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Kevin23
11-04-2009, 11:45 PM
I was thinking earlier in the week looking at the current engagments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the way these conflicts are being controversially compared to Vietnam both in the public sphere and in other areas like the policy one at least in the US. However, I feel late 19th/early 20th Century conflicts like the Boer Wars that occured in South Africa, the Philippine–American War, or even some aspects of the First World War would offer comparisons and lessons also due to many of the dynamics of those conflicts and the way they were fought in some ways by all sides involved.

So I was wondering if these wars hold lessons that can be applied to modern day small wars and if so what are they?

William F. Owen
11-05-2009, 05:36 AM
I feel late 19th/early 20th Century conflicts like the Boer Wars that occured in South Africa, the Philippine–American War, or even some aspects of the First World War would offer comparisons and lessons also due to many of the dynamics of those conflicts and the way they were fought in some ways by all sides involved.

So I was wondering if these wars hold lessons that can be applied to modern day small wars and if so what are they?

Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.

UrsaMaior
11-05-2009, 10:01 AM
I think the title says it all. Think about how national liberation wars (say 1946-1975), Declaration of human rights /1948/, Weapons of mass destruction, the holocaust, and globalisítion etc. has changed our views on warfare, on combatants and non-combatants on casualties and so on.

Edit
One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.

Kevin23
11-06-2009, 10:21 PM
Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.

I couldn't agree more,

As I think conflicts like the Boer Wars hold lessons for COIN both in terms of how to defeat an insurgency and how not to defeat an insurgency.

davidbfpo
11-06-2009, 11:54 PM
Kevin23,

You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8499.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
11-07-2009, 05:49 AM
The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

My view is here (http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4114043)

Kevin23
11-07-2009, 06:35 AM
The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

My view is here (http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4114043)

Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

William F. Owen
11-07-2009, 10:08 AM
Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

Almost. Irregular Warfare is warfare conduct by or against irregulars. It WHO fights, not how or why. Small Wars is a very good description, taken on the Victorian/Edwardian context. - but note: The difference between Warfare, and Wars. Small Wars does not mean small Warfare. Small wars generally means irregular warfare.

Obvious so far? :)

Kevin23
11-07-2009, 04:13 PM
Almost. Irregular Warfare is warfare conduct by or against irregulars. It WHO fights, not how or why. Small Wars is a very good description, taken on the Victorian/Edwardian context. - but note: The difference between Warfare, and Wars. Small Wars does not mean small Warfare. Small wars generally means irregular warfare.

Obvious so far? :)

Yes!:)

I guess small wars would be better description for the colonial conflicts of the 19th/early 20th century Century?

Bob's World
11-07-2009, 06:23 PM
WILF and I will agree 100% that the current grasping at new terminology to describe old things is not helpful.

We will differ as to the importance of "size" as a defining criteria. From my studies, it is understanding the nature of the competitor and his purpose for action that sheds the best light as to how to most effectively deal with him.

Wars waged by states against states for political purpose can be large or small. Similarly, wars waged by populaces against states for political purposes can be large or small.

A State, however, has very different risks, vulnerabilites, strengths, etc than a populace-based organization that must be addressed very differntly (and both fine tuned by the details of the situation at hand.

So ask yourself, are your dealing with a state, or a populace as the first, and most important branch in your quest for understanding.

I also contend that the one thing truly unique today is the rate and availability of information. This does not change the nature of war, but is does require one to reassess the TTPs that were developed for dealing with populace based wars prior to the 1980s. I believe it was this modern information age that actually brought down the Soviets (sure the West's containment efforts and the Soviet's own weak economy and mistakes contributed), but when it all began to quickly unravel, it was the people across eastern europe empowered and informed that made it happen. This was just the bowwave of similar popular uprising in the Middle East and Africa today.

One significant differnce is that Gorbachav made the conscious decision not to counter these popular uprisings. The West, faced with a similar loss of control over populaces of the Middle East chose a differnt route... So the Soviet puppets were tumbled, the Western puppets still sit; pretty fascinating stuff actually.

bspeer
11-10-2009, 01:28 PM
I have found it is always quite difficult to use modern terms in reference to centuries old warfare. The debate about the about Jeff Davis' "offensive-defensive" vs. "defensive-offensive" is but one example.

At times, one man's insurgency is another's conventional war.

Steve Blair
11-10-2009, 02:28 PM
Edit
One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.

It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.

Kevin23
11-10-2009, 11:26 PM
Kevin23,

You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8499.

davidbfpo


Sorry for the late reply Davidbfpo,

I really wasn't planning any extensive research paper or anything else on this subject at current time, as I mainly started this thread as topic of discussion. However to answer your post, haven't really had a chance to read anything by Pakenham or about the Boer War recently. Although I did read the illustrated edition of his book on the Boer War a very long time ago. Also I have read Martin Meredith's book on the war, Diamond's Gold, and War. So overall throughout the years I've always thought as the Boer War as mainly a guerillia war and I have seen it presented in that way when reading history.

Dayuhan
11-11-2009, 08:31 AM
I also contend that the one thing truly unique today is the rate and availability of information. This does not change the nature of war, but is does require one to reassess the TTPs that were developed for dealing with populace based wars prior to the 1980s. I believe it was this modern information age that actually brought down the Soviets (sure the West's containment efforts and the Soviet's own weak economy and mistakes contributed), but when it all began to quickly unravel, it was the people across eastern europe empowered and informed that made it happen. This was just the bowwave of similar popular uprising in the Middle East and Africa today.

One significant differnce is that Gorbachav made the conscious decision not to counter these popular uprisings. The West, faced with a similar loss of control over populaces of the Middle East chose a differnt route... So the Soviet puppets were tumbled, the Western puppets still sit; pretty fascinating stuff actually.

Other than Iran in 1953, where has "the West" countered a popular uprising in the Middle East... and where in the Middle East does "the West" still control a populace?

Dayuhan
11-11-2009, 08:39 AM
It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.

In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.

Bob's World
11-11-2009, 12:09 PM
Other than Iran in 1953, where has "the West" countered a popular uprising in the Middle East... and where in the Middle East does "the West" still control a populace?

Control is a relative term of course, and if one takes it too literally one is apt to mollify themselves into a self-serving perspective that casts ones meddling into a benign, always good to all people, light.

This is not how the populaces of the region see it, and it is their perception that matters in the current conflict. The U.S. must target that perception to prevail, not the insurgent elements of those populace, nor even be perceived as merely building the capacity of those governments we have helped establish and sustain to continue their reigns over their populaces by crushing popular uprisings in the name of "counterterrorism."

Take your own home. The people of the Philippines don't believe there is excessive US meddling in their governnance? The people don't perceive that on many issues the national government listens more to, and responds to, what the US wants over what they want? The people of the nation, don't in large numbers support organizations like the NPA in the north, or the MILF and MNLF in the south as expressions of their sense of lack of representation in and support by their own government? Even with the extremely carefully tailored US operations in support of the AFP in the south, with every action by-thru-with Philippine lead, is there not perceptions and constant challenges raised that the US is exerting its will there and helping the government to suppress a problem rather than actually resolve it?

Perception is fact in this business, and in many places we make it all too easy for those who oppose the status quo to spin facts to support their agendas. My position is that the US must update its engagement for the current world order rather than the last one, and thereby disempower the messages of many of these resistance movements by becoming a leader for self-determination and freedom for all peoples. And that requires relinquishing control of what those outcomes will look like. By controlling less, I believe we will influence more.

Steve Blair
11-12-2009, 02:30 PM
In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.

I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle. What I was pointing out was that the "white man's invincibility" had been a myth for some years prior to World War II and that there were small wars prior to the Boer War. Artificially starting the "small wars clock" at that point risks missing everything that came before, as does focusing the examination on European colonial possessions in the Pacific region.

There's nothing wrong, obviously, with giving those conflicts careful and thoughtful study. But there are other regions and periods that would repay examination.

wm
11-12-2009, 03:13 PM
I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle. What I was pointing out was that the "white man's invincibility" had been a myth for some years prior to World War II and that there were small wars prior to the Boer War. Artificially starting the "small wars clock" at that point risks missing everything that came before, as does focusing the examination on European colonial possessions in the Pacific region.

There's nothing wrong, obviously, with giving those conflicts careful and thoughtful study. But there are other regions and periods that would repay examination.

I suspect that much of the West's experience with small wars (notably European nations to include UK, France, Portugal, and Germany) is more closely tied to the occupation of Africa during the latter half of the 19th Century. Efforts on the Pacific rim gain importance for Americans because that's pretty much the only place US troops fought (Boxer Rebellion, Phillippine Insurrection) outside our own continent prior to the World Wars.

I also have trouble calling the 2nd Boer War a small war (400k+ Brit troops was an enormous commitment for those days) and think that Pakenham may not be the best source for that war as well (largely a British perspective in his presentation). Others' mileage may vary.

Dayuhan
11-19-2009, 03:25 AM
I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle.

I didn't mean to suggest that you had. I wished to point out that our antagonists in today's small wars have access to infinitely greater resources and capabilities than those in the small wars of old, which might limit the value of the lessons to be learned from those conflicts. It's also worth noting that many of the methods used in early small wars such as the Philippine-American War (not an insurrection) or the wars against the native Americans would today be regarded as illegal, politically unacceptable, and in some cases genocidal, and would hardly be applicable to today's conflicts.

I'm not saying these conflicts do not deserve study, but any lessons deduced need to be taken with several grains of salt.

Dayuhan
11-19-2009, 03:51 AM
First we have this...


One significant differnce is that Gorbachav made the conscious decision not to counter these popular uprisings. The West, faced with a similar loss of control over populaces of the Middle East chose a differnt route... So the Soviet puppets were tumbled, the Western puppets still sit; pretty fascinating stuff actually.


And then this...


This is not how the populaces of the region see it, and it is their perception that matters in the current conflict. The U.S. must target that perception to prevail


So what do we face here, a perception that needs to be addressed or a policy that needs to be changed? There is a difference. Are you saying that the perception is accurate, or that we need to counter its inaccuracy? If the former, I think that claim needs to be supported with evidence and reasoning.


nor even be perceived as merely building the capacity of those governments we have helped establish and sustain to continue their reigns over their populaces by crushing popular uprisings in the name of "counterterrorism."


Again I have to ask; which governments are we talking about? What governments did the US help establish? Where have we crushed popular uprisings in the name of "counterterrorism"?



Take your own home. The people of the Philippines don't believe there is excessive US meddling in their governnance?


In general, no, they don't. A few loud voices on the left do, but if any significant portion of the populace agreed with them the demonstrations outside the embassy wouldn't be made up of the same 200 mantra-chanting leftists that have been rallying there for the last 30 years, and they wouldn't be outnumbered 10 to 1 by the horde of visa-seekers. The NPA leaders don't like the US, but they represent a tiny fraction of the populace; most NPA fighters are fighting over personal grievances with the Government or its representatives, and have little concern with US "meddling". The MILF is actively seeking a US role at peace negotiations: they know the US wants a deal made and they know the US can pressure the Philippine government.

All of this illustrates some problems I see with the reasoning you suggest.

It is simply impossible to speak in any relevant terms about what "a populace" or "the populace" wants or believes. No populace is monolithic, some think some things and some think other things. We often grant far too much importance to the views of small numbers of people who have very loud voices, are allied with influential groups of foreign ideologues, or are willing to use violence. Just because a group is loud does not mean it represents a populace.

If there is an active insurgency in a nation, that does certainly suggest that a large portion of a populace or sub-populace is disaffected. The existence of a terrorist group does not have to mean the same thing: many terrorist groups do not represent popular sentiment, only the opinions of a highly disaffected fringe. For example, if Al Qaeda had sufficient support in Saudi Arabia to generate an insurgency, they would certainly do it. They haven't done it because they simply don't have the support. Saudis may support AQ as long as they are fighting someone else, somewhere far away, but they don't want AQ taking over their country.

It is all too easy for us to project our own desires or sentiments onto a foreign populace, and assume that they want what we would want in their place and that they want us to help them get it. This is not necessarily the case. Many populace in the Middle East may want more self-determination, but their idea of how that would look is likely to differ radically from ours, and they certainly don't want us trying to meddle in their struggle to attain what they desire. Any involvement on our part will be interpreted as self-interested interference. We can't cure past meddling by meddling more.

We also need to understand that our capacity to exert pressure on Middle East governments (except perhaps that of Israel) is limited. If we're talking about the oil-producing governments, other than that of Iraq, our influence is practically non-existent. These governments don't need us, they don't depend on us, we don't sustain them. Anything we do for them they can get elsewhere, anything we sell them they can buy elsewhere, anything we buy from them can be sold elsewhere. The Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Emiratis etc have far more leverage over us than we have over them.


My position is that the US must update its engagement for the current world order rather than the last one, and thereby disempower the messages of many of these resistance movements by becoming a leader for self-determination and freedom for all peoples. And that requires relinquishing control of what those outcomes will look like. By controlling less, I believe we will influence more.

I'd agree that we have to update our methods of engagement, but I suspect that this needs to mean less meddling, not an effort at counter-meddling. I'd also be curious to know which resistance movements you see in the picture that are arguing for self-determination and freedom. Certainly Al Qaeda, which is (or should be) our primary antagonist at this point, is not arguing for either; quite the opposite.

Hugh Davis
11-19-2009, 06:16 AM
I share the frustration of the other participants. it is difficult to agree on a common vocabulary & definitions, to ensure we clearly communicate the precise ideas we want to discuss, without ambiguity. Adding new buzzwords to our vocabulary further complicates matters.

Since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, humans have banded together to secure the needs & wants of one community against the needs & wants of other communuties. Some of these bands evolve into sophisticated cultures & societies, with robust economic, political & military institutions. Some remain relatively unsophisticated, or allow their sophistication to evolve in different directions.

When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers.

I agree with the earlier commenters that we have much to learn from history. I encourage my children - and other students - to learn from what worked, first, and then to learn from what did not work. After allowing them a few minutes to think about those overly simplified concepts, I remind them that the hard part is figuring out why something did or did not work.

I suspect that we may learn as much about how to succeed in attaining a worthy goal by studying the techniques and practices used to pursue a goal we would not approve, as we could by studying for example, archaic techniques used to pursue less controversial goals.

I think we should draw rational distinctions between different war environments, bearing in mind that all such classifications are at least partly artificial. Sometimes geographic factors are important in analyzing the nature of a conflict. Economic factors, and their impact on social factors, are almost always at the heart of the nature of the conflict. I think anyone who studies human conflict can identify scores of differentiating factors that could be used to classify conflicts. I also think the same serious students of conflict can identify several recurrent themes that cut across any classifications we might devise.

We can rationally differentiate according to the strenght of each belligerent, as well as their relative strength. The political status of the parties may be relevant. Religious, ideological and ethnic/nationalist factors may also shed light.

That's not to say the classification is worthless; to the contrary, I think it helps us break down the individual cases into their component parts, but also allows us to bring those parts back up in a different context, so we can better understand which factors affect each other, & how they do so.

Each conflict cited in this discussion thread should offer valuable lessons to us. The question is whether we can find them & apply them.

What were the participants trying to accomplish? Did they rationally weigh the costs & benefits of pursuing their goal? What course did they pursue to attain the goal? What barriers did they encounter? How did they adapt? Did they attain the stated goal? Did they regret the price they paid?

I can't speak for other scholars on this point, but I try to separate my personal feelings about colonialism & imperialism from my examination of the history. It is hard to avoid tainting analysis with emotional or moral judgments. I am trying to remind myself that the moral analysis can be done after the facts are studied and the utility of the actions are analyzed.

It strikes me as possible (and undesirable) to reject out of hand a morally and ethically defensible technique that was employed to achieve a policy goal I regard as immoral. Without diminishing my moral standing to criticize the abhorrent policy goal, I should try to remain open-minded enough to recognize a technique that appears to be effective, and which could be put to use pursuing a more worthy goal.

Of course, the more moral baggage associated with an event in history, the more difficult it is for us to achieve this elusive objectivity. At the same time, we don't want to slide down the other slope & pretend that morality & ethics have no light to shed on our studies.

The more I learn, the more I see that I need to learn. I have been learning much over the past few months as I read the thoughtful insights of the contributors to these discussions. I expect to keep learning, as long as I live. Thanks for contributing to my learning.

William F. Owen
11-19-2009, 06:23 AM
It strikes me as possible (and undesirable) to reject out of hand a morally and ethically defensible technique that was employed to achieve a policy goal I regard as immoral. Without diminishing my moral standing to criticize the abhorrent policy goal, I should try to remain open-minded enough to recognize a technique that appears to be effective, and which could be put to use pursuing a more worthy goal.


So given a morally justifiable end, you can employ "effective" means? This is extremely context dependant, but I do agree that it is the purpose to which force in employed that should largely (not exclusively) define its political merit. However almost every NGO in the world rejects that view.

Hugh Davis
11-19-2009, 07:21 AM
All human endeavours are highly context specific. I was trying not to wander too far off the reservation with a philosophical treatise, but sometimes, one's own thoughts can seem overly fascinating.

To more directly address your comment & question, I think it is important to weigh the morality of both goals and techniques. Ideally, we would hope to have a clearly moral goal to pursue, and a toolbox full of clearly moral techniques to choose from as we pursue that goal.

I think it would be overly cautious to reject a course of action with no inherent moral fault, just because it appears to have been "tainted" by another's use of that technique to pursue a less acceptable goal.

Colonialism is a good example of what I have in mind. Please read in any appropriate caveats; like most human activities, colonialism was fueled by mixed motives. However, I think it's fair to say that modern society, both East & West, are uncomfortable with the colonial heritage. There are sound moral arguments to be made against the exploitative nature of colonialism.

Since I haven't walked in the shoes of those who colonized the less developed continents, I won't try to weigh the selfish factors against the generous factors that may have motivated them. I simply note that times have changed, and the older colonial model is not acceptable today, especially when it involves subjugation of both the people and the wealth of the colony. That goal is not acceptable today, and you can use the terms "ethics" and "morality" to describe that fact.

However, I have observed that some colonies developed habits of representative government, respect for the rule of law, respect for individual liberties, and other habits & institutions that helped them form relatively stable governments as they became independent. Naturally, the citizens of these former colonies merit our respect for governing themselves effectively.

My curiosity, however, causes me to wonder what actions by colonial governments encouraged or discouraged this development. There may be lessons here to learn as we seek to help other unstable societies build the institutions & habits that will allow their citizens to enjoy stability and liberty.

I can imagine an otherwise intelligent person saying that we must not copy the policies & procedures of the British Raj, because the goal of exploiting India's wealth was clearly wrong, and therefore, any activity that contributed to that goal is inherently wrong, so we should not use those policies or procedures, even to accomplish a wholly different goal.

I will now confess that I know much less than I want to know about colonial administration. There is at least one other thread extant on this topic, & I'm learning from it. Since I know less than I need to know, I can't be very specific about which practices could be adapted to the modern nation-building environment.

In the point you questioned, I was alluding to the possibility of using the experience of the India Office & the Foreign & Colonial Office to inform the efforts of modern statesmen to assist residents of unstable countries in developing stable institutions. My concern was that the "taint" of colonialism would keep us from asking whether there is a specific moral concern about whichever specific procedures we are examining. If the (hypothetical) procedure is not inherently wrong, it makes sense to me to use it to further the goal of assisting a nation in building a stable state capable of protecting the lives, liberty and property of its people.

Thanks for commenting. Questions make us think more clearly. If it didn't lead me to write more clearly, I apologize. I should have been asleep before I started writing.

M-A Lagrange
11-19-2009, 08:13 AM
When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers.


Could you come with a specific reference to Tarbaby effect?


So given a morally justifiable end, you can employ "effective" means? This is extremely context dependant, but I do agree that it is the purpose to which force in employed that should largely (not exclusively) define its political merit. However almost every NGO in the world rejects that view.

By William F. Owen

This is the perception the military has of the NGO. NGO position is less and less clear and orthodox on that particular point. Many would like to find a Leviathan to protect them (first) and the populations (when they are secured). The real question being which political power is found legitimate by NGOs to be respected as a legitimate user of force. I was once discussing the very same issue with a friend from MSF. He came with this comment: “we (MSF) love the rebels. We do not like the official armies of any countries but we love the rebels.”
This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority. But if this is what you see on the ground, this is far from being what you see in the HQ. In all HQ of the world, NGO are doing what governments are telling them. NGO are quite a traditional actor into war. They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.

William F. Owen
11-19-2009, 08:44 AM
This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority.
As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.


They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.
Not sure what you mean by "as in Israel", but whose legitimacy, when and where?
EG:After Israel evicted the Jordanians from the West Bank in 1967, they became the "occupying power." Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.

M-A Lagrange
11-19-2009, 09:35 AM
As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.

Why do you want to take actions against them?
NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.

The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.

By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys. All you have to do is making sure that you control their funds sources and then NGO have an open position against you but do the job for you. But coordination of aid and harmonised approach is may be the most difficult to achieve.

William F. Owen
11-19-2009, 10:02 AM
Why do you want to take actions against them?
I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.


NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.
That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.


The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.
Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.

By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys. Are they really that stupid and simplistic?

Dayuhan
11-19-2009, 11:42 AM
Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.

Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken. Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer. I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.

M-A Lagrange
11-19-2009, 12:24 PM
Are they really that stupid and simplistic?

I’ll start by the easiest. No, they are not that simplistic once you have reached a certain level. But basically, in average 75% western expatriated relief worker are like that. Occupation always had and has bad publicity. By definition you are illegitimate as you are imposing a form of regulation by the use of force. You have to have in mind that they just believe they will impose the Humanitarian order on the world. Governments are not perceived as a partner or a power. They are perceived as threat. A government using force is then by definition a threat to Humanity.


I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.

Well… there always had and will always be. The first ones were not the enemy. So we have to just agree this enters into intelligence management.
As an example I will use a US NGO in Lebanon, in cities under Hezbollah administration. They use to fund huge projects implemented by Hezbollah NGOs and administration. Who was doing masked military activities?
The difficulty of using NGO as a weapon is basically found in the fact you cannot destroy your enemy and even less its effects. Social services delivered by the enemy to its population, whatever is the political back ground, will always have better publicity than yours. So you have to turn it in your advantage. It’s by the funds you can do it.


That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.


It applies to all NGO. It is not because the NGO is the best friend of your enemy it is not the best friend of a military power. Being protected by the Geneva Convention is an advantage for all and an obligation for all parts of the conflict. You cannot kill or arm NGO workers, properties and even less the medical facilities, vehicles and staff: basic constraints for all. All do not decide to apply it, OK, but this is not the point.
Your approach of NGO management is too direct. The bargain has to be apparently invisible. NGO will not do what you want for protection. Protecting them is your obligation. What you look at is having NGO doing what you want as part of their general activities. The dichotomy military and civilian has to be respected. (NGO are contesting your moral legitimacy in who is regulating war.) So you have to show that it is you who integrates their network.


Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.


The hearts and minds fallacy does not apply to conflicts settled in time for generations. It will be difficult to win the heart and the mind of an Israeli and a Palestinian. But I separate hearts and minds as a technical expression and the real object of counter insurgencies: social services distribution to support loyalist military activity.
This is as important than to know what the population thinks. In recent conflicts, as Iraq, what has been undermining all is the delay of reinstallation of basic social services and order. The longer you wait before addressing those simple issues, the larger you open the door to insurgency and, if you’re lucky, to civil war between all the factions who are trying to contest you the power vacuum. Civilian will go for the one who will protect them in a large understanding of protection.
Occupation is not limited to hold. Hold is a transition phase which has to integrate the roots of build. In my opinion, hold and build are mixed. Separating them is what leads to insurgencies.

In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names. :D

Camps are another issue by the way. They have a different legal status than an occupied land. They also fall under a different organization of political power. Would recommend Michel Agier On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (http://www.amazon.fr/Margins-World-Refugee-Experience-Today/dp/0745640524/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1258632871&sr=1-1) and his new book but I do not know if it is available in English: gerer les indesirables des camps de refgier au gouvernement humanitaire. (Managing the unwelcomed, from refugees camps to humanitarian government).

MikeF
11-19-2009, 02:12 PM
All human endeavours are highly context specific.

I was taught to call it METT-TC.

From M-A Lagrange

In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names.

Americans are pretty poor as colonists and running an empire. We're too nice. In Iraq and A'stan, the endstate is not to have a 51st and 52nd state. In truth, we'll be lucky to have neutral partners. I've been skimming the int'l contracts for both states. All the resources and money are going to China, Russia, and others. I have yet to see one major contract for an American company.

The true irony is that we may be paying for others freedom while assisting our economic competitors. So Strange.

William F. Owen
11-19-2009, 02:49 PM
Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken.
So? Why do I care what the other side thing? I am forcing my will upon them. My survival is more important than theirs.

Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer. -again, so what? Speaks to the political aim of the conflict.

I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.
Sure, but again so what?
What looks good on day one doesn't look good 3 years later. You can't tell the future and violence is instrumental to what it is used against, not things that have not yet occurred, or may be flow down effects.
If folks new their wives would divorce them they wouldn't get married.

William F. Owen
11-19-2009, 03:08 PM
Occupation always had and has bad publicity. By definition you are illegitimate as you are imposing a form of regulation by the use of force.
Says who?

Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.

Dayuhan
11-19-2009, 09:57 PM
Wilf, that approach is likely to earn you a lot of enemies and alienate any friends you have. That's fine if you have the capacity to control everyone around you, all by yourself, all the time, forever. Those of finite capacity might want to consider the possibility that their ability to control may eventually erode to the point where that kind of control is no longer possible. That's especially true of those who need external support and who require the regular consent of their own populace.

tequila
11-19-2009, 10:09 PM
I have yet to see one major contract for an American company.


I know you're not looking at DoD contracting there.

As far as mineral and oil exploitation think that is because both Iraq and Afghanistan represent risk profiles far outside that for most Western corporations. The Chinese, OTOH, are known for their willingness to go to marginal places on marginal contracts, often with thin to nonexistent profit margins in the Western sense.

Iraq, for all the progress, remains far more violent and politically unstable than Nigeria, for instance.

M-A Lagrange
11-20-2009, 09:57 AM
Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.

Like I said, NGO need challenging partners with whom them feel they are in control. Saying guys you do what you have been ordered to do just does not work. And it is a good thing. Nowadays we are conducting war among the people not war on a land populated with people. There is much to learn from NGO on how to conduct operations among the people.

And please, look at history. Part from Rome (with various success), when did an occupation have good press? Every time someone from outside comes to occupy a land, you can be sure the population will fight to quick the strangers out. This works everywhere, anytime and all the time…
It is one of the few things that never change in war.



The true irony is that we may be paying for others freedom while assisting our economic competitors. So Strange.

May be the Halliburton contracts at the early beginning of Iraq war were too much.
Also, colonization was first based on economical relations. Colonial wars were primally used to reinforce dominant positions. Cf Portugese in West Congo, French in West Africa... We first made trade then invaded the place. May be that is the key.
One of the calculations of Bush administration was to boost economy through war economy (Invading Iraq). 29 economic crises were solved by WW2. The main difference being the body count (dead do not look for employment).

John Grenier
06-14-2010, 01:07 AM
A lot of professional historians have said that the proper model for understanding at least US actions in the current messes is the Phil. insurrection, but that is even an overdrawn historical parallel IMHO.

The real problem with trying to "use" history for these issues is the cherry picking that goes on. Looking at any "small war" in history can lead one to find the Eureka! moment: "We should do X because Y did it and they won in Z." One of the great tropes is that history repeats itself. People repeat themselves, often to inimical effect. Remember, history not an exercise in lessons learned and case studies like the military's pathetic attempts at PME suggest (remember, PME is to education what air guitar is to music).

I just had a student in the Norwich MA in Mil Hist program write his end-of-program (we don't call it a thesis because it is not) on why the US military continues to conflate the terms UW, FID, revolutionary, guerrilla, COIN, LIC, IW, spec ops, etc. His argument fell partly on the point that the people responsible for writing the doctrine for those operations do not have the proper training in history. Instead, they cherry pick and think reading some stuff on the web will do the trick. Alas, it ain't so.

William F. Owen
06-14-2010, 04:50 AM
I just had a student in the Norwich MA in Mil Hist program write his end-of-program (we don't call it a thesis because it is not) on why the US military continues to conflate the terms UW, FID, revolutionary, guerrilla, COIN, LIC, IW, spec ops, etc. His argument fell partly on the point that the people responsible for writing the doctrine for those operations do not have the proper training in history. Instead, they cherry pick and think reading some stuff on the web will do the trick. Alas, it ain't so.

IMO, Doctrine writers tend not to write Doctrine. They write sales documents for concepts.
Doctrine writers and also Military Theorists, tend to be very bad at military history. Indeed we keep confusing "military historians" with "military theorists." Selective use of sources and simplistic narratives as to events are a huge problem.
My beef with most military history is it's failure to provide insight, and instead to provide narrative. When have almost no "Operational historians" bar the likes of Paddy Griffiths.

Dayuhan
06-14-2010, 09:37 PM
A lot of professional historians have said that the proper model for understanding at least US actions in the current messes is the Phil. insurrection, but that is even an overdrawn historical parallel IMHO.


What professional historian has said that, and where? Quite a bizarre contention, really.

"Philippine Insurrection" is in the first place a peculiar and ahistoric construct. Filipinos call it the Philippine-American War, probably more realistic. It was a conquest, not an insurrection, and despite some familiarity with it I can't see anything even vaguely resembling a useful parallel to the current conflicts. Certainly many of the methods employed would be neither acceptable nor useful today: can you imagine an American commander in Helmand or Kandahar pulling a Howlin' Jake Smith and ordering his men to kill every Afghan male over the age of 11? The times they have a'changed.

John Grenier
06-14-2010, 10:29 PM
Brian Linn for one.

John Grenier
06-14-2010, 10:42 PM
IMO, Doctrine writers tend not to write Doctrine. They write sales documents for concepts.
Doctrine writers and also Military Theorists, tend to be very bad at military history. Indeed we keep confusing "military historians" with "military theorists." Selective use of sources and simplistic narratives as to events are a huge problem.
My beef with most military history is it's failure to provide insight, and instead to provide narrative. When have almost no "Operational historians" bar the likes of Paddy Griffiths.

Doctrine is indeed a political football. Most of it is not worth the paper it is printed on.

Are you a member of SMH? I think you'll find that operational historians are a dying breed because they don't get at the important issues of history. A few places like CMH and CSI write operational histories, but they are really bad. Again, more just reports and lessons learned, but without the proper historic and historiographic context, they become useless. There are a lot of really outstanding military historians out there writing some really good stuff, but on the whole, folks in the military don't listen to them because of the anti-intellectual bias of the military. The good stuff is out there, but it takes a long time to master it.

Ken White
06-14-2010, 11:56 PM
... but on the whole, folks in the military don't listen to them because of the anti-intellectual bias of the military. The good stuff is out there, but it takes a long time to master it.I think rather than bias, your last clause better explains the failure to listen...

Dayuhan
06-15-2010, 04:53 AM
Brian Linn for one.

I liked Linn's book on the Philippine War, but the alleged similarities to Iraq leave me unmoved. The parallels do seem superficially compelling, especially to an audience with little knowledge of the Philippine conflict, but each is slightly stretched, and the cumulative stretch approaches the breaking point. The lessons to be deduced, IMO, go rather beyond the breaking point, and the rather more compelling differences between the conflicts don't seem to get much attention.

For example, there's a huge difference in the fundamental objective of the wars being looked at. The Philippine War was an outright war of conquest; the objective was to annex the Philippines and govern it directly as a colony. The objective in Iraq and Afghanistan is quite different: we're trying to develop an indigenous governing capacity, not to govern these states ourselves. This policies Linn cites as things the Americans did right in the Philippines generally involved the effective exercise of direct governance functions by Americans. This makes perfect sense in an environment we propose to directly govern. If the objective is to develop indigenous government, it makes no sense at all: if Americans directly exercise governance functions they are competing with and undermining the governance structure we are trying to create. Experience with imposing direct governance simply doesn't translate to an effort to cultivate independent governance.

There are other differences as well, many of them: the political and social context, the capacities and constraints of American forces, the capacities and constraints of opposing forces, and many others. In the context of the differences, the parallels, and the lessons deduced from them, grow rather pale.

I realize that academics with niche expertise have excellent reasons for drawing parallels between their niche and current conditions, but the rest of us would be well advised to crank up the skepticism before accepting the conclusions emerging from the process.

slapout9
06-15-2010, 05:04 AM
Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

Nothing wrong with Guerrilla Warfare(armed civilians fighting for a cause). 95% of the world will understand what mean, the only people who don't are in the military.:)

John Grenier
06-20-2010, 05:57 PM
I realize that academics with niche expertise have excellent reasons for drawing parallels between their niche and current conditions, but the rest of us would be well advised to crank up the skepticism before accepting the conclusions emerging from the process.

I will let Brian defend himself (if he even cares). But I think its too easy to discount his expertise and the nuances of what he has to say as "niche expertise" ... the skepticism is often a fig leaf for anti-intellectual bias. I mean really, it's not like the "doers" have done the square root of dick to solve the problems. Perhaps we should listen to some of those pointy headed intellectuals who have spent their entire adult lives thinking about these issues.

jmm99
06-20-2010, 06:52 PM
what is an intellectual ?

Serious question, so I ken whether I is or is not one - and whether I've an anti-intellectual bias.

Regards

Mike

John Grenier
06-20-2010, 08:10 PM
Pretty clear: the guys who puff out their chests and say that the academics "don't know anything because they have never been there" (which often isn't the case because the academics have been there and they've decided to move on to another side of their lives), the military types who refuse to embrace any kind of real learning and education and continue to propogate the "lessons learned" joke that is PME; the promotion system that looks down upon officers with advanced degrees (as in they are wasting their time in graduate school instead of being the aide to some dull witted GO, which is the key to promotion) and makes it very difficult for them to get promoted; the guys who just discount the experts (normally it takes 12,000 to 15,000 hours of experience in anything to approach being an expert, but people who have read a dozen really bad books on this crap will consider themselves experts) because they are not in the military. It's like porn, you can't really define it (those Richard Hofstader did), but you recognize it when you see it.

Kevin23
06-20-2010, 11:02 PM
Pretty clear: the guys who puff out their chests and say that the academics "don't know anything because they have never been there" (which often isn't the case because the academics have been there and they've decided to move on to another side of their lives), the military types who refuse to embrace any kind of real learning and education and continue to propogate the "lessons learned" joke that is PME; the promotion system that looks down upon officers with advanced degrees (as in they are wasting their time in graduate school instead of being the aide to some dull witted GO, which is the key to promotion) and makes it very difficult for them to get promoted; the guys who just discount the experts (normally it takes 12,000 to 15,000 hours of experience in anything to approach being an expert, but people who have read a dozen really bad books on this crap will consider themselves experts) because they are not in the military. It's like porn, you can't really define it (those Richard Hofstader did), but you recognize it when you see it.

Excuse my lack of experience or naivete,

However, I thought from within the officer corps especially earning a graduate degree of any level or type was something highly valuable and rewarded?

Also doesn't the type of thinking you described exist in the other organs of US defense and foreign policymaking?

Btw I hope I'm not steering to far off topic?

jmm99
06-20-2010, 11:47 PM
definitely not highly valuable and rewarded. That's why Dave Petraeus is still an O-5. :D

And keep trucking on your degrees.

Regards

Mike

John Grenier
06-21-2010, 12:32 AM
You've fallen for it -- of course in a system as large as the US military, some guys will get to the top. DP is the wunderkind and an extreme political animal -- the reason he got promoted wasn't because of his degrees, but because he played the political game. That's how all GOs get promoted. BTW, what has his genius done for us in winning these wars? Nothing.

The military values bull#### degrees, like the ones they get from PME.

Sure, there is a direct connection between academia and the government -- it is pretty much the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex. The problem is that the military guys never have the brainpower to contribute much in those circles. Some folks are happy being a tool. Here's a question for you? When was the last time the highly educated brain trust of the US military won a war for this country? Something is clearly wrong in the way we are educating our highest and most trusted officers.

Pete
06-21-2010, 01:36 AM
John, are you the person described in this biographical sketch (http://www.filedby.com/author/john_grenier/2185952/)? I'm trying to put your point of view in context.

John Grenier
06-21-2010, 03:16 AM
Pete,

Yes, sir.

Dayuhan
06-23-2010, 08:00 AM
I will let Brian defend himself (if he even cares). But I think its too easy to discount his expertise and the nuances of what he has to say as "niche expertise" ... the skepticism is often a fig leaf for anti-intellectual bias. I mean really, it's not like the "doers" have done the square root of dick to solve the problems. Perhaps we should listen to some of those pointy headed intellectuals who have spent their entire adult lives thinking about these issues.

I wouldn't wish to comment on anti-academic bias in the military: the closest I've come to the military is this website, which probably does not constitute a representative sample. I recognize that the measurement of bias is necessarily imprecise, but it might be amusing to weigh the proposed anti-academic bias of the military against the frequently alleged anti-military bias in the academe.

In any event, as I stated above, I find the comparison between the Philippine-American conflict and the current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan to be strained and unpersuasive. A few reasons are hinted at above; I'm willing to expand upon those if it seems appropriate. If you disagree, you might consider telling us why... if you're finished making assumptions about other participants in the discussion.

William F. Owen
06-23-2010, 09:40 AM
But I think its too easy to discount his expertise and the nuances of what he has to say as "niche expertise" ... the skepticism is often a fig leaf for anti-intellectual bias. I mean really, it's not like the "doers" have done the square root of dick to solve the problems. Perhaps we should listen to some of those pointy headed intellectuals who have spent their entire adult lives thinking about these issues.
Actually on reflection spurred by Dayuhan, I would opine that actually there is a real problem in both the UK and US with pseudo-academia or real academic issues never held to rigour.
The whole COIN debate has been characterised by poor history, sloppy thinking, and agenda pumping. None of those things speak well of a desire to be academic, if the folks concerned are not forced to be disciplined.

Just because someone got a PhD, it does not mean they can take their training wheels off.

Kevin23
06-25-2010, 02:17 AM
Actually on reflection spurred by Dayuhan, I would opine that actually there is a real problem in both the UK and US with pseudo-academia or real academic issues never held to rigour.
The whole COIN debate has been characterised by poor history, sloppy thinking, and agenda pumping. None of those things speak well of a desire to be academic, if the folks concerned are not forced to be disciplined.

Just because someone got a PhD, it does not mean they can take their training wheels off.

However despite these points,

Couldn't it obviously be agreed on though that some progress within the COIN debate, has been made in terms of addressing the three issues that you just mentioned and that been alluded to earlier?

William F. Owen
06-25-2010, 05:00 AM
Couldn't it obviously be agreed on though that some progress within the COIN debate, has been made in terms of addressing the three issues that you just mentioned and that been alluded to earlier?
Progress has certainly been made. Even the stupidest pig finds a truffle! :)
However we are still living under the influence of some less than stellar thinking.

Steve Blair
06-25-2010, 01:42 PM
Progress has certainly been made. Even the stupidest pig finds a truffle! :)
However we are still living under the influence of some less than stellar thinking.

And that comes from all quarters (to include the military).

Degrees these days are box-checks, and may not be what they were fifty years ago. And military training has had issues in the United States for the entire existence of the nation. Put the two together, and you have issues.

The whole COIN issue, to me, should be "are we going to actually preserve what we learned this time?" instead of "is Iraq like the Philippines/Vietnam/Malaya". And I don't have much faith in the U.S. military retaining anything of value, since it's failed to do so in every other conflict of this nature that it's been involved in.

William F. Owen
06-25-2010, 01:59 PM
The whole COIN issue, to me, should be "are we going to actually preserve what we learned this time?" instead of "is Iraq like the Philippines/Vietnam/Malaya". And I don't have much faith in the U.S. military retaining anything of value, since it's failed to do so in every other conflict of this nature that it's been involved in.
You can, as you did with WW2 IF someone bothers to codify the lessons into an understanding and practice of Irregular Warfare. COIN is a form Warfare, beyond anything else. It IS about breaking will. It needs to be considered in those terms and the lessons will endure.

Steve Blair
06-25-2010, 02:02 PM
You can, as you did with WW2 IF someone bothers to codify the lessons into an understanding and practice of Irregular Warfare. COIN is a form Warfare, beyond anything else. It IS about breaking will. It needs to be considered in those terms and the lessons will endure.

You appear to have more faith in the system than I do, which may be a good thing. I think the last serious effort to do this was the USMC Small Wars Manual.

Dayuhan
06-26-2010, 02:20 AM
The problem with trying to codify the lessons of past experience, of course, is that every case is different and what works in one may not work in another. A manual - even a very good one - makes an excellent servant and a terrible master. It's all too easy to cast them in the latter role.

Somewhere between trying to fight yesterday's war and relearning everything from scratch there is probably a wise middle ground, but I don't know that we'll ever find it.

The Owen/Jones debate - break the will of the insurgent vs remove the root cause of the insurgency - will always be with us and probably always should be: both sides have an important piece of the puzzle. The balance between the two that any given situation requires will have to be worked out on a case to case basis. There is no recipe.

I'm not convinced that there's any set of tactical lessons or methods that would have made our current engagements substantially easier or more successful, because I believe that the primary errors that created the mess were at the level of policy and strategy. A better field manual might have helped in a few cases and a few places, but I can't see it changing the overall picture.

I also don't see the "lessons of late 19th/early 20th century asymmetric warfare" being a game-changer. Certainly it was much easier for light-skinned people to whip dark-skinned people into submission then than it is now: that's why Portugal can no longer run Brazil, Belgium can no longer run the Congo, England can no longer run India. These things have not become impossible because we have lost some knowledge or capacity that our ancestors had, they've become impossible because the world today is a very different place. Our problem isn't that we have failed to learn the lessons of history, but that the other folks have succeeded in learning the lessons of history. The things we did back then are not going to work today, it's time to adjust to the real world before us.

John Grenier
06-26-2010, 02:36 AM
Actually on reflection spurred by Dayuhan, I would opine that actually there is a real problem in both the UK and US with pseudo-academia or real academic issues never held to rigour.
The whole COIN debate has been characterised by poor history, sloppy thinking, and agenda pumping. None of those things speak well of a desire to be academic, if the folks concerned are not forced to be disciplined.

Just because someone got a PhD, it does not mean they can take their training wheels off.

Nuff said.