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davidbfpo
11-25-2009, 10:11 PM
In a post on the thread 'Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5626&page=4 Jon Custis raised the issue of what is presence patrolling?

I think this is the part of the paragraph that could launch discussion here:
Perhaps it should start with a look at the definition of patrolling. (My italics) We haven't discussed it here at the SWC from what I can tell, but what is presence patrolling? One of the most significant complaints concerning OIF that I had and saw was the fact we commuted to work and ran patrols that accomplished very little outside of putting eyes on a certain patch of dirt for that particular period of time. We lost way too many good men and women while they drove to work.

In a quick scroll through 'Trigger Puller' I found a couple of threads where the issue appeared: Patrol Base Infantry http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675
Costly Protection: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3902
MRAP & Infantry mobility: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5696

IIRC the issue has appeared in discussions on peacekeeping and UK operations in Northern Ireland, where building the policing concept of trust and confidence IMHO underpins such patrolling.

May the discussion begin!

Schmedlap
11-26-2009, 01:56 AM
"Presence patrol" was often the task in the mission statement handed down to us in Bosnia. This drew the ire of many senior officers who were schooled in the Fulda Gap school of warfighting and who rose through the ranks in the 1990s Army of training for CTC rotations. Some of us began using the more doctrinal-sounding (perhaps even doctrinally correct?) term of "administrative movement." This, too, was objectionable.

Our response was always, "okay, if the task of 'presence patrol' or 'administrative movement' is an improper 'tactical task,' then please tell us whether raid, ambush, or movement to contact is more appropriate for my 'patrol' to meet with the local police chief." The real question that we wanted to ask was even more cynical: why do we need to hand in typed copies of our FRAGOs to BN? Are you that paranoid that we're not doing our jobs and are you incapable of verifying by conducting on-the-spot checks, rather than having a pile of paperwork handed to you at your desk? But I digress...

We never got a good answer about why presence patrol was such a problem or what the more appropriate term should be. The gist of it was that we were in Bosnia, largely, to maintain a presence. We did that by driving around and making ourselves highly visible. Hence, the term (task) "presence patrol." It wasn't in 101-5, so it made certain people uneasy.

That is my understanding.

Bill Moore
11-26-2009, 03:03 AM
I can't believe that our guys are still asking this, and I suspect it because we have an Army that is indoctrinated versus familiar with doctrine. This gets to Ken's post on the blog under the NPS Thesis on IW, where he severly and rightfully scolds the micro managed training that produces leaders who don't understand the why of what their doing, or how to adapt, they simply follow a series of steps.

Why do we need to maintain a presence with presence patrols? Maybe to keep the enemy off guard, to provide a sense of security to the populace, to collect intelligence, to learn about the people you're there to work with and protect (learn what their complaints are, not simply rely on walk ins), and the list goes on and on. It should probably be mandatory training in leader training to write a paper on why presence patrols are important. Everyone would run to the doctrinal manuals and complain there isn't a book answer, then the answer from the instructor should be along the lines that doctrine is only a guide, you now have a problem where there is no book answer, figure it out. We have too many leaders who simply want to live in a base, push a patrol out to a specific point to conduct a specific task like an ambush or raid(that can be measured), then go back to base calling it a day and mission accomplished. This mind set has contaminated both conventional and special operations forces.

You won't necessarily know if you're presence patrols are successful, but in the day men capable of thinking independently (like many Americans who haven't been re-educated in military doctrinal schools) could get a good sense without MOP/MOE whether or not they were on the right or not. I know if the police maintain a consistent presence in an area with a high crime rate, the crime goes down. Yea, it's more dangerous for the officers but that is what they get paid for, and we get paid to fight our enemies, not focus solely on force protection. Fighting involves risk, we all know that. I would have been stuck with the information our S2 gave us if I didn't go out and run numerous presence patrols, which by the way greatly informed the S2. Never complained about, didn't bother looking for how to do it in a doctrinal manual, it was simply the right thing to do.

We still have a long ways to go to undue the damage of over indoctrinating our force.

Ken White
11-26-2009, 04:29 AM
With an added quote from an AWG Sergeant Major; "All the other combat arms are science, infantry and SF are arts..."

That predicated on the fact that COIN operations are 'Infantry' like regardless of the branch or backgrounds of those involved; it is cued from Bill's point:
"We have too many leaders who simply want to live in a base, push a patrol out to a specific point to conduct a specific task like an ambush or raid (that can be measured), then go back to base calling it a day and mission accomplished. This mind set has contaminated both conventional and special operations forces."Metrics and war simply do not mix...

Fire tables, tank gunnery, maintenance parameters, preflight checklists all have their place, I guess, however, in ground combat at the tactical level they and the mentality that drive them become impediments. Much I've heard from participants in both Iraq and Afghanistan leads me to believe impedimentia rules.

William F. Owen
11-26-2009, 07:50 AM
The UK's concept of "Presence Patrolling" is ensure that the bad guys cannot do stuff, because you are not there to stop them. "Suppress the enemies freedom of action" - just like any patrolling!!

In Northern Ireland, it actually meant lying up in abandoned houses, or woods, sometimes for a couple of days, then suddenly moving into an area unexpectedly.
The object was to appear unexpectedly from an unexpected direction.

In more benign environments it's just showing the flag, and sending he message "don't f**k with us or else," combined with "You're safe because we're here."

All blinding common sense really.

jcustis
11-26-2009, 12:58 PM
It may seem like blindingly common sense, but when we look at the COIN context, and throw in the paradigm of the combat outpost, as seen is post 86 of this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5626&page=5, common sense isn't so easy to determine.

I think any discussion of presence patrolling needs to have a parallel discussion of the conditions (remember TASK - CONDITION - STANDARD?) to the patrol in question, or how else do you train to standard and evaluate it, and how else do we peel back the layer on this COP issue?

I admit that with the siting of COPs, there must be balance achieved by a rational application of METT-TS&L, but if we want to be able to "presence patrol" what is that balance? What does presence patrolling really give us if the BGs can enjoy freedom of maneuver when we are not there, in the ville (which seems to typically happen at night).

I get frustrated the same as the next guy when I see video of an attack taking place on a low-lying COP, but have had to step back and think but if that's where the people are, then there are some basic operational hazards to deal with in that approach...so be it. What I am more frustrated by are patrols that saunter out of the COP perimeter for a period of time, gain terrain and therefore some security for the locals, and then cede that same terrain when they conclude the patrol. They may be establishing a presence for X period of time, but how is that presence achieving what we are trying to do? More importantly, can there be more efficient and force-preserving ways to achieve the same thing?


You are right Wilf, a presence patrol is, in the end, basic and common sense, and doesn't need to fit into a doctrinal boilerplate. The problem is that presence patrol becomes a bumper sticker slapped on a lot of stuff, and Joe fails to understand the WHY behind why he does it. We definitely need to spend a lot of time lying up, but in a many of the clips I've seen, it doesn't look like our boys are doing that.

slapout9
11-26-2009, 01:05 PM
IMO part of the problem is that in most Military patrols you want to detect the presence of the enemy but not reveal your presence until the time of the attack. COIN/Police patrolling is the exact opposite you want to be highly visible for the deterrent effect.....you will get caught so don't commit the crime. Problem is you become a great big target if you are facing a ruthless enemy as opposed to a run of the mill criminal.

William F. Owen
11-26-2009, 01:19 PM
You are right Wilf, a presence patrol is in the end basic and common sense, and doesn't need to fit into a doctrinal boilerplate. The problem is that presence patrol becomes a bumper sticker slapped on a lot of stuff, and Joe fails to understand the WHY behind why he does it. We definitely need to spend a lot of time lying up, but in a many of the clips I've seen, it doesn't look like our boys are doing that.
Common sense is not so common? :(

Back when I was serving, I came to the conclusion, and more so since, that a great deal of what is taught about patrolling in western armies not really thought through very well. There is a good deal of confusing process with outcomes.
If you are walking the streets to walk the streets, then something is wrong. Patrols have to have an objective and clear purpose. Joe should be taught that.
That's why there is a huge difference between hunting and just walking around the woods with a gun!

William F. Owen
11-26-2009, 01:22 PM
IMO part of the problem is that in most Military patrols you want to detect the presence of the enemy but not reveal your presence until the time of the attack. COIN/Police patrolling is the exact opposite you want to be highly visible for the deterrent effect.....you will get caught so don't commit the crime. Problem is you become a great big target if you are facing a ruthless enemy as opposed to a run of the mill criminal.
Got it in one Slap, me old'Mustang driver!

What you really want to do is switch seamlessly between the two, and keep everyone else guessing. Not that hard, once you know how.

slapout9
11-26-2009, 01:49 PM
Got it in one Slap, me old'Mustang driver!

What you really want to do is switch seamlessly between the two, and keep everyone else guessing. Not that hard, once you know how.

Yep, it police world you would have a mix of uniformed and plain clothes police officers and then go have fun watching the bad guys try to figure it out:wry:

jcustis
11-26-2009, 02:56 PM
Not that hard, once you know how.

That's a great proposition, but "knowing how" is where we (at least in the American military) fall short at times.


We have too many leaders who simply want to live in a base, push a patrol out to a specific point to conduct a specific task like an ambush or raid(that can be measured), then go back to base calling it a day and mission accomplished. This mind set has contaminated both conventional and special operations forces.

Yes, a big problem...I don't want to go to a specific point and come back though. I want to go to another specific point and perform a task, then another point. Stay afield and perform a rest cycle, then begin anew. With very few exceptions, we don't do that, but it's been proven as recently as this year that we can.


Our response was always, "okay, if the task of 'presence patrol' or 'administrative movement' is an improper 'tactical task,' then please tell us whether raid, ambush, or movement to contact is more appropriate for my 'patrol' to meet with the local police chief."

As denoted below from the Marine Corps publication "Marine Rifle Squad" MCWP 3-11.2 (the acronym we use for combat patrols is RACES), that could appropriately be categorized as a contact patrol because the chief is supposed to be friend. It could also, in a sense of splitting hairs, be categorized as a basic security patrol.

a. Raid Patrols. Raid patrols destroy or capture enemy personnel or
equipment, destroy installations, or free friendly personnel who have been
captured by the enemy.
b. Contact Patrols. Contact patrols establish and/or maintain contact
with friendly or enemy forces.
c. Economy of Force Patrols. Economy of force patrols perform
limited objective missions such as seizing and holding key terrain to allow
maximum forces to be used elsewhere.
d. Ambush Patrols. Ambush patrols conduct ambushes of enemy
patrols, carrying parties, foot columns, and convoys.
e. Security Patrols. Security patrols detect infiltration by the enemy, kill
or capture infiltrators, and protect against surprise or ambush.

I don't think we get hung up on the actual task as much as we struggle with the PURPOSE, based on what higher headquarters wants us to do, what our personal protective equipment posture is supposed to be, what the enemy situation is (another area we tend to be terrible at at times), what the terrain and weather look like, what conveyance we intend to use to get to those specific points we outline, what the civilian situation is, and on and on. And sometimes, figuring that out amongst the rest of the white noise, requires lot more than just common sense.

slapout9
11-26-2009, 03:20 PM
jcustis, yea it is just guard duty:) You have an interior and exterior guard, you have mobile patrols and fixed posts all over your AO.......I will guard everything within the limits of post and quit my post only when properly relieved.;) we don't need a COIN manual we need basic training general orders.

The other COIN Manual FM 22-6 Guard Duty......The Real POP-Centric manual.
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11675-1/fm/22-6/toc.htm

jcustis
11-26-2009, 03:40 PM
we don't need a COIN manual we need basic training general orders.

Aye, and we need to take a really hard look at the operational risk calculations when we are figuring this stuff out. I'm convinced that based on the threat (which is no joke, I grant you) we are defaulting to mostly passive measures to mitigate the risk, and that is all so very wrong. :mad:

jcustis
11-29-2009, 06:31 PM
ArmyStudyGuide.com provides an example to the T-C-S methodology for how one common task guide lays it out:

171-300-0016 - Conduct a Presence Patrol (http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/SMCT_CTT_Tasks/other_common_tasks/1713000016-conduct-a-pres.shtml)

Conduct a presence patrol so that the military presence of US troops is projected, and all appropriate human intelligence (HUMINT) information is gathered and the commander's intent is met. Interaction with local or foreign civilians, law enforcement, governmental officials or military is conducted in a manner that did not incite aggression against US forces or our allies. Maintained force protection, as appropriate, for the threat situation. Conducted actions on contact. Maintained situational awareness by monitoring FM communications and/or the FBCB2/IVIS

Conditions: In a tactical environment as the section leader, given an operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) to conduct a presence patrol either mounted or dismounted, an operational vehicle, maps with graphic control measures, signal operation instructions (SOI), and the requirement to conduct a presence patrol through populated terrain and/or urban built-up area. Your vehicle may be equipped with the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) system/ intervehicular information system (IVIS) with the current map, operational overlay, and order displayed.

Standards: Conducted a presence patrol so that the military presence of US troops is projected, and all appropriate human intelligence (HUMINT) information is gathered and the commander's intent is met. Interaction with local or foreign civilians, law enforcement, governmental officials or military is conducted in a manner that did not incite aggression against US forces or our allies. Maintained force protection, as appropriate, for the threat situation. Conducted actions on contact. Maintained situational awareness by monitoring FM communications and/or the FBCB2/IVIS.

Performance Steps

NOTE: The primary purpose of the presence patrol is to be seen by military forces and civilians in the area of operations. Although this patrol does perform limited reconnaissance and security functions; it should be planned and conducted as a combat patrol......
Complete list of performance steps is at the link.

Eden
11-30-2009, 02:27 PM
We started calling them 'presents' patrols since we almost always were passing out soccer balls or gum or something.

Seriously, the reason why we didn't like the term 'presence' was not that it was not in the field manuals; it was because it often denoted a patrol that was routinized, purposeless, and non-productive, if not actually counter-productive.

Every patrol should have a purpose, or multiple purposes. It can be 'engage citizen X and Y', or 'observe activity in marketplace', or 'conduct route reconnaissance'. Too many times, 'presence patrols' were labeled that way because subordinate commanders had no clue what they should be doing or were too lazy or too busy to properly plan their daily activities. A 'presence patrol' was easy to mount and easy to count as successful. In our corner of the world we just directed that they be called 'patrols' and that each had a clear task and purpose attached.

Tom Odom
11-30-2009, 02:45 PM
We started calling them 'presents' patrols since we almost always were passing out soccer balls or gum or something.

Seriously, the reason why we didn't like the term 'presence' was not that it was not in the field manuals; it was because it often denoted a patrol that was routinized, purposeless, and non-productive, if not actually counter-productive.

Spot on. The term presence becomes synonomous with routine interpreted to mean "no planning and no purpose". We did that as UN observers too often and I suspect it migrated from the Balkan operations to US operations.

It is not the same as a presence mission; establish a presence is a mission. Conduct a "presence" patrol however soon turns into drive through/walk through without a purpose, without a plan, and all too often without a clue. We saw this quite a bit at the JRTC especially in the earlier days of MREs; such patrols were meat on the hook for Geranimo

Best
Tom

IntelTrooper
11-30-2009, 05:39 PM
It is not the same as a presence mission; establish a presence is a mission. Conduct a "presence" patrol however soon turns into drive through/walk through without a purpose, without a plan, and all too often without a clue. We saw this quite a bit at the JRTC especially in the earlier days of MREs; such patrols were meat on the hook for Geranimo


From what I saw in Afghanistan in early 08-09, this is what "presence/presents patrols" turned into, especially in the over-tasked and under-resourced East. A weekly/monthly visit to a district center constituted a "presence" patrol, and was done as fast as possible. Stops in the bazaar, or to talk to road workers, etc. were verboten, because it was time consuming and we had to be back before dark. :confused:

As a HUMINT guy, these "patrols" were almost worthless, even if one of the supposed purposes was to "gather intelligence" (other than for orientation so we could refer to landmarks when talking to sources). It's really hard to gather intelligence when watching out the window of a HUMVEE/MRAP and then talking to a corrupt district police chief for fifteen minutes.

PhilR
11-30-2009, 06:44 PM
Spot on. The term presence becomes synonomous with routine interpreted to mean "no planning and no purpose". We did that as UN observers too often and I suspect it migrated from the Balkan operations to US operations.

It is not the same as a presence mission; establish a presence is a mission. Conduct a "presence" patrol however soon turns into drive through/walk through without a purpose, without a plan, and all too often without a clue. We saw this quite a bit at the JRTC especially in the earlier days of MREs; such patrols were meat on the hook for Geranimo

Best
Tom

Its unfortunate that we get hung up on task terminology and definition and not on the PURPOSE. I always liked the COA development drill I learned at Ft Benning that directed development of the PURPOSES for all of the moving parts before assigning them aligned tasks. the tasks were understood to be subordiante, supporting, concepts to the PURPOSE.
As JCustis relates above, patrolling is another method, just like establishing a COP, or conducting a sweep, or doing something else. Its hard for our troops to be "strategic corporals" if they don't know why they are doing what they do.
I'd hope that any patrol is conducted as part of a larger plan (that considers more than just the patrol itself). A patrol, by its nature, is not as permanent as a COP, or other outpost, but we can control the periodicity, the randomness, the area covered. There was also a comment about ceding the night (no patrols?). I hope that's not true. I'd wager that "presence" at night in certain areas is as important as "presence" during the day.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

Bullmoose Bailey
11-30-2009, 07:22 PM
In the question of Patrol efficacy: do you think they can replace intel collection & security measures in and around outposts? I've felt minefields, early warning systems, wire and other obstacles might also have a place in security. If so does all this apply in certain AOs & not others as might be expected?

The presence patrol is so enshrined in the western mentality that you might say I'm conducting a presence patrol incident to a Ford Motor Company psy-ops campaign just by driving in public.

"Showing the flag" is a consistent part of the method behind such patrols. Don't forget every patrol is a reconnaisance patrol & as the US soldier is the "Ultimate Weapon" every patrol is a kind of victory parade in the spirit of TR's Great White Fleet Voyage...

jcustis
12-12-2009, 04:43 PM
as the US soldier is the "Ultimate Weapon" every patrol is a kind of victory parade in the spirit of TR's Great White Fleet Voyage...

I'm not sure I savvy your meaning with this, but if you're leaning towards presence patrols as a means of showing who's boss, I suppose that could work. More often than not, at least in Afghanistan, I think we'd be more likely to simply breed resentment or one sort or another.

MikeF
12-12-2009, 05:17 PM
In every endeavor, whether it's establishing a patrol base, conducting a raid, or patrolling, the commander is trying to conduct operations to shape his environment.

Prior to execution, one must ask:

1. What am I trying to accomplish? (Purpose)
2. What do I want my boys to do? (Intent)
3. What are the likely costs and results of x action? (Intended consequences)
4. What am I missing? (Unintended consequences)

To this end, one should neither establish a patrol base just to check off some list of "things I should be doing in COIN" nor send squads out on patrol to "show a presence."

Purpose and Intent are everything in orders. Patrols can be intelligence driven to answer CCIR. For example, 1. Go hang out at at the barber shop, pool hall, gym to see what the latest intel is on x group. 2. Go talk to y farmer to see how the crops are doing. 3. Go talk to z schoolteacher to find out if she got the books ordered and how exams are coming. The worst thing a commander can do (IMO), is to send soldiers out on missions with no purpose or intent.

PhilR brings up an excellent point on night operations. In some denied areas, where host nation runs the area by day and shadow gov'ts run it at night, conducting security actions (raids, ambushes, movement to contact) during the night is the best way to take back control of an area.

Mike

Bill Moore
12-12-2009, 07:29 PM
Prior to execution, one must ask:

1. What am I trying to accomplish? (Purpose)
2. What do I want my boys to do? (Intent)
3. What are the likely costs and results of x action? (Intended consequences)
4. What am I missing? (Unintended consequences)

It was this type of excessive conventional thinking that got us in the mess we're in (firebase mentality, while everything outside the base falls apart).

Yes, we still should the standard 5 paragraph patrol order with associated contingencies, but in general presence patrols, if run correctly, will turn into discovery patrols, which in turn result in FRAGOs on the fly if you have capable leadership at the tactical level and a supporting chain of command that empowers their subordinates to act independently. This mentality that a patrol can only have one purpose sounds too much like drive by COIN, and I hope we're not teaching our counterparts this approach, because it results in a culture of inactivity (thus allowing the enemy freedom of movement) and they only respond to 9/11 calls. You just can't dumb the real world down to fit our ideal doctrinal response. This is equivalent to saying police officers should simply sit in their police stations all day unless they have a specific task and target?

slapout9
12-12-2009, 08:43 PM
but in general presence patrols, if run correctly, will turn into discovery patrols, which in turn result in FRAGOs on the fly if you have capable leadership at the tactical level and a supporting chain of command that empowers their subordinates to act independently.

Along time ago I had a training officer who while patrolling a beat/district he would continuously ask me what has changed since yesterday. After some frustration I eventually figured out what he meant and I was able to answer his questions because something has most definitely changed since your last patrol, some you can see.....many you can't see but you can learn to ask the people about what is going on. There is no such thing as a routine patrol, there are only things that changed you don't know about.

MikeF
12-12-2009, 11:12 PM
It was this type of excessive conventional thinking that got us in the mess we're in (firebase mentality, while everything outside the base falls apart).

Yes, we still should the standard 5 paragraph patrol order with associated contingencies, but in general presence patrols, if run correctly, will turn into discovery patrols, which in turn result in FRAGOs on the fly if you have capable leadership at the tactical level and a supporting chain of command that empowers their subordinates to act independently. This mentality that a patrol can only have one purpose sounds too much like drive by COIN, and I hope we're not teaching our counterparts this approach, because it results in a culture of inactivity (thus allowing the enemy freedom of movement) and they only respond to 9/11 calls. You just can't dumb the real world down to fit our ideal doctrinal response. This is equivalent to saying police officers should simply sit in their police stations all day unless they have a specific task and target?

Bill,

I think your last post may be the first time that I've ever been accused of being conventional.

Please expound on the specific reasoning of your point.

If I send a patrol to see a school teacher to garner information about the schools, and they run into another dude to give info on something else, then that's an added bonus.

My hypothesis was that they should not drive around for the sake of driving.

I don't understand how that reasoning is extraneous.


And please look to my earlier comment- don't put a firebase into an area unless you can justify a reason for it.
Mike

Bill Moore
12-13-2009, 01:41 AM
If I send a patrol to see a school teacher to garner information about the schools, and they run into another dude to give info on something else, then that's an added bonus.

My hypothesis was that they should not drive around for the sake of driving.

The part I put in bold is exactly the result of indoctrinated thinking or a conventional approach. The way you're stating it, any patrol you send out will have to go a "specific location" to do a specific task, which probably means they have a specific route. If someone runs out of the house and talks to them, then that is a bonus. It may be a bonus, but it sure as heck isn't a presence patrol.

If you tell your guys to drive or conduct a foot patrol around sector E, or neighborhood Y, to show presence, engage the populace to get a sense for what is going on (it will greatly inform your pinpointed operations later), with the over all intent to provide the perception to the public that state forces in are the area and available, and to keep the enemy guessing (denying space by creating greater risk), then you're conducting a presence patrol, the bonus is you really get to learn the lay of the land. As one young Marine posted on the SWJ many months ago, you would ideally saturate an area with several small patrols (you want contact with the enemy so you can kill them, after the initial chest bumping you'll own the ground). That requires that conventional leaders think unconventionally and train their subordinates down to the squad level to act independently and then let them act independently (much along the lines of what Hackworth proposed and did).

Conventional minded leaders simply can't handle relinquishing control, and unfortunately that mentality has seeped into our special operations community to some degree also. If you want to be agile, then you have to flatten the organization. If you want to deny space to the enemy, then you have keep a presence out there (not drive to a school, talk to a teacher and drive back).

RTK
12-13-2009, 04:24 AM
We called "presence patrols" more appropriately "trolling for RPGs." It seemed more akin to chumming when you're fishing for sharks.

As stated earlier in this thread, task and purpose are the keys and halmarks to a well planned and, consequently, well executed patrol. Providing area security tied to a specific piece of infrastructure seemed to foot the bill much better. And the boys don't feel like they're out there just to pad a briefing stat at the next BUB.

Schmedlap
12-13-2009, 04:58 AM
I don't see presence patrolling and task/purpose to be mutually exclusive.

I gave patrols the task and purpose of gathering a list of PIRs/IRs in a given area, disseminating messages to specific TA's, and, yes, even the much-hated "route clearance." However, these patrols were intended as "presence patrols." If they came back 4 hours later having none of the IRs answered, I still felt the mission was a success if they sustained a lengthy presence in a specific area, put out the messages, and conducted themselves in a manner that reinforced the messages. If nothing else, they were staying familiar with the lay of the land. That familiarity alone was invaluable. Most of the IEDs that we identified were spotted by a Private who noticed that, "something over there looks different." Plus, whenever a platoon of my guys showed up in a locale and showed their intent to stick around for an extended period, the locals would open up their fruit/vegetable/other stands because they felt safe. Very good for earning their trust and cooperation.

It worked even better if a few team-sized OPs were inserted into overwatch positions near the neighborhood during the prior night. Many foolish d-bags felt the sting of a 72-grain bullet in the back while moving into an assault position in an ill-fated attempt to shoot at the stationary American patrol, not realizing that an 18-year-old American was watching him and impatiently waiting for his team leader to give him permission to deliver the news.

RTK
12-13-2009, 05:10 AM
I don't see presence patrolling and task/purpose to be mutually exclusive.

I gave patrols the task and purpose of gathering a list of PIRs/IRs in a given area, disseminating messages to specific TA's, and, yes, even the much-hated "route clearance."


So it was an area reconnaissance.

jcustis
12-13-2009, 05:14 AM
So it was an area reconnaissance.

Took the words out of my mouth.

The planning and preparation needs to be conventional and doctrinal, even if the actual "approach" isn't quite so much.

William F. Owen
12-13-2009, 05:54 AM
Took the words out of my mouth.

The planning and preparation needs to be conventional and doctrinal, even if the actual "approach" isn't quite so much.
I think/know that is correct and Schmedlap is basically on the money.

Proper patrol routine from a Coy base, means 3 Platoons working really hard, and it is very demanding, so planning is everything, but it is "conventional" patrolling.

The most impressive thing I heard in recent years, was how a US Coy planned visits to the market/souk as a "raid" - but without the shooting bit. It's the boards here somewhere. Callwell would be proud.

davidbfpo
12-13-2009, 11:31 AM
After opening the thread I have kept away as it appears to be 100% military, although Slap adds his mixed wisdom. I really liked how 'presence' became 'presents' and other labels.

Local knowledge and having an impact on the enemy is my "armchair" view of the goal.

In the open literature on the Ulster campaign I recall reading how the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) in rural areas became very adept at patrolling and "snap" VCPs.

My experience with getting the police to think before patrolling has not been good and was invariably considered only at low demand times, which often meant at night. It has got better slowly and talking to the public with purpose is happening, see: http://www.polfed.org/PoliceMag_1109_SupportingRole.pdf

Gaining 'atmospherics' has featured in Helmand Province, using a different name and was subject of two opposing articles in RUSI Journal sometime ago (unable to readily locate on my bookshelf).

slapout9
12-13-2009, 04:19 PM
Plus, whenever a platoon of my guys showed up in a locale and showed their intent to stick around for an extended period, the locals would open up their fruit/vegetable/other stands because they felt safe. Very good for earning their trust and cooperation.



To me that is a very strong metric that you are doing something right. Empty streets are not safe streets they are scared streets. Daily routine activity is a strong indicator of safety, any disruption of that indicates the presence of some threat or threats.

If it was me I would give everyone a ASCOPE worksheet and the first mission is to fill it out completely. From there on every patrol they would update the changes, especially the events column. This would provide a standard patrol intelligence strucutre to work with. My 2 cents anyway.

Schmedlap
12-13-2009, 06:04 PM
So it was an area reconnaissance.

You may be right. "Presence patrolling" is generally done to create a perception of greater security, in part, in order to make the people more willing to divulge information.

Bill Moore
12-13-2009, 06:13 PM
Posted by RTK
We called "presence patrols" more appropriately "trolling for RPGs." It seemed more akin to chumming when you're fishing for sharks.

As stated earlier in this thread, task and purpose are the keys and halmarks to a well planned and, consequently, well executed patrol. Providing area security tied to a specific piece of infrastructure seemed to foot the bill much better. And the boys don't feel like they're out there just to pad a briefing stat at the next BUB.

RTK, I'm a major fan of task and purpose, but hopefully we're flexible enough to allow for more than one task and purpose for each patrol? Additionally, there some things that should become SOP on a patrol in a COIN situation that you wouldn't do in conventional warfare, for example slapout mentioned the ASCOPE assessment. PIR/IR for COIN is obviously different than PIR/IR for a conventional fight.

Perhaps neither you or MikeF are implying that the only thing our patrols can do are missions with one specific task/purpose, but it can be interpreted this way. Somethings are best debated in a TOC, where each side can make their points clear discussing it over a map, and having a common understanding of the threat. The risk with posts is that we can all be right [and I am right :-)] in the context of the scenario each of is envisioning, but we could be envisioning four or five separate scenarios, so we end up talking past one another.

With that in mind, I think our military is still overly risk adverse (a by product of the Khobar Towers Investigation, which IMO was unprofessionally done, and resulted in great harm to the force overall). Mission success was still touted as achieving your objective (task/purpose), but the reality was that it was understood it was take no casualties (training or in conflict). Operations were more focused on force protection than accomplishing the objective, which is what I interpret when I read the posts that are opposed to presence patrols. There is a balance, and I argue that we still lean too much towards force protection. Breaking that mind set in 2007 was what some of us believe was paramount (not the only thing) in breaking the insurgency's back (not defeating it).

If you're on a presence patrol you can view getting shot at as failure or success, but if you're looking for the enemy then a strong argument can made you're successful (especially if you can dominate teh fight and defeat the threat). Over time you'll deny freedom of movement to the enemy in that area (doesn't mean he won't occassionally still get a shot in at you). That is why this type of warfare has been labeled the war of the flea, iti is simply extremely frustrating.

I'll assume that your post didn't imply we hole up and only depart the base when we had a "pinpoint' task". The Brits actually have some of the presence patrolling TTPs I have discussed in previous posts in their COIN manuals (not available online). You can also call it saturation patrolling. Rather than an area recon I would call it an enemy denial patrol, but for those of you wedded to the book, call it what you like, as long as it achieves the same purpose.

Do you plan every patrol? Yes, at you better, is it conventional in nature? No.

MikeF
12-13-2009, 07:16 PM
RTK, I'm a major fan of task and purpose, but hopefully we're flexible enough to allow for more than one task and purpose for each patrol?

Bill,

It's a start point. For example, let's say that your wife sends you to the grocery store for some ice cream. While at the store, you decided you want some popcorn. After leaving the store, you decide to stop and get a movie. Initially, you had one task (get ice cream), and you ended up conducting three (ice cream, popcorn, movie).

When guys get real good, they'll actually start telling the commander what they're going to do IOT answer the CCIR. We'd just huddle at night and discuss it.

The reason that I was a bit adament about this is b/c there are some foolish ideas out there. Here's the worst example. Operation Snakehunter (or snakebite). Division Commander wanted to solve IED problem in AO-North. Solution- For 72 hours, every unit would go sit at the Division's top 100 or so IED hot spot to show a presence. Seriously. Task- sit and show a presence.
The only memoriable event for us was our opportunity to visit Kurdistan.

In 2005, during my second tour, I was trying to figure out what was going on so I asked a bunch of units a bunch of questions. In particular, I asked, "what do you do on a daily basis?" Over 50% of the answers were, "we drive around for a couple of hours to show a presence and wait to get hit by IEDs." I thought that was dumb, and I tried never to have my guys do that.

So, I don't like the term presence patrol.

At our peak, we had six maneuver units (3 US, 3 Iraqi) conducting 24 patrols a day (4 each for duration of 1-4 hours) all leaving out of the same patrol base. In order to manage the schedule, my IA counterpart, my first sergeant, and I would plan together. At that point, we were simply trying to ensure start points/end points and patrol locations varied and did not repeat. That's an art in itself, and I'd submit that one can't do it alone.

Mike

Schmedlap
12-13-2009, 07:47 PM
The reason that I was a bit adament about this is b/c there are some foolish ideas out there. Here's the worst example. Operation Snakehunter (or snakebite). Division Commander wanted to solve IED problem in AO-North. Solution- For 72 hours, every unit would go sit at the Division's top 100 or so IED hot spot to show a presence. Seriously. Task- sit and show a presence.

That sounds like the presence was aimed at the adversary rather than the people.

M-A Lagrange
12-13-2009, 08:06 PM
Presence patroling is what my UNMO (UN military Observers) colleages are doing everyday. It is going out, showing to the people that you are here, that you can come to see them and that you are capable to speak to them.
In practice, because it's the UN, it doesn't bring anything concrete part from the fact that you show you are mobile and there are no "no go areas".
The problem for us is that we have to be with host nation military observers. Most of the people are affraid of them or, when not affraid, do not have the time to speak with us.
On paper, it's a nice idea. In reallity we collect intelligence and data about the humanitarian situation and the people needs. But as the UN system is very much disfunctional in Sudan, once you have collected the info you cannot pass it. Well, it's not true, you pass it and then no one act.

In DRC, the UN came with a solution to that. They integrated the NGO information network through OCHA. Everyday, after approval of the report, it was distributed to the NGOs.
In a COIN people centric approach, this system had the advantage that the military could at least oserve if the NGO were doing something with the data.
The other advantage was, in DRC, that military and NGO were integrated at funding level. So the NGO did not have the feeling they were used by military.

Presence patrolling is useful if there are some benefits for the people who take the risk to speak with the soldiers. Otherwise you end up with low quality information gathering and it's much quicker to straight go to the NGOs to know what is going on.

jcustis
12-13-2009, 08:13 PM
With that in mind, I think our military is still overly risk adverse (a by product of the Khobar Towers Investigation, which IMO was unprofessionally done, and resulted in great harm to the force overall). Mission success was still touted as achieving your objective (task/purpose), but the reality was that it was understood it was take no casualties (training or in conflict). Operations were more focused on force protection than accomplishing the objective, which is what I interpret when I read the posts that are opposed to presence patrols.

Yes Bill, we run the risk of talking past each other even though we are in fact aiming for the same thing. :D

If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB. That's what your combat trains are for, but after six years of FOB life, we've lost that skill to a great degree.

There's nothing hard about that...you take your bivvy with you, aggregate to a large enough force at night to afford a rest cycle and an active defense, and you stay in the field for as many nights as you can. Or even better, you balance day/night operations so you can afford to work a reverse cycle and patrol when knuckleheads like to move around and gather, and go into a defense when you can see better in the day. If you think you are coming back inside the wire, there had better be a damn good reason for it. That's the damn life the infantryman lives and I think it is a shame that so many people forgot that. The only folks holding ground at a COP/FOB need to be the C2 and CSS nodes, as well as any security forces training folks like MiTTs and PiTTs, who need to be with their counterpart force.

It has taken conscious effort to break that cycle and put Marines and Soldiers outside the wire for any more than 24 hours it seems, and I feel passionately that we lost a lot of young men and women in Iraq because we did not employ this tactic. In turn, it took us longer than necessary to pull the population away from the insurgent, and we gave up too much ground gained the day prior, only to allow someone to drive over an IED at the same spot we had patrolled past in the previous 24 hours (just once though).

I don't want patrols to be bound by pinpoint tasks before they sally forth. They should be steady-state operations that can transition fluidly from a movement to contact, to an area reconnaissance, then a route reconnaissance, followed by a couple of contact patrols to visit the local chief of police, mayor, and cement plant, and then full circle as information is developed. FOB life kills our tempo, and we tend to walk like Frankenstein in the pursuit of the knuckleheads who oppose us, instead of population security becoming a natural derivative of our presence - while we are already on task.

slapout9
12-13-2009, 08:31 PM
If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB.

To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.

MikeF
12-13-2009, 08:40 PM
I don't want patrols to be bound by pinpoint tasks before they sally forth. They should be steady-state operations that can transition fluidly from a movement to contact, to an area reconnaissance, then a route reconnaissance, followed by a couple of contact patrols to visit the local chief of police, mayor, and cement plant, and then full circle as information is developed.

JCustis- steady-state operations is probably a better way to describe it. Patrol flexes based-off events on ground as understood by patrol leader.


If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB.

Interesting idea and with proper planning, it is definitely feasible in certain areas. One would have to take a hard look at how long the patrol can sustain without burn-out plus keep patrols within artillery range (or priority for CAS/AWT) and within CASEVAC range.

If they're going in covertly for recon (digging in), then I'd recommend a max duration of 72 hours. After that, brains are fried.

How long should tour length be in this scenario? I'd probably think 6-9 months.

Mike

jcustis
12-13-2009, 08:41 PM
To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.

In the early months of 2005, my task force fell under 2 BCT and had the mission of securing a stretch of MSR Mobile that started about 15-20 kms west of the Thar-Thar canal bridge and east to just above Saqlawiyah (which was about 5 km NW of Fallujah).

The primary task as to control the MSR and ensure freedom of maneuver along that line of communication. Unfortunately, that became the only taks for the most part. We wound up becoming a static outpost-based force, siting mini Fort Apaches within line of sight of each other, and very quickly realized that the BGs knew where the seams were. If we even blinked too much, an IED was getting dropped out of the bottom of a minivan cut open Flintsone style, or slipped out of the trunk of a car at the same time as a jack and tire iron. Those guys were very good at that degree of subterfuge.

MikeF
12-13-2009, 08:54 PM
To use a LE perspective again when one shift goes back to HQ another shift has already taken it's place, in other words there is always a full Presence patrol on duty 24/7. If you don't you have created a time GAP in your security SURFACE and the enemy/criminal will exploit that because he is always watching you even if you aren't watching him.

Here's another similarity between LE and small wars-

1. What is the actual reaction time of the cop or soldier to respond to a crime?

2. What is the local's perception of the reaction time?

In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes. When things were going well, we'd actually had a healthy competition between US and IA to see who could get there first. After we had regained a substantial presence in the town, the enemy began conducting attacks on the civilians to coerce or force silence. I think our reaction time allowed us to gain a little advantage on the enemy.

In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.

Mike

jcustis
12-13-2009, 08:58 PM
Interesting idea and with proper planning, it is definitely feasible in certain areas. One would have to take a hard look at how long the patrol can sustain without burn-out plus keep patrols within artillery range (or priority for CAS/AWT) and within CASEVAC range.

If they're going in covertly for recon (digging in), then I'd recommend a max duration of 72 hours. After that, brains are fried.

How long should tour length be in this scenario? I'd probably think 6-9 months.

This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? :D). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

The conditions are the key here. I am currently thinking along Afghanistan lines, where things are sufficiently open that LOS is decent. If we are looking at an urban environment, the situation is so thoroughly different that even if combat outposts were inkspotted throughout the city, the force density still needs to be very high if we want to achieve the constant number of forces afield that slapout mentions.

We can do this, with the right approach, indefinitely. I've seen it done (albeit with mechanized scouts aboard LAVs), for essentially four months, with only two 4-day reset periods. Our trains were on the move constantly, pushing supplies and recovery downed vehicles back to the CSS node for repair. This was in northern Iraq, during a tough winter. Do troops get sick and injured? Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.

slapout9
12-13-2009, 09:04 PM
Those guys were very good at that degree of subterfuge.

That is why I say they act more like criminals, you ever see that police video on those TV shows where a professional car thief breaks into a car with the Police Officer 10 feet away drinking a cup of coffee:eek:


As to your MSR problem, thats why I like the Guard Duty Manual it is a series of static post support by a series of Mobile posts in the same area. When I was on Guard duty at Ft. Bragg we often caught or interrupted more crimes then the MP's just by following that simple system, to enclude reliefs in order to stay sharp(bad news is you will be on post support details a lot:() But in your case it should be supplemented/combined by/with the local population as soon as possible. You don't need Rocket Scientists for security.

davidbfpo
12-13-2009, 09:09 PM
From MikeF:
In LE, I'd suggest the same goes for gang areas or bad neighborhoods. If the populace calls 9-11 and nobody shows up for several hours, then they probably won't feel secure.

Major Marginal can best comment on response times for LE in Chicago; which IIRC can be up to three hours when CPD is busy. Here in the UK there are mandated targets for emergency calls, for LE, Fire and Ambulance - which can exert a profound impact.

In my experience a 911 call is not always an emergency, but as long as the caller gets feedback on when or whether LE / police will attend satisfaction is high. Those who get neither can be a "lost cause".

Communication is the important point and of couse what LE do when they arrive.

MikeF
12-13-2009, 09:17 PM
This is where I tend to agree with Bill on his arguments about risk aversion (I think it was one of your points, right? :D). I can understand being inside a reasonable envelop for casevac support, but when we look at a force-on-force comparison, I cannot recall too many open-source reports of attacks on patrolling elements (perhaps a few times in Ramadi and then some occasions in Afghanistan) where the enemy had us outmatched in terms of shooters and "firepower". Why then do we have to keep them within range of indirect fire? I agree that it is a good objective to try to meet, but we should not let that limit us. Attach one or two gun trucks for mobile fires platforms, or motorize at least one 60mm tube, crew, and ammo supply (METT-T dependent) and I think you've got the support fires you might need.

The conditions are the key here...Absolutely, but those are the costs that we need to manage, as leaders, the best we can.

Point taken:D, but I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management. I was a bit off with the indirect fire rule- mortars can suffice for initial contact. However, we're the US military. We should be able to respond with UAV, AWTs, and Casevac to support our guys on the ground. I don't think that's risk adverse. I think it's just using all the tools and toys that you have.

While the enemy will not likely win a 1:1 firefight with US forces, IEDs on dismounted soldiers sucks. We took a lot of casualties that way, and one thing that maintained morale was knowing that you would get supported.

Mike

MikeF
12-13-2009, 09:21 PM
That is why I say they act more like criminals, you ever see that police video on those TV shows where a professional car thief breaks into a car with the Police Officer 10 feet away drinking a cup of coffee:eek:


As to your MSR problem, thats why I like the Guard Duty Manual it is a series of static post support by a series of Mobile posts in the same area. When I was on Guard duty at Ft. Bragg we often caught or interrupted more crimes then the MP's just by following that simple system, to enclude reliefs in order to stay sharp(bad news is you will be on post support details a lot:() But in your case it should be supplemented/combined by/with the local population as soon as possible. You don't need Rocket Scientists for security.

My preferred COA is to find the bomb-maker and financiers. Attack the system b/c you'll never be able to secure all roads all the time.

slapout9
12-13-2009, 09:27 PM
In my small little AO, we'd try to respond to an incident within 15 minutes.

Mike

1-In my world 3 minutes was the standard,unless there was a good reason otherwise if it happened to many times you would/could face a disciplinary procedure. All the great COIN theorist constantly talk about Police Operations in there books.

2-911 is somewhat of a problem in my opinion because it goes back to how all this started...... Radio Dispatching of Patrol Cars to calls for service which is very Economical but it is not always that Effective. The old ways are sometimes better.


3-Presence patrolling dose not or should not alwats equal HIGH VISIBILITY patrolling many times your presence will be more effective when it is HIDDEN but constant. The military needs a plain clothes division:wry:

slapout9
12-13-2009, 09:29 PM
My preferred COA is to find the bomb-maker and financiers. Attack the system b/c you'll never be able to secure all roads all the time.

True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

MikeF
12-13-2009, 10:45 PM
The military needs a plain clothes division:wry:

No issues with that. It worked for T.E. Lawrence.


True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

Yes. You need both. A broader question, particularly going back to A'stan, is

When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

Mike

slapout9
12-13-2009, 11:40 PM
When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

Mike

That is a good question. I would think there would come a tipping point where it is viewed as an Occupation as opposed to security. One thing that might be interesting to try is changing uniforms as the area becomes more secure. The MP's used to patrol downtown Fayetteville in Class A uniforms or Khakis when appropriate, NCO's would accompany them sometimes in Class A's called Courtesy Patrols. Point being as things become more secure maybe come out of Digital Alien Being suits.

Bill Moore
12-14-2009, 04:01 AM
Mike
I think we're saying the same thing- conditions, cost, and management

To a point, but you must consider these against your objectives, if you consider them independently it is impossible to determine if the cost is worth it.

Slapout,


True, but really don't you need to do both?which is why I say get local population envolved as soon as possible.

Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).

You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.


The military needs a plain clothes division

It's good to see some unconventional thinking going on. The Brits did this in a couple of conflicts (they took casualties, but the results were probably worth it, although how do you really measure the worth of a man's life?). However, your best plain clothes operatives are going to be your host nation folks, and ideally they'll be police or specially trained covert operatives. By all means we should facilitate this, the enemy should not sleep well at night, and when they walk the street at day they should be suspicious of everyone and each other. We want to install a deep fear, which will make them more receptive to other messages later.

MikeF,
When is our presence patrolling counter-productive? Throughout this thread, we're explaining how we will or should patrol, but ultimately, it's up to the host nation to secure. We may run the risk in certain areas of A'stan of causing more problems when we flood an area.

This is the million dollar question. If Special Forces are being employed correctly, they'll be participating in these patrols with local nationals in the lead. The larger hammer forces will be in close proximity to respond if they end up kicking a hornets' nest. However, if the HN forces are distrusted, and it is in our national interests, then our troops may have to do this.

Every situation is different so the strategy must be adjusted to that particular situation based on a number of factors and our objectives.

slapout9
12-14-2009, 04:42 AM
Slapout,



Rarely is anything in COIN (or any other military operation) a simple stand alone task with one specific task, but rather a part of a much larger whole. We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity. Too much network theory crap imposed upon the force. Draw a network on a powerpoint slide (nodes and links), and then the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).
You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences. If one of your goals is to convince the population that the insurgent can't win, and that you will make every effort to protect the citizens, and over time when the populace realizes you'll actually walk your talk they'll start providing intelligence by the cupful, versus by the teaspoon full. This will creat a momentum that can change the tide of the fight, and that is what you're striving for. You won't get this tidal change by removing one or two key enemy nodes (high value individuals), you have to interact with the populace to create this tidal change in this type of fight. We did NOT do this in Iraq initially.






Hi Bill, I highlighted some important points. I never understood the network theory as the military applies it so thanks for explaining it. What I find really strange is when Warden's Ring theory was first taught to LE on how to counter a drug organization(gang) one of the points that was driven home was don't try that kind of operation, you have to attack HVI+his finances+his hideouts and transport net+his distribution net,etc. all at the same time or as close to it as possible. Otherwise they will just lay low and regroup and retaliate.


Second how you describe gaining popular support for Intelligence is a lot like retaking a high crime neighborhood. First they want tell you Sh....t but if you really show you are going to clean the place up and you are going to do it with respect to non criminal residents the Intel and cooperation will eventually come, but it can hard frustrating work to do it.;)

MikeF
12-14-2009, 04:59 PM
You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences.

Bill,

I agreed with your entire last post, but I wanted to address "the message." In the long run, the question is who is patrolling? If the US floods an area in mass, then there is a perception that we are in charge, and the locals expect us to be in charge and solve problems. IMO, that's one of the big things we missed when we invaded Iraq. The Iraqis expected us to fill the security vacuum in the wake of Saddam's removal, and we expected them to fill it. On the operational level, military leaders tried to fix massive, complex problems (electric grid in Baghdad, flow of oil, reinventing an Army and Police force, re-establishing national governance). On the local level, company commanders assumed responsibility for governance, economics, and security.

Some will hand-wave my comment by stating it's a matter of expectation management, but IMO, that's discounting how the locals perceive us.

If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide.

I've summed this up with the phrase in small wars, sometimes less is more.

Thoughts?

Mike

Bill Moore
12-14-2009, 10:56 PM
Mike,


Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

Starting off the same ole tired caveat this is simply my opinion, and that opinions should always be open to persuasive arguments, otherwise they become dogma

Getting directly to your question, who is patrolling? Please look at the definition for Small Wars (from the SWJ homepage) above, and note the key adjectives inadequate and unsatisfactory. If the host nation security forces (assuming they exist) are inadequate and our government has determined (policy) it is in our national interests to pursue our objectives in country X militarily, then until the host nation forces are adequate and “willing” to carry on the fight, we may well have to do it (and are doing it). I’m not a big believer in getting involved in these types of conflicts unless it is absolutely necessary, so I think we have to assume that our government has made that determination (agree or disagree), so now we just need to do it.

Ideally less is more, but the fallacy behind that assumption is due to the over touted through, by and with mantra. The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests. We’re assuming that employing a FID like response is always the best response to every Small War situation and that may not be the case.

I agree with your comments on Iraq to a point, but for whatever reason we demobilized the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police were never a credible force under Saddam, so assuming that the Iraqi army would provide security in the first place, we still effectively took that option off the table.


If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide.

I agree with your statement, and would add that I have also stated that we should consider narrowing our objectives in some cases to punitive operations to deter future attacks, instead of engaging what some may label as imperial hubris. There are times when it is appropriate to occupy and rebuild, and times when it isn’t feasible (or worth the costs). I think we too often confuse hope and positive thinking with good strategy.

MikeF
12-15-2009, 06:01 AM
Mike,


Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

Starting off the same ole tired caveat this is simply my opinion, and that opinions should always be open to persuasive arguments, otherwise they become dogma

Bill, I understand the definitions and the theory. I'm trying to merge the theory with my practice. Neither Iraq nor A'stan meets the criteria. The US conducted REGIME CHANGE. We completely changed the major stakeholders. Academics will one day argue that these examples are interventions in the post-colonial age and repressions of people's rebellion of UN sanctioned govt's.

In the easiest example, I'd ask you to watch Red Dawn and tell me what type of patrol the Russians could have conducted to win Patrick Swayze and crew hearts and minds. What message should the Russian paratroopers send?

Pat Lang has summed it up better than me in this recent post (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/12/counterinsurgency-a-much-failed-strategy.html). I'd recommend reading the whole thing.


Our war in Iraq is now cited as an example of the success of the COIN theory and its methods. In fact nothing of the sort occurred in Iraq. Remember – COIN = political reform + economic development + counter-guerilla operations. We have not brought on political reform in Iraq. What we have done is re-arrange the “players” in such a way that the formerly downtrodden Shia Arabs are now the masters. This has in no way reduced the potential for inter-communal armed struggle. We did not defeat the insurgents in counter guerrilla operations. What we did was bring more troops into the Baghdad area to enforce the separation of the ethno-sectarian communities while at the same time using traditional methods of “divide and conquer” to split off enough insurgents to form an effective force to use against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq and others whom we disapproved of. This is not counterinsurgency!!!

Conclusion

COIN is a badly flawed instrument of statecraft: Why?

- The locals ultimately own the country being fought over. If they do not want the “reforms” you desire, they will resist you as we have been resisted in Iraq and Afghanistan. McChrystal’s strategy paper severely criticized Karzai’s government. Will that disapproval harden into a decision to act to find a better government or will we simply undercut Afghan central government and become the actual government?

- Such COIN wars are expensive, long drawn out affairs that are deeply debilitating for the foreign counterinsurgent power. Reserves of money, soldiers and national will are not endless. Ultimately, the body politic of the counterinsurgent foreign power turns against the war and then all that has occurred has been a waste.

- COIN theory is predicated on the ability of the counterinsurgents to change the mentality of the “protected” (read controlled) population. The sad truth is that most people do not want to be deprived of their ancestral ways and will fight to protect them. “Hearts and Minds” is an empty propagandist’s phrase.

- In the end the foreign counterinsurgent is embarked on a war that is not his own war. For him, the COIN war will always be a limited war, fought for a limited time with limited resources. For the insurgent, the war is total war. They have no where to escape to after a tour of duty. The psychological difference is massive.

- For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents.

Going back to the Red Dawn example, the only thing the Russians could have done is kill off Swayze and the rebellion.

I gotta squat/hold on the rest of your responses to consider them for a day. You made some good points.

Mike

Ken White
12-15-2009, 03:46 PM
Bill Moore:
We didn't get in this Iraq and Afghanistan initially, instead we focused heavily on the singular objective of head hunting HVIs, and too slowly we learned that it didn't work as a stand alone activity.

... the theory was if you eliminated a key node or two the network would collapse and you could go home victoriouly. We should continue to do this, but this is not decisive (conventional warriors think it is).Seems to me the first quoted statment is correct but since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve... :D
... The so called indirect approach assumes the world will be our surrogates and will fight for our national interests (mercenaries may, not others), but the reality is that the indirect approach only works in situations where we have mutual interests.That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance. (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indirect_approach). I guess there are people who expect the world will be surrogates but I've never met any...

Pat Lang via Mike F:
" - For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents."I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...

MikeF
12-15-2009, 04:26 PM
Pat Lang via Mike F:[/B]I just picked that one but all his objections are short sighted or poorly stated -- they're somewhat true in the current situation but are generally only correct if the major flaw of committing the GPF to that sort of mission occurs. If judicious use of effective intelligence information, diplomacy and SF in small quantities early on cannot creating a true host nation COIN effort to forestall or defuse a situation in a Country of interest; the options then become Clandestine action, overt Strategic Raids, escalation to full scale war or third party GPF 'COIN' efforts like those of which he writes.

Of the four choices, the latter should ALWAYS be the last...

Ken and Bill,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

Mike

Steve Blair
12-15-2009, 04:53 PM
Ken and Bill,

Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

Mike

Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.

MikeF
12-15-2009, 05:08 PM
Jumping in here, but you really have a choice between the realistic option and the best case option. I know that the GPF should always be committed last, etc., etc., but I do consider that to be the best case option (and one that isn't supported by our own history). Our anomalies far outnumber our 'standard' conflicts, and I suspect they will continue to do so.

Steve,

That's probably a good way to put it, and the gap is not that hard to combine IMO. For instance, during heavy manuevers when young PL's and CO's are practicing bounding, fire and manuever, and integrating CAS/AWT, we can incorporate more guerillas on the battlefield with IEDs.

We can also test JCustis' approach of extending past the patrol base with small units conducting steady-state operations with the CO orchestrating it all. If we go that route, I'd suggest that we bulk up the CO level HQ. This type of training/test would allow us to gain a better calculation on risk management before deploying to the field.

I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Mike

Steve Blair
12-15-2009, 05:29 PM
I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

Mike

Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

Bill Moore
12-15-2009, 05:41 PM
MikeF,

I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

I agree with many others that our COIN doctrine is probably flawed, since it frequently references COIN examples such as Algeria, Malaya and French Vietnam as examples, yet in all these cases these were nations defending their land, not providing aid to a foreign government. The French and British could establish the laws and enforce certain standards that we can’t in a true FID situation. Foreign assistance to a government with insurgency problems includes our support to Greece and El Salvador. Iraq and Afghanistan don’t come close to being an El Salvador or Greece. Do we have even have doctrine for a regime change? Where is the UN?

Posted by Ken reference head hunting:


since that was a SOCOM idea, it sort of reinforces the thought in the second item but seems that UNconventional warriors also give nodes more credence than they deserve.

:D partially correct punch below the belt; however, as you well know from your days with the OSS during WWII and then with SF in Vietnam War that UW is only one of our SOF missions, and not one that SOCOM leadership embraced warmly during the early days of the conflict. Most folks are wiser now.

Posted by Ken,


That's not my understanding of an Indirect Approach. Indirect Approach is a strategy that simply advocates an advance along the line / attack / focus on the line or point of greatest expectation of least resistance.

Your definition sounds like a simple flanking operation or other type of maneuver (that isn't a frontal assault). It is my impression that many are pushing SFA as "the" indirect approach. SFA is an important indirect means, but there is also the indirect approach, which implies you influence your enemy indirectly, perhaps by influencing the population in a village that has been providing him support to not support him. You can actually combine means and approach, but don't want to trip over mouse turds.

MikeF,


Ten years from now, assuming that the wars in Iraq/A'stan are settled down, how should we(regular army) train? Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?

USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID).

That doesn't mean the Army shouldn't be flexible enough to provide security and support a wide range of other tasks has they have always done. You may not have time to train on everything, which is why educating our leaders is so critical. If the leadership is perceptive and capable of quickly grasping the situation on the ground and seeing what needs to be done, they can issue the appropriate orders and guidelines to the NCOs and junior officers to execute, and they'll get it done. Our guys and gals can do whatever you tell them to do, and IMO you will be hard pressed to identify any significant failures in OIF and OEF-A that were due to inadequate training at the junior level. Instead you have to look up the chain of command to start finding points of failure. Leadership is decisive.

MikeF
12-15-2009, 05:45 PM
Personally I'd plan on a mix, and keep the training scenarios shifting so that the answer depends on the actual situation and not a "school solution" of some sort. Static command locations may be "easier" from some perspectives, but they also create a very tempting target that tends to soak up security resources and attacks (again depending on the situation).

Additionally, for the environment, one would probably have a civilian to enemy ratio of 10:1 although that's manpower intensive.

The two best training opportunies that I've experienced in CONUS were the Hurricane Katrina relief in 2005 and a JRTC rotation in spring 2006.

Katrina forced the squadron to suspend close with and destroy for a bit to interact with people, help secure a city, provide humanitarian assistance, assess the damage, and coordinate for restoration of essential services.

In 2006 at JRTC, we received permission to covertly infiltrate into the box 24 hours prior to the start of operations b/c we were testing out the light RSTA concept. We spent 80% of the rotation outside the FOB, and our successes and limitations learned during that tour helped us translate that into a campaign plan and execution in Iraq.

Mike

slapout9
12-15-2009, 06:51 PM
good article on this subject from John Robb's Global Guerrilla's.

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/files/obte---armor-art.pdf

Ken White
12-15-2009, 08:59 PM
MikeF:
Should we treat these wars as anomalies and go back to tank gunnery and seizing airfields or should we train for big and small wars?Every war is an anomaly. No two will be alike.

Train for the big stuff; it is easy to adapt down to the slower tempo and lower combat capability demand of small wars, it is not nearly as easy to adapt upwards.
Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.Not tough at all. Easy to take a mobile element and make it static, not much training required; all you have to do is gear it down -- and that's pure leadership. OTOH, taking a static element and trying to make it mobile requires different equipment and training as well as even better leadership...

Bill Moore:
partially correct punch below the belt; however, as you well know from your days with the OSS during WWII and then with SF in Vietnam War that UW is only one of our SOF missions, and not one that SOCOM leadership embraced warmly during the early days of the conflict. Most folks are wiser now.In order: Not partial, wholly; they told me never to fight fair :D ; agreed; agree -- but there are still some who are overly DA oriented... ;)
It is my impression that many are pushing SFA as "the" indirect approach.Agree but they're dumb enough to ignore.

Indirect approach / asymmetric warfare -- all same thing, get thar fustest with mostest, hit em where they ain't, punch below the belt, ;)

Pete
12-15-2009, 09:33 PM
If I were king, the patrol base would only be there for discrete re-arm/refit/reset purposes. Patrols go out and remain out, with resupply and maintenance conducted forward, not aboard the PB. That's what your combat trains are for, but after six years of FOB life, we've lost that skill to a great degree.

To what extent do guys here think that the FOB mentality is an inheritance from peace-keeping in the Balkans? These ideas of "Force Protection" somehow became mingled with tactics and became "the way we've always done it." It seems to me to be the absolute antithesis of infantry tactics to spend one's nights on an FOB and commute to war in vehicles using the same routes day after day.

jcustis
12-16-2009, 01:05 AM
I guess one of the biggest decisions to make is where will BN and higher HQ's be located. Should we assume they'll be in static FOBs or return to vehicles and mobile assembly areas? That's a tough one.

the battalion commander might not always have control, but he always retains command, and if you could deploy his Jump CP and not let it just become some goofy PSD, he can still control considerable chunks of battlespace with the right equipment task organized to it. The Main CP retains the most control, because that is where it is "plugged in" to higher headquarters. We have gotten so burdened with data pathways that it seems very foreign to HHQ to have to pick up a handset to a satcom radio in order to have a chat. I mean that in all seriousness. Sure, it was just 4-5 yrs ago when satcom was a vital lifeline that was utilized a lot, but there has been a perceptible shift. Soooo...we'd have to take a couple of steps back, from the BDE to Regt level and have everyone power down a bit in order to make the "stay afield" bit work across a larger AO, but it's not like we're making water here.:D

MikeF
12-16-2009, 05:06 PM
I concur with much of what Pat Lang posted (not all). OIF and OEF-A were regime changes and occupations, also called liberation efforts. Not sure that everyone concerned in those nations saw our efforts as a liberation effort, so now we have the Islamic version of Patrick Swayze’s conducting their own liberation movements. An oversimplification perhaps, but in both Iraq and Afghanistan we conducted regime changes, then faced some degree of operational and political paralysis, so those sitting on the side lines saw us as a weak, reluctant and uncomfortable occupying power, that quickly as possible stood up a local government (largely perceived as a puppet government), which in both cases was extremely weak (though Iraq seems to be making progress). We can't recreate history, but I wonder what would have happened if we actually took our occupying responsibilities seriously and delayed transitioning to a HN government until conditions were established for success?

Concur. I gave an overstated/simplified example. I am still a bit grumpy that Army has gone ten quarters without scoring a touchdown against Navy. :(


USAID, Department of State, Department of Justice, and SOF among others can address the majority of IW challenges if we don't wait until we have a failed or rouge state. However, only the Joint Force can defeat conventional forces and large irregular forces who are fighting conventionally, so the the Army must strive to remain undefeatable in combat (conventional or otherwise). In the initial phases of OIF and OEF-A we needed the Army to conduct ground combat operations. The Army and Marines had to conduct combined combat operations in Fallujah (twice). No one else can do this outside the GPF, so the Army "must" maintain its proficiency in this area (it's why we have an Army, we don't need the Army to replace SF or USAID). emphasis mine

An important distinction. I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

slapout9
12-16-2009, 05:48 PM
I'd prefer that we call a situation with a large irregular force a medium war. Then, we can keep it simple with small, medium, and big wars instead of all these new terms like irregular, hybrid, and assymetric where everyone has their own definition. I like simple.

Didn't we used to do that with HIC,MIC,LIC? So a PHD in war is an officer that can HIC em,MIC em, and finally LIC em:)

jcustis
12-17-2009, 07:26 AM
A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/military-news/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?


Lance Cpl. Luke McDonell, a rifleman with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, scans the tree line during a security halt while patrolling the area of Now Zad, Afghanistan, known as "The Greens," on December 9th, 2009. The Marines cleared the area as part of Operation Cobra's Anger, an operation aimed at removing the Taliban's stronghold of the area. McDonnell is a 28-year-old from Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.
HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan - Once an urban district and home to thousands, "The Greens," an area within the Now Zad region of Afghanistan quickly became a ghost town, when Taliban fighters procured the area from which to launch combat operations.

With the Taliban in control and the civilian population gone, the area's alleyways were quickly laced with improvised explosive devices, its orchard's filled with bunkers and fortified fighting positions, and its adobe homes stocked with weapons caches and enemy fighters.

While few coalition units have dared to enter The Greens, the Marines and sailors of Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, did exactly that Dec. 8-9 as part of Operation Cobra's Anger.

The Marines of Lima Co. moved swiftly to clear compounds, homes, alleyways and orchards, and it quickly became clear the Taliban had become complacent in the safety they believed The Greens provided them and were unprepared to deal with such an assault.

"We went in there for our first time and there wasn't anybody occupying the area, but we did find a lot IED making facilities, [homemade explosives], pressure plates and stuff like that," said Lance Cpl. Stewart Heim, 20, a rifleman with Lima Co. "It definitely showed us the Taliban were occupying [the Greens], and using it as a centralized place between towns."

Lima Co. also confiscated illegal drugs, Taliban propaganda and uncovered tunnel systems used by enemy fighters.

"We found their tunnel systems which pretty much run throughout the whole Greens," said Heim, a native of Staunton, Ill. "So we've definitely seen that they have the capability to survive us dropping bombs on them."

Lima Co. came to the area expecting their Taliban rivals to defend the ground they've controlled for many months. With the Marines rapidly chipping away at Taliban caches and exposing fighting positions, an attack by Taliban forces to save what supplies remained, seemed even more imminent.

"Walking through The Greens was kind of iffy. You didn't know where you wanted to step, where to step, where not to step. You never knew what to expect around a corner," said Lance Cpl. Michael R. Evans, 19, a combat engineer attached to Lima Co., 3/4. "You'd open up a door and might see a chicken or a dog and it would surprise you since you knew there was nothing out there."

Enemy fighters chose not to engage the Marines and instead left the dirty work for the many IED's positioned throughout the area.

While the IED's were numerous, the Marines' sharp eyes, training and metal detectors were able to locate all devices encountered before they could inflict casualties.

"We found them the way we should find them, instead of having someone stepping on them and having to be [medically evacuated]," said Evans, from McKenzie, Tenn.

The Marines continued to push farther into the area, destroying IED's along the way, gathering information and slowly but surely, breaking the Taliban's reign over the area.

After two days of defying Taliban threats and venturing farther and farther into the area, the Marines returned to friendly lines to refit and resupply.

While many alleyways in the area remain to be negotiated, the Marines set an example for Afghan national security forces and coalition forces to follow, and energized the mission to rid Now Zad of Taliban influence and return it to the Afghan people.

http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=32271


NOW ZAD, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan conducted a major combat operation against insurgent forces in Now Zad, Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 3.

The Marines of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan, struck well-known enemy locations identified within and near the insurgent-infested Now Zad District center.

"Now Zad's District center is kind of a unique place in Afghanistan because there is no local civilian population," said 1st Lt. Mike H. Buonocore, the executive officer of Co. L.

"Company L was reinforced by engineers, aviation support from the aviation combat element, rocket artillery support from SPMAGTF-A's Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, Air Force and Navy aviation assets and Army rocket artillery support. During the combat operation, the Co. L Marines targeted positively identified enemy positions where insurgent attacks have originated from over the past several months. Other locations were identified with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

The two major components involved in the operation were a ground force and an aerial assault. Enemy targets were destroyed by combined fires from rocket artillery, aircraft, mortars and ground troops.

"The mission took some enemy forces out of the fight and showed them how much force we have with us and what we can use against them," said Cpl. Andrew C. Conte, a squad leader with the ground assault element. "It really cleared out some of the areas we were having troubles in."

The ground scheme of maneuver employed Co. L as the main effort by conducting a raid on a known enemy position, while other Marines held blocking positions to ensure insurgent reinforcements were denied freedom of movement and the opportunity to engage the Marine forces.

Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and Btry. D, 2/14's high mobility artillery rocket system set conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets.

"Once the bombs started dropping there wasn't too much movement," said Conte. "With all the ground forces out there and everything we had overhead, it was calm because we knew nothing was going to touch us."

Additional munitions were called in on other known enemy positions to ensure the raid force was successful. Upon initial disruption of the enemy locations, the assault element moved in and conducted thorough site exploitation.

"We were able to engage some enemy targets before they engaged us," said Cpl. Taylor E. Vogel, a forward observer with the 81 mm mortar platoon. "We were able to drop mortars on [enemy] fire teams that were moving in on [Marine] units. We definitely achieved what we wanted to. We destroyed the big targets that have been occupied by enemy forces."

Leading up to the operation, the Marines had proactively conducted combat operations in Now Zad's District center daily in order to shape the battlefield by moving insurgents into disposable positions. Marines took precaution by using leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of danger in the area, which helped create agreeable conditions that would result in little or no collateral damage.

"Throughout the winter in Afghanistan, you hear about the [insurgent] spring offensive," said Conte. "We caught them before they caught us in the spring offensive, and we set the tone of it with showing how much [firepower] we have and what we can use."

Insurgents attempted to counter the Marines' strike on Now Zad with improvised explosive devices, mortars, small-arms fire and two rockets that were fired overhead with no success. Unwavering, the Marines positively identified and pursued their targets.

"The operation was a tremendous success on all levels," said Buonocore. "The confirmed battle damage assessment is pretty significant. There were no civilian casualties, and nothing was hit that wasn't a target. We have achieved tremendous success here against the enemy."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203771904574179672963946120.html


NOW ZAD, Afghanistan

In a war over hearts and minds, Now Zad has neither.

Abandoned by its residents, this mud-brick ghost town is a corner of Afghanistan that might be forever Flanders. There are no schools being painted, no roads paved, no clinics built. There is no Afghan army, no Afghan government at all. In Now Zad, there is just one company of U.S. Marines slugging it out across no man’s land with equally determined militants. From their entrenched lines, neither side is strong enough to prevail.

On patrol this month, Sgt. Tucker Strom, a 26-year-old squad leader from Tallahassee, Fla., lifted his head just high enough above a mud wall to glimpse the Taliban front line across 500 yards of neglected pomegranate orchards. “They’re right there,” Sgt. Strom told a newly arrived Marine. “This is what it turns into—us watching them, them watching us.”

davidbfpo
12-17-2009, 09:21 AM
Posted by JCustis:
A couple of recent articles by USMC combat correspondents can be found here: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/m...s/news1097.htm and although I am not on the ground to confirm the withdrawal mentioned, it leaves me wondering just what the heck was planned vs. what folks are looking at on the ground. why give anything up it Now Zad is supposedly so infested? The story at top is a Dec 14th story. The ones further below are from April and May of this year. What have we learned? What are we doing to prevent the need to go back there again in another 7 months?

Jon,

It appears that you too (USA, USMC plus) are repeating what the UK has done since 2006 in Helmand "mowing the grass". Other items cite the UK fighting over the same piece of land six times.

I suppose if the people have fled then there is no population to protect.

William F. Owen
06-02-2010, 05:18 AM
Yes indeed this 'type' of patrol has appeared since my time. We had reservists, policemen and other odds and sods who escorted civilian specialists to visit villages etc, so perhaps it was an escort patrol of sorts. Not a task for any self respecting soldier... in any war.
Done by the British Army for well over 300 years.
It was never called a "presence" patrol, but patrolling in as part of security operations is normal military activity. It is nothing new. The Romans did it.

Now I do not doubt that today, some armies do it very badly. That is not a reason not to do it well, and in general terms there is usually an operational demand for it.

Actually escorting civilians requires considerable skill and training. The death of Paula Lloyd is worth studying in that regard, as are many other incidents.

Infanteer
06-02-2010, 05:36 AM
I don't understand where the sentiment that "presence patrolling" is counter-productive to effective warfighting.

When we went out, all patrols were treated as an advance to contact and concepts such as good positions for fire and bounding overwatch (or, doctrinally, mutual support) were always employed. At night, for ambushes and OPs, good patrol discipline and deception were utilized as best possible. Orders were given and rehearsals and actions on were conducted.

In the conduct of the patrol, patrol discipline was maintained while the patrol's posture reflected the environment - sneaking around with camouflage and leopard crawling in the day would likely get one laughed at by the legion of kids that would descend on your "warfighting" patrol; generally, when the insurgents aren't active there are people everywhere in Southern Afghanistan. Most of the effective intelligence was gathered by being overt and talking to people as opposed to being covert and looking for AVF markings. Just because we do one doesn't mean we flush the other.

All our patrolling was exercised just how we learned it - fighting against templated Eastern Bloc foes in the prairies of Canada.

Anyways, sorry for the tangent, but I don't buy Fuchs point about counterproductive tactics in Afghanistan (unless leadership lets it) - but I do buy his theory of too much weight is no good.

Chris jM
06-02-2010, 06:38 AM
I don't understand where the sentiment that "presence patrolling" is counter-productive to effective warfighting.

When we went out, all patrols were treated as an advance to contact and concepts such as good positions for fire and bounding overwatch (or, doctrinally, mutual support) were always employed. At night, for ambushes and OPs, good patrol discipline and deception were utilized as best possible. Orders were given and rehearsals and actions on were conducted...


By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area. That can allow for units to achieve their task without actually effecting the enemy, terrain or civil population. Presence is very important but it shouldn't be a task as such. Clear an area, screen an area, guard an area/ feature, interdict eny infiltration, conduct a meeting - these are all tasks that involve ones' presence as a prerequisite of success, granted, but the actual task should be focussed on achieving an effect. If you want to dominate a route by overtly sitting on a hill and watching who moves along it, good for you. But the mission shouldn't be 'sit somewhere and be seen' as presence patrolling implies.

I'm not saying your patrolling was ineffective - your unit was obviously professional enough to patrol effectively regardless of the lack of direction inherent to a presence patrol and commanders no doubt decided upon an effect they wanted to have upon the enemy/ civilians/ terrain. However 'presence' in my opinion is bad practice and incompetence can be defended under its guise.

Kiwigrunt - Agreed.

William F. Owen
06-02-2010, 07:03 AM
By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.
OK, drifting well off topic here - time for a new one?

I agree. I have no idea where the idea came from, in terms of "just being there." It was and is always was part of the conduct of security operations, and, in terms of the UK, the primary mission of the patrol was never related to "being present."

Like many apparently simple military things, there are clearly many who do not get it. Myself and an extremely experienced British Army Major (11 tours in NI!) tried explaining this to the Royal Thai Army at their COIN seminar. By the questions that followed, some clearly didn't get it. Translation may have been as issue, but only partly. I have seen the same short fall with others.

Infanteer
06-02-2010, 04:20 PM
By your description I'd prefer to describe your patrol as a clear task over presence. I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.

Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols and when I gave orders for the patrol, I included any area, route or point objectives. The task was to conduct an area/route/point recce.

Ken White
06-02-2010, 05:22 PM
otherwise tasked (raid, ambush, snatch, meeting, etc.) always a reconnaissance patrol. It is in fact a reconnaissance and presence patrol or operation as well even if a 'combat' mission is the stated purpose. Information gathering plus area (area, not spot...) knowledge and dominance are combat constants, or should be. That applies in conventional and irregular warfare.

Conversely, a reconnaissance patrol is not universally a presence patrol -- but it is simply that as often or more than not.

Add to that, 'everything is training is everything.' Training does not cease in combat, it should in fact intensify.

Take it a step further -- most irregular forces and many conventional forces will not attack people that look and act like they know what they're doing. Why take on a competent force when you can wait a bit and get another unit that wanders along in a chattering gaggle, is unaware of what goes on around them and is not prepared to fight as if they know how to do so...

JMA
06-02-2010, 07:43 PM
Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols...

What exactly were you reconnoitering?

JMA
06-02-2010, 08:21 PM
I have a deep hatred of 'presence patrolling' as it implies you can achieve your mission by simply being in an area.

Based on the following definition of a presence patrol I agree: "a patrol conducted for the purpose of reminding people that there is a military presence in the area" (source) (http://www.militarydictionary.com/definition/presence-patrol.html)

Can't find anything online about Brit doctrine but found this on the US: "Presence patrols conduct a special form of reconnaissance, normally during stability or civil support operations."


From FM 3-21.8

Presence Patrols

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations. It has many purposes, but should always see and be seen, but seen in a specific manner determined by the commander. Its primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO. To do this, the patrol gathers critical (as determined by the commander) information, both specific and general. The patrol seeks out this information, and then observes and reports. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent.

9-137. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of the U.S. forces. Presence patrols are intended to clearly demonstrate the determination, competency, confidence, concern, and when appropriate, the overwhelming power of the force to all who observe it, including local and national media.

9-138. The commander always plans for the possibility that a presence patrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent. Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol where enemy contact is likely. Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operations such as peace operations, humanitarian and civic assistance, non-combatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending out a presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader.

9-139. To accomplish the “to be seen” part of its purpose, a presence patrol reconnoiters overtly. It takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are all part of that impression. When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it; not only for hard information, but also for the patrol leader's impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to see to modify the actions of subsequent patrols. Emphasis mine.

It seems obvious that the presence patrol has been all "dressed up" to replace patrol activity which would be generated if there was any real intel flowing or there was the prerequisite skills level for small teams to locate the Taliban as a prelude to offensive action. The plot has been lost.

By all means send militias and auxiliary forces to escort government officials, census takers, veterinarians, water engineers etc etc but don't use "proper" soldiers for this time wasting activity unless you want to hide one or two men in with the militia to physically recce a route for later infiltration.

JMA
06-02-2010, 08:52 PM
Maybe the last few posts should pop over to this (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9069&highlight=presence+patrol) thread. A lot has been discussed there.

You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.

Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.

Ken White
06-02-2010, 10:30 PM
You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.That's true and is why training is important. Also, some clever people insist that most all US patrols have an Afghan presence (ANA, ANP or other, including some interpreters who have more comabt experience than a very large number of people) to do nuance detection. Works pretty well...
Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.Speaking of nuances, do you know that it's not happening or is that yet more unnecessary innuendo on your part?

Infanteer
06-02-2010, 11:38 PM
What exactly were you reconnoitering?

Everything - different patrols would have specific tasks, but daily patrols would help keep a an eye on things and, better, dominate the ground. No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home.

As well, the US reference you found is, in my opinion, incorrect and outdated - overt presence patrols were always conducted in areas where contact with the enemy could take place. This is why we treated every patrol as an advance to contact.


You are probably correct and you would have noted that those pro these presence patrols seem to believe that youngsters (out of London and New York city) on a short tour of Afghanistan have the necessary skills to pick up the subtle often nuanced changes in the routine of village life which may provide a battle indication or other. Not clever.

Been there done that, if you are watching something then you better know enough to be able to interpret what you see. Not happening.

I don't know what your "been there, done that" constitutes, but your appeals to authority never seem to reflect how things work on the ground. You'd be surprised - pattern of life takes a little while to get used to, but after a month or so soldiers, especially ones with multiple tours, usually figure out what constitutes a combat indicator. The fact that most patrols are conducted with the ANSF only makes this easier - when the ANA start getting antsy, it's usually game on.

Chris jM
06-03-2010, 12:47 AM
Presence patrol merely defined the posture. All these patrols were reconnaissance patrols and when I gave orders for the patrol, I included any area, route or point objectives. The task was to conduct an area/route/point recce.

Why label a type of patrol by the posture, the means your using to achieve your goal, rather than the goal, objective or ends of the patrol itself? The posture could change - maybe you see something and want to observe it covertly, for example. Does your 'presence patrol' then fail because your presence is no longer overt?

I don't think this is needless or nugatory semantics I'm pulling you up on. I do think the label of 'presence' in front of patrolling is (as I stated prior) misaligned with expressing an effective commander's intent necessary for mission command and a very easy shield for mediocrity and poor ideas to hide behind.

Chris jM
06-03-2010, 12:57 AM
otherwise tasked (raid, ambush, snatch, meeting, etc.) always a reconnaissance patrol. It is in fact a reconnaissance and presence patrol or operation as well even if a 'combat' mission is the stated purpose. Information gathering plus area (area, not spot...) knowledge and dominance are combat constants, or should be. That applies in conventional and irregular warfare.

Conversely, a reconnaissance patrol is not universally a presence patrol -- but it is simply that as often or more than not.

Imperfect definitions, evidently. While I agree with your later quote (excluded) that 'training is everything...' I don't think that your first point, that any of your above points excuse or justify the poor 'presence patrolling' philosophy.

Doctrine claims we have two types of patrols: Fighting/Combat and Reconnaissance. This isn't a very intuitive type of categorization as a fighting patrol can be a reconnaissance patrol.

I think we'd be better off looking at two types of patrols - overt and covert. Both are fundamentally different approaches, with equipment and TTPs changing between the two types. However these types of patrols are only the means to an end. Evidentially you cannot patrol to 'be covert' or 'be overt', but rather to achieve an effect.

This might make me appear confused and that I am arguing against anyone conducting a presence patrol initially, then saying that we should replace the fighting/recce patrol with the overt(another word for presence)/covert category. What I'm trying to point out is that overt presence is a means to an end. Achieving your process isn't necessarily going to be productive or helpful - applying your process to achieve a goal may be. Re-aligning how we classify our two main methods of patrolling tasks would assist in this delineation.

Ken White
06-03-2010, 02:37 AM
I don't think that your first point, that any of your above points excuse or justify the poor 'presence patrolling' philosophy.That it's poor that is. I don't think the philosophy is poor, though the verbiage used to posit the idea in some manuals is absolutely dangerous.

The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Those last, BTW, are the reason Armies exist. The COIN stupidity and IW are the realm of Paramilitary Police and US Special Forces / SAS like organizations respectively. So armies in real wars conduct combat patrols to complete designated missions and reconnaissance patrols to insure they do not get surprised or to gather specific information for future action (that's why I say the 'presence' patrol should usually be and often is a reconnaissance patrol; it's also to avoid surprises and gather information for future action...).

JMA made the very valid point that sending kids from London or New York City -- or Auckland -- bombing about in Afghanistan with little cultural awareness or language skill is pointless. He's absolutely correct. that's why we generally avoid doing it by ALWAYS going with local forces (preferably) or at a minimum interpreters who can provide the cultural and translation factor capability.
Doctrine claims we have two types of patrols: Fighting/Combat and Reconnaissance. This isn't a very intuitive type of categorization as a fighting patrol can be a reconnaissance patrol.Not intuitive to you perhaps, most people don't seem to have a problem with it. Recall also that the terms spring from conventional war roots where the parameters are quite different from low intensity COIN and FID.

Fighting patrols do reconnaissance or should and reconnaissance patrols can and do fight. The categorization is predicated on the primary mission of the patrol. I have been on reconnaissance patrols that were looking for and found a fight, conversely, I've been on combat patrols that inadvertently had no fight but returned with much good info.
I think we'd be better off looking at two types of patrols - overt and covert. Both are fundamentally different approaches, with equipment and TTPs changing between the two types. However these types of patrols are only the means to an end. Evidentially you cannot patrol to 'be covert' or 'be overt', but rather to achieve an effect.METT-TC. Whether the patrol is for fighting or just reconnaissance, overt or covert, in a major conventional conflict or an irregular war, METT-TC applies.
This might make me appear confused and that I am arguing against anyone conducting a presence patrol initially, then saying that we should replace the fighting/recce patrol with the overt(another word for presence)/covert category...Uh, no, not confused, you just want a new name. Okay with me.
What I'm trying to point out is that overt presence is a means to an end.Why, yes it is. It is also an opportunity to train and to gather information -- THAT is the purpose of the patrol and presence is simply a synergistic and beneficial effect.
Achieving your process isn't necessarily going to be productive or helpful - applying your process to achieve a goal may be.I'm unsure I understand all I know about that statement. I have absolutely no idea how one 'achieves' a process. I can apply a process, I can achieve a goal; ideally I do the former to reach the latter.

If you mean using a reconnaissance patrol to gather information and at the same time establish presence, then I agree. If you mean using a combat patrol to accomplish an action or task and at the same time letting the opposition and the neighbors know you're there, then I agree. Beyond that, I'm confoosed... Recall, I'm old. :o
Re-aligning how we classify our two main methods of patrolling tasks would assist in this delineation.You may be correct but I'm skeptical. I've seen too many 'covert' patrols get discovered (my LRS kid in Desert Storm got spotted by a six year old kid with Goats -- and a dog... :D) and too many overt patrols accomplish little or nothing.

We now categorize patrols by intended function, combat or reconnaissance, that based on years of experience in major combat operations. You seem to want to categorize them by movement methodology. I'm not certain there's much benefit there. Probably not enough to rewrite most of the relevant manuals, doctrine and training materials in the west...:wry:

Infanteer
06-03-2010, 03:53 AM
Why label a type of patrol by the posture, the means your using to achieve your goal, rather than the goal, objective or ends of the patrol itself? The posture could change - maybe you see something and want to observe it covertly, for example. Does your 'presence patrol' then fail because your presence is no longer overt?

I don't think this is needless or nugatory semantics I'm pulling you up on. I do think the label of 'presence' in front of patrolling is (as I stated prior) misaligned with expressing an effective commander's intent necessary for mission command and a very easy shield for mediocrity and poor ideas to hide behind.

....because....


The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Couldn't have said it much better. I don't get hung up on these terms too much. When I tell my NCOs that I wanted an area recce of the village of X with a presence in the village after evening prayers, it layed out my intent. I would conduct presence patrols because my mission was to "secure the population". The "presence", as Ken aptly described, defines both a reconnaissance part ("Hey, the local mullah told us this while we were in the village") and a combat part ("Anyone want a shot at the title?") It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".

Ken White
06-03-2010, 04:08 AM
....because.... It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".and that's really important...

In COIN or FID, initiating fighting contacts more often than your opponent is important but gathering and applying voluminous and current intel on the AO and the people is more important.

Proving you can come and go as you please is even more important.

Kiwigrunt
06-03-2010, 05:54 AM
He he, I’m following this battle of semantics with interest. Just want to add that in Timor we referred to them as ‘blue hat’ and ‘green hat’ patrols. That’s not in any manual but everyone got the point.

William F. Owen
06-03-2010, 06:12 AM
He he, I’m following this battle of semantics with interest. Just want to add that in Timor we referred to them as ‘blue hat’ and ‘green hat’ patrols. That’s not in any manual but everyone got the point.
Useful. Good point.

JMA
06-03-2010, 06:25 AM
That's true and is why training is important. Also, some clever people insist that most all US patrols have an Afghan presence (ANA, ANP or other, including some interpreters who have more comabt experience than a very large number of people) to do nuance detection. Works pretty well...Speaking of nuances, do you know that it's not happening or is that yet more unnecessary innuendo on your part?

If you need to take a bunch of 'locals' along with the patrol to achieve the mission then the ISAF troops are more in a escort function with the 'locals' doing the real recce and/or communications patrols?

Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol. Further the weakness is that the interpretor is merely facilitating communication between the patrol leader and the local population. The patrol should in fact be escorting and supporting a one/two.three man team of Afghans (an intel team - call them what you may) who will be doing the talking and sussing out the situation in the village... and not some patrol leader from London, New York or wherever out in Afghanistan on a short tour.

JMA
06-03-2010, 07:05 AM
Everything - different patrols would have specific tasks, but daily patrols would help keep a an eye on things and, better, dominate the ground. No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home.

Nobody is saying no patrolling that I have read.

What I am saying is that what the definition of presence patrols is and their use in Afghanistan as has been explained they are a waste of time and manpower and (as the man said) constitute merely 'trolling for RPGs'... or IEDs.

If you were tasked to figure out and implement a method of deployment to prevent or radically reduce the planting of IEDs within a given radius of your base then would you do it with presence patrols?

Given me an indication if you will on what percentage of patrols carried out by your unit were based on solid intel on the presence of Taliban and resulted in an aggressive action in a patrol form which resulted in kills?

That stat I suggest should be the point of departure. And will inform why there has been no alternative but to use presence patrols to keep the soldiers busy.


As well, the US reference you found is, in my opinion, incorrect and outdated - overt presence patrols were always conducted in areas where contact with the enemy could take place. This is why we treated every patrol as an advance to contact.

Well then lets have a new definition. Let someone in the field rewrite and submit the amended paragraphs now rather than wait for some desk jockey to get around to it sometime after the war.


I don't know what your "been there, done that" constitutes, but your appeals to authority never seem to reflect how things work on the ground. You'd be surprised - pattern of life takes a little while to get used to, but after a month or so soldiers, especially ones with multiple tours, usually figure out what constitutes a combat indicator. The fact that most patrols are conducted with the ANSF only makes this easier - when the ANA start getting antsy, it's usually game on.

You said at the outset "No patrolling, and you'll find things like IEDs start popping up closer and closer to your home." and provided no supporting data. Yes, and I too can't provide references and/or supporting data for every comment I make in every post here.

"Been there done that" means I understand (and sympathise) with your predicament. You are obviously trying to do your best with the tasks you have been given. I did the same, walking over miles and miles of Mozambique and Rhodesia looking for the needle in the proverbial haystack. Eventually I figured it out and said so. Your time will no doubt come and good luck to you on how they react ;)

OK, so if the ANA can be relied upon to act like the "canary in the coal mine" then maybe that explains why their local smarts could (maybe should) be used more, yes? (I could tell you a story about local trackers here, but no time)

My guess is that most of them are quite happy to take uncle Sam's dollar or the Queen's shilling but are not quite ready to lay down their lives for Karzai. So seeing so much money is being used to buy off village chiefs and warlords why not pay some of these ANA a reward for intel leading to verified Taliban captures and kills?

William F. Owen
06-03-2010, 07:32 AM
Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol.
Is this your opinion, or a fact? It is certainly almost the exact opposite of what what I understand having actually spoken with the men returned from theatre.

To whit: Presence Patrolling from your quote.

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.
So how is this relevant to a discussion of Afghanistan? Yes the US (and UK) have produced some dumb manuals. That does not mean that is the reality on the ground.

JMA
06-03-2010, 07:38 AM
When I tell my NCOs that I wanted an area recce of the village of X with a presence in the village after evening prayers, it layed out my intent. I would conduct presence patrols because my mission was to "secure the population". The "presence", as Ken aptly described, defines both a reconnaissance part ("Hey, the local mullah told us this while we were in the village") and a combat part ("Anyone want a shot at the title?") It says "Hey a-----e, you say this is your village, but I'll come and go as I please".

Yes indeed we are now getting closer to the crux of the matter.

So the mission is to secure the population.

How do you achieve that with a one time pass of a village once a week/once a month having approached over open ground thus giving ample warning of approach and then departing across open ground thus giving the TB the hint as to when its safe to come out again? And having done this walk by will almost certainly not be back for a week or so. So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.

These presence patrols serve at best to only marginally "secure the population" and then only for the time troops are physically there. That is probably why the use of Protected Villages has been made in the past.

Covert approach by presence patrols seems difficult given the openness of the terrain in general except for small teams which would hardly constitute a show of force. It was mentioned earlier that such a patrol could lie-up covertly nearby then suddenly "appear" in the village. Not sure the surprise value would be worth the effort certainly as the Taliban do not seem to walk about carrying weapons openly unless they are about to make war.

Lets go back to the mission then. To secure the population.

Given the circumstances on the ground there must surely be an effective way of doing this other than wandering around and "trolling for RPGs"... and IEDs?

Red Rat
06-03-2010, 08:23 AM
So the mission is to secure the population.

How do you achieve that with a one time pass of a village once a week/once a month having approached over open ground thus giving ample warning of approach and then departing across open ground thus giving the TB the hint as to when its safe to come out again? And having done this walk by will almost certainly not be back for a week or so. So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.

my understanding is that 'presence patrolling' per se (certainly in the British AO) is done frequently each day from locally sited FOBs. It is recognised that if you do not have a permanent presence on the ground then you cannot even begin to assert that you are securing the population.

RR

William F. Owen
06-03-2010, 08:59 AM
So the mission is to secure the population.
Some may say that. How sensible does that seem to you?

So the population in that village is secured for say 30mins? 60 mins? a few hours? ...then thrown to the dogs again. Every villager knows that come nightfall there will be no ISAF in the village and the Taliban can deal with anyone who has spoken to the troops.
Exactly. - which is why it is far smarter to question the strategy rather than the tactics.
The problem with the strategy maybe that it cannot be reasonably enabled by the tactics and limitation placed upon those tactics via the policy.

jcustis
06-03-2010, 11:22 AM
Some may say that. How sensible does that seem to you?

Exactly. - which is why it is far smarter to question the strategy rather than the tactics.
The problem with the strategy maybe that it cannot be reasonably enabled by the tactics and limitation placed upon those tactics via the policy.

Sooooo...does this pull back the curtain on your emphasis on counter-insurgent activity? Because pop-centric COIN cannot succeed due to the current limitations on coalition forces?

William F. Owen
06-03-2010, 12:04 PM
Sooooo...does this pull back the curtain on your emphasis on counter-insurgent activity? Because pop-centric COIN cannot succeed due to the current limitations on coalition forces?

Not aware there was a curtain! I thought I was pretty up front about it.
I actually think pop-centric COIN is just a dumb idea, regardless of the theatre force ratios.
IMO, in irregular warfare you should use armed force against what it can reasonably be applied against to further policy. IF you want to protect the Population, kill the bad guys. Otherwise leave the population the hell alone.

Ken White
06-03-2010, 04:22 PM
If you need to take a bunch of 'locals' along with the patrol to achieve the mission then the ISAF troops are more in a escort function with the 'locals' doing the real recce and/or communications patrols?If that's a question, then the answer is no. If it's one of your pat innuendo statements with a camouflaging interrogatory at the end, it's incorrect.
Why it is "not happening" is because 99% of the ISAF forces are unable to visually and/or verbally pick up meaningful intel on such a patrol.Basis for that opinionated statement is? Number obtained from what source?

I suspect some of the guys in ISAF with four or more tours in Afghanistan -- and there are a bunch -- would strongly dispute that opinion.
Further the weakness is that the interpretor is merely facilitating communication between the patrol leader and the local population.Obviously, you haven't worked in combat with an interpreter -- at least the way the US employs them. As I said, many of them have more combat experience than most, a few more than you and I combined and that experience is productively employed...
The patrol should in fact be escorting and supporting a one/two.three man team of Afghans (an intel team - call them what you may) who will be doing the talking and sussing out the situation in the village... and not some patrol leader from London, New York or wherever out in Afghanistan on a short tour.Gee, you think? Amazing concept. Brilliant. Why didn't we think of that? :rolleyes:

That's been happening for years -- and you seem blissfully unaware of that. As so many things...

Pete
06-03-2010, 09:15 PM
I wasn't in the infantry so I have little to add to this thread, except to say that this stuff ain't exactly new. From Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army, 1911, Corrected to July 31, 1918:


389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployment on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented.
390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus may suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hosstile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning.
391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.
The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.
A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable.

A later paragraph states, "To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense."

The pocket-sized book this is copied from was published by the Government Printing Office, Washington DC, price 35 cents, and is in the public domain.

Chris jM
06-04-2010, 01:39 AM
.I don't get hung up on these terms too much.

And you probably didn't need to. You could have changed the definitions to the ones I suggest and nothing on the ground would have changed - from what you have told me, it sounds like it was being done right from the word go.

However I am getting hung up on these terms as I've seen (hell, I've been part of the problem) presence patrols justifying inefficiencies bordering on stupidity. I'm loathe to make conclusions based on my experiences as I have not operated against a sophisticated OPFOR - the sharpened mango wars of the South East Pacific wasn't all that demanding - and I remain confident that, if the need drove my defence force, we would have picked our game up. It still doesn't satisfy me that 'presence' is a suitable term.

I myself have been guilty on using 'presence' as a crux for a lack of a tactical appreciation.

I accept that the label 'presence' isn't the root cause of poor patrolling. What it does do, in my opinion and in my experience, is shield incompetency and inefficiencies. Get rid of the presence label and some shortcomings would be revealed, allowing the real causes (training, proper campaign planning and the maintenance of mission command) to be properly rectified.

Chris jM
06-04-2010, 01:58 AM
The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Two points here:

1 - if I had to 'demonstrate dominance' it could be tactically applied as a clearing patrol, you could secure an area for a period, you could disrupt an enemy force from an area, you could deny a threat group access, etc etc. Which leads me to:

2 - If your not going to do it in mid to high intensity warfare, why then do it at the lower level as a doctrinal undertaking? If my service went into a mid-level conflict environment, the presence patrolling concept would not get hung up but would stay as baggage as that is what has been taught, practiced and reinforced. The lessons would be learnt quickly but that's not the point (or perhaps it is the point - if we can learn the lessons now, when men aren't losing lives, the better off we are). Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.



So armies in real wars conduct combat patrols to complete designated missions and reconnaissance patrols to insure they do not get surprised or to gather specific information for future action (that's why I say the 'presence' patrol should usually be and often is a reconnaissance patrol; it's also to avoid surprises and gather information for future action...).


Good point, I wish someone had explained it this way to me before.


It is also an opportunity to train and to gather information -- THAT is the purpose of the patrol and presence is simply a synergistic and beneficial effect.

I don't know if I'm arguing over or around you as I'm in agreement with 90% of what your saying. Yes, presence is synergistic and beneficial so why define your patrol by it's second-order effect? If it's a clearance patrol then clear - and if you need to be overt for reasons of 'presence' in order to do so inside the COIN environment, go ahead.



We now categorize patrols by intended function, combat or reconnaissance, that based on years of experience in major combat operations. You seem to want to categorize them by movement methodology. I'm not certain there's much benefit there. Probably not enough to rewrite most of the relevant manuals, doctrine and training materials in the west...:wry:

I like the 'overt/covert' classification but that's an armchair perspective with no supporting experience. I agree with your point made elsewhere that it may be tomatoes/tomatos - it's the same thing and you can call it what you want but doing it well is the problem.


My main point on presence patrolling remains, and I'm interested in the counter-views (what can I say, I'm a sucker for punishment :)).

Ken White
06-04-2010, 03:52 AM
If your not going to do it in mid to high intensity warfare, why then do it at the lower level as a doctrinal undertaking?Because it serves an important psychological function on the local populace and on the opposition in such conflicts. That benefit disappears in higher order conflicts.
If my service went into a mid-level conflict environment, the presence patrolling concept would not get hung up but would stay as baggage as that is what has been taught, practiced and reinforced. The lessons would be learnt quickly but that's not the point (or perhaps it is the point - if we can learn the lessons now, when men aren't losing lives, the better off we are).Very valid point, applies to the US also and it impugns senior people, not the troops. My belief is that most people will not succumb to that very human failure.
Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.I somewhat agree but, like Infanteer, think the terminology is mostly irrelevant (while acknowledging that there will be some that hang their hats on the issue...). A 'presence' patrol is mostly a reconnaissance that also serves, secondarily, the canine function of marking all the trees in your AO. :D
Yes, presence is synergistic and beneficial so why define your patrol by it's second-order effect? If it's a clearance patrol then clear - and if you need to be overt for reasons of 'presence' in order to do so inside the COIN environment, go ahead.Because Doctrine writers make misteaks? :D
...it's the same thing and you can call it what you want but doing it well is the problem.That's all that counts... :cool:

davidbfpo
06-04-2010, 07:29 AM
Moderator's Note

I have moved the last four posts to the UK & Afghanistan thread, where they should be and not here - a more general debate on presence patrolling. On that thread the posts are No's. 412-415. Hopefully this thread reads OK still.

Red Rat
06-04-2010, 03:29 PM
but I hope not:D The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

Pete
06-04-2010, 03:59 PM
Wilf often makes valid observations about the poor quality of writing in many current U.S. doctrinal publications. Without belaboring the point, the excerpt above from the U.S. Army Infantry Drill Regulations of 99 years ago is clear and to the point, contains no acronyms, and is written in the King's English. Publications that are easily understood are more useful than those that are not.

Infanteer
06-04-2010, 05:04 PM
Two points here:

1 - if I had to 'demonstrate dominance' it could be tactically applied as a clearing patrol, you could secure an area for a period, you could disrupt an enemy force from an area, you could deny a threat group access, etc etc. Which leads me to
....
Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.


To clear, to disrupt, and to deny all imply certain things that may or may not involve talking to locals (if they are present). If I send out a presence patrol and it doesn't talk to people (or isn't clearly visible), then it fails (re: no pee on the tree). I don't believe there is a mission task verb for "go talk to the locals". I'd guess another "doctrinal fit" would be contact patrols that seek to find and retain contact with an enemy force; but again, that has its own implications.

Just because it isn't in doctrine doesn't mean it isn't "real" - perhaps the doctrine guys are not up with the times. I have a feeling we are trying to squeeze 10 pounds of #### in a 5 pound bag here.

Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority. I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it. Presence patrols are likely required in conventional, "high-intensity" (I prefer "high-density") conflicts in the rear areas (think German-occupied Russia, Yugoslavia, and France).

slapout9
06-04-2010, 07:59 PM
I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it.

They certainly did. Before we had what are seen as modern police departments the Patrol function was performed by soldiers and to this day most police departments divided up their patrol sectors based upon the concept of how the Romans divided up their Military Districts, in the south many are still called patrol districts as opposed to beats or sectors or zones or precincts.

JMA
06-04-2010, 08:47 PM
but I hope not:D The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

There is only confusion because some here want there to appear to be confusion. In post #79 above I posted an extract from a US manual which clearly defined a presence patrol.

The definition does fit the wandering around in open areas as the aim is to show the locals that there is a military presence in the area. Thats all it achieves. Sadly the Taliban have got wise to the apparent ISAF addiction to being seen as busy little bees and maintaining a heavy patrol schedule (you know pins in the maps, long detailed SITREP of all the activity, impresses the hell out of the generals) and are using the IED tactic to great effect. But regardless ISAF keep on walking around and getting their soldiers killed. Does this presence patrolling contribute in any significant way in securing the population? Do you get get bang for the buck from it?

Some talk of displaying dominance through such patrols.

Tim Marshall of Sky TV had a recent TV report on a patrol with some Scots Bn who took 4 hours to patrol 2km. Not because they spent time talking to the locals but because the rate of advance was so slow because of the sweeping for IEDs. I can just imagine the locals and the Taliban watching and listening for the bangs and thinking how limited the movement ability of ISAF is due to the "brilliant" use of IEDs. Can't you see that by crawling along at snails pace you merely confirm that ISAF are not dominating the ground and prove to the locals how "clever" the Taliban really are and who is really in charge?

Let me share with you how much fun this "game" must be in the eyes of the Taliban.

Go back to late '70s. FRELIMO would carry ZANLA insurgents up to the border by vehicle, drop them off and wish them well. So pick a road route so used. Send in a few small teams. One creates a diversion which would lead to FRELIMO sending a few vehicles to check it out. One team lays a land mine on the approach route. When the vehicles pass the next team lay a mine to cover the return leg. Leading vehicle detonates mine. Second vehicle loads bodies and casualties and heads for home and guess what?

ISAF have got to go back to the aim, to secure the population, and rethink the strategy and the tactics.

JMA
06-04-2010, 08:54 PM
Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority. I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it. Presence patrols are likely required in conventional, "high-intensity" (I prefer "high-density") conflicts in the rear areas (think German-occupied Russia, Yugoslavia, and France).

Compared to the front line intensity the rear areas were certainly not "high-intensity" by any stretch of the imagination. A few partisans, a little sabotage... maybe.

We are not sure exactly what the Romans did are we? The ROE the Romans used would mean that the people either groveled or fled.

Chris jM
06-04-2010, 10:11 PM
I appreciate the thoughts that have gone into this topic, and don't want to flog the proverbial carcass.

I'll take another stab at pointing out my views but will also suggest that it may be time to 'agree to disagree'. Infanteer, you make valid points that I don't disagree with, however I just read the situation and circumstance differently. This could very well be down to different backgrounds in different armies - so be it. At the risk of getting stuck on permanent repeat, what I intend to be my final attempt at explaining my concerns -


The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

You have narrowed down some of my concerns. What is wrong with the term 'recce', 'fighting', 'standing' etc that we need to introduce 'presence' patrolling as a key conceptual framework to our patrol planning and execution?


To clear, to disrupt, and to deny all imply certain things that may or may not involve talking to locals (if they are present). If I send out a presence patrol and it doesn't talk to people (or isn't clearly visible), then it fails (re: no pee on the tree). I don't believe there is a mission task verb for "go talk to the locals". I'd guess another "doctrinal fit" would be contact patrols that seek to find and retain contact with an enemy force; but again, that has its own implications.

Again, in agreement. I think the continued debate here is coming from the fact that we are using the same words with different meanings. Stay with me Infanteer, what I am saying is simply:

- Patrolling to 'talk to locals' is a way we achieve a tactical task.

- Patrolling to provide an overt presence in the eyes of the locals is the way we achieve a tactical task.

- Neither of the above should be misconstrued as the tactical task in itself, though.

If we want to dominate an area, provide the local populace with the belief that 'we' are the omni-present all-powerful force of good, if we want to 'mark the tree' metaphorically, we have to break down these tasks to achievable tactical tasks that patrolling can accomplish. The whole 'domination' is a second-order effect that is a legitimate end-state for campaigning, but needs to be broken down into a number of tactical tasks to achieve that aim. Clear the main traffic routes in and out, guard the market place, deny threat groups the ability to move around the population, reinforce a local police checkpoint, secure a key govt building ---> these are all legitimate tactical tasks that can contribute to the 'dominate' concept. Each one of these may use the presence of friendly forces as a key enabler to achieve the tactical effect, but my key point is that presence patrolling is not a tactical task to be undertaken. 'Presence' may describe how we do it and imperfectly describes 'why' we do it, but in itself it is too imperfect a task and too open to poor usage that it doesn't help us.

I've spoken before about the 'presence' concept being too easily corrupted to justify poor and inefficient practices, and I'd just reinforce that idea here.



Just because it isn't in doctrine doesn't mean it isn't "real" - perhaps the doctrine guys are not up with the times. I have a feeling we are trying to squeeze 10 pounds of #### in a 5 pound bag here.


You might be right. If so, we can agree to disagree here - I think it is a small technical point but in my area of the world I genuinely think that it having detrimental effects on the preparation and employment of military forces. As such I am jumping on a pedestal for my 15 minutes of infamy!


Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority.
So is aerial superiority, but you don't task a single flight to conduct an 'aerial superiority' patrol, do you? As a transient effect you have to break it down into a series of barrage/ combat air patrols, interdiction patrols, SEAD tasks, EW tasks, etc etc. No problems with the legitimacy of 'presence' in military tasks, I just don't see it a valid or useful task verb, descriptor or modus operandi to be used with a tactical patrol.

In a hypothetical scenario to illustrate my point, you and I are 2 platoon commanders in a similar area. We both get our tasks and see that 'presence' is the key task that has been given to us. As you have described above, your approach sees you hit the key population centers and mark your territory. Down the road, I'm taking the identical instructions and intent of 'presence' but applying it poorly as I'm a bit of a moron. Instead of doing the good ideas your enacting I walk in and out of a market place, have a bit of a friendly wave, then sit off to another side of the village and man a VCP. Being a key route in I think great - we are providing a presence. Some of my sections conduct independent tasks and, due to a number of factors such as poor motivation, poor training and a general lack of grey matter up top, their 'presence' task is quickly fulfilled by what amounts to a quick walk-in walk-out/ we're still here kinda stuff and then they knock all patrolling on the head mid-morning and RTB for scones and earl grey. They also poked their head into the local police checkpoint to let them know we are still alive, but that was pretty much it. Presence achieved, but the effect is poor.

Had either my hypothetical Company orders or had I been smarter and shrugged off the 'presence' patrolling construct, I think a lot more could have been achieved in this situations. A mission appreciation would have come up with a few tasks, using legitimate tactical task verbs such as clear and secure. Intel would have still be gained through an overt patrolling posture but the short-term goals would have been far clearer, easy to plan for and easier to achieve - thus focussing my patrolling and making us more effective a force. I also see tactical tasks enabling mission command and decentralized command and control far better than 'presence' does as you can let your patrols know what effect it is your after, and co-ordinate/ synchronise efforts better.

I'm not trying to be condescending here Infanteer, but rather explain my perspective. Agree/ disagreements aside, do you at least understand what I am trying to say and why?


There is only confusion because some here want there to appear to be confusion.

I wouldn't completely agree... confusion there is, but keep in mind that everyone here has _massively_ different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives on the same issue.


The definition does fit the wandering around in open areas as the aim is to show the locals that there is a military presence in the area. Thats all it achieves.

In my view (I've bored everyone with it enough above, so excuse my brevity in expanding upon it here) it also justifies/ excuses/ protects the inefficient 'wandering around' of military elements.

I've reread the definition your provided in post #79, and it continues to be valid to the discussion.


A presence patrol['s]... primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO... Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent.

I agree with this doctrinal definition, but still hold true to the belief that viewing ones patrol as a 'presence' one isn't following the best practice available. The concept of 'presence' is best achieved by following the more doctrinally applicable tactical tasks to the operational situation at hand.

Ken White
06-04-2010, 10:49 PM
What is wrong with the term 'recce', 'fighting', 'standing' etc that we need to introduce 'presence' patrolling as a key conceptual framework to our patrol planning and execution?The US doesn't use 'standing' patrols. I'll trade our 'presence' for your 'standing'... ;)
I've spoken before about the 'presence' concept being too easily corrupted to justify poor and inefficient practices, and I'd just reinforce that idea here.Yes, and I agreed but isn't that really a training, education and the well worn leadership problem?
I'm not trying to be condescending here Infanteer, but rather explain my perspective. Agree/ disagreements aside, do you at least understand what I am trying to say and why?I hope he does, though I must confess I do not. :confused:
I wouldn't completely agree... confusion there is, but keep in mind that everyone here has _massively_ different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives on the same issue.I agree with that and in conjunction with the preceding lack of understanding on my part, I was conducting 'presence' patrols before the US doctrine writers coined the term. Long before. Those patrols were recon or combat patrols which managed to provide 'presence.' Nothing changed with the adoption of a new term.
In my view (I've bored everyone with it enough above, so excuse my brevity in expanding upon it here) it also justifies/ excuses/ protects the inefficient 'wandering around' of military elements.That is IMO emphatically an education, training and leadership problem, not a semantic one...
"A presence patrol['s]... primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO... Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent."

I agree with this doctrinal definition, but still hold true to the belief that viewing ones patrol as a 'presence' one isn't following the best practice available. The concept of 'presence' is best achieved by following the more doctrinally applicable tactical tasks to the operational situation at hand.Emphasis added above by me. It's a recon patrol; while you're out, you're showing the flag. Armies have been doing that for thousands of years. It works. If it's misused, fire the responsible leader -- or better train him or her...

Pete
06-05-2010, 01:12 AM
Why try to put a limit on the number of purposes for which a patrol might be conducted? According to the Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of the Army of the United States, 1917,
The designation of a patrol indicates the nature of the duty for which it is detailed, as, for example, visiting, reconnoitring, exploring, flanking, combat, harassing, pursuing, etc. The main thing to be avoided is complicating doctrine by coming up with different procedures for each type.

Chris jM
06-05-2010, 02:05 AM
I hope he does, though I must confess I do not. :confused:

Evidently the failings in articulation and argument are my own, then.

I feel that my objections are becoming increasingly theoretical and abstract, and thus of minimal utility to anyone, myself included. What I can agree with is that, in the words of Ken White, this is "emphatically an education, training and leadership problem, not a semantic one" and I am, undeniably, focussed solely on semantics here.

Stepping back from my disagreements in classification and typification tidies things up. All my concerns would be answered and solved if the 'education, training and leadership' flaws that give form to poor patrolling - 'standing' or otherwise :D - thus probably hinting to me that my argument is getting too far into abstracted weeds.

This would also, as Pete put it, avoid 'complicating doctrine' or anything else unnecessarily, which I am certainly not advocating but unfortunately seem to be doing. :wry:

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 06:35 AM
I've reread the definition your provided in post #79, and it continues to be valid to the discussion.

From the JMA Quote's.

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.
OK? How is this relevant to current OPs? I submit, it is not. A'Stan is certainly neither.

Tim Marshall of Sky TV had a recent TV report on a patrol with some Scots Bn who took 4 hours to patrol 2km. Not because they spent time talking to the locals but because the rate of advance was so slow because of the sweeping for IEDs.
If you do not understand why a Patrol may be tasked with recovering, and/or clearing IEDs, or conducting a similar activity in support of other patrols, and/or activity, then I'll leave it to Red Rat's seemingly inexhaustible patience to walk the OPSEC line and explain it to you.

Chris jM
06-05-2010, 07:22 AM
From the JMA Quote's.

[9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.]

OK? How is this relevant to current OPs? I submit, it is not. A'Stan is certainly neither.


Because, like it or not, perfectly or imperfectly, the military is filling an important capability gap in the Afghani security situation.

There is no expeditionary constabulary or indigenous forces to do the lower-end policing to a satisfactory standard in opposition to the Taliban and, in that void, the strategy and policy from governments is that the military is to pick up the task.

This may be our own doing through poor planning, mission creep or a combination of all the above with the addition of poor policy. However, I think you are amiss to say that it is irrelevant to current operations. Undesirable, perhaps, but not irrelevant. The military has been tasked and we have to deliver.

If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 07:47 AM
If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?
Are we? Patrolling does mean being present. There is both benefit and risk associated with that (security v activity). That is the art part. Making that judgement. The term "presence patrols" teeters on the moronic, and it seems to appear in one obscure US manual.

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.
It may be those things at some time in some places.
If you find yourself writing down Apache Close Air Support Frequency and have a JFAC tagging along, then I submit the words "stability" and "civil support" do not need to be used.
If you find yourself standing outside a shop in Antrim, while an RUC officers buys more cigarettes, then things will be slightly different again. Context, context and context.
To quote my wife, "You don't ride your donkey on the highway."

JMA
06-05-2010, 10:19 AM
Because, like it or not, perfectly or imperfectly, the military is filling an important capability gap in the Afghani security situation.

There is no expeditionary constabulary or indigenous forces to do the lower-end policing to a satisfactory standard in opposition to the Taliban and, in that void, the strategy and policy from governments is that the military is to pick up the task.

This may be our own doing through poor planning, mission creep or a combination of all the above with the addition of poor policy. However, I think you are amiss to say that it is irrelevant to current operations. Undesirable, perhaps, but not irrelevant. The military has been tasked and we have to deliver.

If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.

Nail on the head again Chris.

I suggest that the question be asked as to why this virtual peacekeeping activity - presence patrols has assumed such importance is that the ISAF forces are fresh out of ideas.

The (US) doctrine is clear and for as long as the term presence patrols are used this fruitless activity can be measured against the laid down definition.

This is pertinent: (see more in post #79 above)
"9-138. The commander always plans for the possibility that a presence patrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent. Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol where enemy contact is likely. Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operations such as peace operations, humanitarian and civic assistance, non-combatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending out a presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader."

I anticipate that this tread will become drowned in the semantics of what a presence patrol is or isn't. I suggest therefore that in order to avoid that one discusses the suitability of the current patrolling tactics as applied (certainly in Helmand).

One needs to go back to the aim (the selection and maintenance of the aim used to be the first principle of war, and if it isn't it is not hard to see where things started to go wrong) and that appears to have been to secure the population.

Essential background reading to see where things went wrong in Helmand to the point where now some monster called presence patrols has become the order of the day.

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf)
Anthony King

The problem began with the 'penny packeting' of troops into first platoon houses and then into FOBs then the doctrine kicked in where commanders believed they needed to aggressively dominate the AO.

Now put the following ingredients together in a mix and what you get is a presence patrol.

* Have troops will/must patrol - get the troops out of base.
* Terrain too open for the soldier's skills set to operate in a covert/clandestine manner.
* Should be securing the population - so visit every village once a week and secure it for an hour.
* Want to be seen to be dominant - when the Taliban see us coming they move out of the way (or take a few long range pot shots at us).
* Have no intel - must get some so we will talk to the population (if they will talk to us).
* Have no credible Afghan military or police presence to share the work load.
* Have 6 months to make an impact - make a name for oneself, earn a medal, kill some gooks.

Quite a witches brew you will admit.

The basic soldier cannot be blamed for the tactical incompetence that manifests itself in sending out these presence patrols or indeed what passes for patrolling activity.

It seems the quote from a Royal Marine back in 2008 about ‘failed to clear,
fail to hold and failed to build’ (See Anthony King pg 8) still holds good for operations today.

Call it what you will a presence patrol or any other name and you will never work in its current form in areas where their is a high risk of making contact with the Taliban (or rather the Taliban making contact with you).

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 10:52 AM
JMA
Please tell "us" how it's done. Please detail specific solutions. Specifically,

a.) You say FOBs are a mistake. What's the alternatives?
b.) You say patrol "tactics" are wrong. Specifically, what is wrong and what are the solutions?
c.) Add as much operational context as possible, based on your knowledge of the theatre.

JMA
06-05-2010, 11:18 AM
If you do not understand why a Patrol may be tasked with recovering, and/or clearing IEDs, or conducting a similar activity in support of other patrols, and/or activity, then I'll leave it to Red Rat's seemingly inexhaustible patience to walk the OPSEC line and explain it to you.

I was being very specific about Tim Marshall's TV reporting out of Helmand. This was a wandering around type of patrol and nothing to do with clearing IEDs.

See for yourself here (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Afghanistan-Daily-Risks-On-Patrol-In-Helmand-Province-Sky-Joins-Soldiers-From-C-Company-1-Scots/Article/201005415640824?lpos=World_News_Article_Related_Co ntent_Region_2&lid=ARTICLE_15640824_Afghanistan:_Daily_Risks_On_P atrol_In_Helmand_Province,_Sky_Joins_Soldiers_From _C_Company_1_Scots)

Very clearly this was a patrol from one base to the next and back again.
(Sounds a bit like the Grand Old Duke of York, yes? - For our US friends the background to this can be found here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Grand_Old_Duke_of_York).)

What makes this whole situation so much more sad is the following quote from Tim Marshall:


One NCO (non-commissioned officer) told me his fears were not when he was patrolling, but the night before, when he was planning the route and thinking: "Are these the right decisions to keep the guys safe?

So its safety first? Or are we out there to show the Taliban and the locals whose the boss?

Quote again:
For the 1 Scots men, halfway through their six-month tour of duty, it was routine. They do it day in, day out, seven days a week, and they take it one day at a time.

The system is broken... fix it... or get the troops out.

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 02:34 PM
I was being very specific about Tim Marshall's TV reporting out of Helmand. This was a wandering around type of patrol and nothing to do with clearing IEDs.
The reason for the patrol was never given. To those of us with even a miniscule understanding of the subject, there are many sound reasons for mounting such a patrol. Base plate check? A walk through to position the patrol in support of another action? Do not know. We were never told.

That you do not understand what you are seeing, does not support your theory about "wandering around type of patrols", and if you look carefully, you will see them sweeping for IEDs.

Still curious as to your insights as to how you would do everything better.

davidbfpo
06-05-2010, 04:48 PM
I opened this thread months ago, as the issue of presence patrolling appeared on another thread and as an "armchair" observer have kept out of the debate.

I am mindful that non-military posters, even those with historical experience are hampered in commenting upon practical presence patrolling for such reasons as OPSEC and relying on open sources.

This thread has once again focussed on the UK campaign in Afghanistan, when there is a separate thread. IMHO as a patient moderator that is where many of the recent posts belong. I have not moved these recent posts.

Chris jM
06-06-2010, 07:55 AM
The term "presence patrols" teeters on the moronic, and it seems to appear in one obscure US manual.

This is the point I have been grasping for all along but still struggle to realise and articulate clearly. I have no problems with patrolling, nor with presence patrolling. I just have concerns with presence patrolling being raised as an objective to be attained or a task to be conducted.


It may be those things at some time in some places.
If you find yourself writing down Apache Close Air Support Frequency and have a JFAC tagging along, then I submit the words "stability" and "civil support" do not need to be used.
If you find yourself standing outside a shop in Antrim, while an RUC officers buys more cigarettes, then things will be slightly different again. Context, context and context.

Absolutely. However at some point we have to hang our hats on generalisations in order to create and enact solutions and an organisational response. Context is everything, agreed - we need to understand the problem as it stands and not fight 'the war we want to fight'. If applying the prism of COIN or SASO to parts of Afghanistan assist us in creating and enacting workable campaign plans then it's worthwhile.


To quote my wife, "You don't ride your donkey on the highway."

I don't want to get in an argument with Mrs Owen, but she obviously hasn't been to Afghanistan. There, they do indeed ride donkeys on their highways! And camels, and horses, and weird goat/sheep hybrid things come to think of it! :D


Nail on the head again Chris.

I suggest that the question be asked as to why this virtual peacekeeping activity - presence patrols has assumed such importance is that the ISAF forces are fresh out of ideas...

Essential background reading to see where things went wrong in Helmand to the point where now some monster called presence patrols has become the order of the day.

We may be in agreement in part, however I can't agree with your conclusions as a whole. Staying with the presence patrol issue:

I see presence patrolling as a correct course of action borne out of an improper/ imperfect understanding of the subject. Thus I see it as dangerous as, if we are doing the right thing for the wrong reason, we may try it elsewhere and get it wrong because we didn't understand why we did it in the first place. If we understand why we do it and why it works, we will have more success in future knowing when and where to employ the correct patrolling TTPs.

Your perspective, as I read it, is that presence patrolling is an incorrect course of action borne out of an incorrect understanding of the subject at hand.

William F. Owen
06-06-2010, 08:21 AM
Context is everything, agreed - we need to understand the problem as it stands and not fight 'the war we want to fight'. If applying the prism of COIN or SASO to parts of Afghanistan assist us in creating and enacting workable campaign plans then it's worthwhile.
The problem then is training and doctrine, crippled by poor vocabulary and definitions. Get that sorted out and all else follows. The current problems are far more to do with "The Strategy" - than the "tactics." Patrol Operations have to ensure that the Strategy is delivered by the tactics.

I don't want to get in an argument with Mrs Owen, but she obviously hasn't been to Afghanistan. There, they do indeed ride donkeys on their highways! And camels, and horses, and weird goat/sheep hybrid things come to think of it! :D
Well aware. By "Highway" my wife means "motorway" or "Interstate." Having said that, I cannot actually ride a donkey, but she can. :eek:

JMA
06-06-2010, 03:17 PM
It appears that there is no agreement on what a presence patrol is.

There is but one definition available, a US one, which does not seem to fit what is happening on the ground.

It may be more productive to discuss patrolling methodology and the success or otherwise in a new thread. This would, however, be counter productive if there is no stomach for robust discussion on the issue.

Infanteer
06-06-2010, 04:03 PM
Okay - to start.

Patrol is going to do something without the intention of staying.

Anyone have anything more simple than that?

William F. Owen
06-06-2010, 04:14 PM
Very happy to discuss generic "Patrol Operations," but we have better give it a pretty sensible context, or else it just becomes a collection of "tips and tricks."

Rex Brynen
06-22-2010, 05:56 PM
This caught my eye, from the Rolling Stones piece on McChrystal (http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236?RS_show_page=4):


One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.

Go to it, JMA :D

JMA
06-22-2010, 06:18 PM
This caught my eye, from the Rolling Stones piece on McChrystal (http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236?RS_show_page=4):

Go to it, JMA :D

Rex, this Rolling Stone article might just herald the end of McChrystal. Big news over here on in the UK (via satellite TV) and on CNN. On the carpet tomorrow I believe.

Just when we needed stability.

William F. Owen
06-23-2010, 05:00 AM
One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.
Wow.... who knew doing stupid stuff was ... well stupid. Welcome to the flow down effects of wooly thinking.

Infanteer
06-23-2010, 05:32 AM
One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminated card reads.

To paraphrase - give a region to the enemy if he contests it.

This seems to take counter-insurgency junk theory to its limit. Military direction like this seems to rely on some sort of deus ex machina to solve the problem of militant irregulars.

I know COP JFM and the area very well. You can't leave the door there without moving into an area that would require defence using lethal force. Thus, to follow this directive, they would have to withdraw from the area.

JMA
06-23-2010, 01:36 PM
To paraphrase - give a region to the enemy if he contests it.

This seems to take counter-insurgency junk theory to its limit. Military direction like this seems to rely on some sort of deus ex machina to solve the problem of militant irregulars.

Junk theory? I can't understand what the difficulty in understanding is. What phase of insurgency would you class Afghanistan? The strategy and tactics needed are to combat guerrilla warfare. Not rocket science if you have the resources, (manpower and funding).


I know COP JFM and the area very well. You can't leave the door there without moving into an area that would require defence using lethal force. Thus, to follow this directive, they would have to withdraw from the area.

Maybe that's the best option. I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified. So yes under these circumstances better to withdraw from the area.

Now take Helmand and figure out where the troops should be. Where is the vital ground (VG)? Which is the ground of tactical importance (GTI)? Question answered. Oh yes... and get rid of the poppies... all of the poppies!

Ken White
06-23-2010, 02:32 PM
...Not rocket science if you have the resources, (manpower and funding).are known and shared by the troops that are there and have been there. Unfortunately, they are severely constrained by Politicians and policy makers on those two major issues you cite as well as on the rules they must follow. That and the very significant terrain difference which you also tend to ignore lead to some odd conclusions on your part. For example:
I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified.What's classified? I get several e-mails a day from a US DoD automated system that gives me the daily casualty reports. Anyone in the US can sign up for it, don't know about overseas. While the opponents have an obvious desire and need to conceal their losses and while truly accurate data on those losses is difficult to obtain, the news media have numerous tales, some specious but a thread is detectable -- they get pounded pretty heavily in most contacts.

Then there are these: LINK (http://www.icasualties.org/oef/). LINK (http://www.sipri.org/blogs/Afghanistan/taliban-201cissue-battle-damage-casualties-list-201c-inflicted-on-nato-isaf),and you can sort through these LINKS (http://www.google.com/search?q=Taliban+casualties&hl=en&client=firefox-a&hs=dSR&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:Official&prmd=niv&ei=HBgiTKuTC4XGlQeh6unSAQ&start=10&sa=N). It might aid the discussion if you were to do your own research and avoid asking leading questions in what appear to generally be an attempt to imply malfeasance or worse on the part of westerners in Afghanistan. If you believe 'we' shouldn't be there, then you and I can agree -- unfortunately, 'we' are there. That's reality. So is the fact that the combat effort there is severely constrained on political grounds. I don't agree with that either but it is not going to change.
So yes under these circumstances better to withdraw from the area.Sometimes can sometimes not for both tactical and political reasons.
Where is the vital ground (VG)? Which is the ground of tactical importance (GTI)? Question answered.Is it the right question? Given the lack of adequate troop strength, given the nature of the conflict and given the terrain involved, I think not. I agree with your contention that the basics are very important -- but that's a little too basic...

There's more to it than terrain
Oh yes... and get rid of the poppies... all of the poppies!Far easier said than done.

JMA
06-24-2010, 09:39 AM
are known and shared by the troops that are there and have been there. Unfortunately, they are severely constrained by Politicians and policy makers on those two major issues you cite as well as on the rules they must follow. That and the very significant terrain difference which you also tend to ignore lead to some odd conclusions on your part.

I ignore terrain? You got the wrong guy Ken.

I maintain the more time spent in-country the better the understanding of the terrain, the climate, the people and their culture etc etc. In other words continuity.


For example:What's classified? I get several e-mails a day from a US DoD automated system that gives me the daily casualty reports. Anyone in the US can sign up for it, don't know about overseas. While the opponents have an obvious desire and need to conceal their losses and while truly accurate data on those losses is difficult to obtain, the news media have numerous tales, some specious but a thread is detectable -- they get pounded pretty heavily in most contacts.

ISAF force causalities are not classified I know that andi suppose they are close to being 100% accurate.

It is the Taliban casualties that I talking about. What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released.


It might aid the discussion if you were to do your own research and avoid asking leading questions in what appear to generally be an attempt to imply malfeasance or worse on the part of westerners in Afghanistan.

It is natural that where the facts are embarrassing these facts would not be released. We might even hear that they don't want to release Taliban casualties to avoid alarming the Muslim world. I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.


If you believe 'we' shouldn't be there, then you and I can agree -- unfortunately, 'we' are there. That's reality. So is the fact that the combat effort there is severely constrained on political grounds. I don't agree with that either but it is not going to change.Sometimes can sometimes not for both tactical and political reasons.Is it the right question? Given the lack of adequate troop strength, given the nature of the conflict and given the terrain involved, I think not. I agree with your contention that the basics are very important -- but that's a little too basic...

There's more to it than terrain. Far easier said than done.

War is never easy, but may become impossible to conduct under a certain level of political restraints. When that point is reached the lives of soldiers are being meaninglessly squandered.

However, I don't see all the tactical issues on the ground being all as a result of the political issues. You yourself have commented on a photo where the most basic tactics are appalling. This more widespread than one would like to admit.

As far as the poppies are concerned I find it quite frankly hilarious that the US is arguing to allow the locals to grow a crop which when processed will kill many thousands of western kids. Actually its not hilarious, its damn sad.

You need to give these relics from the stone age the message that by growing this you are killing our children. If you attempt to carry on you will see what you will see... (no one has the balls to deal with that have they?)

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 09:58 AM
I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.
Again, you are just out of touch with the subject and/or poorly informed. Back in January I spoke at a UK School of Infantry seminar, where figures of Taliban KIA were openly discussed. Ratios >100:1 were mentioned, based on theatre experience. The issues remain around verification - go and read the "body count" thread.

This more widespread than one would like to admit.
How do you know, and are you actually well informed enough to pass comment?

Red Rat
06-24-2010, 01:42 PM
I hear the same ratios as Wilf (unsurprisingly!).

There is an issue over verification. There are also issues in terms of campaign ethos, presentational and political issues and security over putting out a body count:


1) It smacks of Vietnam and measuring success in terms of body count. we may argue over the good/not so good ways of pursuing a COIN campaign, but in this campaign I understand that HQ ISAF do not regard a body count metric as very useful measure of success and so it is not publicised. I am not sure what HQ ISAF is currently using as a metric of success, but I suspect they would rather focus on areas where there is little violence.

2) Anything that smacks of likening this campaign to Vietnam presents huge political challenges to the domestic audience in a campagin that is increasingly seen as unwinnable.

3) publication of a large body count may have the same impact as the attack on the US embassy in the Tet offensive had on US public opinion or the CIMIC House saga had on UK public opinion. what was seen as a campaign under control was seen in both instances (rightly or wrongly) as a campaign out of control.

4) While verification is difficult on a security side we do not want the other side to know what we know. Also we do not want to upset worldwide sensibilities and start a surge of would be shaheed coming to Afghanistan.
I would be surprised if UNAMA and ANSO do not publish estimated figures, certainly I know of several security consultancies who track these metrics and will release them - for a sum!

Infanteer
06-24-2010, 01:46 PM
Judging by the Afghan's ability to police up the battlefield, I'd be hesitant to accept any claim at a body count.

JMA
06-24-2010, 01:53 PM
Again, you are just out of touch with the subject and/or poorly informed. Back in January I spoke at a UK School of Infantry seminar, where figures of Taliban KIA were openly discussed. Ratios >100:1 were mentioned, based on theatre experience. The issues remain around verification - go and read the "body count" thread.

How do you know, and are you actually well informed enough to pass comment?

Mentioned or verified?

Read and participated in the 'Body Counts and Metrics' thread nothing mentioned as to specifics of the Taliban KIA, captured etc. Wonder why?

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 02:00 PM
Mentioned or verified?

Read and participated in the 'Body Counts and Metrics' thread nothing mentioned as to specifics of the Taliban KIA, captured etc. Wonder why?
As I said, "mentioned." - see Red Rats post. As I said, "verification" remains an issue. If you do not have verification procedures in place, then you are dependant on estimates.

Ken White
06-24-2010, 02:10 PM
I ignore terrain? You got the wrong guy Ken.Not at all. You consistently go on about 'open ground.' What you say makes sense at platoon level in a location with mixed vegetation. It cannot apply in Afghanistan on the operational level due to the vast stretches of open terrain that must be used or crossed to get from one place to another.
...In other words continuity.All true -- also not possible as you couch it for a variety of reasons, mostly UK/US/Other western nation domestic political.
It is the Taliban casualties that I talking about. What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released.How can it be released if it is not known. Estimates could be released but the forces are leery of releasing an estimate that some media source disproves or challenges in a war that is essentially and effectively a media or information war. You also appear to discount the US' bad experience with the Viet Nam body count. The number killed actually proves little in any event.
I believe that we can safely say that the facts are just too bad to be made public.Unsurprising. You have a number of strange 'beliefs.' Other disagree. You also make use of 'we' a great bit. Not a good idea to include others in arguable comments because as a reader on this board, I become a a part of that 'we' and I think that's a very specious statement. So 'we' cannot say that at all.
War is never easy, but may become impossible to conduct under a certain level of political restraints. When that point is reached the lives of soldiers are being meaninglessly squandered.Brilliant statement!!! Great insight. We can all agree with that. I strongly doubt anyone on this board disagrees with that. Umm, good. Now, what do you propose we do about it?

You might also recall that a number of folks here agree with that but are still serving and have no choice but to go to the squandering in Afghanistan, that they do so without complaint and wonder why you -- who have not gone and are not going -- continually carp and complain to no effect about things neither they or you can change. Most of your complaints, some of which are valid, are with the political direction of this war. Few of those directing it will read anything here and the likelihood of any that do paying you much mind is quite slim. So all you often do is penalize others on the board and wrongly charge them with malfeasance or incompetence all too often. Thus, if your intent is to be a gadfly in the principal definition of the term, you're succeeding.
...You yourself have commented on a photo where the most basic tactics are appalling. This more widespread than one would like to admit.Huh. Sure. I commented on it and have repeatedly done so, yet one doesn't like to admit it? Your statement contradicts itself, a not unheard of phenomenon. :rolleyes:
As far as the poppies are concerned I find it quite frankly hilarious that the US is arguing to allow the locals to grow a crop which when processed will kill many thousands of western kids. Actually its not hilarious, its damn sad.What is hilarious is your continuing mis or disinformation. The basic problem is that we could easily eradicate the poppies but that leaves more farmers without a viable crop and the environmental impact would be long lasting. There is on going discussion here about the policy, many here are as unhappy as you and the DEA who were scuffing up big dealers and labs is still pressing on. Policy is in flux; this a a US domestic political battle between left and right. The US is a center right nation, the current Administration is center left. Things change, we'll see how long the 'allow the farmers to grow Poppies' bit lasts.
You need to give these relics from the stone age the message that by growing this you are killing our children. If you attempt to carry on you will see what you will see... (no one has the balls to deal with that have they?)Uh, no, no one apparently does in this day and age -- except for random marginally informed posters on discussion boards who have seem to have a collection of gripes and sour grapes but no responsibility for actually doing anything.

JMA
06-25-2010, 12:26 PM
I hear the same ratios as Wilf (unsurprisingly!).

There is an issue over verification. There are also issues in terms of campaign ethos, presentational and political issues and security over putting out a body count:


1) It smacks of Vietnam and measuring success in terms of body count. we may argue over the good/not so good ways of pursuing a COIN campaign, but in this campaign I understand that HQ ISAF do not regard a body count metric as very useful measure of success and so it is not publicised. I am not sure what HQ ISAF is currently using as a metric of success, but I suspect they would rather focus on areas where there is little violence.

2) Anything that smacks of likening this campaign to Vietnam presents huge political challenges to the domestic audience in a campagin that is increasingly seen as unwinnable.

3) publication of a large body count may have the same impact as the attack on the US embassy in the Tet offensive had on US public opinion or the CIMIC House saga had on UK public opinion. what was seen as a campaign under control was seen in both instances (rightly or wrongly) as a campaign out of control.

4) While verification is difficult on a security side we do not want the other side to know what we know. Also we do not want to upset worldwide sensibilities and start a surge of would be shaheed coming to Afghanistan.
I would be surprised if UNAMA and ANSO do not publish estimated figures, certainly I know of several security consultancies who track these metrics and will release them - for a sum!

Good reply (I'm guessing you must have done some time at the MoD or Foreign office? ;)

Found this Request for Information (http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/32337/response/80773/attach/html/4/20100414%20FOI%20TB%20Fatalities%20U.doc.html) on the Net.

Sadly in this reply the MoD are trying to sell a line of crap when they say "There is also no reliable method to calculate the number of insurgents killed."

There is... you physically count the bodies and the weapons and if you have put in an airstrike you count heads and weapon barrels. Then you can verify 10 bodies and say 9 weapons (and then leave it to others to speculate what the 10th guy was doing there.) Body plus weapon = one gook. Verified by mark-one eyeball.

But... say you come under fire from an estimated 10 gooks from a tree line 300m away and call in an airstrike. The airstrike silences the firing but you don't sweep through and clear the area then YES you would have no idea of how many kills if any.

So what are we saying here? The actually verifiable kills may not be as good as some would like?

JMA
06-25-2010, 12:34 PM
As I said, "mentioned." - see Red Rats post. As I said, "verification" remains an issue. If you do not have verification procedures in place, then you are dependant on estimates.

Nonsense, absolute nonsense.

Why are you trying to sell me this line of c***? I know how to verify the kills, you count them. Only actuals, no estimates.

On the big externals they ran an air photo sortie (where possible) and then left it to the photo interp boys to count the bodies. Only count what you see.

Then of course we used radio intercepts of their reports to confirm our numbers which were always higher than what we counted. So that filled the gap between kills verified by mark one eye-ball and actual. No estimates needed.

Why should it be different there?

Ken White
06-25-2010, 01:32 PM
you count them. Only actuals, no estimates...Why should it be different there?in Viet Nam at a cost in time and effort only to find out the hard way -- as did you in Rhodesia -- that it didn't make an ounce of difference in the outcome.

So why bother.

William F. Owen
06-25-2010, 01:41 PM
Why are you trying to sell me this line of c***? I know how to verify the kills, you count them. Only actuals, no estimates.
I'm not trying sell you anything.
Both "verified" - by what ever means = "Recovery" AND "Estimates" also have value = IMINT/SIGINT/Witness statements, ground sign, "all sources."

Again, I cannot see your point. You opined/implied Loss-exchange-ratios favoured the Taliban - on the basis of no evidence - as with most of your comments.

Infanteer
06-25-2010, 10:27 PM
At the risk of wandering off topic, I have videos of engagements of insurgents by our LAVs where you see the bad guy turned into fine pink mist but when the troops cleared through the area for BDA, they found a few blood splotches. As easy as it may be to say "just count the bodies" it is very hard to do with insurgents such as the Pashtun who police the battlefield in such a detailed and rapid manner.

Heard a story of an IDF specialist that was taken out with A-10s. They had to basically put two Kiowa's on the body until a BDA assessment could recover the body lest the locals police the scene.

JMA
06-26-2010, 07:05 AM
in Viet Nam at a cost in time and effort only to find out the hard way -- as did you in Rhodesia -- that it didn't make an ounce of difference in the outcome.

So why bother.

Because certainly we collected and then either took with us or destroyed in situ any weapons and war materials that were found in the contact area. And believe it or not we quite often found some valuable (Intel) documents in the pocets and kit of the leaders. So while doing this why not count (verify) the kills?

JMA
06-26-2010, 07:31 AM
At the risk of wandering off topic, I have videos of engagements of insurgents by our LAVs where you see the bad guy turned into fine pink mist but when the troops cleared through the area for BDA, they found a few blood splotches. As easy as it may be to say "just count the bodies" it is very hard to do with insurgents such as the Pashtun who police the battlefield in such a detailed and rapid manner.

Heard a story of an IDF specialist that was taken out with A-10s. They had to basically put two Kiowa's on the body until a BDA assessment could recover the body lest the locals police the scene.

You cont the bodies or the body parts. Simple, yes.

Now if you have a video of a gook being converted to gases at a rate of 3,000m/s then that is verified proof of a kill, yes?

What I'm saying is that (probably) the vast majority of kills can be verified by a physical count. The odd other one you can't find any trace of then you don't claim as a verified kill, pretty simple stuff.

It seems the Brits are talking about a kill ratio of 1 (of theirs) to 100 (Taliban).
So with 300 Brit KIA that would be 30,000 Taliban kills. Can't see it, sorry.

What do you mean police the battlefield?

JMA
06-26-2010, 07:37 AM
I'm not trying sell you anything.
Both "verified" - by what ever means = "Recovery" AND "Estimates" also have value = IMINT/SIGINT/Witness statements, ground sign, "all sources."

Again, I cannot see your point. You opined/implied Loss-exchange-ratios favoured the Taliban - on the basis of no evidence - as with most of your comments.

I did not say favoured the Taliban, but I will say that the 1(Brit):100 (Taliban) spoken about is probably a big thumb suck.

Secondly I'm NOW asking why the troops do not clear the contact area where if they did they could easily count the bodies and collect war materials?

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 08:49 AM
It seems the Brits are talking about a kill ratio of 1 (of theirs) to 100 (Taliban).
So with 300 Brit KIA that would be 30,000 Taliban kills. Can't see it, sorry.
The estimate refers to LERs from contacts. Not all theatre losses.

I did not say favoured the Taliban, but I will say that the 1(Brit):100 (Taliban) spoken about is probably a big thumb suck.
...and the difference between an estimate and guessing is?

Secondly I'm NOW asking why the troops do not clear the contact area where if they did they could easily count the bodies and collect war materials?
Fairly obviously, they do, when they can. That is part of your post contact drills. Does the number of bodies recovered inform the estimate commonly quoted? I do not know. What do you think? How come Red Rat an I hear the same figures?
Point is, I know this is part of an on going discussion within the British Army.
What's your point?
a.) Why do you want to know?
b.) What do you hope to contribute?

JMA
06-26-2010, 10:08 AM
The estimate refers to LERs from contacts. Not all theatre losses.

Estimates just don't cut it. Why do you need to estimate when you can actually count? Unless...


...and the difference between an estimate and guessing is?

Not much but its all about the motivation. Is it because the actuals are such that it is better to work off (suitably inflated) guestimates?


Fairly obviously, they do, when they can. That is part of your post contact drills. Does the number of bodies recovered inform the estimate commonly quoted? I do not know. What do you think? How come Red Rat an I hear the same figures?

So if you have actual figures from bodies counted why not just use them and not suck 1:100 ratios out of one thumb?

JMA
06-26-2010, 10:24 AM
Fairly obviously, they do, when they can. That is part of your post contact drills. Does the number of bodies recovered inform the estimate commonly quoted? I do not know. What do you think? How come Red Rat an I hear the same figures?
Point is, I know this is part of an on going discussion within the British Army.
What's your point?
a.) Why do you want to know?
b.) What do you hope to contribute?

I had stated "Secondly I'm NOW asking why the troops do not clear the contact area where if they did they could easily count the bodies and collect war materials?"

You say they do when they can. And I ask when would it be that they can't?
This is important from a military/tactical point of view. Why would troops who have supposedly just won the contact not be able to hang around in the contact area? There is something very strange going on there.

Especially when Infanteer makes a statement like the following:

"As easy as it may be to say "just count the bodies" it is very hard to do with insurgents such as the Pashtun who police the battlefield in such a detailed and rapid manner."

Very, very strange.

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 12:24 PM
Very, very strange.
No, not strange. What is it, that you do not get about the fact that there aspects to this subject which are both operationally and politically sensitive?
Those of us who actually care, do not want to get sucked into a pointless debate with you on a public forum.

SWC is a prominent and highly regarded source of information on operational issues. (well it used to be!) Thus it is read by a great many people.

JMA - you have no dog in the fight, and you are neither formally or informally involved with the discussions concerning UK activity in Afghanistan. Now none of that would be an issue, if you could contribute usefully to open source learning and discussion on the issue of "Small Wars." - which is why most of us are here. Your agenda seems incompatible with that objective.

Pete
06-26-2010, 12:54 PM
What do you mean police the battlefield?

In this context policing means cleaning things up. It's a U.S. Army expression. Police Call was the old bugle call for troops to assemble for tidying up the area.

JMA
06-26-2010, 02:30 PM
In this context policing means cleaning things up. It's a U.S. Army expression. Police Call was the old bugle call for troops to assemble for tidying up the area.

Thanks Pete, now I just need to learn what is meant by that in the Afghan context.

JMA
06-26-2010, 03:53 PM
No, not strange. What is it, that you do not get about the fact that there aspects to this subject which are both operationally and politically sensitive?
Those of us who actually care, do not want to get sucked into a pointless debate with you on a public forum.

SWC is a prominent and highly regarded source of information on operational issues. (well it used to be!) Thus it is read by a great many people.

JMA - you have no dog in the fight, and you are neither formally or informally involved with the discussions concerning UK activity in Afghanistan. Now none of that would be an issue, if you could contribute usefully to open source learning and discussion on the issue of "Small Wars." - which is why most of us are here. Your agenda seems incompatible with that objective.

Lets take a step back and look at this subject:

I introduced it with the following:

"I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified."

Then having to explain myself again I said:

"What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released."

then you countered with "Ratios >100:1 were mentioned" to which I responded whether these kills were verified.

Then we got the official line from an actual serving officer (who really does have a dog in the fight) which I complemented with a copy of a letter under the Freedom of Information Act (what a joke) which basically said we are not goin to tell you. (see here (http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/32337/response/80773/attach/html/4/20100414%20FOI%20TB%20Fatalities%20U.doc.html))

The MoD came up with the bizarre "There is also no reliable method to calculate the number of insurgents killed." to which I replied "why not just count the bodies"?

Boy did that open up a can of worms...

Infanteer came up with "As easy as it may be to say "just count the bodies" it is very hard to do with insurgents such as the Pashtun who police the battlefield in such a detailed and rapid manner."

And you put the rider "when they can" in response to my question about troops clearing the contact area.

It appears that for whatever "operational" reasons the contact area is not really/properly swept/searched/secured.

The reason for this and the actual number of Taliban casualties are being kept from the public.

Then I get the "I'll put this upstart in his place" speech from you.

I respond as follows:

* The Taliban know exactly how many casualties they are taking.
* The Taliban know exactly why some of the time/most of the time the Brits do not consolidate and sweep/search the contact area.

There is no OPEC issue here other than what the MoD wants to hide from the British people. This being what the actual Taliban casualties are.

Is this what you term operationally and politically sensitive?

Then your comments re my contributions to SWJ, I treat them with the contempt they deserve. Your cheap attempts to silence me are the stuff of the playground bully.

Serious military men would never shy away from dealing with the "difficult" issues and would welcome the opportunity to talk through some of these issues in a forum such as this. If still serving they have the option to hide behind a nickname so as to give them greater freedom to discuss sensitive issues.

It would have been better had Infanteer responded with "Count the dead, you make it sound so easy, we can't do that because of A, B and C." Then instead of attempting to make a simple action (clear the contact area after a contact and count the bodies and collect/destroy the weapons and equipment) familiar to almost every soldier who been in a war sound unreasonable he would have shown an understanding that the problem actually lay with his situation and not with the routine experience of others.

Ken White
06-26-2010, 04:25 PM
...So while doing this why not count (verify) the kills?To satisfy the idle whims of posters on discussion boards?

The political fallout from body counts published in the media in most western societies, certainly in the US, make the publication of such counts an invitation to trouble (LINK) (http://www.sipri.org/blogs/Afghanistan/body-count-good-bad-or-ugly). Probably should not make any difference but it does. The counts are generally made, situation permitting -- it does not always do so -- but the stats aren't going to be published due to bad experience with such publication during Viet Nam. In fact, one US Division made a decision to publish their count (LINK) (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124380078921270039.html) but that decision was overruled after some controversy about publishing the figures (LINK) (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902274,00.html). There are advantages to counting and that's done, there are advantages and disadvantages to publishing the figures. The current US / NATO decision is to not publish them at least partly because many in NATO with troops in Afghanistan adopt the fiction there's no war there. You may disagree with that but I doubt ISAF much cares.

So, there are political reasons for not counting -- or, more correctly, for not reporting the count. If that wasn't reason enough, as you said on another thread:
Now what these tactics would be in each different theater I don't know but rather than just a raw body count the kill rate is even more important in my opinion.

(Detailed stats out of Rhodesia are difficult if not impossible to get.)LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95753&postcount=57).

So you acknowledge the issue is somewhat academic as the kill rate is more important (and I'd add that would have little benefit as published data for most civilians), that there are likely problems with the data but you still wish to make an issue of it? Sounds almost troll-like to me... ;)

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 04:27 PM
Is this what you term operationally and politically sensitive?


Have you ever heard the UK MOD saying they use body counts as an operational metric of success? Yes/No?
Do you think the issue of body counts may be politically sensitive? Yes/No?
IF, and ONLY IF - there were set body count procedures being used in Theatre - to inform intelligence estimates - do you think it would be politically sensitive? Yes/No?
Would the converse be true?
As estimating the enemy casualties is a intelligence activity, - and not one for public debate, do you understand why it may be operationally sensitive? Yes/No?


Then your comments re my contributions to SWJ, I treat them with the contempt they deserve. Your cheap attempts to silence me are the stuff of the playground bully.
You are responsible for your comments. I am in no way attempting to silence you. I, and perhaps a few others, am waiting for something of use or insight, instead of the variable content and baseless allegations to date.

Serious military men would never shy away from dealing with the "difficult" issues and would welcome the opportunity to talk through some of these issues in a forum such as this.
Well I submit I am pretty serious, but yet far less so than many more here. My track record of saying in public and publishing uncomfortable and unpalatable things about the British Army is pretty well charted.
I've made no friends saying that some aspects of infantry training/doctrine/equipment concepts suck - unlike your support for the DS solutions.

...and I think things are badly wrong in Afghanistan, and as I have said many time before, I think some really hard questions need to be asked.

Now given some thought, if anyone had any relevant expertise in irregular warfare, that they wanted to share it, it might be good if they started threads on general topics of concern - body counts, patrol operations, QRF procedures - that might help, instead of making a lot of baseless allegations about on-going operations of which they are poorly informed. Just an idea.

Ken White
06-26-2010, 04:41 PM
Lets take a step back and look at this subject:Excellent idea
I introduced it with the following:

"I often wonder what the ratio of kills between the two sides is? I know it has to be poor when it is classified."That's an accusatory and inflammatory statement and an assumption on your part.
Then having to explain myself again I said:

"What I'm saying is if this ratio ISAF KIA / Taliban KIA were in any way reasonable it would be released."Another inflammatory statement based on an assumption.
The MoD came up with the bizarre "There is also no reliable method to calculate the number of insurgents killed." to which I replied "why not just count the bodies"?

Boy did that open up a can of worms...You opened the can and fed the worms with this:
It appears that for whatever "operational" reasons the contact area is not really/properly swept/searched/secured.

The reason for this and the actual number of Taliban casualties are being kept from the public.

Then I get the "I'll put this upstart in his place" speech from you.

I respond as follows:

* The Taliban know exactly how many casualties they are taking.
* The Taliban know exactly why some of the time/most of the time the Brits do not consolidate and sweep/search the contact area.

There is no OPEC issue here other than what the MoD wants to hide from the British people. This being what the actual Taliban casualties are.

Is this what you term operationally and politically sensitive?That is all your opinion and you can say it -- however, you will receive curt answers due to your abrasive approach. You receive more generally polite responses from others than your posts sometimes merit. You may not be aware of that but several other posters have made comments on the board and you seem to ignore them.

Everyone needs to chill a bit or I'll lock this thread.

JMA
06-26-2010, 06:14 PM
To satisfy the idle whims of posters on discussion boards?

The political fallout from body counts published in the media in most western societies, certainly in the US, make the publication of such counts an invitation to trouble (LINK) (http://www.sipri.org/blogs/Afghanistan/body-count-good-bad-or-ugly). Probably should not make any difference but it does. The counts are generally made, situation permitting -- it does not always do so -- but the stats aren't going to be published due to bad experience with such publication during Viet Nam. In fact, one US Division made a decision to publish their count (LINK) (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124380078921270039.html) but that decision was overruled after some controversy about publishing the figures (LINK) (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902274,00.html). There are advantages to counting and that's done, there are advantages and disadvantages to publishing the figures. The current US / NATO decision is to not publish them at least partly because many in NATO with troops in Afghanistan adopt the fiction there's no war there. You may disagree with that but I doubt ISAF much cares.

As the man said “…when you stand with your legs astride a dead body, call me and tell me you killed one person.” and I would add "a dead body with a weapon".

But i guess the main problem I have with this is the lie that the enemy casualties can not be estimated. Why do the Brits try to lie their way out of a Freedom of Information Request? (Not only that but they are actually breaking their own law.)

The next point is that maybe all that is needed is good honest factual reporting. Is this concept so revolutionary? If you tell the truth nothing can come back and bite you in the... If people want the info let them request it via the Freedom of Information Act and then give it too them. What could be more subversive as asking for the enemy casualty figures, do I hear you ask?

What on earth has the 24 hr burial requirement got to do with anything? The sweep/clearance of the contact area takes place hours/minutes after the kills so what relevance has it?

It should be quite obvious that the truth of the matter is being shrouded by an all smoke and mirrors magician show which leaves one to think only of the worst.

And finally of course ISAF doesn't care. ISAF under its last boss didn't even care what the President thought. And just like their counterpart during the Vietnam war who swore by body counts by the spin of a coin they too may be wrong now in Afghanistan.


So, there are political reasons for not counting -- or, more correctly, for not reporting the count. If that wasn't reason enough, as you said on another thread:LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95753&postcount=57).

I said the "kill rate" is even more important than mere enemy kills data. Nowhere have I said that body count was unimportant.


So you acknowledge the issue is somewhat academic as the kill rate is more important (and I'd add that would have little benefit as published data for most civilians), that there are likely problems with the data but you still wish to make an issue of it? Sounds almost troll-like to me... ;)

Ken, rule number for moderators should be not to take cheap shots.

But the Rhodesian stats are only a problem because no one is really sure where all the info has ended up. Currently a lot of COMOPS and Army HQ stuff sent out to the UK is being scanned to be available to the UK public through the library system.

Everyday in SITREPS every contact and incident was recorded with all the relevant detail. Its out there some where in its entirety.

Lets say you deploy a company of troops on offensive ops for say 6 weeks and they kill nothing what does that tell you. Maybe a number of things. If your infanatry are not killing then you are wasting your time. They my point comes in that when you start killing to look towards the efficiency of that killing. That is kill rate = what percentage of those contacted are killed in that contact. We've been through this before: Brit SAS in Malaya 13%, average across all Rhodesian forces 18%, and RLI fire force at the height of the war 84%. Can you venture a guess as to why this stat may be significant?

From the other two stats (own force KIA and enemy KIA) you can simply calculate the kill ratio. Not critical information nor earth shattering unless that ratio is not very comforting. There can be no reason other than the worst possible news why the Brit MoD is deliberatelt floating the law in not complying with a Freedom of Information Act request. Or could there?

Ken White
06-26-2010, 09:36 PM
But i guess the main problem I have with this is the lie that the enemy casualties can not be estimated. Why do the Brits try to lie their way out of a Freedom of Information Request? (Not only that but they are actually breaking their own law.)Have no knowledge of or concern with British law, I'm not British. As to the estimate, it may be a lie, may not be -- it could be that some PR flack misspoke, could be that it's a cover for the real policy. Hard to say. The answers to many of your questions are hazy as I'm sure you know and while those answers are important to the people actually concerned they become of merely academic interest to people on discussion board that are not going to change the policies of any government.
What could be more subversive as asking for the enemy casualty figures, do I hear you ask?No, you do not hear me ask. It's not subversive but it also has little relevance to most people so one could assume that anyone with no vested interest who made an issue of it had some arcane point to make.
What on earth has the 24 hr burial requirement got to do with anything...so what relevance has it?Depends on the action, immediate sweeps cannot always be conducted and later assessments of air strikes or artillery are often at the outer limit of that time. Plus there's the fact that the Talibs -- most area forces -- collect bodies and casualties and haul them off if possible specifically to deny the count for several reasons, not least so they can downplay there casualties while inflating ANA / ANP and coalition casualties in their videos and on their web sites.
... which leaves one to think only of the worst.Depends on ones inclination, I believe. You can do that it you wish and you obviously do.
Nowhere have I said that body count was unimportant.Nor did I say you had done so.
Ken, rule number for moderators should be not to take cheap shots. If you'll check my responses to you over the past few months, you'll see the majority are civil. Not warm but civil. I have told you on a couple of occasions that you are pushing things with your attitude and idle harassment. That comment you quoted was not what you apparently think it was.

Sorry you think it a cheap shot -- I very much disagree and think it an accurate assessment. It was not a cheap shot -- it was a warning.

Either way, it will not deter me as a Moderator from reacting to your tendency to be deliberately abrasive all too often, to make assertions that make adverse implications and to employ innuendo for whatever purpose you deem to be that critical.
...RLI fire force at the height of the war 84%. Can you venture a guess as to why this stat may be significant?Don't need to guess, I know. It was important to you because you were there, it was important to Rhodesia due to the relative numbers on both sides and it is important as a statistic because it applies to one war in one nation at one time. Can Fire Force tactics be replicated in, say, Afghanistan today? No. Therefor it may be important but it is also irrelevant to this thread except as a point scoring rhetorical trick.

You make valid points and you -- and many of us -- have valid complaints about governmental and senior leader failures. No doubt error and failures occur daily. Comments about those are welcome, hopefully they will be civil comments and not accusations disguised a 'opinions' with no discernible basis of whatever malfeasance they might indicate.

However, you generally refuse to accept the political constraints that both we and the British are forced to accommodate, you constantly ask others to do research which you could do yourself, you make continual accusations and you are quite adept at pushing the envelope on civility. You attempt to be deliberately provocative, perhaps to foster discussion, but you appear to several here to overdo that. If you're smart enough to do that, you're smart enough to not do it to score your many cheap shots IMO on a recurring basis.

Do not misunderstand that sentence above. It is not a cheap shot at you -- It is a warning to clean up your act, keep the snide comments to a minimum, avoid making sweeping allegations based on your opinions as opposed to facts and behave with a little more civility.

You've proven quite capable of making informed sensible and civil comment, I hope you continue to do so

JMA
06-26-2010, 11:24 PM
Thanks for those kind words Ken, I'll take them under advisement

davidbfpo
06-27-2010, 03:54 PM
I am mindful that this thread has started to "loiter and engage" on the concept of Fire Force and whether it is applicable today. So I have started a new thread in the OEF - Afghan chapter, called 'Moving the Fire Force concept to Afghanistan' and will remove the latest relevant post here to there.

Apologies if the debate appears to have hit a "brick wall". A Moderators Note will be added. Patience too as some domestic distractions.