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Steve the Planner
12-08-2009, 02:26 AM
OK. Now we know how many troops, and when the next decision comes.

Now, what about the civilian side which everyone says is the whole point.

Barry McCaffrey has an assessment in circulation which he prepared for Gen. Petreaus, says the civilian thing just ain't happening. Even if they send them, it is too dangerous to leave the base and do anything effective.

FP has a different take from Dov Zakheim in the Shadow Government section:

"In much of our government, however, the war is nowhere to be seen. Civil servants go about their business as if it were peacetime. There is still a serious shortage of U.S. government civilians here in Afghanistan, although their numbers are increasing. Many of those who do indeed serve here do not venture out of Kabul. This is so not because they are less dedicated to their mission. The sorry fact is that all too often they have little to offer in the field. Their expertise tends to be bureaucratic -- they are only equipped to manage and document projects and activities -- rather than technical. "

That has been one of my on-going criticisms--- lots of program administrators, etc., but few with actual technical training in relevant subject areas. Wholeof Government is a great concept, but few federal agencies actually do things--- program and grant administration are the core skills.

Lots of big noise at AEI on an expended civilian surge, pending a new Obama funding request.

I attended a seminar today at USIP with Ashraf Ghani & Steven Hadley. Lots of criticism, and good recommendations on ways forward, but.... (Trying to get a web cast link)

Dec 8, McCrystal and Eikenberry both hit the Armed Services Committees. Hopefully some tough questions...

Steve

Hugh Davis
12-08-2009, 05:30 PM
If the objective is to help the provincial & local governments in Afghanistan build their capacity for governance, maybe instead of sending more grant administrators, we should recruit people from State & local governments who have hands-on experience in fixing potholes, running water & sewage systems, disposing of garbage, running local police departments, etc. Of course, it would also help if our government & our public were willing to accept the risks inherent in letting these people work in the places where they can make a difference.

The questionnaires in the USAJOBS job announcements don't really give people with these skill sets much opportunity to show how their skills could contribute to the success of the mission. An applicant from outside the Federal government / NGO community doesn't have much opportunity, under the structure of the application process, to detail his experience.

The ITAO applications were at least a little more open to that kind of experience.

If we're going to do this, we ought to at least consider whether there are other assets that might be more effective, and whether we are putting the resources in the places they can be most effective.

I understand the security concerns, but when citizens volunteer to help in a situation like this, most of us recognize & accept the fact that there are some risks inherent in the process.

Steve the Planner
12-08-2009, 06:17 PM
Hugh:

You are drawing the relevant distinction between technical Subject Matter Experts in development, government finance, and operations of government vs. diplomacy and foreign assistance program managers.

It was bewildering to me in Iraq how the Subject Matter Experts (the few of us there were) were scattered out to PRTs, and subject to the direction of folks with little to no background in State & Local government, technical aspects of development, etc...

I do a lot of expert consulting in the public and private sectors, and nothing in the structure of US civilian assistance remotely resembles how it is actually done, or could viably be done.

It's that dumb old question: If the power goes out and the sewers back up at home, who you going to call? No offense but a foreign service officer wouldn't be on the list---they have no technical skills in those areas.

Same with a school system. Might help to have an actual experienced school administrator/facilities person engage in the dumb technical questions: Where are the nearby schools? How are teachers and supplies going to be delivered (after US expeditionary funds stop)? Do we have clear title and school system acceptance for the school?

In Iraq, DoS had a handful of slots in 2007/8 for Senior Planning Advisers and Senior City Management Advisers, but not for Afghanistan. Go figure?

In my opinion, senior technical reconstruction advisers should be flying squads to support/synchronize provincial/national/US/international reconstruction focus and resources through RCs, Brigades, Battalions, FSOs, USAID, PRTs and DSTs. No reason, with a good technical back-up, that a sergeant can't do a lot more, and a lot more effectively, with that approach.

That way, you magnify the capabilities of the folks on the ground by giving them helpful technical support and advice (and not just a new layer of bureaucracy) without impeding their hard-earned local relationships.

Also, you synchronize efforts by connecting the dots, at the local level, to programs and practices used elesewhere. At a USIP Conference yesterday, Ashraf Ghani (Former Minister of Finance, Afghanistan) was adamant that most of the reconstruction efforts could be done a lot cheaper, quicker and more effectively---a 90% cost/effectiveness increase. I agree.

As an example, in most small counties, they use "circuit rider" planners for special projects, and local engineering/legal, etc., experts as asupplement to local governments for those special projects. The locals keep control and responsibility, but get access to broader knowledge and best practices when needed. It's a pretty time-worn process.

The results in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is not used, speak for themselves.

If you check out a USAID application process, the big screen-out question is whether you have spent four years with an NGO in a post-conflict environment---so they are unlikely to ever obtain subject matter and technical experts in development---just more NGO contract managers.

When is USAID going to waive it's closed shop union requirements to recruit technical experts? I haven't seen that on anyone's list.

But, what do I know?

Steve

Affiliations:
Former Senior Urban Planning Adviser, Iraq
American Planning Association
American Institute of Certified Planners
Institute of Transportation Engineers
Council of Educational Facilities Planners, Int'l

MikeF
12-08-2009, 06:39 PM
Steve,

Here's one possible way ahead that could be easily implemented.

Given the problem (as I understand it)- in small wars, we cannot get the right people to the right place at the right time. Various explanations as to why (security situation, unwillingness to deploy, salary, etc.)

Assumptions:
- In the gap, the military is taking over many of the stabilization tasks.
- The United States has a vast amount of intellectual capital.
- This is not 1850. We invented something called the internet.

Solution- Harness the power of social networking and the web and outsource the problem. Groups like ashoka.org do this with micro-financing.

Way Ahead- Outsource the problem.
1. Hire non-deployable civilian experts to work full-time or part time on problem sets.
2. Develop website to facilitate share of information.
3. Military and Political officers work as facilitators instead of problem-solvers. For example, X Infantry commander in Kabul has an issue with re-establishing school system for his town. He develops and defines the problem and send it via email or website back to US.
4. Civilian experts read the problem and send back RFI's (Request For Information). CDR answers questions. Civilian experts work the problem and send back a solution.
5. Military CDR implements. Civilian experts stand by to answer further questions.

We do a little of this on SWJ. The Stryker brigades do it everyday with intel analysis.

It seems like a very simple solution.

Best,

Mike

Steve the Planner
12-08-2009, 07:54 PM
MikeF:

Same thing our professional associations do now. Council of Ed Facilities Planners, Intl does outreach to Guatemala, India, etc... both through site visits and on-line.

I got a lot out of reach back, but you have to know what to ask for. Also, DoD/DoS are very wired into Universities, which is fine if you need what they have. But the majority of problems are not university problems.

The same trouble with maps. We were discussing last month the way to get NGA's mapping capacibilities into the hands of DoS/PRTs etc., but you have to know what to ask for and why.

A water/waste water system designer is looking for topo (to establish drainage patterns), population data (to establish the design standard), and sub-surface studies to know what he is designing in. The questions he would want answers to are all technical---not the types of things program administrators would know, or think about. Thus, a circuit rider to answer the basic scoping questions. Problem with using US designers is that they don't always understand the context and local techniques and materials. Finding the balance for a project, then engaging the right folks, is a one-two week problem, then move onto the next.

Actually, I'm interested in a goosed up construction battalion deployment process, because a lot of the big toys come in very handy for reconstruction-related activities. But that, like COIN, needs to be set in a protocol to become effective.

I just wish they would start on some of the big basic stuff SOOON.

Steve

slapout9
12-08-2009, 08:25 PM
OK. Now we know how many troops, and when the next decision comes.

Now, what about the civilian side which everyone says is the whole point.

Barry McCaffrey has an assessment in circulation which he prepared for Gen. Petreaus, says the civilian thing just ain't happening. Even if they send them, it is too dangerous to leave the base and do anything effective.

FP has a different take from Dov Zakheim in the Shadow Government section:

"In much of our government, however, the war is nowhere to be seen. Civil servants go about their business as if it were peacetime. There is still a serious shortage of U.S. government civilians here in Afghanistan, although their numbers are increasing. Many of those who do indeed serve here do not venture out of Kabul. This is so not because they are less dedicated to their mission. The sorry fact is that all too often they have little to offer in the field. Their expertise tends to be bureaucratic -- they are only equipped to manage and document projects and activities -- rather than technical. "

That has been one of my on-going criticisms--- lots of program administrators, etc., but few with actual technical training in relevant subject areas. Wholeof Government is a great concept, but few federal agencies actually do things--- program and grant administration are the core skills.

Lots of big noise at AEI on an expended civilian surge, pending a new Obama funding request.

I attended a seminar today at USIP with Ashraf Ghani & Steven Hadley. Lots of criticism, and good recommendations on ways forward, but.... (Trying to get a web cast link)

Dec 8, McCrystal and Eikenberry both hit the Armed Services Committees. Hopefully some tough questions...

Steve



Saw just a few minutes of this....Eikenberry was/still is opposed to the surge:eek:

Steve the Planner
12-08-2009, 08:29 PM
Slapout9:

Nation-building/non Nation-Building; a withdrawal date set oin stone/not set in stone; Karzai, a crook. now elder statesman. Surge, no surge.

Hard to keep track of what each term means on a daily basis.

You must have been watching body language again, because the words don't seem to have any solidity.

slapout9
12-08-2009, 09:06 PM
Slapout9:

Nation-building/non Nation-Building; a withdrawal date set oin stone/not set in stone; Karzai, a crook. now elder statesman. Surge, no surge.

Hard to keep track of what each term means on a daily basis.

You must have been watching body language again, because the words don't seem to have any solidity.

I am becoming more confused day by day:confused: Ken was right it is all on Autopilot now.......everything else is just a talking head. If you can't dazzle them brilliance Baffle them with Bullsh...t.:D

tequila
12-08-2009, 09:14 PM
Spencer Ackerman doesn't think Eikenberry opposes the surge (http://washingtonindependent.com/69962/eikenberry-i-can-say-without-equivocation-that-i-fully-support-this-approach). I haven't watched the HASC testimony myself, though, so I can't say.

Also here (http://washingtonindependent.com/69972/eikenberry-about-those-cables).

Rob Thornton
12-09-2009, 02:44 AM
Ken was right it is all on Autopilot now.......everything else is just a talking head. concur with it being on autopilot, but I don't know how it turns out.

My guess is anything that approaches an increase in civilian capacity will be contracted - and as such it will be expensive, but probably better than filling a USG capability gap we've known has existed for about 5 years with people off the street who may/may not have anything approaching the right technical skills and experience.

Even then, I suspect the majority of any tasks (time to name that tune) we'd expect a civilian surge to fill will be done (if done) by the uniformed folks once we realize we laid place settings for dinner guests that never even existed (or were intended to exist):(

Best, Rob

Steve the Planner
12-09-2009, 04:06 AM
Rob:

Right. The military is the only real party with the "expeditionary" capability to boldly go...

At some point, however, for the things they do to have purpose, continuity, and propulsion, they must link to a substantive civilian structure.

Otherwise, it is just Clear, Clear, Clear, Build Some Crap, Clear, Clear, Clear...

Steve

Ken White
12-09-2009, 04:41 AM
"Rebuild same Crap, Clear, Clear, Clear..."

Ken White
12-09-2009, 04:55 AM
concur with it being on autopilot, but I don't know how it turns out.Big drawdown by mid 2012, full probably about late 2015 - early 2016.
...but probably better than filling a USG capability gap we've known has existed for about 5 years with people off the street who may/may not have anything approaching the right technical skills and experience.I'd say that capability gap has been known since 1918, was relearned in 1942 and we've had it branded on our foreheads about for about 50 years. The gap has really existed for about 34 or so years , has been reborn for about 7 -- it's not like we haven't done this before...

I also suggest that if the USG cannot put the right people with the right skills in place, that is the sole fault of the USG and specifically the
legislative and executive branches -- to include State, DoD and the US Army. The people are out there.
Even then, I suspect the majority of any tasks (time to name that tune) we'd expect a civilian surge to fill will be done (if done) by the uniformed folks once we realize we laid place settings for dinner guests that never even existed (or were intended to exist):(If so, that is the fault of the uniformed folks for not sticking to what they should be doing and allowing others to do what they should be doing. Indeed, insisting on others doing what they should be doing...

But that might mean a budget shift...:rolleyes:

We've done this before. We do not do it well and Congressional, military and bureaucratic failings are a big part of why we do not. The attitude that "...it won't get done unless we do it." is a big part of the problem. People think they need credit for a big Attaboy on their watch. "I see it, I own it" is a poor philosophy...

Bob's World
12-09-2009, 05:19 AM
A little faith Ken, there's a wild card in the deck.

Rob Thornton
12-09-2009, 05:26 AM
Hi Ken,
You are probably right on all accounts. On points 2 and 3, as much as I suspect you are right, they don't do much to engender any confidence that we will get it more right in the future.

On point 2, there is knowing and then there is knowing. Its kind of like that expression there are no lessons learned, just lessons available. It leads me to believe there will again come an opportunity in the future where we will discover we have a gap that was previously identified and not addressed.

On point 3, I don't know if its specifically that so much as a desire to make it work - its one of those things that is maybe both a strength and a weakness. Also at work maybe is pride and a fear of being the fall guy (or component/department/etc.). I'm relatively young as such things go, but I don't expect a budget shift and part of the reason is based on what I have seen I don't think any potential beneficiary would be willing to risk having the marker called in - they only seem to want the sure thing and I don't see many of those in the near future.

Best, Rob

CMSbelt
12-09-2009, 11:50 AM
The issue with civilian participation as being due to security problems is usually overstated, and often done in a manner to give the incorrect impression that the military personnel are "braver" and more willing to work in dangerous areas.

A more pertinent issue is the lack of a civilian reserve capability to provide people with the right skills. Only about 25% of the US military is currently deployed on operations. The vast majority of the force is available and "waiting" (to include training, re-setting, and preparing) to be sent on missions. Conversely, almost everyone in a civilian agency is currently doing their primary job. There is no vast pool of civilians available to be sent to Afghanistan without taking them away from other critical functions.

The military is more like the fire department. Only a small percentage is out fighting fires at any one time, with the majority waiting to be sent out. The civilian agencies are more like the police department. Almost all of them are already out "on the beat" with very few in reserve. The US is trying to build such a capacity with the Civilian Response Corps, but this Bush-era initiative was only recently given adequate funding and still has a ways to go.

Additionally, aside from the problems already mentioned regarding program managers and bureaucrats versus subject matter experts, we don't really have a good handle on how to integrate the military and civilian planning and execution functions. It's not just a matter of adding another column or two to the synch matrix. For more on this topic, see "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art" at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/prism/1/5_Prism_37-50_Schnaubelt.pdf

and "Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments" at:

http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79

Steve the Planner
12-09-2009, 01:36 PM
CMSBelt:

Agree that security and availability are overstated problems.

On the civilian reconstruction side, however, I think the same is true of post-conflict reconstruction.

I have read all the literature and manuals recently produced on the subject, but most miss the point. Most, IMHO, are assemblages of political and organizational slogans, but provide little if any guidance on the actual how to's needed for effective solutions.

Immediate reconstruction, ie, restarting what existed before, is neither complicated nor non-linear. In sum, very much adaptable to traditional mil approaches and resources. Rapid and effective reconstruction requires, more than anything, a systematic approach to understanding what was there before, and what needs to be done to get it operational again.

In Iraq, I put together a simple diagram---a triangle with Water, Energy, Mobility (WEM). Beyond security, these were the essentials to get back in place, and the pre-conditions (in varying degrees) for any business, factory and local economic restarts. Systems of roads and bridges, articulatedto identify local trade connections, patterns and dependencies, as an example, helps to prioritize which repairs are needed when, and which roads and bridges are essential to do first. Also, quick repairs and route/movement security are usually well within the military sphere--including construction resources.

So, there is a Level One which is deeply tied to military reconstruction for immediate and basic services.

Level Two is more complex, involving major repairs and system replacements---like engineering and constructing a major bridge replacement.

The place where things bog down is when people, organizations attempt to go beyond reconstruction into the sphere of development, whether social, economic or political.

At the first level, you have folks doing what they thing are "quick hits" like building schools and public health clinics, but these are actually local/provincial organizational and systemic changes that require, for sustainability, a level of organizational/institutional engagement that may, from the outset, assume levels of political stability and will that goes far beyond the immediately possible. The slippery slope to a higher level of problem/solution.

At the next level, you get into regional and national system change which, in any light, is a very advanced problem/solution set (nation-building) which, at it's core, involves every possible "wicked" problem.

Instead of rationalizing the levels and distinctions between immediate post-conflict reconstruction (a very military-oriented problem), and the distinctly different start down the slope of development, we operationalize a series of competing, and often conflicting, US and international agencies, armed with contractors and contract managers, to create a mix and muddle with little feasible sustainability or focus.

Minister Ghani and Stephen Hadley were discussing this at USIP on Monday. As the Minister indicated, a lot of US/Int'l reconstruction is just a mess, and far more expensive, rife with corruption, and ineffective than it should be. It is a dance of aid agency organizational imperitives, and not a genuine and focused reconstruction effort. Now, if you can't get the baseline reconstruction part going, how do you effectively leap to complex social and organizational development?

I spent time with Dr. Baban, Iraq's Minister of Planning, looking at the US effort, and shaking heads. Last month, he was quoted in the NYT as saying our $53 billion reconstruction effort left no marks---he was starting from scratch. I agree.

Notwithstanding, our Iraq Surge succeeded in getting us out, and begs the question of which parts, if any, of the failed $53 billion effort, actually contributed to the military and political problems we faced/addressed in Iraq.

This problem becomes uniquely important in Afghanistan where, unlike Iraq, our focus is not on a unity of indigenous government, but, instead on a complex, disaggregated approach to the body politic.

Add complexity to complexity, and immerse it in development missions with little focus, and you get what you get.

Steve

Ken White
12-09-2009, 04:24 PM
I just subcribe to realism and accept that it will not be pretty, they way most would like, or the best we could do. I wish it could be different but accept that it likely will not be and I can very grudgingly accept that...

And that's okay, it will be adequate. Mediocrity is our touchstone. :rolleyes:

Bob's World: There always are... :D

Rob:
"...I don't expect a budget shift and part of the reason is based on what I have seen I don't think any potential beneficiary would be willing to risk having the marker called in - they only seem to want the sure thing and I don't see many of those in the near future."Exactly -- that's why it will not get fixed. :(

A big part of the problem is that we -- military and civilian -- have become so bureaucratic and so very risk averse in all aspects that we are becoming a true danger to ourselves. We aren't there yet but the prognosis is not good unless those trends are reversed...

CMS and Steve the Planner:

We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body... :wry:

Steve the Planner
12-09-2009, 05:40 PM
Ken:

"We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.

As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.

Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body... "

Right.

Within my aspirations (World Peace? A Bugatti on the Autobahn?) is a
Field Guide to Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction, laying out the stages and actions required to do at least a functional job of getting the basics done after fighting. It is, of necessity, military led and focused. And just the basics of stabilization.

(Quite apart from all the confusing multi-agency Development initiatives that people seem to get lost in).

Another forest cut down to become a paperweight?

Steve

jmm99
12-09-2009, 07:33 PM
The FM should be in three parts:

1. The Ways and Means of a Punitive Raid, where there is no intent to occupy a country legally.

2. Your Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction in situations where a short-term legal occupation follows from an intervention.

3. Clear doctrine when we should use 1 vs 2 - there is a difference.

Cheers

Mike

Hugh Davis
12-09-2009, 08:00 PM
I hope somebody at DoS's S/CRS reads this thread & asks for Steve's advice before the process of organizing & recruiting for the CRC gets committed to the "bridge to nowhere" syndrome.

I am confident that everyone involved in these stabilization & reconstruction projects really wants to make things better. I also understand the natural tendency to assume that qualifications similar to those of the planners would be appropriate for the people they bring in to carry out the projects.

If I were hiring employees, or forming a partnership, I would look for people whose strengths offset my own weaknesses, and let's face it, we all have some. I'd also try to identify the body of knowledge, skills & abilities (KSA) needed to attain the objective, & try to figure out where people are most likely to develop those KSAs.

I think the KSAs for development & stabilization are more likely to exist in the private sector & local government than in the Federal government. Even the ability to articulate policy in a variety of forums exists among local government & private sector employees.

I understand our government's aversion to risk the lives of civilians, but they really ought to give both the volunteers & the public more credit for having the courage to accept risks for a worthwhile goal. Manage the risk rather than trying to hide from it.

At the risk of sounding facetious, rural Americans from private sector or local government backgrounds may be able to establish rapport with HN personnel in a way that some other USG representatives don't. We can honestly tell the HN officials & local leaders that we understand exactly why they feel uncomfortable & suspicious when someone introduces himself by saying, "I'm from Washington, & I'm here to help." Once that's out of the way, maybe we can help. After all, some Federally funded projects actually do some good at home, even if there are good reasons to ask whether the strings are worthwhile.

Maybe USAID is the natural home for the CRC whenever it finally gets organized. It's amazing how much of their budget is in the form of grants & contracts to be administered, rather than hands-on development work. I suspect "The Ugly American" would have trouble getting hired in this generation.

Steve the Planner
12-09-2009, 08:05 PM
Mike:

Right. Different types of engagements have different requirements.

My version is that it runs from theatre to village, but focuses exclusively on the immediate post-conflict reconstruction process.

First, post-conflict reconstruction is the stage at which immediate issues of human services are addressed---food security, health/casualty care, refugees, basic system restoration, and basic establishment of the writ of government (to include security/rule of law).

Also, it focuses on basic systems studies, fact-finding, forensic analysis, and documentation to establish what was there before, what is there now (post-conflict assessment), and establishes the analytical tool kit for what comes now and later (background systems mapping, population & refugee accountability, infrastructure availability and condition studies)---the essentials for figuring out what is there now, and the analytical spine for future "development" considerations.

It proceeds in basically three stages through the "handoff" to development. Stage 1 is just about human and essential services (first aid, refugees, food, water and security).

Stage 2 begins to focus more on improving systems stuff, courts and procedures, intergovernmental connections and public works projects (as opposed to immediate relief/repair).

Stage 3 starts to prepare for hand-off to either development (if applicable within the mission) or indigenous government with the caveat that Rule of Law seems to be the last and most important continuing component.

The How To part should be general enough to guide theatre level oversight, but with enough basics and case studies of projects and types to take a platoon through an engagement in a village that wants a new school or well repair.

Like the old 1940's Country books for Iraq, Iran, etc... Here are the basicxs you need to know to move intelligently through this objective...

Embedded in that is the notion that CERP (Commander's Emergency funds) are for immediate restoration and stability, and some other coordinated support system exists for development (ie, school building, major projects).

When, were and if "something else" like development, region, or nation-building is needed, that is a different manual....

Something like that.

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-09-2009, 08:27 PM
Hugh:

My understanding is that SCRS didn't get funded (again) to move beyond the theoretical. Unfortunate, IMHO, that they were not able to organize, step up, and get some streamers for their guidon while the two biggest post-WWII operations were underway. Probably not a good sign...

MG Caslen (just left MND-North) did a presentation today at USIP on the Way Forward in Iraq.

Interesting that, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, a uniform is a big deal. In the middle, a civilian is probably, as you suggest, the best counter-party for civ-to-civ gov't interface; a local public works manager or transportation engineer speaks the same functional language across the world. At the end, as MG Caslen pointed out, they appreciate the military contribution but cannot afford to be photographed too often with the military in the post conflict/occupation periods.

Personally, I think they are all just ephemeral presentations, but recognizing the importance of appearance is critical. Getting the job done right is the heart---changing uniforms is easy.

Personally, I thought the State Department's Blue Badge was the all-purpose badge, but, with the exception of the 2007/8 Civilian Surge, it seems that DoS mostly just staffs within its species now (foreign service/governance, not technical SMEs).

In Afghanistan, from the looks of it, there are a number of different agency-by-agency stripes, and they each seem to have their own plans, purpose. Lots of noise about cooperation, but my friends on the ground there don;t see much difference from what was described in the opening Foreign Policy Article.

jmm99
12-10-2009, 12:53 AM
It is interesting to look at FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf) (which is primarily a 1956 effort, except in some areas not relevant here, representing the post-WWII experience with Germany, Japan and transitions where a friendly government is on deck):


Section II. ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

362. Necessity for Military Government

Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises governmental authority over occupied territory. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military occupation, or the undesirability of allowing it to do so. (See par. 12, which discusses military government, and par. 354, dealing with civil affairs administration.)

363. Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (HR, art. 43.)

which are the default for a legal occupation. The transition to civil affarirs adminitration is covered here:


354. Friendly Territory Subject to Civil Affairs Administration Distinguished

Civil affairs administration is that form of administration established in friendly territory whereby a foreign government pursuant to an agreement, expressed or implied, with the government of the area concerned, may exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government.

Such administration is often established in areas which are freed from enemy occupation. It is normally required when the government of the area concerned is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. Territory subject to civil affairs administration is not considered to be occupied.

If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the enemy, military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure (see par. 12 b and c). A civil affairs agreement should, however, be concluded with the lawful government at the earliest possible opportunity.

A neat simple outline of legal responsibilities. As you say, "nation building" is another manual.

Regards

Mike

Steve the Planner
12-10-2009, 02:43 AM
jmm:

If I am not mistaken, there are certain rules of the road/treaty obligations for occupation reconstruction/safeguarding populace, which would be worthwhile to summarize.

And a collection of technical "thou shalts" when a project is built by the US, even in a foreign country.

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-10-2009, 02:46 AM
jmm

I've seen this one before, and it gives me the willies about Iraq:

"363. Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (HR, art. 43.)"

Any statute of limitations, waiver or estoppel?

Steve

jmm99
12-10-2009, 03:51 AM
is a primary source of obligations imposed on an Occupying Power - Secs 246 - 448 of FM 27-10 cover Civilians and Occupations.

I wouldn't stay awake at nights worrying about Sec 363 (thinking about looters running wild ?). The SOFA pretty much puts the two governments in a clean start situation. I expect sovereign immunity would bar most individual claims that haven't already been settled.

I don't plan on research until the multi-billion dollar suit is brought - probably by one of the US firms that advertises on TV ("Are you an Iraqi who suffered damages during the US Occupation ? Call 800-xxx-yyyy). :D

Regards

Miker

Steve the Planner
12-10-2009, 04:08 AM
Good to know about the Status agreement.

The current class action is US Iraq assignees vs. KBR for the Burn Pits and Water Treatment. That one was just consolidated in Maryland with a law firm in Georgetown.

Been trying to learn more about it, but essentially, I believe the claim is that KBR violated it's contract in the handling of waste, uncontrolled burning including medical waste, and problems with the treatment of water.

Having seen and smelled the burn pits at Balad and Spiecher, and written a lot about water, it's not really a surprise that some particular claimants might come forward--like the electric buzz.

A total class of all Balad/Spiecher assignees would be something like 20,000 per base times two bases, times more than five rotations per year (six and 14 monthers). Heck, even the other KBR employees/contractors might be in the same class.

No doubt, more info to come.

Steve

CMSbelt
12-10-2009, 11:00 AM
Steve:

My observations come from serving in Baghdad as an Army National Guard colonel in CJTF-7 (I was Chief of Policy in the C-5 Directorate) in 2004 and then as a State Department civilian in the US Embassy Baghdad’s Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment (JSPA) office in 2006 and 2007. My academic background includes a good deal of work in Public Policy. (Before I decided to focus upon security studies, I was interested in urban planning.)

While you raise many good points and your “three stage” outline is a useful structure to prioritize post-conflict reconstruction activities, my argument is that:

(1) It may be getting close in some places, and some areas such as the Kurdish provinces have been mostly peaceful for several years, for the most part Iraq has not yet reached the “post-conflict” stage and is at best is currently a semi-permissive environment;

and

(2) Development/Reconstruction in conflict areas or semi-permissive environments has a quantum difference from those activities in peaceful areas or permissive environments. This is because our normal development and economic practices and models operate under the assumption of a relatively high degree of security, which is necessary for the spontaneous individual economic decisions and investment that are required to expand and link together the efforts of the government (and/or occupying forces and/or international development programs). As a sheer matter of manpower and funding limitations, centrally directed and funded efforts cannot do very much on their own. It’s not merely a matter of having funding, a good central plan, and sensible priorities--solutions also require the participation of individuals who contribute value and begin to “fill in the gaps” and can leverage the government/occupier/international community efforts.

The problem in a semi-permissive environment is that no logical person will want to invest in a business if the storefront is likely to blown up and its employees and customers frequently murdered. And, government/occupier/international community activities are attractive targets for terrorists, insurgents, and guerillas unless a high degree of security is provided. But, securing business areas, residential areas, and infrastructure requires a large force—whether military, contractors, or police—until the conflict is reduced to the point where the environment really becomes “post-conflict” and normal development/economic growth processes can be used.

During the interim period we recognize that jobs and economic opportunity play an important role in reducing incentives to engage in violence, but I do not believe it is at all clear how to integrate military/police security efforts with economic and civil society development efforts in manner that will help to push the environment into a “post-conflict” situation. To date, I think we’ve attempted to follow the processes and practices that are known to work in primarily peaceful environments but we either do not understand how to adequately adapt them to situations of high violence or have been unwilling or unable to devote enough resources to create enduring pockets of security within which the usual approaches will be effective.

In late 2003 and early 2004, when violence was relatively low compared to the peaks of 2006, the priority effort to restore electrical power to Baghdad in particular and across Iraq more generally seemed sensible and a great deal of expertise and money was devoted to repairing and enhancing the electrical infrastructure.

--Chris Schnaubelt

CMSbelt
12-10-2009, 03:07 PM
---Continued---

In late 2003 and early 2004, when violence was relatively low compared to the peaks of 2006, the priority effort to restore electrical power to Baghdad in particular and across Iraq more generally seemed sensible and a great deal of expertise and money was devoted to repairing and enhancing the electrical infrastructure.

This effort pretty much aligned with your description of Stage 2.

However, the US-led coalition forces were either unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection to hundred of kilometers of power lines and insurgents soon discovered they could easily bring down power lines and pylons to disrupt the supply of electricity and achieve an important psychological effect of showing the impotence and/or incompetence of the occupation forces at first and then the new Government of Iraq once sovereignty was handed over.

Although everyone recognized that Iraq was still a "war zone," efforts to repair and improve the electrical infrastructure did not adequately recognize the special requirements of an environment at the level of conflict existing at the time. (Also critical, the military senior leadership tended to view the infrastructure and economic development efforts as separate and unrelated to security and thus protecting them was "somebody else's" problem.)

This only one example, but is representative--I think--of the way economic development efforts must operate differently, and require additional integration with security efforts--in environments that have not yet achieved the "post-conflict" stage.

The attitudes have changed with new leadership and the publication of FM 3-24 (COIN), and there is more willingness today to cooperate amongst military and civilian officials than what I saw in the first half of 2004. But, I believe there are unique features of a semi-permissive environment that require tailored activities and integration between security and development activities that we haven't quite figured out yet.

Steve the Planner
12-10-2009, 03:58 PM
CMSbelt:

Security is not a decisive factor in whether people need to eat on a given day.

Either security permits free access and low prices, people starve, or it comes some other way.

A battle space commander does not own the economy unless he actively engages and understands it---from day one. Markets, supply routes, sources, etc...

Mishandling has two alternative consequences: (1.) people suffer from lack of supplies, which destabilizes support for him; or (2) a black market grows which destabilizes support for him.

Iraq and Afghanistan are conflict zones of long-standing, and American occupation did little to materially change the economic difficulties they learned to adapt to. People find a way or they starve. Black markets cannot be eradicated in those places without reasonably abundant free trade and basically functional markets---or by mass feeding programs.

Baby needs to eat every day, and if a battle space commander does not know how the people in his space are eating, there is probably a lot more that he is not tracking.

KRG prosperity is a really bad example. If you track the supply routes supporting their relatively peaceful economy, they were primarily Diyala and Ninewa---the conflict zones that they were equally dependent on.

There was never a day when the oil barons of Bayji did not have fresh eggs and Hillal chicken, nor one where people couldn't buy gas from him (even if the government supply wasn't delivered). This despite inaccurate assurances from Baghdad that poultry re-start in the North could not occur until the train restarted to move grain from Basrah.

KRG got its grain without a train, and Bayji had abundant fresh poultry if you could afford it. How did that happen?

The sustainable solution to black market oil profiteers in Kirkuk was not to arrest the bad guys, but to fill the market with legitimate gas.

An effective Stage 1 response to conflict is to identify and stabilize economic systems, and to supplement legitimate ones as rapidly as possible. Otherwise, you can end up in a years long occupation in a very troubling space.

Perhaps it is too simplistic to draw the distinctions, but, somewhere, there is a thesis waiting to be written contrasting occupation without due consideration for economics vs. non-occupation or occupation that focused on economic systems.

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-11-2009, 01:05 AM
Civilian surge: an expensive failure or an emerging force?


AFN Leads with a headline that Risks Limit Civilian Movement:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h4Im82B9tfF689MFjVWJE9A0Zcdg

""So what we're doing is embedding a lot of our civilians with our military troops," the chief US diplomat said as she stood next to Jandrokovic.

The policy allows the civilian experts and aid workers to get out "at the same time or literally the next day after the Marines and the army have sent the go signal that civilians can begin to work with... the Afghan people on a range of issues," she said.

But John Dempsey, a United States Institute of Peace analyst, told AFP last month that if civilians are stuck mainly on a military base or with armed escorts, "the impact of the increase will be marginal yet expensive."

President Barack Obama has called for increasing the number of civilian experts from 320 in January 2009 to 974 by January 2010 in order to help the Kabul government serve its people and wean the economy off opium production.

Jack Lew, the deputy secretary of state for management and resources, told US lawmakers Wednesday that he forecast a "20 to 30 percent" increase in 2010 above the current civilian target of 974."

Attackerman writes about a civilian to military ratio of 1 to 100.

"About 1,000 civilians overall in Afghanistan,” with 400 of those “out in the field” beyond Kabul, “USAID development specialists, Department of Agriculture specialists, throughout the country,” law-enforcement, DEA agents. They’ll “multiply the effects of wherever they are by hiring Afghans.”"

The civilian surge continues to be emerge...

Ross Wherry
12-11-2009, 12:59 PM
Steve and Hugh,
After watching the USG operate in post-conflict situations, I offer that civilian federal government agencies will never be useful sources of the SMEs required to carry out the programs that PRTs or other Feds can fund. Federal agencies are intensely domestic in focus and don't usually award merit to overseas duty, especially in a war zone. In the domestic circumstance, Feds throw money at problems and hope for the best. Same overseas.

In the 2007 Iraq surge, I recruited large numbers of city managers, trash engineers, electrical technicians, etc. These are the most valuable employees a city has, and at best we could borrow an SME for up to 12 months. When the guy returned to his city or county post, he had to eject his deputy who had been filling the job "temporarily" or go into the job market himself. We got good people, but they were treated worse than returning military reservists after their mobilization was done.

It's unreasonable to expect the Feds for the come up with SMEs on short notice -- the needed specialists do things that the civilian Government doesn't have a clue how to do. The ideal would be to mobilize Dade or Dallas county into service as a unit. Could the Govt afford such a thing?

Steve the Planner
12-11-2009, 04:07 PM
Ross:

The crux of the problem.

In the field, everybody wants (and might actually need) Greg Mortenson or Rory Stewart to come in, join the tea party, and work out effective schools, jobs, etc.., in a village they have just invested a huge amount of time, blood and treasure to clear, so that it can be effectively held and built---a stable addition to the win column.

Reality is that actual trained civilian SMEs will always be a shortage, and the conditions will not support and sustain them to operate effectively beyond one-on-one examples. 12,000 some villages need 12,000 Greg Mortensons working for two years; not going to work, or happen.

What we get instead is something that does not work. Lots of contractors where, a contract let in Washington gets flipped down through so many groups that only 5% of the money/value ever hits the ground in Afghanistan. This being managed by US federal civilians whose expertise is, in fact, in those contracts, and contracted engagements. It is expensive, inefficient, and does not deliver what hold and build promises.

The statement was that there would be 1,000 civilians of which 400 will be in the field. What do the 600 do? What do the 400 do? How are they resourced? What are their specific expertises for the problems faced?

Most, it seems are ag experts (a big help maybe), FBI/DEA, transferees from higher level federal agencies. Oh, and plenty of reflagged military---while I agree that the pay/benefits are better, and that an experienced military reflag will always be productive, they are not civilian SMEs of the type required for serious change. And are, too often, compromised by prior position from reaching beyond "this is how we have always done it."

The big disconnect, it seems, is that soldiers in villages are calling for schools and services (immediate and medium term engagement tools), while the US civilian focus was and remains on poppy irradication (Ag, FBI, DEA). While laudable, it is a very big mismatch.

We all know that, especially for an older civilian, their are huge risks and discomforts to going out in the field for the civilian, and an additional burden on those who are carrying them. The challenge, however, should be whether it is worth it.

My argument was, and remains, that civilian SMEs will always be in short supply (absent a genuine Reconstruction Corp which doesn't exist, or USAID retooling/restaffing with SMEs---this would not happen in any time frame related to Afghanistan).

Assuming the 400 are genuine SMEs in, say, transportation, schools, health, once one is assigned out to a FOB or DST, how productive can he be? He is only one expert in one of potentially many needed specialties.

The question is: Given that they will always be in short supply, how do you magnify their work to support the required mission?

Off the bat, I can imagine lots of ways to magnify SMEs down to the village-level, but most involve working out of a hub that brings advice, training and resources down to the front line.

Personally, I believe the hub works most effectively as a civilian SME activity engaged around an MND or RC, and sets up a service delivery system that takes advantage of what they offer: Division-level engineering, terrain, intel, CA, construction battalions, oversight, coordination, movement, finance, logistics.

From there, it serves as an expert tool with linkage downward to the field, but links upward to national and US-level programs. Civilian planners, for example, are trained to connect dots between resources and needs, and its that vital connecting of dots that is missing.

In many cases, too, as with UN Development Program, the system of hubs and satellites can extend back even to a safe ground. In Bahgdad, the UN's main hub was in Amman where engineering, data were free from the strains of war, but readily accessible; experts came and went in rotations, which had two results: made it more attractive for civilians, and made them more productive. At the same time, the UN's expert hub is not built on SMEs sitting at a FOB for one year, but coming and going to problems and places as an when needed---often over many years, so they were deep experts whose one day on the ground was better than most SMEs could accomplish in a month.

I know from my experience with State, however, that there was no plan or structure to effectively use SMEs, and, for example, not even a dwell time or home training piece. If you wanted a year away to gather your thought, you had to not take an assignment. If like myself and other SMEs, you needed to catch up on professional certifications and continuing education, you went home. My professional requirements, for example, would not allow me to do a back-to-back two year tour as a State SME because my certifications would all lapse, and I would be too far out of touch with my profession.

At home, I can take course in regional watershed management and international development efforts (Honduras, Nairobi), go to conferences on UN Habitat initiatives, and have access to unlimited professional research bases and tools.

I listened hard last week at a DC seminar as Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani explained why the current US civilian program fails, and how to improve it by a factor of ten. There is a lot to learn here that just doesn't get transferred down to a FOB (except probably through this board).

But, as you said, there is no system to effectively engage/retain actual civilian SMEs any more than there is one to take full advantage of them once they are one the ground.

It could all be changed, but, to my knowledge, no effective changes have hit the ground yet.

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-11-2009, 04:52 PM
Just in from AP: Kai Eide willleave when his two-year contract ends in March.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9CH5EB80

Much controversy about him and his position but, at the least, his analysis of the situation is on par:

"Speaking in Kabul, Eide lamented that civilian work remains too "fragmented," too "ad hoc," and expressed hope that future work done by the international community will be sustainable when foreign assistance declines."

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-11-2009, 05:05 PM
World Politics Review has an article about the spheres of influence (China/India) and the Big Game being played out through Afghanistan on the economic development side:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4796

"To begin with, a de facto division of the country into these spheres of influence is already taking place. China is making investments in mining all around the country, but its flagship project -- the massive copper mine at Aynak -- is, significantly, in the Pashtun belt. Beijing seems to be counting on Pakistan's support in the event the central Afghan government loses control of this region. But would Pakistani guarantees be sufficient to keep the mine in operation? Meanwhile, India's influence is strongest in the north and west, the heartlands of the old Northern Alliance.

Unlike the situation in Persia, where spheres were imposed on the country, the outside players in Afghanistan do find genuine support among specific ethnic groups and regions of the country.

And unlike the treaty of a century ago, there need be no formal document drawn up this time around. An informal agreement whereby the major players voluntarily placed limits on where they will situate their investments and security services would suffice. Kabul could return to its traditional function as the country's marketplace, where all sides are represented. A settlement in Afghanistan could work to guarantee China's vital Baluchistan lifeline, while leaving intact the Indian-Iranian transport routes that provide New Delhi with a direct route to Central Asia."

To me, there are two implicit elements: (1.) Eide's role was probably eclipsed long before he started by the Big Game; and (2.) the humble troops in the field cannot have a big and sustainable effect using a village-by-village approach without some form of engagement/coordination of their local work to the Bigger Game being played around them; they don't need to understand it, but they need to effectively walk with and around it.

Steve

Ross Wherry
12-12-2009, 06:28 PM
Steve,

I agree that direct hire govt employees might be more efficient than those awful contractors, of whom I'm one. But the Feds aren't allowed outside the wire without massive security. Counterproductive. Contractors, being modestly more expendable, can often get out and be useful if well directed.

Contracts should be judged by their tooth-to-tail ratio. More than half tail -- send 'em home, with no further ado.

Poppy eradication is a steadily receding mirage. Same for spraying coca bushes. Been there, chased it, came home disillusioned. Until the marketing links are disrupted, Smith's invisible hand will keep the harvests coming.

I like your thought of a well staffed hub, provided that there is unity of purpose. A half-pint replication of the WDC interagency process isn't good for the mission. There are (too) few examples of ready reserves in civilian instances, but they exist. The trick seems to be finding a city/county with enough good men and women willing to take a walk on the wild side from time to time.

How do we make this hub work? Komer did it in Viet Nam, but I haven't seen it be successful since.

Steve the Planner
12-12-2009, 07:22 PM
Ross;

My problem with contractors isn't, per se, with the contractors, but the contracts.

Too often, I have seen, or heard of contractors who, because of their status, are just not allowed into the game---so their effectiveness gets limited. Otherwise, it is the gamesmanship of the contracts themselves.

In Iraq, I worked closely with some RTI contractors, who were genuine specialists, and real did great work where they could. One was around since Basra in '04 and is mentioned in the Prince of the Marshes. I wished, though, that he had a proper Blue Badge so he could be more effectively engaged in '08, and that he wasn't tied to tripping over contract/admin stuff so much.

Even though we might have been great side-by-side, the contract was a stumbling block. Same with the civilian GIS folks---good skills but no clearances was a problem for rapid ramp up using US base data.

Being concerned more with the end product than the who, I felt that many of the people would have been more effective for the US effort if there was a direct structure.

Sorry if you took it the wrong way.

Steve

Hugh Davis
12-12-2009, 09:31 PM
Steve & Ross,

I've learned a lot from reading SWJ's discussions, & spent several weeks reading the discussions before registering. As you may have gathered, most of my career is in State & municipal government. I haven't yet had the opportunity to serve overseas. I appreciate folks like you sharing your lessons learned. If (when?) I get the call, I want to be as prepared as I can be, which, to me, includes anticipating potential problems & trying to have at least a partial solution in mind.

I hope I'm wise enough to remember that these partial solutions aren't set in stone, & have to be adapted to the facts on the ground.

In the meantime, as we discuss this "big picture" stuff about how the civilian effort should be organized, I agree that mid-career SMEs have additional responsibilities & concerns that need to be addressed differently than we approach the recruitment of an 18 year old military volunteer. Ross is right that career protection is important. It would be helpful if Congress would consider protecting these volunteers' jobs the way we protect reservists deployed on military duty. Steve is also right that continuing professional education & certification is an important concern.

It's tempting to get frustrated about how imperfect the system is. It does take time, though, for the US to figure out what does & does not work, & then to figure out why, & then to make improvements. It's not just Congress & the bureaucrats; they have to figure out how to explain to the rest of us what they're trying to accomplish & why it's a good idea to spend our money on it. I think that's part of our "national character," to be difficult to persuade & slow to decide. Sometimes it's a strength, & sometimes a weakness.

Again, I appreciate y'all sharing your experience, & I hope somebody in a position to influence the decisions is paying attention.

Steve the Planner
12-14-2009, 04:55 AM
I guess I had my fingers crossed that somebody on this Board was going to jump out and, No you are wrong. New things are coming. It will all improve.

I keep scanning for articles, but all I ever find are the kind, like below that explan why or how the civilian effort isn't working: a UPI Report about "the missing tool" for Afghanistan:

"First is the means to bring governance to Afghans. In this regard, the government in Kabul is incapable certainly over the next year or two and almost certainly for the longer term. Appointing an overseer or foreign viceroy to put some steel into President Hamid Karzai's backbone is entirely infeasible and will no doubt force the resignation of the three or four capable ministers in the government who do not wish their authority bypassed. Hence, the job of bringing governance will fall on the shoulders of an already overstretched U.S. and NATO military and a so-called surge in civilian capacity that is a fiction. Unfortunately, even if the president had agreed with commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's upper-limit request of 80,000 additional troops, this nation building is not a job any military can do with confidence.

Second, the Afghan government has been roundly and correctly challenged on the grounds of corruption and waste. But even if those excesses could be magically corrected -- which they cannot -- this criticism misses the point. It is not Afghan waste and incompetence in managing its resources that is the issue. It is the incompetence and waste with which the tool of Western aid has been so grossly mismanaged that needs immediate redress.

The investigations of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan who reports to Congress -- not the White House -- suggest the scope of mismanagement. These could have been harsher. Specifically, for every dollar spent on Afghanistan reconstruction and aid, about a dime goes to the Afghan people. If this tool cannot be made to work, then all the king's horses and men will not turn Afghanistan into a functioning state."

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/2009/12/02/Outside-View-The-missing-tools-for-the-Afghan-job/UPI-20201259762400/

Maybe somebody will come along....

Steve the Planner
12-14-2009, 05:50 AM
Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Aproject=rand&v%3Asources=rand-books-select&input-form=rand-simple&query=reconstruction&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

MikeF
12-14-2009, 06:39 AM
Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Aproject=rand&v%3Asources=rand-books-select&input-form=rand-simple&query=reconstruction&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

I thought some of the points were good, some bad. They're trying to address the security issue- Good on them; however, I dislike many over the overgeneralizations. Anytime one talks about a controversial subject and begins with "it is widely agreed that..," they usually lose my attention. We have a lot of untested theorems circulating right now.

One common element that I find missing in many of these reports is assuming what the local populace needs instead of asking. Here's an example of how I learned this through blunt trauma.

In Zaganiyah back in June 2007, we started seeing great strides in security. I wanted to begin lifting many of the blocking positions, curfews, and other emergency measures to begin transitioning into "hold and build." We started planning and resourcing for project money for clinics ($150,000) and schools ($200,000).

Before we executed my brilliant plan, a local came by to talk to us at the patrol base. He stated that he was a doctor, a clinic already existed, and all he needed was some soldiers to provide security, medical supplies, and a salary to pay him and his nurses. I looked at him dumbfounded. I was like, "that's it?"

The clinic was up and running the next week at a cost of less than $3000. The IA pulled security, our medics ordered extra CL VIII supplies, and some cash got the doctor back in business.

Same answer with the schools. The lesson I learned was to always ask the people that live in the area how best to help them instead of planning up grand schemes in a vacuum.

Mike

Steve the Planner
12-14-2009, 06:49 AM
Mike:

Thanks for the positive.

What I love about your posts is that they always seem to focus on identifying the actual folks involved in deciding what is needed, then engaing them in getting it done.

It's like US planning 101, but seems so difficult to get across in the reconstruction game.

Steve

Ross Wherry
12-14-2009, 07:35 PM
Steve,

Apologies for seeming prickly. I agree that it's the contract culture. But like honest politicians, good contractors stay bought and get their job done with a minimum of whining.

The UPI article posted recently is dead on, or at least completely consonent with my biases. I was also impressed by Micheal Yon article from 13 Dec on SWJ. He sees clearly. My own experience in Helmand was 2005, flying into Lashkar Gah's pebble runway. I can only be in awe of Marines now operating south of there. The farmers we were trying to help still had dried poppies hung up in barns in case the Americans left (which eventually happened).

On the issue of clearing and holding villages, I hold the position that villages are probably the right level for "clear and hold" security operations since that the bad guys move into the villages first, whether it's Nepal or Colombia. The "build" operations probably are best run out of the equivalent to a county, call it a district or a qada or a municipality. It lends a certain economy of scale, and allows for balancing local rivalries. MikeF had it right with the need to be circumspectly consultative -- if the local folks chose the project, it's less likely to be destroyed by one or another of the armed groups. We saw that in Salvador and Colombia, but not in eastern Zaire.

Lastly, I had the honor of running the RTI project in Iraq for 18 months. Thanks for the kind words.:)

Ross Wherry
12-14-2009, 07:52 PM
Steve.

Who writes that stuff? The authors I recognized spent their tours in Baghdad in the friendly confines of the Republican Palace.

see also Imperial Life in the Emerald City, but don't buy a copy.

Guess my biases are all out on the table now.:eek:

Steve the Planner
12-14-2009, 07:54 PM
Ross:

That's what it looks like to me.

Lot's of money in them there think tanks afterwards, too.

I think I was in the embassy a few times, usually on the way to somewhere that you could actually see and learn things...

Steve the Planner
12-15-2009, 12:59 AM
OK.

Here's a good test.

Press coverage indicates that the battle of Now Zad,second largest town in Helmand is complete and they are just mopping up now.

Clear is done, lots of refugees fled.

Now what comes next?

Steve

Cole
12-16-2009, 01:26 AM
Here's a good test.

Press coverage indicates that the battle of Now Zad,second largest town in Helmand is complete and they are just mopping up now.

Clear is done, lots of refugees fled.

Now what comes next?

Steve

I'll bite. Cognizant that we want civil, government, and security activities to occur simultaneously, I would start by positioning FOBs, COPs and OPs around Now Zad that are mutually supporting and adjacent to the population. I would collocate ANA/ANP and U.S. security personnel in each of the FOB and platoon (+) sized COP. Also would position OPs in between the COPs and FOBs with vehicle crew-served weapon firing positions available at each protected by HESCO.

Looking at this maplandia photo of Now Zad, where would the best locations for the FOB and COP be based on both METT-TC and ASCOPE:

http://www.maplandia.com/afghanistan/helmand/now-zad/

I might suggest putting the FOB in the open area and inch and a half north of the blue dot at the end of the diagonal main street appearing to run through town. On the southern end of town and that diagonal road, would take over the entire compound of buildings and courtyards that sits alone at the end of the road, to create a COP. Just east of the zoom tool in an L-shaped open area inside the town, would create another COP. Midway along the west end of town in the open desert south of the zoom tool would create a COP. On the east side of town about 4 inches from the west COP would position another COP in the open area close to the town, but not too close.

Would construct tall towers at each COP and FOB with video surveillance to ensure coverage of much of the town. Would place a QRF in the FOB in the center of town. Construction of that large FOB with interior helicopter landing area would facilitate resupply. Might consider building housing for government civilians, civilian aid workers, and contractors within that FOB. Might consider building or walling in housing adjacent to the FOB for families of locally recruited Pashtun Soldiers who return to town looking for work and a place to live.

Would build girl's schools next to each COP and FOB with women's clinics adjacent to each. Would encourage mothers to bring their girls to school where the mothers can get medical help next door. Waiting rooms for moms with televisions would provide information messages that will be passed along to husbands. All employees in the girl's school and clinic would be women. Male doctors might provide televised advice to clinic personnel and televisions in classrooms would help teach students. Hot meals prepared at COPs and FOBs would also be provided for school breakfast and lunch to encourage attendance. Other grains and raw foods might be handed out to mothers on a limited basis.

Would include wind turbines and solar power panels at each COP and FOB and large generators to power both the FOB/COP and adjacent neighborhoods eventually, with nearby government offices and schools/clinics receiving power initially.

How does that sound for someone tempting William F. Owens wrath about seeing something work in theory given my novice awareness of COIN?

Steve the Planner
12-16-2009, 02:43 AM
Cole:

I'll leave Wilf or the great Ken to address military.

First, this seems like a very managable scale for a perfect civilian exercise.

Stabilize the existing population. Bring in additional clinics and food, humanitarian services at the outset? Secure and reopen what markets can be reopened now? Start development of a small-scale school system? Solar to get street lights, etc...?

OK. So, first essential and human services. Bring back (and vet) the old "government?" Now how to attract returnees and address damage?

Is enough enough then?

Do you hold tight with that, or move on to fancier development initiatives?

Steve the Planner
12-16-2009, 03:02 AM
As a civilian reconstruction type, I'd be interested, while house-to-houses are going on, in getting as much local population, social and econ information as possible, embedded with questions of: Do you need help? Is there a food supply? What is most important to get reopened? How many houses were damaged? What resources exist/are needed to rebuild?

I'm pretty interested in the hinterland---ag types, markets, resources.

Assuming that it is a great place from which to distribute bad stuff (prssure plates, etc...), I assume the town has some basic market-serving functions too. What were they? What would it take to bring them back? What basic levels of government and/or community control needs to be in place?

I'm increasingly becoming concerned that we may "over-build" some of these places with stuff that can't be sustained, absent the LaLa Land of Foreign Aid, and isn't wanted or needed. Where is the line of "good enough" in a rural village, or small region-serving town?

My guess, too, is that once a basic Phase I stabilization, inventory, repair job is done, the next level of serious development, if warranted, is going to need to be left to some "higher" program (USAID, NGOs?), so that the military does not become unproductively engaged in town building, and is free for the next challenge.

Steve

Cole
12-16-2009, 03:46 AM
Noticed the link does not default to the same zoom or screen position that my initial description was based on....which perhaps is for the better from an OPSEC standpoint.

Guess most of the door-to-door searching pertains to looking for bombs since the city that once had 30,000 is currently pretty deserted. Not sure how you get folks to return but by having the FOB, COPs, and OPs in place beforehand, and other building started or adapted when empty, you would have the makings of a future Marine-protected ink spot.

Anecdotally, I have several relatives who home school and the smartest pair of mothers have created really smart kids. Another in-law with less education was far less successful. If mothers could be taught in parallel classes in their daughter's school and given learning materials, they could assist their children's learning and long term Helmand province development.

Steve the Planner
12-16-2009, 02:21 PM
The details.

Various reports over the many successive occupations report the population as ranging from about 10,000 in the town to a ghost town. For now, I will assume about 2,000 with, at best, the maximum restoration of about 5,000.

The 30,000 figure is probably for Now Zad district---all those happy poppy growers.

Probably a ton of the homes visible on Google Earth are damaged/unoccupied.

As for schools, assuming, based on the young age of the pop in general, that about 1,000 school age students are possible in the town, and a total of about 10,000 in the district, it is most likely that much of the schooling will be informal (tents, abandoned homes, people's houses), but it's important to know whether any plans for schools in town are intended to serve the town, or reach for a more regional strategy---specialized high schools, etc...

Twenty total teachers and classrooms is probably a max, to be fazed in as re-occupation proceeds. How many tea cups does that take?

Where lack of buildings is a problem elsewhere, Now Zad, it seems, would have plenty of empty space, some of which could open the door for rapid repair/re-use without costly and slow building projects. Take a few adjacent houses and turn them into schools, health clinics, kitchens. A good time to plan something out before refugees return.

Why would they return initially? Reconstruction jobs? New teacher jobs? Unfortunately, the jobs drivers will all be foreign aid/int'l supported, but what else?

The real challenge, based on past successive occupation/abandonment (Brits, Russians, us, etc...) is to find a sustainable strategy to what is around Now Zad. Is it intended as an Oil Spot, with a focused strategy to reinvent ag production away from poppy, or is poppy an assumed?

I assume there was a reasonably productive agricultural base before poppies. Wonder what it was, what old sites, knowledge and infrastructure supported that, could be re-promoted?

My guess is that unless we take the town strategy as part of a focused strategy for the immediate region, and maybe the district, then it is just another passing occupancy. In large part, that comes back to Ross's comment about what gov/societal level to target---district for higher level project/programs---but what is the state of governance and/or societal structure at that level?

How, where to engage which level of government? I think the answer to that question depends on what bigger picture is intended in Now Zad/Helmand--- central, regional, provincial, district, town, tribal?

Steve

Steve the Planner
12-23-2009, 11:11 PM
NPR's latest report on State's Inspector General Report:

"When it comes to its counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, the State Department's activities, while well-intentioned, leave a lot to be desired, according to a new report from the department's inspector general."

http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/12/state_depts_afghan_antidrug_ef.html

What are you going to do?

Steve

jcustis
12-24-2009, 07:49 AM
Would build girl's schools next to each COP and FOB with women's clinics adjacent to each.

Cole, why would you focus on doing this? I ask because this is one of the first things you went to, but I wonder what it gains us in terms of cooperation or information...what do you desire to achieve by trying to apply resources to a specific target affiliated with a schools's project? Going after influence over military-aged males? Going after close-hold information from tight-lipped fathers who truthfully want an education for their daughters?

Also, PM sent re: UAS employment.

Steve the Planner
12-24-2009, 08:47 PM
Custis:

Your point has a lot of resonance.

First, my understanding is that the first real societal confrontation in the current era occurred when the communist urban government started to tear down a lot of old cultural traditions, and directly challenge long-standing rural practices---including education and professions, and especially for women. Social transformation stuff.

So is the military role in post-conflict on immediate stabilization/restoration, reconstruction, social transformation, etc...? Especially if bigger objectives are multi-year and richer and broader than available resources.

Where does the line get drawn? Quick hits? Immediate work?

My problem with, for example, the poppy game, is that the real answer lies in creating a sustainable alternative, which means developing (or reestablishing) markets, market support resouces, trading patterns and transportation links. My general assumption is that the farmers know how to grow what they grew for generations (not poppies) but something today makes only poppies viable. Address that. Carrots, sticks, incentives, whatever---there must be an obvious and economically viable strategy behind the many tactics.

If we want to improve their ag techniques, approaches, that is a next stage which, for the most part, they are going to figure out and adopt later...

Steve

Cole
12-24-2009, 11:27 PM
Cole, why would you focus on doing this? I ask because this is one of the first things you went to, but I wonder what it gains us in terms of cooperation or information...what do you desire to achieve by trying to apply resources to a specific target affiliated with a schools's project? Going after influence over military-aged males? Going after close-hold information from tight-lipped fathers who truthfully want an education for their daughters?

Also, PM sent re: UAS employment.

Just used that as an example and would include male schools as well if not already present. But believe it's in line with my latest reply under the COL Gentile post about things the Taliban would never provide...which maybe reason enough. Besides, what nation can afford to not educate half its citizens. My wife is a longtime post Child Development Center provider and has had many Saudi kids in pre-school classes over the years. The wives would often still be in full Islamic garb yet would be highly educated which helps her teach her kids. For poor Afghans, it would not hurt to have a second bread-winner in the family, either. Sewing classes and similar lessons could be provided, and the women's health clinic would reduce the horrid childbirth death rate and death rate of kids under 5 years old.

The whole idea is to move civilian aid workers, teachers, clinic workers etc into the same COP so they are close to their work and the COP can provide overwatch. Just my theory that has zero basis in reality to back it up that I can point to. But it seems to align with COIN practices.

Hopefully you got at least one of the PMs.

jcustis
12-25-2009, 01:33 AM
Custis:

Your point has a lot of resonance.

First, my understanding is that the first real societal confrontation in the current era occurred when the communist urban government started to tear down a lot of old cultural traditions, and directly challenge long-standing rural practices---including education and professions, and especially for women. Social transformation stuff.

So is the military role in post-conflict on immediate stabilization/restoration, reconstruction, social transformation, etc...? Especially if bigger objectives are multi-year and richer and broader than available resources.

Where does the line get drawn? Quick hits? Immediate work?

My problem with, for example, the poppy game, is that the real answer lies in creating a sustainable alternative, which means developing (or reestablishing) markets, market support resouces, trading patterns and transportation links. My general assumption is that the farmers know how to grow what they grew for generations (not poppies) but something today makes only poppies viable. Address that. Carrots, sticks, incentives, whatever---there must be an obvious and economically viable strategy behind the many tactics.

If we want to improve their ag techniques, approaches, that is a next stage which, for the most part, they are going to figure out and adopt later...

Steve

This is what has, and always will, worried me in terms on non-kinetic efforts to improve the plight of the people we are charged to protect. I have had to endure prattling from folks about this or that project or initiative, and I often thought them mad since it ran totally counter to a number of societal trends that fit that specific slice of society.

Your point about the poppy alternative effort makes me think back to a class I took in undergraduate where I formed the impression that that the so-called Green Revolution did not actually improve the plight of the most impoverished on our planet. Distribution networks, markets, seed and fertilizer procurement systems have to improve at the same time. It's not enough to simply do a seed drop of resistant wheat, without having a grasp of other factors already at play in that agricultural system.


So is the military role in post-conflict on immediate stabilization/restoration, reconstruction, social transformation, etc...? Especially if bigger objectives are multi-year and richer and broader than available resources.

If that is what the role must be, alongside kinetic efforts, the campaign plan for it has to be water tight...Sadly, when stacked up against even 15 month deployment rotations, I don't imagine that these campaign plans retain the focus and rudder steer required to actually show something for the effort.

Steve the Planner
12-25-2009, 05:20 PM
jcustis:

That's what I found fascinating about Iraq. No shortage of smart, brave people or resources, but. amongst all the competing priorities, and action-oriented campaign plans chock-full of programs and tactics, we couldn't seem to create an Iraq in our image---had to wait for Iraqis to do it.

MG Caslon (MND-North) talked about the June 30 SOFA turn-over. Initially, was very skeptical that Iraqis were ready for responsibility, but accepted Gen. Odeirno's point that it was the only way forward. In retrospect, he said he was amazed by how much the Iraqi Army was ready, willing and able (within their resources), to take possession of their own country's responsibilities. Might not be perfect, but it was theirs.

Some kind of big lessons there.

Steve