Economics and Irregular Warfare [Archive]

vertnyc

11-10-2009, 02:12 PM

I'm the Brigade Economic Development Officer for Task Force Stryker in Southern Afghanistan and I've done Zero Economic Development. I was sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

We are here now in Afghanistan and I spend most of my time focused on stabilization, which isn't taught in any of our officer courses or NCOES.

The COIN Academy in Camp Julien just had their inaugural Stability course in early November.

Stabilization, Development and Economics are linear processes in my mind. If the area does not have persistent security and the population's grievances are not addressed, then don't even worry about Development or "Economics."

I hate when USAID from Kabul comes down and talks about GDP. What does GDP have to do with anything in a remote village in Southern Afghanistan where they think the Russians are back?

Assuming that we get good at stabilization and start looking at development- that is a dangerous road for the military to take because we do not have the program management skills necessary for big development. If you mean development in terms of building a small well then perhaps we do...but I'd argue that we cannot even really build a well then QA/QC it.

Also building wells are stupid because it lowers the water table but that's a diffferent story.

The only other uses that my training has helped with is making sure CERP and/or other projects do not cause inflation in the economy or a rise in commodity prices like gravel and other construction material.

Anyways- fiscal discipline on the part of the military isn't good enough as other instruments of national power have programs which have budgets that I get the feeling "have to be expended" by a certain time. Which is bad. And it's really bad if you concentrate in only two Provinces and spend $240+ Million in the next 10 months.

Hacksaw

11-10-2009, 02:53 PM

Kind of a loaded question since our officers come from three commissioning sources... without a doubt the USMA Grads for thorough understanding of Micro, Macro and International Economics (SOSH Rules :D)... seriously USMA grads do get at least a semester of economics and when I left the three highest degree granting programs were 1. Econ, 2. Intl Relations, 3. American Politics... all in the Dept of Social Sciences... ergo most (of at least the MAJ and below) USMA grads do have more than an introductory education in econ...

Perhaps without realizing it... your whole last post showed a level of appreciation for the economic impact of operations -- a good thing...

However, if the question is whether our CPT-COL Commanders understand the impact they are making at the municipal level I'd shrug and say some yes some probably no... for some as you say it is still somewhere down the priority list that they haven't gotten to because they've as yet est. conditions necessary to think about micro development...

So was your post out of frustration with the green tabs in the BCT??? Kind of a you sent me for 6 mths to UW then ignore everything I have to say???

If so, have you addressed them with the BCT CDR? Do you have a seat at the table with the planners are you interacting with the plans shop of your higher hqs???

Best of Luck, Live well and row

MM12

11-12-2009, 05:11 AM

Well to introduce myself, I am a CPT in the US Army. I have some fellow friends in Afghanistan and Iraq who are commanders, BN S3A, or BN/BDE S4s. I have heard from them including my personal experience the diffculties of having to develop a local community. It seems the Joint and highest echelons of the US Army leadership anticipate (based upon current doctrine) that our officers have to develop the local communities in their AOR, but have not provided them the know how in either the schools or manuals.

I'm concerned about the long term effect this may have especially in countries that are not developed such as Afghanistan. Imagine a company or battalion commander who has significant amount of CERP funds and all of a sudden is investing these funds in a tiny community, the impact is major in a positive sense but also negative too. Its a double edged sword.

Security will always be the most important line of operation, but economics is always going to be second most important (or at least it should be with the framework of COIN). If the military wholeheartedly adds irregular warfare to the spectrum of operations, it needs to find ways to educate its officers and prepare them for not only the security challenges, but the cultural challenges which includes economics as well. Each society views property differently as they do with capital, wealth and many other economic terms....these are all related to COIN, stablization, reconstruction, etc. We and the force need to be aware of this and understand the dynamics of economics to be successful.

If a community relies on the US to provide financial resources, can the local, provincial or national governments support them if the US leaves? If not, then all that was done was for nothing.

Thanks for the replies and hope to hear some more....

Surferbeetle

11-12-2009, 05:27 AM

SWOT (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis)

VRINE (http://www.google.com/search?q=VRINE&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a)

Balanced Scorecard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balanced_scorecard)

Peter Drucker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Drucker)

Harvard Business Review (http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/)

Value Chain Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_chain)

From USAID: CASHMERE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS AFGHANISTAN (http://www.ahdp.net/reports/Cashmere%20Value%20Chain%20Analysis.pdf)

The USAID-funded Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP) is committed to create broad-based, market-led agriculture development with the aim to provide economic opportunities for rural Afghans. The cashmere value chain is one of the selected value chains on which ASAP will concentrate. This report provides an overview and analysis of the Cashmere Value Chain, linking the global context to the national context, with the aim of determining Afghanistan’s competitiveness and identifying main leverage points and key strategies to improve Afghanistan’s competitiveness and promote development in a pro-poor manner. It will provide the basis for ASAP’s interventions in the Cashmere Value Chain, and will lay the foundation for ASAP’s cooperation with other agencies active in the sector.

From Roots of Peace: Baseline Survey Report on Villages for Value Chain Business in Afghanistan (http://www.rootsofpeace.org/documents/ADB_RBSP_Program-Baseline_Survey_of_Villages-RoP-April-2009.pdf)

Agricultural growth and development is deeply intertwined with economic progress. Afghan agriculture possesses the basis and resources for many value chain businesses like cultivation of potatoes, vegetables, oil crops, animal products, carpet weaving and other major crops (i.e. fruits, nuts, other horticultural products, spices, medicinal herbs, forestry, livestock and fisheries) that can be the basis for a large number of agro-based industries and commercial activities. Investment in electricity generation, small and medium scale dams and reservoirs, local roads, agro-training and extension activities, large scale introduction of modern practices in value chains, irrigation, research and development, agricultural and ecological education and training need to be introduced into the country.

Schmedlap

11-12-2009, 05:40 AM

Just a few things I'll throw out there...

Economic development should not fall upon the shoulders of a company or battalion that could unexpectedly receive orders to operate in a new AOR at any given time, either by redrawing boundaries or relocating. It should be handled by higher level units that have more direct communication with higher level political operatives and more direct channels to other agencies within our government - which allows them to tap into greater and more diverse funding sources.

CERP is a tool for short-term projects to gain short-term advantages for small units and it is also a damage control instrument. It is not, nor should it be, a tool for economic development. If any unit is under the impression that they are disbursing CERP funds as part of a long-term stimulus program, then they either misunderstood their commander's intent or their commander gave them some bad information.

Surferbeetle

11-12-2009, 06:04 AM

...having a discussion concerning economics and irregular warfare with your local CA-bubba and/or PRT-bubba. It should help to dispel some common misconceptions about what is possible...

CERP

CALL Handbook 09-27 (http://call.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf)

GTA 90-01-017 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/jcchb/Contingency%20Model/JCC/JCC%20Tools%20CD/training_smartcard/CERP%20GTA%2090-01-017.pdf)

USAID

Local Governance Program (http://www.lgp-iraq.org/)

Provincial Economic Growth Project/Tijara (http://www.tijara-iraq.com/)

National Capacity Development/Tatweer (http://www.tatweer-iraq.com/)

CERP is a tool for short-term projects to gain short-term advantages for small units and it is also a damage control instrument. It is not, nor should it be, a tool for economic development. If any unit is under the impression that they are disbursing CERP funds as part of a long-term stimulus program, then they either misunderstood their commander's intent or their commander gave them some bad information.

Schmedlap,

Please clarify your point...opinion or fact, and cite your references.

Thanks,

Steve

Bill Moore

11-12-2009, 06:30 AM

1. If you haven't read the Ugly American read it, if you have read it again.

2. Talk to the locals again and again and really seek to understand how their economy functions and what their desires are.

3. Don't preach U.S. free markets, complex economic theories, or promise projects that are more than several months in the making (such a new dam for power production). You'll lose credibiility.

4. Manage expectations, and ensure that any economic quality of life improvements are well known throughout the target audience. You must create the perception of progress.

5. Find an economic development mentor who really understands development in developing nations. They probably don't need laptops and building a school won't put food on the table anytime soon. Identify where you can make real differences, "possible" examples include:

a. Bringing in small business/trade instructors to train the women on a craft that will allow them to make money for the family.

b. Send individuals off to trade school, and help them establish their business when they return (mini loans to stand up their business)

c. Bring in experts (agriculture, other as applicable) to share knowledge on how to improve upon what they're doing already.

6. Use economic development to influence a populace if at all possible. Identify a project of value (the people will tell you what it is, you don't determine it), ensure you can deliver, then tell them what the cost is (no IED attacks upon coalition forces for 2 weeks and we'll start on it (you better deliver), and as long as no IED attacks are the norm we'll continue to work on it.

Best of luck to you.

Dayuhan

11-12-2009, 08:10 AM

I have heard from them including my personal experience the diffculties of having to develop a local community. It seems the Joint and highest echelons of the US Army leadership anticipate (based upon current doctrine) that our officers have to develop the local communities in their AOR, but have not provided them the know how in either the schools or manuals.

Purely an opinion, but an opinion from one's who's spent a few decades around development projects, and seen a few successes and a lot more failures.

You can't develop someone else's community. Nobody can. You can help the community to develop itself... if you do it very carefully.

There is almost always some sort of economic activity going on in a human environment. As security is established this activity is likely to accelerate. Assisting the economic activity that grows naturally out of an environment is much more effective than trying to introduce some totally new activity that you or some funding agency happens to be enthusiastic about.

Slinging money around often does more harm than good.

One piece of advice I've given to many in the development world, though few listen:

If you see people behaving in a way that makes no sense at all to you, don't assume that they are irrational or stupid. Assume that there is some factor in the picture that you don't see.

My gut reaction to the whole idea is that asking military men to do development work makes about as much sense as asking development workers to fight a war, or asking an engineer to do surgery.

M-A Lagrange

11-12-2009, 09:18 AM

Stabilization, Development and Economics are linear processes in my mind. If the area does not have persistent security and the population's grievances are not addressed, then don't even worry about Development or "Economics."
From vertnyc

Stabilization, development and economic are all but linear. In fact there are very little linearity in passing from a stabilization (non regulated economical environment) to development and even less from development to economic development. The linearity understanding is issued from Rostow theory in which we all start in stone age to end up in ultra capitalist liberal market. But time has shown that it does not work this way.
In developing countries or in recovery economy, the stabilization phase is the initial moment we would like to impose an initial take off. But this is mainly restricted by the comparative advantages the place has to offer (production, work cost, market access…). So in rural economy with low level of technology (not mechanized mainly) the first level for the populations is to accumulate enough to generate savings. What is called going out of the circle of poverty. This first step is realized by several means, one of them being neighbors' resources pillages. This very first step is not to be mistaken with the initial recovery step in which populations are trying to recover what they had previously. Marxist theorist call that the mercantile stage. Liberal will call it precapitalist or pre market stage. The reality is much unclear and both are mixed.
At this stage the artificial introduction of huge quantities of money may have a kick off effect. This is what is described in so many manuals: high intensity man power work as cash for work… It does work with very specific conditions.
First you need a minimum security. This is the F@*#ing rule nb 1. No way to get out of it. If you do not have it then you expose the populations and they turn against you.
Second, effects have to be immediate. Telling someone he will earn good money next harvest just doesn't work. People need to be paid at the end of the week. This will allow them first to increase their household revenues and then generate savings.
Third: include as much as possible everyone and let the elders or local traditional authorities solve out the question of who get employed or not. It will end up like this. So just start with it. You may discover that some insurgents are being employed. Well that is not that bad: you are more careful when it comes to attack the bank that feeds you. But also, make sure that every villages around has the same access to the programs. Nothing is worst than a village benefiting from all efforts and the surrounding ones having nothing. Because them you are not capable to provide rule nb 1.

2. Talk to the locals again and again and really seek to understand how their economy functions and what their desires are.
From Bill moore

Yes, talk and talk again. People will not tell you what they want, they will tell you what they think you may give them.
As a basic rule have in mind that people will never express their real needs. They will only express what they know you can provide. If they say a school, they might in fact express the fact they want food for the kids. But as they know you will provide school, they ask for a school so they can have school feeding program. Got my point?
One good way to know what the people want is to talk with women. But it HAS TO BE a woman talking to a woman (even in US). This just because they will not say the same things than the men. You may find out the reality behind the smog.
But cultural habits are the strongest: you cannot give to the women without first giving to the men.

Finally, do not try too much to orientate and teach the people how to set up a business. Most of them had this many times before, in Afgha, in refugees camps, in displaced camps…
Let their imagination work. But small loans are welcomed.

The limit will always be market opening capacity. Traders will come to buy locally and then export if you're competitive. But the bias is they will try to keep the production cost as low as possible. Some may propose to organize producers… Be careful: this is opening the development problem Pandora box. Let the people get organized by them selves.

Finally, do not try to provide a better life to everyone at the same time. Target individuals. Especially in Muslim context, private enterprise is much welcomed and the community has its own mechanisms.

For readings, have some basic as Robert Chambers to understand rural rationalities. Farmers seem crazy but they are all but irrationals.

Hope this helps.

Schmedlap

11-12-2009, 01:22 PM

Schmedlap,

Please clarify your point...opinion or fact, and cite your references.

I guess you could call it highly preferred TTP? It is what we were instructed in 2007 and it jibes with how we used it in 2005 and 2007. As for citing, we did all of our business on SIPR. I don't know if that means it was classified or if that means that we simply did too much business on SIPR. Either way, I cannot cite.

The gist of the reasoning was that CERP only gets you short term gains. Ad hoc projects do not address the underlying causes of economic decay. They only fill gaps in what the community needs. They are good for obtaining goodwill and temporary cooperation. But after you conduct a project, the people are happy for about a week. Then they start asking, "what have you done for us lately?" Therefore, we were instructed to use them for temporary cooperation or to ameliorate genuine need of a community to solve some serious problem. If we needed longer-term cooperation (for example, enough cooperation over a period of months to purge the area of AQI), then we needed to plan projects that would occur in succession, ideally with a bit of overlap, so that as goodwill from the first project leveled off, we would begin another project to sustain that goodwill, and so on.

vertnyc

11-12-2009, 03:14 PM

So was your post out of frustration with the green tabs in the BCT??? Kind of a you sent me for 6 mths to UW then ignore everything I have to say???

If so, have you addressed them with the BCT CDR? Do you have a seat at the table with the planners are you interacting with the plans shop of your higher hqs???

My post isn't really out of frustration- I will always appreciate the opportunity for training or education regardless if I get to use it or not- I just happen to be using that particular skill set in an indirect way...

Most of the planning sessions believe it or not occur outside of the Brigade, at least in terms of economic development. Which is a good thing in my mind, because it's wrong to put that burden on the military. But I'm invited to those and those usually go just fine.

I've heard of theories of putting stability / non-lethal activities as a S3 function. In actuality, not much integration with the S3 shop.

vertnyc

11-12-2009, 03:21 PM

From vertnyc

Stabilization, development and economic are all but linear. In fact there are very little linearity in passing from a stabilization (non regulated economical environment) to development and even less from development to economic development. The linearity understanding is issued from Rostow theory in which we all start in stone age to end up in ultra capitalist liberal market. But time has shown that it does not work this way.
In developing countries or in recovery economy, the stabilization phase is the initial moment we would like to impose an initial take off. But this is mainly restricted by the comparative advantages the place has to offer (production, work cost, market access…). So in rural economy with low level of technology (not mechanized mainly) the first level for the populations is to accumulate enough to generate savings. What is called going out of the circle of poverty. This first step is realized by several means, one of them being neighbors' resources pillages. This very first step is not to be mistaken with the initial recovery step in which populations are trying to recover what they had previously. Marxist theorist call that the mercantile stage. Liberal will call it precapitalist or pre market stage. The reality is much unclear and both are mixed.
At this stage the artificial introduction of huge quantities of money may have a kick off effect. This is what is described in so many manuals: high intensity man power work as cash for work… It does work with very specific conditions.
First you need a minimum security. This is the F@*#ing rule nb 1. No way to get out of it. If you do not have it then you expose the populations and they turn against you.
Second, effects have to be immediate. Telling someone he will earn good money next harvest just doesn't work. People need to be paid at the end of the week. This will allow them first to increase their household revenues and then generate savings.
Third: include as much as possible everyone and let the elders or local traditional authorities solve out the question of who get employed or not. It will end up like this. So just start with it. You may discover that some insurgents are being employed. Well that is not that bad: you are more careful when it comes to attack the bank that feeds you. But also, make sure that every villages around has the same access to the programs. Nothing is worst than a village benefiting from all efforts and the surrounding ones having nothing. Because them you are not capable to provide rule nb 1.

Concur with persistent security first...without that we cannot have either stability, development, or economics. Also concur with #2 and #3- we are doing those.

But I do have some issues with the stability, development, and economics explanation. Why do you think Afghan villagers want to accumulate savings? Also, what are your definitions of stability, development, and economics?

I didn't notice the definitions there aside from promoting labor-intensive cash for work programs, which I support.

Bill Moore

11-12-2009, 05:12 PM

Yes, talk and talk again. People will not tell you what they want, they will tell you what they think you may give them.
As a basic rule have in mind that people will never express their real needs. They will only express what they know you can provide. If they say a school, they might in fact express the fact they want food for the kids. But as they know you will provide school, they ask for a school so they can have school feeding program. Got my point?

When I first read this I thought you were getting close to the white man's burden philosophy (too arrogant to listen to the locals, so you'll tell them what they need), but on the second read I see you make a very good point, especially since we have been there several years and the locals know how we operate. Here comes the coalition, they're going to build schools, roads, and dig wells so we just ask for schools, roads and wells because that is what we're going to get. We'll turn to someone else to provide what we really need now (employment, healthcare, law and order, or whatever the locals think they actually need today).

I just happen to be using that particular skill set in an indirect way...

Most of the planning sessions believe it or not occur outside of the Brigade, at least in terms of economic development. Which is a good thing in my mind, because it's wrong to put that burden on the military. But I'm invited to those and those usually go just fine.

Seems to me you're on track with the "indirect use" of your education. Your BDE is in a tough fight, so I can see why your S3 isn't embracing development at this time as a core function in the Ops shop. They have to focus on the fight and providing security first (I don't want to get into what comes first argument development or security, but I'm firmly in the security camp). If there is some room, or spare capacity to do development while fighting, then some development work might be useful, especially if it provides employment while you're creating a secure environment. I think the key role that you and your BDE can provide is critical input (ground truth) to those planning and doing economic development, and in some cases you may even be able to provide some priorities that nest with your security efforts.

For all of us on the SWJ who are not standing in your shoes on point in a very tough fight, we wish you well. We'll provide our thoughts and whatever advise we have, but you have more awareness of the ground truth than any of us, so trust your intuition.

Surferbeetle

11-13-2009, 05:11 AM

The gist of the reasoning was that CERP only gets you short term gains. Ad hoc projects do not address the underlying causes of economic decay. They only fill gaps in what the community needs. They are good for obtaining goodwill and temporary cooperation. But after you conduct a project, the people are happy for about a week. Then they start asking, "what have you done for us lately?" Therefore, we were instructed to use them for temporary cooperation or to ameliorate genuine need of a community to solve some serious problem. If we needed longer-term cooperation (for example, enough cooperation over a period of months to purge the area of AQI), then we needed to plan projects that would occur in succession, ideally with a bit of overlap, so that as goodwill from the first project leveled off, we would begin another project to sustain that goodwill, and so on.

Many of my experiences with the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),as well as development programs in general, were and are different than your description. None the less the proof of any program/system, to include CERP, is always in the results. Do the operators and recipients of the associated projects maintain and use them? Were the associated projects completed on time and under budget? Over the long run we taxpayers will have plenty of time to judge if our development programs were synchronized and effective systems which capitalized upon the power of unity of effort or if they were isolated one-year tour efforts repeated X times and of marginal utility.

5-year planning cycles are common in many parts of the world. In engineering-land this is typically due to synchronizing scarce resources with the time and resource intensive requirements associated with developing statement of works, cost estimates, project schedules, quality assurance/quality control plans, full blown engineering designs, construction and construction management systems. There are many similarities between engineering planning efforts and the Military Decision Making Process.

During my tour in 03-04 we initially shot for identifying all ongoing and planned projects conducted by Iraqi’s, NGO’s, IO’s, USG elements, and Contractors in our AO. From there we worked to prioritize projects among the stakeholders and used CERP to fund gaps with Iraqi's taking the lead in executing many of the projects. We also worked to translate all of that info into mil-knowledge via the concepts of mission analysis (receipt of mission, facts, assumptions, specified tasks, implied tasks, essential tasks, gaps, COA development) and unity of effort. This is not to say that our efforts in our AO resulted in the creation of a lasting oasis of peace or an enduring 'Little America' nor that they were a bloodless effort devoid of any setbacks or WTF moments.

The CERP and USAID links I provided in my post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=86808&postcount=8) emphasize the importance of synchronized development systems which strive for unity of effort. Only time will tell, however, if the costs and benefits (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/weekinreview/01glanz.html) of our coalition development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will have surpassed, equaled, or fell well short of the costs and benefits of the ~13 billion USD Marshall Plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_plan) (1952 US GDP ~358 billion?).

Bill Moore

11-13-2009, 06:48 AM

thanks for the editing catch, I cleaned it up a little more. That's what I get for rushing and not wearing my glasses. :eek:

M-A Lagrange

11-13-2009, 09:12 AM

Hello Vertnyc

I will try to come with complete answers to your questions. I will first answer to the simpliest one:

Why do you think Afghan villagers want to accumulate savings?
Why do poor people need to accumulate savings?

The question seems a little out of the loop in first place. This basically comes from the circle of poverty theory.

Poor households do not generate enough incomes to cover all their expenses. So they have to make choices between members of the household to allocate their resources. Example: the household does not have enough money to buy clothes for all and send all to school. They will choose to buy closes for the oldest girl so she can get married and send one boy to school. All their choices are driven by a rational allocation of their incomes.

To be able to get out of this circle, households need to be able to generate more incomes to increase the range of choices. To increase their choices they need to be economically secure at household level. To reach this stage, vulnerable households need to accumulate goods or money so they will be able to diversify their production capacity. That diversification can be done through small business, acquisition of land, diversification of production, education… But all this need the household to generate savings they can use to purchase non basic/survival goods.

Also, accumulating symbolic richness as cattle or land or weapons is a way to show both your economical wealth and your social power. For young men especially, their capacity to show symbols as weapons, cattle, land is important as it prove to the communities that they are capable to have a family, to be respected as a man… So they will be socially accepted. You find this problematic in almost all post war context. I found it in places as different as Liberia or Somalia.
Finally, in Islam, being rich, accumulating symbols of richness, is being blessed in the eyes of Allah (Quite like in Calvinist approach of capitalism). So generating savings is something that most of the people will look at.
In traditional societies, the main point to understand is that group rationality lies at household level, not at group level. Vulnerable families will, as example, share with extremely vulnerable families but this is not a charity act. This is an expression of power and social domination.

About this, I would recommend to read Bourdieu : la distinction, critic social du jugement, 1979, edition de minuit. I know it has been traduced in English but do not have the reference. May be a little difficult to read and the link with Afghan society not clear at first look. But this helps to figure how the social habits are preserved and continue to drive individual relationships. What you have to keep in mind is that vulnerable households are self centered. Relations with others are symbolic power struggle. The group, let’s take the village level for the moment, will only prime on a very limited range of issues. And it will be driven by a limited number of influential families.

M-A Lagrange

11-13-2009, 10:13 AM

I will try to come with a definition of those “ stages”. I will not come with manual definition but describe them in a “development” approach.

Stabilization: reinstallation of law and order by a military power coupled with humanitarian activities (post conflict type) to address basic survival population needs. The economy is disrupted and there is a low level of market organization. Political context is unstable and influx on economical capacities and choices of the population. Economical efforts are looking to recover pre conflict economical level.

Development: This may include economical recovery (But I would rather include that into stabilization stage). Basically it takes place in a stable security environment with or without political stability. Actions are targeting economical capacities of household to get organized and increase their incomes. This is looking to create the conditions for economical take off for communities. Rule of law is in place and markets are regulated.

Economy: this targets the market organization regulation. It would be the creation of a normative economical context allowing large investments and production distribution. This would be the stage during which juniors and then majors will invest and basically build production plants… Security and political contexts are stable and allow long term activities.

Those are raw definitions and you may disagree. Personally, I would go with a much detail canevas: life saving; recovery; post conflict:pre development; primary sector development and pre economical development; economical development.

To my understanding, Afghanistan (Depending the areas) is between recovery (with life saving activities) and post conflict activities. With some pockets of pre economical development in major cities.
What you may (and most probably experience) is the creation of pockets of take off rather than a homogeneous take off from all the villages or families in your area. (The basic principle of the drop oil theory).

Then comes the problematic of cotinuum and contiguum in “development activities”.

Continuum is what we all want. From humanitarian life saving stage, we introduce enough money to generate small savings at household level. The population and goods have free movements capacity. This creates small shops and a dynamic market exchange place. This generates enough immediate benefits for all the population so the populations rally the coalition. Then you have long term stability and foreign investors are coming…

Contiguum is what we experience: For a reason we do not know, all is fine in village A but nothing is going well in village B. While village A is becoming a centre and tracts and attracts all economical investments and attention, village B is still in basic survival stage and becomes a periphery. So you have a pocket of linear development and pockets of no progresses.
There village A is an economical centre and village B is an economical periphery. In a wonderful world, villagers from B, watching what is happening in A will double efforts to reach A level and the centre will tract the area to pass from stabilization to development.
In reality, what we experience most of the time is B becomes jealous. Villagers from B will put their efforts in restricting village A economical efforts. This may includes the use of violence. So village B becomes a violence centre and A a violence periphery. So you will have to put your efforts in maintaining A security level to secure its economical progress. And you will have to restrict B violence activities but double your economical efforts to make them progress. Watching that, A may be unhappy (At least…).

I would recommend reading Francois Gruenwald, but I do not know if he has been translated in English. His organization (group URD) is present in Afghanistan if I am not mistaking.

Concerning labor intensive cash for work:

It is a starting point but not the response to everything. You have to be able to stop it at one stage. Once population is creating small business then you have to stop and shift to other activities that will support households’ capacities to generate regular and sustainable incomes.
Cash for work is your first step to enter the community. It is just a tool. Second step may be production transport or transformation…

I support cash for work, used it a lot to stabilize small unsecured areas in many contexts. I also would warn about the side effects of it. The main one being seen only as a cash for work provider and then being unable to do other activities. The day you stop cash for work, the population may decide to no more support you as you are no more providing easy money.

Hope this respond to your questions. Do not hesitate if you feel some dark areas in my explanations.

Elric

11-13-2009, 03:14 PM

I'm the Brigade Economic Development Officer for Task Force Stryker in Southern Afghanistan and I've done Zero Economic Development. I was sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

Anyways- fiscal discipline on the part of the military isn't good enough as other instruments of national power have programs which have budgets that I get the feeling "have to be expended" by a certain time. Which is bad. And it's really bad if you concentrate in only two Provinces and spend $240+ Million in the next 10 months.

Congratulations on your assignment... I was up the road near Herat in 08-09 doing HA/CA. You have the luxury (?) of US maneuver forces in your AO to check the CERP project sites. You are near or in Kandahar with ready access to cash.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/asia/13jurm.html?_r=1&hp
Afghan Enclave Seen as Model to Rebuild, and Rebuff Taliban

A nice, easy way to ultimate victory ;) Have you considered the National Solidarity Plan (NSP), Provincial Development Plan (PDP), the District councils, and the Community Development Councils? I worked with the US Envoy to Herat province and the USAID folks.

For my druthers, I'd rather hand off CERP for big projects to USAID (they have local staff) and return to the Emergency Response part of CERP.

J Wolfsberger

11-13-2009, 04:06 PM

I suspect, based on my own MBA experience and some of the postings, that the education, guidance, planning, etc. for economic reconstruction/development has all been based on US experience. That is, it applies to a well developed economy in an industrial (or post industrial) state of development, with well developed judicial infrastructure to apply and enforce a well developed body of business law.

Absolutely none of which applies to Afghanistan. In short, it is taking a macro-economic approach in a country where the closest thing to a macro-economy is the heroin trade.

So, for what it’s worth, here’s my recommendation, based on what I understand the real situation to be on the ground in rural areas.

1. What do these villagers produce? Of that, what do they consume locally, and what do they trade with other villages, towns or cities?
2. What do they consume? How much of that is produced locally, and how much comes from other villages, towns or cities?
3. How do they exchange value? How much of this local trade is based on currency, and what currency is it? How much local economic activity is based on barter?
4. What do or could the locals produce that could go to a larger market? What do they need in the way of additional infrastructure to produce it?
5. Are there any micro-loan programs in place to finance starting or increasing production of goods for local consumption or trade? Why not?

In other words, the approach,. for now, needs to be entirely on increasing/supporting localized micro-economic activity.

These are just of the top of my head, and I could come up with more given more time. The bottom line is that the type of development plans likely to be produced by the usual suspects will be (probably have been) wildly inappropriate to the reality on the ground where it counts: rural Afghanistan.

MM12, vertnyc, I’ve had some specialized training in the area going back to my own adventure in self employment (:D). I may have some information or pointers I could transmit. PM me if you’re interested.

vertnyc

11-13-2009, 05:01 PM

Have you considered the National Solidarity Plan (NSP), Provincial Development Plan (PDP), the District councils, and the Community Development Councils? I worked with the US Envoy to Herat province and the USAID folks.

For my druthers, I'd rather hand off CERP for big projects to USAID (they have local staff) and return to the Emergency Response part of CERP.

The CDCs of the NSP are intact and useful on a case to case basis. So far, not much movement in our districts. A little more activity for DDAs, but no concrete results. Trying to explore ASOP but I heard there is an artificial turf war between ASOP/NSP. NSP "didn't work" in Helmand, so ASOP went. NSP works in some parts of Kandahar...but no ASOP here...yet.

USAID is trying to get CERP to pay for their projects so I guess we do live in an upside down world.

vertnyc

11-13-2009, 05:11 PM

Concur with western training tailored for something way more developed than Afghanistan. Please do send me any good info.

In response to the questions:

1. What do these villagers produce? Of that, what do they consume locally, and what do they trade with other villages, towns or cities?
.

In 1 district, villagers produce only poppy. However they do not own the land. Land owners live in Kandahar City. In another district, villagers grow tobacco and wheat, tobacco to be sold in Pakistan. Wheat for consumption. Haven't really seen intra-village trade, but most goods go to KC or through Pakistan to Chaman.

2. What do they consume? How much of that is produced locally, and how much comes from other villages, towns or cities?
.

They consume what they grow. Insufficient data for other question. Which is really a point I'd like to highlight that it is the lack of data such as this which makes decisions hard.

3. How do they exchange value? How much of this local trade is based on currency, and what currency is it? How much local economic activity is based on barter?
.

Haven't seen anything based on barter yet, near KC, they use Afghani. Some contractors take dollars. Near the border, 50% they use rupees or whatever the currency Pakistan uses, and 50% afghani.

4. What do or could the locals produce that could go to a larger market? What do they need in the way of additional infrastructure to produce it?
.

In Arghandab, pomegranates. They need everything on the value chain for pomegranates in terms of infrastructure.

5. Are there any micro-loan programs in place to finance starting or increasing production of goods for local consumption or trade? Why not?
.

USAID has a program called WOCCU. CERP has $500 micro grants. We are not allowed to give micro grants at this point of time due to some people in the unit not liking that idea.

Elric

11-13-2009, 06:10 PM

The CDCs of the NSP are intact and useful on a case to case basis. So far, not much movement in our districts. A little more activity for DDAs, but no concrete results. Trying to explore ASOP but I heard there is an artificial turf war between ASOP/NSP. NSP "didn't work" in Helmand, so ASOP went. NSP works in some parts of Kandahar...but no ASOP here...yet.

USAID is trying to get CERP to pay for their projects so I guess we do live in an upside down world.

Agree on case by case basis. The Herat governor was working on getting the PDC to create a realistic PDP. The participants had been asking for things of less utility than were suitable for the PDP. In the committee's defense, a big issue was the GIRoA funding for the NSP. If you don't expect the money to show up, why plan?

Welcome to alphabet soup. My pipe dream was to "partner" with the PDC or DDA (or even CDCs) in order to fill the supportable items on the PDP/District Dvelopment Plan (if there is such a thing). Sort of the US stepping in to fill specific items off the NSP that the GIRoA didn't fund. The twist is the specific items fit with the effort to support the GIRoA (or whatever term you would like). This technique of aligning with the PDP/DDP sure helps with getting involvement from the GIRoA folks. If the CDCs are well thought of, aligning to that plan may be useful, as the CDCs are supposedly more inclusive than the village leadership. Are the CDCs a way to get the villagers some self-governing experience?

Are the DoS and USAID folks helping with involving local government with your efforts? As an aside, Kabul did not like microgrants as being "susceptible to corruption". What do they thing Afghanistan is, the 1950s with Beaver Cleaver?

Still does not address Terms of Use that the end user will get, as we cannot guarantee that whatever we build will be used according to the contract. Having the GIRoA as the maintainer of a completed project is dependent on what needs to be done. Karzai wanted a district hospital down in Shindand, looking at the plans from Kabul, I noticed two 40T fuel tanks for the generators (power lines from Herat don't run far south). If we build a nice hospital that has no power due to GIRoA not funding the fuel it needs, was it a good thing to even start construction?

Interesting event out in eastern Ghor province, I think the Lithuanian PRT funded the building materials for a school in Laal (?) district. The tribe built it, and it was theirs, no fooling. Probably cinderblock and a poured cement pad.

We did a province wide buy of wheat seed, fertilizer, and fruit tree saplings for Herat province ($1.09M) using the province's Co-Op framework. I had the Herat Ag Chief work the amounts, come up with the distribution plan, and develop the SoW for the contract. What I wish we had was an economic ad visor to help us develop a sustained plan to develop agriculture (nice summary earlier). What were the impacts of cornering the wheat seed market, how was the harvested seed to be used (on-farm or marketed), how was it to be transported to market on the (rather pitiful) roads....

marct

11-13-2009, 07:06 PM

Being the somewhat pedantic person I can be at times ;), I think it is important to point out that the English word "economics" comes from the Greek oekos nomos or, transliterated, "household management". I would also second M-A Lagrange's suggestion about reading Bourdieu; the particular reference in English is Distinction: A Social critique of the Judgement of Taste (http://www.amazon.com/Distinction-Social-Critique-Judgement-Taste/dp/0674212770/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1258138746&sr=1-10).

While Bourdieu has some good ideas, he can be tricky to read and apply (especially in translation). Personally, I prefer Bronislaw Malinowski, from whom Bourdieu "borrowed" extensively. I would recommend Dynamics of culture change (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Culture-Inquiry-Relations-Phyllis/dp/B0014M7LHI/ref=sr_1_19?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1258138999&sr=1-19) and Towards a scientific theory of culture (http://www.amazon.com/Scientific-Theory-Culture-Bronislaw-Malinowski/dp/0807804339/ref=sr_1_39?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1258139118&sr=1-39); both are fairly easy to read and have some fairly simple, yet power, analytic methodologies in them.

Cheers,

Marc

Schmedlap

11-14-2009, 04:15 AM

Many of my experiences with the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),as well as development programs in general, were and are different than your description.
I don't doubt it. But I was speaking to the intended use and to the guidance that we received for it. It's nothing new for a tool to be used differently than intended, whether it's a poncho liner, Command Launch Unit, or CERP. But even going beyond intended use, I would go a step farther and say that, in this case, I think the intent is correct. CERP is a poor tool for economic development. I think we learned that lesson over a couple of years, which led to the explicit instructions we received in 2007 to think small and short term.

The CERP and USAID links I provided in my post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=86808&postcount=8) emphasize the importance of synchronized development systems which strive for unity of effort. Only time will tell, however, if the costs and benefits (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/weekinreview/01glanz.html) of our coalition development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will have surpassed, equaled, or fell well short of the costs and benefits of the ~13 billion USD Marshall Plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_plan) (1952 US GDP ~358 billion?).
I did not plow through the entire 90+ page CALL document, but in skimming it I noticed some dramatic differences between that CALL unclass treatise on MAAWS and the one that I used in theater (our command's SOP) that discussed numerous lines of funds available to us (not just CERP).

I did read the entire GTA (all two pages). The GTA, unless I really misunderstood, supports the guidance that we received in 07. I see only one mention of economic development and it is in the lower left of the first side of the GTA, mentioning that CERP can support a long-term goal of helping to develop indigenous capacity for a viable market economy. I think even that is a bit presumptuous. CERP is short-term funding (usually lump-sum) for a short-term project. Perhaps a good planner can pull off a bunch of projects done in a coordinated manner like you did in 04. Likewise, I guess if you give an artist some art supplies and he's in the right mood and something inspires him, then he can create a masterpiece. For the rest of us, we need to assume more modest goals and realize that conditions are usually inadequate to do much.

On that point, I would like to reiterate my earlier assertion...

Economic development should not fall upon the shoulders of a company or battalion that could unexpectedly receive orders to operate in a new AOR at any given time, either by redrawing boundaries or relocating. It should be handled by higher level units that have more direct communication with higher level political operatives and more direct channels to other agencies within our government - which allows them to tap into greater and more diverse funding sources.

I think the lack of continuity in an AO prevents long-term economic planning at the BN & below level. Even if a unit spends an entire year in an AO, they're still getting their bearings within the first month and they're not likely to plan projects that will extend beyond their tour. That leaves you with about 8 to 10 months to work with. That's not long-term. And the lack of continuity resulting from yearly RIP/TOAs and/or redrawing AORs makes long-term planning nearly impossible. I've done 8 RIP/TOAs at Bn & below (4 deployments, with a RIP/TOA at each end) and observed several others. Continuity always gets talked about, but it never happens.

Surferbeetle

11-14-2009, 07:15 PM

…and branches (http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/10/redwoods/redwoods-interactive) (Forests in the Air tab)

From the Commander in Chief (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/):

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists. We will help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world. And we will forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.

From FM 3-24 (http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf)

THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
5-1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions.

5-3. COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. The focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct stages that can be envisioned with a
medical analogy:
Stop the bleeding.
Inpatient care—recovery.
Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency.
Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational environment are important to the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. This knowledge allows commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”
5-4. Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security. During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common operational picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed. Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”
5-5. The middle stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability. Counterinsurgents are most active here, working aggressively along all logical lines of operations (LLOs). The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of human and other types of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

LATE STAGE: “OUTPATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY”
5-6. Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces. The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership. In this stage, the multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Quick reaction forces and fire support capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LLOs are performed by HN forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As the security, governing, and economic capacity of the host nation increases, the need for foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the host nation has established or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable government that sustains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the nation’s entire population.

From the CERP GTA 90-01-017 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/jcchb/Contingency%20Model/JCC/JCC%20Tools%20CD/training_smartcard/CERP%20GTA%2090-01-017.pdf)

Short-term goals:
Provide security to local populace
Restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs

Long-term goals:
Develop indigenous
capacity for:

Essential services
Viable market economy
Rule of law
Democratic institutions
Robust civil society

But I was speaking to the intended use and to the guidance that we received for it. It's nothing new for a tool to be used differently than intended, whether it's a poncho liner, Command Launch Unit, or CERP. But even going beyond intended use, I would go a step farther and say that, in this case, I think the intent is correct. CERP is a poor tool for economic development. I think we learned that lesson over a couple of years, which led to the explicit instructions we received in 2007 to think small and short term.

The nesting of intent displayed in the Presidents speech, FM 3-24 (and other FM's which include Civil Affairs FM's), as well as the GTA allows for a graduated response as conditions permit. I salute you and thank you for your service to include four tours in tough areas.

I think the lack of continuity in an AO prevents long-term economic planning at the BN & below level. Even if a unit spends an entire year in an AO, they're still getting their bearings within the first month and they're not likely to plan projects that will extend beyond their tour. That leaves you with about 8 to 10 months to work with. That's not long-term. And the lack of continuity resulting from yearly RIP/TOAs and/or redrawing AORs makes long-term planning nearly impossible. I've done 8 RIP/TOAs at Bn & below (4 deployments, with a RIP/TOA at each end) and observed several others. Continuity always gets talked about, but it never happens.

This is a pithy observation and something that requires an institutional/systematic fix as opposed to the consistently ad-hoc, stovepiped, and fragmented knowledge management solutions we are forced to cobble together downrange.

When we covered enterprise resource software (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterprise_resource_planning) in business school I thought back to my paperless office days back in the 80's at a multinational bank and compared both experiences with my knowledge management experiences with the Army in Iraq...yes...we certainly have come along ways from typewriters, alps printers, and multimate run on 386 chips (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_80386) but it is 2009, we are the American Army, and we do have access to integrated knowledge management software/geographic information systems after all...

Arcview (http://www.gis.com/content/what-gis) with SQL Server (http://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/2008/en/us/default.aspx) or Oracle (http://www.oracle.com/index.html) would allow for interactive maps with all layers tied to a database...(I do not have a financial interest in any of these companies)

A geographic information system (GIS) integrates hardware, software, and data for capturing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of geographically referenced information.

GIS allows us to view, understand, question, interpret, and visualize data in many ways that reveal relationships, patterns, and trends in the form of maps, globes, reports, and charts.

A GIS helps you answer questions and solve problems by looking at your data in a way that is quickly understood and easily shared.

GIS technology can be integrated into any enterprise information system framework.

Bill Moore

11-14-2009, 10:52 PM

What I find most interesting about these posts, with the possible exception of Slapout's last post is the discussion of economic development separate from the COIN effort.

This is the fallacy with the lines of operations approach to military operations and USG strategy in general. Instead of developing and executing a strategy (not talking strategic level, but rather clear operational objectives and integrated plans for achieving those objectives instead of everyone doing their own line of operation independently, what I call lines to no where).

If you're waging a COIN effort, then is it wise to support economic development blindly and haphazardly, or better to integrate economic development as part of the over all COIN strategy?

We can use economic development as one form of influence to shape specific populations.

Use economic development to influence a populace if at all possible. Identify a project of value (the people will tell you what it is, you don't determine it), ensure you can deliver, then tell them what the cost is (no IED attacks upon coalition forces for 2 weeks and we'll start on it (you better deliver), and as long as no IED attacks are the norm we'll continue to work on it.

This is only one example. I think we need to take a step back and relook how we better integrate economic development with the COIN strategy. Perhaps this being done in Afghanistan, but from what I'm reading it is not apparent.

If they have essential services restored, what else do we need to do? Why are we doing it? Are we giving them a free lunch, or are we getting a desired result? What effect is it really having?

Surferbeetle

11-15-2009, 12:10 AM

With a H/T to Registan (http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/11/08/security-is-more-than-uniforms/); The Design Observer Group: Between Mission Statement and Parametric Model (http://places.designobserver.com/entry.html?entry=10757) by Tim Love

So where are we? What do we need to do to synthesize the powerful formal possibilities of parametric modeling with the need to realign disciplinary priorities? This is a large question, which I’ll explore in future articles. For now I’ll suggest that one approach is to better understand the complexities and pressures of mainstream practice. How do existing professional power structures, working with real clients and regulatory frameworks, encourage certain kinds of design production and inhibit others? Why does the DNA of almost every office building in North America — maybe the world — consist of the same center-core diagram with the same ungainly and clumsily dimensioned floor plan, no matter how sophisticated the skin? Why are the majority of new public school buildings soulless and isolated object-buildings surrounded by acres of parking lots and sports fields? Why do super-sized arterial roads, and the retail big boxes that line them, continue to be developed when the landscapes that result are so banal, and widely reviled as such? My hunch is that if design pedagogy began to engage these everyday conditions, whether in the market-driven economy or through the mechanism of public funding (or a combination of the two), then a new design-focused pedagogy would emerge, one that would gain intellectual weight through the relevance of the problems. Such a context might inspire designers to use sophisticated professional tools — including parametric modeling — to produce truly new and meaningful paradigms.

slapout9

11-15-2009, 01:30 AM

Perhaps this being done in Afghanistan, but from what I'm reading it is not apparent.

IMO the real 800 pound Guerrilla in A'stan is the Economy. Without a stable Economy no country can survive.......Including the USA.

Cavguy

11-15-2009, 02:53 AM

Wish I had more time to write.

This is what I have concluded about economic development from my personal experiences and two years at the COIN center, which doesn't all agree with theory. The key is to realize that all aid "takes a side" as you alter the power balances between communities, governments, families, and tribes. That well you just built may fundamentally alter a centuries old power dynamic.

You'll never get to the bottom of the 2d and 3d order effects in a society you are not a part of. Therefore, it is my opinion that $$ employed by tactical commanders must be transactional. Our temptation is to do good works. As some others have indicated, that's nice but not what a tactical commander should be doing. He should use it to gain influence with targeted groups and individuals critical to defeating the insurgency in that AO. The key part is that for such assistance you MUST get something tangible in return. That can take many forms - security force recruits, safe passage, governance participation, etc. But don't ever do a project HOPING it will "buy" goodwill. Analyze your AO, determine what populations or people you find most critical, and use your limited funds accordingly.

If you click on my sig and read about my experiences, you will see that money was employed tactically at those who were cooperating by providing security, information, and cooperation. Bottom line, good behavior rewarded, bad behavior - no $$ to your AO.

A good example was in Ramadi - instead of just doing good works and providing security with our forces, BG MacFarland made it transactional. In exchange for protection and aid they provided police recruits - half guarded the local area, and half were used elsewhere in the city as we needed. We also received guarantees of safe passage. Read the articles linked in my sig for more. Granted, this example was from Iraq, but I think that is one of the few non-location specific messages out of Ramadi. As Kilcullen says, giving the locals something without a return only gains their contempt, not cooperation. Some may sneer at it as bribery, but that's what CERP really is for anyway, no? Disguised as civil works, but at its essence a bribe to keep the population content? I guarantee it costs much less than an MRAP, Stryker, or the SGLI/medical care of dead soldiers. It may even have positive long term effects on the region and nation, if done right.

Bonus win if you can employ the $$ through local or national security forces. It doesn't matter so much what the Afghans think of you, only what they think of their own government.

Just random Sat night musings. I'll be more coherent tomorrow.

Bill Moore

11-15-2009, 03:59 AM

Posted by Cavguy,

If you click on my sig and read about my experiences, you will see that money was employed tactically at those who were cooperating by providing security, information, and cooperation. Bottom line, good behavior rewarded, bad behavior - no $$ to your AO.

Although you're just touching the issue, you are looking at from the right perspective.

Posted sy Slapout,

IMO the real 800 pound Guerrilla in A'stan is the Economy. Without a stable Economy no country can survive.......Including the USA.

The insurgency is based on a lot of things, but very little has to do with the economy. What is really different with the economy today (other than the occupiers Russian and U.S. who provide a temporary foreign economy) than say 1975? There are several countries with very weak economies that continue to survive year after year. My argument is you're supporting a major effort that isn't solving the problem that we need to solve. Putting it simply, even if our efforts to establish a better economy are effective, the insurgency would still exist.

We can use economic development at the micro level to influence behavior if we're skillful enough (read not politically correct), but I quote Kilcullen from his book "Accidental Guerrillas" on p67,

Governance and development, tied to a security and information strategy that gives the population incenttives to support the government, are thus extremely powerful COIN tools

break

There is also a belief, unfounded in reality, that deveopmental assistance generates gratitude, or "hope", in the population and encourages them to support the government. Field experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, has shown that insurgent intimidation easily overcomes any residual gratitude effect, while historical studies have shown that in civil wars and insurgencies, popular support tends to accrue to locally powerful actors rather than those actors the population sees as more congenial: the more organized, locally present, and better armed a group is, the more likely they'll be able to enforce a consisttent system of rules and sanctions, giving the population the order and predictability it craves in the deeply threatening , uncertain environment of insurgency.

We (the coalition) should be most powerful force in that village making the rules, not diverting efforts building the economy unless it is relevant to influencing the population. After we suppress the insurgency, then we can do some real economic development for the long term win like we did in Germany and Japan.

Surferbeetle

11-15-2009, 04:47 AM

Bill,

A policeman's understanding of the proverbial three blocks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Block_War) in his AO is decidedly different than a Soldier's/Marine's understanding of those same three blocks. That hard won knowledge is based upon a significant difference in time on station (years vs. 12 months or less), use of different TTP's (http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14699623), and I, for one, do not lightly dismiss a policeman's considered opinion concerning the human animal.

Soldiers and Marines insights are just as valuable as a policeman's, and I do not dismiss those either. There was a SF WO who's insights proved to be invaluable to me just outside of Iskandariyah and those of his Marine tanker brothers were just as important...

Let's check a couple of your stated assumptions:

The insurgency is based on a lot of things, but very little has to do with the economy

Selected Histories of Economic targeting

Islamic Charities (http://csis.org/publication/understanding-islamic-charities)

This alleged support for acts of violence and terrorism in the Islamic charitable sector—and a seeming toleration of such activities—raises serious questions. Is a significant portion of this charitable sector a front for terrorist activities? Or is a small minority tainting the good deeds of the majority?

Iraq Embargo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_sanctions)

The Iraq sanctions were a near-total financial and trade embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council against the nation of Iraq. They began August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,[1] and continued until May 22, 2003, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in the US-led invasion earlier that year. Their stated purpose was at first to compel Iraq's military to withdraw from Kuwait and after that to compel Iraq to pay reparations, and to disclose and eliminate any weapons of mass destruction, and to do certain other things.

Soviet Union (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_the_soviet_union)

The Soviet Union's collapse into independent nations began early in 1985.[dubious – discuss] After years of Soviet military buildup at the expense of domestic development, economic growth was at a standstill. Failed attempts at reform, a stagnant economy, and war in Afghanistan led to a general feeling of discontent, especially[citation needed] in the Baltic republics and Eastern Europe.

1973 Oil Embargo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis)

The 1973 oil crisis started in October 1973, when the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or the OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt and Syria) proclaimed an oil embargo "in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military" during the Yom Kippur war; it lasted until March 1974.[1] OAPEC declared it would limit or stop oil shipments to the United States and other countries if they supported Israel in the conflict. With the US actions seen as initiating the oil embargo, the long-term possibility of embargo-related high oil prices, disrupted supply and recession, created a strong rift within NATO; both European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the US Middle East policy.

After we suppress the insurgency, then we can do some real economic development for the long term win like we did in Germany and Japan.

Simultaneous execution of multiple LOO's

Varying levels of development work are historically undertaken during preconflict, humanitarian/criminal crises, wartime, and post conflict periods.

For example, CA-bubbas have worked (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Civil_Affairs) WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

CA Bubbas are not the only people who work during hostilities...ICRC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Committee_of_the_Red_Cross), MSF (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctors_Without_Borders), and others do what they can...

Best,

Steve

slapout9

11-15-2009, 06:52 AM

Some may sneer at it as bribery, but that's what CERP really is for anyway, no?

Bribery is very effective so I wouldn't be to concerned about it.........just think of it as a Campaign contribution, that's how most US Politicians look at it.:wry:

Bill Moore

11-15-2009, 06:58 AM

Steve,

I normally learn a lot from your posts, but your last one to me appears to be have completely missed the mark. You're bringing up examples of economic warfare that have nothing to do with economic development as it relates to COIN.

CA Bubbas are not the only people who work during hostilities...ICRC, MSF, and others do what they can...

This is exactly what I'm taking issue with, we do what we can instead of doing of the right thing. I'm sure ICRC and others "feel good" when they hand out school books and medicine, but during a COIN effort if it doesn't specifically target a select populace with the objective of separating them from the insurgency and pulling them into a closer relationship with the government then you're just doing humanitarian work to simply make yourself feel better, it doesn't contribute to a strategy. I ensure the enemy doesn't just do what it can, but has an agenda when they hand out aid.

As for police officers looking at it differently, could it be they're looking at a different problem set altogether? The elderly in the U.S. may be involved in the Meth trade now because they can't make it on social security, so that is an economic issue that must be resolved, because ultimately in this case that is the underlying issue.

Kids in depressed areas may join gangs and get involved in illegal activities because that is the accepted economic model. If you improve the job aspects you only address one underlying issue. Normally there is another underlying issue that is seldom considered, and that is the security/social norm influence. If the strongest tribe in the neighborhood is the gang and you offered a fair paying job to a kid that is a gang member (without moving him out of that neighborhood/influence), do you think he would take it? More importantly do you think he would leave the gang and place his family and him/herself at risk?

This alleged support for acts of violence and terrorism in the Islamic charitable sector—and a seeming toleration of such activities—raises serious questions. Is a significant portion of this charitable sector a front for terrorist activities? Or is a small minority tainting the good deeds of the majority?

No one said insurgencies didn't require economic activity, I said the root cause wasn't about economics. By all means we need to target their economic engines, but you don't necessarily do that through economic development. It may or may not play a role.

The Soviet Union's collapse into independent nations began early in 1985.[dubious – discuss] After years of Soviet military buildup at the expense of domestic development, economic growth was at a standstill. Failed attempts at reform, a stagnant economy, and war in Afghanistan led to a general feeling of discontent, especially[citation needed] in the Baltic republics and Eastern Europe.

Not germane, we're talking about insurgency and furthermore as you know were many factors that came together to create the perfect storm for the USSR. I suspect they spent far less on their military than we did, but they spent a greater proportion of their GDP. Still that was only one reason the wall came down.

The 1973 oil crisis started in October 1973

State versus State, not an insurgency

Simultaneous execution of multiple LOO's

I call this the illusion of a plan, and it is the lazy man's way out of doing the real work that a real plan involves. Amazingly now how we can address any problem by making up four or five LOOs, put them on a power point slide, then we're done. If the simultaneous efforts aren't synchronized toward common objectives, then they lines to no where. Read Killcullen's example of building a road in Afghanistan as a form of political maneuvering, it wasn't simply doing what they could, but they built it with specific objectives in mind that had little to do with the road itself.

We're forgetting the basics.

slapout9

11-15-2009, 07:03 AM

What is really different with the economy today (other than the occupiers Russian and U.S. who provide a temporary foreign economy) than say 1975? .

Hi Bill, what is different is Opium production has skyrocketed SINCE we invaded. That needs to change and that is part of COIN IMO. I don't disagree with you across the board but I do think that a viable economy has to be there in order for the Local Government to provide basic services (tax base), if they can't do that and the drug dealers/Insurgents/Radicals/Guerrillas/whatever you want to call them can do it then I think you will end up loosing the population. Also a viable Economy does not have to be an expensive billion dollar proposition that takes 10 years either, there are a lot of options.

M-A Lagrange

11-15-2009, 08:17 AM

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

1. What do these villagers produce? Of that, what do they consume locally, and what do they trade with other villages, towns or cities?

In 1 district, villagers produce only poppy. However they do not own the land. Land owners live in Kandahar City. In another district, villagers grow tobacco and wheat, tobacco to be sold in Pakistan. Wheat for consumption. Haven't really seen intra-village trade, but most goods go to KC or through Pakistan to Chaman.

2. What do they consume? How much of that is produced locally, and how much comes from other villages, towns or cities?

They consume what they grow. Insufficient data for other question. Which is really a point I'd like to highlight that it is the lack of data such as this which makes decisions hard.

3. How do they exchange value? How much of this local trade is based on currency, and what currency is it? How much local economic activity is based on barter?

Haven't seen anything based on barter yet, near KC, they use Afghani. Some contractors take dollars. Near the border, 50% they use rupees or whatever the currency Pakistan uses, and 50% afghani.

4. What do or could the locals produce that could go to a larger market? What do they need in the way of additional infrastructure to produce it?

In Arghandab, pomegranates. They need everything on the value chain for pomegranates in terms of infrastructure.

5. Are there any micro-loan programs in place to finance starting or increasing production of goods for local consumption or trade? Why not?

USAID has a program called WOCCU. CERP has $500 micro grants. We are not allowed to give micro grants at this point of time due to some people in the unit not liking that idea.

My advice would be:

1) Take the time to discuss with NGOs and humanitarian actors. They are active in the area since sometimes, they know a lot of what is going on. Most of the time, they do not have formalized knowledge. NGOs and UN agencies do not have institutional memories, they have human memories. So linking with the people is important. One good entry point is sharing information with NGOs through OCHA coordination meetings. You give them data about what you have observed as humanitarian problems in some specific villages and then try to encourage NGO to intervene in the targeted villages. No need to promise anything to villagers. Wait NGO have act. Also your actions have to come as a complement of what NGO, UN and USAID are doing. USAID is implementing a program: they must have an economical profile of the area. USAID must have a development plan for the area. Even if it is silly (what I doubt) it is better to coordinate with them.

2) do not get involved into landownership problematic. This will sunk you into the local conflicts between families. (Can be extremely interesting to know who owns what and rent it at what price).

The main problem concerning poppy production being there are very few agricultural products competing with it. Also, land access is influencing households' production choices. You should look at poppy producers' landownership: what surface they own and what is the annual price of land. Also, compare with non poppy producers.

Second point being: can those lands produce something else than poppy? The choice of poppy is rational. It is driven either by no other production possibility, either by financial obligations. People do not produce poppy just for the pleasure to produce poppy.

The only problem being: once you found the problematic, then it will be difficult to solve it. But this may give you the economical roots of the poppy production. And allow you to identify the root problematic restricting your capacity to support agro project in district one.

According to your post, producers do not move but contractors are at least coming. So there are exportations/movements of goods. Even if there is no population movement, there are goods movements. Non locally produced products as candles, matches, cooking oil… are coming from somewhere.

In agricultural household economy, main source of incomes is coming from production export/trade. In your case, it is clear this is tobacco and may be fruits. The other main source of incomes is dayly agricultural work. Also, what needs to be identified is the percentage of the harvest which is used for auto consumption, what is sold (and to purchase what) and what is saved for seeds. I would recommend to make focus groups separated with men and women (men on one side, women on the other). The women will give you accurate data on what is consumed and sold. Men will give you accurate data on seeds and what is sold. You may have difference for what is sold between men and women. Take the highest. This will give you a raw idea of household economical/food security. But USAID and NGO or FAO should be able to help you on those particular questions.

Also, the village economy is cyclical, based on harvest and seasonal access. You should observe price and availability variations of goods on local market. By establishing a local agricultural calendar, you will be able to identify which period of time is difficult for the households. You should also try to establish a revenue annual calendar of households sources of revenues. You may be surprise to identify annual migration or unidentified activities as firewood cutting or handicrafts confection... There again, FAO, UNICEF or OCHA should be able to help you.

Hope this helps.

MikeF

11-15-2009, 02:20 PM

The key is to realize that all aid "takes a side" as you alter the power balances between communities, governments, families, and tribes. That well you just built may fundamentally alter a centuries old power dynamic.

You'll never get to the bottom of the 2d and 3d order effects in a society you are not a part of. Therefore, it is my opinion that $$ employed by tactical commanders must be transactional. Bottom line, good behavior rewarded, bad behavior - no $$ to your AO.

Either transactional development or coercive civil affairs, we use money as a weapon. We're the military. We use everything as weapons:). As Schmedlap noted, we finally fixed our process to get access to money and flood the community w/ short and simple projects; however, our output is still skewed. Niel talks to that issue. Many times, we just don't know how our actions effect the community. By flooding cash to certain leaders, our armed social work may disrupt the natural order of things that only stokes underlying tensions.

A commander must use discretion and discernment with all of his weapon systems. In my case, I would go in once a week to meet with the elders. I would flash $5000 and tell them there was more where that came from, but I refused to do any reconstruction until the level of violence diminished. To me, it didn't make sense to pave roads that would just get blown up again. Additionally, I was having to give the elders respect for others classes- "no, it's not okay to behead your neighbor and take his property." As we went back and forth, I learned something very disturbing. Their grievance was not about what they did not have. It was envy over what others had. In cases like that, there's not much we can do.

In the clearance and hold phase, money can be used effectively to achieve security and stabilization, but this short term effect does not equal long term development and prosperity. I'm not convinced that this type of work can be accomplished by those in uniform. As I studied others that are having success (Greg Mortensen and Mohommed Yunnis), their work is often ad-hoc and decentralized. I'm not sure how to incorporate their work into our centralized, bureaucratic processes.

slapout9

11-15-2009, 05:05 PM

This is what I have concluded about economic development from my personal experiences and two years at the COIN center, which doesn't all agree with theory. The key is to realize that all aid "takes a side" as you alter the power balances between communities, governments, families, and tribes. That well you just built may fundamentally alter a centuries old power dynamic.

Which goes right to the heart of the SBW mantra of the 3 F's to understanding a Human Organization System. IMO Family,Friends and Finances are all you really need to know about the Human Terrain. With the possible exception of the 4th F.....who is foolin around with who:wry:

Cavguy

11-15-2009, 10:40 PM

Many times, we just don't know how our actions effect the community. By flooding cash to certain leaders, our armed social work may disrupt the natural order of things that only stokes underlying tensions.

Exactly! And furthermore, we are unlikely to understand the 2d and 3d order impacts, no matter how culturally aware we try and make ourselves.

A commander must use discretion and discernment with all of his weapon systems.

True. Including the money.

Their grievance was not about what they did not have. It was envy over what others had. In cases like that, there's not much we can do.

It seems we have both come to the same conclusions. Your development money profoundly affects the prestige and pecking order of societies. This is fine, as long as you understand you are doing so. I had heated arguments with a former co-worker over this - he insisted on "balanced development" across an AO, while I argued that development (CERP-level) should be employed as a reward/incentive for cooperation.

In the clearance and hold phase, money can be used effectively to achieve security and stabilization, but this short term effect does not equal long term development and prosperity. I'm not convinced that this type of work can be accomplished by those in uniform.

Agreed. The military cannot effectively perform this kind of work. Our goals are too short term and transitory. That's why I don't think CERP should be used with long term development in mind. As you indicated, its a weapon system to be employed as a useful part of a broader combined arms/full spectrum approach to COIN.

To address one of the original points though, I found paying 20 individuals $50 to fix their own small problems bought more goodwill/info/cooperation than spending $5000 on a contractor to do a larger project. We also liberally used the small and micro rewards programs to a variety of purposes. This worked great in Tal Afar, oddly, MNF-W banned it at unit level in Anbar. It was a useful way for commanders to hand out up to $100 at a time to those that helped us in some way.

MikeF

11-15-2009, 10:57 PM

It seems we have both come to the same conclusions. Your development money profoundly affects the prestige and pecking order of societies. This is fine, as long as you understand you are doing so. I had heated arguments with a former co-worker over this - he insisted on "balanced development" across an AO, while I argued that development (CERP-level) should be employed as a reward/incentive for cooperation.

Agreed. The military cannot effectively perform this kind of work. Our goals are too short term and transitory. That's why I don't think CERP should be used with long term development in mind. As you indicated, its a weapon system to be employed as a useful part of a broader combined arms/full spectrum approach to COIN.

Mohommad Yunnis already solved this problem. We just asked the wrong questions. I don't want to say to much on this thread b/c it's part of my answer to the SWJ writing contest.

To address one of the original points though, I found paying 20 individuals $50 to fix their own small problems bought more goodwill/info/cooperation than spending $5000 on a contractor to do a larger project. We also liberally used the small and micro rewards programs to a variety of purposes. This worked great in Tal Afar, oddly, MNF-W banned it at unit level in Anbar. It was a useful way for commanders to hand out up to $100 at a time to those that helped us in some way.

Again, I agree. TBP from me I guess:D. I would suggest that everyone go back and read Niel's comments on this subject. I concur with his words.

Surferbeetle

11-17-2009, 04:36 AM

LOO's, Lines of Action, and product lines. What are the similarities, if any, and what does this say about what can be simultaneously managed?

From The Economist: Nestlé (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14744982)

Investors are also worried that Nestlé has become too large and unwieldy. The firm has 30 product lines that each generate more than SFr1 billion in annual sales, from Nescafé coffee and Nesquik milk to Purina pet food and Pure Life, a bottled water that is sometimes made from stuff that comes out of taps, rather than out of the ground. Consumers have been trading down to cheaper, unbranded foods in recent years, a trend that accelerated in the recession, potentially undermining the value of owning big brands.

Richard Laube, the head of Nestlé’s nutrition business and a former pharmaceuticals executive, describes a “pipeline” of some 75 research projects. Borrowing terminology from the drugs industry seems appropriate, given the time required to develop these new products. Unlike the quick development cycles usually seen in fast-moving consumer goods, which typically take one to two years, products in Nestlé’s nutrition pipeline may take four to six years to develop.

Finally, there is a risk that Nestlé’s new strategy could damage the firm’s blockbuster brands, which have taken decades to establish. This could happen in several ways. If some of the firm’s functional foods fail to pass muster with the regulators or, worse, turn out to cause harm rather than do good, then consumers could turn against all its products, even those that make no health claims at all. That could hurt, because most of its revenues will still come from selling treats like chocolate, ice-cream, coffee and flavoured milk.

Marketing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketing)

The term marketing concept holds that achieving organisational goals depends on knowing the needs and wants of target markets and delivering the desired satisfactions.[2] It proposes that in order to satisfy its organizational objectives, an organization should anticipate the needs and wants of consumers and satisfy these more effectively than competitors.[2]

Surferbeetle

11-22-2009, 08:39 PM

Bill,

Your analysis, as always, covers interesting points and I appreciate the opportunities to consider what you have to say. You have been some places and seen some things and it shows in your words.

You're bringing up examples of economic warfare that have nothing to do with economic development as it relates to COIN.

The general point I was/am attempting to make is that economics are an inseparable component of human wars. From this it follows that victors of wars understand how to use economics to further their aims, and that the use of economics has both destructive and constructive components which need to be trained upon.

By walking the land and studying it I have come to the understanding that all living things are designed to find/use/excrete resources, reproduce, and rest. Finding/using/excreting resources leads to competition/fighting/wars (and capitalism is one such manifestation of this design but I digress :D). Plants fight for existing space/sunlight/water/nutrients/breeding rights, and animals fight for existing area/water/nutrients/breeding rights. Neither fights all day/night long everyday however, and it is obvious to me that more skills than just fighting are required in order to live life.

This is exactly what I'm taking issue with, we do what we can instead of doing of the right thing. I'm sure ICRC and others "feel good" when they hand out school books and medicine, but during a COIN effort if it doesn't specifically target a select populace with the objective of separating them from the insurgency and pulling them into a closer relationship with the government then you're just doing humanitarian work to simply make yourself feel better, it doesn't contribute to a strategy. I ensure the enemy doesn't just do what it can, but has an agenda when they hand out aid.

My friend, we follow FM's for many things however FM's are just individual trees in the proverbial forest. How about the 'strategy' of the Bible, Torah, and Koran?

As for police officers looking at it differently, could it be they're looking at a different problem set altogether? The elderly in the U.S. may be involved in the Meth trade now because they can't make it on social security, so that is an economic issue that must be resolved, because ultimately in this case that is the underlying issue.

Kids in depressed areas may join gangs and get involved in illegal activities because that is the accepted economic model. If you improve the job aspects you only address one underlying issue. Normally there is another underlying issue that is seldom considered, and that is the security/social norm influence. If the strongest tribe in the neighborhood is the gang and you offered a fair paying job to a kid that is a gang member (without moving him out of that neighborhood/influence), do you think he would take it? More importantly do you think he would leave the gang and place his family and him/herself at risk?

The human condition encompasses the spectrum from all out war to peace. Reductionist thinking/analysis (i.e. problem sets, control volumes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_volume), and free bodies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_body)) can be very powerful, but at the end of the analysis procedure we must reincorporate the resulting answers into an analysis of the particular system being studied in order to check for accuracy.

I am of the opinion that much of the security LOO, in fact two out of the three blocks in the three block war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_block_war), can and should be handled by police forces/rule-of-law-forces working in concert with the military. Like you I have been reading about policing, speaking with police friends, and I am also trying to understand our problem set (Iraq and Afghanistan) from this particular viewpoint. At the end of the day however I am a soldier and not a policeman/lawyer/judge and so I am still thinking about it.

No one said insurgencies didn't require economic activity, I said the root cause wasn't about economics. By all means we need to target their economic engines, but you don't necessarily do that through economic development. It may or may not play a role.

I believe that economics are an inseparable component of human wars.

Not germane, we're talking about insurgency and furthermore as you know were many factors that came together to create the perfect storm for the USSR. I suspect they spent far less on their military than we did, but they spent a greater proportion of their GDP. Still that was only one reason the wall came down.

State versus State, not an insurgency

You are correct here, to use Ken's word, I did indeed conflate some of the finer points that you have identified here while in pursuit of the larger point that victors of wars understand how to use economics...sloppy on my part.

I call this the illusion of a plan, and it is the lazy man's way out of doing the real work that a real plan involves. Amazingly now how we can address any problem by making up four or five LOOs, put them on a power point slide, then we're done. If the simultaneous efforts aren't synchronized toward common objectives, then they lines to no where. Read Killcullen's example of building a road in Afghanistan as a form of political maneuvering, it wasn't simply doing what they could, but they built it with specific objectives in mind that had little to do with the road itself.

Being able to successfully execute a campaign comprised of simultaneous efforts synchronized toward common objectives is the result of intensive training. How often does the GPF train on how to use economics as part of a campaign? How about SOF?

We're forgetting the basics.

True.

Our training process and content needs to be revamped...but that is for another thread :wry:

Regards,

Steve

Bill Moore

11-22-2009, 09:52 PM

Posted by Surferbeetle

The general point I was/am attempting to make is that economics are an inseparable component of human wars. From this it follows that victors of wars understand how to use economics to further their aims, and that the use of economics has both destructive and constructive components which need to be trained upon.

In any social system there is an ecomonic system, just as in any biological organism there is an energy system to sustain life processes. Yet I stand firm, unless convinced with strong logical arguments, that is not the same as the USG blindly "attempting" to economic development to undermine an insurgent movement. If economic development is even required, then it needs to be focused on supporting the political objective. The other side gets that, Hezbollah are good at, LeT is good at it, and some communist insurgencies have had some success. The issue isn't whether it is important or not, in some cases it is, in others it isn't. Blanket statements and templated approaches are dangerous.

Being able to successfully execute a campaign comprised of simultaneous efforts synchronized toward common objectives is the result of intensive training. How often does the GPF train on how to use economics as part of a campaign? How about SOF?

This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach. :D

slapout9

11-22-2009, 10:12 PM

This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach. :D

In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well:eek: I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete:)

Bill Moore

11-22-2009, 11:45 PM

In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete

Having been around in those old days I don't recall CA doing a lot of economic development with SF? Unfortunately the 7 phases of UW are very much military focused (more guerrilla warfare than UW, though some will argue the UW is implied), yet the reality is that very little attention was/is given to the political organization aspects. It was just assumed away except for some cursory instruction on the area command. I for one don't think MAJ Gant's paper was a strategy piece, at most it offered some TTPs, which as you said isn't anything new, but it would be fair to characterize it as a "rebirth" of common sense in SF.

There is a Special Warfare Magazine, but it is a little too much focused on back slapping, look at me side for my tastes. We need something more along the lines of a Special Warfare Parameters magazine with some seriously thoughtful and self criticizing articles. You'll never get better if you keep telling yourself you're great and there is nothing left to learn, actually at that point you have become obsolete. I would recommend calling it Political Warfare Magazine, because now Special Warfare means different things to different people, whereas political warfare is the context we need to be thinking in.

We had a Special Warfare Revolution in the 1950's and early 1960's that was embraced by the PSYWAR community, CIA and parts of the State Department, but not by many in DoD. A lot of incredibly smart folks wrote some serious papers on how to counter communist sponsored insurgencies and the various challenges associated with it. IMO we a Special Warfare evolution to address current threats and new global dynamics that impact the way war is fought now.

I had a good friend/mentor (former Team Sergeant) who told me every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage. I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.

slapout9

11-22-2009, 11:58 PM

Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine? Happened while I was up there.....don't know that it ever took hold, but more of what I think the CA/economic support should be.

Ken White

11-23-2009, 12:27 AM

...every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage...May be fifteen if they're really doing welll.
... I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.That, too...

We do ad-hoc beautifully, though..:wry:

Bill Moore

11-23-2009, 12:40 AM

Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine?

Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then :D

May be fifteen if they're really doing welll. Ken, it takes five years to get a concept approved, another 7 to get the funding and manning, so really my buddy's suggestion about every 20 years is probably about right:p. Completely unfeasible in our bureaucracy, but as LTG Boykin put in his book they had to form Delta because SF was too conventional. I don't think SF was too conventional, but they were rigidly adhering to legacy definitions of unconventional. What was the issue back then that was driving the force change requirements for SOF? Oh yea, terrorist groups from the Middle East, both Palestinian and Iranian sponsored. Amazing how long we can keep our heads buried in the sand.

slapout9

11-23-2009, 12:49 AM

Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then :D

SPARTAN
Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation building. Google the whole!! name and you should get references.

Early 70's when I new about it. Worked with American Indians in Florida, Montana and other places to practice Tibal Area Improvements.....no sh.. it was a little like Billy Jack :wry:Protect them and help them Prosper.

Have to go watch a special on new info about the Kennedy Assasination....they still haven't figured it out....guess I will have to help them ;)Be back in a little while. Slap

Bill Moore

11-23-2009, 03:43 AM

Slapout, Thanks, some of the guys told me they did some work on the reservations, and I recall seeing a SF recruiting video about it, but I didn't know the name of the program. I'll take a look at it. Bet we stopped it because the Army couldn't see how that would stop tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, what do you think? Bill

Surferbeetle

11-23-2009, 04:18 AM

Rand Monograph MR-1630 by: Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk: Terrorism and Development, Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1630/)

This report examines the social and economic development policies enacted by three countries — Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom — to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions. Drawing on a broad research base, including numerous first-hand interviews, the authors outline the initiatives implemented by each country then assess their effectiveness, with the aim of informing U.S. decisionmakers of the benefits and pitfalls of such initiatives as they develop policy to counter terrorism. Among their conclusions are the following: Social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits, and such policies can be used as a "stick" to discourage terrorism. They caution, however, that the ability of these policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation, and inadequately funded such policies are likely to renew support for terrorism.

Case Studies in Economic Development (http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/277/284582/todarocasestudies.pdf), Third Edition, by Stephen C. Smith, George Washington University, Department of Economics

Case Studies in Economic Development strives to represent alternative points of view in a balanced way. In doing so, the central role of market based development is stressed as a complement to the indispensable role of well-designed government policy. The prevalence of market failure in development is examined without overlooking the recurring problems of government failure. Finally, although at its core the text is one of development economics, it seeks to integrate the vital contributions of other disciplines when they help us to understand the complexities of development and guide the wise implementation of policy.

Bill Moore

11-23-2009, 07:41 AM

Steve,

I did a quick read of the RAND study, and I find it supports my arguments. I look forward to reading the Case Studies in Development later.

The RAND study was published in 2003, and it described the economic development in the Southern Philippines overall as a dismal failure because it was grossly under resourced ($6.00/per person), most of the aid went to the Christian population (not the target population), and that the government of the Philippines is corrupt through and through. It did site a couple of "minor" successes regarding banana plantations, where it gave "some" guerrillas an alternative life style via providing jobs.

However, the fact of the matter is that the insurgency is still alive and well today in the Southern Philippines, and most of the economic development projects have failed. Different perspectives will give you different views. On one hand if you listen to Philippine and USG representatives they'll tell point out individual successes, and then if you talk to the Muslim Filipinos who live there, especially the ones not touched by these relatively micro successes, they'll tell you another story.

Let's say you have 100,000 disenfranchised citizens who are active or passive supporters of the insurgency, and your economic development actually provides jobs for 5,000 of them. That makes for 5,000 folks who are more content (perhaps), and some kodak moments for your next brief, but you still 95,0000 disenfranchised folks who are active supporters of the insurgency.

Not necessarily bad, because now you can point to the 5,000 and say if you quit fighting we'll do the same for you, BUT YOU BETTER BE READY TO DELIVER. As the study pointed out, if you give them rising expectations, but fail to deliver you will actually have made the problem worse with your false promises. This is exactly the failed economic aid I saw in Iraq, a number of promises made that never could be realized until we first established security by suppressing the insurgency.

As the study stated, its focus was "inhibiting a resurgence" of violence, not defeating an insurgency. That is completely different than what we were discussing earlier. You were implying you could use economic development to defeat an insurgency, and I disagreed and still do unless the root cause of that insurgency is "simply" economics, and that is rarely the case.

The study also confirmed that poverty doesn't cause terrorism, but it may contribute to it. My previous point, if the issue that they're fighting over isn't economic disparity, then why waste time and our precious resources on economic development to begin with? Furthermore, if the economic development isn't synched with the plan (and used as a carrot and stick), then it is going to fail.

I'm letting this thread die from my side, so in summary, economic development isn't something you do independently of the counterinsurgency effort, and there are more risks associated with doing economic development poorly than not at all. COIN is political warfare, and if you employ economic development as a leverage tool versus a handout, then "maybe" you can make a difference with it, but only if you really know what you're doing.

slapout9

11-23-2009, 12:57 PM

brich

11-24-2009, 04:19 AM

As a current student and former military instructor of Economics, I appreciate you entertaining my mandatory ILE blog.

Furthermore, if the economic development isn't synched with the plan (and used as a carrot and stick), then it is going to fail.

so in summary, economic development isn't something you do independently of the counterinsurgency effort, and there are more risks associated with doing economic development poorly than not at all. COIN is political warfare, and if you employ economic development as a leverage tool versus a handout, then "maybe" you can make a difference with it, but only if you really know what you're doing.

Economic development is much more than spending money as Bill Moore adeptly points out. Economic systems are absolutely about the synchronized objective, but the scope of the problem is even larger than this discussion has so far touched on as it encompasses almost every conceivable LOO or LOE.
Economic development cannot succeed most efficiently in the absence of property rights, a known and predicitable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts. These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.
In this one man's humble opinion, MM12 simply asked how to best spend his money which is a far cry from the benefits and difficulties of imposing free market capitalism in the context of an English common law judicial system on a tribal Muslim culture. I have to agree with one John Nagl's points that economic development within our current COIN doctrine is equivalent to changing a society.

I certainly admire, but don't envy MM12 for attacking either problem. Thanks for your service and keep up the good fight.

Major Adam Albrich, student CGSC, Belvoir satellite campus
"The views expressed in this "insert type" are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."

jmm99

11-24-2009, 05:14 AM

the "benefits" (if any) of "imposing free market capitalism in the context of an English common law judicial system on a tribal Muslim culture." ?

The "difficulties" of attempting that are self-evident.

I do agree with this:

from brich
Economic development cannot succeed most efficiently in the absence of property rights, a known and predicitable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts. These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.

although removing the words "most efficiently" would cause no uproar from me. I know of no functioning economic sytem that is absent some form of property rights, a known and predictable means of settling disputes and some basis for enforcing contracts - whether it be individualistic, collectivistic or tribal - including Astan's thriving poppy trade.

OfTheTroops

11-25-2009, 02:47 AM

What is this?

These speak to a challenge greater than security - a functioning legal (not police) system.

I take it to mean a legal system with a responsive police force. As the gatekeepers to legal system the police are the only portion of that system that the law abiding citizen will ever see. Wild west hanging judges or Judge Dreads or thought police are far more practical than a legal system sans enforcers.:(

Steve the Planner

11-25-2009, 03:20 AM

In the regulatory and legal communities, there is a concept of a "bundle of rights" which is the background predicate for much of our interactions within our societies.

We typically think of property rights as the unimpeded ownership or right of use of a property. But land tenure and holding patterns vary dramatically. In Iraq, most citizens live in a town or city, but have some form of ownership or use right in a plot of land outside the town.

During the 2008 Drought, for example, many areas of Northern Iraq were intensively plowed, but not planted. Satellite images indicated a lot of "cultivation" which led the Ag Folks in DC to erroneously believe that bumper crops would be forthcoming. What was actually going on was a very old land tenure system where folks had a use right in land provided that they actively "used" the land. So many of these folks went out to till the land to demonstrate use under their tenure agreements, but had no rational reason to plant seeds in a drought. Many of you in Iraq last year sucked the dust from the record dust storms which were, in part, the result of the tilling needed to preserve their continuing "property right" interest in the land.

Usually, too, we assume rights---quiet enjoyment; police won't kick down your door without a Court writ and show of cause; a permit issuer at the County will not demand a bribe as acondition of issuing a permit; the government will place taxes, once collected, in dedicated tax accounts for uses related to the purpose of the tax; that a mortgage or deed transfer cannot be recorded against a property you own without your consent.

None of this has anything to do with police, but everything to do with a reasonably functional society and economy. The USG focus on Rule of Law often overlooks the most important non-police elements which create resistance to reconstruction, post-conflict stabilization.

I read today that Iraq has finally passed an Investment Law which gives rights to foreign investors to defend claims, interests, ownership rights in things they may invest in in Iraq.

Bear in mind, however, that even with that law, there remain claims outstanding from decades of past practices in Iraq. Sadaam's government forcing Turkmen to sell land for a pittance which was later given to military officers, etc... Even the Jews that were forced out of Baghdad in the 1950s still have potential claims wandering out in cyberspace about real properties and businesses in Iraq.

Very complicated indeed. Especially in the places at issue.

Steve

jmm99

11-25-2009, 03:48 AM

What I speak of (and probably also MAJ Albrich) is the need for a civil legal system (property rights, contract rights, family & inheritance law, and dispute resolution of the same) to allow operation of a functioning economic system.

We take much of that for granted in our organized society. We get the morning newspaper from the box at the end of our sidewalk ("our's" because the property lines are established by deed and plat; the newspaper because the paper carrier has been invited onto our property to deliver it; contract made and performed because we subscribed to the newspaper).

In our society, the vast bulk of legal events are part of the civil legal system, which operates fairly seamlessly without need for lawyers and courts.

In the Astan of 40 years ago, the civil legal system on a local village level was a triangular arrangement of village elders (shura or jirga - language dependent), the local mullah and the local "big man" (malik, district officer or local warlord). In the chaos of two generations of armed conflict, the traditional tribal legal system disintegrated in many areas, along with whatever educational system existed.

As nature abhors a vacuum, so does law. So, various legal systems developed: those of the Taliban, regional warlords and drug lords. Now, we do not generally look at these as "legal systems" (often not that much in writing, but rules nonetheless). The villagers probably would have preferred their age-old traditional local institutions; but, in chaos, power and law flow from the barrel with the largest bore. In effect, the villagers have to select the best kind of insecurity that will allow their economic survival, which is often at the subsistence level or below (credits: Marc Legrange).

Now, the police power obviously has something to do with all of this - if the police power carries the largest bore cannon, and if it is going to remain at the village level to enforce its own brand of security or insecurity. Add to that, the development of locally-based security forces as a necessity.

The question then becomes whether the police power is going to impose its own brand of law (civil and criminal), as well as its ideas of economic and educational development; or whether it will seek to restore, as much as possible, the once stable traditional legal institutions; and to assist that economic and educational development needed to raise the villagers above the subsistence level (which to them would be "security") with minimum manipulation of their normal lifestyle (credits: Jim Gant).

STP is right on point with his Iraqi examples. Astan is a much more primitive case; and the less sophistication imposed, so much the better.

Regards

Mike

Steve the Planner

11-25-2009, 04:18 AM

JMM:

True. True.

But in Iraq, the civilian side spent far too much time on writing US federal things like national banking and stock market laws years before they were really ripe and needed.

Instead, the majority of our daily lives are defined by small scale regulations and complex webs of "agreed" standards (sometimes enforceable).

Personally, I spend a tremendous amount of time in my private consulting practice on regulatory and finance/budget compliance issues. And its these little, yet standardized practices and regulations, that are what keeps our society functioning without having to have a lawyer in everyone's speed dial.

Whether styled as formal or informal systems, they are the Rules of Law that we commonly understand.

In Afghanistan, it seems logical that the systems JMM described really are the current functional norms, but as he notes, these are not the systems that governed things before. They are the aberations resulting from war, and stable replacement systems have not yet been established or applied.

What good is a properly recorded deed if you can't occupy "your" house?

Surferbeetle

12-02-2009, 07:37 PM

H/T to Bill...

PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal (http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/PROVN_Westmoreland.pdf)

Historians have often used a 1966 Army report nicknamed PROVN
either to cast aspersions on the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam
between 1964 and 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, or to
praise his successor, General Creighton Abrams. This interpretation is
simplistic and inaccurate. Although the report criticized aspects of the
war under Westmoreland, its target was really the U.S. and Vietnamese
governments. Moreover, PROVN’s conclusions were less radical
and its remedies less novel than observers have tended to admit. A
fresh look at PROVN reveals significant continuities in thought between
Westmoreland, the report, and Abrams.

If the importance of security was well understood by the Army, so, too, was the notion that political and socioeconomic reforms were also necessary. The U.S. Army had a long tradition of making institutional reform a part of its counterinsurgency, nation-building, and constabulary activities, and it had readily accepted Walt W. Rostow's thesis that socioeconomic change was a key weapon in the fight against the spread of communism in the third world.21

Surferbeetle

12-20-2009, 07:11 AM

H/T to Slapout

Rand Monograph R0462, Rebellion and Authority, An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R0462/) by: Nathan Constantin Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr.

Economic reasoning applied to an analysis of rebellion and authority yields some new conclusions about both. Fundamentally, the struggle for popular support is not exclusively or primarily a "political" contest as these terms are usually understood. People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population. One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point. (Also published by Markham Publishing Company, 1970.)

Bill Moore

12-20-2009, 04:56 PM

People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.

We have ignored the wisdom in this post for years, and I don't recall our COIN/FID doctrine adequately addressing this. To conduct effective COIN you must employ an effective (situation specfic) population control measures and methods to mobilize (counter organize) the populace, and "eliminate" negative influences (don't compete with them, this isn't a legal political contest) instead of blindly building schools, roads, and spreading messages of good cheer, all the while leaving the political warfare victory to the enemy.

The caveat is equally important:

One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point.

Surferbeetle

12-20-2009, 06:33 PM

In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

Private schools flourish in Hawaii, even though families take on substantial debt (along with the associated risks), because parts of the public school system are unable to provide their charges the skills necessary to compete in and among a global workforce. The cost/benefit equation used by parents in Hawaii includes a time variable which is greater than 12 months.

In Iraq how many packs of kids did we both see roaming the streets and seeing and participating in things that kids should not see or do? Will these kids be constructively competing with our kids in the global workforce or will our kids be seeing them on future battlefields?

In short, focusing upon only the violence or school variables does not solve the multivariate cost/benefit equation associated with war.

Rand Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations (http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR633/) By: Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry M. Sollinger, Kayla M. Williams

This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.

Bill Moore

12-20-2009, 06:59 PM

Surferbettle,

And a Merry Christmas to you and yours. Promise I'll read your enclosed study before the New Year.

Don't disagree with anything you wrote (seriously); however, my point has been and remains that building schools doesn't counter active insurgencies. Over a longer time line (assuming they're well managed and have adequate teachers) they will enable more capable socieities by developing the human potential (I'm a believer), but ss we both know it is hard for kids to go to school when there is still a shooting war going on, it is bad enough when there is simply gang warfare in the vicinity of the school (Chicago, Miami, LA, etc.).

Let's focus first on how to deal with the active insurgency. From your previous post,

What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.

IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization. To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.

Dr. Kilcullen obviously explains it much better in his book, but his example of building a road in one province as a tool to actively organize the people against the Taliban (I need to review my notes, but in general it was more than building a road, there was a reason behind it beyond economics). He demonstrates it can be effective. In short I think you can be effective with your approach if you connect all the dots and tie those efforts to the greater cause. Bill

slapout9

12-20-2009, 08:12 PM

Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

jmm99

12-20-2009, 08:31 PM

In a week, some folks will be celebrating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Propaganda Unit for National Liberation. This armed unit was set up on 27 Dec 1944 and consisted of a picked group of some 34 officers and soldiers. It was commanded by one Vo Nguyen Giap.

Starting as an armed propaganda unit, its purpose in life was to train and educate local cadres and guerrilla units in both the political and military efforts. It also dabbled in targeted killings. It later developed into PAVN.

Bill Moore (with whom, John McCuen would agree) sets out the counter to such as the PUNL, as this:

Let's focus first on how to deal with the active insurgency. From your previous post,

Quote:
What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.

IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization. To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.

In the essence of methodology, this is fighting fire with fire. The political narratives will differ in substance.

Do we need an elaborate system to do this ? E.g., while I recognize the ideal suggested by Steve:

from Steve
In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

No quick fix suggested - it took the PUNL 10 years to develop into PAVN which won at DBP in 1954.

My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.

No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos. :D )

Mike

MikeF

12-20-2009, 09:03 PM

First, Leites and Wolf is a classic. The old Rand Corp set the bar high for think-tanks, and they provide great work on small wars. When I have a chance, I'll see if I can find their piece on the Malaya Emergency for posting. In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intevention points when accurately defined. An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them), but they need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive. With that said, on to Surferbeetle's points...

In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close). So, what do we do with the denied areas while Surferbeetle is revamping the protected areas? Five current options:

1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
5. Do nothing.

The first three options have high potential pay-offs, but come with high risks/costs. The fourth option may disrupt over-time, but the results are hard to measure. The fifth option is very dangerous IMO.

Mike

Surferbeetle

12-21-2009, 12:35 AM

Surferbeetle, And a Merry Christmas to you and yours.

Same to you Bill :)

…however, my point has been and remains that building schools doesn't counter active insurgencies.

We were in Vietnam for ~30 years (http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_long_did_the_Vietnam_War_last). Compulsory education in Vietnam appears to consist of the first five years of primary school. If the compulsory requirement (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Vietnam) was indeed five years during the conflict it then follows that both sides had a crack at influencing 6 cohorts of potential insurgents. I do not know of any sources which examine the capture rate of students by the two ideologies but is an interesting point to consider.

…IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization.

Bill, here is what I have lived:

1. During my year in Iraq, OIF1, we executed the 'three block war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Block_War)'. 24/7 security operations attempted to blanket the AO as me and mine ran seven day a week assessments and coordination meetings focusing on governance and economics issues for the first half of my war. During the second half of the war we dropped down to six days a week. We provided our own security throughout.
2. During my time in Central America me and mine ran six day a week assessments and coordination meetings. We provided our own security with augmentation throughout.
3. During my international engineering work we usually provide on our own security.

All of it is dangerous to some degree, but the need for security, governance (politics, electricity, clean water, etc.) and economics (business) does not stop just because some armed folks are fighting in one of the three blocks. Simultaneous lines of operation in economics, governance, and security will be provided by one side or the other; if we abdicate the field under fire how does this advance our objectives?

…To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.

I agree.

…In short I think you can be effective with your approach if you connect all the dots and tie those efforts to the greater cause. Bill

Like you, I am more than willing to play team.

I posted this one in another thread, but for completeness I will post it here. The ideas are pretty interesting and the math is mostly confined to the appendix.

The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development (http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/fali_1005.pdf) by Fali Huang of Singapore Management University

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

This one does not pull too many punches regarding our reconstruction efforts. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (http://www.sigir.mil/hardlessons/pdfs/Hard_Lessons_Report.pdf)

Surferbeetle

12-21-2009, 12:50 AM

Surferbeetle

12-21-2009, 02:00 AM

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

Mike,

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.
2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.
3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.
4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

Let’s also briefly touch upon an organizing and operating principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone_soup) of Civil Affairs-bubbas.

According to the story, some travelers come to a village, carrying nothing more than an empty pot. Upon their arrival, the villagers are unwilling to share any of their food stores with the hungry travelers. The travelers fill the pot with water, drop a large stone in it, and place it over a fire in the village square. One of the villagers becomes curious and asks what they are doing. The travelers answer that they are making "stone soup", which tastes wonderful, although it still needs a little bit of garnish to improve the flavor, which they are missing. The villager doesn't mind parting with just a little bit of flour to help them out, so it gets added to the soup. Another villager walks by, inquiring about the pot, and the travelers again mention their stone soup which hasn't reached its full potential yet. The villager hands them a little bit of seasoning to help them out. More and more villagers walk by, each adding another ingredient. Finally, a delicious and nourishing pot of soup is enjoyed by all.

My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.

I agree.

No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos. :D

Gaaahhhh!!!! I would need chains to ride my motorcycle... :eek: :eek: :D

Surferbeetle

12-21-2009, 03:13 AM

In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intervention points when accurately defined.

The study (Rand # R0462 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf),186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper (http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/fali_1005.pdf) provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them)…

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

…they [an insurgency] need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive.

Agreed.

Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close).

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ;) ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

So, what do we do…

1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
5. Do nothing.

Oil spot theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Grainger_Ker_Thompson) is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?

slapout9

12-21-2009, 02:48 PM

The study (Rand # R0462 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf),186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

jmm99

12-21-2009, 06:02 PM

Hi Steve,

You've managed to bring in the techie factor (which I omitted since I was focusing on my current areas of interest) as well as pointing out that there is a spectrum of efforts dependent on the situational environment:

from Steve

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.

2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.

3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.

4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

No disagreement as to any of this, which depends on how primitive or advanced the systems are - and on capabilities (scarce resources) that are available.

If you are so lucky as to have an intact civil administration (as in Malaya), the task (besides providing security) is to enhance what is already there - as well as the colonial power (UK) being willing to provide a nationalistic Narrative (Malayan independence taking into account the three major ethnic groups, Malay, Chinese and Indian) acceptable to the vast majority of the People.

If you have a society that is more urban and modernized - as well as used to centralized control - such as Iraq, more conventional methods (more similar to what we would use here at home) can be successfully applied. Both you and Steve the Planner have pointed that out.

With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

---------------------
Real Stone Soup

Great story. Giap's PUFL teams did just that, but the soup resulting was political. That is, the first step was to infiltrate the community (preferably with former residents) and determine what the gripes were - and what little non-muscle things could be done. After developing the local Narrartive (which had nothing to do with Communism), the teams would then subvert the community and radicalize it against the local government factors and symbols. Of course, that meant killing off unpopular landlords, local officials and teachers, etc.; but only after the local community was more or less ready for those more drastic measures. From our standpoint, it was a Devil's Soup.

Regards

Mike

MikeF

12-21-2009, 06:33 PM

Hi Steve,

The study (Rand # R0462 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf),186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper (http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/fali_1005.pdf) provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

Thanks for the links. This thread is becoming a treasure trove for good reading. I'll get to them as time allows.

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

I need to clarify that statement (and it's a direct quote from Dr. Gordon McCormick not my original thought). In the beginning of the insurgency, the insurgent IS invisible, and the one comparative advantage they have throughout the struggle is an information advantage. That advantage may not last long if the host nation is effective. So, one of the key task for a counter-insurgent is to find the enemy. The easiest/most accurate way is gaining the information from the populace.

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ;) ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

I partially disagree. The current small wars may not be linear, but the enemy controls pockets of territory. In a big city, it may simply be the "bad" neighborhoods where the police don't venture.

Oil spot theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Grainger_Ker_Thompson) is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?

Agreed, and my first three COAs could be derivatives of Oil spots depending on how the ground commander viewed the situation. I'd probably recommend this approach, and the areas chosen must be considered based on conditions.

From Slapout:

That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

Exactly, and brilliant post by the way:D. In a small war, adaptation is a competition for information for the host nation and mobilization for the insurgent. Whoever adapts fastest wins.

From JMM:

With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

Mike, I have no doubt that you and Steve could adapt and thrive.

Best,

Mike

jmm99

12-21-2009, 08:35 PM

I happened on the following 2008 theses, which seem to bear on aspects of what we are discussing - especially how insurgencies and counter-insurgencies differ dependent on the environment and adaptations to it:

Michael R. Wilcheck, Risen from the Ashes: Phoenix and the Struggle against the Viet Cong Shadow Government (http://www.hpu.edu/images/GraduateStudies/MADMS/200820Michael20Wilcheck_a29716.pdf).

The Past in the Future: Phoenix Applications for the Present and Tomorrow

It has been said that those who do not learn from history are destined to repeat it. In studying Phoenix, the author believes that its story holds several important lessons that still remain applicable in today‟s world. There is no formula for fighting an insurgency that can be universally applied, nor will one ever exist. The very nature of an insurgency is unique to a specific time and place and specific to a people and their culture. Thus, when conducting counterinsurgency in foreign countries, it is essential that policymakers be well educated on the country where it is taking place. As was the case in Vietnam, a lack of understanding between Western-educated policy makers and a non-Western culture on which those policies are thrust can hinder counterinsurgency efforts from being as effective as they could be.
....
Robert Wall stated, “Phoenix represented the strategy that could have won the war.” Yet, it did not win the war. Although one may argue that Wall‟s statement may have greatly oversimplified the reasons for South Vietnam‟s eventual defeat, it is important that the United States learn from Phoenix so that America does not once again repeat Wall‟s words substituting another program in another insurgency. By learning from Phoenix and applying the universal lessons made evident through it, America can take positive steps to ensure an effective strategy does not once again fail.

Edward A. Brady, Urban and Rural Insurgencies: A Comparative Analysis (https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_81e9c409-53b9-4e45-aa6b-4eecdce16aea/display.aspx?rs=enginespage).

Chapter 4
Conclusions

A victory is not [just] the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. It is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. - David Galula

The four historical examples studied in this paper display many of the traits commonly associated with insurgent warfare. Winning requires a political solution, not simply a military one. These struggles are protracted in nature. The ultimate goal of the insurgency is replacing the existing government. And both the insurgents and counterinsurgents battled for legitimacy throughout the various conflicts. Both the Anti-Huk campaign and the Battle of Algiers can be viewed as government victories. While important, France’s political defeat in Algeria came about by factors beyond the scope of this study. The Afghan insurgency is at a stalemate, which favors the insurgency. The Baghdad insurgency was tipping steeply toward an insurgent victory during the period studied. Based on this bag of mixed results, we will now review the most essential aspects of the four insurgencies here studied, to determine the similarities and differences of the underlying dynamics of urban and rural insurgencies.
....
This thesis historically analyzed two rural insurgencies and two urban insurgencies to determine the underlying similarities and differences between the two types of insurgencies. A systematic analysis of these four cases revealed two similar dynamics and two divergent dynamics. The first similarity is that insurgents must be able to hide in order to expand in the beginning and middle stages of an insurgency. The second similarity is that the ability to hide and grow depends on the relative capabilities between the insurgents and counterinsurgents to operate in insurgent base areas. The divergent dynamics are that the criticality of popular support to the insurgent and the density of high-impact targets for insurgents to strike vary between urban and rural insurgency.

Implications

Although the underlying dynamics of rural and urban insurgencies are very similar, there are also some important differences. These differences do not require diverse conceptual approaches. They may, however, require modifications in technique that current doctrine fails to address adequately. Therefore, the insights developed in this thesis should be carefully considered by doctrine writers to validate, refute, or amend existing COIN doctrines.

Best

Mike

Dayuhan

12-22-2009, 02:04 AM

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

These are all excellent and useful ideas, but they all hang up on one of the basic realities of our current COIN problems: we're not fighting our insurgencies, we're fighting someone else's. Most communities are not comfortable with the idea of furriners setting up schools or holding influence over what is taught, or setting up courts and holding influence over decisions, or setting up councils and holding influence over who sits on those councils and what is debated. Even if we try to be impartial, the perception that these institutions represent foreign influence is bound to be present. To the extent that resistance to foreign influence is a part of the insurgent narrative, this sort of activity may actually support that narrative.

Of course it's best if this sort of organizing is done by the Government we're supporting, but it often isn't... or if it is, it is aimed less at building durable institutions with popular support than at supporting individuals or groups that suit the convenience of the governing elite.

It's easy to say that the governments we support need to govern effectively, but that falls into the "good morning, Captain Obvious" category. If they had the will and the capacity to govern effectively they probably wouldn't be facing insurgencies in the first place.

This is the hole we have dug for ourselves: we are heavily invested in Governments that cannot stand, but that we cannot allow to fall. If we try to govern in their place, we undercut their vestigial authority and credibility. If we allow them to govern on their own, they won't. If we try to assist them, we come up against the reality that our agenda (development of effective institutions) is generally very different from theirs (personal gain).

It's a gnarly problem. The only solution I can think of would be to not have gotten into this position in the first place, but it's a wee bit late for that.

jmm99

12-22-2009, 06:38 PM

As to this:

from Dayuhan
These are all excellent and useful ideas, but they all hang up on one of the basic realities of our current COIN problems: we're not fighting our insurgencies, we're fighting someone else's.

I see no "Made in USA" label on what I wrote:

from JMM

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

or on what Steve added:

from Surferbeetle

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.

2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.

3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.

4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

Strictly a generic framework for one portion of a civil affairs program.

Unless the foreign armed political action workers happen to have solid language and cultural training and education, as well as considerable in-country experience, I can't see how they could execute very well at the very basic level I'm talking about.

Taking Steve's four systems (educational, judicial, political and engineering), I'm positing those systems to be indigenous, which would require foreign "assisters" to learn the local systems and to adapt to them - not the other way around.

You hit the problem for external intervenors (goes beyond GOs and includes NGOs), with this:

from Dayuhen
Of course it's best if this sort of organizing is done by the Government we're supporting, but it often isn't... or if it is, it is aimed less at building durable institutions with popular support than at supporting individuals or groups that suit the convenience of the governing elite.

It is often in the enlightened self-interest of "governments" in failed or failing states - also applicable to the various armed groups that may well be roaming around - to preserve what we (liberal democracies) see as instability and insecurity; and to use what they see as a rational distribution of instability and insecurity to serve their own ends. Credits: Marc Legrange.

The fundamental issue is whether to intervene or not, which is a basic policy issue for Politik. Frankly, we (US) have intervened over my lifetime in a number of situations where the governments we supported were greater or lesser mutts - and where FID assistance sometimes morphed into much larger GPF commitments. In a number of those situations, the narratives of the insurgents have had greater appeal to me than the narratives of the "host governments" - realizing that the folks behind insurgents had their own agendas which did not correspond to the narratives that were being propagated. In short, in many cases, a Third Way would have been the more preferred solution to me - not really feasible since then we (US) would have been waging unconventional warfare against both the "host governments" and the insurgents.

For Politik, the reason for intervening will determine the initial desired end state and also the parameters of the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle to reach that end state. The possible reasons for intervention are not likely to be totally consistent with one another. For example, in SOCOM's 2008 Strategic Appreciation (http://www.au.af.mil/awc/africom/documents/ussocom.pdf), we have for Africa this (p.23):

U.S. INTERESTS

The group viewed the dynamics of Africa through the prism of United States national interests. Specifically:

- Maintaining access to African resources

- Ensuring homeland security (with a particular focus on disease; violent extremist organizations [VEOs]; transnational criminal organizations [TCOs]; and weapons of mass destruction [WMD] proliferation and transportation)

- Supporting human development (political, economic, and social) as a means toward establishing stability in Africa

The United States must review its African selective engagement policies in light of national interests. Simply stated, the United States cannot effectively engage all the challenges that exist across the entire continent.

It is easy to posit a situation (or find one in existence) where the first interest (access to resources) might well be better or more easily secured by support of a "government" that does not support "human development" or "stability".

Once Politik decides to intervene, the civilian and military subordinates of Politik don't have the luxury of reversing the decision, but must try to make the best of what may be a bad situation.

Regards

Mike

Surferbeetle

12-23-2009, 11:52 PM

Hi MikeF,

Meant to post this one here the other day, OBE. Merry Christmas.

From the WSJ by Ann Marlowe, Fighting a Smarter War in Afghanistan (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704107604574608112613370386.html)

No substantial business sends its sales force out to sell a product without supplying them with market research. But we are doing just that to our troops in Afghanistan. We've spent an estimated $173 billion in fiscal year 2009 selling a product to Afghans—cooperation with their government—without much idea why some people buy it and others don't.

On the platoon and company level, where American troops conduct ground-level counterinsurgency (COIN) in the Afghan Pashtun belt, we're fighting a good war. During five embeds with the Army from 2007 to last month, I've seen lieutenants and captains survey their area of operations, collecting information on the economy and patterns of work and travel. They regularly sit down with local elders to collaborate on development and security measures.

The problem is that valuable data are collected, but then aren't analyzed, or not at the level where the rubber meets the road. What's more, experienced soldiers leave. So most of our soldiers are operating with bare guesses about where the leverage points are in their local populations.

The good news is that more sophisticated methods are now being introduced in Afghanistan. Col. Pamela J. Hoyt heads the first team tasked with analyzing data in Afghanistan for the generals who set policy.

"What we have found, as you state, is that data is not in one repository with easy access," Col. Hoyt wrote to me in a Dec. 15 email. She's developing a database using previous surveys as well as "a model to evaluate if the Afghan National Army can achieve their growth objective given historical recruiting, attrition, and re-contracting rates, and increased recruiting levels."

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 02:36 AM

From the Nov 12th 2009 Economist: Iraq's mobile-phone revolution Better than freedom? (http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14870118)

During recent years of civil strife, when many stayed indoors, mobile phones were the lifeline. They also became a tool of commerce. Reluctant to risk their lives by visiting a bank, many subscribers transferred money to each other by passing on the serial numbers of scratch cards charged with credit, like gift vouchers. Recipients simply add the credit to their account or sell it on to shops that sell the numbers at a slight discount from the original. This impromptu market has turned mobile-phone credit into a quasi-currency, undermining the traditional informal hawala banking system.

The market’s growing size is making some bankers wonder if phone credit should be traded on a public exchange. This may not be practical, but more regulation would be welcome. Criminal rings are among the parallel currency’s busiest users. Kidnap gangs ask for ransom to be paid by text messages listing a hundred or more numbers of high-value phone cards. Prostitutes get regular customers to send monthly retainers to their phones, earning them the nickname “scratch-card concubines”, while corrupt government officials ask citizens for $50 in phone credit to perform minor tasks. Viewed as cash substitutes, scratch cards have also drawn the attention of armed robbers. In one case, a gang emptied out the card storage of Iraq’s biggest mobile operator, Zain, which is based in neighbouring Kuwait.

Not to be left out of the bonanza, Iraq’s cash-strapped government now says it will sell a fourth mobile-operating licence, after raising $1.25 billion from each of the last three. That is less than its vast oil reserves promise to put into the state’s coffers but a lot easier to negotiate. And Baghdad is not the only place where mobile-phone commerce thrives. The UN says it has plans to deliver aid to Iraqi refugees in Syria in the same way.

From the Feb 22nd 2008 Economist: Bringing the poor online, It won't be as easy as providing mobile phones (http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDSQRSQG)

THE mobile-phone industry returned from its mammoth annual trade show, 3GSM, held earlier this month in Barcelona, gloating over its successful year. More than 3 billion (almost half the world’s population) now have mobiles, and the price of a phone has sunk as low as $25. There are now more mobile-phone subscribers in poor countries than rich ones. That would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

Mobile phones have improved poor people’s lives tremendously, from providing political news and health-care information in remote areas to fuelling commerce. Enthusiasm over bringing technology to the world’s poor has been matched in the computing industry, with many companies now selling low-cost laptop computers (so far around $200, but poised to drop much further). But the next digital hurdle—providing internet access—will be much harder to surmount, for both economic and geographical reasons.

Mobile-phone usage is inexpensive because the networks are cheap and easy to build. Equipment is priced low due to rabid competition (particularly from Chinese makers). The capital expenditure differs, too: coverage is built piecemeal as subscribers swell, bolstered by generous vendor financing. And almost all subscribers are on pre-paid plans, so operators collect money before the first call is connected.

Dayuhan

12-24-2009, 05:57 AM

I see no "Made in USA" label on what I wrote:

Have we the capacity to make it elsewhere?

All this talk about creating, selecting, vetting, developing assumes capacity and will. If the host nation government had that capacity and will there wouldn't be an insurgency in the first place. The reason we're involved in these situations is that the capacity and/or will are not present in the host government... and the harsh reality is that in most cases we can neither fill that gap with our own capabilities (which would require us to govern the territory in question ourselves) or to force or persuade others to fill it.

It is often in the enlightened self-interest of "governments" in failed or failing states - also applicable to the various armed groups that may well be roaming around - to preserve what we (liberal democracies) see as instability and insecurity; and to use what they see as a rational distribution of instability and insecurity to serve their own ends. Credits: Marc Legrange.

One might debate how enlightened this position is, but yes, this is the problem I'm talking about. Complicating the issue is the reality that different units of government (e.g. national vs local) may have very different agenda and priorities, and that individuals within these systems are likely to have agendas and priorities of their own. All of these agendas are likely to be very different from ours, and none of the parties involved may be at all interested in pursuing the sort of capacity building that we're discussing - though they will very likely feign such interest if they think it will get them some of our material support. This is why asking military or civilian forces to assist in "nation-building" in a failed or failing state with the assumption of local capacity is like sending a starving man to sit on a pile of canned goods with instructions to assume a can opener. In a failed or failing state the local capacity is by definition absent. If the capacity was there the state wouldn't be failed or failing.

It is easy to posit a situation (or find one in existence) where the first interest (access to resources) might well be better or more easily secured by support of a "government" that does not support "human development" or "stability".

Conflict over access to resources is actually easier to posit than to find examples of, despite vast amounts of rhetoric to the contrary. In today's world you don't need to control territory to gain access to resources; in fact physical control is often as much obstacle as advantage in resource access. If resources are the issue it's usually easier to cut a deal with whoever has the territory and simply buy the stuff... or, as base resources are generally fungible, to let the Chinese take the risks and buy our own stuff from somewhere else.

In our current situation access to resources is less likely to be the motivation for intervention than a perceived need to deny territory or support to hostile forces.

Once Politik decides to intervene, the civilian and military subordinates of Politik don't have the luxury of reversing the decision, but must try to make the best of what may be a bad situation.

This is all too true, and ultimately the key to managing these situations lies with more realistic decision making at the political level. This of course is small consolation to those in the field, but I don't know if it will help them any more to lay out a program based on assumed capacities that in most cases will not actually exist.

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 06:41 AM

Dayuhan,

...your excellent analysis of the heterogeneity of motivations, opportunities, populace/culture/language, governance and economics (access, competition, etc.) have brought our situation into crisp focus.

Your are also truly on target to emphasize that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The question of this being too much to expect of our political construct I would like to defer for the moment. :wry:

Instead, for those of us who have gone and will go again, please turn your analytical skills for a moment to the how-to of building something of lasting value with broken and worn out tools (http://www.everypoet.com/archive/poetry/Rudyard_Kipling/kipling_if.htm) for the situations we are in. My particular focus has been upon Iraq of late however an analysis (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/afghanistan-governed-by-a-fede/#c006227) of Afghanistan would be just as interesting.

Bill Moore

12-24-2009, 09:04 AM

Surferbettle your post,

The market’s growing size is making some bankers wonder if phone credit should be traded on a public exchange. This may not be practical, but more regulation would be welcome. Criminal rings are among the parallel currency’s busiest users. Kidnap gangs ask for ransom to be paid by text messages listing a hundred or more numbers of high-value phone cards. Prostitutes get regular customers to send monthly retainers to their phones, earning them the nickname “scratch-card concubines”, while corrupt government officials ask citizens for $50 in phone credit to perform minor tasks. Viewed as cash substitutes, scratch cards have also drawn the attention of armed robbers. In one case, a gang emptied out the card storage of Iraq’s biggest mobile operator, Zain, which is based in neighbouring Kuwait.

triggered an old idea about the black economy (illegal/illicit economic activity). Obviously the thrust of our economic assistance is to boost the white (legal) economy, but in countries where there is limited State control (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) the black economy emerges rapidly, and I suspect these models become deeply rooted (part of their economic culture) and thus are hard to eradicate.

I remember many of the coalition development efforts in Southern Iraq were controlled by the Shi'a militia's (sometimes directly, sometimes clandestinely by coercing from the shadows). They controlled what contractors got the jobs, and no doubt the militia's collected their taxes and got the message out that if you want to make money you need to side with us. All others will be paid a visit by your friendly militia thugs.

Several points worth studying IMO.

- How much of our economic aide in these countries actually supports the efforts of our foes? I just looked a graph today that showed a correlation between CERP spending and reduced violence, but is that the real picture, or did we simply forfeit control to the enemy, thus there is no need to fight?

- Once black economy models are established (such as the illicit business transfers on the cell phones, selling gas illegally on the side of the road, narcotics trade, human smuggling, kidnap for ransom, etc.) is it even feasible to displace this black economy with a legal economy?

- There are estimates that up to one third of the world's economic activity takes place in the black economy which equates to over a trillion dollars that governments have no control over. What does the ever increasing convergence of crime and extremism mean to those of us who develop and execute plans in an attempt to defeat terrorists and insurgents?

- Are there cases where our economic development efforts actually undermine successful black economic development, thus push the populace away from us and the HN? For example, attempting to eradicate the poppy plant and replace it with some form of unskilled labor or with a replacement crop that isn't worth as much?

There is a lot more to economic development than meets the eye when you're operating in these chaos zones.

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 03:42 PM

Surferbeetle your post, triggered an old idea about the black economy (illegal/illicit economic activity). Obviously the thrust of our economic assistance is to boost the white (legal) economy, but in countries where there is limited State control (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) the black economy emerges rapidly, and I suspect these models become deeply rooted (part of their economic culture) and thus are hard to eradicate.

Bill,

Speaking of which you might enjoy this short article at Foreign Affairs by Nikolas K. Gvosdev entitled The Soviet Victory That Never Was (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65713/nikolas-k-gvosdev/the-soviet-victory-that-never-was), What the United States Can Learn From the Soviet War in Afghanistan (H/T to the Nixon Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org/))

The Najibullah government was able to survive because Najibullah recognized the futility of the earlier Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. Afghans, he knew, would not fight and die for the Soviet Union. But, he realized, Afghans could be co-opted to work with the government to defend local and clan interests. Najibullah allowed regional leaders -- and, in some cases, former mujahideen commanders -- to form their own militias and, with mixed results, to join the regular army. The most successful of these was the Uzbek militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, which formed the 53rd infantry division of the Afghan army.

The departure of Soviet troops -- “the foreigners” -- weakened ties among various mujahideen factions. Najibullah’s government used long-standing rivalries, along with selective and generous bribery, to drive wedges between militant groups and then take advantage of the fighting that broke out as a result. At the same time, Najibullah received weaponry, food, and fuel from the Soviets, which gave his forces a significant advantage in terms of battlefield firepower and resources. The Afghan military flew the latest Soviet aircraft and had hundreds of Soviet-made Scud missiles in its arsenal.

The government in Kabul also dropped many of the more radical social-engineering programs previously championed by the Afghan communist leadership. It moved away from Marxist ideology and embraced Islam as the state religion, making an effort to put many of the country’s mullahs on the government payroll.

Finally, Najibullah constructed a nationwide patronage network to dispense the government largesse provided by the Soviet Union. In particular, he kept open the Salang Road -- a critical supply route linking Kabul with the country’s south -- by striking a series of deals with local villages and elders, who agreed to prevent mujahideen from mounting attacks on supply lines in exchange for a percentage of the goods flowing from the Soviet Union.

In short, Najibullah relied on time-honored practices of Afghan statecraft. He resembled a communist version of Mohammad Nadir Shah, who had ruled the country after the overthrow of King Amanullah Khan in 1929. Both the shah and Najibullah pushed for quiet modernization rather than reform from above, placated local interests while using divide-and-rule techniques to break up the opposition, and focused on strengthening the state’s army and security services.

I remember many of the coalition development efforts in Southern Iraq were controlled by the Shi'a militia's (sometimes directly, sometimes clandestinely by coercing from the shadows). They controlled what contractors got the jobs, and no doubt the militia's collected their taxes and got the message out that if you want to make money you need to side with us. All others will be paid a visit by your friendly militia thugs.

There were similar things going on up north, but being run by different actors. Certain roads were slick with smuggled oil.

There is a lot more to economic development than meets the eye when you're operating in these chaos zones.

If you find any case studies (http://ideas.repec.org/e/pho173.html) that you think would shed some light please pass them along and I will do the same.

slapout9

12-24-2009, 04:13 PM

Surfer and Bill, might want to try this link to Rogue Economics.......I have not read the book but have seen short interviews of work......not sure I believe everything she says but alot I do.

http://www.sevenstories.com/book/?GCOI=58322100402010

jmm99

12-24-2009, 05:49 PM

I fail to see the logic of this:

from Dayuhen

Originally Posted by jmm99
I see no "Made in USA" label on what I wrote:

Have we the capacity to make it elsewhere?

All this talk about creating, selecting, vetting, developing assumes capacity and will. If the host nation government had that capacity and will there wouldn't be an insurgency in the first place. The reason we're involved in these situations is that the capacity and/or will are not present in the host government... and the harsh reality is that in most cases we can neither fill that gap with our own capabilities (which would require us to govern the territory in question ourselves) or to force or persuade others to fill it.

The logic appears to be that:

1. If the incumbant government has an insurgency on its hands, it lacks the capabilities or will to implement the very modest suggestions by Steve and me on a local level.

2. Therefore, since the modest program cannot be implemented by the incumbant government, it can be implemented only by a foreign intervenor (e.g. US).

3. Therefore, the modest program will have a "Made in the USA" label, even though I clearly stated that the local program should be indigenous.

The fallacy lies in the initial premise.

What we are talking about, for a rural population complex of say 2500-5000 people, would be an armed civil affairs team of say 6-12 persons; and a very mobile platoon of patrolling Dobermans to preserve the military balance.

If the incumbant government cannot make that effort, it indeed is in deep trouble (regardless of how good it looks on paper at higher levels). In effect, it will be legislating into a void.

The factors of "creating, selecting, vetting, developing" are relative. None of them requires the resources of a modern industrial state. They should be done in accord with the local environment. Obviously, the local environment is capable of "creating, selecting, vetting, developing" - otherwise, the insurgency would not exist.

Merry Christmas

Mike

Bill Moore

12-24-2009, 07:36 PM

This is the first post of a few on this topic if the moderators don’t shut me down. In this one I just want to introduce some additional context that will shape later posts on the efficacy of our economic development efforts as means to counter threat economic systems, which can probably be described as the life blood of any movement.

Eventually I hope to evolve these thoughts with your help to where I can make a case for changing “clear, hold and build” to clear, hold, and consolidate” where build is one subcategory of consolidate. Then I hope to collaborate with the SWJ larger mind to develop effective approaches of neutralizing enemy economic systems (slap, I’ll know you’ll love this), which will hopefully push the populace to rely on State endorsed economic systems (without conducting economic warfare against the populace). However, I think this will prove to be a tough nut to crack.

I think that even with over eight years of experience with GWOT, our military and other government organizations such as State remain largely incapable of understanding unconventional warfare, since our perception is biased by outdated doctrine.

The U.S. military focus on unconventional warfare is really nothing more than a focus on the warfare piece (i.e. maneuvering guerrillas within the constraints of the law of land warfare) against enemy forces. This really isn't UW at all, but simply a fifth column of surrogates that is conducting a limited form of guerrilla warfare that is very much tied to the our interpretation of CvC’s view of war as a state versus state conflict where the military is the decisive factor.

If this is true (open for debate), then it is only natural that our counter UW, or COIN doctrine is largely focused on militarily defeating the IED networks (in the current fight). Once again the conventional force has learned this isn’t a conventional war (but they were slow learners), so they slowly revisited previous lesson from previous conflicts that had a similar (not identical) character. They started protecting the populace, providing essential service and focused on developed relationships with community to facilitate more effective intelligence operations, which were largely focused on finding and destroying the IED networks. It still keeps coming back to that, because CvC taught us the way to win was to destroy our foe’s ability to wage war. CvC wasn’t wrong, but we failed to see that the enemy can wage war without IED networks through propaganda, political subversion, quiet terrorism behind the scenes to influence key personnel, establishing shadow governments, taking over the local schools, economic subversion, etc. We tend to largely ignore these threats, we may deal with them if we stumble across them, but that isn’t what our intelligence is focused on. I think Jmm would agree that we simply don't have the legal authority to fight fire with fire in the shadow wars, so we focus on what we can.

Specifically I want to focus on the E in DIME, and challenge the idea that our economic development efforts are achieving the desired results. A combination of luck, intent and globalism is allowing our irregular foes to effectively undermine our economic power. As Naim wrote in his book “Illicit” there is a growing gap between the haves and have nots as globalization spreads. This has facilitated, perhaps out necessity, the rapid growth of the black economy, which according to Naim is in the trillions of dollars. How does the Taliban manage to pay their fighters more than the State of Afghanistan paid theirs? How do numerous NGOs who are clearly tied to various terrorist organizations effectively fund the development of schools, medical clinics, etc.? How do we displace black economic activities such as the narcotics trade and other forms of smuggling without harming the locals who thrive off of it? The State is no longer relevant in this economic system (thus legitimacy is further undermined), and if the State intends to crush or displace this activity, what economic system will they replace it with?

While this doesn’t apply to all conflicts, it does apply to OIF and OEF-A. If we even hope to understand the problem (system) we have to look at it globally, because the black economic systems are tied into the new global economy of which less and less is controlled by States.

We see a rapidly increasing trend where organized transnational crime networks (its an open system) and other irregular threats such as insurgents, terrorists, etc. are converging on a global scale, and I suspect we don’t really understand the implications of this.

These relationships are often based simply on mutual business interests. Such as AQ affiliated groups in the Trans Sahel assisting drug cartels from S. American and W. African smuggle cocaine into Europe. This is just one of many examples of how a terrorist network expands its links (perhaps unintentionally) from a regional effort in the Trans Sahel to bad actors in W. Africa, South America and Europe. The amount of money involved in these activities is overwhelming for developing states, so centers of power shift from State to non-state actors. These groups can now buy effective influence from the windfalls garnered from their illicit activities. Over time, I suspect this corruption/subversion changes the character of the war and its goals, thus my reference to new economic cultural norms in my previous post. We now have an area that neither our law enforcement nor military is ideally organized, trained, or enabled through authorities to confront effectively. Those limitations extend to our partner nations who are afflicted with this threat.

I recommend a quick read through "Illicit" (there are other books on the topic now) to get additional context.

http://www.amazon.com/Illicit-Smugglers-Traffickers-Copycats-Hijacking/dp/1400078849/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1261677733&sr=1-1

jmm99

12-24-2009, 08:52 PM

I like to read and think about your ideas. Lord knows, we need a more comprehensive approach to transnational violent non-state actors - and to the non-violent species as well. That cuts across the entire DIME spectrum and ultimately will affect all of the various legal systems that have to deal with these non-state problems.

Merry Christmas - I now have to go out in the snow and buy the bottle of Christmas dinner wine.

Mike

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 09:27 PM

How-to-build (http://wiki.fablab.af/index.php/Fab-Fi) a wireless router:

FabFi is an open-source, FabLab-grown system using common building materials and off-the-shelf electronics to transmit wireless ethernet signals across distances of up to several miles.

From Scientific American by Richard Heeks, Gaming for Profits: Real Money from Virtual Worlds (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=real-money-from-virtual-worlds)

A gold farmer in China who plays games and sells virtual currency can earn the same wage and, sometimes, more than might be paid for assembling toys in a factory for 12 hours a day.

In just a few years gold farming has become a vast enterprise. A best estimate suggests that Asia, and particularly China, where most of the gold farmers reside, employs more than 400,000 players who spend their days stocking up on gold. Total annnual trade in virtual gold probably amounts to at least $1 billion. Perhaps as many as 10 million players worldwide buy gold or services from farmers that help them to advance in the game.

...currently the game most subscribed to, 1,000 gold units retail for around $10, which is about the same as the yen-to-dollar exchange rate

CIA World Factbook puts the estimated 2008 GDP for Afghanistan at 11.71 billion dollars (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html).

What about having a 'Virtual Easy Button' in the games to employ a 'gold farmer' in Afghanistan to help with the OEF effort?

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 09:31 PM

Eventually I hope to evolve these thoughts with your help to where I can make a case for changing “clear, hold and build” to clear, hold, and consolidate” where build is one subcategory of consolidate. Then I hope to collaborate with the SWJ larger mind to develop effective approaches of neutralizing enemy economic systems (Slap, I’ll know you’ll love this), which will hopefully push the populace to rely on State endorsed economic systems (without conducting economic warfare against the populace). However, I think this will prove to be a tough nut to crack.

Bill,

I am in. Let's see where it goes...

Surferbeetle

12-24-2009, 11:16 PM

From IEEE Spectrum, Open-Source Warfare (http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/opensource-warfare/1) by Robert N. Charette (H/T to Global Guerrillas)

To understand open-source warfare, it's instructive to revisit Eric S. Raymond's 1997 manifesto, The Cathedral and the Bazaar , in which he describes how a large community of open-source software hackers created the operating system Linux.

”Linux is subversive,” Raymond wrote. ”Who would have thought even five years ago [1991] that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?” He likened the rise of Linux to the public marketplace of the bazaar. The programmers agreed to observe a few simple principles but were otherwise free to innovate and create. Raymond contrasted that style with the ”cathedral” approach to software, in which a single organization, using highly planned, sequentially structured steps, maintained tight managerial control over every aspect of the process.

Eventually, the open-source culture would triumph over the proprietary world, Raymond argued, not because it was morally right ”but simply because the closed-source world cannot win an evolutionary arms race with open-source communities that can put orders of magnitude more skilled time into a problem.”

slapout9

12-25-2009, 12:11 AM

Eventually I hope to evolve these thoughts with your help to where I can make a case for changing “clear, hold and build” to clear, hold, and consolidate” where build is one subcategory of consolidate. Then I hope to collaborate with the SWJ larger mind to develop effective approaches of neutralizing enemy economic systems (slap, I’ll know you’ll love this), which will hopefully push the populace to rely on State endorsed economic systems (without conducting economic warfare against the populace). However, I think this will prove to be a tough nut to crack.

Bill, may not be as tough as you think. In fact the tough part is probably going to be convincing the establishment that there is another (better) way to achieve a lasting desirable outcome. Can't wait to read some of your ideas.

Steve the Planner

12-25-2009, 05:50 PM

Bill:

Your insight about the black economy is the driver.

We are sitting heree with the notion that Afghanistan has virtually no economy, while the self-evident truth is that there is always an economy, everywhere, all the time.

The Russian Ambassador, commenting on their failures, reiterated the truism that Afghanistan is not a war that cane be won, but a reconstruction/development process.

Where, in truth, the many parts of Afghanistan were, more often than not, under "foreign" subjugation throughout history, it was to trade patterns and alliances that were productive.

It is almost silly to believe that the largest global trade in opium derives from Afghanistan without a substantially evolved and routinely performing economic system. Obviously, in a three year period, Afghanistan has sprung two vibrant economies: first, the fantastically growing poppy trade; and, second, a booming business in foreign aid "supporting" industries (security, theft, extortion/kidnapping).

So, if we start with the reality that Afghans, like everyone else, are substantially economically motivated and capable, we then turn to the problem that we don't like their economic system and desire to change it.

But if I put on my Afghan farmer hat, why am I going to do something else, given my alternatives?

Let's assume for a second that we substantially interfere with the poppy conveyor (arrest major leaders, disrupt production/distribution). Absent a credible alternative, wouldn't that, of itself cause such substantial opposition and economic suffering that we are back to where we started?

If it was me, I would be interested in mapping out and understanding the poppy economy (not just the military/terrorist component), then looking for ways to re-direct it.

India, for example, is a huge poppy economy, but for the legal medical markets. What's up with that? Could legal production displace illegal?

What if, once you mapped out the system, you were able to limit external transfers of poppy wealth? You can earn it, but it has to be spent in Afghanistan. Does that become a basis for economic investment in infrastructure, etc...

I continue to hear the lament from the North and West that they need to exploit mineral resources to create jobs, GDP. Lots of questions surrounding that, but our focus on the Northern Supply route (for military expedience) does not sound like a sustainable supporting investment on that path. I assume the black economy would see the Northern Route as a boon to getting opium to Europe by piggybacking on our efforts.

Good idea to start with a base-line understanding of all economic systems.

Merry Xmas.

Steve

davidbfpo

12-25-2009, 10:37 PM

Bill,

A small quote from your longer commentary above:
How do numerous NGOs who are clearly tied to various terrorist organizations effectively fund the development of schools, medical clinics, etc.?

I suspect the reason some Islamic groups can obtain funding and have a non-violent infrastructure is that compared to their competitors they are not corrupt, greedy etc. Look at how the PLO ran the Gaza Strip and Hamas's pre-power imagery; or in slightly different setting of Southern Lebanon, how Hezbollah became the de facto state IMHO.

I not aware of how much overseas funding is raised by such groups, IMHO mixing the non-violent even charitable actions and the violent actions enables donors to "pick & mix", or claim "I gave it to 'X' charity and it ended up there, shocking".

Probably the best example is nearer the 'frontline' with LeT in Pakistan, with an established structure of charities, schools etc (see Stephen Tankel's writings on LeT). That provides not just supporters, but the wider public with facilities when others - including the state - fail to provide.

It will be interested to watch, from afar, whether this non-violent aspect of the 'struggle' and the creation and maintenance of a broader coalition, which is assumed, is adopted by AQ. A question that has been posed in discussions amongst analysts on the future of the global jihad (FGJ).

slapout9

12-26-2009, 03:21 PM

Link to some real economic thinking, explodes the myth of so called free markets. Talks about the superiority of the Military business model applied to the civilian economy. Good stuff.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUfYGl40KqE&feature=sub

Surferbeetle

12-26-2009, 07:19 PM

From the WSJ, by DAVID LUHNOW Saving Mexico (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704254604574614230731506644.html)

Today, the world's most successful drug trafficking organizations are found in Mexico. Unlike Colombian drug gangs in the 1980s, who relied almost entirely on cocaine, Mexican drug gangs are a one-stop shop for four big-time illicit drugs: marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin. Mexico is the world's second biggest producer of marijuana (the U.S. is No. 1), the major supplier of methamphetamines to the U.S., the key transit point for U.S.-bound cocaine from South America and the hemisphere's biggest producer of heroin.

This diversification helps them absorb shocks from the business. Sales of cocaine in the U.S., for instance, slipped slightly from 2006 to 2008. But that decline was more than made up for by growing sales of methamphetamines.

In many ways, illegal drugs are the most successful Mexican multinational enterprise, employing some 450,000 Mexicans and generating about $20 billion in sales, second only behind the country's oil industry and automotive industry exports. This year, Forbes magazine put Mexican drug lord Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman as No. 401 on the world's list of billionaires.

Unlike their rough-hewn parents and uncles, today's young traffickers wear Armani suits, carry BlackBerrys and hit the gym for exercise. One drug lord's accountant who was arrested in 2006 had a mid-level job at Mexico's central bank for 15 years.

Recently, Mexico's deputy agriculture minister, Jeffrey Jones, told some of the country's leading farmers that they could learn a thing or two from Mexican drug traffickers. "It's a sector that has learned to identify markets and create the logistics to reach them," he said. Days later, Mr. Jones was forced to resign. "He may be right," one top Mexican official confided, "but you can't say things like that publicly."

Surferbeetle

01-01-2010, 04:50 AM

From Bloomberg by Anthony DiPaola and Grant Smith on December 10, 2009, Iraq’s Second Oil Bidding Round Bolstered by Exxon, Eni Deals (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601072&sid=adqdigOfDr7U)

From Bloomberg by Anthony DiPaola and Maher Chmaytell on December 11, 2009, Shell, CNPC Win Iraq Oil Contracts, Adding to Earlier Deals (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601207&sid=anrTPoevAjiA)

From the website Iraq and Gulf Analysis by Reidar Visser on December 13, 2009 The Second Licensing Round in Iraq: Political Implications (http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/12/13/the-second-licensing-round-in-iraq-political-implications/)

The second licensing round for Iraqi oilfields was carried out by the oil ministry in Baghdad over the weekend. On the one hand, the contracts won by foreign companies will prove controversial because Iraq remains in the middle of a chaotic process of political transition and has yet to agree on a legal framework for the oil sector. At the same time, however, the relatively straightforward nature of the technical service contracts under offer as well as the emerging broader picture of a reasonably balanced mix of foreign and Iraqi participation in developing the country’s oil sector mean that these deals are on the whole less vulnerable to criticism than those previously entered into by foreign companies on extremely lucrative terms with the Kurdistan Regional Government – and therefore also stand a greater chance of surviving in their existing form in the long term.

Surferbeetle

01-10-2010, 01:43 AM

From the 9 Jan '10 WSJ Chavez Devalues Venezuela's Currency (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126305109903923235.html?mod=rss_Today%27s_Most_P opular) By JOHN LYONS and DARCY CROWE

President Hugo Chavez, harried by recession and declining popularity, announced a major currency devaluation late Friday to shore up government finances and stimulate economic growth before key elections this year.

The move cuts Mr. Chavez's two-year-old "strong bolivar" currency by half – to 4.3 per dollar from 2.15 per dollar – for most imports and transactions. The central bank will also subsidize a stronger 2.6-per-dollar rate for imports of food, medicine and other essential items, Mr. Chavez said.

The move reflects the increasingly difficult economic and political trade-offs faced by Mr. Chavez, who has been in power for more than a decade and veered the country's economy sharply to the left through steps like nationalization of key industries, rampant government spending, and currency and price controls.

For years, Venezuela has been able to defend an overvalued currency thanks to currency controls. Venezuelan citizens and companies can get dollars at the official rate only with government permission. That has led to a thriving black market, where those who don't get government permission buy the U.S. currency. Even the Venezuelan government uses the black market to some degree, economists say.

On Friday, that black market rate stood at about 6.25 per dollar – well below the former official rate of 2.15 and still below the new rate of 4.30. Economists say one of the reasons for the move was an attempt to deflate the black market, a catalyst for inflation that has also spawned a frenzy of schemes to defraud the central bank of dollars.

Official devaluations are nothing new for Venezuelans, with many getting their first taste of currency controls in 1961. The peg imposed then was kept for 22 years but a decline in oil revenue forced the government to devalue in 1983, marking the beginning a downward spiral that included several adjustments to the foreign currency rate. A devaluation in 1994 amid a deep economic crisis spurred a wave of popular unrest that Chavez eventually tapped to win the presidency five years later.

Surferbeetle

01-11-2010, 03:10 AM

Unfortunately little quantitative data is provided on how much $ by line of operation

From the January 10, 2010 LA Times,
In West Bank, conditions 'not ripe' for Palestinian uprising (http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-palestinian-mood10-2010jan10,0,3816121,full.story)
by Edmund Sanders

But in a not-so-subtle reminder that Israel can reseal the borders again, construction is underway on a new, expanded checkpoint. Meanwhile, Nablus residents -- from businessmen to teenagers -- say they are enjoying the broadest freedom of movement they have experienced in years.

Israel takes part of the credit for the apparent softening of Palestinian resistance through a carrot-and-stick approach under which it has eased checkpoints and permitted economic growth even as it has maintained an army presence and cracked down on militants.

"You have to have a very complex, nuanced approach of strengthening moderates, building the economy but not giving in to the terrorists," said Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. "The [Israeli army] presence right now is not only necessary, it's diminished the chances of a third intifada."

Critics say Israel's strategy amounts to "beautifying" the occupation by relieving just enough pressure to weaken resistance and by making the West Bank dependent on billions of dollars in foreign aid.

"We are 'for sale' now," Kassem said, adding that some Palestinians today place a higher priority on jobs, education and lifestyle. "We are spoiled. People might get angry, but in a week they reach in their pockets and do nothing. We don't feel the occupation as much."

He noted that the Palestinian Authority, largely funded by the U.S. and other countries, now employs 180,000 people who "are not ready to sacrifice their jobs for another intifada."

Steve the Planner

01-11-2010, 01:17 PM

Steve:

Financial Times had the latest on the opening of the Northern Route, and hearty encouragement for the line through Afghanistan to India via Pakistan:
"From hell, through hell, to hell."

Strange but typical business arguments about united all stakeholders, and long-term benefits if Taliban will join up with Pashtun brethren to reap the benefits...

Seems out of place for a couple of reasons: First, corruption---How are all these long-term stakeholders supposed to perceive/receive a benefit in the current climate? Second, another reason to unite Taliban and Pashtuns for an inter-border "benefit" for Pashtunistan. No?

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e09d8fa-fea4-11de-91d7-00144feab49a.html

Makes sense, but there are plenty of reasons why it hasn;t moved forward yet.

Surferbeetle

01-12-2010, 02:45 AM

Steve,

Appreciate the article it's an interesting one.

Financial Times had the latest on the opening of the Northern Route, and hearty encouragement for the line through Afghanistan to India via Pakistan:
"From hell, through hell, to hell."

Strange but typical business arguments about united all stakeholders, and long-term benefits if Taliban will join up with Pashtun brethren to reap the benefits...

Here are some more Afghanistan energy centric jigsaw pieces:

Wikipedia on the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Afghanistan_Pipeline) (TAP)

On 24 April 2008, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan signed a framework agreement to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan.[6]

The pipeline will be 1,420 millimetres (56 in) in diameter with a working pressure of 100 standard atmospheres (10,000 kPa).[7] The initial capacity will be 27 billion cubic meter (bcm) of natural gas per year of which 2 bcm will be provided to Afghanistan and 12.5 bcm to each Pakistan and India. Later the capacity will increase to 33 bcm.[8] Six compressor stations would be constructed along the pipeline.[7] The pipeline was expected to be operational by 2014.[9]

The cost of the pipeline is estimated cost at US$7.6 billion.[6] The project is to be financed by the Asian Development Bank.[10]

The Afghanistan Energy Profile (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=AF) from the EIA. The estimate for natural gas reserves is in the neighborhood of 1,750 billion cubic feet. (website acessed on 11 Jan '10) (1 cubic meter = 35.3146667 cubic foot)

The Afghanistan Country Study (http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/index.html), Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Edited by Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, Research completed, January 1986.

Chapter 3 covers the Economy and Mining info starts on page 192 (55 of the pdf).

Natural gas was the most important mineral resource and industrial product. The country was thought to possess 110 to 150 billion cubic meters of total reserves. With Soviet assistance, production began in 1967 at the Kwoja Gugerdak field, 15 kilometers east of Sbeberghan in Jowzjan Province. The field’s reserves were thought to be 67 billion cubic meters. The Soviets also completed in 1967 a IOO-kilometer gas pipeline, 820 millimeters in diameter, linking Keleft in the Soviet Union with Sheberghan. Other fields were discovered at Kwaja Bolan, Yatim Taq, and Jousik, with reserves of about 2.5 billion cubic meters. Gas production rose from I.68 billion cubic meters in 1968 to 2.8 billion in 1980. In 1982 a new field at Jarquduk, also in Jowzjan, started production, again with Soviet aid

For scale the EIA (website acessed on 11 Jan '10) Qatar Energy Profile (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=QA) estimate for natural gas reserves is in the neighborhood of 910,520 billion cubic feet and the Turkmenistan Energy Profile (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=TX) estimate for natural gas reserves is at 71,000 billion cubic feet. (1 cubic meter = 35.3146667 cubic foot)

Bloomberg tracks commodity futures here (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/cfutures.html). As of 11 Jan '10 the NATURAL GAS FUTR (USD/MMBtu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMBTU)) 5.485 and 1 std.cu.feet of natural gas = 1000 BTU = 252 kilocalories per this website (http://www.eppo.go.th/ref/UNIT-OIL.html) (Energy Policy & Planning Office, Ministry of Energy, Thailand) while Wikipedia notes that "1 standard cubic foot of natural gas yields ≈ 1030 BTU (between 1010 BTU and 1070 BTU, depending on quality, when burned)" and that 'MMBTU represent one million BTU'.

Seems out of place for a couple of reasons: First, corruption---How are all these long-term stakeholders supposed to perceive/receive a benefit in the current climate? Second, another reason to unite Taliban and Pashtuns for an inter-border "benefit" for Pashtunistan. No?

As you know from Iraq identifying and empowering moderates is very tricky business. Our DoS friends have their work cut out for them

Steve

davidbfpo

01-12-2010, 08:54 AM

Steve,

IIRC the Afghan gas and oil fields were heavily reduced during the Soviet intervention, even to the point they had been exhausted. What is the current state of those fields? I have not looked any further.

tequila

01-12-2010, 02:51 PM

AFP - Afghanistan sitting on a gold mine (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iFrOtnNs42obPsi8ul_AHEXmOGzQ)

USGS - Assessment of Undiscovered Petroleum Resources of Northern Afghanistan (http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3031/)

Using a geology-based assessment methodology, the U.S. Geological Survey–Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Industry Joint Oil and Gas Resource Assessment Team estimated mean volumes of undiscovered petroleum in northern Afghanistan; the resulting estimates are 1,596 million barrels of crude oil, 15,687 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of the undiscovered crude oil is in the Afghan-Tajik Basin, and most of the undiscovered natural gas is in the Amu Darya Basin.

Afghanistan has quite a bit of mineral wealth that, in the absence of conflict, could bring it a reasonable resource base for development. Of course that would require ending the insurgency so that investors would feel comfortable expending the billions required to get at it, and an Afghan government that could avoid the resource curse.

Ross Wherry

01-22-2010, 07:54 PM

Alcon - I've been uncharacteristically quiet the last few weeks. Work got in the way. I hate it when that happens.

Vertnyc,
I'm a retired AID officer, enjoying the Iraqi sun for past 3 years, with a bit of time in Helmand before that. Lovely place.
You are correct in your assertion that all economics, like politics, is local. Village residents aren't concerned with Khandahar, let alone Kabul, until political authorities involve themselves in the economic sphere. For example, when it got on its feet in 2003, the first act of the state-run cotton gin in Helmand was to have the police burn the nine private gins so as to regain its monopoly. So the AID program got out of cotton. We tried lentils -- big Indian market, durable commodity, and a simple value chain -- except that we misunderstood the friction costs of transport. By the time the payoffs were done, there was no profit left for the marketer. So we got out of lentils. Wheat was the default crop, and we noticed a lot of dried poppies hanging in sheds.
Nonetheless, the adage about think globally but act locally works in conflictive situations. If you can survive the Kabul-speak, we found that the best approach in crops was to ask villagers what they could sell. We traced the truckers and their routes to sketch the market links to estimate returns to the farmer. This approach was successful in Charikar with raisins, but we never found a good (licit) crop for Helmand.
Hope you have better luck!!

Ross Wherry

01-22-2010, 08:39 PM

Bill, Apologies for coming late to the discussion. I'm retired AID after Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and others. A jarhead, I don't know how AID let me in.

Surferbettle your post,

- How much of our economic aide in these countries actually supports the efforts of our foes? I just looked a graph today that showed a correlation between CERP spending and reduced violence, but is that the real picture, or did we simply forfeit control to the enemy, thus there is no need to fight?

- Once black economy models are established (such as the illicit business transfers on the cell phones, selling gas illegally on the side of the road, narcotics trade, human smuggling, kidnap for ransom, etc.) is it even feasible to displace this black economy with a legal economy?

- There are estimates that up to one third of the world's economic activity takes place in the black economy which equates to over a trillion dollars that governments have no control over. What does the ever increasing convergence of crime and extremism mean to those of us who develop and execute plans in an attempt to defeat terrorists and insurgents?

- Are there cases where our economic development efforts actually undermine successful black economic development, thus push the populace away from us and the HN? For example, attempting to eradicate the poppy plant and replace it with some form of unskilled labor or with a replacement crop that isn't worth as much?

There is a lot more to economic development than meets the eye when you're operating in these chaos zones.

Re CERP and less violence -- why chance a fight when the resources are being given away at no risk? And over and over again!

Re black economic activities -- Some activities, eg, human trafficking, drug smuggling, kidnapping are indeed criminal and wrong. Cops and maybe the Coast Guard are the correct response. But selling gas by the side of the road? Ripping off electrical service? "Facilitation" at the port? These are all highly profitable outcomes of government policies that allow perversion of licit economic activities. Cops can't solve them -- it's gotta be the folks who negotiate "reform" with the host government.

Re pushing the population away -- a great example is the takedown of the Cali cartel in Colombia. We caught the big fish, but the little fish scattered like drops of mercury and kept on exporting. The loss of the cartel leaders -- the big local property investors -- set the city back 20 years. And Calenos know what country did the job. Killing the coca or poppy plant in the field makes us the clear source of the farmer's incipient poverty. More better we got good at taking out the processors/warehouses.

Ross Wherry

01-25-2010, 05:13 PM

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

Slapout sums it up neatly.

Whether it's Colombia, Sinaloa, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon. The motive is acquisition of power, and that power rests on finances/economics, discriminate use of force, and acquiesence by the population to the rules and benefits adminstered by the insurgent or criminal. The unworthy government that RAND would have us beware of, too often looks similar to the black hats when viewed from the village level.

Many billions later, we seem to be arguing which of the three legs is themost important.:o Unfortunately, the insurgent/criminal seems able to stand on only one leg if he has to.

Steve the Planner

01-26-2010, 01:41 PM

Ross:

I read a few Rand Studies on COIN/CIVMIL stuff. I don't think they even know how to begin to understand the problems---so they just throw jargon at them and keep moving.

No doubt, you've seen you share of that klind of advice.

Steve

Rex Brynen

01-26-2010, 02:35 PM

The unworthy government that RAND would have us beware of, too often looks similar to the black hats when viewed from the village level.

Indeed, even a "worthy" government --which we're light years away from in Afghanistan--can still look rather unappealing to populations who (while wanting greater access to resources) also rather prize their current local autonomy.

Many billions later, we seem to be arguing which of the three legs is the most important.:o Unfortunately, the insurgent/criminal seems able to stand on only one leg if he has to.

Plus they don't have to sit through endless facile powerpoints about "3D", all-of-government approaches. That prospect alone would be enough to get me to join the Taliban :D

S2MSSI

01-26-2010, 04:59 PM

All, sorry to budge in on this post and take it back some posts, but I saw some areas/questions that were not really addressed and I may be able to shed some different thinking.

Initially, the post addressing Economics was brought up to assess an area. Through the posts it came to Illicit Activities as perhaps another more viable approach to COIN and IW-related activities.

I'd like to draw you back to the systems-approach of understanding an ecosystem of the immediate and outskirts of an environment. Economics is certainly a part of this, and as many have posted--the local level is core. But going back to a dynamic systems approach where one looks at the associations and intersections of activity, you may see that in fact when it comes to hunting finance and value exchanges the core may be informal economies---not illicit. Also not economics but the micro and macro version of the formal and informal economic transactional structure and how value exchanges take place from social favors and obligations to commodity items (livestock, produce, clothes, land, ...) to actual monetary items through the banking system (again informal and formal where hawala meets 1st Bank of X).

Again, it comes back to the human terrain and social culture and history to know how life takes place on a daily basis and how sub-systems of an illicit activity blend into normal every day life because for locals it is part of every day and is not illicit in their eyes. A porter carrying raw opium across a border may not be conducting an illicit activity as much as in his eyes is doing his daily porter job within his tribal ties but today someone has asked him to carry an item involved in narcotics trade (whatever that may be to him) vs. a tv the day before. Note: rough example as many are fully aware of the legal aspects involved in drugs and the higher wage they can gain. But the point is, yes, economics and dark transactions all need to be assessed but not in a vacuum and instead as the whole environmental on-goings if one is to really spot obvious or subtle indicators and anomalies. Good example is Trade Based Money Laundering where one needs to know the baseline of goods and services in a country or local market before one can see if the overs/unders make sense.

Back to systems approach one can also see the Power players of an area to see where real power does indeed rest through catalyst areas of influence and centers of gravity. Profits can also be better understood because through full ecosystem mapping you can break almost all activity down to supply chain processes, which can be augmented, improved, or my favorites--destroyed and disrupted.

Anyway, my 2 cents in an effort to fill a couple holes.