Quick question about parapets

[Fuchs]

Quick question:

What's the current state of affairs in regard to parapet firing positions in the U.S.?

Is it still fashionable/been done or was it succceeded by something better/worse?
Were the troops testing results of the 70's accurate or overly optimistic?

[jcustis]

Take a look at the 2nd Bn 5th Marines.com website I have referenced on other threads. That site gives good details about a few optimized possibilities. "Digging in" is still done, though often at reduced pace/scale due to environmental concerns, and moreso because arraying yourself in a company defense is not a trsining event done often. Almost all time is spent training to some COIN task.

[William F. Owen]

I can only comment that the UK Defensive ideas about digging in the 1980's were amazingly dumb, and known to be, but there seemed little spirit or intent to change them.

Elaborate stores intensive 4-man trench with 2 shelter bays, that were always too small, and you fired from a predictable and easily detected 2m frontage.
More over the UK tactical teaching on siting a platoon/company defensive position was almost moronic, as almost every FTX constantly proved!!

My own thinking has gone back to separated "hides/shelters" with multiple pre-prepared "fire/observation" positions. Not rocket science. Keep it simple.

[slapout9]

Fuchs, I come from that era and it was called a Parfox position if I remember correctly. We had to know about them but we never really dug them in training. The key points were the position had to be concealed from the enemy and you had to have interlocking sectors of fire. Your are essentially hiding behind something and shooting at the enemy from an angle. There is a study that is online somewhere about some this if I can remeber where it is.

[Stan]

The link to JC's posts are here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1729).

Another fine thread at the SWJ under Rifle squad composition!

[slapout9]

The link to JC's posts are here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1729).

Another fine thread at the SWJ under Rifle squad composition!

Good Job Stan:wry:

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs, I come from that era and it was called a Parfox position if I remember correctly. We had to know about them but we never really dug them in training. The key points were the position had to be concealed from the enemy and you had to have interlocking sectors of fire. Your are essentially hiding behind something and shooting at the enemy from an angle. There is a study that is online somewhere about some this if I can remeber where it is.

I think this is the DuPuy or "Dragon teeth" trench/bunker system. It works very well, in the right ground, - under near ideal conditions. EG: Works very well in flat ground with very thick scrubby bush, or forests with good ground cover/jungle. IMO, it really only works for small arms and against infantry.

[slapout9]

I think this is the DuPuy or "Dragon teeth" trench/bunker system. It works very well, in the right ground, - under near ideal conditions. EG: Works very well in flat ground with very thick scrubby bush, or forests with good ground cover/jungle. IMO, it really only works for small arms and against infantry.

It was designed for use in Vietnam(by a private if not mistaken). It worked well against a lightly armed infantry. If they had some modern day missile systems it would be a very different story.

[Schmedlap]

One of the old retired NCOs at my old military school credits the DuPuy bunkers with saving their lives at the Battle of Ap Gu. Enormous mortar barrage preceded the assault upon their position. They survived the mortar barrage and then repelled an assault so fierce that even the Chaplain was engaged in hand-to-hand fighting (literally choked a few enemy to death - BADASS!).

[slapout9]

One of the old retired NCOs at my old military school credits the DuPuy bunkers with saving their lives at the Battle of Ap Gu. Enormous mortar barrage preceded the assault upon their position. They survived the mortar barrage and then repelled an assault so fierce that even the Chaplain was engaged in hand-to-hand fighting (literally choked a few enemy to death - BADASS!).

My primary MOS was 11B4P my secondary was 11C4P. The primary HE mortar round we fired was fused to detonate about a 1/2 second before impact. Point being it did not penetrate the ground. If you were in any hole and didn't receive a direct hit you would probably survive. Mortars are vicious against Infantry that are exposed, not so good if they are dug in unless you can alter the fusing mechanism. Artillery/Indirect fire invented EBO a long time ago:D

Yea, that Chaplin was a bad dude.

IMO the Parfox is basically designed like Old Medieval Forts. The inside of the firing ports were BEVELED at an angle so you could stand behind solid rock and shoot at the enemy (with a crossbow) from an angle all day long and not be effected by enemy fire.

[Fuchs]

I can only comment that the UK Defensive ideas about digging in the 1980's were amazingly dumb, and known to be, but there seemed little spirit or intent to change them.

Elaborate stores intensive 4-man trench with 2 shelter bays, that were always too small, and you fired from a predictable and easily detected 2m frontage.
More over the UK tactical teaching on siting a platoon/company defensive position was almost moronic, as almost every FTX constantly proved!!

My own thinking has gone back to separated "hides/shelters" with multiple pre-prepared "fire/observation" positions. Not rocket science. Keep it simple.

That's funny, we thought completely in parallel on this one.

I am preparing a damning text on field fortification ~doctrine in the Heer (which is pretty much stuck in the 30's and the FMs are simply a scandal in this regard!) and came to the conclusion of artillery-protected hideout + edge observation & firing positions as well.

My thought was in great part about how infantry can control open fields between closed terrains (as for example the mix of forest - field in NE Europe). Simply sticking to the edge of a forest is too predictable (even if it's 20-100 m inside), but necessary for observation & LOS firing.


IMO the Parfox is basically designed like Old Medieval Forts.

The basic idea is as old as turrets on walls, but the Renaissance's angle bastion is the very best analogy in my opinion.

[slapout9]

My own thinking has gone back to separated "hides/shelters" with multiple pre-prepared "fire/observation" positions. Not rocket science. Keep it simple.

Unless it was a Major Operational Test we did something like that. I think it was called an improvised prone firing position (can't remember) basically you dug a 6 inch slit in the ground(the size of your body) so you were flush withthe ground, making you very hard to see and harder to hit from small arms fire, but it wasn't going to stop anything. That was really all you needed under the Airborne Systems Thinking Philosophy(shoot,move,and communicate) which was see and shot the enemy first and you want have to dig anything:)

[kaur]

My thought was in great part about how infantry can control open fields between closed terrains (as for example the mix of forest - field in NE Europe). Simply sticking to the edge of a forest is too predictable (even if it's 20-100 m inside), but necessary for observation & LOS firing.

Can't wait for your new text :)

[William F. Owen]

That's funny, we thought completely in parallel on this one.
Not that funny. We're both pretty sensible chaps. :cool:


My thought was in great part about how infantry can control open fields between closed terrains (as for example the mix of forest - field in NE Europe). Simply sticking to the edge of a forest is too predictable (even if it's 20-100 m inside), but necessary for observation & LOS firing.
European forest and field does create that dynamic. I think you have to be able to use a number of systems dependant on the terrain, and you don't really get a choice as to where you might have to work.


.... basically you dug a 6 inch slit in the ground(the size of your body) so you were flush withthe ground, making you very hard to see and harder to hit from small arms fire, but it wasn't going to stop anything.
We called that a "Shell scrape". Really only used when you set up a patrol harbour. Talking to anyone who has been actually "shelled", and they all dig down to "STAGE 1," and forget about shell scrapes!

[Rifleman]

We called that a "Shell scrape".

Our manuals call it a "Hasty Fighting Position." :rolleyes:

Troops usually call it a "Ranger Grave." :eek:

[slapout9]

We called that a "Shell scrape". Really only used when you set up a patrol harbour. Talking to anyone who has been actually "shelled", and they all dig down to "STAGE 1," and forget about shell scrapes!

What is a Patrol Harbour?

[Steve Blair]

Slap,

A patrol harbour is basically a small patrol base or patrol layover point. Not a term I've seen used in US writing, but it's really common in British stuff (and possibly other former Commonwealth stuff).

[slapout9]

Slap,

A patrol harbour is basically a small patrol base or patrol layover point. Not a term I've seen used in US writing, but it's really common in British stuff (and possibly other former Commonwealth stuff).

Thats good I thought the Navy was taking over:eek:

[Pete]

Fuchs, click on the link below to Field Manual 5-103, Survivability, from 1985. I believe that's the most recent version of the manual but I might be wrong.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/5-103/CH4.HTM

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, click on the link below to Field Manual 5-103, Survivability, from 1985. I believe that's the most recent version of the manual but I might be wrong.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/5-103/CH4.HTM

It would take thorough deliberation to draw a mroe stupid picture than this one:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/5-103/IMG00077.GIF
Almost everything is wrong in it.

[Ken White]

It would take thorough deliberation to draw a mroe stupid picture than this one:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/5-103/IMG00077.GIF
Almost everything is wrong in it.That's what happens when you hire civilian educators to develop training and doctrine materials... :mad:

[Fuchs]

It reminds me a lot of ~1900 exercise field fortifications. It's just a bit too empty for a 1900 illustration, of course.

The rest of the manual has many very elaborate buildings (supposed to be field fortifications) that would be inadequate for peacekeeper outposts, too easily hit in static warfare and too elaborate for mobile warfare.

Field fortifications and field manuals seems to be a NATO-wide if not world-wide problem. The state of the art seems to lag behind technology by decades, and many field manuals lag behind the state of the art by even more decades.

Germans and Austrians rarely create grenade sumps, for example.
The Bundeswehr did (and I think it still does) prefer field of fire absolutely over protection - as if it was still in the "our MG42 provides 80% of the squad's firepower and the squad only has one, therefore it needs maximum field of fire!" mode despite the introduction of automatic rifles and two MG4 into the squad.

And then there's the generally stupid idea of trenches in open terrain. That's easy to illustrate - and idiotic.


Field fortifications is one of the topics that promise a rude awakening in the next great war. The peacekeeping and small war above-ground fortifications surely did much harm to the idea of field fortifications.

[Firn]

A blast from the past (http://www.archive.org/stream/snipinginfrancew00pricrich#page/66/mode/2up). It might be a partly biased work, but it doesn't seem to me that this bias extens into core of the subject. The threat of enemy fire was certainly a bit larger back in those days.

Firn

[Cole]

Fuchs, believe many OPs/COPs/FOBs effectively protect Soldiers and would protect ANA after we leave. Others, not so much. Consider the following:

1) Insurgents use massed RPG fire in Afghanistan as surrogate artillery
2) Currently inaccurate harassing mortar/rocket fires may not always be as inept...plus GPS mortars and smaller rockets will come sooner than we think
3) Population-centric COIN requires closer COP proximity to villages which increases risk of attack and provides cover for attackers
4) Current HESCO bastion provides potential for rapdily created above ground "trenches" and even "walls" for rooms

My personal belief is that COPs in particular should have smaller interiors to reduce probability of interior impact by RPGs or mortar/rocket fire. The tendency to have lots of wooden buildings and flammable roofs that can burn ala COP Keating is another weakness. A reporter or Soldier had made a YouTube video of COP Keating which showed its weaknesses because it was built in an earlier time when the threats were not as great. It not only was below nearby steep mountains, but did not appear to have many towers or defensive positions. Another YouTube seemed to confirm the lack of defenses as a UH-60 took off and someone filmed the entire COP.

In contrast, I've seen promotional material for HESCO showing a PLS-like flatrack holding a container with HESCO deploying hundreds of feet in a matter of seconds, ready to be filled with dirt/rocks. The container itself can also be used as a room in between the HESCO. Place those seven foot tall, 100 foot long barriers about 9' apart from each other in parallel and it creates rows of trench-like rooms that just require mortar-resistant overhead cover. Use bunkbeds as coal mine-like bracing material.

The final component is vehicle fighting-positions within the COP to exploit M-ATV crew-served weapons capabilities when not patrolling. Create a one-way, one lane road within the HESCO perimeter walls (with rows of HESCO forming the rooms in the center) with firing positions at each corner to reduce opportunities for the enemy to hit the M-ATV with massed RPG fire as the enemy did at Wanat where the TOW vehicle and mortar HESCO position were in the open and targeted immediately.

There is a lack of concrete plants and it is difficult/expensive to get HESCO into Afghanistan and filled by engineers in a timely manner for newly arriving forces in new COPs. Given the same amount of HESCO, I contend you can either create:

1) Smaller HESCO perimeter COPs/OPs with interior trench-like HESCO rooms
or
2) Far larger HESCO perimeter COPs/OPs with exposed interior wooden buildings that still must be built and are a fire hazard with little overhead protection

As always, just my opinion with no commercial interests in HESCO.

[Ken White]

Almost no one has those today...:rolleyes:

Hesco Barriers® are like MRAPs -- they have their uses AND misuses, advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvantage is that they provide a cocoon that most (not all) troops (and their leaders...) are reluctant to leave and thus discourage aggressive action and provide a generally false sense of security. That doesn't even address the concurrent lack of mobility and thus flexibility...:(

The cost of mass Armies is becoming increasingly unaffordable, the nation(s) that break(s) the small but very high quality plus the intelligence / flexibility / speed barriers is/are the one(s) that will win most fights.

So called COIN operations using mass armies have never worked unless a degree of (today) unacceptable harshness was used. Those days are gone and have been since 1945. We need to back off this fetish with 'fixing broken nations. Abysmal stupidity! :eek:

[Pete]

Fuchs, the link below to the Charles B. MacDonald book The Siegfried Line Campaign, U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1963, probably won't tell you anything that you don't already know, but the photographs and architectural drawings are interesting. The author received his introduction to combat as an infantry company commander during operations in 1944 against these defenses.


http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Siegfried/Siegfried%20Line/siegfried-ch02.htm#p33b

[Fuchs]

"Defensive operations are a product of mass armies.
Almost no one has those today..."

Field fortifications are about protection, not about defensive operations.

You should dig in while resting, while waiting (marshalling areas are shell magnets!) and you may dig in to prepare for an ambush.

The perception that "dug in = static defensive" is widespread and wrong.
This mistake is probably part of the problem with modern field fortifications (the lack of experience after WW2 being the greater one).


It's too enticing, so I'll drop a few more lines:

The exploitation of the superior strength of tactical defensive is a smart move (and often done) on the offensive.
A classic example is the use of ambushes after overtaking a withdrawing enemy during a pursuit. Rommel's book provided a stunning anecdote that nicely illustrates the point (how he supposedly eradicated a regimental-sized marching column by taking its soldiers captive one vehicle at a time behind a turn of a road ... after infiltrating with units relatively deep into opfor country).
One of the most successful German tank commanders of WW2 (great Colonel, poor General) was also extremely successful by infiltration+ambush.
A recent Israeli urban combat tactic is apparently all about setting up ambushes indoors while advancing (that takes time, of course).


In short: Stuff associated with defence can also belong into the advisable repertoire of offence.

[Ken White]

I didn't. ;)

Neither a Hesco Barrier® nor an MRAP have much to do with field fortifications. :wry:

Which has little bearing on the fact that I do not agree with the excessive digging many advocate. There is a time and place and I've dug a hole or two in as hard a soil as anyone but excessive use is just like those Hescos and MRAPs -- it breeds an 'I'm safe here' mentality and a reluctance to move. In any serious war, one either moves or one dies. :eek:

That simple. This is true:
This mistake is probably part of the problem with modern field fortifications (the lack of experience after WW2 being the greater one).You're also 100% correct on the marshaling areas. Which is one reason their use should be avoided where possible; they're necessary for marginally trained troops -- that mass Army thing again -- but not necessary for well trained units. :cool:

[davidbfpo]

I have followed this thread and note the art of fortification does make rare appearances, oddly always around Hesco barriers and introduction over those interested in such matters may find this website useful:http://www.fsgfort.com/. It belongs to the Fortress Study Group, which I am member of and historical field fortifications do appear.