Do working men rebel? A call for papers.

[MikeF]

Gentlemen and Ladies:),

As you may or may not know, I'm taking a break from day-to-day blogging as I sort through my own emotional issues. I refuse to write unless my thoughts are controlled. However, my friends continue to press. COL Joe Felter et al, a dear friend, the founder of the USMA CTC, and a veteran of OEF-P, has co-authored a new paper entitled "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines."

I'm currently working on a qualitative model and anecdotal evidence using the special case of Zaganiyah to back their quantitative analysis. I've pushed the essay to Dave Dillegge for a spot on SWC. IMHO, this essay is a must read. This thread is a call for anecdotal evidence from the field. What say y'all? Is their method a confirm/deny? My answer is a complicated yes. Attached is the full essay.



Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines
Eli Berman, Joseph Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro
NBER Working Paper No. 15547
November 2009
JEL No. F51,F52,H4,H56,J6,O12,O53


ABSTRACT

Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in places with active insurgencies. We test that prediction on insurgencies in Iraq and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly- available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, we find a robust negative correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians.

Eli Berman
Department of Economics, 508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093
and NBER
elib@ucsd.edu

Jacob N. Shapiro
Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy
and International Affairs
Princeton University
Robertson Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
jns@princeton.edu

Joseph Felter
Hoover Institution
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
felter@hoover.stanford.edu


Introduction

The vast majority of aid money spent to reduce political violence is motivated by an opportunity-cost theory of distracting recruits. Two causal logics underlie this theory1. The most commonly cited is that gainfully employed young men are less likely toparticipate in insurgent violence2. A slightly less prominent argument is that
unemployment creates grievances, generating support for insurgent violence3. This support could lead to more violence directly—through more recruits or enhanced fundraising—or indirectly—by reducing the willingness of a population to share information with counter insurgents. Whichever causal pathway is posited, the testable implication is the same: there should be a positive correlation between unemployment and insurgent violence. We test that prediction on data from Iraq and the Philippines, using unemployment surveys and two newly- available measures of insurgency: (1)attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians.

The opportunity-cost approach is based upon a number of often implicit assumptions about the production of insurgent violence. Some of these include:

- Participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time.
- Insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits.
- The supply of labor is a binding constraint on insurgent organizations.

Each of these assumptions is questionable in some contexts, suggesting first that empirical testing is warranted, and second, that the relationship between unemployment and insurgency may be more complex than is commonly assumed.

A number of alternative possible causal channels actually predict a negative correlation between unemployment and violence. Suppose, for example, that the main constraint on the production of violence is the extent to which non-combatants share information about insurgents with the government (Kalyvas, 2006; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2008). This might imply no
correlation between unemployment and violence, or, if counterinsurgents spend money to buy intelligence –as they routinely do, as the local employment picture worsens and household incomes drop, the marginal dollar spent to buy inforation will go further and violence will fall. Alternatively, suppose that security efforts—establishing checkpoints and the like—reduce
violence but also increase unemployment by impeding the movement of goods and services.

That would imply a negative correlation between unemployment and violence. Or, fighting a perceived occupying force might be something people do out of belief in the cause, but can do only once basic needs are accounted for. If insurgency is a normal “good” in this narrow sense, then an improved economic situation could lead to greater levels of participation and hence
greater violence so that reduced unemployment causes more violence. We survey other alternative theories below.

To empirically distinguish between theories we use panel data on local unemployment and insurgent violence in two countries: Iraq and the Philippines. These countries vary greatly both in geography and in the nature and intensity of the insurgencies they face. Yet they yield broadly
similar results.

Using a variety of statistical models we find that the data rule out a positive correlation between unemployment and violence for both the Iraqi and Philippine insurgencies; if there is an opportunity cost effect, it is not dominant in either case. Why is the correlation of unemployment and violence generally negative? Existing data do not allow us to fully adjudicate between possible reasons, but we offer preliminary evidence that it is due to the relationship between local economic conditions and counterinsurgents’ efforts to combat violence. Our findings are consistent with two hypotheses concerning counterinsurgency: (1) as local economic conditions deteriorate, government forces and their allies are able to buy more intelligence on insurgents (i.e., the price of information falls); and (2) efforts to enhance security—establishing checkpoints and the like—damage the economy.

The remainder of this paper describes our effort to study the relationship between unemployment and insurgent violence in Iraq and the Philippines. First, we briefly review the existing literature on this relationship. We then describe our data, report estimation results, and conclude.

1 United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2006.
2 General Chiarelli, the U.S. Army Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq, made this
argument in a press briefing, December 8, 2006.
3 See, for example, Brainard and Chollet, 2007, p. 3.


Best

Mike

[MikeF]

Two emails combined...

I was not suprised by your findings. It something that I knew intuitively, but I was unsure of how to articulate or prove it. You've helped me with that.

In my time in Iraq, men continued to resist despite employment or wealth. They resisted based off feelings. These emotions ranged from pride, arrogance, jealousy, anger, and bitterness. This motive was projected towards different actors- the government, sects, religions, ethnicities, and other families. Again, it was mutually exclusive to the amount of money we handed out, services the government provided, or jobs available.

In our own country, we're dealing with a new greivance- the perceived state of the underemployed. I'm not sure how to translate this factor. It's a perception that someone is owed a better job or better wage based on his/her education, background, or talent. We violate the fundamental truth that one cannot spend more than one makes, but we demand more. It concerns me because I believe it drives into the heart of the social scientist question of "why do men rebel?"

Anyways, I just wanted to tell you that I appreciated your work, and I look forward to reading more. Currently, I'm reading Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. Her insights are quite profound towards this discussion.

************************************************** ******

I wrote this short essay today to assist y'all. You're doing some great work, and I can back up a portion of your quantitative analysis with a qualitative model and anecdotal evidence from my own experience. I have not published this model or my findings, and it is something that I may eventually use for a dissertation. Take some time to digest it. If my thoughts are helpful and you want to include it in a later publication, then just let me know.

Your results are neither controversial nor counterintuitive. Instead, they flow with the reason and logic of the great thinkers prior to this post-colonial, post-modern era. Moreover, the great practisioners of past small wars understood intuitively that sometimes less is more. So, keep at it :).

John Nash wanted to answer the question- how does one derive a fair settlement between two hostile parties? He determined that fair value was a measure of properly dividing utility based-on perceived effort, relative value, and merit. His end result was Nash Arbitration. When applied to hostile business contracts, his method works brilliantly. When applied to hostile social contracts (divorce, labor disputes,gangs, and insurgencies), his measure is left wanting. In social contracts, fairness is a measure of both utility AND emotion.

My model expands a bit past employment and violence, but I think it may have some value to your research. It shows emotion and utility, or in this case, hearts (emotion) and minds (utility). Keep in mind, with your initial work, dudes that join insurgencies are employed just like drug dealers are employed by gangs. We just don't track those statistics.

In the most simplest of descriptions, a woman's scorn in a hostile divorce will never be resolved by simple redistribution of property, assets, or alimony. In other words, in social contracts, a fair arbitration of utility cannot reliquish emotions of betrayal, hatred, anger, or disappointment.

In the same manner, simple employment, wages earned from services provided, will not stop a man with perceived grievances from taking up arms against his oppressor, destroying his roads, or blowing himself up in martyrdom. In today's world, described by President Obama as the Age of Selfishness (Fort Hood, 2009), there is a sense of entitlement that extends past the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (or property).

As is the nature of these matters, y'all will probably end this reading with more questions than answers. I left Iraq that way. Such is the endeavor of the social scientist. Let me know what y'all think. I'm in the process of leaving NPS so I'll include alternative contact information in case this email is void.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm not sure what the attitudinal data in Iraq shows, but in the Palestinian territories there is certainly little or no linkage between unemployment and support for armed attacks against Israel--indeed, socioeconomic factors appear, in general, to have little effect on political attitudes at all.

[marct]

One of the general, underlying assumptions of the correlation is that money = status. This is, in actuality, quite problematic for many individuals and in a number of cultures since it is a reflection of a base metaphysics that abstracts "worth" outside of an individual. At best, it is a marginal return on investment in economic language.

Mike, if you are looking for a qualitative correlation, especially amongst young men, then look at the local requirements for getting married. This may be related to income, capital or status (i.e. position within a ranked social structure), but is unlikely to be directly correlated with "employment" (which is a quite recent concept and reality; roughly 1850's or so).

You also have to look really seriously at the local cultural matrix as well. This is what Rex is getting at in the Palestinian case, since cultures are quite able to create "vectors of aggression" in the social ranking systems. BTW, if you want a US version of that, watch Glee and look at the interaction between the football team and the Glee club ;).

Cheers,

Marc

[MikeF]

My inner math geekiness gets excited when I see quantitative analysis that is derived from good data sets. I wrote too much initially.

Here's the bottom line:

COL Felter and some academics found a negative correlation in Iraq and the Phillipines between employment and violence. Over time, as employment increased, violence increased.

This is counter-intuitive to what we now think. GEN Charialli and the 1st CAV had "success" in Sadr City in 04/05 by getting the young men off the streets and employed. GEN Patraeus told us in 07 that money is a weapon. The academics analysis suggest otherwise. The real answer is probably sometimes, it depends.

What they need now is for practisioners to confirm/deny their hypothesis with anecdotal evidence. After that, they can start using econometrics and qualitative work to ask why it works in some areas and why it does not work in others (as Rex and Marc are suggesting).

So the question is

In your experience, did the level of violence increase/decrease as we flooded an AO with money and the men were employed?

Marc- I refuse to watch Glee :).

Mike

[marct]

Mike, just so you don't have to get the data later, it would be a really, REALLY, good idea to get any anecdotal evidence discretely located in both space and time (e.g. "Tikrit, Aug 2006" vs "Iraq"). That will let you start working out the local cultural variables that give rise to the negative correlation. BTW, I find it perfectly intuitive - then again, I live in a government town :D!

[Schmedlap]

More work = more violence? That seems neither intuitive nor counterintuitive to me. There is a reason that we refer to certain shootings as "going postal" rather than "going unemployed." Lots of people hate their jobs.

I would assert that a welfare state that functions well (by "well" I mean that it efficiently churns out the welfare benefits) stands a good chance of experiencing very little violence because people are getting a large part of their income for little more than filling out paperwork and demonstrating need and/or helplessness, real or faked.

I would also assert that a relatively wealthy society with a non-existent welfare apparatus could quite easily turn violent if a large portion of the population is poor (low income and/or few assets) because the sense of inequality and rejection, merited or not, will rile people up or make them prone to being riled up by agitators.

I think there are a lot of other factors besides income. Are people upset? Do they blame the gov't? Do they feel threatened (by an ethnic group gaining power, an ideology gaining power, laws changing significantly, etc)? You can have a high-paying job, be angry about something unrelated to income/assets, and blame the gov't. Consider how many rich comfortable people hate(d) GW Bush and were willing to cough up cash to defeat him and, when that failed in '04, were willing to cough up cash to defeat McCain simply because he was successfully portrayed as Bush II. Grievances can come from anywhere. While they are often real or legitimate, they need not be.

[Cavguy]

I'm inclined to agree with your thesis. Jobs never really seemed to dampen the insurgency in my limited experiences. Security did, combined with legitimate local government.

Kind of confirms Moyar's thesis that the real problem is in grievance against the govt/system .... which is a problem of leadership.

And means we're in deep doo-doo in Afghanistan.

[tequila]

I would assert that a welfare state that functions well (by "well" I mean that it efficiently churns out the welfare benefits) stands a good chance of experiencing very little violence because people are getting a large part of their income for little more than filling out paperwork and demonstrating need and/or helplessness, real or faked.


I'd flip your analysis on its head. A welfare state that functions efficiently already assumes several major social stabilizers are in place: (1) commands enough resources to distribute (2) has data and control over enough population to distribute welfare goods (3) has the bureaucratic mechanisms and social players to both extract and distribute such goods.



Kind of confirms Moyar's thesis that the real problem is in grievance against the govt/system .... which is a problem of leadership.

I don't think that's leadership. That's politics.

[MikeF]

There is a reason that we refer to certain shootings as "going postal" rather than "going unemployed." Lots of people hate their jobs.

Very good point.

Cavguy said:

And means we're in deep doo-doo in Afghanistan.

Not necessarily. All this analysis is showing is that throwing money at the problem doesn't work. Rex's example of Palestine-Israel is probably the best case in point. I always scratched my head when guys boast over how much CERP/Reconstruction money they spent during their tour. My point was so what? What is the effect or return on investment?

That's the benefit of what some scholars are now doing. They're using available data to test our assumptions and COIN strategies to find out what works and what doesn't work and why.

Here's some things that do work, and it partially goes back to the saying "time heals all wounds."

1. Conflict Resolution. The marraige counselor of small wars- neutral mediator attempts to help competing factions resolve differences. If no resolution is found, then groups may have to be seperated (Bosnia/Serbia).

2. Forgiveness. I listened to a discussion on NPR about how Rwandans opened up a public forum for former fighters to apologize for atrocities. Apparently, it's working.

3. Increase of violence by the host nation/COIN to establish control. This works in the short term as we know from Iraq (Population control measures, lowered targeting criteria, curfews, food/service restrictions, etc), but the long-term effectiveness is in doubt if not coupled with other measures.

4. Micro-Financing. Initially started by Mohammed Yunnis on the village level and taken globally with internet sites like Ashoka.org, these organizations attempt to fundamentally change societies through vetted, targeted development.

Mike

[Fuchs]

COL Felter and some academics found a negative correlation in Iraq and the Phillipines between employment and violence. Over time, as employment increased, violence increased.

This is counter-intuitive to what we now think. GEN Charialli and the 1st CAV had "success" in Sadr City in 04/05 by getting the young men off the streets and employed. GEN Patraeus told us in 07 that money is a weapon. The academics analysis suggest otherwise. The real answer is probably sometimes, it depends.

A statistician would likely call it simply "empirically unrelated".

[Meh]

Surely whether working men rebel is primarily related to whether they're getting laid. Now that is scientific fact. There's no real evidence for it; but it is scientific fact.

[Adam L]

Surely whether working men rebel is primarily related to whether they're getting laid. Now that is scientific fact. There's no real evidence for it; but it is scientific fact.

That is entirely true. I don't know if we men would do much of anything without the sexual motivation. That is with the obvious exclusion of violent acts which we will commit to get laid, or because we are not getting laid. Perhaps we should initiate sex-centric counter insurgency operations. I'm trying to reverse engineer an operational acronym. So far I have: Sex Centric Human Tactical Optimized Orgasm Program, or "SCHTOOP."

I remember a few years ago when CNN was covering how the most popular pharmaceuticals in Iraq were Prozac and Viagra. Perhaps we missed something.

Adam L

[jcustis]

That is entirely true. I don't know if we men would do much of anything without the sexual motivation. That is with the obvious exclusion of violent acts which we will commit to get laid, or because we are not getting laid. Perhaps we should initiate sex-centric counter insurgency operations. I'm trying to reverse engineer an operational acronym. So far I have: Sex Centric Human Tactical Optimized Orgasm Program, or "SCHTOOP."

I remember a few years ago when CNN was covering how the most popular pharmaceuticals in Iraq were Prozac and Viagra. Perhaps we missed something.

Adam L

It's interesting that this point comes up. I had a conversation with a special operations civil affairs soldier who was supporting a NSW team. He told the tale of doing well at one key leader engagement with a small sheik because they spent several hours talking about nothing but porn, sex, and the shiek's exploits. :eek:

[slapout9]

It's interesting that this point comes up. I had a conversation with a special operations civil affairs soldier who was supporting a NSW team. He told the tale of doing well at one key leader engagement with a small sheik because they spent several hours talking about nothing but porn, sex, and the shiek's exploits. :eek:

I'm telling you the fourth F is the key to victory:D

[Adam L]

It's interesting that this point comes up. I had a conversation with a special operations civil affairs soldier who was supporting a NSW team. He told the tale of doing well at one key leader engagement with a small sheik because they spent several hours talking about nothing but porn, sex, and the shiek's exploits. :eek:

There are two universal cross-cultural constants. The first is porn, and the second is The Rolling Stones.

Adam L

[MikeF]

It's interesting that this point comes up. I had a conversation with a special operations civil affairs soldier who was supporting a NSW team. He told the tale of doing well at one key leader engagement with a small sheik because they spent several hours talking about nothing but porn, sex, and the shiek's exploits. :eek:

It's very interesting that he brought this point up. My unit caught one bomb-maker, and outside of the bomb-making dvds we found, we found substational amounts of American and home-made deviant porn.

Also, Sayid Qutb supposedly had some issues with sex.

I've always wondered if that was a causal variable. Kinda hard to prove. It's like trying to figure out how many men are employed by a gang or insurgent group. Can you imagine a survey officer walking around asking,

"Excuse me, my records show that you are currently unemployed. Are you gainfully employed by al Qaeda?" Probably wouldn't go over very well.

Mike

[Meh]

I should also note that how often one frequents and posts on message boards is inversely related to how often one gets laid. Now that's scientific fact....etc.

[Adam L]

I should also note that how often one frequents and posts on message boards is inversely related to how often one gets laid. Now that's scientific fact....etc.

Nah...for some of us it is more of a post-coital thing.

Adam L

[jmm99]

According to Dave Grossman (author of On Combat and On Killing), there is a corellation between sex and violence (killing, watching others being killed, thinking of killing, thinking of being killed, etc.).

Not a shrink, and not trying to be; so, I dunno if sex is a cause or an effect. I suppose the two things could be interactive.

If you think about it, the whole thing might be an ancient, hard-wired species survival mechanism: take a life, create a life.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

During 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland the UK spent a huge amount on subsidies to all sorts of activity, including the non-state security sector. I cannot now recall the unemplyment figures, but IIRC there was at the start in 1969 higher unemployment in the Catholic / Republican ghettoes than Protestant or Loyalist areas.

Eventually one fix that appeared to work was state funding of "community projects" and an "army" of community workers. I have little doubt this meant funding paramilitaries at times, but as both "sides" had their 'snout in the trough" few complained.

The "projects" often involved IIRC sports halls and other facilities, which were rarely inter-communal.

I am sure there are learned articles on this factor, none on my radar.

Today in the UK the impact of unemployment upon radicalisation is sometimes debated in public, although IIRC those who are radicalised and are caught in acts of violence are more often employed. My own opinion is that high unemployment may contribute, making it easier for an individual to believe he is worthless and only the 'cause' provides an answer. In one area often the focus of CT and non-CT responses nearly two years ago youth unemployment was 55%; allowing for changes since then and the UK practice of fiddling the figures I would not be surprised if was 75%. Weirdly the local buoyant economic factor is drug dealing.

[Adam L]

According to Dave Grossman (author of On Combat and On Killing), there is a corellation between sex and violence (killing, watching others being killed, thinking of killing, thinking of being killed, etc.).
Yes, there is a correlation between sex and killing, but applying it in this case is a bit of a stretch. Also, Grossman perverts the whole sex and violence relationship. (I can't go into detail on this as I haven't read any of his works in a while.) It really is more of a sex and death issue. (This (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_drive)isn't the best article, but it will give you an idea of what I'm talking about.)



If you think about it, the whole thing might be an ancient, hard-wired species survival mechanism: take a life, create a life.

Regards

Mike

As far as evolution is concerned, sex, like food and water, is an essential. Just as we will kill for food and water, we will kill for sex. In this case the equation is more:

Money = Sex

Job = Money

Therefore

No Job = No Sex

Then

No Sex = Frustrations

Rebellion = Frustration venting

Therefore

No Job = Rebellion

Edited: I just remembered this: for a fascinating intro to sex and death, you can either watch the David Cronenberg movie "Crash (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZTYkmAcsvk)," (not for viewing by younger audiences) or the J G Ballard novel of the same title on which it is based.

Adam L

[Meh]

Being sexually frustrated is definitely a factor in some way. It's interesting to me that Nidal Malik Hasan would go around mosques trawling for a wife. Many Muslims in America - especially those well integrated enough to serve in the military - have no qualms about dating. Nor do many Muslims outside America.

But no, Hasan was an all-or-nothing, "if you like it, you should put a ring on it" kind of guy. Here's a guy who's totally afraid of going on an unsuccessful date. Totally afraid of rejection. Perhaps even afraid of a woman wielding power over his destiny (in this case, whether he gets to marry her). Fundamentally insecure.

But can you do something about sexual frustration? Especially on the societal level (and these problems - men with weak egos - are particularly strong in societies where women are marginalised)?

Nah. Just something you have to factor in and live with it.

[M-A Lagrange]

Well, I would support Marct assumption/assertion about marriage.
In all failed State post conflict and conflict context I have been working in the question of marriage and youth has been at the center of the cause of violence.
In Liberia, the 80 revolution happened after the raw material world crisis. As Firestone was leaving the place, young men could not find any work and therefore could not afford the dot. So they could not marry and then it created (with time) conditions for civil war. (the help of C. Taylor also).
About this, I would recommand Stephen Ellis book, the mask ofanarchy. It explores and explains in details how Liberia went fromalmost peaceful place to one of the worst african war (Liberia used to say that liberia was a piece of hell the devil forgot on hearth...).
I am facing the same problem in Suth Sudan. While elections are also a source of conflict, the youth unemployment creates the conditions for violence.

That said, I am not sure that unemployed men only do rebel. Most of the european resistants (they did rebel at their time) used to have a formal job as a cover.
Mao states that the partisan has to be integrated into the villagers life and participate to daily work.
The main question would be what could possibly push an established man or woman (with a family, a job, a social position...) to take arms and run to the bush.

Also, the definition of rebel could be interresting. Is a supporter providing intelligence and logistic a rebel?

Unemployed people are more prone to rebel as they see rebellion a way to be integrated into the society and then get, through insurgent engagement, the social recognition they do not get through normal life. (especially men, that's personal opinion).

Socio-economical context is also important. Economical disruption are often the core source of social disruption leading to violence. The economical causes of rebelion and insurgencies in failed States are deeply linked with the problematic of development and ressources sharing. See the war economist and black economy authors.

And finally, taking the example of LRA, Sierra Leone, Liberia or DRC, the rebels have found a solution to the question of do working men rebel: they abduct children, brainwash them with drugs and extrem violence to let them with the only possibilty to join them. (Once you've kill your brothers and father, raped your mother and sisters... Basically the job question seems meaningless).

[MikeF]

For some background on this topic, I would recommend that one starts with the Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel (http://www.amazon.com/Why-Men-Rebel-Robert-Gurr/dp/0691021678/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1260199902&sr=1-1). For a young social scientist or military practisioner, this book is a classic that begins to attempt to address the question.

For the Cliffnotes version, just read this review (http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680/).


This is a classic book that explores why people engage in political violence (riots, rebellion, coups, etc.) and how regimes respond. Though written long before the current rash of insurgencies, it has a lot to say about what is happening in the early 21st century.

In this book, Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence.

Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."(p.24)

It is noteworthy that Gurr does not look to a more absolute or objective indicator of deprivation as the source of political violence. People can become inured to a bad state of affairs, even one that offers so little access to life-sustaining resources that members of the group are starving or dying of remediable diseases or exposure.

If, however, there is a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood of rebellion. Gurr posits this to be the case even if there is no question that their basic needs will be met. The first situation may be a desperate one, but it is the second that is frustrating. And, according to Gurr, just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of an individual, so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by social groups.

A number of other variables influence the use of violence as well, for example the culture, the society, and the political environment. The culture must at least accept, if not approve, violent action as a means to an end. Political violence is also more likely if the current leadership and/or the socio-economic/political system is seen as illegitimate. Another factor is whether violence is considered to be a viable remedy to the problem.


Mike

[marct]

The relative deprivation hypothesis is probably one of the better ones around, especially since it is one of the few that actually reflects how we, as a species, think / perceive, which is in "relative" terms. Part of the reason why I suggested looking at marriage is that it is a rather complex proxy for both sex and status that is independent of any particular economic system 9i.e. it goes on regardless of the formal economic systems).

One of the other things that, I think, is important to look at is the countervailing question. Why do me rebel when they have (good) jobs? Take a look, for example, at the number of people involved in terrorist attacks who have well paying jobs and great careers. I would submit, as a subject for discussion, that the emphasis on looking at the unemployment - rebellion nexus is really a reflection of the US and Western cultural assumption of the primacy of income as a status marker, and its obverse; looking at well employed people who "rebel" casts doubt on that assumption.

Having thrown the cat amongst the pidgeons, I'll now gracefully withdraw :D...

[MikeF]

Why do me rebel when they have (good) jobs?

That is the answer that seems to alude us all. Here's five very different examples to consider.

1. Charles Manson. We view him as a sociopath, but to his followers, he was leading a rebelion. His recruits came from rich families. Purpose- anarchy.

2. Latino Gangs. Money, Respect, Power is one LA gangs motto.

3. UBL/ Al Qaeda. Purpose- establish Caliphate.

4. Tyler Durbin/ Fight Club. Purpose- Anarchy.

5. Ayn Rand/Libertarians/Tea Parties. Purpose- Reclaim Capitalism.

Each group taps into some type of recruiting method that targets something (grievance, emotion, religion, whatever).

Disclaimer- I am not suggesting that the Tea Parties are akin to al Qaeda. I could have easily used a group like Code Pink.

Mike

[marct]

Hi Mike,


That is the answer that seems to alude us all. Here's five very different examples to consider.

Well, the pattern is similar behind all of them. as one pundit noted, "Man does not live by bread alone". What it really comes to is a quest for meaning and the differences between meaning structures provided by a society/culture and the opportunities to pursue them. You might want to check out Merton and Strain Theory (decent little article here (http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/merton.htm)).

[MikeF]

Well, the pattern is similar behind all of them. as one pundit noted, "Man does not live by bread alone". What it really comes to is a quest for meaning and the differences between meaning structures provided by a society/culture and the opportunities to pursue them. You might want to check out Merton and Strain Theory (decent little article here (http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/merton.htm)).

Marc,

Thank you for the link. Merton's expansion on Anomie theory makes a bit more sense to me than Durkheim's original definition. On a side note, this excerpt on the differences between the inalienable pursuit of happiness and the American Dream seems particularly relevant today.


The wording of the paper and the order of ideas remained quite close to the original product until Merton began his discussion of the accumulation of wealth and the American Dream. It is at this juncture that he expanded the discussion significantly. He elaborated on the American Dream and Americans’ desire for pecuniary success stating that there is no stopping point within the dream. The American Dream is cyclical in nature. An individual wants just a little bit more than what he has and once he achieves the little bit more the process will begin again. Merton (1949:233) declared that the origin of the dream was an individual’s parents, who he deemed to be the “transmission belt for the values and goals of the group of which they are a part, with schools acting as the official agency for passing on prevailing values.” He also claimed that individuals are bombarded from all sides with culturally accepted goals, citing numerous examples.

This description seems to be the core assumption of Thomas Friedman's Hot, Flat, and Crowded (http://www.amazon.com/Hot-Flat-Crowded-Revolution-America/dp/0374166854), and his call for nation-building in the US.


Our Parents were the Greatest Generation...My generation...turned out to be the "Grasshopper Generation..." devoted to our recent age of excess...and gorged on the savings and natural world that had been bequeathed to us- leaving our children huge financial and ecological deficits...And therefore we and our children are going to have to be the "Re-Generation," and summon the will, energy, focus, and innovative prowess to regenerate, renew, and reinvent America in a way that will show the world a new model for growing standards of living and interacting with nature that is truly sustainable, renewable, healthy, safe, fair, and creative of more opportunities for more people in more places than ever before.

Mike

[outletclock]

is that the authors utilized a set of assumptions, and those assumptions are questionable, and may have caused the disconfirmation of their results.

1) Is participation in insurgency really a full-time occupation? Isn't one of the defining characteristics of (some) insurgencies that the insurgents are "part-time" soldiers (and thus difficult to distinguish from the population)? In other words, soldiers by night, "ordinary people by day?"

2) Is insurgency a low-skill occupation? It would seem to me it might make more sense to take an industrial organization approach, in which insurgent organizations are looked at as "firms," with various members possessing various skill sets of varying scarcity and complexity (or lack thereof)?

3) Sure, the supply of labor might be a binding constraint, but *how* binding is it? Was there a *real* scarcity of insurgents in, say, 2003 Iraq?

Regards,
OC

###

The opportunity-cost approach is based upon a number of often implicit assumptions about the production of insurgent violence. Some of these include:

- Participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time.
- Insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits.
- The supply of labor is a binding constraint on insurgent organizations.

[outletclock]

the disconfirmation of their hypotheses.

Regards
OC

[Schmedlap]

Participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time.
- Insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits.

I think both of those are inaccurate. Many members of the insurgency in Iraq included doctors, engineers, and other professionals. Many were still doing their legitimate full-time jobs. Many insurgent roles are low-skill, but many are not, particularly folks who were in leadership, who were financiers or logisticians, and the guys who handled propaganda.

[M-A Lagrange]

I tend to believe that men rebel for a cause. The main problem for us is to actually recognise that cause. Few weeks ago there was a threat in SWJ called do soldiers fight for a cause.
The main feeling I had in that threat was that most of the participants came with the assumption that soldiers do a job. It goes with our model of society but does not fit into Afghan society for example. (Yes soldiers and policemen have a job there).
My point is that we, westerners, engage in the army or police with some bottom line adhesion to the cause it is fighting for. Cause and job are combined.
In the case of rebels, it is the cause that drives the engagement.
Looking at Iraq with a complete external eye, I can see that men did not rebel in a first time. They took an opportunity due to power vacancy to first pay back what the other side made them suffer and then impose their domination. And yes, the US did see it as a rebellion, rebels questioning their domination on Iraq.
In Afghanistan it is even deeper as US came and said we will change your society from A to Z.
In both cases what they have in common is a cause, not the same but a cause.

What makes them embrace that cause is the question.
But if an external power comes to your home and says: Ok I’am the new sheriff in town and you will do things the way I want.
Wouldn’t you rebel?

May be we should start looking at that first.
Because what makes you rebel (the deep and high theoretical cause) is probably the same as them.
If the US comes in my home to tell me they will run my country. Despite I like them and we share core value: I will rebel!

[MikeF]

I think both of those are inaccurate. Many members of the insurgency in Iraq included doctors, engineers, and other professionals. Many were still doing their legitimate full-time jobs. Many insurgent roles are low-skill, but many are not, particularly folks who were in leadership, who were financiers or logisticians, and the guys who handled propaganda.

Maybe it's more appropriate for Outletclock to refute the assumptions with some quantitative or at least multiple case-study qualitative evidence rather than just say "I don't like the assumptions" and ask further questions.

Yes, in the Iraq case, we caused immediate unemployment when we disbanded the Army and outlawed the Ba'ath party. But, they're covering Iraq and the Phillipines. Furthermore, Rex added the Israel/Palestine study to provide additional weight.

With that said, I got to check the dictionary on the definition of parsimonous.

Mike

[outletclock]

why the predicted results did not arise. If anything, I'd think it'd be more appropriate for me to refute the *outcomes* of the authors' "experiment" or paper rather than the *assumptions* they made in conducting and writing the experiment/paper. I was, again, just trying to come up with a parsimonious* approach toward explaining why predicted results were not found.

**I merely ventured a guess as to why: flawed assumptions.**

Besides, abundant labor/unemployment was not their only assumption - the most egregious assumption to me was that insurgency was a full-time occupation. To me the defining characteristic of an insurgency is that an insurgency (here I'm thinking of the archetypal Viet Cong) works during the day. Finally, that insurgencies are not vertically-integrated enterprises struck me as an assumption worth quarreling with.

I don't think the burden of proof is on me to come up with an explanation as to why the paper's/experiments outcomes failed to match the authors' prediction, through quantitative evidence or multiple case studies, and quite frankly, I'm not sure I could do it, certainly off the top of my head and without research. If that renders my post presumptuous (or the prior ones), I apologize. I simply think/thought it's adequate for me to posit one reason why (once more) results encountered were not the ones anticipated.

Regards,
OC

**
Parsimony: extreme or excessive economy or frugality; stinginess; niggardliness. :-)

[MikeF]

why the predicted results did not arise. If anything, I'd think it'd be more appropriate for me to refute the *outcomes* of the authors' "experiment" or paper rather than the *assumptions* they made in conducting and writing the experiment/paper. I was, again, just trying to come up with a parsimonious* approach toward explaining why predicted results were not found.

**I merely ventured a guess as to why: flawed assumptions.**

Besides, abundant labor/unemployment was not their only assumption - the most egregious assumption to me was that insurgency was a full-time occupation. To me the defining characteristic of an insurgency is that an insurgency (here I'm thinking of the archetypal Viet Cong) works during the day. Finally, that insurgencies are not vertically-integrated enterprises struck me as an assumption worth quarreling with.

I don't think the burden of proof is on me to come up with an explanation as to why the paper's/experiments outcomes failed to match the authors' prediction, through quantitative evidence or multiple case studies, and quite frankly, I'm not sure I could do it, certainly off the top of my head and without research. If that renders my post presumptuous (or the prior ones), I apologize. I simply think/thought it's adequate for me to posit one reason why (once more) results encountered were not the ones anticipated.

Regards,
OC

**
Parsimony: extreme or excessive economy or frugality; stinginess; niggardliness. :-)

OC,

Thanks for the reply and teaching me a new word:cool:. You did bring up an important point. Some (or many) insurgents may be employed during the day in legitimate jobs while working for the insurgency at night. Honestly, I don't know how you would track that figure unless you conducted a survey 10-15 years after hostilities were ceased.

We spend a lot of money on the assumption that if the people are employed, then they won't fight. That may be true in some cases, but it is not true in others. For instance, many Sunnis in Iraq felt that the gov't was illegitimate so they were going to fight regardless.

Contrastingly, in the case of perceived underemployment, the initial results (their paper is not published yet) is that there is a strong correlation to rebelling. That probably goes back to the original hypothesis of relative deprevation.

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development (http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/fali_1005.pdf) by Fali Huang of Singapore Management University


This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

Walt Whitman Rostow (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Whitman_Rostow)


Walt Whitman Rostow (also known as Walt Rostow or W.W. Rostow) (October 7, 1916 – February 13, 2003) was an American economist and political theorist who served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Prominent for his role in the shaping of American policy in Southeast Asia during the 1960s, he was a staunch anti-communist, and was noted for a belief in the efficacy of capitalism and free enterprise. Rostow served as a major adviser on national security affairs under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He supported American military involvement in the Vietnam War. In his later years he taught at Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin with his wife, Elspeth Rostow, who would later become dean of the school. He wrote extensively in defense of free enterprise economics, particularly in developing nations. Rostow was famous especially for writing the book The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto (1960) which became a classic text in several fields of social sciences.

[SJPONeill]

Are there not two questions here? The first is why do working men rebel? The second is that described in the abstract for the paper: why do working men rebel in insurgencies? or perhaps why do working men support insurgencies? I wonder also does the paper include both sex's employment status as there may be some interesting differences between stats for men and those for women - which may or may not be related to local culture.

I'm thinking that perhaps the answers to the first question may be totally different to the answers to the second; and that there may also be distinctions between those who simply rebel and those who rebel and align to a cause (rebel by aligning to cause?).

This is a great topic and one which challenges a lot of preconceptions - certainly I am going to be following it with interest with a view to rethinking my stance on opportunity insurgents...

[outletclock]

on some of the issues you raise.

1) Are all rebellions insurgencies?

2) Are all insurgencies rebellions?

3) Should we substitute rebellions for revolutions? (Perhaps this is just me.)

4) Why do working men rebel (presumably, as opposed to the unemployed - an issue, I think, touched upon by Marx in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte")? That is, is there a differential propensity to rebel/be an insurgent depending on one's unemployment status, i.e., employed versus unemployed, not whether one has "high" or "low" unemployment status - e.g., Wall Street Titan versus (fill in the blank).

5) Is there a differential propensity to rebel/be an insurgent depending on one's sex? Here I'd be thinking hard about the opportunity costs of being a woman in an insurgent organization, or being a neutral, or being a government supporter; and - once more in regards to the industrial organization of insurgencies - the role of women within insurgencies.

6) Perhaps most interestingly, strategic and/or opportunistic behavior during insurgencies and revolutions: free riding off others (e.g., waiting until the insurgents appear to have won, and then joining the insurgents - or the counterinsurgents, as the case may be), waiting for tipping points, trying to gauge tipping points. I'm struck, I think, by Jeffrey Race's observation in "War Comes to Long An" that the war had been won by the Viet Cong by some *very* early stage - say, 1955 (I don't have the book available).

Don't claim to have any of the answers, but thought I'd try and sort out the some of the issues, although I might not have been any more successful at that, either.

Regards
OC

###

Are there not two questions here? The first is why do working men rebel? The second is that described in the abstract for the paper: why do working men rebel in insurgencies? or perhaps why do working men support insurgencies? I wonder also does the paper include both sex's employment status as there may be some interesting differences between stats for men and those for women - which may or may not be related to local culture.

I'm thinking that perhaps the answers to the first question may be totally different to the answers to the second; and that there may also be distinctions between those who simply rebel and those who rebel and align to a cause (rebel by aligning to cause?).

This is a great topic and one which challenges a lot of preconceptions - certainly I am going to be following it with interest with a view to rethinking my stance on opportunity insurgents...

[MikeF]

on some of the issues you raise.

1) Are all rebellions insurgencies?

2) Are all insurgencies rebellions?

3) Should we substitute rebellions for revolutions? (Perhaps this is just me.)

4) Why do working men rebel (presumably, as opposed to the unemployed - an issue, I think, touched upon by Marx in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte")? That is, is there a differential propensity to rebel/be an insurgent depending on one's unemployment status, i.e., employed versus unemployed, not whether one has "high" or "low" unemployment status - e.g., Wall Street Titan versus (fill in the blank).

5) Is there a differential propensity to rebel/be an insurgent depending on one's sex? Here I'd be thinking hard about the opportunity costs of being a woman in an insurgent organization, or being a neutral, or being a government supporter; and - once more in regards to the industrial organization of insurgencies - the role of women within insurgencies.

6) Perhaps most interestingly, strategic and/or opportunistic behavior during insurgencies and revolutions: free riding off others (e.g., waiting until the insurgents appear to have won, and then joining the insurgents - or the counterinsurgents, as the case may be), waiting for tipping points, trying to gauge tipping points. I'm struck, I think, by Jeffrey Race's observation in "War Comes to Long An" that the war had been won by the Viet Cong by some *very* early stage - say, 1955 (I don't have the book available).

Don't claim to have any of the answers, but thought I'd try and sort out the some of the issues, although I might not have been any more successful at that, either.

Some thoughts:

#1,2,3. My understanding of the literature is that insurgency, rebellion, and revolution are synonymous. I prefer to use the old language as it is easier to understand. When trying to differentiate between the different phases, I turn to Mao's Protracted War three phases. In every society, many rebellions will exist on the Phase 0 level (small, non-violent, non-influential). Basically, they start with an idea. Most insurgencies are uninteresting- they never build momentum, the government squashes them once they go violent, or they fight through the political system. It's the violent ones that we study. One key exception is the non-violent social movements of the 20th century. I suppose we can call them assymetric rebellions.

#5. Sex is another interesting case. Most serial killers and sociopaths are men, but some exceptions remain. We had a phenomena with female suicide bombers in Iraq that has not been analyzed in depth, but for the most part, it's the men who rebel. One thing that I recently learned is that in Afghan/Pakistan society, young men must receive permission from their mother's to join the rebellion. So, if we can influence the mothers through education, then over time, we may minimize the recruitment of young men.

For a man to take action (blow up his own roads, kill/behead his neighbors, or blow himself up), he's got to be pretty upset. My own thoughts are that grievances are a combination of utility and emotion.

Thoughts?

Mike

[outletclock]

Here are my thoughts:

1) I'd agree that we can and do use the three words mentioned synonymously. That said, I think they can and sometimes do carry different connotations. I hear a lot about the French Revolution, not the French Insurgency. Maybe the magnitude of the changes wrought cause it to carry a different name? Another thoughts: is using "Phases" to delineate stages of an insurgency overly dependent on Mao's theorizing? After all, isn't it the ostensible spontaneity or rapidity of revolutions that makes distinguishable from other phenomena? ("And all of a sudden, one day in 17XX, everything changed.") I'm probably picking nits here, or not disagreeing with you at all, but just some thoughts.

2) Sex IS interesting. :) No, seriously, my sense is some insurgencies integrate women into their operations far more than other insurgencies. At the other end of the spectrum, my understanding is there's a female warlord leader somewhere in the contested part of Burma/Myanmar. Presumably, everything being equal, one would want as many boots on the ground, so to speak, female or male. So it's interesting the power of culture (and obviously not one limited to small wars or insurgencies): to gain permission to fight, to decide to let women fight, and the ways they do it ("Well, you'll fight, by putting these rivets on these planes.").

3) Grievance, in my opinion, could be utility-maximizing or emotion, although I think in common terms we think of a grievance as something purely emotional rather than something purely utility-maximizing. I don't see why it couldn't run down the whole spectrum - "I do it partly because I think there will be wealth redistribution when we burn down X's farm because he's on A's side, and also, by the way, I don't like X, and if you asked me to tell you what proportion of my actions are driven by calculations of utility and what proportion are driven by calculations of emotion, I wouldn't be able to tell you; I see a window of opportunity to do something I want to do, for reasons I'm not quite sure of, and I act." Obviously long-standing grievances might differ greatly from my lame example, but nonetheless, why a grievance couldn't be both emotion- and utility-based in any proportion eludes me.

I think even the word "grievance" might be misleading, because it carries connotations of emotion: rationale might be better. That's Stathis Kalyvas's take on FM 3-24, based on my reading of the Perspectives of Politics article by him I read, and how it intersects with the greed versus grievance literature on civil wars; basically, FM 3-24 assumes insurgents operate because of grievances, not greed. Ergo, fix the host nation, one eliminates the rationale for the insurgency, and one eliminates the insurgency. But if insurgents aren't motivated by grievance, but greed (which is an emotion, now that I think about it), then "the solution" changes.

4) Regarding why a man blows himself up, I'd take a look at an article by Ehud Sprinzak in Foreign Policy from about 5-10 years ago (wish that I could recall more closely its date). You can probably pick up the big RAND works on terrorism (try Darcy ME Noricks's articles for citations, although I'm not guaranteeing it's there). Basically, people become socialized to kill himself or herself, but you can't make someone kill himself or herself (ie, upset enough to kill himself or herself.) You can identify would-be suicide bombers like the Columbine kids and nurture them along, but that's about the best you can do. That's what I recall from the article, though - don't hold me to it. :)

5) "Most serial killers and sociopaths are men" I think most would-be and actual presidential assassins are or have been white men of small stature, too.

Regards,
OC

[MikeF]

Good Points...


1) I'd agree that we can and do use the three words mentioned synonymously. That said, I think they can and sometimes do carry different connotations. I hear a lot about the French Revolution, not the French Insurgency. Maybe the magnitude of the changes wrought cause it to carry a different name? Another thoughts: is using "Phases" to delineate stages of an insurgency overly dependent on Mao's theorizing? After all, isn't it the ostensible spontaneity or rapidity of revolutions that makes distinguishable from other phenomena? ("And all of a sudden, one day in 17XX, everything changed.") I'm probably picking nits here, or not disagreeing with you at all, but just some thoughts.

The phrasing is a matter of perspective. King George III and King Louis XVI would disagree with both the American and French Revolutions, but they lost so we don't call them insurgencies or rebellions. In the American case, a phase zero brewed from 1760-1770, moved into phase I-II during the early 1770s, then finally into a full blown phase III.


2) Sex IS interesting. :) One of the main financiers and facilitators in the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq was a woman.


3) Grievance, in my opinion, could be utility-maximizing or emotion, although I think in common terms we think of a grievance as something purely emotional rather than something purely utility-maximizing. I don't see why it couldn't run down the whole spectrum - "I do it partly because I think there will be wealth redistribution when we burn down X's farm because he's on A's side, and also, by the way, I don't like X, and if you asked me to tell you what proportion of my actions are driven by calculations of utility and what proportion are driven by calculations of emotion, I wouldn't be able to tell you; I see a window of opportunity to do something I want to do, for reasons I'm not quite sure of, and I act." Obviously long-standing grievances might differ greatly from my lame example, but nonetheless, why a grievance couldn't be both emotion- and utility-based in any proportion eludes me.

I think even the word "grievance" might be misleading, because it carries connotations of emotion: rationale might be better. That's Stathis Kalyvas's take on FM 3-24, based on my reading of the Perspectives of Politics article by him I read, and how it intersects with the greed versus grievance literature on civil wars; basically, FM 3-24 assumes insurgents operate because of grievances, not greed. Ergo, fix the host nation, one eliminates the rationale for the insurgency, and one eliminates the insurgency. But if insurgents aren't motivated by grievance, but greed (which is an emotion, now that I think about it), then "the solution" changes.

Concur. One could also use the LE term of motive in determining causation.

Mike