USMC and SOCOM [Archive] - Small Wars Council

DDilegge

11-02-2005, 08:54 AM

Reprinted in full per terms of the DoD:

Marine Corps to Join U.S. Special Operations Command
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1, 2005 – The Marine Corps will soon officially join the special operations community with a new Marine Special Operations Command to become a component of U.S. Special Operations Command, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld announced here today.
Rumsfeld announced his approval of the plan, part of a sweeping range of transformations under way to strengthen the U.S. military and its special operations forces, during a Pentagon news briefing.

The new command "will increase the number of special operations forces available for missions worldwide while expanding their capabilities in some key areas," Rumsfeld told reporters.

The new command will formalize a longstanding relationship between the Marine Corps and Special Operations Command, Marine Corps spokesman Maj. Douglas Powell told the American Forces Press Service.

It will increase Special Operations Command's ability to field highly skilled special operators in the numbers required to support of the war on terror and other missions, he said.

The command's members will train foreign military units and carry out other Marine Corps missions traditionally associated with special operations work: intelligence, logistics, fire-support coordination, direct action and special reconnaissance, among them, Powell said.

The 2,600-member command will have three subordinate elements: a special operations regiment, foreign military training unit and special operations support group.

A portion of the command will train and deploy with Marine expeditionary units, enhancing those units' special operations capability, officials said.

The command headquarters and nearly all its elements will be based at Camp Lejeune, N.C. One element of the Marine Special Operations Regiment will be stationed at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

The activation date for the new command has not been set, and its elements are expected to phase in their operations. Some elements, including the Foreign Military Training Unit, are expected to assume missions almost immediately, officials said.

Marine Brig. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik will be the MARSOC's first commander, officials said. Hejlik previously served as deputy commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

Strickland

11-03-2005, 04:41 PM

So the Marine Corps takes 2600 bodies out of hide? We never get these gents back? How is this a good deal for us? In essense, we just lost 2.5 Infantry Battalions plus a Regimental HQ element. Did they kick the dog on the way out the door?

Doc.

11-20-2005, 02:34 AM

Strickland

11-20-2005, 05:53 PM

Knowing the marines, and corpsman firsthand gives you a different Idea on how you look at this situation. The army, air force, and Seal units have been getting much better funding than their marine brothers have been. I think its about time for these professionals actually get the cut. The Reconnaisance community, forever has been doing the same job as the other branches, with out the money, the publicity and pull that other units get. I went trough ARS, and let me tell you what. The instructors are phenominal. Down right professionals. This one Captain explained to the studs there that if it were his choice as the XO, he'd have the training expanded to where he could have realtime training With the tools and time to properly train these recon marines. Yet they get the job done in 11 weeks and do a damn good job at it. As time's are now these marines go practically straight to war. fighting along with other socom units. But are not referred to the Socom community. Now all of this happening, is to me a good thing. It means maybe someone will wake up and see how these boys are being starved of the right equipment to do the same job as any other operator, and with a 1/4 of the training. I hope to see more funding come our way. If the Marines that are sour about losing thier 0321's then maybe you should have shown some more respect by giving them the up to date gear, and training that you were sending them down range to do.

So the argument is that since funding was deficient for a segment of the Marine community, it is better to lose it and control over it for good, so that it can be properly funded and employed by non-Marines? It is odd that the only positive argument that can be made for this realignment is increased funding.

For all those who believe that SOCOM is the answer in Small Wars, and that the evidence supports this assertion, I would please ask someone show it to me again. Please do not point to Afghanistan. The ANA and NATO force in Afghanistan have NO freedom of movement, do not control the whole of the country, cannot secure the border, have not been able to kill/capture the top remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, nor disarm the local militias. The Afghan National Army is so poorly funded that it lacks the ability to take the initiative and pursue significant offensive action.

Bill Moore

11-20-2005, 06:03 PM

The only advantage I see to this course of action is that you’ll have a unit composed of senior NCOs capable of training foreign units. Too many times I have seen young Marines and Soldiers get put in a trainer role in a foreign nation without being trained to do it, and unsurprisingly fail miserably. Too often this results in these young Marine and Soldier trainers getting frustrated, then calling their students stupid, which in turn harms our relations with that nation, and the snow ball starts rolling downhill from there. The bottom line is you can’t get just grab a much of kids and tell them to train up a foreign unit and expect good results. This is a complex operation, not a “hey you” detail. So if the Marines want to embrace this trainer role (they have a long history of doing it effectively, albeit on a much smaller scale than what we face now), perhaps forming a unit composed of the right people is the right answer. The question remains, does it need to be under SOCOM? Is that the only way it will get funded?

The disadvantages were clearly stated by MAJ Strickland, and with the Marines being such a small force, I don’t see how they can bare the pain of losing this many senior NCOs without bearing a significant degradation to their ranks. As stated elsewhere on this website, this is the war of the strategic corporal, so having that experience in the ranks is critical to strategic success. If the Marines change are planning on changing their MTOE, so these slots don’t come out of hide, then it may work over time.

Since the Army can provide the same function, is this really what we need our Marines to focus on? I hope we haven’t degenerated to the point where we’re all chasing the latest mission of the day. I recall an argument being made in the early 90’s that the Big Conventional Army didn’t need Armor divisions anymore. I for one am very glad we had that tool when Desert Storm rolled around, and also think they were critical to our success in phase III of OIF.

The challenge of defending our democratic and capitalist nation that we all love, is that too many business practices transfer over to national defense. Just because all of our products are not selling off the shelf today, doesn’t mean they will not be needed tomorrow. For example, the Navy has played a limited role in GWOT, but their relative importance increases daily, as does China’s blue water navy. None of us know what threats tomorrow will bring, so I think we would want to maintain a joint force with a wide range of capabilities.

The Marines are unique in that they can bring a very capable functional combat team to the battlefield quickly. Furthermore, they can park a viable combat force off the shore of a potential hot spot giving our policy makers options short of full commitment. We in the Army on the other hand can deploy an Airborne Battalion rapidly, but their combat power is limited, and they can’t linger off the shore shy of an actual commitment. The point is that Marines have and continue to have a viable set of missions that the nation depends on the USMC being able to execute. Despite the fact that the Marines and Army have overlapping capabilities, the reality is that neither can do each other’s core missions based on training and task organization.
I think it is a mistake to assume that Iraq is the wave of the future; it is only the wave of today. Before we throw the baby out with the bath water, we need to assess the impact on our “joint” war fighting capabilities. That bright shinny thing on the horizon today may simply be a mirage.

While it may seem disingenuous coming from an Army guy, I think the Marines need to protect (better fund), and improve their capabilities in their current roles, which remain absolutely essential to our national security.

DDilegge

11-20-2005, 06:33 PM

This is a complex operation, not a “hey you” detail. So if the Marines want to embrace this trainer role (they have a long history of doing it effectively, albeit on a much smaller scale than what we face now), perhaps forming a unit composed of the right people is the right answer. The question remains, does it need to be under SOCOM? Is that the only way it will get funded?

The disadvantages were clearly stated by MAJ Strickland, and with the Marines being such a small force, I don’t see how they can bare the pain of losing this many senior NCOs without bearing a significant degradation to their ranks.

Since the Army can provide the same function, is this really what we need our Marines to focus on? I hope we haven’t degenerated to the point where we’re all chasing the latest mission of the day.

The challenge of defending our democratic and capitalist nation that we all love, is that too many business practices transfer over to national defense. Just because all of our products are not selling off the shelf today, doesn’t mean they will not be needed tomorrow.

The Marines are unique in that they can bring a very capable functional combat team to the battlefield quickly. Furthermore, they can park a viable combat force off the shore of a potential hot spot giving our policy makers options short of full commitment. We in the Army on the other hand can deploy an Airborne Battalion rapidly, but their combat power is limited, and they can’t linger off the shore shy of an actual commitment. The point is that Marines have and continue to have a viable set of missions that the nation depends on the USMC being able to execute. Despite the fact that the Marines and Army have overlapping capabilities, the reality is that neither can do each other’s core missions based on training and task organization.

I think it is a mistake to assume that Iraq is the wave of the future; it is only the wave of today. Before we throw the baby out with the bath water, we need to assess the impact on our “joint” war fighting capabilities. That bright shinny thing on the horizon today may simply be a mirage.

I snipped several lines from your previous post here (quote) - well said Bill. Marines who are wary of this new relationship are not attempting to blow-off the importance of Special Operations and its increased importance in the GWOT. Rather, it is as you stated most eloquently – many are worried we will be sacrificing a core capability that is of vital importance to our national defense in order to address the ‘conflict of the day’ and fill gaps that may well be addressed by increasing the capabilities (manpower is but one example) of those that have been doing this since the early sixties.

The Marine Corps is a “young” force, it constantly replenishes its junior enlisted ranks with new recruits well beyond the rates of the sister services. This is a “good thing” – keeps the Corps’ lean and mean (no pun intended). But, if this relatively small force loses its best SNCO’s and NCO’s to the snake-eater community – there may well be dire second and third order effects. Enlisted leadership has always been the center-of-gravity when it comes down to the wire in accomplishing the missions assigned the Corps.

Doc.

11-20-2005, 07:44 PM

I really dont think your losing such a force as maybe you think you are. Its always been known even the average marine has been above the cut. I mean what do all the people always say. "send in the marines!". Being the small force they've always been just tells you that all marines are special. Yet its the Recon Guy's. They get more training to do the more "hairy missions" Yet there still operating with ARmy SF. So why. Why all the back doors that are going on now. Just let recon go to where they should be. I think if the corps loses the community, the Marines will still have F.A.S.T., STA. and the regular grunt, whose still a badass to the enemy. All the Senior NCO's that you say your losing. The numbers aren't as high as everybody think they are. Its always been a marine tradition of putting the responsiblility down to the lowest rank. Im looking forward to working with the other branches learning from the army on how to do what there known for, I dont think your really losing all this, your gaining a lot more. The marines have been left out of the loop so long its about time there clue'd in on everything. The best way to finish and be successful in a job is to be working together giving one anothers best. Lets focus on fighting terroism and not worrying about who's going to adopt our "Uncle sams miss guided children"

DDilegge

11-20-2005, 08:58 PM

SOF missions and what the Marine Corps' does as its core competency are two different worlds. There are much bigger issues here than "sexy" missions and years of specialized training. Again, the Corps is small and will still be called upon to perform its traditional missions and can ill afford to lose its best and brightest SNCO's and NCO's to full-time SOF.

Rather than making a significant percentage of our infantry forces full-SOF (that would be 2 1/2 battalions worth out of a force with a total of 24) we should give the training, manpower and other relevant resources to the Corps to assume SOF-like missions that do not require 35-year-old squad leaders. FID (training part) and CAP come to mind here. It can be done and it has been done by younger less SOF trained Marines.

I would agree with the Corps assuming the SOF mission if it could be guaranteed a corresponding quality increase in force structure. Note the word quality – being small the Corps has held fast with the every Marine a rifleman standard for quite some time.

Another guarantee I'd like is that the USMC will not lose any aviation assets in this grand experiment (possibly never to be seen again), and yet another guarantee that USMC SOF forces would be available to the Regional Combatant Commander and any MEU or other MAGTF under its command. Moreover, these SOF forces must be available for the training and evaluation that is part of the pre-deployment work-up.

Doc.

11-21-2005, 07:16 PM

The loss of SNCOs, and such. I dont think its going to be coming from the regular grunt units. Marine Times just put out that this loss is coming from the Reconnaisance community, which typically are already snake eaters. along with the transfer techs with the areas of Intelligence, FO's and some reg marines will comprise the support teams of this new units much like the army's B-teams. Yet think of it like this. when the navy made the New SeAL units there were the Udt's, now it wasn't just a switch "okay today your udt's tomorrow your seals." no they comprised of two new teams team 2 in little creek, tm 1 coronado. then over the next few years there were a gradual change. I dont think the corps is going to lose the manpower which they dont really already see. When you go to lejeune, wheres recon, way out in Court house bay, pretty much doing there own thing, as they will be when this transition takes place. Did they say anything about SOTG. will they only train SOcom marines, or will they continue training the average mortor platoon as typically they are now. I'm not sure someone let me know.

Hansmeister

11-27-2005, 11:35 PM

Being already in SOCOM I think this might be a very good thing, given that SOCOM has been upgraded from a supporting command to a supported command. The USMC will not lose complete control over these troops, but can shift much of the cost to SOCOM.

However, it won't be long before SF recruiters show up at this USMC unit and try to recruit from them. :D

12-01-2005, 06:43 PM

There is alot more going on in FID than just training some guys in basic infantry skills.

DDilegge

12-01-2005, 10:43 PM

There is alot more going on in FID than just training some guys in basic infantry skills.

USMC relieves SOF from certain aspects of FID like "training some guys".

12-07-2005, 01:30 PM

USMC relieves SOF from certain aspects of FID like "training some guys".
Dave, FID provides access, losing the FID mission denies access.

NDD

12-09-2005, 01:39 AM

Unlike other services, the USMC is not "in search" of a mission or relevance; thus should not go "chasing dollars" with SOCOM. Why would we want to hand over either 700 FMTU / MTT Marines or a 2000 man det comprised of senior staff non-commissioned officers and officers? I would prefer you stand up two more infantry battalions, which I would imagine could be done for a lot less money.

More SOF is not the answer to what ails us in either Afghanistan or Iraq. SOF should remain an ARSOC, AFSOC, SEAL community.
More SOF is not the answer? Is two more infantry battalions the answer? I disagree most wholeheartedly that more SOF is not what is needed. Hearts & Minds are needed, and SOF is the key to H&Ms.

NDD

12-09-2005, 01:43 AM

Dave, FID provides access, losing the FID mission denies access.
Very well said.

I doubt it will take the USMC element long to adapt to a new role.

DDilegge

12-10-2005, 02:32 PM

The old paradigms of FID and SOF have changed and we have to keep up and not just assume it is business as usual - but on a global and consistent scale.

I fully understand the points raised here concerning FID as an integral part of SPECOPS and agree.

Still, there is not enough SOF to conduct all the traditional missions on a global basis. My suggestion was that conventional forces (USMC in this instance) take over the “less snake-eater” missions (training for one) while SOF continues to do what it does best. Under a JTF, and if well-planned and executed, this relationship could be codified and appropriate doctrine, TO&E, and TTP established.

All that said, it is a moot point. A USMC conference next week will hammer out the details on this done deal. As a good Marines, the USMC will salute sharply and carry out the new mission to the best of it's capabilities. Our nation will not be disappointed...

NDD

12-11-2005, 08:09 PM

Dave,
Handing over the training mission has been tried several times in the past. In just the time I was active, I remember:
USMC telling Ted Kennedy they could do it and us having to do a dog and pony.
An experiment involving Puerto Ricans from the NG in Central America.
SEALs trying to do FID and train HN troops.
Drill Sergeants (Spanish-speakers) trying something somewhere.

None of it worked for various reasons. Language is often thought to be the critical path. My experience differs greatly.

I have friends in Iraq that frequently complain about the training being conducted over there.

I was fortunate enough to have worked with the USMC on several occasions. When they adapt to this new mission, I think they will be a great asset - but some adapting will have to be done. I look forward to watching the Marines attack this mission with the professionalism they have always shown every time I have had the priviledge to watch them work.

I firmly believe this will be a good thing for both sides of the house.

I'm not sure what you mean by the old paradigms of FID have changed - could you expound?

We have a saying we frequently tell the new guys - "If you can't do FID, seek life elsewhere."

Bill Moore

12-12-2005, 12:27 AM

NDD

12-12-2005, 10:24 PM

I understand your point that we're waging a global war, but that doesn't equate to global FID. We were waging a global war against communism, as we were fighting its spread in South and Central America, throughout Africa and Asia, and in Europe (Greece and Italy among others), but we were not executing global FID. FID by its very nature is very local in its design, so there isn't a global template for executing it. It is extremely dependent on the political and social environment where we contribute; more so than any other type of operation. If you're arguing the need to execute FID in more locations, thus the need for more forces to do so, then I would agree with some caveats, but we're not doing global FID. If anyone thinks we are please explain the concept.
I agree 100% that we are not doing global FID, nor should we be. The first criteria for FID should be that it is an "internal" that is worth "defending". In other words, worthy of strengthening. Why would we ever consider doing FID in Chechnya for example?

However, in your analogy of communism, can you tell me please in which of those areas you mentioned we were not doing FID?

Yes, FID is local - hence the area-oriented Group concept.

Is there a global template for other operations in LIC? Is there a global template for big war?

Groups like AQ would appear to me to prey on weak governments in Muslim countries. They are a virus, not an operating system. FID was designed to aid in preventing this very problem.

I agree that there is a need for big battalions, armor, the whole 9 yards. I also know first hand what it takes to get even a miniscule group prepared to do FID. But I have seen the results first hand and I have no doubt the USMC will be an asset in this role. The troops in OIF I did a fantastic job of running through the conventional Iraqi forces like crap through a goose. The force structure would appear to have been next to perfect - for that oepration against those people at that time. Can the same be said now? Could the USMC still have done the same tremendous job they did then without the Marines that will be moving to SOCOM?

Perhaps I don't understand what you are saying.

And I would love to hear your caveats.

Steve Blair

12-13-2005, 07:18 PM

More SOF is not the answer? Is two more infantry battalions the answer? I disagree most wholeheartedly that more SOF is not what is needed. Hearts & Minds are needed, and SOF is the key to H&Ms.

I do not agreee that a blanket SOF policy is the way to H&M. Certain aspects of what have been lumped into SOCOM are very useful in this area, but it's not a blanket solution.

NDD

12-14-2005, 03:14 AM

I do not agreee that a blanket SOF policy is the way to H&M. Certain aspects of what have been lumped into SOCOM are very useful in this area, but it's not a blanket solution.
What is a blanket SOF policy? A blanket solution? No, SOF is not THE solution. COIN requires other than military assets to achieve. However, on the military side of the house, I would be very interested in hearing what else you suggest.

Strickland

12-17-2005, 04:28 PM

I may have done a poor job of representing my position about losing two battalions worth of Marine INF, and my overall impression of SOF. I understand the utility of SOF; however, dont think that they will sink or swim based of the addition or lack of a USMC component. On the other hand, if the USMC loses 2 battalions worth of Marines comprised mostly of senior leaders, I think this will significantly degrade our capabilities. I am not advocated adding two more USMC battalions, but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.

NDD

12-17-2005, 10:26 PM

but I am suggesting that the USMC should be left alone as is.

And why should the USMC be the exception? Do you remember Kerry's campaign speeches reference super-sizing SF? We very narrowly missed being the victims of yet another social experiment. Ever hear of Katie Wilder? The 18X Program (not a bad thing)? There's pain enough to go 'round for everyone.

On a more serious note, did you read the recent articles on Stability Operations and the new role in the chain? My personal opinion is that FID will be a key element in them and nobody does FID better than certain elements of SOF.

NDD

01-10-2006, 12:42 AM

MarSOC: Just Call Them Marines

Fred L. Schultz

Proceedings, January 2006

The commanding general of the controversial new Marine Corps Special Operations Command--seen here in Iraq, greeting Marines of Gun 6, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment last year—talks to Proceedings.

Not long after he was tapped to lead the first leatherneck contingent into the nation's Special Operations Command, Brigadier Geneal Dennis J. Hejlik was asked by Marine Commandant Michael Hagee if he had settled on a catchy nickname for his troops. General Hejlik nodded.

"Marines," he replied.

Later that day, General Hejlik (pronounced Hey-lik), in an exclusive interview with Proceedings, outlined his plans for the new unit, known as the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MarSOC).

He also expressed support for the decision to finally make the Marines part of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom), a move long opposed by the Corps. From time to time, he revealed bits and pieces about himself. One thing was evident. He travels light. He showed up with a staff of none.

Over lunch at an Irish restaurant here in Annapolis, the 58-year-old career infantryman laughingly recalled how he found out about the new job. Transferred from California to Quantico, he and his wife, Sandy, were having dinner at a restaurant the night before they were to move into new quarters at the northern Virginia Marine base. His cell phone rang. He took it outside, returned an hour later.

"Where are we going now?" his wife asked. Her husband had been a Marine for 35 years. They had been married for all of those years. She knew something was up.

So long, Quantico. Hello, Camp Lejeune.

An Iowa farm boy, General Hejlik enlisted in the Marines in 1968. He got out four years later as a sergeant and headed off to Minnesota State University, Mankato, just across the border from his home state. On graduation day 1975, he received a diploma and a commission in the Corps.

He has since taken on a wide array of Marine assignments, getting his hands dirty with logistics and weaponry as well as earning a Master's degree from the Naval War College. He served as senior military fellow at the influential Council on Foreign Relations and was two-hatted as deputy commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Iraq. Especially important in light of his new assignment, he also was chief of staff and director of the Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness at SOCom, of which his new command will soon be a part.

His tour at SOCom, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, means he's no stranger to the snake-eater community, and his familiarity with the organization no doubt played a role in his selection to head the estimated 2,500-member Marine unit now being organized.

In his most recent combat tour, his brigade took on radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia in the fall of 2004 for control of the Islamic holy city of An Najaf. In this battle, General Hejlik's troops lived up to his widely quoted promise to "whack 'em."

After the shooting stopped, he returned to the command center in Fallujah, where his boss, Lieutenant General James T. Conway, the expeditionary force commander, greeted him as if bestowing knighthood.

"Marines, ladies and gentlemen, soldiers, sailors, airmen—The Lion of Najaf!"

The title stuck, and General Hejlik says it's all General Conway's fault.

When he spoke with us, at lunch and later at Naval Institute headquarters in Beach Hall, the general was relaxed and seemed to enjoy the interview. But he also had a sense of purpose, points he wanted to convey, and a good idea of how he wanted his new command to look, even at this early stage.

The Marines are anything but charter members of the Special Operations Command. For many years after Congress created the force in 1986, the Corps doggedly resisted contributing troops to it.

For those 20 years, a parade of commandants insisted that there was no need for such an affiliation, asserting that all Marines by definition were capable of special operations. The Marine leadership also maintained that the Corps, because of its small size, could not afford to detach any troops to another outfit. The leadership further feared that prized Marine units such as Force Recon would be prime targets for cherry picking if SOCom were licensed to do so.

Behind the Corps' about-face was a growing need to beef up and replenish special operations forces in the midst of draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing terrorist threat, along with a strong push for the Marines to get with the program from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. After a year and a half of negotiations, a meeting on 28 October 2005 among Secretary Rumsfeld, General Hagee, and the SOCom combatant commander, Army General Bryan D. (Doug) Brown, closed the deal.

While General Hejlik believes that senior leaders across the services think the move "is a good thing, good for the country, and good for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism," it has drawn opposition, both internally and externally. "With continued education," he said, "this will be a win-win for all."

"One of the things that really makes me nervous," General Hejlik said, "is the word 'special.' All Marines are special, all Marines are equal, and all Marines are riflemen." He intends to address this concern, because he doesn't want any Marine being treated differently from a special forces Marine.

He also said he does not expect residual hostility to the move to adversely affect recruiting for his special ops unit. On the contrary, he said, the new command already has an abundance of volunteers.

"The thing we have to be careful with," he stressed, "is that they're Marines, first and foremost." Marines who volunteer must come out of operating forces and will undergo a rigid assessment and selection process. Selectees will train to a standard similar to Army Ranger training. "What exact standard that is has not been fully determined," General Hejlik conceded.

The new command will consist of a Marine special operations regiment of two special forces battalions. A total of nine Marine special operations companies (four on the east coast and five on the west coast) will form the combat core of the command, and each will be from 85 to 110 strong. The force will be split, 75% to 25%, between command, regimental, and battalion headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and a battalion headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California.

NDD

01-10-2006, 12:42 AM

To complement the special operations companies, two other principal components will be a support unit of radio, communications, and intelligence specialists, and a foreign military training unit, both based at Camp Lejeune.

The foreign training unit will consist of 430 Marines who will train military forces from around the world that lack such training, such as those from some of the poorer central African nations.

Special operations groups will deploy with Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that already have troops capable of special operations on board amphibious ships. As special operations companies are organized within these groups, the existing Maritime Special Purpose Force—a unit capable of conventional or selected maritime special missions—will be phased out.

Special operations companies will be separable but not separate from expeditionary units, while specific command-and-control relationships are being worked out.

"Right now, it's kind of the best of both worlds," General Hejlik said. "We work with the MEU, but we belong to SOCom as a component. That will fill part of the capability gap. Special operations have suffered a little bit, because the Global War on Terrorism has worn them a little thin."

For those concerned about what all this bodes for the future of Force Reconnaissance, the Marines' elite deep-penetration units and the Corps' answer to special ops in the past, General Hejlik assured that it "will be alive and well. The core of the company will be a Force Recon platoon, which will retain all of its specialized skills, such as deep reconnaissance, advanced communications, precision shooting, and specialized insertion and extraction capabilities."

The general expects his new command to work regularly with Army Rangers and Green Berets. But Marines will be treated as Marines, he said, right down to their gear and weaponry.

"If I'm an 03-21 reconnaissance Marine, I will come with my helmet, my flak jacket, my rucksack, and my warfighting gear. My weapon could be an M-4, M-16A-4, or 9-mm, but if the mission requires special equipment, SOCom will supply it. Hands down, SOCom has the most efficient and proficient acquisition process in the Department of Defense."

Marines have been working with the Special Operations Command since the 1980s, "so this is not a new thing," General Hejlik said.

"In my own experience, the special operations in Najaf and Fallujah were well organized and very interoperable," he emphasized. "The Global War on Terrorism has forced everyone to take a fresh look at the way they fight irregular warfare, which has no rules. This is why special forces have become such sought-after commodities."

General Hejlik said his new command originally was going to be part of a reconnaissance unit that would complement the Special Operations Command. "That's where Det. One [Marine Special Operations Detachment One, set up as proof of the concept that Marines were suited for special operations] came from," he said. But he thinks this new arrangement will be much more effective.

Negotiations prior to the establishment of the Marine Special Operations Command in October were characterized in some press reports as difficult and long. General Hejlik agreed that they were long and acknowledged one major difficulty:

"The difficult part was the cultural aspect. There are always going to be soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who want things to stay the way they are. They say, 'Let's not change for change's sake.' But this is not the case; change here is necessary. We want to get the Marine Corps fully involved in the.war on terrorism. We want to complement SOCom and fill in some of the gaps. This is the right thing to do. I'm an optimist at heart and by trade, and I think this will work."

General Hejlik learned two major lessons from his most recent service in Iraq. He found that a special operations force borders on the unique, "small in size but packing a great big punch. What such a force brings to the battlefield is much more than just trigger pullers," he said. Lesson two was that today's conventional soldiers or Marines are better trained, better led, and better equipped than any he has seen.

"When you combine conventional war fighters with a Marine special operations team, the culture and the war-fighting ethos are the same, and you've got a force that's unbeatable."

Mr. Schultz is Senior Editor of Proceedings.

GorTex6

01-10-2006, 08:40 AM

"My weapon could be an M-4, M-16A-4, or 9-mm,

What happened to the high speed custom Kimber 1911? :D

SWJED

01-10-2006, 08:59 AM

Reprinted in full with permission from the MCG. Original copyright applies to further reproduction...

January Editorial: A Time for Every Purpose

There has been a lot of talk lately in defense circles about the Marine Corps finally hopping aboard the special operations bandwagon. On 1 November 2005, the Department of Defense formally announced the approval of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC). The command will consist of a headquarters element, a foreign military training unit (FMTU), a Marine special operations regiment consisting of two battalions, and a Marine special operations support group. The authorized strength for the entire enterprise is approximately 2,600. Most of the MarSOC elements will be located at Camp Lejeune, with one of the battalions of the regiment located at Camp Pendleton.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) was formed at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL in April 1987. For over 18 years the operators have been from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Marines chose not to play—opting for similar training for its MEUs designating them as “special operations capable.” USSOCom is taking on an increasing role in the global war on terrorism, and it is time for the Marines to jump aboard the special operations train. The trick is to do it right. If we don’t get it right, we become irrelevant in that increasingly important milieu.

We are fortunate in that we are not starting from scratch. In November 2001 our 32d Commandant, Gen James L. Jones, signed a memorandum of agreement with USSOCom to work together. In July 2003 the Marines formed an 86-man contingent, called Detachment 1, to train and operate specifically in special operations missions.

As tantalizing as it is to declare victory in the world of the 24-hour news cycle, it is important to understand that the “beam me up, Scotty” mantra from Star Trek days just isn’t doable. To get it right, we must go about the formation in stages, and we must ensure that each stage is fully funded. We may not see MarSOC at full operational capability for about 5 or 6 years. Here are some knotty things to think about as we go along.

Manpower issues. Once the units are formed, we must keep the manning at 100 percent plus. Anything less will be unacceptable. Once designated, expect individuals to remain in the business for consecutive tours—perhaps even for the duration of careers. Our promotion boards will have to adapt to this reality. Other concerns are skill qualifications to be designated, impacts on the ability of the Marine Corps to deploy other operational units under current plans, and creating the MarSOC out of existing end strength authorizations of approximately 175,000 if required to do so.

Concept of employment. Since the FMTU already exists, the continuance of that program should proceed unimpeded. Presumably, the special operations elements, probably of company size, would deploy with our forward deployed MEUs, much in the manner of special purpose MAGTFs that we have formed in the past. If this kind of deployment is routine in the future, what is the impact on the MEU? Who will task, command and control, and provide support for operations? What is the role of Marine aviation from the seabase in support of this special unit? How is the current air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) configuration impacted since the support group missions in the joint world coincide to a degree with that of ANGLICO?

MarSOC headquarters. What is the role of the headquarters staff for MarSOC? Is it a warfighting staff or just an administrative organization that will simply man, equip, and train the various units?

Operational security. There is no organization in the Nation that has a better feel for public relations than our Marine Corps, but this is one of the areas that is best handled out of the limelight. We have some very smart officers at the upper echelons dealing with this issue. I’m confident that they will get it right, and in the end, we will be that part of USSOCom that is called upon repeatedly to handle the toughest tasks in the war on terror in the difficult days ahead.

DDilegge

01-11-2006, 11:43 PM

Sorry for the delayed response. Most of the replies (questions) to my original posts were, in my opinion, answered adequately enough for those that read those posts. The USMC - SOCOM relationship is a done deal and the debate on the positive or negative aspects of this relationship is moot.

That said, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with MG Geoffrey Lambert (USA Ret.). General Lambert is one of the “grey beards” (senior mentors) of a program I work on (Joint Urban Warrior) and of course, one of our nation’s foremost experts on SOF related issues. His background in SOF speaks volumes.

Reader digest version – I asked him how the USMC could maintain its “youth” (large turnover of first-term Devil-Dogs) while "taking on" many SOF missions that historically have been filled by senior NCO’s and SCNO’s. His advice was to look at the US Army Ranger model for a possible answer to this issue. Any thoughts out there? I know just enough about the Ranger community to make me dangerous.

S/F

Dave

SWJED

01-26-2006, 11:51 PM

25 Jan. American Forces Press Service - Marine Corps Special Ops Will Add to Military Capability, Commander Says
(http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060126_4019.html).

By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26, 2006 – The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, the newest addition to the special operations community, will be a complementary force that will ease the strain on other services' elite units and will contribute to the nation's readiness in the global war on terror, the new unit's commander said here today.

"I firmly believe that this is the right thing to do for the country at this time," said Marine Brig. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik, commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. "This irregular warfare is here to stay. If we don't start to go that way, where the force is more joint and more capable across the spectrum, that's not a good thing."

The Marine Corps Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, will formally stand up its headquarters Feb. 24 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. In addition to the headquarters, Camp Lejeune will be home to the Marine Special Operations Support Group, several foreign military training units, a Marine special operations battalion, and the Marine Special Operations School, Hejlik said. Another Marine special operations battalion will be stationed at Camp Pendleton, Calif., he said.

Over the next five years, MARSOC will grow to an end strength of 2,600 people, Hejlik said. This will include 24 foreign military training units that will deploy worldwide in support of U.S. Special Operations Command and the various combatant commanders, he said. MARSOC already has three FMTUs that will deploy in 2006 and 2007, he said.

The Marine special operations battalion will include four Marine special operations companies, each with 97 to 118 people, depending on mission requirements, Hejlik said. The core of these companies will be experienced force reconnaissance Marines taken from the mainstream Marine Corps, he said.

"There's a lot of capability there, because they're a little bit older; they're a little bit more mature," he said.

The Marine special operations companies will deploy with Marine expeditionary units, Hejlik said. Once deployed, the companies will under operational control of the special operations commander in theater, but be available to support the MEU if needed, he said.

"The intent is not just to rip the guts out of the MEU," he said. "We like to say that they're not separate, but separable."

The focus of MARSOC at the beginning will be the foreign military training units and their missions, Hejlik said. These units will complement the work being done by similar units in other special operations forces and will fill gaps that have arisen due to the recent high demand on special operations, he said. The Marine FMTUs will support all five geographic combatant commanders, with the first scheduled to carry out a mission for U.S. European Command, he said.

The first Marine special operations company will not be formed until May 2006 at Camp Lejeune, Hejlik said.

Marines will only spend three to five years in MARSOC and then will be rotated back into the regular Marine Corps, Hejlik said. This rotation will benefit the entire force, because young Marines will be trained to a higher standard in MARSOC and will bring those skills to other units, he said. It will also prevent Marines from becoming stagnant in one unit and give them opportunities for advancement and education, he said.

"If you take a quality Marine and you bring him up to a little higher standard using (special operations forces) standards, and you give him the right equipment, he is unbeatable," he said.

NDD

02-11-2006, 04:35 AM

DDilegge

02-11-2006, 04:09 PM

Ranger Batts do not do FID. I think there are many SOF missions that the Marines and Rangers do with junior troops. I would say FID and UW would be the exceptions I can think of right off the top of my head.

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?

NDD

02-11-2006, 07:41 PM

He acknowledged that - during our discussion we were trying to nail down at least the beginning of a concept on how to keep a force with specialized skills requiring extensive training and education young. The USMC will be conducting FID so there is a requirement for younger Marines to be trained for this mission. By UW, do you mean unconventional warfare?
Yes, unconventional warfare - as defined by SF.

Unconventional Warfare (UW). These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a Special Operation (SO) that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander's overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required,accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set ofcircumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:

1. Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.

2. Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

3. Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

4. Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.

5. Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.

The common element between FID and UW is rapport. They require patience in abundance.

At the end of the day, I think it all depends on what the unit will be capable of within their limitations. There really aren't a lot of UW missions to do. There is a lot of FID.

Mr. Bill Moore made a statement previously in this thread along the lines of "the USMC has done FID thoughout history" or words to that effect - without trying to ruffle, I disagree with that statement. Yes, other units have done some FID. And I fully believe the Marines are capable of doing it - if they are trained to do it and will accept the need to change in order to get it done. But nobody but SF has been doing FID, I mean really doing it, for the last 50 years.

In order for this unit to have FID as a primary mission, the young-old thing will have to be put aside. If I were king, this unit would be doing DA, SR and CT, not FID. That would free up A-Teams to focus on FID and UW. That way everybody is sort of in their lane. And it would be easy to keep them young.

My experience has shown me that there is a progression: When one is young, door kicking is all that. Then there comes the maturity and patience needed to do FID - about the same time one can no longer run and gun with the 20 year-olds.

I would use the Marine element to hunt down and interdict high value targets and let them slowly work their way into the FID thing, if it all. I think the Marines bring a lot to the table and I'm really glad this is happening.

Bill Moore

02-12-2006, 04:41 AM

DDilegge,

Sounds like the Marines signed up for the entire thing, DA, CT, and FID. I haven't read all the posts, I have a lot of catching up to do, but I would like to see how you're going to task organize. As MG(R) Lambert pointed out the Rangers are uniquely organized, equipped, and trained for their DA role, and unlike the old days, they keep their people in their ranks longer now, but they are still a relatively young unit, so I don't think that will be overwhelming challenge for you guys.

Growing the FID forces is another story. If they are going to be strictly trainers and combat advisors, I would speculate that they have no need to go through a Commando like selection process. You simply pull good guys out your ranks in the grades of E5 and above that have the identified traits you're looking for (interpersonal skills, capability to learn a language, adaptable, and appropriate skills) and train them to work as a trainer/advisor. Have them commit to a three year stint with an option to stay longer. The last thing you want to do is make guys stay there that don't take to the mission. Over time you'll develop a capable cadre, but until you do don't overstate your capability.

FID isn't rocket science, you guys did it throughout the Banana wars in Central America. The regular Army did it very successfully in the Philippines and Greece, and the list goes on. FID is an interagency mission and all of DoD participates as it makes sense. Helicopter pilots taught El Salvadorians how to fly (part of FID), the Coast Guard teachs costal security around the world (part of FID), the AF plays a critcal role, along with the Regular Army and the Marines, so figure out exactly what the so called FID force your training is trying to accomplish (they will only do a small piece of the overall FID role) and task organize and train accordingly. SF is ideal at working with light infantry units and paramilitary units, but they are not the ideal advisors for other types of units. SF cannot sustain support for running basic training type programs either, that is why we have the regular running them in OIF and OEF-A. Admittedly their is a considerable loss of quality when you throw a unit at a problem like that instead of seasoned personnel who know how to train others, but we all have to operate within our limitations. I hate to say it, but the best executers of FID that I have seen to date (over 25 years doing this now) is MPRI guys. Some of their work is simply top notch, and they may be able to provide some trainers to help you stand up your program. Good luck!

NDD

02-13-2006, 01:36 AM

Yes, there are special skill sets that SF cannot train, such as piloting aircraft. However, we ran the CREM (Basic Training) in Honduras for years. We also ran BCT in El Sal for a lot of that conflict. We turned the Panamanian PDF into a police force with FID. And we are helping the Colombians turn the tide on the world's longest continuously running insurgency with FID.

I don't really know anything about the ME, my AO is LATAM. Those high tech MTTS are nice, but Gs are beaten on the ground by privates, NCOs and LTs.

No, FID isn't rocket science. And that is why a lot of people think they can "just do it" - doesn't work that way most of the time. FID isn't just an MTT to teach pilots to fly. It is about building relationships and changing thought processes. It is about trust and rapport. It is about sowing a seed through that trust and having the patience to watch it grow.

Unless something has changed I don't know about, the Ranger Batts are not uniquely organized. I never had the priveldge of serving in one, but I worked closely with them and their success is in my outsider's opinion due more to their continuing selection process and tradition more than anything else.

I would hardly call the advisors in Greece and the Philippines "regular Army".

I think this is pertinent to the discussion. It has already been posted, so I'll just post the link:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp

SWJED

02-15-2006, 04:23 PM

According to the 20 Feb edition of the Marine Corps Times here is what MARSOC will look like...

Three main components: direct-action companies under a Marine Special Operations Regiment; a Foreign Military Training Unit; and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. Officials expect MarSOC will reach full operational capability by 2010.

The first FMTU teams, which are based at Lejeune, are training and will deploy starting in May.

The first Marine Special Operations Company - there will be nine direct-action MSOCs under the Marine Special Operations Regiment - will organize in May, train with the Lejeune-based 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deploy later this year. The first West Coast-based spec ops company is slated to join the 13th MEU in September.

Under current plans - outlined to senior leaders during their quarterly "executive off-site" on Jan. 18 and remaining in flux as working group studies and reviews continue - the nine direct-action companies will fall under two Marine Special Operations Battalions. Those battalions report to the Marine Special Operations Regiment.

Besides the direct-action companies and FMTUs, plans also call for the establishment in July of a Marine Special Operations Support Group, which will provide battalions with a range of specialized skills, from security and K-9 teams to communications, intelligence and logistics.

Marine Special Operations Command

Under current plans, the MarSOC will be broken into three main sections:

Marine Special Operations Regiment

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Four Marine Special Operations Companies

1st Special Missions Training Branch

2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion

Five Marine Special Operations Companies

2nd Special Missions Training Branch

Small Craft Company

Foreign Military Training Unit

Alpha Company

12 teams

Bravo Company

12 teams

Marine Special Operations Support

Support Company

ANGLICO Platoon

Security Platoon

Communications Platoon

Intelligence Company

CI/HUMINT Platoon

SIGINT Platoon

Analysis Platoon

Logistics Company

NDD

02-17-2006, 12:36 AM

Interesting TO&E. I wonder what the size of the teams in the FMTU will be. Also be interesting to see the rank structure of those teams. I'm not a Marine, but with 24 teams it looks like they will be NCO led? Maybe a Corporal?

NDD

02-18-2006, 02:36 AM

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces

Long, but good FID stuff.

SWJED

02-26-2006, 04:59 PM

March issue of National Defense - Corps’ Trainers Target ‘Ungoverned’ Areas of World (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/march/trainers.htm).

The first element of the Marine Corps’ new special-operations command already is scrambling to tackle its mission—to help prepare the soldiers of under-developed nations to defend themselves against terrorists.

The foreign military unit, as it has been dubbed, was established in October 2005, said its operations officer, Maj. Herman Glover. Ultimately, it will include 430 Marines and Navy medical corpsmen. The unit will be organized into a headquarters element, four companies built around two-dozen 11-man teams and a standards and training cadre. The companies will focus on specific regions where cultures and languages are similar, Glover said...

Training foreign military personnel has been a core assignment for special operators at least since 1952, when the Army’s Special Forces were founded. But the pace of that training has grown significantly in recent years as part of emerging U.S. counter-terrorist operations. In 2004, in addition to fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operators participated in more than 50 joint combined-exercise training events with other nations around the world...

Teams will deploy to host nations for periods ranging from six weeks to three months, he said. They will teach basic infantry and counter-terrorist tactics. Among the subjects will be:

• Individual skills, such as marksmanship with individual and crew-served weapons, hand-to-hand combat, first aid and tactical communications.

• Small-unit tactics, including coastal interdiction, patrolling, offensive and defensive operations, urban shooting skills and civil affairs.

• Anti-terrorism and force protection, such as access control and unit self-defense.

• Support functions, including basic logistics and casualty evacuation.

• Leadership and law of land warfare.

... The FMTU is recruiting mature Marines who can work independently, knowing that their actions can have strategic implications, he said. In fact, the first two teams, which began training in August 2005, are made up entirely of non-commissioned officers with at least one overseas deployment in an infantry unit and foreign language capability.

Once they join the FMTU, Marines will be expected to stay three to five years—a relatively long tour of duty—Glover said. “We will invest a lot of time and money to teach them those skills, and we want to get our money’s worth.”

After their tours in the FMTU is over, Marines can either go back to a regular Marine unit or transfer to another MARSOC element, such as one of the special-operations battalions or the support group...

NDD

02-27-2006, 03:23 AM

Link doesn't work for me.

After their tours in the FMTU is over, Marines can either go back to a regular Marine unit or transfer to another MARSOC element, such as one of the special-operations battalions or the support group...
I'll have to think about it, but this sounds bass ackwards to me.

And 3-5 isn't a long tour for doing FID.

... The FMTU is recruiting mature Marines who can work independently, knowing that their actions can have strategic implications, he said. In fact, the first two teams, which began training in August 2005, are made up entirely of non-commissioned officers with at least one overseas deployment in an infantry unit and foreign language capability.
Sounds good. I just hope they are not focusing on language to the exclusion of all else.

Thanks for posting it, I like watching this develop.

DDilegge

02-27-2006, 09:16 PM

Link doesn't work for me.

I think the site (NDIA's National Defense Magazine) was down earlier, seems to be working now.

NDD

03-01-2006, 02:04 AM

I think the site (NDIA's National Defense Magazine) was down earlier, seems to be working now.
I'm in, thanks.

SWJED

03-17-2006, 02:47 PM

16 March San Diego Union-Tribune - Marine Corps Force Deploys in Summer (http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20060316-9999-1mi16briefs.html).

The newly formed Marine Corps Special Operations Command will begin its global missions this summer, the command's leader said Tuesday.

Although his 2,600-man force won't be fully operational until 2008, Marine Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik said a unit focused on training foreign troops will deploy soon. Also, a special operations company from Camp Lejeune, N.C., will deploy with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in the summer.

The first West Coast company will deploy next year with the Camp Pendleton-based 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Hejlik said...

NDD

03-23-2006, 02:38 AM

What do you think?

03-24-2006, 06:50 PM

DDilegge

03-24-2006, 09:56 PM

I understand Det 1 was stood down about three weeks ago and that when they offered their 28 million dollars worth of equipment to MARSOC, the new CG wanted to know why they had all of that specialized kit.

Not sure if your "info" is first hand or rumor. If rumor I would say that the CG's statement, if actually true, was taken out of context. Most likely his comment concerned the truly "high tech" gear DET-1 had (Direct Action mission) compared to the entire kit his force will need in reference to the non-direct action missions they will undertake.

Again, I would like to hear all the words that came before, and after, that comment - if he actually made it. Context means a lot...........

03-29-2006, 01:13 PM

Dave,
My info comes from a Det 1 guy.
Eric

Jedburgh

09-06-2007, 11:58 AM

GAO, 5 Sep 07: Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S. Special Operations Command (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071030.pdf)

Whilethe Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special operations command, the Command has not yet fully identified the force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD developed initial force structure plans to establish the Command; however, it did not use critical practices of strategic planning, such as the alignment of activities and resources and the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making processes when developing these plans. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has identified several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command’s ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure.

Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command. While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform special operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all of the critical skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special operations forces units. These analyses are critical to the Marine Corps’ efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional training and skills; however, the policy is inconsistent with the Command’s goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special operations community. Until the Command completes an analysis to identify and document the critical skills and competencies needed by its future workforce to perform its full range of special operations missions, the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative strategic human capital approaches for managing personnel assigned to its special operations forces units.

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Command’s training programs are preparing units for their missions because it has not established common training standards for many special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these programs prepare units to be fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The Command is providing training to its forces that is based on training programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations missions prior to the Command’s activation and incorporates the training that USSOCOM’s other service components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not validated that the training for Marine Corps forces prepares them to be fully interoperable with DOD’s other special operations forces. Without an evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances that Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with its other forces, which may jeopardize the success of future joint missions....
Complete 48 page report at the link.

yogi

03-26-2010, 08:37 PM

Bring back the GWOT and make the USMC responsible for “winning” this conflict over the next forty years.

Just a quick thought to resurrect this train. As a “conventional” fighter pilot/Air Force officer at an Army school for the past year, I am an outside observer to both the Army and Marine Corps institutions.

A speaker today from USSOCOM provided a “Strategic Appreciation” chart showing the potential tensions in the world system generating instability counter to the interests of the United States. The chart indicated instability and criminal activity followed migratory/trade routes from troubled areas to the doorstep of the United States. Also clearly evident from the presentation, if not explicitly stated, was that USSOCOM required increased capability above the current 57,000 personnel in order to counter this threat and influence the unfolding global system in purposeful ways over the coming decades.

I am not an economist or an historian. But my instinct tells me that the United States is in danger of financial ruin caused in part by “imperial overstretch” and poor political decisions. The debt has reached the insanity level. Military resources are sure to decline in the coming years out of necessity for the United States to continue adequate governance at home. USSOCOM expansion currently requires sacrifices from the existing budgets of the services.

What if the USMC transitioned from an energetic and youthful force bred to take the hill to a more mature force capable of nuanced decision making and influence backed up with lethal effects? What if the USMC were given the task to fully assume responsibility to conduct Overseas Contingency Operations (GWOT)? The Marines already have significant capabilities in their favor to execute this mission: motivated; mobile by boat, air, or land; joint within the department; and a select group full of pride and tradition. These characteristics are immediately transferrable to turn this force into an effective GWOT capability for the benefit of the United States.

USMC responsibility for the GWOT would allow the Army, Air Force and Navy to focus on conventional and nuclear deterrence. This arrangement provides the highest potential for success in today’s fight while deterring or winning tomorrow’s conflict within the resource constraints of future budgets paying down massive debt.

davidbfpo

03-26-2010, 10:06 PM

Yogi,

Congratulations on such a first post, challenging "conventional" wisdom and advocating the USMC take on the GWOT role - even more of 'what' when you are an airman.

Elsewhere Imperial overstretch has been discussed, IIRC more on the financial burden, rather than who should be the "boots on the ground". Curiously after WW1 the British Empire considered and implemented the use of air power for imperial policing, notably in Iraq and less so along the Northwest Frontier (now the FATA). Military effectiveness and cost-cutting were involved, plus the then new "toy" of air power.

I was puzzled at this:
A speaker today from USSOCOM provided a “Strategic Appreciation” chart showing the potential tensions in the world system generating instability counter to the interests of the United States. The chart indicated instability and criminal activity followed migratory/trade routes from troubled areas to the doorstep of the United States.

For some the chart should have shown instability and criminal activity follow routes from the USA to troubled areas. Mexico is a good, current example where US domestic demand for drugs has increased the crisis of governance. I am sure other SWC members, including two SOF members, have chimed in on this theme recently.

Now I shall sit back and see if your post causes others to react.

John T. Fishel

03-27-2010, 12:46 PM

David, I must take some minor issue with your characterization of drug related crime as flowing from the US (demand). Demand is, itself, much more complicated with Europe being as (nearly ore perhaps more so) big a market for illicit drugs as the US. Then there are the emerging drug markets in the producing and transit countries. Other issues that are related - criminal gangs. The Salvadoran MS 13 and Mexican 18th Street were founded in the US, exported back to their home countries through deportation exacerbated by no notice to the host country from the deporting country(US, UK, Canada) and then re-exported to the US (and UK and Canada). Point, as my title suggests, is that this is a highly complex issue with few, if any, good answers.

For our Air Force and USMC friends - our world is now JOINT whether we likeit or not. USMC capabilities can be enhanced in the direction suggested or not but the USMC (and USAF, USN, USA, and USCG) will operate jointly for the foreseeable future under unified commanders, JTFs and JIATFs. That means that the GWOT, by whatever name, will be joint (writ large) - which I applaud. Each military service along with other govt agencies brings unique capabilities to the table which are generally much more effective when employed together than when used alone.

Cheers

JohnT

GI Zhou

03-29-2010, 08:58 AM

Yogi,

It could be argued that this was the mission of the Marine Corps in 1920s and 30s from Central America to China and outposts in between, and this continued after the Second World War. This is why they were so successful in the Chosin Resevoir Campiagn (the small number of Army tanks and tankers helped all out of proportion to their numbers too). The United States Marine Corps had kept its combat role and mission.

revet.

JeffWolf

03-29-2010, 09:14 AM

Gi Zhou:

I think this article - http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/2/257 - argues it was Marine personnel policy that contributed to success at Chosin.(Mod's note - article behind a register and paywall).

Thanks
Jeff

yogi

03-29-2010, 05:39 PM

Davidbfpo,

The SOCOM speaker acknowledged the return of resources/money etc. following the trade routes.

GI Zhou,

I agree that the Marines were highly effective at executing the majority of the President’s/United States foreign policy over the years. The Marines have used airpower in small wars for longer than the USAF has existed. My confidence in their capabilities and motivation are part of the reason I suggest their responsibility for this ongoing operation.

John T.

The GWOT is the “most likely” threat to the United States. Full up conventional or nuclear war, through direct conflict or the escalation smoldering cold war remnants is arguably the “most dangerous” for the long-term existence of the United States. One “joint” organization preparing for both means compromise. Jack of all trades, master of none…

If the Marine Corps assumed or is assigned the responsibility for the GWOT, this would increase the overall security of the United States. As an airman, I’ll use the debate about the Joint Strike Fighter and the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) to demonstrate. The USAF is purchasing 100 LAAR aircraft to fill the gap between conventional capabilities and Irregular Warfare requirements in a permissive air environment (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2009/07/usaf-officially-launches-light.html). This procurement is simultaneous with the requirement to cut over 5,000 active airmen from the force to comply with resource constraints while ISR requirements continue to rise. The idea is that these aircraft will allow increased USAF Foreign Internal Defense (FID) capability as well as fill a niche capability for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander during JTF operations.

I would argue this LAAR capability, while extremely important, is better served by the USMC invested/responsible for the GWOT and assuming FID as part of that effort. Does the USMC really need a Harrier replacement in a 4th generation STOL aircraft? I think it is a hard sell. With the JSF estimated at $135M per aircraft (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/20/jsf-price-tag-jumps-to-135-million/) that is an expensive platform for an arguably required capability. What if the USMC purchased 150 LAAR at $5M a piece (less than $1B for 150 aircraft and boats to preposition them on, or 7 JSF) and operated 50 for training and prepositioned the others afloat for potential FID or GWOT efforts? The bang for the buck would significantly increase for the United States if the Marines assumed this FID/GWOT role for the land/sea and air domains.

Thanks for the comments. Who listens to these ideas any way? Do they make a difference in the long run?

Yogi

Pete

03-29-2010, 11:38 PM

Okay, for the purpose of discussion let's assume that the Marine Corps has transferred its conventional warmaking responsibilities to the other services so it can focus exclusively on the counterterrorist mission. Does this mean that Jcustis would be forced to become an Army officer? :eek:

Old Eagle

03-30-2010, 03:00 PM

The last time I ran into this proposal was on the Army Staff where a bunch of heavy forces think tankers were toying with it. In the ramp down after Desert Storm, they were proposing that the Army transform itself into a heavy fighting force to "fight and win" the nations ground campaigns. Those light forces not transformed would be dealt away to the USMC to form contested entrance forces and troops for all the lesser included offenses.

I wonder if there was a good reason why it never came to fruition. Other than that "the division" (82d Abn for you uninitiated) would become a Marine asset.

Hmmm.:confused:

kotkinjs1

03-31-2010, 03:56 AM

Yogi (post 52),

I think you missed the intent of the Strategic Appreciation brief. First, from your post:

Also clearly evident from the presentation, if not explicitly stated, was that USSOCOM required increased capability above the current 57,000 personnel in order to counter this threat and influence the unfolding global system in purposeful ways over the coming decades.

That's actually the exact opposite what the brief intends to get across. PM me for details, but basically, the brief tries to show that while we were in our happy foreign policy Cold War box that defined everything we did up till 1989 and the way we looked at all other countries and 'problems' across the globe, the world changed but we, the USG and hence DoD, did not adapt our respective mindsets. The result we see today are true, fundamental challenges that get short shrift from USG while we focus our blood and treasure on the symptoms, not the causes. What's worse, other challenges are being left unchecked to the detriment of future stability and national security.

The brief then attempts to draw a correlation between how the DoD, and USSOCOM specifically, have traditionally been used in the past and how currently, given systemic, environmental, demographic, and economic trends, the USG can adapt to meet rising and future challenges. Through the yet-to-be-learned effective partnering across the various Departments and even NGOs and possibly MNCs and partner nations where applicable, we could possibly focus on and manage/mitigate/lessen the negative effects which current foreign policy and military legacy mindsets ignore or otherwise sideline in favor of focusing on major theater war with hypothetical enemies or maintaining the comfortable Cold War, zero-sum box we live in to this day.

To do this, SOCOM isn't asking for more bodies from the Services but rather cooperation at the strategic through the tacical level, from DOS, Agriculture, FBI, CIA, etc, etc, etc. This will make our SOF more effective and help the USG realize that in the "3D" construct all Depts and especially the SOF warrior apply all three of the "Ds" (diplomacy, development, defense...or more properly, 'security') at various times in their respective deployed duties. DoD and DoS have nominally bought into this 3D construct/theory, but there are still too many stovepipes and mis-allocated funding to make it effective.

The Strat App only tries to show that the world has changed while we weren't looking; not that its more complicated now than ever before (that's a convenient excuse people use to forgo critical thought in seeking blanket funding), but rather that views of problems/challenges, partners, economies of force, training, strategies, and of course, budgets, have to adapt to the new environment and its challenges. Its not seeking a bigger USSOCOM empire; its actually seeking a smaller and more shared DoD slice of the pie. To do that, SOCOM is first focusing and realigning its doctrine, mission, strategy, and vision of the world. So far, we've had success in shedding light on the new environment and the failings of our legacy crutches.

It sounds like the J5 shop might need to reengage or at least provide some standalone briefs/EXSUMs. Are you at AWC? SAMS?

MAJ Kotkin
(I'm deploying in a week, but I can take any questions/concerns and forward them to the right POC in the Strategy Division to get back to you.)