NATO's Afghanistan Challenge

[Ray]

Friday, May 19, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

EDITORIAL: Project Afghanistan: Pakistan and NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) wants closer military and political relations with Pakistan. The quid pro quo: Islamabad should support the 26-member alliance’s operation in Afghanistan. Last Wednesday, a NATO spokesperson in Brussels said that “The essence of the relationship will be pragmatic”. What he described as “technical discussion, technical cooperation, specifically related to support in Afghanistan” can be deciphered thus: we (NATO) need operational and relevant political support from Pakistan for the ongoing operation in Afghanistan and in return are ready to help Pakistan. Therefore Project Help Pakistan presumably could include support at various levels: relief work (as happened after the earthquake), intelligence sharing, equipment provision, joint training, and so on.

One thing is clear. NATO does want closer cooperation with Pakistan since it is broadening its operation in Afghanistan and relieving US troops with NATO-ISAF contingents. NATO is also putting troops on the ground in southern Afghanistan, the hotbed of the Taliban, and it makes sense for it to try and enlist Pakistan’s support. Only last week NATO deputy secretary-general, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, was in Pakistan along with a contingent and met General Pervez Musharraf and other senior officials of the defence and foreign ministry and intelligence services in Islamabad. Mr Rizzo was accompanied by NATO’s senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, Hikmet Cetin, a former Turkish foreign minister.

The presumption seems to be that at some point the security and other interests of NATO and Pakistan converge. As the spokesperson said, Mr Rizzo discussed southern Afghanistan with General Pervez Musharraf and “Pakistan of course wants ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) to succeed. They have the same interest as we all have.” NATO took command of the ISAF in August 2003. Afghanistan is the first mission for the alliance troops outside the Euro-Atlantic area since its formation. Its broad objective currently is to fight the war on terror. The presence in Afghanistan of its troops, whose strength will shortly go up from 9,000 to 15,000, is part of that mission.

The question for Pakistan, currently a major non-NATO ally of the United States, is: Do its interests in Afghanistan converge with those of NATO, and by extension that of the United States?

The presence of the NATO delegation in Islamabad meant that NATO also wants to know the answer to this question. There are two broad theories on it. One says that Pakistan is still supporting the Taliban; the other rejects this and says that Pakistan is doing as much as it can to control the situation on its side of the Durand Line. A third theory, which combines aspects of both, argues that while Pakistan is bent on eliminating Al Qaeda, its interest in the Taliban remains, though this is primarily because Kabul seems to be dancing to New Delhi’s tune. For its part Islamabad denies that it has any soft corner for the Taliban or that it wants to destabilise Afghanistan. Indeed, Islamabad has its own gripe against Kabul for trotting out this line and has accused President Hamid Karzai’s government of advancing India’s anti-Pakistan designs by fishing in Balochistan.

Be that as it may, it should be evident that a stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest. It should also be clear that Afghanistan cannot go against Pakistan’s interests beyond a certain point. It is landlocked and needs Pakistan for access to the outside world. Besides, Pakistan’s relations with NATO serve the interests of both sides and there is no reason that Pakistan should try to gain tactical points and lose sight of the larger strategic picture. NATO needs Pakistan and Islamabad should take advantage of its need by helping it secure Afghanistan. General Musharraf has reportedly discussed the possibility of opening NATO schools for Pakistani military personnel along the lines of the three such schools in Europe (Rome, Munich and Norway). NATO’s presence in this region is part of its drive to open up towards the countries of this region, an effort that is underpinned by the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative.

On the downside, Islamabad will have to be careful about how it communicates its interaction with NATO. The people largely look at NATO as an extension of the US, which is not entirely correct. However, this perception is strong for two reasons: the US is the core state of the alliance; and the US foots the major part of NATO’s bill. In tandem this means that the US also gets to influence NATO in a major way. However, NATO is present in Afghanistan under the UN mandate. In legal-political terms this is very different from Iraq, for instance, where the US embroiled itself against the wishes of even its own NATO allies and without a UN mandate.

Pakistan has therefore to look at its interaction with NATO only in terms of Afghanistan. It also needs to keep its interaction with NATO on a separate track from its relations with the US. When NATO sent its relief contingent for the quake-affected people, the political opposition raised Cain and accused the government of kowtowing to the US. Wild theories flew around and it seemed that NATO was in Pakistan to either take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or be the vanguard of the cordon against China. The key, therefore, is to sell this idea to the people as it is. That’s the tough part. *
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\05\19\story_19-5-2006_pg3_1


This is an editorial from a Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

It raises interesting issues vis a vis the US, NATO, Pakistan and Afghanistan and with some reference to India too.

Unlike other countries, Afghanistan has always had strong warlords based polity with a nominal head at Kabul. It has been governed by tribal customs and have rarely been a cohesive nation as such. It is because of this situation that controlling Afghanistan has not been an easy task for anyone. Each warlord to his own, so to say.

Being landlocked and with a demanding terrain, while it is picturesque, it hardly supports agriculture or industries. Education has never been an attraction in Afghanistan.

In such a scenario, something more troublesome to govern that the "wild west", to have only 40,00 troops to "control" the nation and bring it to some semblance of democracy is well nigh impossible, especially since it is but small zones of tribal power centres and hardly a nation!

The current government or even the past ones were never friendly with Pakistan since there has always been the demand for Paktunistan (the land of the Pathans or Pashtuns or Pakhtoons) based on parts of Pakistan (inhabited by Pashtuns) and that of Afghanistan. And likewise Pakistan has always eyed Afghanistan with some suspicion. Afghans have never been easy with Paksitan. It must be remembered that Afghanistan is not a pure Pashtun country.

Therefore, for any organisation or country to expect Pakistan to assist without expecting anything in return is but a pipedream. That is why at regular intervals, Pakistan has to be woken from their reverie to take action in NWFP as was seen when President Bush visited Pakistan and admonished them for a tardy response to the War on Terror.

One wonders if the US is serious about bringing some semblance of order to Afghanistan. The Soviets had 120,000 troops and they failed (of course there were other reasons too). In India to contain the Pakistan sponsored cross border terrorism, there is a huge number of troops and para military (because India does not use artillery or air to control the terrorists) and yet the US expects to bring control with a mere 40,000!

One wonders how that could be possible.

Britain is sending 600 troops which is an understrength battalion in Indian terms.

Could someone explain how it is expected that Afghanistan can be 'normalised" with a mere 40,000 troops and with Pakistan being unable to control the Taliban and AQ from entering Afghanistan from Pakistan and return to their safe havens in Pakistan?

The worst case scenario being that Pakistan is actively aiding these Taliban and AQ to foment problems for ISAF!!

[SWJED]

21 June Los Angeles Times commentary - NATO's Afghanistan Challenge (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions) by Max Boot.

... On the plus side, the ISAF is that rare coalition in which soldiers from more than 30 nations, including such non-NATO allies as Australia and Macedonia, work together in relative harmony. In the Combined Joint Operations Center in Kabul, soldiers from different nations work side by side at computer terminals. Everyone communicates in English. The only way you can tell them apart is by the national flags on their shoulder patches...

Of course, protecting a group of visiting VIPs is one thing; protecting the people of southern Afghanistan from the Taliban and their narco-trafficker allies is a lot more difficult. This task has fallen primarily to 3,000 British, 2,200 Canadian and 1,500 Dutch troops. The other members of the ISAF prefer to serve in less perilous areas.

This points to one of NATO's biggest challenges — getting members to volunteer troops, and to do so without placing too many caveats on their deployment. In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.

In theory, the ISAF is supposed to concentrate on the softer side of counterinsurgency, providing development aid and security, while U.S. troops focus on hunting down bad guys. In practice, the distinction can be hard to draw. NATO troops in the south can engage in "proactive self-defense," whatever that means. Fleshing out this nebulous mandate will be up to commanders on the spot, and the widespread expectation is that British and Canadian troops will be more aggressive than their more cautious Dutch colleagues.

It is a daunting task that NATO has taken on in a country that ranks 173 out of 178 on a basic index of human development, and one whose economy is more dependent on illegal drugs and foreign aid than any other nation...

[Jedburgh]

I highly recommend this week's The Economist. Unfortunately, all the good stuff is restricted to "subscriber only" on-online.

This week features a very good Special Report on Afghanistan titled A Geographical Expression in Search of a State, that offers a balanced discussion of progress, failures and challenges. Couple that report with a longer (10 pages) survey of neighboring Pakistan, which The Economist calls "the most terrifying country in Asia", and it makes for an interesting read.

[Jedburgh]

Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf)
Brutal attacks by armed opposition groups on Afghan teachers, students, and their schools have occurred throughout much of Afghanistan in recent months, particularly in the south. These attacks, and the inability of the government and its international backers to stop them, demonstrate the deteriorating security conditions under which many Afghans are now living. While ultimate responsibility lies with the perpetrators, much about the response of the international community and the Afghan government can and must be improved if Afghanistan is to move forward. The situation is not hopeless, yet....

Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.

[SWJED]

4 August Christian Science Monitor - Taliban Hinder NATO 'Ink-Spot' Strategy (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0804/p07s02-wosc.html) by Rachel Morarjee.

Any Taliban fighters approaching Camp Bastion are visible for miles because the main British base in southern Afghanistan is slap-bang in the middle of nowhere. There is nothing around Bastion but seas of dust.

"We have tied up thousands of troops protecting a white elephant in the middle of the desert. The Taliban won't be able to attack us, but we are not doing anything to protect the Afghan populace with this base," says a British officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The location of the British base in southern Helmand Province highlights one of the many problems which face incoming NATO forces in the former Taliban strongholds of Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar Provinces.

NATO took over command of southern Afghanistan from US forces this week, promising to breathe new life into development, which has ground to a halt in the face of a reinvigorated Taliban. With double the number of forces that their US predecessors had, NATO plans to set up secure zones, then slowly expand them outwards like "ink spots" on blotting paper. But the virulence of insurgent attacks are already taxing the force, further delaying the reconstruction needed to win over what British commander Ed Butler refers to as the "floating voter."

"There is not a popular uprising in southern Afghanistan, but people are sitting on the fence. They are no longer sure whether the Taliban or the government will be the winning side," says Joanna Nathan, an analyst with the International Crisis Group.

Even before this week's handover, insurgents dramatically stepped up attacks in an apparent bid to knock off-balance the incoming NATO force. Nine British soldiers have died in the two months since they were deployed to Helmand, three of them in a well-planned ambush just a day after NATO took command of the region on July 31. Thursday, a Canadian soldier was killed by a roadside bomb, and 21 civilians died from a suicide car bomb in a Kandahar market. Over 1,000 people - most of them militants - have been killed since May.

NATO forces now number 8,000 across Afghanistan's four southern provinces, with some 4,000 departing US forces redeploying to eastern regions along the Pakistan border.

For the last four years US troops have focused their efforts on battling Al Qaeda and the fight to catch Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan's restive south. The task of rebuilding its shattered infrastructure has fallen by the wayside, and popular discontent has grown.

So has the opium crop, which is set to be the biggest ever this year in Helmand Province, which produces over 30 percent of Afghanistan's $2.8 billion harvest. In many parts of the south there are few other jobs.

Five years after the fall of the Taliban, the changes people expected to see in their lives have not materialized. Over 200 schools across southern Afghanistan have shut their doors in the face of violent threats and many more people have pulled their daughters out of the schools that remain open.

The Taliban have stepped into the security void that has opened up, setting up shadow administrations, offering people a chance to cultivate their drugs unmolested and promising a return to the law and order they enforced before 2001...

[SWJED]

5 September USA Today - Deadline to Break Taliban: 6 Months (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060905/1a_lede05.art.htm) by Paul Wiseman.

NATO's commander here has set a six-month deadline to reverse a Taliban insurgency terrorizing southern Afghanistan or risk alienating Afghans undecided about whom to support.

British army Lt. Gen. David Richards said his troops must prove to Afghans in the south that the fundamentalist Islamic militia won't be able to undermine the democratically elected Afghan government or stop efforts to rebuild the shattered country.

Only 10% of the south's population supports the Taliban, Richards said, citing Afghan government surveys. In an interview, he said 70% won't declare their loyalty until they “see which side will win. They can't wait forever. We've got to show them we will win.”

Nearly five years after a U.S.-led campaign ousted the Taliban government that had sheltered al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Richards' troops have launched “Operation Medusa” in Panjwayi district in Kandahar province. The campaign aims to quell the Taliban's aggressive new offensive. NATO reported that more than 200 Taliban fighters were killed in the first two days of Medusa, which began Saturday.

The fighting also has brought NATO casualties. Monday, two U.S. warplanes mistakenly strafed NATO troops in Panjwayi district. A Canadian soldier was killed, said Maj. Scott Lundy, a NATO spokesman. A British soldier was killed in a suicide bombing in Kabul, the British Defense Ministry said. More than 130 NATO and coalition troops have died this year, the Associated Press reported, more than in all of 2005.

NATO took over responsibility for southern Afghanistan from the United States on July 31. As early as this month, NATO will take over for the U.S.-led multinational coalition in eastern Afghanistan...

[SWJED]

5 September Reuters - NATO Says Offensive is Cornering Taliban (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500063.html).

NATO said on Tuesday its major offensive to crush a revitalized Taliban in southern Afghanistan is pushing the guerrillas into a corner as heavy fighting continues.

"We are closing the circle on the Taliban -- we have got the Taliban in a bit of a trap," NATO spokesman Major Quentin Innes said.

NATO launched Operation Medusa, its biggest ground offensive against an increasingly active Taliban, last weekend in Kandahar province, the hardline Islamist group's spiritual heartland.

The operation is focused on Panjwai district, near the capital, Kandahar city, and is being supported by air strikes.

Medusa was launched after NATO forces encountered stiffer-than-expected Taliban resistance as it took over the south from U.S.-led troops, the alliance's biggest-ever ground operation.

Casualties have been high. NATO says it has killed more than 200 guerrillas, a claim the Taliban disputes. At least five Canadian soldiers have died in combat and 14 British troops were killed when their plane crashed early in the offensive...

[SWJED]

23 September Wall Street Journal editorial - Operation Medusa (http://www.opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110008987).

In the war on terror, few battles are as clear and decisive as the one fought these last few weeks in southern Afghanistan. Six thousand Canadian, British, American and other NATO troops trounced resurgent Taliban fighters who dared to fight in the open. "Operation Medusa" dislodged insurgents from trenches and tunnels near Kandahar, killing a thousand or more.

The intensity of the fighting surprised some NATO allies, who this summer took over the lead in southern Afghanistan from the U.S. More tests are to come. The insurgents will surely regroup, shun direct engagements with Western troops, and resort to the ad hoc terrorism perfected in Iraq. To adapt NATO's nomenclature, the Medusa was injured but the snakes are very much alive...

[SWJED]

29 September USA Today - Nations Limit Use Of NATO Forces (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060929/1a_bottomstrip29.art.htm) by Jim Michaels.

Countries sending their troops to Afghanistan have placed a web of restrictions on how they can be used, creating headaches for combat commanders and hurting the coalition's ability to fight a resurgent Taliban.

The restrictions, also called caveats, vary and are imposed by governments who fear casualties or don't agree with all parts of the mission. Other caveats are due to a lack of training or equipment.

The result is some forces can't fight at night or in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan...

Some restrictions

Germany (2,300 troops): No combat.

Netherlands (1,400 troops): No ground combat.

Others (identities classified by Pentagon): No night fighting.

[SWJED]

18 October Globe and Mail - NATO Faces ‘Window of Opportunity' (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061018.wxafghan18/BNStory/Afghanistan/home) by Paul Koring.

Military successes over the Taliban in recent months have opened a crucial six-month “window of opportunity” to prove to Afghans in the south that long-promised reconstruction and security can be delivered, NATO's commander in Afghanistan said Tuesday.

However, British Lieutenant-General David Richards warned that “if we fail to deliver on the promises that they [the Afghan people] feel have been made to them,” the Taliban will be back in strength next summer. “If you do not have the consent of the people in a counterinsurgency, at the end of the day, you're probably going to lose. So we need to explore these ways to get the people onside.”

The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan failed to follow through as it should have after ousting the Taliban government in 2001, setting the stage for this year's deadly resurgence, he said. The mistake consisted of adopting “a peacetime approach” too early.

Gen. Richards stressed the urgent need for reconstruction, the development of a reliable and honest police force and alternatives to the poppy production that supports southern Afghanistan's economy.

Gen. Richards stressed the urgent need for reconstruction, the development of a reliable and honest police force and alternatives to the poppy production that supports southern Afghanistan's economy.

“At some point the military can do no more, because we don't offer solutions to all the other complex issues that are confronting the country. We are just part of the solution,” he said...

[Jedburgh]

...a decidedly pessimistic point-of-view from Michael Scheuer at the Jamestown Foundation:

The West is Running Out of Time in Afghanistan (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=201)
...The old adage that familiarity breeds contempt is no place on earth truer than in Afghanistan, and there it additionally always breeds armed resistance. In the Afghans' view, the U.S.-led coalition has occupied Afghanistan for five-plus years, has failed to deliver a more prosperous and safer society, has killed a large number of Afghan civilians and shows no sign of planning a near-term departure. Always short of patience in regard to foreigners running their affairs, most Afghans probably would concur with Taliban spokesman Mutamen's statement that "the people of Afghanistan...never accept foreign dominance...America has attacked Afghanistan without any reasonable plan or suggestions. The Americans, therefore, get nothing but the death of their soldiers in Afghanistan. We want NATO and other foreign troops to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible" (Afghan Islamic Press, October 7). Ominously, another Taliban leader, Mullah Mehmood Allah Haq Yar, claims that not only has the Pashtun-dominated Taliban's patience run out, but that the forces of the late Ahmed Shah Masood—heretofore backing Karzai—are beginning to decide that they did not defeat and evict Moscow only to be ruled by the West. In late spring 2005, Yar claims to have talked with Northern Alliance representatives who "condemned the foreign presence in the country, but insisted that the Taliban take the lead [in attacking it] and then they would follow suit." Yar claims that the Taliban's contacts with the Alliance commanders are continuing (Asia Times, October 5).

Overall, the increasing pace of the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan suggests it is only a matter of time until the commanders of the U.S.-led coalition are faced with telling their political leaders that a decision must be made to either heavily reinforce coalition forces—it appears that more than the 120,000 men Moscow deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s would be necessary—or begin preparations to withdraw from the country. If taken now, such a decision would be made in the context of polls showing popular opinion in Canada and Britain turning decidedly against continued participation in the Afghan war and media reports that France may begin to withdraw its special forces from Afghanistan next spring (Associated Press, October 15).

[Jedburgh]

ISN, 23 Oct 06: Perspectives: Insurgency in Afghanistan (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16825)
NATO's mission in southern Afghanistan, the alliance's first land deployment outside Europe, is proving its toughest yet. NATO's command has set a six-month deadline to wipe out the Taliban insurgency in order to work toward its original goals, hoping to reverse the situation before the onset of winter. Much is now riding on NATO's ability to see its mission through, and many experts agree that Afghan stability will depend on the alliance's success in the southern region. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned that without greater international help, Afghanistan could again become a breeding ground for terrorists.

Violence in Afghanistan continues to escalate, and is said to be worse than at any time since US-led forces invaded the country in 2001 to remove the Taliban. As such, NATO's mission has seen its mandate and its rules of engagement expanded well beyond the original duties of peacekeeping.

Complicating matters, last week, air strikes by NATO helicopters hunting Taliban fighters tore through three homes in southern Afghanistan as villagers slept, killing at least nine civilians, including women and children, according to news agency reports. Residents of the village of Ashogho condemned the attack. At around the same time on Wednesday morning, a rocket struck a house in a village to the west, killing 13 people. The strikes come at a time when NATO was counting on local support for the counterinsurgency.

Is NATO capable of handling the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan or will troops be there for two more decades, as one British military official opined recently, thanks to the sidelining of the Afghan mission because of the invasion of Iraq?

ISN Security Watch asked you to share your views on NATO's mission in Afghanistan...
Some interesting commentary follows...

[Tom Odom]

Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf)


Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.


Jed,

I generally like HRW. Their work in Rwanda was excellent; that said, they operate from their core belief that all violence and all war is a violation of human rights. In particular, HRW "reporting" of organized killings by the new GOR in late summer/early fall was suspect in my view then and remains so today.

Other organizations like AI are highly suspect; they draw funding by making dramatic claims, many of which are effectively proved to be overstated or even false. Then again there is MSF; if I talk about the MSF in Rwanda we will have to move this post to the "rant" column. Then again MSF in Goma was one of the few NGOs willing to speak out against what was happening in the camps and act on it.

I did a quick scan read of this one; looks good and well judged in its assessments.

Best
Tom

[marct]

On of the comments following the ISN piece was

The lynchpin to watch is Canada. Since moving into the south of the country this summer, its troops there have borne some of the heaviest fighting. At the same time its political investment in the success of the Afghan adventure is more in line with European members than with America or even the UK. The fear that a Canadian withdrawal will prompt a strategic re-evaluation in European capitals is a very real one.

Coming on top of that, CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/10/22/afganistan.html) just posted an interesting story


Military considers longer tours of duty in Afghanistan
Last Updated: Sunday, October 22, 2006 | 11:32 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian military wants to increase the time served by its troops in Afghanistan to nine months, up from six, a general told soldiers gathered in Edmonton on Saturday.

Brig.-Gen Mark Skidmore spoke after a change of command ceremony that put him in charge of army forces in Western Canada.

The career soldier from London, Ont., took over the job from Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, who will become commander of Task Force Afghanistan for six months.

"If you're a member of the Canadian military, particularly a soldier with a skill set that's required in Afghanistan, and you haven't been yet, I think chances are very good that the opportunity is going to be there to serve," Skidmore told the assembled troops at the Jefferson Armouries.

On Wednesday, Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of defence staff, said the Armed Forces will be looking outside combat units to find troops.

"We will re-role people that are in the training system right now but who are designed to be something else," he told the Commons defence committee.

... more

There are some very odd maneuvers going on politically here :rolleyes:

Marc

[Ray]

One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

[marct]

One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

Good points but, unfortunately, there is no way it can be done as things now stand. If you look at the case in the south-east, the border into North and South Waziristan is wide open and the Pakistani Government has no hope of being able to seal their side. One totally radical suggestion, that I know the Pakistanis won't accept, is to return Waziristan to Afghanistan (they used to be Afghan provinces and are dominated by the Pashtun tribe). The key to "winning" in Afghanistan, IMHO, lies to a large degree in recognizing that the current borders are illusions and operating on that recognition.

We lost the best chance for "winning" when the Loya Jirga met in 2003 and the king was shuffled aside - Karzai doesn't have the same personal authority, either moral or organizational. And, while I do respect him for a lot of the work he has done, he is not going to be able to unify the country as long as he is viewed as a puppet for the West. A victory in Afghanistan must be a victory by Afghans along the lines of the 2nd Afghan war (1878-1881).

Marc

[SWJED]

31 October London Times - Troops Turn Away From 'Ink Spots' For Control (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2429379,00.html) by Anthony Loyd.

... “If you listen to all the rumours then you would never go out or do anything,” said Colonel Ian Huntley, the Royal Marine commander in the capital of the restive Helmand province of Afghanistan. “It was always expected that there would be a period of asymmetric war, suicide bombings, et cetera. Generally, though, the place is relatively benign. I’m sure there are many worse places in the world to work.”

The colonel’s phlegmatic approach typifies the attitude of 3 Commando Brigade, which arrived in Helmand a month ago. Its mission — to support the Afghan Government with the necessary security measures to allow civil development — had been slanted more to war fighting than reconstruction after the outgoing 16 Air Assault Brigade spent the summer engaged in heated battles with insurgents.

Development was all but non-existent in Helmand by the time the Marines arrived, its concept still pinned on the failed idea of “ink spots”, whereby isolated northern towns, including Musa Qala and Sangin, were supposed to be the seeds of an expanding stability rather than the scenes of fierce fighting and rancour.

In the absence of officials from the Department for International Development, who rarely venture out of Kabul, the development of Helmand — the key to making progress in southern Afghanistan — has fallen largely on the military’s shoulders. The “ink spot” idea has been killed off, replaced by the concept of the “ADZ”, the Afghan Development Zone, a lozenge-shaped area, approximately 40 km (25 miles) long by 20 km wide, stretching along the Helmand river valley from the town of Gereshk to the city of Lashkar Gah.

Despite the threat of the suicide attacks, British patrols are deploying daily from their base in Lashkar Gah, home to about 350 soldiers and Marines, and assessing the potential of redevelopment sites within the ADZ.

The speed of progress might be slow, but the mission is up and running. And unlike in Iraq, where British officers and men have expressed doubts openly about the advantage of their continued presence in the country, in Helmand hope in the mission still remains high...

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 2 Nov 06: Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf)
...The desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace is what has brought Afghanistan to the present, increasingly dangerous situation. It has to be recognised that the armed conflict will last many years but the population needs to be reassured now that there is a clear political goal of an inclusive state. Actions to fight the insurgency must be based on and enforce the rule of law with priority given to the reform of the police and judiciary. Short-term measures such as reliance on ill-trained and poorly disciplined militias, harsh, ad hoc anti-terrorism legislation and discredited power brokers from past eras will only undermine the long-term goal of building sustainable institutions. Political strategy talk seems to focus increasingly on making a deal with the Taliban. That is a bad idea. The key to restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan is not making concessions to the violent extremists but meeting the legitimate grievances of the population – who for the most part have eagerly supported democratisation...

[SWJED]

7 November Los Angeles Times editorial - Make a Drug Deal with Afghanistan (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-hari6nov06,0,2531827.story?coll=la-opinion-center).

... The Afghan people are rebelling because the U.S. government is currently committed to destroying 60% of their economy. In the name of the "war on drugs," a U.S. corporation, Dyncorp, is being paid to barge into the fields of some of the poorest people in the world and systematically destroy their only livelihood.

These Afghans are growing poppies — from which heroin is derived — out of need, not greed. A quarter of all Afghan babies die before their fifth birthday. The Senlis Council warns that if Western governments continue this program of economic destruction — and the negative propaganda bonanza it creates — the Taliban may be sufficiently rejuvenated to march on Kabul, depose President Hamid Karzai and pin up a "Welcome home, Mr. Bin Laden" banner.

There is an alternative to this disastrous spiral. The world is suffering from a shortage of legal opiates. The World Health Organization describes it as "an unprecedented global pain crisis." About 80% of the world's population has almost no access to these painkillers at all. Even in developed countries, for cancer care alone there is an unmet annual need for 550 metric tons more opium to make morphine.

Afghan farmers continue to produce the stuff, only to be made into criminals because of it. Meanwhile, in a Kabul hospital, half the patients who need opiates are thrashing about in agony because they can't get them, while in fields only a few miles away opium crops are being hacked to pieces.

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

[marct]

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

Actually, this is one that the Western governments really shouldn't do - the UN or private companies operating under UN and national government oversight should. There are just too many resonances with the Opium War if national governments by themselves are doing it.

Marc

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 13 Nov 06: Afghanistan after the Taliban: Five Years On (http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8159467&top_story=1)
...Some worry that this will prove to be the high point of progress in Afghanistan. Analysts discuss the risk of successes of the past five years now draining away. There have been real achievements, if unevenly distributed. Afghanistan has an elected and popular president, Hamid Karzai, and a parliament that, despite some doubtful members, has proved itself generally responsible. Some 4.5m refugees have come home and 6.5m children are back in school. A national army of 35,000 men has been built from scratch, along with a police force of 55,000, although the latter is woefully corrupt and needs reforming. A UN disarmament campaign has processed 63,000 members of illegal armed groups and impounded 10,000 tanks and other heavy weapons. Some 4,000 health posts and 10,000km of roads have been built or rebuilt, although it unclear how these will be maintained in the long term...

...The prospects for long-term recovery depend, ultimately, on getting stability and flattening the Taliban. NATO commanders admit that they would like more troops to do that, but Western public opinion may not tolerate a long and bloody campaign. The Taliban, by contrast, appear happy to plan for the long term. As one Taliban commander recently boasted: “You have the clocks but we have the time.”...

[CaptCav_CoVan]

Interesting piece on Afghanistan from The Asia Foundation:

Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf)

November 13, 5:01 pm

The Asia Foundation (http://www.asiafoundation.org/) has just released Afghanistan in 2006: a Survey of the Afghan People (http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey06.html), one the most comprehensive surveys of Afghan public opinion. Questions ranging from government performance to security and reconstruction progress were asked of 6226 respondents throughout the country. The Asia Foundation does note, however, that due to security concerns they were unable to conduct the survey in Zabul and Uruzgan provinces.
The 128-page report contains both good and bad news. First the good, 44 percent of Afghan's believe the country is on the right path and have an optimistic view of the future. The bad news is that this number is significantly smaller than The Asia Foundation's 2004 survey (PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/afghan_voter-ed04.pdf)) in which 64 percent felt the country was heading in the right direction.
Strangely, security is not the number one reason cited by Afghans as shaping their opinion on the country's direction. A bad economy, the lack of reconstruction progress, poor government performance and unemployment all trump security as major concerns.

Below are some of the key findings (PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-surveyfindings_english.pdf)) that we think are especially interesting:

The national mood was found to be positive on the whole, with 44 percent of Afghans saying the country is headed in the right direction. While 21 percent felt it is headed in the wrong direction, 29 percent had mixed feelings and four percent were unsure.
Good security was cited as a reason for the country going in the right direction. For people who were disappointed with the direction, however, lack of security was not seen as one of the major reasons.
Though 80 percent felt poppy cultivation was wrong, they cited economic reasons for continued cultivation, and few made any linkage of poppy cultivation to terrorism, insecurity, or greater corruption.
An overwhelming majority (86%) of Afghans surveyed said they agreed to the principle of 'equal rights regardless of gender, ethnicity, and religion.'
A significant majority of survey respondents were in favor of women's rights to education and work.
Almost half of the respondents felt that men and women should have equal representation in political leadership.
For reporting a crime, 63 percent of the survey respondents went to the police, while for resolving problems the preference was to go to elders of the local shura (44%), followed by the police (37%). While 61 percent felt religious leaders should be consulted on problems, most reported having resolved problems through local elders. [Full Article, PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf)]One of the best aspects of this survey is that it includes a description of the methodology as well as a copy of the questionnaire used. Don't have time to read a 128-page report? Turn to page 90 and you can quickly see what questions were asked, how they were asked and the exact percentages for each answer. Take a look, the Afghan perspective provided in this survey is well worth your time.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 15 Nov 06:

Transforming NATO (...again): A Primer for the Summit in Riga 2006 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061114_nato_primer.pdf)

The portion of the report dealing with Afghanistan and its potential effects upon the Riga summit and NATO's future is on page 48 of the pdf document.
...The NATO operation in Afghanistan is in itself a remarkable achievement. Given the distance from Brussels, complexity, and operational environment, ISAF would have been an unimaginable mission just ten years ago.

Many observers believe the ISAF mission marks the birth of a “global NATO” that is willing and able to face 21st century threats. Others, however, are increasingly skeptical about the operation’s long-term sustainability. SACEUR General James Jones called for an additional 2,000 troops in September 2006. The deafening silence that followed raised questions about whether NATO had the political will and adequate capabilities to succeed....

[marct]

From CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/12/11/duceppe-afghanistan.html)


Duceppe threatens to topple government over Afghan mission
Last Updated: Monday, December 11, 2006 | 7:34 PM ET
CBC News

Bloc Québécois Leader Gilles Duceppe threatened Monday to try to topple the Harper government over the mission in Afghanistan unless the current mandate is changed.

Duceppe warned he might table a no-confidence motion if the mission isn't "rapidly and profoundly" altered, with more resources put into reconstruction instead of fighting.
....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS Briefing, 12 Dec 06:

Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061212_afghanistan.pdf)
Key Trends
- Development of effective government and economy will take at least 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.
- Current Afghan government, and US and NATO aid and activity levels are inadequate.
- Reconstituted enemy is more lethal and shows increased capacity for effective asymmetric warfare, including effective information operations
- Pakistan sanctuary is an enemy advantage
- Major rise in violence in West and South
- Rising threat in other areas
- Violence likely to be at least equal next year and may well be higher.
- Afghan forces developing but require major increases in aid and years of support.
- NATO effort has insufficient forces and only US, Canadian, British, Danes, Estonians,and Dutch forces are in the fight. Romanians have been in limited action but are largely road bound due to wrong APCs.
- Increased Narco-trafficking/crime
- Threat exploits limited transportation infrastructure.
- Image-risk of US defeat in Iraq strong morale builder for Taliban-Al Qa’ida
(Much more detail in the 71 slide pdf presentation)

Edit to add: Press Briefing Transcript (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/press/061213_cordesman_afghan.pdf)

[marct]

From CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/14/senlis-report-061214.html)

Troops bear brunt of 'misguided' Afghan aid policies: report
Last Updated: Thursday, December 14, 2006 | 2:30 PM ET
CBC News

International agencies, including the Canadian International Development Agency, have failed to tackle the food emergency in southern Afghanistan, and NATO soldiers in the region are paying the price, a new report says.

The paper, released Thursday by the Senlis Council, an international think tank, says "misguided" policies by agencies such as CIDA and the British Department for International Development have left the local population hungry and angry towards the international community.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/14/senlis-report-061214.html)

The full report (4MB) is available at http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/HM_report_full

Marc

[Tom Odom]

From page 54 of the Senlis report.


Even if you don't accept the veracity of the figures, the message is still there in this chart, one I delivered to an Israeli colonel in my history seminar in 1987.

It is for this reason I still maintain that "civilian" or worse, "collateral" casualties must be treated as friendly. "Us and them" has to be "we."

tom

[Jedburgh]

Culture note, from The Economist, 19 Dec 06:

Pushtunwali: Honor Among Them (http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8345531)
...It is over 250 years since Afghanistan was cobbled together, from many ethnic groups, and two centuries since British colonisers tried stretching their writ to India's (now Pakistan's) north-western frontier, where the plains crumple up towards the Hindu Kush. Yet, in both places, a large part of the population is still wedded to Pushtunwali. Some 15m Pushtuns live in Afghanistan, or 50% of its population; and 28m in Pakistan, mostly in NWFP, representing about 15% of the population there. Most of them are ruled by their tribal code, the notable exception being where the rival Islamist code, of the stringent Saudi variety which is preached by the Taliban and quite new to Afghanistan, is strong. Islamism has rivalled Pushtunwali for centuries; it has often gained prominence, as currently, in time of war. More typically, the two competing ways have cross-fertilised in Afghanistan, each subtly influencing the other...

[SWJED]

U.S. Says Afghan Troops Issue Critical to NATO's Future (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-01-26-voa80.cfm) - VOA.

A top U.S. State Department official warned Friday that NATO's future may hinge on alliance members dropping conditions they have placed on their troops' service in Afghanistan. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns says the so-called "caveats" on what various contingents may do in that country are an "existential" issue for NATO.

The Bush administration has made clear its irritation over conditions some NATO countries have placed on their soldiers' activity in Afghanistan...

NATO Allies Wary of Adding Troops in Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/asia/26cnd-afghan.html?) - NY Times.

America’s European allies remained noncommittal about sending additional troops to Afghanistan today, even as the Bush administration sought to inject new energy into the NATO mission against the Taliban by offering more American soldiers and money.

Officially, the language at a NATO meeting here today reflected resolve and commitment on Afghanistan. NATO “is stepping up its game in Afghanistan on all fronts,” the alliance’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands, said. “The fact that you saw so many people from the international community sitting around the table is a strong message itself.”

But beyond the sound bytes, the realities that have troubled the NATO mission in Afghanistan since the 26-member trans-Atlantic alliance took command last year remained on display. France and Germany continued to limit their combat role; both countries have refused to deploy troops in the south of the country, where Taliban forces are strongest. Germany’s Parliament has yet to approve a proposal to send six Tornado reconnaissance jets to southern Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi is battling allies in own party and government who oppose the Afghan mission and want the government to set a deadline for withdrawing the country’s 1,800 troops...

[SWJED]

6 March Washington Post - NATO Launches Major Operation in Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/06/AR2007030600109.html) by Griff Witte.

NATO and Afghan forces launched what commanders described as a major operation in a key province of southern Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=el) Tuesday morning, part of a bid to win back territory that has become a haven for insurgents.

The operation, the international force's largest to date in the country, was centered in the northern part of the Helmand province (http://www.nationalgeographic.com/landincrisis/020312/political_sw.html), where Afghan government authorities have very little control and insurgents have been able to move with relative impunity. The province's governor said 700 al Qaeda fighters recently moved into the region, and were planning to continue the wave of suicide bombings and other attacks that have besieged Afghanistan for the past year and a half.

Both sides have said this is likely to be a bloody spring for the country, and Tuesday's operation seemed to mark a significant escalation. NATO forces said the operation began at 5 a.m. and ultimately would involve 4,500 NATO troops from the U.S., Britain, Canada and the Netherlands, plus 1,000 Afghan soldiers...

[SWJED]

18 April Washington Times - Afghan Offensive to Test NATO Credibility (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070417-101212-4508r.htm) by David Sands.

The United States and its NATO allies are making progress in Afghanistan but face a critical test of the alliance's credibility from an expected spring offensive from the Islamist insurgency, Dutch Ambassador to the United States Christiaan Mark Johan Kroner said in an interview yesterday.

The U.S. and Dutch armies are among the few NATO countries carrying out the bulk of the military operations against resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan's restive south and east.

The 2,100-member Dutch force has taken command of the volatile southern sector from Canada, but several NATO powers have placed restrictions -- known as "caveats" -- on the deployment of their forces to Afghanistan's more dangerous regions.

The war is a "critical test of NATO's credibility," Mr. Kroner said in a luncheon with editors and reporters at The Washington Times.

"If NATO does not succeed there, it will be a disaster -- not just for Afghanistan and the region but for NATO itself," the veteran Dutch diplomat said. "It would certainly be a blow to the credibility of the West to deal with a crisis."...

[SWJED]

8 May Washington Times - NATO Paces Afghan Offensive (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070507-115823-8325r.htm) by Philip Smucker.

NATO officers and diplomats say they are selectively securing some areas of southern Afghanistan ahead of others, hoping the contrast between Taliban and government rule will gradually undermine support for the Islamist insurgents.

Officers responsible for "Operation Achilles," the spring offensive being undertaken by U.S., British and Canadian forces, say they are in no hurry to drive the Taliban from some of the strongholds they captured in northern Helmand province last year.

"We will move into these Taliban areas at a time of our choosing," British Lt. Col. Charlie Mayo said, when asked why NATO forces had not yet challenged the hard-line Islamist organization's grip on Musa Qala, a major town in this key battleground province.

NATO is trying to set examples of development and stability in enclaves already under Afghan government control, Col. Mayo said...

[SoiCowboy]

It comes across more as NATO weakness than strategic brilliance.

[goesh]

- they may be waiting for the Dutch to decide if they want to engage armed Talis or not, the Dutch need multiple E&E routes ya' know and it takes time to map them out:p

[jcustis]

From what I've seen of combat camera footage of the Dutch in action, those guys are the last thing that could be holding NATO up.

[Old Eagle]

I'm not sanguine about this approach. It is basically a reprise of the approach taken around Brcko, BH. Federation-controlled areas were pumped full of redevelopment projects while Serb areas, since we were having problems with the little darlin's, were left to languish. Intended message -- behave and good things happen. Message received -- Croats and Bozniacs are willing to sell their souls for money, but we Serbs are too proud and strong for that! Tribalism wins out.

Pls note -- this is history. I have not been to Brcko in nearly a decade; I am not trying to describe current ground truth.

[TROUFION]

European troops in general tend to be excellent. Well trained well supplied and motivated. Unfortunatley they seem to be hampered by vacillating Governments and Commanders who, again seem, to give in when presented a dilemma that puts their men and their national policy at any risk.

Example: Srebrenica: The United Nations had previously declared Srebrenica a UN protected "safe area", but they did not prevent the massacre, even though 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers were present at the time.[12]
http://www.gendercide.org/case_srebrenica.html

Of course Srebrenica was a peace keeping operation so ROE was a factor BUT...

[tequila]

Apropos - even supposed America-lover / Muslim-basher Sarkozy is eager to withdraw (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070426/ap_on_re_eu/france_election)from Afghanistan. I remember that Jacques Chirac was also a great lover of America when he won office.

[SWJED]

30 May Washington Post - NATO General Tells of Taliban Setbacks (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901938.html) by Jason Ukman.

A top NATO alliance general said yesterday that Afghanistan's Taliban militia has lost its ability to control large swaths of territory, even if the hard-line Islamic movement remains strong in "small pockets" of the country.

Dutch Maj. Gen. Ton van Loon, who this month ended his tour as commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan's volatile south, said Taliban fighters had been driven out of the regions where they had sought to gain a foothold, including Kandahar city and parts of Helmand province...