View Full Version : TRADOC Losing Its Edge?
One would hope that FM 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine are not regarded as "not invented here" topics by TRADOC. From an entry today in The Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:
There was a time a couple of decades ago when the Army's Training and Doctrine Command was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding the post-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it is doing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.
To read the rest of Tom Ricks' piece, click on the below link:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/11/whatever_happened_to_tradoc
Rob Thornton
12-11-2009, 08:26 PM
Over the past 5 years or so TRADOC and the rest of the generating force have been significant bill payers for a service that has also been a huge bill payer for a department that has been the primary bill payer to meet operational requirments in multiple theaters.
One can argue that this is good as it gets folks back into operational positions and as such should bring that experience back into the generating force. While that may be true, a hole is hole. If you think of the generating force as a mechanical generator that provides a power supply to operating force, how many kilo watts are required to provide power? How much is required to provide minimal power (meet current requirments) and maximum power (meet current and future requirements)? How many kilo watts do we have on hand relative to the requirment(s)? I don't know the answer to that question, and I don't think many others do as well.
I do think TRADOC has managed to do its part in ensuring that the wheels don't fall off as we increase the demands on the Army - demands that will likely increase with additional mission creep. This is a feat in itself, and I think a testimony to stewardship of an important and limited resource - our Army. Some may argue it could be done more efficiently or more effectively, I'd only ask them to prove it. I'd add that there are lots of folks in and outside the Army who are in fact trying to do that, its proven to be harder than some have thought.
I think we've done OK, and could perhaps do better, but I'm not totally sure how - or if in fact its within a given leader's, organization's, command's, service's, or department's authority to make it so. While that is frustrating, I do beleive that there are a lot of folks trying hard to get things more right, and that the leadership has set a mostly conducive and tolerant atmoshpere. That they don't jump to every proposed solution may seem recalcitrant or obstinant, however I'd offer it may in fact be the knowledge and experience that recognizes that while an organization as big as the Army can recover from not getting it quite right, its very hard to recover from getting it completely wrong.
Best, Rob
Hacksaw
12-11-2009, 09:30 PM
Wow so this is what happens when I guy excuses himself from the rigor of writing for a respected news agency...
"yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."
Ricks accusing Dempsey of being intellectually sloppy is the pot calling the kettle black...
Hmmm...
"I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle."
Let's see the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) is a major subordinate organization of the Combined Arms Center... a Major Subordinate Command of TRADOC... so it is an organizational failing that the higher headquarters didn't get in the way of the subordinate organization's mission... if only it were so more often...
I wonder when was the last time Ricks spent some time, beyond a stop and pop to pimp a book, to discover how TRADOC/CAC is organized and what it is up to...
Rather you get this type of silliness (nicest term I could come up with)... recommend we just kill this one, it doesn't deserve much more...
Oh by the way, I may be the biggest critic of TRADOC...
Live well and row
Fuchs
12-11-2009, 10:08 PM
AWG - is that a TRADOC effort?
IntelTrooper
12-12-2009, 12:08 AM
AWG - is that a TRADOC effort?
Wikipedia claims that they are.
Ken White
12-12-2009, 05:30 AM
Check the LINK. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_Warfare_Group)
Fuchs
12-12-2009, 10:48 AM
I found no reference to TRADOC in that Wikipedia page or its links.
TRADOC itself doesn't mention it as a subordinate unit.
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm#MSOs
The AWG is pretty much doing what TRADOC was supposed to do.
Ken White
12-12-2009, 03:15 PM
It is charged with developing new technologies and techniques in rapid fashion but aimed specifically and narrowly at asymmetric current and possible future threats which TRADOC isn't addressing. It is also charged with identifying (not in competition with the Intel community or SOCOM) such threats. That specifically because the formal mechanism is rather slow and ponderous while being directed at all threats. The focus, the inability to conduct major studies and such are quite different.
AWG is supposed to be light and agile and is supposed to be to the Army what these guys LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skunk_Works) are to Lockheed Martin.
It could be. It could also become hidebound, overcautious and simply another arm of the bureaucracy. Too early to tell
Hacksaw
12-14-2009, 02:59 PM
AWG...
AWG was established by then HQDA G3/5/7 Gen Cody... One of several efforts like JIEDDO that sprung up, I think, in response to operations after OIF 1...
I would offer that AWG as currently organized makes little sense... the same as the 1st IO Command... they were aligned they way they were in order to take them "out of the system"... much like an AD HOC planning element, the lead for OEF in the early stages, in USCENTCOM once worked out of the J3 Exercises...
The problem with these types of "extra-ordinary" C2 arrangements is that they are out of system... I will clarify... first, much like the human body... an organism/organization will fight against a foreign "element" inserted artificially... second, since they exist "outside the system" the solutions they develop are likewise outside the system; An ingenius box delivered to a deployed HQ in theater, with one time training, is a door stop within two rotations...
As wikipedia indicates AWG is obviously not organizationally aligned to TRADOC, but does in fact work directly with TRADOC in order to accomplish some of its missions... they feed off established lessons learned structure... they team with other training elements... etc etc...
I suppose Ad Hoc(ery) has its place, but it is terribly inefficient... and the question you have to ask is.... If the system is bad, why not fix the system as opposed to establishing yet another bypass... and I think the answer is that there are a lot of good reasons/advantages to a system that doesn't respond to every single bump in the night... maybe the institutional base shouldn't be easily moved to reflect the whims of a leader who is in place for 24 mths as a rule...
TRADOC has real faults... needs to relook its internal processes (did so about 5 years ago, re-wrote the TR 10-5 series, and then ignored it) and adhere/act upon what they agree is the best way forward (that means moving resources to reflect their operational & organizational plans...
got me lots more, but will spare all the bile...
Live well and row
When we got to this slide shortly after lunch, this little yellow text box got most of us listening again :rolleyes:
Most of us paused (sigh) when we heard...
A complete and detailed approach focused on a general solution for the entire Army
MikeF
12-14-2009, 05:16 PM
I had some good experience with the AWG guys. I'd sum the organization up as SF NCOs conducting FID with regular US military.
Prior to deployment (spring 2006), they provided dedicated marksmenship training for three of my NCOs at Bragg. Several school houses deploy training teams CONUS these days (Scout course, Sniper School) IOT maximize training opportunities.
In country, they embedded with my company for two weeks to observe and coach. I liked it b/c it gave my leaders and I a second set of neutral eyes to evaluate our company's operation and TTPs.
Overall, the program is win-win. The AWG gets to train units and pass on what works/doesn't work, and they also get the observe many different units.
Mike
Retired Army Major General Robert Scales says the following in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:
You have made some very useful observations about TRADOC. But really the issue is not TRADOC so much as the state of intellectual capital in the Army. When we overused our equipment in units we "circle x'd" minor faults (then called deferred maintenance). If the odometer or the fuel gauge went on the fritz units deferred maintenance so vehicles could still be driven. Inevitably the fleet melted down under the cumulative effect of neglect over time. We are at a similar place now with our intellectual capital.
Click on the link below to read the rest of the article.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/14/what_happened_to_tradoc_ii_weighed_in_the_scales
Ken White
12-14-2009, 08:53 PM
I would offer that AWG as currently organized makes little sense...they were aligned they way they were in order to take them "out of the system"..."Ture but adjustments will be made...
an organism/organization will fight against a foreign "element" inserted artificially... second, since they exist "outside the system" the solutions they develop are likewise outside the system; An ingenius box delivered to a deployed HQ in theater, with one time training, is a door stop within two rotations...Your premise is of course totally correct but the latter part is not true in this case. They're successfully working on the fourth year of rotations and not as door stops. Most there are totally aware that if the Army functioned as it was supposed to, they would not be needed. They are also regrettably aware that they are needed. They also know that even if they went away today, company intel cells and a number of other things they introduced are in fact embedded in the organism...
I suppose Ad Hoc(ery) has its place, but it is terribly inefficient...I disagree. Strongly. Not that ad-hocery is inefficient, it sometimes is (it is also sometimes wonderfully efficient) -- but with the implication that ad-hocery is bad. I suggest that a minimal reading of US military history shows a rich and effective tradition of ad hocery. Bureaucracy is not a 21st Century invention... :wry:
and I think the answer is that there are a lot of good reasons/advantages to a system that doesn't respond to every single bump in the night... maybe the institutional base shouldn't be easily moved to reflect the whims of a leader who is in place for 24 mths as a rule...That's true but that also is not the total answer. Hidebounditis and turf protection also come to mind as equally salient reasons why the system cannot or will not tell the difference between a genuine need to adapt versus a bump in the night...
"(did so about 5 years ago, re-wrote the TR 10-5 series, and then ignored it) Is that akin to this?
"maybe the institutional base shouldn't be easily moved to reflect the whims of a leader who is in place for 24 mths as a rule...":D:D
Hacksaw
12-14-2009, 10:15 PM
Ture but adjustments will be made...Your premise is of course totally correct but the latter part is not true in this case. They're successfully working on the fourth year of rotations and not as door stops. Most there are totally aware that if the Army functioned as it was supposed to, they would not be needed. They are also regrettably aware that they are needed. They also know that even if they went away today, company intel cells and a number of other things they introduced are in fact embedded in the organism...I disagree. Strongly. Not that ad-hocery is inefficient, it sometimes is (it is also sometimes wonderfully efficient) -- but with the implication that ad-hocery is bad. I suggest that a minimal reading of US military history shows a rich and effective tradition of ad hocery. Bureaucracy is not a 21st Century invention... :wry:That's true but that also is not the total answer. Hidebounditis and turf protection also come to mind as equally salient reasons why the system cannot or will not tell the difference between a genuine need to adapt versus a bump in the night...Is that akin to this?:D:D
I was not referring to AWG as door stops, rather literal boxes... as for Company Intel team... that isn't permanent until it is reflected in MTOEs... permanence being a relative term... again has its place, but it would be far better if the MTOE of Companies reflected the reality of the requirement as opposed to a temp fix (temp being relative as well)...
I don't think I characterized ad hoc(ery) as inherently bad.... rather that in comparison to fixing the base reason for the ad hoc(ery) is generally preferred... and at the institutional level ad hoc(ery) is TERRIBLY inefficienct... for the simple reason that it spends half its time defending itself
That's why ad hocery has a place.... as I noted in an earlier post in this thread, I'm actually a genuine critic of TRADOC... mostly for its hidebound tendencies... but I can't tell you how many times I had a GO tell me he wanted to work relatively routine actions (extra-ordinarily) because they thought the process to hidebound, but in fact they understood very little about the process they criticized...
Again, I'm not a fan... but some critics... especially the Tom Ricks of the world are ill-informed and unwilling to learn...
As for AWG... intent wasn't to take a crack at AWG... it fills a role that you could argue TRADOC should, but maybe it shouldn't... it's role is better filled by an Ad Hoc organization (this being its proverbial place)...
Schmedlap
12-14-2009, 10:24 PM
I would offer that AWG as currently organized makes little sense... the same as the 1st IO Command... they were aligned they way they were in order to take them "out of the system"... much like an AD HOC planning element...
I think the good outweighs the bad. To me, these arrangements are analogous (maybe not by design) to spinning off subsidiaries or joint ventures in the business world to develop a new competency/technology/skill.
AWG, 1st IO, and similar do in-house training, farm out their personnel in support of other units, learn, then personnel come back, share lessons with fellow "subject matter experts" (for lack of a better term), and then adjust their training... and repeat. Imo, they provide a higher quality augmentee than individual units are currently poised to provide and they help to speed up the process of developing a new (or neglected) competency.
Obviously, we would all prefer greater unit integrity, rather than augmentees, but the general lack of competence/proficiency/etc across the force in certain areas makes the ad hockery a good plan for now. The lack of unit integrity is mitigated by having only Officers and (usually senior) NCOs in these units who generally don't need a lot of supervision. They show up having done their own SRP and bringing their own gear and put little to no logistical burden on the receiving unit.
Just my take on the situation. I have no idea what the actual intent was for said ad hoc arrangements. But, those are the upsides as I see it.
Hacksaw
12-14-2009, 10:54 PM
I think I'm going to excuse myself from this thread only because I seem to have clouded the discussion rather than shed light... but as a last ditch effort at explaining myself...
I argued, and still hold the opinion, that the current C2 alignment of AWG and to a lesser extent 1st IO Command are less than logical... just an opinion, but I think if after 4-5 years... they still exist because they still add value... then we might think about making them a more permanent fixture... and if we think the system can't take the shock, then we might be better off healing the system rather than working around...
It was not my intent to denigrate the efforts or contribution of either organization.... Both are professional and provide added value to their "customers"....
But, and its a big but, is something that has existed for 4-5 years still considered ad hoc... and if its not, I'd argue that its not, why still held out as extra-ordinary in C2 arrangement??? and if the reason is institutional ineptness... might want to put a little energy into fixing that... then again I think TRADOC is perfectly capable of institutionalizing AWG, might even help it transform from within...
My original beef was with a "personality" who decided to take an ad hominen swipe at TRADOC in general and General Dempsey in particular, and cited as an example the creation of FM 3-24 which in fact was perfect illustration of TRADOC writ large and CG, TRADOC in particular (then General Wallace) acting/not-acting exactly as designed...
I now bow... head bloody and beaten... and back away from the thread:D
Just an idle thought.... but as the or
IntelTrooper
12-14-2009, 11:09 PM
I found no reference to TRADOC in that Wikipedia page or its links.
TRADOC itself doesn't mention it as a subordinate unit.
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm#MSOs
The AWG is pretty much doing what TRADOC was supposed to do.
If you click the link for G-3/5/7, it sends you to the Wikipedia entry for TRADOC. :confused:
Here in the Eastern Panhandle of West Virginia hocery pucks are hard to find. :wry:
Schmedlap
12-15-2009, 12:00 AM
I think I'm going to excuse myself from this thread only because I seem to have clouded the discussion rather than shed light...
I don't think anything can get any cloudier after Ricks handles it.
It was not my intent to denigrate the efforts or contribution of either organization....
I didn't get that impression - hopefully no one else did.
I argued, and still hold the opinion, that the current C2 alignment of AWG and to a lesser extent 1st IO Command are less than logical... is something that has existed for 4-5 years still considered ad hoc... and if its not, I'd argue that its not, why still held out as extra-ordinary in C2 arrangement??? and if the reason is institutional ineptness... might want to put a little energy into fixing that
Can't argue with that.
My original beef was with a "personality" who decided to take an ad hominen swipe at TRADOC in general and General Dempsey in particular, and cited as an example the creation of FM 3-24 which in fact was perfect illustration of TRADOC writ large and CG, TRADOC in particular (then General Wallace) acting/not-acting exactly as designed...
Actually it wasn't Tom Ricks who brought up the subject of FM 3-24 in his blog, it was me in the post that started this thread. In the comment section to Rick's online article on Friday I made a point of saying that it was the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that was the agency responsible for writing the manual. The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.
Hacksaw
12-15-2009, 02:40 PM
Actually Pete... This is a direct paste from Ricks piece on-line...
"There was a time a couple of decades ago when theArmy's Training and DoctrineCommand was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding thepost-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it isdoing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.
I was thinking about this because I was just reading the text of a speech Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."
With regards to...
"The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.
As for the areas your bring up...
The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force
as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9142&highlight=COIN
By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE
Live well and row
William F. Owen
12-15-2009, 03:06 PM
Hacksaw mate, Question
Gen. Martin Dempsey, current commander of TRADOC, gave at a meeting of the Army association in DC in October. His bottom line is fine withme -- yes, got it, adaptability is key for the future of the service -- but the points he makes getting there are just intellectually sloppy."
Who was sloppy?
IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some.
The idea of devoting/specializing/converting 2-3 divisions to a light MTOE for COIN operations is a little baffling, don't think anyone is seriously considering this for several reasons, the most important may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force.
True! The idea that you do not use Tanks in irregular Warfare is utterly fallacious, and the idea that "light is right" is utterly without evidence. You need to be able to use any tool for any job. Some are better than others.
- and irregular warfare demands lots of good infantry, same are regular warfare. Not all troops doing dismounted operations, have to be infantry.
slapout9
12-15-2009, 03:47 PM
may be that some of our best "COIN" commanders thus far have been CAV officers/tankers... converting a unit heavy to light does not make it a COIN force
IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it:wry:
Ken White
12-15-2009, 03:59 PM
...because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations...That would be a huge mistake.
They've already added 'light' Bdes to heavy Divs and that isn't going to end well. :mad:
From the Tom Ricks blog today:
The shallowness of General Dempsey's presentation was all the more striking to me because on the same day I read a similar piece by retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno. Like Dempsey, Barno is grappling with change and trying to look into the future, but he shows much more rigor and originality in doing so. He also challenges the Army far more than Dempsey did.
Click on the link below for the entire story:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/15/whatever_happened_to_tradoc_iii_the_gen_barno_chal lenge
Hacksaw
12-15-2009, 06:11 PM
IMO it's not the tanks it's the fact that Cavalry commanders understand Maneuver almost as a sixth sense. An Insurgency Maneuvers through the Population through Stealth. To win at least until the Political effect takes place you have to deny the enemy freedom of movement. Cavalry officers seem to understand that as an instinct. Besides Cavalry is John Wayne American, Boots and Saddles thats why the 82nd Airborne was supposed to become the 82nd Air Cavalry Division. Air Mobile ain't got no MoJo to it:wry:
couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...
Wilf...
"Who was sloppy?
IMO, not just FM3-24 but almost all the writing on so-called COIN is abysmally weak from the stand point of rigour. Complex-adaptive-culture-human-terrain, does not a coherent doctrine make.
In fact, quite the opposite. Words have meaning, and you have 3,000 years of classical warfare to learn from.
Why the "WOW-COIN" generation took the opposite route will one day, I suspect, make very uncomfortable reading for some."
I suppose if all soldiers and leaders were nuanced enough to adapt Saint Carl's musing into a framework that allows them to perform as effective counterinsurgents we'd all be better off... the fact is the vast majority of the unwashed want/need some checklist material... I refuse to enter into the debate of whether 3-24 is good or bad (I think both... good for what it was intended by their "god fathers", bad in that it is often ill-applied) - that said it has filled a role in helping the less nuanced to think differently about their mission and their environment... and from personal observation that was a dire need... as for your point... it was a part of this discussion because Ricks used the development of 3-24 and TRADOC HQ lack of involvement in its development as an example of the deterioration of TRADOC from what it once was...
Pete... LTG (R) Barno is/was a fine officer/great intellect according to those I know who served with him (I didn't)... I'm sure given space and time to think about the challenges the Army faces as it attempts to build a force to prevail in current operations and set a stance to succeed in the future, that he has some worthwile and perhaps even novel ideas (editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)... I'm sure Barno is probably in some way shape or form in dialogue with TRADOC since his intellectual interests seem to lean in that direction...
comparing a 10 page paper with a presentation at AUSA is in a word... Silly on the part of Ricks... and lacks rigour...
Didn't I say I was going to excuse myself -- truly hell is freezing over when I'm defending TRADOC :eek:
The main appeal of the lighter MTOE is its strategic deployability--the problem of course is what to do if once in-theater an adversary confronts us with heavy weapons. I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.
slapout9
12-15-2009, 06:45 PM
couldn't agree more... but that's the point... its between the ears - and - the stuff between the ears is formed/shaped throughout a career and anecdotal evidence is that a career as a light infantryman has no discernable correlation to understanding how best to operate as a counterinsurgent...
Yep, and we seem to ignore factual evidence that when we created a Cavalry Constabulary in both the early Philippine campaigns and Germany WW2 the US was very successful.
Cavguy
12-15-2009, 08:37 PM
as for the instruction... absolutely correct, although I'd argue its improved to some extent, great article on the topic... that I'd bet has made its way into Dempsey's inbox... was published in SWJ BLOG here...
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9142&highlight=COIN
By the way the author of that piece spent the last 2.5 years fighting the good fight to improve COIN integration/inclusion in LDE
I know the guy you describe. He's a hack. ;)
Anybody who would call Hawaii a hardship tour ... :confused:
Ken White
12-15-2009, 09:17 PM
Hacksaw:
(editorial note: we all know nothing is a novel idea unless it came from Ken White)Nay, not so -- tons of good novel ideas here from a great many folks on a daily basis. There are also those who will acknowledge the status quo is not good but surprisingly, still defend it...
Take ad-hocery, that's the way the US of A always fights. Having served with a few ad-hoc aggregations and seen the good and bad, I have no particular problem with it. My contributions aren't novel, they are simply what I have seen work -- or not -- over many years. What never works is hidebound bureaucracy...
Pete:
I was in the 7th Inf Div when it began converting from straight-leg to light in the early 1980s. Most of the World War II triangular infantry divisions in Europe had an attached battalion of armor. Perhaps armor or mech infantry battalions could be attached or made organic to light infantry brigades. Sort of a modular TOE, if you will.Like you, I served in regular infantry divisions -- including the 7th in Korea post war -- the old style Infantry Division TOE had a lot going for it and IMO it was a mistake to 'lighten' of 'heavy-ize' all of them.
Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.
82redleg
12-15-2009, 11:12 PM
Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't. I think the Division as an echelon should go away but their should be light, medium and heavy Bdes, I think -- each has a niche in which to operate.
I don't think that the division echelon can simply "go away"- the span of control from Corps to BDE in Iraq would be over 20 (even now), over 30 at the height of the surge.
I think that the BCTs should be truly independent (a simple first step would be calling them something unique, rather than # of whatever division), and capable of operating independently- a BG CDR, COL DCO, 4 maneuver battalions, 4 (or 5) troops in the RSTA, 4 (or 5) firing batteries in the FA, increased CS and CSS elements- the BN and especially the BCT HQ can handle it, we cut line units at the expense of HQs in 2004-2006. Functional and multifunctional BDEs aren't too bad, and can retain COL CDRs (they are smaller, and they shouldn't maneuver)- the equivalent "CMD" for maneuver COLs can be the DCO positions, just a MAJs don't command now.
BG Was de Czege agreed with you on the regular infantry organization- way back in JUL-AUG 1985 Infantry Journal (article called "3 Kinds of Infantry"). I could argue that, at the BN level, the ABN/AASLT infantry (and the current IBCT battalions) were/are a esxtremely lightened version of the regular IN, and that the SBCTs fit the bill rather nicely. M2 mech IN is clearly "armored" infantry (to use Was de Czege's term), while the former light infantry battalion's were pretty decent "light" infantry- the RGR RGT's organization works as well. The problem with the ABN/AASLT organization is that it only cross-pollinated with the light and RGR units, and not much at all with the mech units, thus becoming "light" by ethos in spite of a (extremely lightened) medium MTOE.
Bottom line, I agree on light, medium and heavy BCTs- we need to beef all the BCTs up in #s, and enable their C2 to operate a 2 maneuver BN (+ enabler slice) task force under the DCO if required for a mission. Divisions need to remain (maybe not as many, but some HQ between corps and BCT/BDE), and probably without DCGs (the BGs go the BCT command positions).
During World War II and for some years afterward we had armored infantry battalions in many of our armored divisions. Their main combat vehicle was the half-track. The term armored infantry isn't one that de Czege invented.
82redleg
12-16-2009, 01:35 AM
During World War II and for some years afterward we had armored infantry battalions in many of our armored divisions. Their main combat vehicle was the half-track. The term armored infantry isn't one that de Czege invented.
Correct- I merely meant that I was using the term in the way the Was de Czege defined it. The term was used before that.
And I believe armored infantry WERE the infantry in armored divisions- not in many of them.
From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:
I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
For the rest, click on:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/16/barno_tradoc_iv_is_the_victim_not_the_villain
Rob Thornton
12-16-2009, 08:04 PM
There is an interview over at National Journal Online with GEN Dempsey (http://insiderinterviews.nationaljournal.com/2009/12/longterm-army-planning-for-a-s.php). The title: Adaptability is Power
Best, Rob
Rob Thornton
12-16-2009, 08:17 PM
From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:
Quote:
I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
For the rest, click on:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain
I can't say for sure they are avoiding the assignments, some of it is due to operating force demands. However a hole is a hole, and I suspect there will be more of them and one sourcing solution will be contractors, another DA civilians.
I'm also not totally convinced of the quality issues associated with the use of civilians to teach ILE. From my perspective, the folks that taught my ILE class were very good, they were not outmoded or outdated, and they were very curious about our uniformed experiences and encouraged and facilitated working them into the course. At the top of the schools there is a uniformed leader who charts the course of what will be taught.
What concerns me is not the quality of the instruction, or the ability of the instructors to deliver the material (or take advantage of the students' experiences), rather its the question of determining if the things that are taught are in line with what we say we desire and require out of leaders. Until we answer the question of what we want our leaders to be capable of at each grade or position it will be hard to determine if what they are being taught is right or wrong, or can be improved upon. I think we could say the same for the other generating force responsibilities as well.
Best, Rob
Fuchs
12-16-2009, 08:19 PM
What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?
Steve Blair
12-16-2009, 08:24 PM
What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?
Giving up or surrendering, more or less.
Rob Thornton
12-16-2009, 08:53 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?
Giving up or surrendering, more or less.
Steve, I think in this case the context did imply taking a break from operational assignments, or MTO&E units - or in today's terms deployments.
However, I have not seen that to be the case, Niel Smith is an example of a guy who prior to attending ILE was in a generating force assignment to help Army integrate COIN lessons into big Army. Niel not only benefitted Army by this assignment (and through his efforts many others), but also got some insights into how other parts of the Army work which I think benefitted him and may provide him with insights as he moves on to increasing positions of responsibility and authority.
There was a discussion on another thread about guys working in post BQ (branch qualifying) assignments as part of TRADOC and how they are selected - this not only includes time at Leavenworth, or the various branch school instructor positions, but also assignments in the NCR (National Capital Region), ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling), service academies, CTCs (Combat Training Centers) etc. Add to that a growing requirment for Army to augment MTO&E units and staff in theater to meet requirments for advisors, contracting officers, and a host of other functions and pretty soon Army is running the marathon at sprint speed. Indeed there are holes all over, so I'm not sure anybody is really taking a knee - but I do know that there are an awful lot of balls in the air, and I'm not sure we know which ones are glass, or why they are glass - hell, they may all be glass.
Best, Rob
Rob Thornton
12-16-2009, 08:58 PM
OK - I fianlly got the link to work. I think its a combination and depends upon a point of view. I think it is also indicative of the stresses on the force. Its a good interview with LTG Barno, and he brings up some very important points.
Best, Rob
What Gen. Barno is saying is reminiscent of what Chief of Staff Gen. "Shy" Meyer was saying about the "Hollow Army" after the Vietnam War. Granted, today's problems are different, but the operational tempo is wearing the institution out.
Schmedlap
12-16-2009, 10:31 PM
From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:
I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.
If TRADOC has responsibility for training and leader development, then that is a problem.
"Taking a knee" generally refers to taking a breather. "Tapping out" would be the proper phrase for quitting. I don't know how it can be considered a "put down" to consider a non-operational assignment to be "taking a knee." It's just an acknowledgment that the tempo in operational assignments is far more intense than a non-deployable position.
If TRADOC has responsibility for training and leader development, then that is a problem.
"Taking a knee" generally refers to taking a breather. "Tapping out" would be the proper phrase for quitting. I don't know how it can be considered a "put down" to consider a non-operational assignment to be "taking a knee." It's just an acknowledgment that the tempo in operational assignments is far more intense than a non-deployable position.
Several points:
* Many Soldiers have earned "taking a knee" given repeated combat deployments in austere and dangerous conditions away from their families
* Using TRADOC contractors frees Soldiers for resetting TOE units so their expertise is best applied in units preparing for combat while still "taking a knee" stateside with their families
* TRADOC contractors are a necessity because the Army deploys more often and for longer durations than any other service...which might, IMO, indicate an unbalanced distribution of service personnel if some branches can deploy 4-7 months while the Army is deploying 12-15 months....with a year break in between.
* TRADOC contractors often are less expensive than military personnel and develop writing and research expertise that are lost when Soldiers learn a TRADOC job and then leave it
* TRADOC contractors provide institutional memory without the cost of extra permanent civil service personnel who we complement by working programs for several years and then moving on to other programs without the billet still being there
As part of an Army-contractor team, for the past 8 years I have written doctrine, worked FCS task analysis and training, and currently we are conducting doctrine and tactics training for a new Army system. The Army is getting it's money's worth from company team members who work TRADOC-related jobs, just as it does for our company's government and private sector clients. Our extensive experience working for TRADOC coupled with past military experience, gives us some unique capabilities and perspectives.
True military personnel could do the same thing, but some of the drudgery associated with technical requirements for doctrine writing and lesson plan development are the intellectual equivalent of KP. We long ago decided contractors could accomplish KP and other dull work to spare Soldiers from such duties. It's all the worse if Soldiers perform such dull duties and it does not help their careers much in the process.
Schmedlap
12-17-2009, 05:58 PM
Just to be clear, I wasn't concerned about civilian contractors in TRADOC. My concern is that TRADOC (regardless of whom it is composed of) is purported to have "responsibility for training and leader development." That is the job of the chain of command within units, not the faculty at some place where we send people on TDY. Yeah, I get it, OBC, Career Cource, CGSC, etc. Basically "here's a course in the stuff that you learned in your last duty assignment - you should have done it this way. Oh and here's an introduction to some other new thing. Enjoy the weekend."
Today's installment in the Tom Ricks series is not about TRADOC--rather, it's an essay by a captain on what he thinks the future Army should be like. He wants one force for conducting COIN and stability operations and another for conventional fighting. Some guys were saying that before 9/11 and it didn't happen then; due to financial constraints I doubt that it ever will. Click on the link below to view the article.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/17/the_stoopiding_of_the_army_v_a_view_from_the_penta gon
Steve Blair
12-17-2009, 06:43 PM
Just to be clear, I wasn't concerned about civilian contractors in TRADOC. My concern is that TRADOC (regardless of whom it is composed of) is purported to have "responsibility for training and leader development." That is the job of the chain of command within units, not the faculty at some place where we send people on TDY. Yeah, I get it, OBC, Career Cource, CGSC, etc. Basically "here's a course in the stuff that you learned in your last duty assignment - you should have done it this way. Oh and here's an introduction to some other new thing. Enjoy the weekend."
But until we get stable unit chains of command (regimental-type system, anyone?) I don't think you're going to see this happen. One of the unfortunate results of the massive rotation system is the need for external education programs, since you can't necessarily count on a stable chain of command to pass along lessons and educate new leaders on the way of doing things. It also might come from the compulsive desire for "standard solutions."
IMO, anyhow.:cool:
"Taking a knee" generally refers to taking a breather. "Tapping out" would be the proper phrase for quitting. I don't know how it can be considered a "put down" to consider a non-operational assignment to be "taking a knee." It's just an acknowledgment that the tempo in operational assignments is far more intense than a non-deployable position.
I don't know. During my year in TRADOC I thought the tempo was much higher than it was when I was deployed. I mean, much of my 'operational' time was taken up in sitting around, waiting, watching turbaned men lounging around mud buildings, trying to stay awake, chatting, etc. Yeah, the days were long and no days off, and every now and then somebody tried to kill me. But high optempo?
I'm pretty sure I spent more time engaged in actual work behind a desk at Fort Knox then I did in Afghanistan. I imagine there are some 'take a knee' type jobs out there, somewhere...but there aren't many.
Schmedlap
12-17-2009, 08:30 PM
Yeah, the days were long and no days off, and every now and then somebody tried to kill me. But high optempo?
I'm pretty sure I spent more time engaged in actual work behind a desk at Fort Knox then I did in Afghanistan.
I'm not sure how to square your insights with your question.
Long days + no days off + less time with family < shorter days + days off + more time with family?
I guess the work behind the desk sucks a lot more. But I'm thinking that being able to take frequent showers, getting to eat real food, having a somewhat more normal sleep schedule, actually getting some days off, and having more predictable hours has got to more than offset the added mental strain.
I'm not sure how to square your insights with your question.
Long days + no days off + less time with family < shorter days + days off + more time with family?
I guess the work behind the desk sucks a lot more. But I'm thinking that being able to take frequent showers, getting to eat real food, having a somewhat more normal sleep schedule, actually getting some days off, and having more predictable hours has got to more than offset the added mental strain.
I didn't much like my unaccompanied year flying in the Sinai, so can't imagine repeat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On the other hand, in a TRADOC environment, it's stressful making major revisions to 20 collective tasks followed by development of nearly 700 slides and 200 pages of lesson plans for training within a six month period.
There are things learned from both a TDA and TOE assignments.
It might be worth asking our friends in the British Army how they grew accustomed to training for vastly different operational scenarios from the late 1960s until the mid-1990s. During that period it had battalions conducting counterterrorist operations in Northern Ireland as well as having forces prepared for conventional warfare in Germany. Although counterterrorism isn't the same thing as counterinsurgency, the Bloody Sunday episode taught the COIN lesson of not gratuitously offending a major part of the local population. The British experience appears to have some similarity to what the U.S. is facing today.
davidbfpo
12-19-2009, 05:51 PM
It might be worth asking our friends in the British Army how they grew accustomed to training for vastly different operational scenarios from the late 1960s until the mid-1990s....The British experience appears to have some similarity to what the U.S. is facing today.
Pete,
Some of your points are covered in other threads such: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3576 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=897 Try the RFI thread ans search there.
The British Army presence eventually took a fixed shape, with garrison units serving an accompanied tour (3yrs plus), rotations for short tours (IIRC called roulement invariably from Germany), specialists and a large locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). There were training facilities in the UK, Germany and elsewhere. It took time to get this machine "well oiled", not only over tactics, evidence-gathering. surveillance and dealing with the media.
The first thread links to a reflective paper on "lessons learned": http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/misc/opbanner.pdf (ignore the link title it is a British Army paper that is in the public domain). Hopefully that will help.
William F. Owen
12-20-2009, 07:09 AM
It might be worth asking our friends in the British Army how they grew accustomed to training for vastly different operational scenarios from the late 1960s until the mid-1990s. During that period it had battalions conducting counterterrorist operations in Northern Ireland as well as having forces prepared for conventional warfare in Germany.
Exactly. - and it shows the lie to the hoary old "COIN is Special" punt that the WOW-COIN generation bye into.
Although counterterrorism isn't the same thing as counterinsurgency, the Bloody Sunday episode taught the COIN lesson of not gratuitously offending a major part of the local population. The British experience appears to have some similarity to what the U.S. is facing today.
a.) Why differentiate between so-called COIN and CT? Why make a problem out of something that does not exist. The Brits never saw a difference, nor did the Rhodesians.
b.) Bloody Sunday taught no lessons at all to the British Army, except that you should follow the training and the ROE = Don't do stupid things. - and that isn't a lesson. The British Army was far better prepared for Operations in Ulster than the US was for Iraq. We had two generations of soldiers who had fought irregular warfare, and serving officers who wrote on the subject - and it still took us 7-8 years to get it right, because warfare is generally pretty context specific.
Thank you for the British points of view. My main line of inquiry is not on the history of the troubles in Ulster, but rather how a military organization adapts to having different types of tactics, techniques, and procedures for different kinds of conflicts. The question has a lot of relevance for the doctrine and force structure of the U.S. Army, and I'm not sure that vague statements about "the full spectrum of operations" really have much practical use. Although I'm all for developing doctrine and tactics and teaching it in our schools, there is a limit to what school solutions can do.
I'm reminded of the observation of Sir Michael Howard in his essay "Military Science in an Age of Peace" in the Royal United Services Institute Journal of March 1974: "I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives."
Ken White
12-24-2009, 02:27 AM
...and I'm not sure that vague statements about "the full spectrum of operations" really have much practical use...There's nothing vague about full spectrum operations. That spectrum is well and adequately described and the training requirements for each part of the spectrum are known -- if not employed. Without full spectrum knowledge, the ability to do this:
"What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives."will not be present. As the song says, you can't have one without the other.
On another note, this statement is correct:
Although I'm all for developing doctrine and tactics and teaching it in our schools, there is a limit to what school solutions can do.and illustrates why 'school solutions; should not exist in any way shape or form. The proper tactical or operational solution is one that works at that place and time -- all others are superfluous.
The Tactics instructors at Leavenworth used to say:
- "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling, unforested terrain on a mild and sunny June day against a peer enemy who uses conventional tactics and provided you have all your personnel and TOE equipment in combat ready status. If any of those conditions change, you will have to adapt..."
Just so.
William F. Owen
12-24-2009, 05:26 AM
My main line of inquiry is not on the history of the troubles in Ulster, but rather how a military organization adapts to having different types of tactics, techniques, and procedures for different kinds of conflicts. The question has a lot of relevance for the doctrine and force structure of the U.S. Army, and I'm not sure that vague statements about "the full spectrum of operations" really have much practical use.
I don't want to sound "fly", but we really didn't think about it. There was Ulster and there was Germany. It really only became to a problem when lessons from one were miss-applied to another.
EG: When I did my Close Reconnaissance Commanders Course in 1990, the course was intended to prepare close reconnaissance platoons for general war against the Russians. We spent most of the course learning skills only relevant to working in Ulster. Yes, we had a high degree of skills, but some were irrelevant in Germany, and skills essential for working in Germany (long range comms) got missed. What was all the more confusing is the Army ran a special Close Observation Course, just for operations in Ulster!!
Basically, what I teach/write today is that you need regular warfare skills and irregular warfare skills. Some skills will be relevant to both and some will be specific to one or the other. If you have them all, this will not matter, and it can be done. You just have to do a couple of days in the classroom laying the ground work.
davidbfpo
12-24-2009, 06:59 PM
Pete,
The only book I can recall that addressed this issue was by a journalist, called Hamill, which appeared in the early 1980's; alas I'm not at home so cannot grab it and add the details - IIRC it is on one of the Ulster threads (found it): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=897, when I listed most of my Ulster bookshelf.
When I did my Close Reconnaissance Commanders Course in 1990, the course was intended to prepare close reconnaissance platoons for general war against the Russians. We spent most of the course learning skills only relevant to working in Ulster.
William, you've described exactly the point I'm trying to make--rather than muddling through, at some point the Army and TRADOC have to decide what the proper mix should be for school instruction when it comes to high-intensity conventional warfare as opposed to unconventional fighting. I hesitate to say whether unconventional warfare should be called counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular operations, or asymetrical warfare; what I mean are all the other graduations of the full spectrum that are less than the traditional Fulda Gap scenario. We've got to be able to be able to do all these types of warfare, and getting it right in the schoolhouse as opposed to letting things slide is our first step towards getting there.
Without doubt unconventional warfare definitely needs to be taught, but Colonel Gian Gentile's statement in the Autumn 2009 issue of Parameters about my old branch of field artillery is a case in point: "In 2008, three U.S. Army colonels, all former brigade commanders in Iraq, told Army Chief of Staff General George Casey that after seven years of population-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army's field artillery branch had lost the ability to fight and had become a "dead branch walking."
Ken White
12-25-2009, 01:38 AM
...at some point the Army and TRADOC have to decide what the proper mix should be for school instruction when it comes to high-intensity conventional warfare as opposed to unconventional fighting...You cannot 'mix' instruction for combat, all that does is confuse people and leave important things off the POI. We simply have to train people for combat in their MOS during institutional training -- that means a much more thorough grounding (and yes, more expensive and longer) in the basics of soldiering -- and units then have to provide the tailored approach for the specific mission set. This is not rocket science; we used to do it and did it fairly well until we lost our way during Viet Nam.
I don't see the Army as having lost its approach to training during or after Vietnam. The schools I went to during my service from 1977 to 1984 taught standard combined arms with an emphasis on armor and mechanized infantry. The airborne and air assault guys emphasized their own operational techniques. Those were the days when Bill DePuy and Don Starry ran TRADOC, the active defense and all that. With unconventional wars being our most likely challenge during the next several decades, I'm trying to understand how we should go about maintaining our core competencies in combined arms while we're simultaneously facing unconventional adversaries.
Ken White
12-25-2009, 04:36 AM
I don't see the Army as having lost its approach to training during or after Vietnam.Did you serve in it before Viet Nam? After VN, we dumbed down training to cope with McNamara's Project 100,000 intake with the task condition and standard foolishness; and even though those losers are long gone and we have some sharp troops, we're still using that flawed training model. We also concentrated solely on fighting a major land war in Europe to the exclusion of other theaters and other levels of combat. Absolutely foolish. I'm thoroughly familiar with both DePuy and Starry and am not a fan of either. The only saving grace in that period was Shy Meyer as Chief of Staff. He had great plans for the training arena but TRADOC just waited him out; the bureaucracy won.
...the active defense and all that.Ah, yes -- with Battle Books. Any tactical evolution that requires a three ring binder to execute will get you killed. Quickly. :rolleyes:
With unconventional wars being our most likely challenge during the next several decades...Why is that so? They will only be if we allow that to happen. I guess we could be dumb enough to play by the other guys rules; we certainly have before -- but that doesn't seem very smart to me. I think we should make them play by our rules... :cool:
I'm trying to understand how we should go about maintaining our core competencies in combined arms while we're simultaneously facing unconventional adversaries.First, we aren't all that competent at the core -- never have been in peacetime -- not allowed to do that in a democracy, the mothers get upset at training casualties and Congress gets upset at spending training money instead of equipment money which provide more jobs.
Second, core competency for an Army is basic simple warfighting, it is not difficult. We now half train people and hope for the best. That is not a good plan. If individuals can do the basics well, they can easily and quickly adapt to any level on the spectrum of warfare with decent leadership. We understood how to do what you're trying to understand in the late 50s and early 60s. We just forgot and then got really dumb post VN in an effort to avoid another war like that -- then we wandered into two more. :mad:
The key thing to remember is that if you deploy general purpose forces to a Foreign Internal Development (FID) or security Force Assistance (SFA) effort as in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will not be done well -- you're using a sledge hammer to build a piece of cabinetry...
slapout9
12-25-2009, 04:55 AM
I don't see the Army as having lost its approach to training during or after Vietnam. The schools I went to during my service from 1977 to 1984 taught standard combined arms with an emphasis on armor and mechanized infantry. The airborne and air assault guys emphasized their own operational techniques.
I served from 72-75 and yes they (Army) got lost in the wilderness. Around late 73 the Army started losing highly experienced NCO's in a big way. When the Sergeants start voting with their feet....... you is in big trouble.:( Vietnam darn near destroyed the Army IMO.
I remember when someone lost a Battle Book in Germany in around 1979 by leaving it on the canvas roof of a jeep during a terrain walk. It wasn't my battalion that did it but if I recall correctly the incident was even in Stars and Stripes. I think 3rd Armored had to re-do all their plans for the first few days of WW III.
Merry Christmas. I wish we could send you some of the snow we have around here in the Martinsburg, WV-Winchester, VA area. There was a Union Signal Corps observation station 1000 yards from here in 1864 to watch the Valley Pike, now U.S. Route 11. On a clear day Winchester could be seen with telescopes.
Around late 73 the Army started losing highly experienced NCO's in a big way. When the Sergeants start voting with their feet....... you is in big trouble.
The year 1965 was when the last of the WWII veterans hit the big two-zero year mark.
slapout9
12-25-2009, 05:23 AM
The year 1965 was when the last of the WWII veterans hit the big two-zero year mark.
I wasn't talking about WW2 vets, I was talking about Vietnam vets.
slapout9
12-25-2009, 05:41 AM
If you want to know how bad it was go to the link below. The comic book called "Dopin Dan" was about some hippie in the 82nd Division, I had this edition in my wall locker. It was part of what was known as the Underground Press back then. The comic book was all over Ft. Bragg and it was nothing but Communist Propaganda and subversion. Crap like that was all over Fayetteville and drifted onto Bragg. I got mine mine for free but if you don't mind spending a few bucks it it a Propaganda masterpiece and the guy that wrote it new a lot of things about the 82nd SOP's that should not have been published but they were. Ken is right the Army went into the Twilight Zone for awhile,might end up back there if they are not careful.
http://www.newkadia.com/?Dopin_Dan_Comic-Books=1111122415
That sort of thing was over with when I enlisted. What we had were lots of foot-dragging attitudes, guys yelling "short" all the time, and racial resentment simmering beneath the surface.
Infanteer
12-25-2009, 01:57 PM
Interesting discussion.
2 Points)
1. From the perspective in Afghanistan, I have trouble conceptualizing "COIN" as something unique, new or different. I prefer the Afghan approach of terming it "war". "Clear, Hold, Build" makes sense as a general concept of ops - I wouldn't say it is a novel novel; didn't we have to do that to the Germans in Paris in 1944? "Small war" and "big war" just refers to how many players and how much lead is moving around.
2. Light, heavy and medium brigades. Must be nice to be able to argue this. :) From our small, 3 Brigade Army we can't afford to do this (although we tried in the past - going to war threw a wrench in that). Alot of the times I find the "light/heavy" argument to be a false dichotomy. My Pl is mechanized (or motorized) but does most of its work on foot due to the nature of the terrain and the tasks. We're just "infantry".
slapout9
12-25-2009, 03:18 PM
That sort of thing was over with when I enlisted. What we had were lots of foot-dragging attitudes, guys yelling "short" all the time, and racial resentment simmering beneath the surface.
Our Division Commander required the whole division to watch the movie "Brian's Song" about Gayle Sayers and Brian Piccolo as part of our Race Relations class.
Link to movie clip. They were the first Black and White roomates in the NFL....very big deal back then.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sF8lEfuqAL4&feature=related
"Clear, Hold, Build" makes sense as a general concept of ops - I wouldn't say it is a novel novel; didn't we have to do that to the Germans in Paris in 1944? "Small war" and "big war" just refers to how many players and how much lead is moving around.
One of the big differences between conventional wars such as World War II and the ones going on now is the considerable reduction in the role of fire support. This is done to avoid collateral damage and the effect it has on winning "hearts and minds."
The role of infantry described below is from the Paul F. Gorman monograph "The Secret of Future Victories" in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It might even arouse some people from their holiday torpor. :p
In 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.
Ken White
12-27-2009, 02:29 AM
One of the big differences between conventional wars such as World War II and the ones going on now is the considerable reduction in the role of fire support.Not collateral damage avoidance, scarcity of targets. Different wars entirely. Little WW II experience in NW Europe is relative outside NW Europe...
"but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique." The flaw in much of that statement by DePuy is that it stuck in the minds of many young impressionable CPTs who later became Flag Officers and who proceeded to fight major land wars in Europe while actually confronting far different enemies with very different TTP and cultural attributes (yes, culture matters in wars other than COIN fights) in such diverse places as Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq. How did that work out for us?
Every war is different and formative experiences need to be carefully winnowed lest they lead people -- even entire Armies -- astray.
Which brings up a question. I know why FOs were Officers in WW I and even WW II -- because they could read and count. Why are they being wasted as FOs today?
Ken, the U.S. Army was all but out of the Vietnam War when DePuy said that in 1971. We've had enlisted forward observers of MOS 13F for several decades now. During the First World War battery commanders or other battery officers were the forward observers, the old "command observation post."
Ken White
12-27-2009, 05:07 AM
Ken, the U.S. Army was all but out of the Vietnam War when DePuy said that in 1971.I'm also aware of the fact that we really misused Artillery in Viet Nam. Badly. All of which elides the fact that DePuy was guilty of selling snake oil.
We've had enlisted forward observers of MOS 13F for several decades now.I'm also aware of 13Fs (Fire Support Specialist; and their predecessor MOSC, 2705 IIRC) -- they were around before I retired, in fact they were around when I was in Korea and in Viet Nam. They were even around in WW II...
That still doesn't explain why THE FO is still an officer even though the NCOs on the FIST or COLT or JTAC can do it as well or better than most of the 2LTs. Could it possibly have something to do with Branch Officer Strength? Thus future promotion opportunities...
It was an academic question in any event -- the new JTAC AGOS courses will aim for 13Fs and some 18 series. So we're finally getting a bit smarter. My intent was to point out we used to ride to work on elephants but we no longer do that. The corollary is that Officers as FO were needed in WW I, possibly desirable in WW II and have not really been necessary for effective functioning of field artillery since then.
Point being that we change but we change too slowly because people don't like change and they get stuck in the past -- and they try to carry what worked in one war forward to do the same thing in another war (that seldom works well...).
That and that the Personnel system is screwed up...
During the First World War battery commanders or other battery officers were the forward observers, the old "command observation post."Initially, others were added by late 1918 and WW II saw Officers as Forward Observers everywhere. Initially because they had math skills and they've been around ever since. Waste of Officers...
The problem is that virtually all American infantry are trained in Second Generation tactics. The Second Generation reduces all tactics to one tactic: bump into the enemy and call for fire. The French, who invented the Second Generation, summarize it as, "Firepower conquers, the infantry occupies." The supporting firepower, originally artillery, now most often airstrikes, must be massive. If it is not -- as is now the case in Afghanistan, under General McChrystal's directive -- the infantry is in trouble. Everything it has been taught depends on fire support it no longer has. Inevitably, its casualties will rise, and it will often lose engagements.
The above is from William S. Lind last September, who I realize is not everyone's favorite person. He's saying much the same thing as Gen DePuy did in 1971--in any event I think both were exaggerating to make a point. When DePuy was at TRADOC he did a lot for the infantry, such as defining the infantry movement techniques of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
Below is the Gorman monograph with the DePuy anecdote. I like the part about McNair and Army Ground Forces.
http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/gorman/gorman.asp#ch2-69
Ken White
12-27-2009, 06:12 AM
When DePuy was at TRADOC he did a lot for the infantry, such as defining the infantry movement techniques of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.I was taught overwatch movement techniques as a 15 year old NG Pvt by a bunch of WW II vets, got to practice it as a Marine in Korea where it was SOP for all movement. Cavalry and Infantry used overwatch for years, centuries even, before DePuy was born
The best thing DePuy did at TRADOC was consolidate the three different Track Vehicle Mechanic Schools and insist the new school at Knox teach all tracked vehicles. Most of the rest of his 'reforms' were tacking names on things and standardizing training literature. Needed to be done but it was not innovative. DePuy was a good commander (not least because he relieved inept subordinates -- much to PersCom's chagrin :D) and he did good at TRADOC -- but he was formed by WW II in NW Europe and he never let it go. He was and is not alone in that shortfall...
The monograph I added the link to in my message above includes a discussion on how infantry training changed in about 1973. Perhaps it's what you were speaking of the other day.
Ken White
12-27-2009, 06:29 AM
That quote from him is wrong on virtually every level. That generation of warfare foolishness will get more people killed than will lack of fire support. His allegation is true with respect to some commanders but most know better; most infantry can operate quite well with their own mortars and do not need or want Arty or Air unless it's really bad. That "Firepower conquers, the infantry occupies." dictum is as bad as DePuys comment; there's a time and place for artillery and there are times and place where it is superfluous. I'd like to see Lind in a fighting hole and watch an average Rifle Platoon from the 82d move through...:D
Inevitably, its casualties will rise, and it will often lose engagements.The first statement is correct -- goes with the job; more patrols, more contacts. The second is TBD; my bet is that it's wrong more often than not (all US units are not equal :( ).
in any event I think both were exaggerating to make a point.Invalid point, IMO. Poorly stated in both cases as well. However, I suspect both believed what they said. Pity...
I gather then that you weren't overly impressed by the "Revolution in Military Affairs"?
Ken White
12-27-2009, 06:45 AM
The monograph I added the link to in my message above includes a discussion on how infantry training changed in about 1973. Perhaps it's what you were speaking of the other day.They immediately started to wake waves so their initial Commanders could make an impression on their watch. Some improvements were made in OBC and the Career Course at the Infantry School.
The training process I cited was developed in the mid-70s and TRADOC foisted the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) and the FM 25 series with that Task, Condition and Standard dumb-down in the late 70s and it was fully implemented Army wide by the early 80s. Unfortunately.
Note the name, Battalion Tng Mgmt Sys -- that's because a lot of Bn Cdrs in Viet Nam discovered in the 1968-73 period that they had few Captains and few Senior NCOs but a slew of 2LTs and SGTs (who were mostly NCO Candidate Course graduates). They were all great and smart kids, would do anything you asked them to -- but they didn't know much tactically, so the two LTCs who commanded the typical Bn for a year in VN learned to micromanage. The training system they then developed reflected that micromanagement. Dumber than a box of hammers. They should have better trained the 2LTs and SGTs...
Ken White
12-27-2009, 06:47 AM
I gather then that you weren't overly impressed by the "Revolution in Military Affairs"?There is no revolution, war hasn't changed a bit -- but warfare always changes due to technological and societal changes. That change is always incremental. Been that way for over 5,000 years.
I didn't realize that the RMA was going on until around 2001, when an E7 with an intel MOS told me about it. I had rejointed AUSA some years previously and hadn't read a thing about it in Army magazine either.
I don't recall hearing about BTMS until 1981. There wasn't anything revolutionary about it--it's long-range planning, that's all.
Ken White
12-27-2009, 03:48 PM
legend in its own mind... :D
IOW, it doesn't exist. Unfortunately, BTMS is far more than long range planning. It tried -- and failed -- to say the Bn Cdr was the Trainer of the unit; it introduced the Task, Condition and Standard stupidity to the Army (as well as the flawed ARTEP) and it attempted to place task performance on a "Go-No Go" basis allowing standards to be modified to achieve 'acceptable' "Go" rates in institutional training.
It was introduced in TRADOC service schools in the late 70s, finally made it to the field in early 80s. It was designed by Civilian training specialists with no military experience to replicate industrial training practice and it was flawed from the beginning. That the Army today, marginally trained as it is, does much right is a tribute to a host of Officers and NCOs who have managed to train people fairly well in spite of a deeply flawed training process.
Combat is not accomplishment of tasks, it is the amalgamation of many tasks to accomplish a mission and one has to KNOW which tasks must be accomplished and which are not necessary. Conditions vary widely -- my pet example is clear a building; the Capitol, your local City Hall, The Ford plant or a mud hut in Outer Bafloofistan? I watched standards manipulated downward to enhance the 'Go' rate for a good many years. Fortunately, that got spotted in the 90s and has generally been reversed...
It's a dumb system and needs to be retired so we can move to Outcome Based Training and Evaluation.
marct
12-27-2009, 05:49 PM
It's a dumb system and needs to be retired so we can move to Outcome Based Training and Evaluation.
The only problem with outcome based training and evaluation is that it is based on outcomes. Mein Gott, Ken - are you trying to destroy the politically correct proposition that all results must be equal :eek::D!
Ken White
12-27-2009, 06:37 PM
It seems like a good idea... ;) :cool:
However, I'm sure Congress will object just as they did to the 'Thou shalt not get preggers' edict. :eek: :mad:
Marc, your comment reminds me of the old saw to the effect that lust is an objective universal measure; love -- and combat training -- OTOH are subjective values...
Comment posted today by Col Gian Gentile on Tom Ricks' blog:
Counterinsurgency is not, NOT, a strategy. I am continually amazed by folks who so easily throw that term out there. Even David Kilcullen has acknowledged as much that it is not strategy.
Instead Population Centric Counterinsurgency which the de jour term of Coin implies is an operational method, nothing more and nothing less. The mistake we make is when folks elevate it to the realm of strategy which it is not. But see that is the problem nowadays in Afghanistan in that we really have no strategy, but just a set of Coin operational methods and tactics; or, a strategy of Coin tactics.
Um, Tom, in fact Counterinsurgency is by demand a massive nation building effort. Nation building is the essential element to the kind of Coin that has become the American Army's New Way of War. FM 3-24 acknowledged that Coin is nation building as did Galula, Thompson, and the rest.
But I ask, if we are not doing nation building in Afghanistan then what are we doing there, Jack McCuen's notions of Hybrid War? I get more and more confused by the minute in this age of the graduate level of war.
gian
Cavguy
12-29-2009, 08:12 AM
I have never held that COIN is a strategy. However, this doesn't negate that learning COIN tactics and their useful employment is a good thing. It's a way to get at the strategic end.
Fuchs
12-29-2009, 10:19 AM
There is no revolution, war hasn't changed a bit -- but warfare always changes due to technological and societal changes. That change is always incremental. Been that way for over 5,000 years.
Many people agreed to call that a generation and that's OK.
The French Revolution didn't change that much either once you got used to the changes.
The introduction of PGMs in WW2 (after a failed attempt to do it in WWI) and the late near-full realization of their potential during the 80's and 90's has (in addition to astonishing sensor capabilities that have almost reached Star Trek TOS levels) changed many aspects of high-end war. That doesn't prevent that people can kill each other with old methods and tools, of course.
Ken White
12-29-2009, 02:38 PM
The French Revolution didn't change that much either once you got used to the changes."It is too early to say." :D
Col Gentile's article in the autumn issue of Parameters was entitled "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army." Perhaps the irony was lost on some people.
After reading about the avoidance of information overload in a recent paper on the Army Capstone program, Tom Ricks wrote in his blog, "I take back some of the bad things I said about TRADOC recently." (No doubt this will make Hacksaw's day, and this time he will not let slip his 2 x 4s of vengeance on Mr. Ricks.) The blog entry can be read on the link below:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/21/an_army_warning_overwhelmed_by_information
Hacksaw
01-22-2010, 03:44 PM
Only because we are talking about Ricks...
I believe in his earlier postings he referred to TRADOC in general and Dempsey in particular as "Intellectually sloppy"...
Hmmm...
"I know the concept isn't new, but this is the first time I can recall an Army doctrinal document elevating the issue to key aspect of command. I take back some of the bad things I said about TRADOC recently."
The document to which Mr. Ricks refers is a Capstone Concept not doctrine...
As for whether it is novel in Army doctrine... no... it's in an obscure manual called FM 3-0, Operations (Chapter 7)...
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
7-59. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information. Information management disseminates timely and protected relevant information to commanders and staffs. Information management helps commanders develop situational understanding. It also helps them make and disseminate effective decisions faster than the enemy can. Among other aspects, information management includes lower level mechanical methods, such as organizing, collating, plotting, and arranging. However, information management is more than technical control of data flowing across networks. It employs both
staff management and automatic processes to focus a vast array of information and make relevant information available to the right person at the right time. Information management centers on commanders and the information they need to exercise command and control. It has two components: information systems and relevant information.
Petty... I know:D
These transgressions only required a sharp slap of the hand across the back of his head... the kind my pappy used to deliver on a routine basis to signal that I had once again miscalculated my left and right limits
The British Army was far better prepared for Operations in Ulster than the US was for Iraq. We had two generations of soldiers who had fought irregular warfare, and serving officers who wrote on the subject - and it still took us 7-8 years to get it right, because warfare is generally pretty context specific.
To concede one of Willf's points, the British soldier of the 19th century indeed had a special knack for winning over the hearts and minds of local indigenous populations, as is shown by the following diary entry by the Englishman R. D. Blumenfeld for June 27th 1887:
There was present at luncheon a tall, extremely well-dressed young man, with whom I returned to town in a hansom cab. I noticed that part of his forehead was very much sunburned, but one part, from the hair to the nose above the right eye, was of a different colour. This is ‘the swagger mark’ indicating a soldier. It comes from the pill-box, which protects only a small portion of the head and forehead from the sun; a much-coveted distinction. On the way he told me that he is a private in the 2nd Life Guards, and that ‘the gentlemen of the Guards’ are permitted to go off duty in mufti if they so desire. A large number of these Guardsmen, however, prefer to go out in uniform, shell jacket, very tight overalls, and pill-box askew on head, ready to be hired for an afternoon or evening by nursemaids to ‘walk out’. There is a regular, fixed tariff. Household Cavalry for afternoon out in Park, half-a-crown and beer. Brigade of Foot Guards, eighteen pence and beer. Royal Horse Artillery, two shillings. Other services, a shilling. The fact that there is a big demand is shown by the large number of females at barrack gates early in the afternoon and evening waiting to engage escorts.
davidbfpo
01-22-2010, 10:16 PM
Pete,
To concede one of Wilf's points, the British soldier of the 19th century indeed had a special knack for winning over the hears and minds of local indigenous populations.
A funny example cited - "walking out" ladies in London. Might have worked there, I doubt it worked anywhere else like that - with the "locals". Consider the reaction in South Wales to military intervention to support the police pre-1914, let alone in the Empire, say in India after the 'Mutiny'.
You've got a point. Discussion on the Great War Forum over whether Haig and the other generals were butchers often takes on an aspect of class warfare, with Labour-leaning people on one side, the Tories on the other, and the Social Democrats somewhere in between. I've got a book that alleges that the Muslim participation in the Indian Mutiny was led by the Deobandi sect, the Indian version of the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia.
William F. Owen
01-23-2010, 07:13 AM
A large number of these Guardsmen, however, prefer to go out in uniform, shell jacket, very tight overalls, and pill-box askew on head, ready to be hired for an afternoon or evening by nursemaids to ‘walk out’.
Dam!! Woman hiring soldiers? In my day it was the other way around! :mad:
What the Guards and Household Division don't tell is this persisted well into to the 1980's with the cliental being London's Gay community
Lot of experimenting will occur with TOEs in the near future, I suspect. The so-called modular concept we're now under is proving that some aspects work and others don't.
Yup, you were right.
Review: Army should add Stryker units
By Matthew Cox - Staff writer
Army Times
Posted : Wednesday Jan 27, 2010 21:22:55 EST
The Army should trim several heavy brigade combat teams from its future fighting force to make room for more Stryker units, according to a Dec. 3 draft of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review.
“Our assessment of security trends points strongly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility,” the draft document states. “By FY13 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available, [DoD] intends to convert several more BCTs” to the medium weight, rapidly deployable Stryker model. Currently, the Army has seven Stryker BCTs, six active and one National Guard. The service would add up to four more Stryker brigades in the future, according to the draft QDR report.
A congressional mandate requires the Defense Department to conduct a QDR every four years to evaluate its strategies and policies that directly affect how the services set force structure and procure weapon systems.
Surprisingly, the Pentagon document makes no mention of the Army’s primary modernization effort — the Ground Combat Vehicle, a new class of infantry fighting vehicle that will eventually replace the Bradley.
The December draft report also calls for the increase in “rotary wing assets.”
“Vertical lift has been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere,” the draft report states. “As operations in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan grow in scope and intensity, more rotary wing lift capacity will be needed to ensure that coalition and Afghan forces can be re-supplied at remote outposts and effectively cover their areas of responsibility.”
The Army and other services “will take steps, including expanding pilot training, to make selected vertical lift assets more readily accessible to forces in forward theaters of operations,” the report states.
U.S. Special Operations command will field an “additional company of cargo helicopters."
William F. Owen
01-28-2010, 06:42 AM
“Our assessment of security trends points strongly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility,” the draft document states. “By FY13 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available, [DoD] intends to convert several more BCTs” to the medium weight, rapidly deployable Stryker model. Currently, the Army has seven Stryker BCTs, six active and one National Guard. The service would add up to four more Stryker brigades in the future, according to the draft QDR report.
This makes as much sense as saying, "because it rained today I am going to buy a puppy."
So more Strykers are the answer to the "Hezbollah-Hybrids" with IEDs, ATGMs, and RPG-7/29?
82redleg
01-28-2010, 12:37 PM
This makes as much sense as saying, "because it rained today I am going to buy a puppy."
So more Strykers are the answer to the "Hezbollah-Hybrids" with IEDs, ATGMs, and RPG-7/29?
I agree that the actual Stryker vehicle itself is open to improvement, but the organization (3 IN BNs of 3 COs, each with its own Assault Gun platoon, plus a RSTA squadron) is a HUGE improvement over the HBCT, with a much better balance of AR to IN for MOST operations. The battle command improvements are also HUGE.
William F. Owen
01-28-2010, 01:39 PM
I agree that the actual Stryker vehicle itself is open to improvement, but the organization (3 IN BNs of 3 COs, each with its own Assault Gun platoon, plus a RSTA squadron) is a HUGE improvement over the HBCT, with a much better balance of AR to IN for MOST operations. The battle command improvements are also HUGE.
I don't doubt that some thinking lead to some improvements. It would be odd if it didn't.
Beyond that I remain sceptical about almost every aspect of Stryker Brigades.
Oh well, when it comes to force structure some people are such traditionalists that they aren't to be satisfied, as in the link below.
http://www.doctormacro1.info/Images/Wayne,%20John/Annex/Annex%20-%20Wayne,%20John%20(Fort%20Apache)_03.jpg
82redleg
01-29-2010, 01:10 AM
I don't doubt that some thinking lead to some improvements. It would be odd if it didn't.
Beyond that I remain sceptical about almost every aspect of Stryker Brigades.
Care to expound on this?
GI Zhou
03-18-2010, 04:32 AM
In defence of TRADOC, TRISA after editing it to fit in with the accepted style, published my book, 'How the PLA Fights: Weapons and Tactics of the People's Liberation Army', which is primarily from Russian and Chinese language sources. They saw fit to publish the Second edition, warts and all so they are definitely not hidebound nor discard material when 'not inevented here' ( I am an Australian), when going about their duties. TRADOC would be the least hidebound military organisation I know.
William F. Owen
03-18-2010, 06:28 AM
Originally Posted by William F. Owen: I don't doubt that some thinking lead to some improvements. It would be odd if it didn't.
Beyond that I remain sceptical about almost every aspect of Stryker Brigades.
Care to expound on this?
Sure, and sorry not to do this sooner.
The Stryker Brigade concept could have been fitted into almost any common vehicle chassis system. The C2 system, the weapons, almost all of the bells and whistles could have been fitted in another more capable vehicle.
It does not gain from being based on Stryker/Piranha box. The whole idea of having a C-130 transportable Brigade was profoundly stupid.
Almost all the limitations the Stryker has (and there are lots) flow from he Chassis/Vehicle choice, which came from someone viewing the problem in a way that made Stryker the solution, and not working out the best way to solve it.
82redleg
03-18-2010, 02:52 PM
Sure, and sorry not to do this sooner.
The Stryker Brigade concept could have been fitted into almost any common vehicle chassis system. Agreed
The C2 system, the weapons, almost all of the bells and whistles could have been fitted in another more capable vehicle.Out of curiosity, what vehicle(s) would this be?
It does not gain from being based on Stryker/Piranha box. The whole idea of having a C-130 transportable Brigade was profoundly stupid. I agree that limiting it to C130s was a poor choice, but it did give a pretty good benchmark to keep the size/weight under control (the C130 limit has been lifted, anyway)
Almost all the limitations the Stryker has (and there are lots) flow from he Chassis/Vehicle choice, which came from someone viewing the problem in a way that made Stryker the solution, and not working out the best way to solve it.
While I agree that the SBCT is not perfect, I think that the basic organization is sound, and (given the caveats that I haven't worked with it and all my information is hearsay) the equipment is pretty good, especially given the speed with which it was procured in the current screwed up acquisition system. For 15+ years, the US Army Infantry had a gap in the middle, identified in the mid-80s by BG Was De Czege. The SBCTs correct that gap. The increase in SBCTs creates a better balanced US Army.
I think I've said it before, but my ideal world would have 8 IBCTs, 8 HBCTs and ~30 SBCTs in the US Army, with the ARNG about 50-50 SBCTs-HBCTs. I truly believe that the 3-1-1 IN-AR-Recce balance in the SBCT is better than the 4-4-3 in the HBCT for most purposes. Yes, the chassis could be improved, or we could get many of the same benefits by simply subbing M1/M2 1:1 for ICV/MGS. Overall, I think the net contribution of the adaption of SBCTs in positive.
Fuchs
03-18-2010, 03:21 PM
I've always wondered about this "middle"?
What terrain is supposed to be its preferred ground where "medium weight" units are superior to both heavy and light forces?
Open areas with soft ground would qualify if the "medium" force had a very low MMP (mean max ground pressure). That's not the case with 18 ton 8wd.
Ken White
03-18-2010, 03:36 PM
less expensive vehicles that will do most things in limited wars and operations other than wars. I further suspect they will disappear rapidly in major conflict for several reasons. Thus, all things considered they make military sense (in the fullest meaning of the word) and are cost efficient while providing marginal effectiveness for some purposes and making almost no combat sense. :D
William F. Owen
03-18-2010, 04:12 PM
Out of curiosity, what vehicle(s) would this be?[/COLOR]
OK, but what do you want it to do?
Why does it have to be one type?
I agree that limiting it to C130s was a poor choice, but it did give a pretty good benchmark to keep the size/weight under control (the C130 limit has been lifted, anyway)
I'll confess that I used to think that as well, but the limitation of weight (and size) was never expressed in a useful way. It was all about HOW and not about WHY.
Hacksaw
03-18-2010, 05:22 PM
I'll confess that I used to think that as well, but the limitation of weight (and size) was never expressed in a useful way. It was all about HOW and not about WHY."
It is my recollection that the C130 criteria was based on the why that is usually expressed as 'operational maneuver from strategic distance
Of course the C130 criteria became the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone... in essence it replaced the why because it was far easier for the unwashed to grasp...
then again, I wasn't involved in any tangible sense whilst this was debated... I do think that it was a Huba idea recycled from the writing of Svechin... again my memory may be faulty though
Go Orangemen!!!
TRADOC doesn't deserve to be given all the blame for what happens during the development of new Army systems; the TRADOC role is to serve as the "combat developer" responsible for defining system requirements and conducting user/operational testing. "Materiel development," or the actual engineering and prototyping work, is the province of Army Materiel Command, AMC, or "A Million Civilians" as it is sometimes known.
If I recall correctly the transportability by C-130 criterion for the Stryker vehicle and other systems was a requirement more or less dictated by the pressure of Donald Rumsfeld's "Transformation" initiative dating from prior to the 9/11 attacks. (It was the same pressure to be seen to be "transforming" that brought about the silly change to the black beret.) Have people already forgotten the gee-whiz futuristic buzzwords and acronyms of circa 2001--network-centric warfare, precision fires, medium-weight brigades, Objective Force, Land Warrior, Future Combat systems, et al?
If I recall correctly the transportability by C-130 criterion for the Stryker vehicle and other systems was a requirement more or less dictated by the pressure of Donald Rumsfeld's "Transformation" initiative dating from prior to the 9/11 attacks. (It was the same pressure to be seen to be "transforming" that brought about the silly change to the black beret.) Have people already forgotten the gee-whiz futuristic buzzwords and acronyms of circa 2001--network-centric warfare, precision fires, medium-weight brigades, Objective Force, Land Warrior, Future Combat systems, et al?
For the record, and to answer some of the above questions, the concepts for the Stryker Force (aka Shinseki’s Interim Force) emerged in late 1999, in part due to the Task Force Hawk debacle during the Kosovo conflict earlier that year. But the general idea has a much longer lineage than this, to at least the mid-1980s (or thereabouts) as Redleg has noted.
What really kick started the move towards the middle was one of the lessons the US Army derived from the 1991 Gulf War, which was that the Army was, in my only somewhat facetiously way characterize, too light to fight, too fat to fly. Simply put, the only quick reaction force the Army could deploy quickly was the 82nd Airborne (there were, of course, other choices), a light infantry unit placed in front of three heavy Iraqi units. On the other hand, it took some 6 plus months to deploy the heavy units which were deemed necessary for Op Desert Storm Add to this was that by the end of 1991, early 1992, it was evident the US was going be pulling ever more of its forward deployed units back to the US (most notably from Europe). The upshot was that the increasing prospect was that the Army would deploy in future from the US, and was, to repeat, too fat to fly, too light to fight, particularly when time was, as it frequently is, a important factor.
General Sullivan, then the CoS Army, recognized this issue and started a process, which runs from the New Louisiana Maneuvers through the Army After Next to the FCS/Stryker Force (with the NLM and AAN both largely concept studies, based on wargaming). Very early decisions to start moving towards what becomes known as the FCS emerge in late 1998. The Task Force Hawk deployment just underlined the ‘too fat to fly’ problem, while I understand that the idea was floated of inserting the 82nd Airborne (or one of its light brethren units) into Kosovo but it was set aside very quickly due to concern that it would very exposed (underlining the too light to fight problem). Kosovo was an embarassment for the Army, and Shinseki moved to accelerate the development of the FCS to address the problems. (in part of service interest - if you cannot get to the fight, funding becomes a potentially problematic issue).
The Stryker force was, as termed under Shinseki’s plan, to be only an interim force to fill the gap until the FCS force came on line in the 2012-15 period. The essential idea was the FCS would be light enough to fly (hence the fit into and be carried by the C-130) and with the application of information and other new tech (some of those buzzwords mentioned by Pete) would be hefty enough to fight.
In sum, the aim of the Stryker Force (and FCS) was to the provide the Army with a sufficient degree of expeditionary capability, that is, with a rapidly deployable capability able to fight against even heavy opponents, to suit what was seen likely to be (and largely has become) an expeditionary era in which the Army would deploy from the homeland, not forward bases.
That is the general idea behind Stryker/FCS, without any reference to the problems encountered, etc and so on. Wilf is right that in one sense the Stryker force does not make sense, if it is seen as an end force aim of the Army. But the Stryker force was designed to provide the Army with an interim expeditionary capability, albeit one without the full combat capability the Army hoped to achieve with the FCS.
Worth noting is the C-130 was chosen as the standard, as being able to move the force via the C-130 would provide tactical lift to move the lighter force around the operational battlefield. This idea originally emerged from the Army After Next programme, which worked with the concept of a 15 ton vehicle and some form of heavy helo lift capability able to pick and move the vehicle - the helo lift was seen as not possible to achieve, with the proposed vehicle was deemed a bit too light.
And enough of clarifying from me.......
Cheers
TT, I don't disagree with what you've said--the impetus for the medium-weight brigade was mainly strategic transportability. "Power Projection" was one of the Army buzzwords of the mid-1990s, an effort to shorten the several-month hiatus it took from the onset of Desert Shield to the beginning of Desert Storm caused by the time needed to transport heavy tank and mech infantry assets from Germany and the U.S. into the theater of operations. The forward positioning of equipment in Kuwait, Qatar and afloat could only partly address the problem. The several months required to transport equipment was one of the factors that delayed the onset of the current war in Iraq from the time of the decision to go to war in the autumn of 2002 until the invasion in March 2003.
Recently in his "Best Defense" blog Tom Ricks has returned to the subject of COIN. This time the thrust of his posts hasn't been aimed at TRADOC, but with whether the institutional Army fully supports COIN as an operational technique in its schools and field training centers. In a post on April 22 entitled "Is the Army too focused on COIN," he quotes a battalion executive officer as saying " ... call us knuckle-draggers or whatever, we weren't trained to do COIN." The post drew a comment from "Hunter," a National Guard battalion commander, who said his brigade received almost no COIN training before it went to Iraq. That day's blog entry can be read by clicking here (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/22/is_the_army_too_focused_on_coin).
Hunter's comment was featured in Ricks' installment titled "The lack of COIN in the institutional Army" the following day:
Our BDE was designated as a SECFOR BDE so we didn't rate a trip to a CTC. Indeed when I asked the two star why we weren't going to a CTC I was told, "You're just a LTC, you need to see the big picture." To which I say, #### you very much sir.
Also we got virtually no COIN training at the MOBSITE ... only the training I forced on the unit. Indeed I am entirely self-educated on COIN since 2001 when I realized that I was gonna need it eventually. Actually, I had the help of Tom and a lot of really smart guys on an another internet forum I frequent.
My task force was extremely successful in no small part because they treated the local populace with respect and a COIN mentality -- and I'll take what small credit for that which I deserve. Care to see one (of 4) of my key tasks in my commander's intent, oh, here it is:
"Improve the Iraqi people's outlook of US and Coalition forces in order to gain their support and keep them from supporting anti coalition forces: "First do no harm."
Col. Gian Gentile was one of the persons who responded to the posting, asking, "What are you trying to prove with this constant blog-posting drum-beating that the Army doesn't get COIN?" Starbuck of the "Wings Over Iraq" blog also responded by saying that at his Aviation Career Course in 2007 students were taught mechanized warfare against enemies equipped with Warsaw Pact vehicles. He said he thought the training base was simply recycling its old PowerPoint slides. The entire blog entry can be read by clicking here (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/best_defense_comment_of_the_day_the_lack_of_coin_i n_the_institutional_army).
Finally, this past Thursday, April 29, Ricks quotes Adam Silverman, a Ph.D. who served as a social-cultural advisor to the First Armored Division in Iraq in 2007-08 as saying that the best COIN officers he met were self-educated on the subject. He speculated that the institutional Army might regard COIN as a passing thing, "the flavor of the month" to use his words. That blog entry is available here (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/28/the_army_and_coin_you_re_on_your_own_commander).
GI Zhou
05-02-2010, 08:15 AM
Alternatively, many in the the British Army after the First World War, were more than happy to go back to 'real soldiering' - colonial policing the North West Frontier and other parts of the Empire. Far more exotic, and cheaper to live in, than in Aldershot or some other cold dank place in Britain.
William F. Owen
05-02-2010, 10:56 AM
Alternatively, many in the the British Army after the First World War, were more than happy to go back to 'real soldiering' - colonial policing the North West Frontier and other parts of the Empire. Far more exotic, and cheaper to live in, than in Aldershot or some other cold dank place in Britain.
If you can ever find who actually ever said "get back to real soldiering" I'd love to know. I simply do not believe it was ever said, and if so it is taken out of context.
WW1 was an anomaly. We have never seen anything like it before or since, and warfare has never developed as fast as it did in those 4 years. It is unique. The British Army of 1918 was unsustainable for any other conflict in the form it existed.
GI Zhou
05-02-2010, 11:38 AM
WW2 only followed 19 years later. The Germans went from the Me-109D to rpo the Me-262, the US from a handful of B-17Ds in 1939 to B-29s and nukes in 1945.
What I want to know is where 'it is better to wound than to kill' was originally written down in doctrine. :eek:
William F. Owen
05-02-2010, 12:33 PM
The Germans went from the Me-109D to rpo the Me-262, the US from a handful of B-17Ds in 1939 to B-29s and nukes in 1945.
The Germans flew the He-178 in 1939, so not such a big leap. Yes Nukes was huge, but I still submit that the scale and application of innovations seen in WW1 has never really been matched.
What I want to know is where 'it is better to wound than to kill' was originally written down in doctrine. :eek:
It never was and it's rubbish. The idea dates from the 1930's but it really came out of a book called "Overkill" written in the 1970's and taken from the US use of 5.56mm in Vietnam, as in the round "was not meant to kill."
Perhaps the place of COIN within our doctrine would be more clearly understood if there were a better definition of what it is and what it is not. Some months ago Gian Gentile famously called it "a strategy of tactics"; to my way of thinking it is neither strategy nor tactics, but rather an operational technique for fighting insurgencies and other low-intensity conflicts.
Fighting conventional wars will always be the primary mission of our armed forces for those existential conflicts which threaten the survival of our nation, as well as that of our closest allies. Therefore combined arms doctrine and the need to train in core warfighting competencies will never go away--in any event the use of combined arms, small unit tactics, and proficiency with weapons are every bit as much part of COIN as they are for full-blown conventional warfare.
In one of Tom Ricks' recent blog pieces "Hunter," a National Guard battalion commander and USMA graduate, stated that "First, do no harm" was one of the goals he put into his Commander's Intent when his battalion was in Iraq. Possibly that principle could be integrated into the Law of Land Warfare instruction troops are given during Basic Training, AIT, and precommissioning courses. Conduct that does gratuitous harm to local populations is not merely a violation of COIN principles, in most cases it violates the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ as well. Last but not least, truly reprehensible behavior drags the colors of our services through the mud, as My Lai did many years ago for the U.S. Army.
To my way of thinking the need for instruction on COIN begins at the officer and NCO level. At officers' basic and career courses, as well as at NCO leadership courses, COIN doctrine should be part of the instruction at our schools, maybe ten percent or so. Instruction in COIN as an operational technique should be reserved for the CGSC level, and even there it should not replace teaching on fighting conventional wars.
When all is said and done. COIN or no COIN, infantrymen have to be taught infantry skills, artillerymen how to fire their howitzers, aviators how to fly and maintain their helicopters, and so on. In closing, the old expression "the best is enemy of the good" should guide our changes to training to make room for COIN. A good solution now that can be modified as required in the future would be better than staffing the subject to death for five years to find the best solution.
To read the latest chapter of my work in progress, Internet Insurgency: Jerking Ken White's Chain, please click here (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0813125006?ie=UTF8&tag=fopo-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0813125006). However, be forewarned, this link includes scenes of gratuitous sex and violence and is not for the faint of heart.
Ken White
01-04-2011, 01:37 AM
However, on to the Sex and Violence...
I briefed De Puy once and talked to him twice. He was not a jerk, he was better than most but he was a product of a system -- and, as could be expected, he perpetuated that system while doing a few good things and paying lip service to "Preparing the Army for modern war." :wry:
You should speak to your Therapist re: the Hot Babes... ;)
All joking aside, the following is from a U.S. Army War College journal Parameters review of the DePuy biography in the Winter 2008-09 issue.
Following graduation from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1952, DePuy served as V Corps’ Assistant G-3 for Training in Germany. In this job he tested and evaluated 20 battalions a year. This service brought him back to the fundamentals of Army combat training. After two years in this billet, DePuy took command of an infantry battalion in the 4th Infantry Division. For the next year, DePuy practiced the lessons of training that he had learned with the 90th Infantry Division and in his time as a training officer. He found that his new battalion “was as good as any of the battalions over there . . . . At the squad level it was a shambles, just like my battalion had been in World War II. At the platoon level, it was a little better. The company commanders were better. They had good potential. So I decided to spend my time at the bottom.”
Gole correctly observes that “DePuy’s decision to spend his time ‘at the bottom’ specifically addressed what he found in 1954, but he made the same decision in his battle group in 1961, in his division in 1966, and as the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander in 1973. His lifelong conviction was that if you get it right at the squad and platoon levels, the rest would fall into place.” As a battalion commander, DePuy personally tested his infantry squads and platoons until “they got very, very good.” As a division commander in Vietnam, he continued this hands-on approach to leadership and training.
The complete review is available by clicking here (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/08winter/revwin08.pdf). You'll have to scrool down a bit to find it.
These general officers -- when I was at Fort Benning OCS in '77-'78 the two officers who were the Field Artillery representatives to the Infantry School were the sons of Gens Starry and Kerwin respectively. (Don't try to tell me that happened by complete coincidence!) When I arrived at 7th DIVARTY in '82 who should be there but Major Bruce Kerwin, the same guy; my battalion commander there Lt Col Morrie Boyd detested him, so Kerwin later retired with one star whereas Boyd left with two.
You should speak to your Therapist re: the Hot Babes...
I'll have to check those old "Active Defense" Tasks, Conditions and Standards we once were taught in the late '70s for hasty and deliberate advances upon hot babe citadels.
Everyone agrees that the U.S. Army began a decline during the Vietnam conflict, starting approximately post-Tet in 1968. There were many reasons for that --McNamara's Hundred Thousand, the retirement of the WW II and Korea generations of NCOs -- but my main concern here is the hard road back from there during the period when I served. What I have yet to figure out after a year of messages on the subject is whether DePuy and TRADOC were working to reverse the Army's decline, or whether their initiatives were a main cause of the slump in the first place.
The decentralized Army unit training of the '50s and '60s may have allowed for a lot of variability in the quality of training from unit to unit -- it may have been very good in some outfits but very poor in others. However, I still have yet to see how the Task, Condition, Standard and BTMS initiatives of DePuy's TRADOC actually weakened the Army of the late '70s and '80s.
I know that during that period the renewed command emphasis on training at the local level actually discouraged us from doing it because if we put anything on the training schedule inspectors with clipboards from brigade would be there to watch the instruction and rip us a new one. ("Did the instructor make full use of training aids?") One battalion commander in the 7th DISCOM at Fort Ord told his company commanders to never ever put training on the training schedule because it would only lead to adverse comment from staff officers working for higher-ups!
Ken, just out of curiosity, what did you work on when you were a DA civilian for the DePuy/Starry TRADOC? I'm trying to see where you fit into the larger picture of this period.
Ken White
01-05-2011, 05:21 AM
...What I have yet to figure out after a year of messages on the subject is whether DePuy and TRADOC were working to reverse the Army's decline, or whether their initiatives were a main cause of the slump in the first place.A bit of both, I think. De Puy IMO did more good than harm but he was a 'successful' product of a system, ergo, that system likely was fundamentally sound in his mind. Still, he could and did fix things. I briefed him when he came to Korea in 75. There were several issues. One was that three posts trained track vehicle mechanics. Sill trained on the Arty systems, M107, 8, 9 and 10 and the M578; Knox all the Tanks and Aberdeen did the 113s. Problem was that all fed into one MOS (Shades of combining 11B , 11F, 11H and 11M...) and the wonderful Personnel system would then send these round pegs (M107-10 fixers) to Mech Infantry Bns where they filled Square holes and met M113s for the first time while supervised by a Motor Sergeant who was strictly a wheeled guy. I briefed the then TRADOC CG in the fall of 75 and when I got to Knox the following March, Knox trained all Track Mechanics on all vehicles, the Sill and Aberdeen courses were inactivated.
The decentralized Army unit training of the '50s and '60s may have allowed for a lot of variability in the quality of training from unit to unit -- it may have been very good in some outfits but very poor in others. However, I still have yet to see how the Task, Condition, Standard and BTMS initiatives of DePuy's TRADOC actually weakened the Army of the late '70s and '80s.In order, that variation from unit to unit never ceased -- and it won't. It's a function of a good commander versus a mediocre commander. Good commanders produce good units, the less than good do not. Those good Commanders succeeded not due to but in spite of BTMS, that and having good troops, thanks to Shy Meyer and Max Thurman. The theory with BTMS is that it would cut of the valleys of cyclical training. Two problems with that, you cannot stop cyclical training in an Army that wants and encourages a 25% personnel turnover annually (and has an 'up or out' policy). If you're cutting off valleys, you're also cutting off peaks -- that's a recipe for mediocrity if I ever heard one.
All that is based on service from 1949 until 1977, DAC time from 1977 until 1995 and paying attention plus a couple of kids in the Army since then. BTMS was a bad idea and though it's been marginally improved, it still is woefully deficient. That the Army is as well trained as it is is a tribute not to the process but to the people who work around it.
The problem with the BTMS process is that it does not cope well with the wide variance in conditions found in combat (my pet is "Clear a building") and it does not lend itself to the production of leaders who can merge a number of 'tasks' (many of which are NOT tasks but merely enabling skills and knowledges) to complete a mission. In fact, I believe it impedes the integration. They can do discrete things well but have rarely been taught how to integrate tasks, to merge a number of efforts to get a job done. Fortunately / hopefully, OBT&E will change that.
Ken, just out of curiosity, what did you work on when you were a DA civilian for the DePuy/Starry TRADOC? I'm trying to see where you fit into the larger picture of this period.I did not work for TRADOC and though I went to Monroe on TDY occasionallly, I tried to avoid it to the maximum possible extent. Depressing place. I was an Armor School Training Division Chief responsible for all the map and land nav instruction at Knox (BCT, Armor and Cav OSUT, PNCOC, BNCOC, ANCOC, AOBC, AOAC and the Pre Command Course plus occasional special courses and seminars). That included supervision of 15-20 Instructors, development of training material, integration of that material with tactical training, a budget, coordination and all that jazz. It also included fighting -- and beating -- the Post and the TRADOC Bureaucracies over almost everything... :D
I tried to get all the TRADOC Service Schools on the same wave length and to reduce redundancies. Everyone cooperated well except Benning -- and the C of S there, the Director of the Tactics Dept were both people I knew and had worked for or with -- good guys but hidebound. Captives of the system. ;)
Where I then 'fit' is really totally irrelevant. This "I'm trying to see where you fit into the larger picture of this period." is sort of specious IMO. What you may be after is validating in your mind my credibility to speak to certain things. That's okay if immaterial; what I say either makes sense or it does not. It's generally as accurate as I can recall and mostly subject to all sorts of checks and corroborations. The brief TRADOC experience was only a part of 45 years -- and almost certainly the most unimportant, even trivial, part at that. I didn't learn much at that job. However, it did let me see the inner workings of the training system and to know we don't do what we say or even think we do. Knox let me know Two Stars did not insure competence. DePuy and Donn Starry gave me an impression that even four stars were no guarantee.
Did that for seven years, 77 to 84. Then I went to Atlanta and FORSCOM -- versus TRADOC. Same bureaucracy, different focus. More cynicism acquired. Much more. TRADOC probably is unnecessary, FORSCOM is totally unnecessary. Eleven years in Atlanta and Fort Mac validated my perception that even Three and Four Stars did and do not insure competence. Not by a long shot...
Moral is, do not assign people to large headquarter or let them see how those aggregation work. You'll develop cynics. ;)
All that is why I rail about our marginal training and our disastrous personnel system. I've seen too many people, good people, killed by errant stupidity, a 'go along-get along' or 'don't make waves' mentality and overweening egos. :mad:
Wow ... and to think that all I accomplished during my life was to command the Fow-Fowty-Fow Double-Clutchin' Mutha-Truckin' QM Truck!
The mention of the M107 175mm self-propelled gun brings back old memories because my first TO&E unit had them. When we retubed to the M110A1 eight-inch in around 1980 I believe it made us the next-to-last 175 unit in the history of the Army. A few months later when I was battalion motor officer a guy wearing an Afrika Korps-style hat with the Deutsche Bahn logo walked in my office one day and asked if he could measure one of my howitzers so he could better plan their rail transport to our field exercises in the Grafenwoehr training area.
When I showed him the dimensions of the weapon system in the -10 manual tabulated data he laughed because whoever had made the metric conversions had screwed them all up. I led him to one of our howitzers and told him to have at it. His Afrika Korps hat-wearing crew got to work with tape measures and plumb bobs. When one his men pointed to a puddle of cherry juice forming under an adjacent howitzer I began to explain how the hydraulics of the lock-out system worked. The top guy said, "Ah, leutnant, you do not haff to tell me, I commanded a battery of 88s in Russia!"
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