the early stages on the part of the Army being another. And there are even similarities in the policy conflicts we're seeing now.

Tom Odom
10-28-2009, 02:21 PM
Some thoughts.

First of all I am sure most here have heard (read) me lament the cultural and professional gaps between Defense and other agencies (but in particular State) when it comes to larger strategy and security planning. The creation of a civilian response corps is supposed to help address what I would call the lack of an expeditionary mindset among my fellow civilian travelers, regardless of agency.

Deployment on a PRT or as a civilian with a unit is not just another posting to another embassy. It is voluntary on the front end; it is not voluntary in the middle. The bottom line in places like Iraq or Afghanistan or other garden spots is this: when you take the King's coin, you do the King's bidding until your tour is done. Barring medical condition or injury, you serve your tour. Otherwise those around you cannot count on you. If you cannot do that, don't take the coin.

From the above, resignation couched in the name of others or against a policy (or both) is quitting. You just quit. Period. Those whom you cite as your justification did not quit. To begin with, they can't and in 99.9% of the cases, they would not if they could because of the folks around them. Citing them as a reason only serves your decision to quit.

If at the end of your tour, you still feel the policy is untenable, the strategy is broke, or whatever, then resign. Go public if you wish. Your call. I will salute your moral stance and understand where you are coming from. But don't take the King's coin and then quit because the King's men and women depend on one another.

Tom

Steve the Planner
10-28-2009, 02:28 PM
pj:

Agree with a lot of what you are saying, but, if he was actually a senior civilian official with, say, a tour or two in Afghanistan, and enough visibility to the big picture, I would be more comfortable with both the press attention and the message.

I only spent a year in Iraq, but was probably one of the most well-traveled civilians in Northern Iraq doing a lot of intensive research. Having said that, my research was in a particular field and a particular region in which I still, at best, know enough to know what I don't know.

To project that limited knowledge (especially the amount gleaned from four months into my tour) into a strategic view of the entire national, international, civilian and military effort, would, in my opinion, be quite an unreasonable stretch.

Notwithstanding, there are plenty of folks on this site who know that my opinion of the civilian side of these efforts is less than optimum, and justifies substantial critique and evolution. So, in that context, his criticisms, applicable to the levels he experienced are actually pretty consistent with many things I believe.

One of the bigger debates that I beleive should raise concerns to higher ups is in fact the question of how DoS selects, deploys, supports, and interacts with "so-called" contractors, who are actually supposed to be subject mater and specialty skills experts brought in to fill knowledge and resource gaps in the civilian effort. They are special federal appointees, not contractors, nor foreihgn service officers.

This affair really raises the issue of whether they (or he as an individual within that class) are being properly recruited, deployed, supported, and engaged to the civilian mission.

Maybe I am wrong, but if the civilian surge was actually intended to connect experienced civilians (not ex-military and foreign service officers) to the mission of expanding the reach and capacity of government to its people, what was this guy doing there?

If the answer is that the civilian surge was not able to be staffed in the manner as advertised (thus the facade of military dual-hatting versus actual civilians), then we need to re-examine that surge, not conceal it by alternate military staffing.

The UN, by comparison, in Iraq used a lot of different techniques to drive adequate civilian staffing. One example was to use civilian experts who had an on-going and deep knowledge of the area, but came and went over a longer period: three to six month per year on the ground over five years. Another was to anchor the operation in Jordan, a safe country nearby, from which civilians rotated in for three weeks at a time.

Most civilian experts on that kind of an assignment (known as hotelling) could actually get more done at the anchor (better internet, freer movement, more resources like CAD engineering), and use the on=ground time to research, contact and deliver. As a civilian "expert" I was always taught to leave enough downtime to "think" about a problem (plan twice, build once), than to just push a fast, expedient answer in as is more appropriate, and necessary to a military battle tempo on the ground.

Anyone familiar with routine local/regional government processes understands that a County Executive or Public Works manager may routinely initiate a "cycle" of scoping, evaluation, preliminary design, public or organizational review and feedback, then, and only then, proceed to retain design strategies (whether engineering or systems) from which final design action programs may start (final engineering/construction, bids for computer systems implementation, etc...). These things happen over months and years using appropriate experts sequencing in and out of projects over their course.

If we can't understand how to effectively plan around, staff, and deliver routine civilian processes, then there is something fundamentally wrong with our civilian surge process. How do we deal with that?

Perhaps, if the answer is that security precludes civilian effectiveness, we should acknowledge that, and not pretend to Clear, Hold and Build, but just Clear, Clear and Clear, without pretending that clear is a step to something else that we are not delivering.

Instead, I fear we have the worst of all worlds right now on the civilian side. Short-term assignees (Yes, one year is a short-term for civilian projects of note in a field where most real solutions might take five years to plan and implement), often not qualified in the designated subject areas, with no structured process or support, or plan to align effective civilian consultative and a capacity building processes in a competent and effective manner.

So, does the Hoh affair raise important issues for me? Yes. But that phase of the debate was not brought to the table yet.

Steve

Schmedlap
10-28-2009, 02:48 PM
I suspect that this letter was leaked to the media because Hoh's "biography" is convenient. Someone apparently thought that his background would make this opinion more important than opinions of other people whose opinions might have been formed with far more information and understanding of the situation.

This is standard procedure in American politics, so I'm not decrying the tactic. But it does amaze me that we fall for it every time.

jkm_101_fso
10-28-2009, 03:03 PM
I suspect that this letter was leaked to the media because Hoh's "biography" is convenient.

That was my thought...he was the "perfect" candidate for political fodder.


This is standard procedure in American politics, so I'm not decrying the tactic. But it does amaze me that we fall for it every time.

You're right. I'm guilty.

jkm_101_fso
10-28-2009, 03:52 PM
Abu M. weighs in on apparent inaccuracies in the original WaPo article (http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/10/putting-matthew-hoh-context-and-asking-hard-questions-washington-post.html)

Looks like Schmed might be right...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
10-28-2009, 05:06 PM
To me Mr. Hoh’s resignation and statement do not meet the “so what” test. So what? A DoS contractor quits, back in September no less, after four months in the field and decides our efforts in Astan are not worth it. So what, there are dozens of pundits saying similar things right now, many of whom have spent nearly zero time in Astan. Also, there are advocates for our continuing our efforts in Astan, many of whom have spent nearly zero time in Astan. So Mr. Hoh is not offering any Earth shattering revelations.

I’m with Schmedlap: Why is the Post touting this now? At the very same time that the President in pondering the next moves in Astan and an election runoff is soon to occur there.

I say the Post is merely acting the agent provocateur in an attempt to steer debate on Astan a certain way and using Mr. Hoh’s resignation as some sort of indication that the Obama team has lost the strategic ball.

Schmedlap
10-28-2009, 09:51 PM
JKM,

I wasn't even concerned about whether he was or was not an FSO (Foreign Service Officer... if he was a Fire Support Officer then I might have given him some credit).

My concern about the whole fiasco was this: even if he was a 10-year veteran of the Foreign Service, who cares? There are thousands of people in Afghanistan who have equally insightful views - or more insightful views - than this guy does. This is a PR stunt, plain and simple.

On the other hand, I take great pleasure in one aspect of this. This might turn into something very bitter sweet...


The Washington Post's Dan Rather Moment


Oh, how I hate the media. How sweet it would be.

wm
10-29-2009, 10:39 AM
I suspect that this letter was leaked to the media because Hoh's "biography" is convenient. Someone apparently thought that his background would make this opinion more important than opinions of other people whose opinions might have been formed with far more information and understanding of the situation.


To paraphrase Alex Karas' character Mongo in "Blazing Saddles" :

"Hoh just pawn . . . in game of life."

RKhan
10-29-2009, 01:02 PM
This story just doesn't ring true. First of all, is this guy really a Foreign Service Officer? As I understand it, it takes months to get into the Foreign Service and then you have a year or more of training. This guy got wind of the job last autumn and was in the field within six months or less. I suspect he was a temporary civil service guy--essentially a personal services contractor. If that is the case, I have to wonder if this report properly characterized the reactions of the senior folks mentioned in this article. It is no surprise they’d be informed about the resignation of a DOS rep on a PRT, but would they really take such a strong personal interest in a temp guy who is really working a very junior position? Would McChrystal really send a DOS body to check on Korengal? It all seems a bit odd.

Given this guy's likely status, why did this rate above the fold coverage in the Washington Post? I don't have access to the facts, but my impression is that this is an overblown story that is the product of some questionable journalism and uninformed editors.


Lastly, the guy is likely "honorable" and all that, but I am not the least bit over awed by his bio. There are hundreds if not thousands of us who could match or better his background. I have three long tours in Afghanistan and I spent one of those tours in Zabul. I know the governor mentioned in the srticle. This guy had a couple months up around J-bad and a couple more in Zabul and he is being presented as an expert on Afghanistan. I wish WaPo would approach me for my opinion.

Cavguy
10-29-2009, 05:52 PM
From a friend, some history:


“It has long seemed to me that the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some harebrained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives."


Matthew Ridgway, on the need for officers to be leaders who will go beyond physical courage and display moral courage.


"It is hard to get men to do this, for this is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line."


George Marshall, ibid.

also this:


I've been to Zabul and know the problems there pretty well, so I can understand why Hoh was frustrated.


As for what he did, I can certainly see why folks like him would get frustrated and want to resign in despair. However, Holbrooke was right, you can probably have more impact as an internal critic than an external one, especially given that he wasn't/isn't a big name who would get big time, extended attention from the media. He'll say his piece, have his 5 minutes, and likely disappear - so he probably should have stayed in the fight inside if he wanted to maximize impact.


On the issue of the State Department, I think that they should be actively recruiting people like Hoh (or like me for that matter, not that I'm eager to go back there) with experience in/on Afghanistan (and outside relevant expertise) - esp given the complexity of the problem set and the requirements of COIN. Unfortunately, they rotate in folks with inexperience and little desire to be in such a fight --- they want to be in Paris and Brussels doing "diplomacy", not Kabul or out in the country as one leg of the COIN stool!


[the error] --- it is not a failure to send folks like him there, it is a failure to send the same old people in State that in many cases do nothing useful in the rest of the world but have a claim to "experience"! Professionalized bureaucrats have their advantages but we should recognize their deficits as well, particularly for outside the box missions.


I don't understand the personal vindictive coming out here against Hoh. Perhaps the Wapo should or should not have featured him given his level. Rather than attacking the messenger and his motives because you disagree or have personal axes to grind against the media or junior officer "experts", a better use would attack his case. Just my opinion.

Niel

Schmedlap
10-29-2009, 10:23 PM
I don't understand the personal vindictive coming out here against Hoh. Perhaps the Wapo should or should not have featured him given his level. Rather than attacking the messenger and his motives because you disagree or have personal axes to grind against the media or junior officer "experts", a better use would attack his case. Just my opinion.

I don't think many (or any) of us are vindictive. I think most are wondering why this particular individual's opinion matters so much more than most other peoples' views. The answer to that question seems to be that the WashPo was looking to make news rather than report it.

OfTheTroops
10-30-2009, 04:08 AM
This Hoh case reminds me a great deal of the Watada case. Does anyone else see the parallel? Vastly different in detail but eerily similar as in "hey, I heard this story before."

Steve the Planner
10-30-2009, 05:45 AM
Of the Troops:

Perhaps the most interesting counterpoint to the Watada Case is that fact that regardless of what Watada argued as the merits of his argument against serving in Iraq, the subsequent facts on the ground stood in contrast to his initial claims.

Certainly, there were some bad chapters in the book of Iraq, but, had he joined in the surge, he would have been a part of one of the better chapters, including laying the foundation for ultimate troop withdrawal.

Looks like the folks in the Army PR machine wanted to show the same thing in Zabul yesterday:

http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=40714

While I am not big on US school building projects unless they have teachers, financial support etc...,, that is because I saw to many built that never opened, in part because the condition, location or staffing (due to Iraqi buy-in) was inadequate, I know that schools in Afghanistan can have different outcomes.

So, this godforsaken biblical era place full of nothing but backward, radical anti Americanism somehow turned out a large crowd on October 22 to celebrate the opening of the girls' high school.

And the Zabul PRT seemed to be pretty proud of it, too. (And well-accepted by the locals).

Or was that just well-timed PR counter-battery fire?

Steve

RKhan
10-30-2009, 12:18 PM
Hoh's opinions and analysis can be supported through argumentation and even though I don't agree with him on his ultimate conclusion, he is not a loon. He is more than right in making his opinion known. Perhaps he may even be right.

However, in order to get an audience he has decided to essentially distort the reality of his level of experience and the heft of his duty position. Since this is how he has decided to conjure up credibility to get attention, he has to expect to receive some fire for it.

Hoh made his position rather than his opinions the issue as did Wapo. If you look at his discussion the other day on the Wapo site he contiues to do this without the filter of a reporter.

jcustis
11-01-2009, 01:31 PM
Hmmm...gotta agree...so what?

Greyhawk
11-01-2009, 06:03 PM
Apologies for excerpt length - State Dept presser (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/oct/130972.htm):
Ian Kelly
Department Spokesman
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
October 27, 2009

QUESTION: Can I just – now pick up the question about – the resignation of Matthew Hoh, who was working for the State Department in Afghanistan and has made public a somewhat depressing three-page letter about the reasons for his resignation, and he talks about his loss of understanding and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States presence there.

Is this – how does the State Department view this? Is this an embarrassment of sorts, the fact that it’s become so public? It’s on the front page of the Post today.

MR. KELLY: Well, first of all, we admire Mr. Hoh. We respect the sacrifice that he’s made for his country, both in Iraq and signing up to join our effort in Afghanistan. We take his opinions very seriously. Senior officials on the ground in Afghanistan and here in Washington have talked to him, have heard him out. We respect his right to dissent. This is an old and respected tradition in the Foreign Service, that Foreign Service personnel have the right to express their dissent.

Just to give you a little more background on his affiliation with the State Department, he signed on for a limited appointment. It is a non-career appointment. He signed on March 29th of this year and his employment lasted up until September 28. He submitted his letter of resignation a few weeks before that. He was signed on as a political officer in a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan in Zabul. And his role as a PRT political officer was to monitor and report on political and economic developments in his province.

As I say, we take his point of view very seriously. But we continue to believe that we are on track to achieving the goal that the President has set before us, and that’s – you heard Deputy Secretary Lew lay out some of those objectives: improving Afghan governance; providing security, infrastructure, jobs, basically giving the Afghan people an alternative to the very negative vision of the Taliban and al-Qaida. And this is the strategy, and as I say, we believe we're on track reaching the goals...

QUESTION: Then I’m not – I’m unclear as to how he actually fits into the Foreign Service.

MR. KELLY: It’s – there is a provision of the Foreign Service Act that gives the Secretary the right to designate certain positions as limited with a time certain end date in order to fill positions that have not been filled through the normal Foreign Service process. And so this was one of them. We have, I think a total in the world, about 16 of these type appointments. It’s not – it’s fairly rare...

QUESTION: So this is under Foreign Service, but he is not considered --

MR. KELLY: This is under Foreign Service.

QUESTION: -- a Foreign Service officer, he’s not commissioned as a Foreign Service officer?

MR. KELLY: He’s not commissioned as a Foreign Service officer, yeah...

QUESTION: Pardon me, last question about how we bill this story. It – I mean, it’s – is it – it’s not really comparable to, say, the career diplomats who left the service over Bosnia or, you know, other big disagreements.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I mean, I actually – I have a few friends who --

QUESTION: Or is it?

MR. KELLY: -- who resigned over Bosnia and Iraq. And these were people who had career appointments, who had a number of years into the Foreign Service, a real investment in the Foreign Service. And because they could not accept the policy, they made a principled decision to resign.

I mean, I would draw – I mean, without minimizing the obvious passion and depth of feeling of Mr. Hoh in terms of his perception of the mission in Afghanistan, I would draw a distinction between his situation and somebody who had been in the Foreign Service and had a stake in the Foreign Service for 20 years or more.

QUESTION: So to your knowledge, there haven’t been any career Foreign Service officers who have resigned over Afghanistan?

MR. KELLY: To my knowledge, nobody has resigned over Afghanistan. No career officers, yeah.

CNN (http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/10/27/u-s-official-resigns-over-cavalier-politically-expedient-afghan-war/):

Foreign Service Officer Matthew Hoh, a 36-year-old former Marine Corps captain, submitted his resignation letter on September 10...

State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said the administration respected Hoh's decision.

"We take his opinions very seriously," Kelly said. "Senior officials on the ground in Afghanistan and here in Washington have talked to him, have heard him out. We respect ... his right to dissent."

Hoh's resignation from a special one-year appointment appears, at least so far, to be an anomaly. No career Foreign Service officers have resigned from the State Department over Afghanistan policy, according to Kelly.

AFP (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gqd9QbqTmy7KAkxODuPfmbsNM1Ag):
Describing Hoh as the State Department's "eyes and ears on the ground in Zabul," spokesman Ian Kelly said the department respected his departure.

"We take his opinions very seriously. Senior officials on the ground, in Afghanistan and here in Washington, have talked to him, have heard him out. We respect his right to dissent," said Kelly.

"In the end, he made his own decision that he decided to resign, and we respect that," Kelly said, adding that he agreed with some of Hoh's arguments, but not his conclusions.

PBS (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec09/other_10-27.htmlhttp://)

Meanwhile, a former U.S. Marine captain, Matthew Hoh, became the first U.S. official to resign in protest over the war. The Washington Post reported he quit his diplomatic post last month, saying the fighting only fueled the insurgency.

Today, a State Department spokesman had this to say.

IAN KELLY: Senior officials on the ground in Afghanistan and -- and here in -- in Washington have -- have talked to him, have -- have heard him out. We respect his -- his right to dissent. This is an old and respected tradition in the Foreign Service, that Foreign Service personnel have the -- have the right to express their -- their dissent.

And back to State:


QUESTION: Well, on the same topic, publicly, some of the reports stated that Ambassador Holbrooke had actually agreed with some of Hoh’s analysis – not his conclusion, but some of his analysis. I wanted your reaction on what it is that Ambassador Holbrooke agreed with him on.

MR. KELLY: I’m not – just to be very frank, I’m not sure exactly what Ambassador Holbrooke – what specifically in the letter he agreed with. I’ve read the letter.

QUESTION: The date?

MR. KELLY: Sorry?

QUESTION: The date?

MR. KELLY: The date? I’m not sure I understand.

QUESTION: It’s a joke. Don’t worry.

MikeF
11-01-2009, 06:18 PM
Matthew Hoh was a guest on Fareed Zakaria's 360 today. They haven't posted the entire interview yet, but here is a short clip.

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/us/2009/10/30/gps.hoh.afghan.strategy.cnn

What I found interesting is that Hoh came across as very thoughtful, bright, and deeply concerned about our policies. The conversation reminded me of many of the discussions on SWJ.

I guess someone should have introduced him to this site earlier on:cool:.

v/r

Mike

Greyhawk
11-01-2009, 06:25 PM
One more (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/10/27/DI2009102703143.html)
Washington, D.C.: Don't you think it's ridiculous that you are getting so much attention for quitting your job, yet, those who fight and die for us on a daily basis get little to no coverage in the media?

Matthew Hoh: I agree with your last part. I do believe coverage of those are the ground is severely lack both in quantity and quality. I am happy for the attention to my issues and to the points I am raising, because I believe they have been absent in the public debate of the war. On a personal note, I am ready for my 15 minutes to be up.

Schmedlap
11-01-2009, 06:35 PM
From the same interview...

Washington, D.C.: Do you think there's anything those of us in the F.S. could do to further push the administration towards your understanding of the war?
Matthew Hoh: Continue to write and report honestly and candidly. Speak truth to power at every opportunity.

desrtrat6
11-01-2009, 11:54 PM
I could understand the State Department leadership and the media making a big deal over his resignation if he was an SES or political appointee or if he had an extensive background in Afghanistan and counter-insurgency; however, none of that was the case. He was simply a foreign service officer that decided to quit when the going got tough.

-Tom

Schmedlap
11-02-2009, 12:34 AM
From Greyhawk's post, above...

He signed on March 29th of this year and his employment lasted up until September 28. He submitted his letter of resignation a few weeks before that.

He couldn't gut it out for 18 more days?

There is so much about this case that just reeks of someone trying to make a news story, rather than report one. Everyday, we learn another detail that begs the question: why does this guy's opinion merit billing in the WashPo? I suspect that anyone with similar experience and credentials would be lucky to have their 300-word letter to the editor published.

Steve the Planner
11-02-2009, 01:37 AM
Schmedlap:

Had a discourse with Karen DeYoung, the WP Editor who brought the Hoh story forward. Along the lines that she had heard these positions so many times from people in the field, but couldn't find a venue to float them into a story.

His story and letter provided that venue. She wasn't interested in him, but getting the positions out there.

I'm pretty satisfied with her position.

Steve

PS- Got Halloween call from a friend in Afghanistan. He has endured much worse for much longer, including our prior tour together. Four months in, he is just starting to feel productive after a lot of bumpy experiences. Trying to talk me into joining him, but I still promised my wife/daughter I would be home for a spell. Something about the intestinal fortitude to stand by your commitments once you make them?

Bill Moore
11-02-2009, 03:52 AM
What I found interesting is that Hoh came across as very thoughtful, bright, and deeply concerned about our policies. The conversation reminded me of many of the discussions on SWJ.

I'm deeply disappointed at the amount of shoot the messenger posts that have absolutely no substance. Far below the norm for SWJ.

I heard one of Hoh's interviews also, and he was very thoughtful, whether you agree with his assertions or not. He asked some hard questions that he hoped would be discussed. Instead, at least in this forum we sound like some overly opinionated media person who is incapable of seriously addressing the facts, but perfectly capable of slander.

Someone many of us respect named McMasters wrote a book titled the "Dereliction of Duty" that highlighted the failure of officers to take a moral stand. It is easy to see how our culture encourages this.

Hoh's observations are very much in synch with another respected author named Kilkullen.

For Steve the Planner, if the plan is flawed, is it still wrong to question it? You are too quick to slay this kid, and didn't address any of his points. Agree or disagree he had the right to offer his resignation. I too would like to know who surfaced the letter publically, and I'm sure the list of suspects is a long one, but that really isn't the point now, the issue is public, time to discuss the points he surfaced.

Schmedlap
11-02-2009, 05:09 AM
Bill,

I think you're misinterpreting the push back to this story. It's not about the messenger or the message. It's about the media making news rather than reporting it.

You say that the issue is public and thus it is time to discuss. No. The issue was public before this. What new issue did Hoh raise that hasn't been discussed on this site alone, let alone elsewhere, for example, here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5810), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8467), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6366), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6052), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7128), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6959), or here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4542)? This story was a stunt to thrust specific arguments to a position of greater prominence than the arguments could achieve on their own merits. It was not an effort to inform the debate. Words in this story were chosen carefully for rhetorical effect.

Speaking only for myself, I'm not playing the game. It's BS. The media is trying to shape the debate rather than inform it. They're trying to dictate the issues rather than report them. I know, it's standard fare and it's how the system works. But when it is blatantly obvious, I see no reason to play along and pretend everything is kosher.

Steve the Planner
11-02-2009, 05:23 AM
Bill:

Personally, I believe the plans I've seen playing out to date are very flawed, but I don't agree with his position or his actions.

Do I believe we are going home anytime soon? No.

Do I believe that even if we left, we will be back? Yes.

Do I believe that there are valid objectives to accomplish there? Yes.

Having said that, a plan (or plans) for Afghanistan must be drawn around the realities and possibilities of Afghanistan, and not all the US delusions to date.

Those realities and possibilities are not what is on the ground today, perhaps, and it sure looks like a lot has been screwed up aka our regular practice of trying everything else first.

As far as Hoh is concerned, he looks like he picked up things from around, and had no significant depth of experience or background to move to the next question. If everything we are doing now is going nowhere (or worse), what is it that should be done given that we are going to be going back again and again until something remotely stable (or minimally benign) is achieved?

Why else is the PRT in Zabul opening a girls high school with strong community showing? Granted Zabul is tough, but that picture is not at all consistent with his report. Are other alternatives possible?

Remember that it is the peace that was flubbed, not the war-fighting part (until after the peace part failed). So, how many different ways are there to start a viable post-conflict process.

Genuine Afghans, and people like Rory Stewart and his associates, have some pretty substantial ideas, as one example. They just don't happen to involve pouring large volumes of troops and billions of dollars of unfocused aid. Is that a problem?

Tom Ricks and David Ignatius have proposed the two phased strategy of securing the cities while aggressively striking in Taliban controlled areas. I'd have to leave the viability of that to military planners.

A political expert ought to know that, even if he can't proceed under the current marching orders, there are still ways to identify and pursue alternative objectives. At that point, it is time to get to work, not to quit.

Just my opinion.

Steve

Tom Odom
11-02-2009, 05:51 AM
I'm deeply disappointed at the amount of shoot the messenger posts that have absolutely no substance. Far below the norm for SWJ.

I heard one of Hoh's interviews also, and he was very thoughtful, whether you agree with his assertions or not. He asked some hard questions that he hoped would be discussed. Instead, at least in this forum we sound like some overly opinionated media person who is incapable of seriously addressing the facts, but perfectly capable of slander.

Someone many of us respect named McMasters wrote a book titled the "Dereliction of Duty" that highlighted the failure of officers to take a moral stand. It is easy to see how our culture encourages this.

Hoh's observations are very much in synch with another respected author named Kilkullen.

For Steve the Planner, if the plan is flawed, is it still wrong to question it? You are too quick to slay this kid, and didn't address any of his points. Agree or disagree he had the right to offer his resignation. I too would like to know who surfaced the letter publically, and I'm sure the list of suspects is a long one, but that really isn't the point now, the issue is public, time to discuss the points he surfaced.

Bill

First of all "yellow blogging" is a group indictment, one little better than those you seek to admonish. My opinion differs from yours; we can agree to disagree.

My issue is with Mr. Hoh and his actions, not his opinions, as indicated in his letter, not the Washington Post or any other news media outlet.

I pushed back on Mr. Hoh because he signed for a year and quit after 4 months. I see too much of that.

I read his letter and his points may or may not be valid. They are, even as he wrapped himself in the flag to make them, irrelevant because he quit during his tour when he should have gutted it out.

Regards

Tom

Bill Moore
11-02-2009, 07:04 AM
Posted by Steve the Planner,


Remember that it is the peace that was flubbed, not the war-fighting part (until after the peace part failed). So, how many different ways are there to start a viable post-conflict process.

Please elaborate on this comment. I'm not sure I'm following your line of logic on this.

Tom,

I'm not so sure we disagree on your points, my disappointment is that no one addressed his points except RYNO, and he basically dismissed them without explaination. Is the issue Hoh quitting or his resignation letter? As you said, many folks are quitting, and some are only quitting because its hard, not because they disagree. Either way not a behavioral trait to encourage.


I think you're misinterpreting the push back to this story. It's not about the messenger or the message. It's about the media making news rather than reporting it.

I don't know if it has always been this way, but it has definitely been this way since the advent of 24/7 news. It's a business that has long lost its professional ethics. Giving the power of information, professional reporters should be licensed and their license should be revoked if they violate an agreed upon code of ethics. That's just an opinion, and of course it will never make it past the SWJ Council.

Tom Odom
11-02-2009, 07:38 AM
Tom,

I'm not so sure we disagree on your points, my disappointment is that no one addressed his points except RYNO, and he basically dismissed them without explaination. Is the issue Hoh quitting or his resignation letter? As you said, many folks are quitting, and some are only quitting because its hard, not because they disagree. Either way not a behavioral trait to encourage.

Bill

Perhaps not. My point is that quitting your job in the face of adversity makes your opinions on said job less than valuable to me, especially when you then try an apply them on a scale beyond their relevance. Doing that and then claiming an even larger purpose--as in the soldiers' lives as well as their families--is even worse.

I guess what bothers me the most is the idea that if this person can quit and then come across doing so as a responsible leader, what do we say to the squad leader, platoon leader, company commander who feels disenchanted? This to me is not the same as McMaster's book of the failure of senior leaders to stand up on Vietnam. Mr. Hoh was not serving as a general; he volunteered to take a political officer slot on a PRT, as indicated in subsequent reports on a contract.

I agree with you on the news media exploitation angle; that to me is pretty much a red herring. That is what the news media does and the only way to avoid it is not offer yourself up. The one area I see exploitation is the senior Foreign service officer angle; that too is something of a red herring because Mr. Hoh's resignation speaks to his appointment as a Political Officer in the Foriegn Service as well as the Senior Civilian Representative for the US Government in Zabul Province. If as he indicates he wants his 15 minutes to end, he could try getting off the stage.

Let me wrap up this spew with a final thought: it is difficult enough as a civilian who retired from the military to bond with the tribe on wartime deployment. The friction of them versus us never really goes away; trust, however, mitigates its worst effects. My brothers and sisters in uniform expect a certain level of partnership; they can't just quit when things get ####ty and neither should I.

Best
Tom

Bill Moore
11-02-2009, 08:28 AM
This to me is not the same as McMaster's book of the failure of senior leaders to stand up on Vietnam. Mr. Hoh was not serving as a general; he volunteered to take a political officer slot on a PRT, as indicated in subsequent reports on a contract.

My brothers and sisters in uniform expect a certain level of partnership; they can't just quit when things get ####ty and neither should I.

Agree, but darn it I still want to debate of couple of his points ;)

P.S. Keep your head down, I admire you for getting back in the ring again after being retired for a few years.

Tom Odom
11-02-2009, 10:37 AM
few years

You have no idea how kind you are being :D

Bill Moore
11-02-2009, 10:36 PM
Ha, originally I wrote old timer, but then thought you might want to kick my butt for posting that. :D

MikeF
11-02-2009, 10:43 PM
Ha, originally I wrote old timer, but then thought you might want to kick my butt for posting that. :D

Respect your elders:). Tom, like many senior officers that I've met, has an uncanny ability to make me rethink my positions or my perceptions of "facts." IMO, he makes a strong case that Hoh should have sucked it up and completed his tour before resigning.

On the other hand, when I first read the story, I was wondering why Hoh left the Marines. Does anyone know? Maybe he was disillusioned with the understanding that the military is only a partial solution in small wars, and he thought he could be more effective as a political officer. I dunno.

Any thoughts?

Mike

Steve the Planner
11-02-2009, 10:50 PM
Mike:

Assuming integrity, I believe Hoh was looking for a way to make a difference in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, a Blue Badge (State Department) was a way to do that, but you had to (1) know how to use it (takes more than four months), (2) bring something substantial to the table re: post-conflict stabilization, and (3) build a cadre of civ/mil/nationals connections to accomplish things.

All the more sad that he quit well before becoming effective.

Ambassador Crocker (on Afghanistan) argued for "strategic patience."

Steve

MikeF
11-02-2009, 10:56 PM
Steve,

You probably just nailed it.


I believe Hoh was looking for a way to make a difference in Afghanistan.

Ambassador Crocker (on Afghanistan) argued for "strategic patience."

Unfortunately, for many of us (myself included), decisive action to make a difference and strategic patience are mutually exclusive at times.

BTW, I'm sorting through Tolle's A New Earth. It's all about meta-physics and transcending ego so I'll probably ramble more about small wars, the human condition, and the illusion of control as I continue to contemplate my own theories:)

Mike

Steve the Planner
11-03-2009, 01:52 AM
Mike:

I started with that meta-physical stuff (after a stint as an NCO in 3/64 Armor).

It took a while to outgrow it.

Maybe doing it the other way around (after you know enough) will be more enlightening (and with less unintended consequences).

Actually, one of my favorite readings was from Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, who really probes the depths of the role of government and society in an age of public scepticism and theoretical uncertainty (1970's).

"The new science of organizations: a reconceptualization of the wealth of nations." Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989 Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989, is one of those books that takes years to read, and leaves you confused for decades.

Steve

MikeF
11-03-2009, 02:02 AM
Mike:

I started with that meta-physical stuff (after a stint as an NCO in 3/64 Armor).

It took a while to outgrow it.

Maybe doing it the other way around (after you know enough) will be more enlightening (and with less unintended consequences).

Actually, one of my favorite readings was from Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, who really probes the depths of the role of government and society in an age of public scepticism and theoretical uncertainty (1970's).

"The new science of organizations: a reconceptualization of the wealth of nations." Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989 Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989, is one of those books that takes years to read, and leaves you confused for decades.

Steve

I should have known that you were in the wrong batallion:D. 1-64 AR, Desert Rogues here....I'm doing it all in reverse- from practice to theory. Thanks for the links. We'll see where it leads.

Mike

Pol-Mil FSO
11-03-2009, 04:44 AM
Steve:

Your previous question about recruitment of civilians in Afghanistan is a good one, but the DOS PRT officer is supposed to be a political officer rather than a development expert. His (or her) responsibilities include reporting on political, pol-mil, economic, and social developments of interest to the Embassy in Kabul. The PRT officer should also be a political advisor to the PRT Commander and, depending on the situation, a political advisor to Afghan officials, notably the Provincial Governor.

My list of desired qualities of a PRT officer would include: at least one (preferably two or more) overseas tours as a political officer involving interaction with host national politicians (without a translator) with related analysis and reporting for Washington consumers; experience with the interagency process developed in a Washington assignment as a country desk officer; understanding of military structure, procedures, and operations gained through a pol-mil assignment or through prior military service; a basic understanding of counterinsurgency theory; service overseas in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment; service in at least two Embassies; and, supervisory experience in an Embassy or in a domestic assignment in the State Department.

We do not have too many FSOs who fit all of the above requirements and many of the PRT officers in Afghanistan are junior officers who have not spent enough time in the Foreign Service to have gained the experience that would help them to perform effectively in such an environment. (This is not to say that they are not doing a good job but it is a steep learning curve without the years of experience.)

I think in the case of Mr. Hoh, the recruiters did not do a good job of looking at his qualifications. I suspect they decided that being a Marine combat veteran in Iraq and a civilian veteran in Iraq were sufficient without examining his actual duties in those jobs. There are military personnel who could do a credible job as a political officer but I would look for someone with more years of experience (i.e. MAJ or LTC), especially those with a FAO qualification, and look first at the Army SF and CA communities. I've also run across a few NCOs and Warrant Officers from 7th and 20th SFG whom I believe could do the job.

Steve the Planner
11-03-2009, 05:28 AM
That certainly makes sense.

Steve

vertnyc
11-10-2009, 03:34 PM
Here are my two cents after having briefly worked with Matt.

Overall, I thought of him to be a go-getter type of guy.

He left...my first impression: so what, the mission still continues.

Zabul is hard...organizational issues between the Romanians and American Task Force and its headquarters in Kandahar. It's the poorest province in Afghanistan. What district or province isn't hard? No easy button in Afghanistan...sorry.

Most of us at Task Force Stryker cover both Kandahar and Zabul and all the headaches that generate from that. Governance, Reconstruction, Development and all that other jazz.

In conclusion- we are fine. Other people have stepped up to fill the roles. In fact I've never even seen heard of the media attention until I signed up for this forum today...so maybe it's a case of armchair generals and reporters overanalyzing things.

P.S. Building a girl's school is dumb, especially in a place like Zabul. Z-PRT has been assessed to not move too far away from HWY1.

Pol-Mil FSO
11-10-2009, 09:15 PM
There seems to be a competition for bragging rights as the poorest province in Afghanistan. Bagdhis Province in RC-West has also claimed the title. I imagine that a few other provinces could also make a good case. I don't know if there are credible statistics to establish a winner.

Early last year at KAF I heard a U.S. SOF officer say the following: "God bless the Romanians, their hearts are in the right place but when you talk COIN and look into their eyes you can see that it is way over their heads."

I was at Camp Atterbury in June as an interagency OC/T for the MRX of the 12 U.S. PRTs getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan. Our lane was the elections scenario that included Afghan role players playing the provincial governor, provincial Chief of Police, UNAMA official, and UNDP official. The PRT Zabul team that came through our lane made quite an impression because it was led by a USAF FAO who spoke better Pashto than all of the Afghan role players (who spoke Dari as their first language). In fact, this FAO and a woman FSO who was formerly assigned as the DOS PRT Officer in Kunar are the only U.S. officers whom I have met that are competent Pashto speakers.