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View Full Version : Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level



jcustis
12-24-2009, 11:59 PM
A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

Villages and other populated areas can be considered sanctuaries for insurgents until counter-insurgent forces wrest control away. As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way, and they need not be a black or white proposition that has been sensationalized in recent media offerings.

ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have been slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night, to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

Timbers
12-25-2009, 12:15 AM
The chance to disrupt the disruptors at very low cost seems to me a great opportunity.

A strategy of pinning down insurgents through denial of movement and then eliminating them at a convenient time appears to offer an effective way to decimate TB at low risk to allied forces.

slapout9
12-25-2009, 12:17 AM
A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way.

How the Taliban take over a village is similar to how a gang takes over a neighborhood.

jcustis
12-25-2009, 01:06 AM
How the Taliban take over a village is similar to how a gang takes over a neighborhood.

Indeed, and they can get away with it through carefully applied intimidation, "night letters", and outright murder during visits in the night.

Are we unable to stop them simply because we often do not have a durable presence in those villages, like a beat cop should have durable presence in his assigned neighborhood? Or is it more due to a lack of a mechanism for said villagers to anonymously report when the insurgents are maneuvering through their land/homes?

Put another way, does law enforcement succeed primarily from presence or speed in response?

slapout9
12-25-2009, 03:39 AM
Indeed, and they can get away with it through carefully applied intimidation, "night letters", and outright murder during visits in the night.

Are we unable to stop them simply because we often do not have a durable presence in those villages, like a beat cop should have durable presence in his assigned neighborhood? Or is it more due to a lack of a mechanism for said villagers to anonymously report when the insurgents are maneuvering through their land/homes?

Put another way, does law enforcement succeed primarily from presence or speed in response?


Not really either one. Mostly a combination of surveillance and informants. Beat cops in the old days would be able to prevent a lot of it, but those days are gone. But criminals also have extraordinary economic leverage to, they can simply buy peoples silence, especially in poor neighborhoods. More neighborhoods are taken over that way then many people realize but intimidation and force will certainly be used if need be.

Surferbeetle
12-25-2009, 04:39 AM
ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

Hi Jon,

Know that your CAG-guy would be working his assessments of Security, Economics ($/hectare), and Governance of their side and ours for you. Here is something from the civilian side of things that might be of use to you as well.

From Marketing Strategy 3rd Edition by O.C. Ferrell and Michael D. Hartline (http://www.amazon.com/Marketing-Strategy-O-C-Ferrell/dp/product-description/0324362722) (man they are proud of that book...my wallet cried for days):

Internal Environment

Availability and Deployment of Human Resources



Age & Capacity of Equipment or Technology



Availability of financial resources



Power & Political Struggles within the Firm



Current Marketing Objectives & Performance


Customer Environment

Who are our current & potential customers?



What do customers do with our products?



Where do customers purchase our products?



When do customers purchase our products?



How & why do customers select our products?



Why do potential customers not select our products?


External Environment

Who are the Competition?



Economic growth & stability?



Political Trends?



Legal & Regulatory Issues?



Technological Advancements?



Sociocultural trends?


Merry Christmas

Steve

Bob's World
12-25-2009, 05:23 AM
Under current widely-held definitions of "sanctuary" (ungoverned spaces) both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are really simply battling for temporary access through the exertion of force.

Better, I think, to take a more wholistic view on what truly contributes to "sanctuary":

1. Legal status: A border often provides this; but so does a non-state status like AQ has; or a quasi-state status like LH has, that takes them outside the rule of law.

2. Support of a poorly governed populace. Only a small portion of a populace may take up arms, but the factors that give rise to insurgency (causation) affect regular, peaceful people as well. When a popualce feel little loyalty to its government, it is ripe "sanctuary" for an insurgent to hide within and draw support from. BL, sanctuary comes far more from poorly governend populaces than from un or undergovernend spaces.

3. Some favorable terrain, vegetation, cover, concealment. Can be mountains, a swamp, deep forest, or urban, or some mix. Open desert doesn't work well.

So, a mix of legal status, a supportive or neutral populace, and cover/concealment. That is sanctuary.

Operations in the Arghandab, or nearby areas like Shah Wali Kowt and Khakrez to the north; or Zari -Panjiway to the South, or within Kandahar City itself can in fact temporarily deny physical sanctuary so long as one occupys the ground (and is willing to stay and not return to ones FOB at night..); but this is not the denial of "Sanctuary."

True denial of sanctuary requries targeting legal status issues of the insurgent; addressing poor governance issues of the populace; and then designing capabilities to work within the type of cover and concealment being employed in the area of operaitons. All these are things that require time and a holistic approach to address.

MikeF
12-25-2009, 05:34 PM
Operations in the Arghandab, or nearby areas like Shah Wali Kowt and Khakrez to the north; or Zari -Panjiway to the South, or within Kandahar City itself can in fact temporarily deny physical sanctuary so long as one occupys the ground (and is willing to stay and not return to ones FOB at night..); but this is not the denial of "Sanctuary."

True denial of sanctuary requries targeting legal status issues of the insurgent; addressing poor governance issues of the populace; and then designing capabilities to work within the type of cover and concealment being employed in the area of operaitons. All these are things that require time and a holistic approach to address.

Very well put- particularly the last two paragraphs. To expand, coersion can be used by the USG or HN to clear the sanctuary. Coersion can be a mixture of population control measures, increased application of violence, and limited/resitricted civil affairs operations. These measures can destroy the existing enemy or encourage them to flee the area. Force should be focused on destroying the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy. This use of military force can best be defined as occupation.

However, without real political reform (conflict resolution between HN and populace(a form of marraige counseling), land reform, and sustainable political and security systems) then the clearing efforts could be for naught.

Merry Christmas all.

Mike

jcustis
12-25-2009, 08:40 PM
Who are the Competition?

Excellent item to consider!...I think I will frame any question about a way ahead for my unit's operations with a single starting point: Why is the enemy here and what does he want?

From my experience, not a lot of time has been spent kicking that can around enough to ascertain precisely what is going on. Even after RIP/TOA, a good bit of recce needs to happen in order to confirm ground truth, since all friendly ops need a solid starting point.

Surferbeetle
12-26-2009, 01:26 AM
Excellent item to consider!...I think I will frame any question about a way ahead for my unit's operations with a single starting point: Why is the enemy here and what does he want?

I like it.

If the staff have time perhaps they can diagram for you the business plans......of the orchard farmers, poppy farmers, fertilizer suppliers, small animal farmers, militia's, etc.? Supply chain or value chain analysis is very illuminating...and we have the muscle to help or harm at key points in the chains.

From the help standpoint, and from an armchair view, I wonder about the potential for some sort of small business development, training, co-op effort run and staffed by locals and perhaps assisting across the economics, governance, and security spectrum?

jcustis
12-26-2009, 01:37 AM
From the help standpoint, and from an armchair view, I wonder about the potential for some sort of small business development, training, co-op effort run and staffed by locals and perhaps assisting across the economics, governance, and security spectrum?

What's a realistic life cycle required for something like that to be effective, do you think? Seven months? Twelve? Fifteen? I like the idea, but there has to be a logical endstate, and it's always next to impossible to get there without being on the ground for the right duration to start, sustain, and transition those types of efforts at the right time.

I like short, big impact efforts the same as the next guy, but they always strike me as though we are just giving the guy fish.

Surferbeetle
12-26-2009, 01:49 AM
What's a realistic life cycle required for something like that to be effective, do you think? Seven months? Twelve? Fifteen? I like the idea, but there has to be a logical endstate, and it's always next to impossible to get there without being on the ground for the right duration to start, sustain, and transition those types of efforts at the right time.

During my last long trip to Iraq, we worked as specialty teams for a DIV. Some of my friends were able to analyze land locations, coordinate for permissions, and get a facility built for a business center. The follow-on folks were able to move things further with local staffing, equipment, etc. I just checked for their website...no longer up (as least I haven't found it yet) but it was up a year or two ago. There are 2008 you-tube videos for this business center.

The next question that has to be considered is what are the metrics to be and what's acceptable? Their way is not ours...

Locally provided grants and funding (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_banking) are also very interesting to think about. Are there nearby NGO's or IO's who want to work?

jcustis
12-26-2009, 01:55 AM
Under current widely-held definitions of "sanctuary" (ungoverned spaces) both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are really simply battling for temporary access through the exertion of force.

Better, I think, to take a more wholistic view on what truly contributes to "sanctuary":

On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

Surferbeetle
12-26-2009, 02:06 AM
On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

Sanctuary as presented is a western POV.

Suggested noun or phrase: emigrant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emigration), combat emigrant, or combat emigrants...as opposed to immigrant (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/IMMIGRANT).

If I speak the language, know the culture, know the land, and can come and go as I wish...I live there...I am no short-term tourist, even if I don't plan to live there forever.

Having lived on the economy in a number of countries it's my observation that one eventually becomes part of the community at some level. Thus my comments regarding the need to understand the economics in order to understand the area.

Slap has a more holistic analytical method - the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who. I believe the policing model is worth deeper examination in order to be successful in the COIN fight.

Finally, we might also consider the reports of Hezbollah troops intermarrying with locals (This headline from Lebanonwire (http://www.lebanonwire.com/0912MLN/09120111PRLW.asp): Hezbollah political manifesto asserts intermarriage between resistance and army to face Israeli aggressions ) in terms of permanence and commitment. Again, not our way, but a way...

Firn
12-26-2009, 10:23 AM
One aspect that has been touched by some already is the importances to address the realm of polity, politics and polity in the villages, districts, provinces and regions to fulfill (our) overarching political purpose. We all know that Afghanistan is a mosaic composed of different ethnics, cultures, families, tribes, alliances, religions (or interpretations of), terrain, infrastructure.... and so on. The recent conflicts have reinforced the reliances on both the family, the village, the tribe and a coalition/warlord and the identity found through them.

To deny the Taliban it might be necessary to give the lower levels of governance (and of the coalition too) greater autonomy and power, in certain regions and villages even over the local security forces. Doing so might make - togheter with other policies - COIN their fight too. It is a risky way, but maybe less so than not taking it.


Firn

Bob's World
12-26-2009, 11:21 AM
On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

First, all of Afghanistan is divided into Coalition AOs, so that fact in of itself has no impact on what regions of that country are possesed of the combinaiton of poorly governed (and or overtly coerced) populace, favorable cover and concealment, and also utilized by both nationalst insurgents and other non-state UW elements taking advantage of that legal status outside the law to operate there

Question, if one removes the insurgents and other non-state UW agents from a region, has one either "defeated" the insurgent there or "denied" the sanctuary? So long as you have an enduring and persistent presence, perhaps.

To truly deny the sancutary you must address the motivations of the popualace to provide support. Some of this is building the confidence that you will stay and not merely take what you yourself need from the populace, and then leave and abandon them to the certain retaliation of the insurgent when he flows back in behind you. Most of it though, is a combination of the commitment to stay and to address the elements of governance that are precieved as "poor" by that particular populace. Such commitment to ones populace will have a chance to truly deny the insurgents and his UW enablers such internal sanctuary within a state.

That is if the populace percieves that governance as legitimate (it can earn legitimacy through doing this);

If the popualce percieves it is respected by and can receive justice from this govenrance.

A governnace that treats a populace with disrespect or injustice, or that is not seen as legitmate will have a very hard time addressing issues of sanctuary within its borders.

BorderEnforcementAdvisor
12-26-2009, 04:35 PM
I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.

jcustis
12-27-2009, 01:19 AM
Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.


ENEMY ASSESSMENT
Determine why the insugent/narco-terrorist/thug is operating there, what he wants and/or needs.
Determine the avenues of approach that are used to gain access to these areas of operation, the choke points along them, and other key terrain along the route that can be of advantage to friendly forces.
Determine who's who in the zoo, both for and against you, and sitting on the fence.
Determine if the local populace is complicit in the insurgent's activities or in fact merely compliant due to the intimidation encountered.
Strive to understand why, in a culture that embraces honorable struggle and protecting things tribal and familial, the able-bodied males do not (or cannot) protect themselves, if threats against them and their families have an impact..
Look at the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who.
Determine how local governance is viewed...is it legitimate? Is support provided to the insurgent a matter of poor governance or under-governance (thanks BW for this specific point, as it certainly means different things)?
Determine what IO the enemy is conducting in the village/area, and determine its effectiveness [*need a model to look at effectiveness of enemy IO]
Determine if the insurgent is using the economic fabric against you. Can you leverage off of the goings-on in the market?
When security forces enter the area, where are the insurgents likely to go? Do they even leave at all, or rather just melt into the background to watch and conduct counter-recce against you as friendly forces bumble about?
Although his actions do not necessarily follow a shape-clear-hold-build in precisely the same fashion as our operations, he is nonetheless conducting operations along a similar continuum. At what point are his operations...is he shaping through night letters but not yet invested in the village, or perhaps already attempting to clear through murder and intimidation of local officials, elders, or intelligentia? Is he transitioning between phases, and can that be exploited?

*The bullets above can form the backbone for an effective situational template which, while not traditional in terms of what we are taught in formal PME schools, has to be built nonetheless. The more daunting task is portraying the information and ensuring that the collections plan accounts for information gaps as part of a continual loop. The effort also has to account for collections that will confirm/deny the analysis so that it remains current and reduces the latency.

FRIENDLY FORCES ASSESSMENT
Determine if force, applied by the coalition side, can destroy the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy, and influence them to leave the area.
Determine if patrols and the siting of patrol bases are causing adverse disruption, considering the fabric and rhythm of the village(s) (thanks Infanteer for this relevant snippet). Are you a help or a hindrance?
Determine if the siting of patrol bases provides a permanence that visiting patrols do not provide, and facilitates true information collection from locals who feel safe enough to provide walk-in tips.
Is the area most influenced by the imam/mullah, or by the malik? How much does that matter, and is any one particular type of influence good, bad, or complementary? Would the the village be better served by having the malik as the dominant influence or would a religious leader do better? Which of the two could support your efforts the best? Although you may be able to influence one, the other, or both, are they the right targets you should be trying to influence in the first place?




Does a model exist for building sit temps in a 4th Gen/UW/Irregular Warfare environment?

MikeF
12-27-2009, 01:53 AM
Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.


Determine why the insugent/narco-terrorist/thug is operating there, what he wants and/or needs.
Determine who's who in the zoo, both for and against you, and sitting on the fence.
Determine if the local populace is complicit in the insurgent's activities or in fact merely compliant due to the intimidation encountered.
Strive to understand why, in a culture that embraces honorable struggle and protecting things tribal and familial, the able-bodied males do not (or cannot) protect themselves, if threats against them and their families have an impact..
Look at the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who.
Determine how local governance is viewed...is it legitimate? Is support provided to the insurgent a matter of poor governance or under-governance (thanks BW for this specific point, as it certainly means different things)?
Determine if force, applied by the coalition side, can destroy the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy, and influence them to leave the area.
Determine what IO the enemy is conducting in the village/area, and determine its effectiveness [need a model to look at effectiveness of enemy IO]
Determine how disruptive patrols and the siting of patrol bases are, considering the fabric and rhythm of the village(s) (thanks Infanteer for this relevant snippet). Are you a help or a hindrance?
Determine if the siting if patrol bases provides a permanence that visiting patrols does not provide.
Determine if the insurgent is using the economic fabric against you. Can you leverage off of the goings-on in the market?
Is the area most influenced by the imam/mullah, or by the malik? How much does that matter, and is any one influence good, bad, or complementary?




Very good start. Don't forget terrain and maneuverability. I'd also recommend:

-Determine enemy's avenues of approach (mounted/dismounted)
-Determine trafficability of routes (Stryker/MRAP)
-Determine/verify map reconnaisance (crossing points on rivers, LZs, etc)
-Determine/verify key terrain

And the big one-

-Determine if there is a sphere of influence OUTSIDE of this area that can achieve your desired goals without boots on the ground (ex. Sistani or Sadr). If so, can he be co-opted for mutual benefit?

jcustis
12-27-2009, 02:17 AM
-Determine if there is a sphere of influence OUTSIDE of this area that can achieve your desired goals without boots on the ground (ex. Sistani or Sadr). If so, can he be co-opted for mutual benefit?

That's a little big for the scale that I'm looking at right now, but I like the direction of atk.

Surferbeetle
12-27-2009, 02:25 AM
Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.

Like the list, they look so deceptively simple to make don't they?

Our SWJ community has been happily bashing powerpoint the last week... so how do we transform the resulting information into knowledge? Back in the day we did acetate overlays on maps for the Army side of my life. I guess that's part of why I enjoy Arcview so much on the civilian engineering side. Here is a typical algorithm:

1. Take geotechnical samples at set intervals, depths, and locations.
2. Use the resulting information to paint a picture of the existing underground stratigraphy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stratigraphy).
3. Match engineering properties to each layer - ie the ability to carry a set load (ie ~2,000 pounds/sf for sand, much more for rock depending upon type), exhibit permeability (I worry about waterflow - clay cores vs. sand cores), etc.
4. Analyze data via finite element modeling (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finite_element_method) to identify weak and strong areas
5. Develop a statement of work or design, cost estimate, and project schedule.
6. Get a construction specialist to build the sucker and inspect the heck out of them for QA/QC :wry:

Beyond all of the calculations paper/calculator/excel/mathcad/proprietary calculation programs we capture and share the geo-referenced knowledge using AutoCad Civil 3D (not applicable for our SWJ project) and Arcview before, during and after the project. We also use powerpoint ;)

While developing/evaluating a business plan for a small group of investors we use excel, google earth, typical business metrics for our reference industries, capital budgeting techniques, marketing, and lots of shoe leather.

It may be just me but I see many parallels between the civilian side and the military side when we wisely decide to address the non-kinetic part of life in our solutions. Governance, economics, and security covers alot of ground...

Cavguy
12-27-2009, 03:33 AM
Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

Schmedlap
12-27-2009, 04:01 AM
I've always thought that it would be an interesting topic to compare the use of barriers in Sadr City in 2007 and the use of berms to surround cities, as was attempted in 2005/6.

jcustis
12-27-2009, 04:05 AM
Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

My research does not lead me to believe that those measures are part of any ISAF campaign plan at the moment.

I sat back last night and though about the Sexton article, and how close it rang to accounts of what the VC would often do when trying to establish control of an area. That in turn made me think about the strategic hamlet project effort. Then I had to ponder how that fits into the current fight in AFG.

Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

Bob's World
12-27-2009, 04:16 AM
I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.

Any law that constrains that actions of those enforcing the law, but enables the actions of those violating the law is clearly a problem. This is exactly what borders are.

In Vietnam we hand built an insurgent sanctuary by creating the state of North Vietnam; let alone allowing the use of Cambodia and Laos relatively free from attack.

Similarly the Durand line is a matter that must be effectively dealt with between the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West if there is to be any hope in working toward an enduring solution. It means nothing to the Pashtun people; it is a constant source of irritation to Afghanistan; and a critical national interest to sustain for Pakistan; and the primary sources of legal status sancuary for Taliban insurgents and AQ UW operators. This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

Schmedlap
12-27-2009, 04:25 AM
This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

While that is probably how it will need to be resolved, I don't think it will ever get to the table due to the efforts of those people. An issue this thorny will be kept under the rug unless a lot of large NGOs rally a lot of public concern in many countries and make a loud clamor for the self-determination of the ethnic groups in that area - not just the Pashtun, but the Baloch, too.

I often wonder if Pakistan exists for any reason other than the benefit of its ruling class. The instability in Kashmir, NWFP, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan seem to be justified only so that the Pakistani government will not fall, because they need to remain in control, because they have nukes. If they didn't have nukes, what would be the point? Propping up a government that requires a large region of instability to remain in power - what a way to run a planet.

jcustis
12-27-2009, 04:26 AM
Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction (http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_2.html)

This drifts a bit off topic for what my aim is, but this I found this Army professional Writing Collection article when running a Google string for "sanctuary denial".

MikeF
12-27-2009, 04:39 AM
Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.

Cavguy said:

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control.

True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.

One final point. I can't overstate the importance of good reconnaisance and surveillance prior to execution into denied areas. The confirm/deny of your initial hypothesis based off incoming information may drastically change what you thought you were getting into OR you may find decisive point that you could have missed (ex. location and massing of guerillas in a training camp).

slapout9
12-27-2009, 05:49 AM
JC, did you see this when I posted it awhile back?
Identifying Insurgent Infrastructure by Major James A. Harris
This guy was SF during the late 80's and he was so frustrated that know one ever showed him how to Identify the hidden insurgents that he turned to LE techniques so he could figure out how to do it. Good stuff in there I can testify to;) Link is below.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA225486&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Surferbeetle
12-27-2009, 07:03 AM
Slap, thanks for the link to the paper by Maj Horris, I am currently working my through it.

Jon, thanks for the link to the paper Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction...it's a thought provoking piece.

Firn, help us out and give us some examples of how to apply CvC to this exercise. As an applied science guy I certainly can use the assistance.

Bob's World; in the west our system of living (a system of systems) ensures that we have to pay attention to right-of-ways and other borders during construction projects or things can get very expensive very quickly. As you often state and are no doubt intimately familiar from both your barrister time and military time however many problems are not necessarily constrained to artificial boundaries delineated by right of ways and treaties. To me the term Sanctuary implies definitive borders and that those receiving Sanctuary have the mandate of heaven...thus the negative visceral reaction to it's use with respect to our enemy. As an up front stated assumption I also believe that it skews the follow-on analysis.

Schmedlap, would you agree that at the end of all conflicts some sort of mediation or negotiation occurs? If so, would we not want the most experienced negotiators representing our interests when this time comes? I would also posit that we need these negotiators to help shape the situation along the way towards resolution.

MikeF; I paraphrase..."don't forget METT-TC dumbass" ;) I was very lucky to have had an airborne/air assault/ranger Cpt out of Alaska as an instructor for those first key years...so, yea verily you are right.

Cavguy; security is very important and desired but believe it or not 'low level' local efforts persist even in high threat environments. I use the heuristic life threatening, life sustaining, and life enhancing for a rapid assessment/solution tool.

B.E.A.; thanks for the references.

------------------------------------------------------------------

So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic?

Sandtables are a integral piece of kinetic training. Recently me and mine were able to learn from a nearly 7 foot Marine who used small team training techniques supported by sandtables and applied video games...the event ranks among the top ten of my kinetic training experiences with my CTC rotations still in the lead.

For stateside non-kinetic training I have had mine tour water treatment plants, wastewater treatment plants, landfills, and city councils. I have also had the troops break up into teams lead by our civilian experts who serve in the reserves (irrespective of rank) and use google earth and the 'interweb' to put together open source assessments of state owned enterprises (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government-owned_corporation). Currently some of mine are studying a value chain analysis example .... quiz to follow ;)

So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

I am using my Christmas iPod touch to review short instruction blocks (free) on materials engineering...

jcustis
12-27-2009, 07:34 AM
Slap, that's a unique and valuable piece of work. As I got to page 43, it jarred me to the notion that I needed to modify the bulletized list...one of the most critical things is to force the intelligence side to produce a relevant and accurate situational template. Any information gaps that prevent that template from connecting the dots need to be published and incorporated into the ISR collection matrix, plain and simple.

I admit that with all this COIN jazz, it's easy to let things go a little amok and forget to employ basic tools of the MCPP/MDMP system.

Cavguy
12-27-2009, 07:37 AM
I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.


Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

One of the things that continues to baffle me in Iraq and Afghanistan is why we didn't start licensing/registering cars and issue difficult to forge IDs to the people. With today's computers and printers it is easier than ever before. We have BATS/HIDE down to unit level now anyway.

If the Romans could do a census c. 2000 years ago, we can do one now. Biometrics, etc.





True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.
.

Agree. Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

jcustis
12-27-2009, 08:19 AM
So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic.


So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

There is certainly very little training for the battalion task force-level training audience (at the Marine Corps' Exercise MOJAVE VIPER) in integrating OGAs into the mix. We figure it out as we go along, but for the most part it's self-study and experiential learning that allows the green side to function best amidst these supporting elements.

Just as we are pushing civil affairs down to the battalion level, and pushing intel cells down even further to the company, there needs to be a component for CMOC training, even if it were just one or two modules for select personnel. We don't have that resource at this moment though, and yet COMISAF's campaign plan would lead most to believe that cracking that nut is the most important task we must master.

MikeF
12-27-2009, 04:35 PM
Great links from JCustus and Slap. This thread is turning into a "power" thread of good ideas. Here's another consideration. Neil touched on it yesterday.

Surveys and Census.

1. Surveys. A well structured survey prior to infiltration or post-clearance can be a powerful tool to gather relevant information for the commander to add to MDMP, civil affairs considerations, and future psyops info ops. This is one tool that I think we've underappreciated in Iraq/A'stan. However, in a hostile area, should we trust the results? It seems like many locals that are distrustful of the HN gov't would not answer truthfully.

2. Census. This is a bread and butter task, and I have no idea why we've don't use it. Yes, some units have conducted mini-census in Iraq (ID cards and biometrics on the neighborhood/village level), but a nation-wide census would provide the building blocks for many tactical and operational decisions.

From Cavguy

Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

Agreed.

From Surferbeetle:

"don't forget METT-TC dumbass"

METT-TC means different things to different people. I was considering how my views changed over time (from cadet through major) b/c of experience, maturity, common sense, intuition, whatever. Nothing on this thread is new, but it drives your earlier question- how do we capture and institutionalize this stuff? And that's a million dollar question.

MikeF
12-27-2009, 04:46 PM
Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction (http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_2.html)

I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.


If the advantages of sanctuary and access to border transit are critical to the insurgency, then the sanctuary becomes a center of gravity to be attacked. Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty. Other vulnerabilities include the support they need from the local populace, their sources of supply, and their base defense systems. Insurgents must conduct a fine balancing act to protect all of these vulnerabilities, but their challenge to the host government's authority could be their biggest problem.

In a sense, insurgents hand us a gift when they establish sanctuaries and base camps. Most insurgencies are fought on "human terrain," offering few instances when the counterinsurgent can actually find, fix, and fight the enemy. But when the enemy seeks sanctuary, engagement becomes possible. Once we have located and defined the sanctuary area, we can focus our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets on it and then, in at least some instances, our combat power. We would be negligent if we didn't force insurgents to earn their pay when they congregated and surfaced. Of course, attacking them in their host-nation sanctuary will require synchronization of military and other government agencies' capabilities at the operational level and higher, to ensure that kinetic actions do not result in defeats in the international court of public opinion.

Bob's World
12-28-2009, 01:59 AM
I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.

But if your goal is counterinsurgency (defeating the reasons the government is being challenged and not just those individuals or organizations who currently dare to operationalize that challenge); then this is a pretty limited view IMO.

There is far more dangerous sanctuary to Great Britain among the disaffected Pakistanis heritage British Citizens living in Great Britain than than there is in either the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Thus the importance of understanding and addressing the sanctuary within poorly governed populaces over that of undergoverned spaces. As this author states, dirt can be surrounded, searched, and cleared of insurgents. But while that may be a critical supporting effort to a larger COIN operation, I would caution strongly against considering it decisive, or a COG to ones larger campaign.

The irony is, the harder one works to defeat the physical sancutaries in the lands of others; may very well be intensifying the sanctuaries among your disaffected popualces at home with ties to the issues and people of those regions. Win the battle, lose the war. When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.

Ken White
12-28-2009, 03:04 AM
When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

Bob's World
12-28-2009, 04:53 AM
in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

violence is pretty fundamental; and warfare is violence for the sake of politics. Warfare between to separate parties is a clash of separate politics for separate populaces, a resoloving of conflicting interests that could not be resolved by other means. CvC spoke to this, and most thought on warfare is on this dynamic.

insurgency is all about internal politic (discounting the external politics and interests that are often engaged by FID and UW forces that show up at various insurgencies around the world to wage pawn warfare at the expense of that troubled host). More like an election gone bad, when the votes don't count, when the supreme court can't resolve it, when the populace rejects what the government is dishing out. Still politically driven violence, but to very different terms. Is this more complex? Perhaps not, but it is definitely much harder to grasp as the inclination of politics is to blame the other guy and refuse responsibility for ones shortcomings; and effective COIN requires that hard look in the mirror first.

So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.

Ken White
12-28-2009, 05:48 AM
So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:

Surferbeetle
12-28-2009, 06:46 AM
Sun Tzu says it well when he states: ‘And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.’

It would then seem to follow that COIN operations, although chameleon like, are no freer from the presence of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity than are Conventional operations nor are the associated efforts of either type of warfare isolated from the people, the commander/army, and government.

Bob's World
12-28-2009, 06:47 AM
Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:


My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own.


At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

Infanteer
12-28-2009, 03:21 PM
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

marct
12-28-2009, 03:34 PM
Hi Bob,


My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

This problem (technically a "breech" in our assumed reality), turns around and really highlights the problems with a lot of our doctrine and operational stance. For example, the entire concept of "poor governance" or "corruption" assumes particular socio-cultural standards of both, and the ascribes causality for an "insurgency" to them. Why? Probably because that is what caused a number of them in our own past political history. That, my friend, is the real definition of ethnocentrism - the ascription of a cultural assumption as a universal law.

So what happens if we through out the assumption that 'states" exist as anything other than socio-cultural constructs? Well, for one thing, it forces us to be a lot clearer on what our campaign intentions are. It also highlights the ways in which campaign planning would have to change, and that specifically includes what political institutions should be imposed / changed.


When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

One of the "insurgencies" that we never seem to discuss is the Liberal Revolts of 1847. I think that it would really help clarify some of our thinking in this boundary zone (i.e. the interface zone between politics, warfare, insurgency, policing, etc.) to take a look at how they were handled in the Austrian case from 1847-50. Very little "fighting", and the entire "revolt" (and separation) of Hungary ended when their own minorities "rose up" against them.

Part of the reason why this is a useful case is that it is primarily "political" (i.e. non-kinetic conflict) and that it happened at a time of fairly rapid technological change, which makes it a useful analogic case. As an added bonus, it is one of the few really good European instances where a "state" and a "people" are not the same which, BTW, tends to be another one of those nice little ethnocentric assumptions about "states" that we have.

Anyway, I need more coffee :D.

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF
12-28-2009, 03:51 PM
Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

This question is the crux of the debate isn't it? In the formal model that BW suggest


insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

we're assuming a state versus a counter-state. This model can be an insurgency or a civil war. In reality, there are multiple actors vying for power and control on the micro or local level. When we interdict as an external actor, we become a third player into the two-person game. We have to define a role. In Bosnia, we played a role as an arbitrator splitting the competing factions. In Iraq, at times we became a competitor, fighting for control. It's a slippery slope, and it can get messy. On the batallion and below level, we often don't get to choose our roles or our friends. We simply execute operations in support of higher's stated goals.

Here's an interesting example- Kurdistan. To some in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, Kurdistan is a terrorist safehaven that possesses a potential existential threat. To the US, the Kurds are our allies.

That drives back to BW's early point on conducting COIN versus being a counter-insurgent. On the ground level, it's a moot point. I'd submit that's an operational issue. When you're given a mission to clear a denied area, you gotta figure out how best to do it.

Best

Mike

Bob's World
12-28-2009, 04:21 PM
My take is the that people who live within what is now called Afghanistan have an ancient and accepted system of local governance; a flegling and unproven attempt to apply centralized "state" governance; a Taliban led insurgent challenge to that central role; and a mix of competitors for regional influence in the midst of all.

At the local level I think the best you can hope to do is enforce the ancient local systems, and then work to help connect them effectively to the fledgling centralized systems to a degree and in a manner that is acceptable to that populace. There is nothing simple about that task; but I think the key is to see it as bringing the two together, vice imposing one upon the other. Some of those informal competitors, be they labled "warlord" or "taliban" etc may well be essential connectors in many areas.

Ken White
12-28-2009, 04:29 PM
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:
When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:
"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:
At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

Surferbeetle
12-28-2009, 05:56 PM
I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...


"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell


The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/26/AR2009122600761_pf.html) (H/T to Daniel Drezner (http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/28/markets_2_totalitarian_societies_0))


It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.

Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.

The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.

Bob's World
12-29-2009, 02:02 AM
Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)


Ken,

While I have tremendous respect for the SWJ community, and certainly there are many very keen insights posted here, I offer just this in response to your middle point of:

"the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception."

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

Bob.

jmm99
12-29-2009, 02:55 AM
Hi Bob,

You and I have had a low level (decibels) discourse on your "good governance" and "self-determination" concepts from the gitgo. Some agreement; some disagreement.

I think you need to clarify this statement:


from BW
No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support.

Now, my knowledge of the Malay "insurgency" in far southern Thailand is based only on what I've read from Kilcullen, from which I gleaned:

1. Viewed from an all-Thailand viewpoint, the Malays are a "small group with a distinct agenda" which is "taking on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

2. Viewed from the Malay enclave, the Malays are a large group in that enclave with the "distinct agenda" of "self-determination", where the Malay populace is largely dissatisfied with the "goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

So, are the Thailand Malays an "insurgency" ? From whose viewpoint do you measure "good governance" ?

I've made it clear that I regard "governance" as an integral factor in the Political Struggle. But, as Bill Moore has made clear in a number of posts, governance is only one factor in that political effort (which BTW is not the Politik that drives both the political and military efforts to a common end goal).

Regards

Mike

Schmedlap
12-29-2009, 03:02 AM
If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this...

I am closer to your position, kemosabe, than I am to the opposing view. But, I have two problems with the following excerpt.


Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

1. Popular support - how does one define this?

2. The notion of feeling a movement is "a better option than what they are getting from the current team" - is this to suggest that the populace thinks as one system or brain, rather than just a bunch of people reacting to short-term fears?

Ken White
12-29-2009, 03:04 AM
So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.or because others do not agree with you, it is a dangerous misperception because as you say:
No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure...It is simply inaccurate and misrepresents history and if one is a strategic planner and one plans on what one admits is an even slightly flawed assumption, then I suggest it becomes potentially dangerous and if one admits it's a misrepresentation -- or a hyperbolic statement if you prefer -- then I suggest my tag is valid.
If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.I'm sure that is an accurate statement, our thinking will evolve. Nothing wrong with being a Lone Ranger but one does need Silver Bullets for that role. :D

We all use hyperbole to make points. Nothing wrong with that. I do believe, however, it is critical to not believe ones own hyperbolity. ;)

Bob's World
12-29-2009, 06:51 AM
2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community. If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration.

WWII was conceived in Versailles, not some Munich beer hall; and GWOT was conceived in the US policy decisions not to roll back Cold War controls in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War as it did in Europe; and not in some cave in Afghanistan. Conception isn't evil, often it is just ignorance or negligence; but those arguments won't relieve one from a judgment of a duty to deal with the consequences in the world court any more than they will in family court. Far easier to blame it on the bastard child that emerges for being born, but that won't truly solve the problem as it ignores the roots of it all.


Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail. But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

My personal quest continues.

Firn
12-29-2009, 08:57 AM
Before moving back to the topic, I will just want to bring an example in CvC's timeframe to show just how difficult it is to divide the phenomenon war into clearly defined elements.

During the Napoleonic wars the Austrian crownland Tyrol was ceded by Austria to the French ally Bavaria. It has been the ambition of many a Bavarian ruler and the largest part of it's population spoke a similar German dialect, a large part an Italian dialect and a relative small one Raetoroman (Ladin). All shared the same catholic faith, and the rural population had a similar way of life.

However liberal reforms and Austrian victories brought up the whole country and to a differing degrees the different communities against the French and their puppets which were the legitimate rulers of the land. Due to the strong will of the population, political organisation, widly dispersed and famous skill in markmanship, good armament and the mountains the insurgents were able to inflict very severe defeats on the forces of the government and their French allies. The Austrian Empire aided their former crownland little, but used of course their will to fight to their advantage. After new defeats the Austrians would cede Tyrol again which would rise up and drive the new rulers out again after having found the right occasion. This would repeat itself 4 times in a single year, until the fourth times only part of the leaders and the militias would meet head on with the main body of the enemy, as many felt betrayed by Austria. (The last three times an open battle against the main force had worked just fine).

So how can we define this wars? COIN, counter-counter-revolutionary wars, (multi)nationalist uprising, (defensive) people's war, a (small) war to support the main effort ?

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The link provided by Slapout provides some very interesting insights. The need of organisations skilled in the techniques employed by law enforcement and the secret services to operate effectively against the (more political) moves of the enemy is obvious. While the military has, due to the situation on the ground to shoulder most of the weight it is difficult to swallow that perhaps far more suited and experienced members and organisations have seemingly not been used in sufficiently intensive and skilled manner.

With the combat outposts and the efforts of their personnel under constant enemy watch there is a glaring need to have also more covert elements working to create a huge and yet fine net to recruit, observe, identify, filter, control, target, and so on. There are many ways and possibilities to aid this efforts, many of them are most likely already already in field, some not, but so far the effort to counter the infiltration and subversion seems to have been not strong enough. This is especially true when it comes to the cooperation between the coalition and the Afghan government/leaders/organisations.


Firn

P.S: It certainly surprised me how strictly the insurgents in the mentioned case study devided the military and political organisations and tasks.

marct
12-29-2009, 03:15 PM
Hi Bob,


2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community.

Personally, I think this is playing definition games. I have no problem with that, but it's always a good idea to be up front about it since I have a feeling that definitions, and how they are constructed and used, are at the heart of much of the apparent "disagreements" with your model.

Broadly speaking, there are three major types of definitions:


"Crisp" definitions of the either / or type. Usually based in some form of nomonological-deductive model, they are "certain" or "yes/no" types. As a note, people tend to us this form most often even if they have no idea if it is the correct form for when and where they are using it. Take a look at the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for an example of this :wry:.
"Fuzzy" or probabilistic definitions. These are usually presented either as probabilities - e.g. "I'm pretty sure it's an insurgency; say 80% - or, much less likely but more accurately, "it has certain characteristics in common with accepted definitions of insurgency, but several that are either not there or only in minimal form".
Plausible definitions. These tend to be used when people are trying to figure out concepts, constructs and just what they should be looking for. So, for example, if you were to look at the case of various and sundry national liberation movements in Quebec during the past 50 years, why didn't an open insurgency develop? All of the hallmarks were there: a distinct culture, poor governance, a different language and religion (on the whole), popular support for separation, etc.

Normally, all of these definitions tend to be used together but towards different ends so, for example, when you are talking about the Thai insurgency


If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

What this indicates to me is that you are dealing with a whole slew of different concepts. Pulling them apart, you've got


a rough model relating to the likelihood of an insurgency happening that draws on size of the group and dispersion of the group at a purely geographic level.
you switch levels between a nation state and a local community, and
you ascribe motivation back to perceptions of poor governance.

Now, the issue of governance is, as I think we would all agree, tricky. My suspicion is that the motivation is only partly related to the quality of the governance and much more related to the perception of the legitimacy of the governance. Key point here is that you appear to be conflating "good", which is qualitative and probabilistic, with "legitimate" which tends to be more "crisp".


Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration. (emphasis added)

Now, that "never" is a crisp definition. Really? How about the American Revolution? What it comes down to again is definitions and you appear, to be using a tautology on "good" where if an insurgency happens then it must have been due to "not good" governance.


Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail.

If you are looking for an example, try Algeria which had a very low initial support for the insurgency there. If you want another example, check out the various Jacobin revolts; the motivation has to do more with legitimacy than with effectiveness of governance structures. I would also strongly urge you to look at cases where they have crappy governance, and yet don't have a continuing situation of insurgency. Basically, what I am getting at is that you need a really good definition of "governance" that is probabilistic rather than crisp.


But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

No worries, Bob :D. Some day, we need to get a bunch of us together in a convivial intellectual setting (aka a bar or brew pub), and really try to thrash out a decent "fuzzy" model of this - I'll buy the first round ;).

Cheers,

Marc

Surferbeetle
12-29-2009, 03:46 PM
There is certainly very little training for the battalion task force-level training audience (at the Marine Corps' Exercise MOJAVE VIPER) in integrating OGAs into the mix.

NTC is worth a visit, I enjoyed working with the USMC there. MOJAVE VIPER sounds interesting. :wry:


We figure it out as we go along, but for the most part it's self-study and experiential learning that allows the green side to function best amidst these supporting elements.

Our resident spammer ugh boots brought this one (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5952) to my attention the other day What Role for Germany in Iraq? (http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5208) by Dr. Christopher S. Chivvis (http://www.rand.org/about/people/c/chivvis_christopher_s.html). Not Afghanistan, however it is very interesting to look at Iraq through the SWP (http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/) prism, and more importantly I find Dr. Chivvis' analytical method itself to be worth study.


Just as we are pushing civil affairs down to the battalion level, and pushing intel cells down even further to the company, there needs to be a component for CMOC training, even if it were just one or two modules for select personnel. We don't have that resource at this moment though, and yet COMISAF's campaign plan would lead most to believe that cracking that nut is the most important task we must master.

Mobile training teams are something to consider using as an ad hoc fix. I have been part of/learned from them both in and out of theater and have generally had good experiences with them.

jcustis
12-30-2009, 09:56 AM
NTC is worth a visit, I enjoyed working with the USMC there. MOJAVE VIPER sounds interesting.

I've been part of two BLUFOR rotations there, the first in '96 and the second when my Bn was preparing to return in 2004. It was light years ahead of where the Corps was in terms of live simulation, but the margin has closed significantly since then.

davidbfpo
12-30-2009, 06:57 PM
I've just read through this thread and from an "armchair" faraway surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. As I recall in Malaya, not just in the protected villages, there was a very clear statement of principles / intent by the government and the resulting punishment for evasion (draconian by contemporary standards).

In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

Slap in particular has pointed at the lessons of gangs. We may not admit it, but most Western democracies have 'no go' areas or areas where neither the law nor state power are decisive - especially at night. Surveillance can help, for obvious reasons covert surveillance tends to be long range and the identification of individuals has a host of difficulties.

jcustis
12-30-2009, 07:27 PM
Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village. We can engage them in dialog all we want, but if we are did so during a short 2-4 hour visit, we used to be told all sorts of tales of woe, which usually had a self-serving purpose most of the time.

It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2009, 08:46 PM
Hi Bob,



I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.


Cheers,

Marc

Was thinking about just this a couple days ago.

I've often wondered if in reality the "state" as we so often perceive it isn't one of the biggest examples of -

A solution in search of a problem.

Not dissing the institution but rather trying to recognize that just like most things states come into existence as a coordinated effort to solve various delimmas. As such once those are addressed effectively it should be fluid enough to adjust to new and more pressing issues yet quite often is too rigid to do so effectively.

The why and whats of that are fodder for all you polisci guys to work on.

davidbfpo
12-30-2009, 10:02 PM
Jon,

In post No.57 I said:
(Taken from)..surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. ...In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

Jon Custis replied:
(Taken from) Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village... It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288


(In part)Yes, the Afghans are great fighters, but that does not mean they wish for a war all their life. We needed to fight against the Russian invasion and I still strongly believe we have done the right thing defending our country and nation against Communism; as I said earlier, things went wrong when these so-called Mujahideen or Freedom fighters leaders started fighting one another. I believe every Afghan wishes for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yes there are some who will continue fighting, but we all know they are small in numbers and are not significant. (My added emphasis)The reason many young men are part of the Taliban and other insurgents is the lack of employment , lack of better life conditions and of course lack of any positive attention from their government in Kabul. At this moment if you ask me, why are these young men are turning to Taliban and are fighting the US, NATO and the Afghan government? You will hear a simple answer from me and that is lack of employment opportunity for these youth who are mostly uneducated.

I believe the Afghan government and the US/NATO should provide training programmes to all those young Afghan men at around age of 16 and above who have lost the chance to go to school and get education. By learning skilled trades, I believe they will be in a position to earn a loaf of bread for themselves and their family and in this way we will prevent many young men from falling in the trap of believing being a suicide bomber means a life in the hereafter with the 72 virgins which will await them at the corridor of heaven.

I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2009, 11:00 PM
Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

Jon Custis replied:

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288



I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

Pretty certain this is something thats been brought to the forefront time and again. The interview hopefully helps reinforce why its important.

jcustis
12-31-2009, 03:42 AM
The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

Ron Humphrey
12-31-2009, 04:23 AM
The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

That sounds about right




Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

The easy answer is yes, The more difficult nuance is the fact that in order to lead one requires Capacity, capability, and an overall sense of requirement to do so. As they say Devils in the details

marct
12-31-2009, 04:25 PM
Hi Ron,


I've often wondered if in reality the "state" as we so often perceive it isn't one of the biggest examples of - A solution in search of a problem.

Years ago I read an SF book that made the off hand comment that institutions are problem creating constructs that allow people to have fun by trying to solve these problems. It's sort of an inverted logic but, I must admit, it really caught my attention.


Not dissing the institution but rather trying to recognize that just like most things states come into existence as a coordinated effort to solve various delimmas. As such once those are addressed effectively it should be fluid enough to adjust to new and more pressing issues yet quite often is too rigid to do so effectively.

The why and whats of that are fodder for all you polisci guys to work on.

Are states a solution looking for a problem? I suspect they are, and that is more "true" (in the probabilistic sense) within states that have a democratic form as politicians and other groups vie for selling problems to the populace. One really good article that I have used as a text in a number of classes is by Joel Best Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children Problem (http://people.stu.ca/%7Emccormic/3263/articles/Best_rhetoric1997.pdf), Social Problems, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 101-121.

Other state forms seem to be much more "stable" - certain types of theocratic governance structures for example (e.g. the Temple States in Sumeria). The trick, however, seems to be in distinguishing what institutions actually make up a "state", and then focusing on them. Just as a quick example, there is a key, institutional difference between a constitutional monarchy / parliamentary democracy and a republican form in the institutional relationship between the head of state and the head of government. In many republics, the two are melded to a fairly large degree, which in parliamentary democracies they are quite separate (that allows for concepts like a "Loyal Opposition", as well as the reality of being able to dis your hed of government without dissing your head of state).

Not being a polisci type (hey, I got kicked out of intro to polisci for beating my prof in an election :eek:!), I tend to look at it more along organizational and institutional lines, coupled with the "lived experience" factor.

Surferbeetle
12-31-2009, 05:39 PM
Rory Stewart in London Review of Books, with a piece entitled The Irresistible Illusion (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion)


The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate.


What is this thing ‘governance’, which Afghans (or we) need to build, and which can also be transparent, stable, regulated, competent, representative, coercive? A fact of nationhood, a moral good, a cure for corruption, a process? At times, ‘state’ and ‘government’ and ‘governance’ seem to be different words for the same thing. Sometimes ‘governance’ seems to be part of a duo, ‘governance and the rule of law’; sometimes part of a triad, ‘security, economic development and governance’, to be addressed through a comprehensive approach to ‘the 3 ds’, ‘defence, development and diplomacy’ – which implies ‘governance’ is something to do with a foreign service.

Moderators note: this article was published in July 2009; still a good read.

Ron Humphrey
12-31-2009, 10:02 PM
Thanks for the links gonna be getting through both as soon as I ring the new year in .

MikeF
01-01-2010, 03:05 AM
"We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay."

Well stated, but the message must include.

Let's work for peace. Let us not work against each other. Let's cooperate for our children's sake not our own personal interest. If you choose the latter, if you attack us, then we will push every asset to destroy you. Please choose peace. The moment is ours to decide. Let us pray together.

Surferbeetle
01-02-2010, 06:48 PM
Our nation has and continues to benefit from an steadfastly apolitical military skilled at the various ways of warfare.

Although we must at certain times and places, outside of our nations borders, walk, wade, or swim in the waters/solvent of politics with all of their unseen currents and various questionable additives it is not wise to drink of the same, nor foolishly conflate our role with that of politicians, native or otherwise.

In the spirit of gaining some understanding about the waters currently roaring through the floodplain and applicable/non-applicable TTP's....

The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq (http://www.amazon.com/Prince-Marshes-Other-Occupational-Hazards/dp/0151012350) by Rory Stewart


In August of 2003, Rory Stewart (known to the Arabs of southern Iraq as Seyyd Rory) "took a taxi from Jordan to Baghdad to ask for a job from the Director of Operations". This was four months after the Coalition invasion. Shortly thereafter Stewart wound up as deputy governate coordinator of Maysan. He became, at age 30, the de-facto governor of a province of 850,000 in southern Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the war. This is his story


"I had never believed that mankind, unless overawed by a strong government, would fall inevitably into violent chaos. Societies were orderly, I thought, because human cultures were orderly. Written laws and policy played only a minor role. But Maysan [province] made me reconsider."

jcustis
01-04-2010, 03:57 AM
Bumping this with an edit to the main list in post #18. I was reading a Kimberly Kagan piece in Foreign Policy and began to think about the insurgent's use of shape-clear-hold-build (or some other similar flow) as a continuum to organize his efforts.

We probably need to understand where he is in the process, as there are certain nuances to our approach based on that.

Surferbeetle
01-05-2010, 08:34 PM
CNAS, 4 Jan 09: Fixing Intel (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf): A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan by Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, Paul D. Batchelor, DIA and discussed in greater detail here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9412) at SWJ.


The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population.There are more than enough analysts in Afghanistan. Too many are simply in the wrong places and assigned to the wrong jobs. It is time to prioritize U.S. intelligence efforts and bring them in line with the war’s objectives.

From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450461&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve


This section presents the primary research question of this monograph as determining the potential value of using Geospatial Information Systems to assist the Government of Colombia’s counterinsurgency efforts and thus provide a framework for determining the value of using GIS as a tool in other counterinsurgency settings. After a discussion of the doctrinal and conceptual background that informs the project, it discusses the methodology, limits, and delimitations of the project. The following chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding counterinsurgency and the critical role terrain plays in it.

Google Earth KML programming link (http://code.google.com/apis/kml/documentation/kml_tut.html)


KML is a file format used to display geographic data in an Earth browser such as Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Maps for mobile.

Infanteer
01-06-2010, 08:25 AM
shape-clear-hold-build

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

Ron Humphrey
01-06-2010, 09:29 PM
Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

Its usually a pretty good practice to think through and understand what you expect to do and how you expect to do it before actually doing it.

Situation dependent of course.

Also helps to remember that to assume it's implied in clear holds the very high likelihood that the particular operation is approached more in a what do I want to make happen as opposed to what needs to happen to facilitate"X" and what might help to influence it that direction.

Steve the Planner
01-06-2010, 10:05 PM
Beetle:

Major Madera does a great job in providing an overview of CIMS -Civilian Information Managament Systems as:

demographics, economics, social constructs, political processes, political leaders, civil-military relationships, infrastructure notes, non-state actors in the area of operations, civil defense, public safety and public health capabilities, the environment.31 In short, CIMS capture the sort of information that paints a clear picture of the ecology of insurgency.

If he were updating this 2006 paper, I would suggest that he add: cadestral/property ownership (What MG Flynn calls out), and the basic topo, soil type and hydro data sets for cursory reconstruction/manuever stuff.

In Iraq, we used roads and bridges (with identification of the agency responsible for the component-state, provincial, local), ag components (the whole value chain for each applicable sector), reconstruction assets (asphalt & cement plants), major industrial/economic components, and important government activities (schools, clinics)/repair facilities.

Other special purpose maps "might" have included appointed/elected official's homes (for a variety of reasons).

Key thing in Iraq and Afghanistan, where UN demographics were used, was to set up shape files for each census boundary, even if political boundaries may have changed since. Important to, is to integrate real time, refugee, and pop displacements best estimates whenever you can suck them in.

As much as you can get whenever you can get it.

I'll cross post this on the Fixin's thread.

Steve

Citation from SurferBeetle:

"From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve"

Surferbeetle
01-10-2010, 03:30 AM
From the USAID Business Growth Initiative (https://www.businessgrowthinitiative.org/Pages/default.aspx) website


USAID’s Office of Economic Growth of the Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT/EG) has established the Business Growth Initiative (BGI) project to promote best practices in enterprise development as a critical element for Economic Growth. BGI will serve as a key element in building a Community of Practice for Enterprise Development, both within USAID and its development partners and among the broader development community worldwide.

Enterprises are the engine of economic growth. Enterprise development entails setting the framework to assist business ventures of all sizes to grow and employ more people. Firms do that by improving levels of production, accessing new markets, meeting international technical standards, improving marketing operations, obtaining greater returns on investments, and increasing revenues and profits. The nurturing of entrepreneurship through business education, business services of all types, business association development, policy advocacy, finance and market information is part of that process.

USAID Case Study:

CASE STUDIES IN ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS BOSNIA – PHILLIPINES – AFGHANISTAN TECHNICAL BRIEF NO.4 (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM288.pdf)


This brief presents three examples of enterprise development in post-conflict environments: Bosnia, Philippines, and Afghanistan. Through these cases, the brief highlights critical factors that an enterprise needs to succeed in a post-conflict environment. While each post-conflict environment is unique, this brief also draws out commonalities across the three cases and suggests good first principles for donors and enterprise development practitioners when offering support to enterprises in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, a central theme across all three cases is the importance of risk mitigation for businesses in a post-conflict environment. This brief highlights strategies that businesses and enterprise development practitioners have used to successfully manage risk in post-conflict settings.

USAID Handbook

Agricultural Recovery for Resilience -- A Preliminary Framework (https://www.businessgrowthinitiative.org/KeyPracticeAreas/Documents/Agricultural%20Recovery%20for%20Resilience-A%20Preliminary%20Framework.pdf)


Section four contains sample agriculture recovery assessment questions to asses the seven identified framework areas. These assessment questions support personnel of USAID Missions and the USAID/EGAT/AG office when assessing and designing agriculture recovery programs in post-crisis situations such as post-conflict, natural disasters, pandemics and governance failure. Furthermore, the questions are designed to be asked during Phase 2 of the recovery cycle, in other words during the transitional phase of reconstruction, rehabilitation and institution-building. The questions focus on the agriculture sector even though it is recognized that other activities such as macroeconomic policy and pro-poor initiatives should be implemented along with sub sector initiatives.

From the GTZ (http://www.gtz.de/en/): Sustainable Economic Development in Conflict-Affected Environments: A Guidebook (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/VVOS-7V2QD6/$file/GTZ_Jun2009.pdf?openelement)


The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has thus commissioned the GTZ sector projects ‘Innovative Approaches for Private Sector Development’ and ‘Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation’ to explore the links between conflict, peace and economic development conceptually, and practically through conflict-sensitive SED interventions in various partner countries.

This comprehensive Guidebook on Sustainable Economic Development in Conflict affected Environments synthesises that work and contributes to the current international efforts, in particular of the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED), to improve economic development approaches in these difficult conditions. It explains the challenges of working in a conflictive environment and guides development practitioners towards successful project planning, implementation and monitoring.

ADT Handbook (http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/12/121009-ADT.aspx)


The Center for Army Lessons Learned has just released CALL publication 10-10, Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT) in Afghanistan Handbook.
This handbook is a product of the National Guard Agribusiness Development Team coordination office with input from current and previously deployed ADTs.
Agriculture accounts for 45 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is the main source of income for the Afghan economy. Over 80 percent of the Afghan population is involved in farming, herding, or both.

jcustis
01-10-2010, 08:31 AM
Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

Good question. I can easily envision the clear, hold, and build components. "Shape" gets to be a bit more dicey, and can of course lead to a wide range of interpretation.

Infanteer
01-11-2010, 07:00 AM
To me, I picture Clear, Hold, and Build as phases - just like Mao's three phases. A counterinsurgent can (and will) be in different phases in different places at one time and should expect different areas to move along this scale in either direction, just like Mao did. The three are not a checklist of what needs to be done, but rather signify what sort of tactical activity will be most important in your AO.

Adding extra stuff like "Shape" is just making a simple construct complex so a staff officer can fit more powerpoint slides into his presentation. If left unchecked, I could see "R"(emove all IEDs) and "M"(eet with local powerbrokers) being thrown into the mix....

My opinion of course - take it for what it's worth....
Infanteer

Bob's World
01-11-2010, 07:53 AM
Western Doctrine has become a bit "phase-obsessed" of late. What can be a helpful organizational construct in general, can in fact, become a mental straitjacket as well.

Often it is far more helpful to think of your operations in terms of what phase YOUR OPPONENT is in, in a given area, with a given populace, perhaps even time of day. Particularly this is true for COIN, which, by definition is a counter to another's operations.

Instead of thinking in terms of I need to get from Shape to Clear to Hold to Build (becuase you can do all of those things in theory and not affect what phase the insurgent is in a single, significant bit); it is to my way of thinking far more instructive to have your intel guys (hey, after all they love to brag how intel drive ops...) produce a product for you that shows you what phase the insurgent is in across your battlespace.

In this village or district they may be in phase I during the day, but surging to phase II at night. In this city they may be in high phase 0. In a district along historic ratlines in the mountains they may well be in Phase II 24-7. The goal never being to get your own operation to "Build," but rather to reduce the insurgent operations among critical populaces first, but expanding to everywhere, to Phase 0. This does not mean an end to insurgent activity, merely that you have reduced violence to below the socially acceptable level for that particular culture and populace, and have brought the populace within the ability of the civil governance to serve without military assistance.

Perhaps that is too disorderly for a SAMS trained planner to work with; but insurgency by its nature is disorganized and such an approach not only lends flexibility to ones operations, but it also has a built in exit strategy. You can even build a color coded overlay for your map that shows Green (ph 0), Amber (ph1), Red (Ph 2) and Black (Ph 3) regions. This allows you to explain to politicians, the media, and the populace back home, that you are not here to FIX (build?) the country, but merely to bring the situation within the realm of civil capacity.

Infanteer
01-11-2010, 02:19 PM
Western Doctrine has become a bit "phase-obsessed" of late. What can be a helpful organizational construct in general, can in fact, become a mental straitjacket as well.

Often it is far more helpful to think of your operations in terms of what phase YOUR OPPONENT is in, in a given area, with a given populace, perhaps even time of day. Particularly this is true for COIN, which, by definition is a counter to another's operations.

Good points,

To me Clear, Hold, Build should, as mentioned above, be reflective of what the enemy is doing; if I have a large concentration of insurgents who have executed local government officials and are taking over a village, then I have clearly moved into a different situation, regardless if I was making progress the day before; and getting back on track may not even require a period of "Hold" if insurgent influence was minimal. This should simply serve as a construct for how to orient your focus ("Ok, I'll have to put the well project on hold and start shooting out some ambush patrols...."). To avoid the straight-jacket approach, these phases should be seen, as pointed out, as very fluid. It is not simply a matter of A-B-C-D-E and boom, you have victory, but rather how you intend on countering the insurgent at that particular point in time and space....

As much as "what the enemy is doing" should impact what you are doing, I think the key is "how are enemy actions impacting the locals" and that will ultimately define what "phase" you are in. Is greasing the local IED team really going to be the sign that you're defeating the insurgency? I've seen many assessments that say "Yes! We got 'em!" only to be disappointed when the next cool-named dude brings a few of his cousins up and starts the same cycle over again in a week or so.

Now, I may be lambasted as a "COIN-ista" pop-centric, unoriginal fad-chaser just regurgitating FM 3-24, but Colonel Jones has a point. If insurgents are laying bombs on my roads and I was continually shooting them, I could say I was stuck in the early stages of a counterinsurgency effort until the cows came home; the enemy will most likely do this until you leave and his movement has (hopefully) regressed into a criminal enterprise. If the locals are not throwing rocks at you and actively supplying you with information then you are probably making progress. Enemy activity against you can be quite consistent for long periods of time, but when a local leader friendly to government forces disappears, it should be a telling indicator of the potential for problems down the road.

Anyways, I'm off to read about Lawrence of Arabia....;)

Infanteer

jcustis
01-11-2010, 02:36 PM
Instead of thinking in terms of I need to get from Shape to Clear to Hold to Build (becuase you can do all of those things in theory and not affect what phase the insurgent is in a single, significant bit); it is to my way of thinking far more instructive to have your intel guys (hey, after all they love to brag how intel drive ops...) produce a product for you that shows you what phase the insurgent is in across your battlespace.

Excellent points BW, and something I have been trying to get at with this thread all along.


You can even build a color coded overlay for your map that shows Green (ph 0), Amber (ph1), Red (Ph 2) and Black (Ph 3) regions. This allows you to explain to politicians, the media, and the populace back home, that you are not here to FIX (build?) the country, but merely to bring the situation within the realm of civil capacity.

Another excellent point. Fiddling in/around the BUILD phase, and wringing our hands over what part the host nation is playing, seems to be kicking our ass at the moment. Heck, it's been kicking our ass the entire time, with the analyses I've seen of our disjointed development efforts.

Surferbeetle
01-11-2010, 06:07 PM
Many different knowledge models have been applied to the marketplace of ideas and motivations over the ages. Knowledge models can be characterized as communities who employ characteristic methodologies used to gain advantages for their respective stakeholders. The SWJ/SWC and USG knowledge models make for an interesting comparison.

SWJ/SWC could be described as a digital community frequented by stakeholders in the nuts and bolts of America’s day-to-day efforts to make the world a better place. The demographics include experts and students of the myriad facets of security, economics, and governance from various lands. Pacing daily changes, ‘best of breed’ ideas, concepts, and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) are examined and debated in a non-hierarchal, open, Socratean manner. The community is an example of the results of democratization and globalization of information and knowledge, in that transactional costs associated with gathering and analyzing information are very low and flash mobs of stakeholders can form, as time and resources permit, for 24-hour analysis of interesting/vexing problems. The quality of output from the SWJ/SWC knowledge model varies (trending towards stochastic) as a factor of the educational, experiential, and motivational levels of the participants.

The USG could be described as a physical and digital community comprised, primarily, of paid stakeholders in the nuts and bolts of America’s day-to-day efforts to make the world a better place. It uses a more common, closed model of vertical and hierarchical integration (with high transaction costs) in which information gathering and analysis is, more often than not, primarily limited to in house personnel specialized in the myriad facets of security, economics, and governance (among many other topics). Standardized training, and educational experiences are part of an attempt to provide a regulated and dependable (trending towards deterministic) output from stakeholders.

It is my thesis that the SWJ/SWC model offers the added potential for involving local stakeholders in a way, perhaps, that the USG does not currently attempt. It would be interesting to see if stakeholders who live in the area of interest agree with the proposed framework outlined by jcustis in post #18 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89885&postcount=18) of this thread.

It would also be interesting to see what the two communities could do to develop solutions, and how solutions would differ with the information available to each for an agreed upon area of interest.

jcustis
03-25-2010, 05:18 AM
This thread has been the most important one for me since joining the SWC, from a practical aspect. I am about to put my moderator and contributor effort on hiatus due to my immediate OEF deploy, but I'll try to circle back around to this thread and provide feedback if this analytical framework actually bears any fruit. Stay frosty guys...

slapout9
03-25-2010, 06:02 PM
This thread has been the most important one for me since joining the SWC, from a practical aspect. I am about to put my moderator and contributor effort on hiatus due to my immediate OEF deploy, but I'll try to circle back around to this thread and provide feedback if this analytical framework actually bears any fruit. Stay frosty guys...

Good luck and stay safe, Slap

MikeF
03-27-2010, 05:47 PM
First, JCustis- good luck downrange brother. As time allows from the day-to-day business of doing the good work, let us know what your thinking in terms of theory and practice.

Second, I meant to address this question a while ago. If I'm successfull, hopefully, I'll encompass it in my next series of essays, but for now, here's an attempt in this thread.


Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?

No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.

Ultimately, we're just trying to figure out what we know and what we don't know. Throughout this phase, which remains simultaneous in later efforts, we seek to answer:

What do we think we know? What is actually going on? Who is fighting whom? Who is the enemy? What does the enemy think they know? What does the enemy want? What do the people need? What is the enemy's weakness? What are we missing here?

One way of approaching these answers to define facts and assumptions for MDMP is the following:

SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.

v/r

Mike

Infanteer
04-30-2010, 07:11 PM
No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.

Maybe I'm just guilty of applying Occam's Razor too severely, but that just seems to fit into the "Clear" for me - you gotta know what you're clearing out first. I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".

I'm more of a KISS principle guy and all of this detracts from the simplicity of removing an overt insurgent presence from an area, protecting it against a relapse, and then building local capacity to deal with future threats and subversion. Clear, Hold and Build represents that to me; someone said on these forums that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory(TM).

Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight - something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. The enemy is going to change, especially after you move forces into an area, attack his network, and start attacking his legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.

...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.

MikeF
05-01-2010, 12:28 PM
Maybe I'm just guilty of applying Occam's Razor too severely, but that just seems to fit into the "Clear" for me - you gotta know what you're clearing out first. I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".

I'm more of a KISS principle guy and all of this detracts from the simplicity of removing an overt insurgent presence from an area, protecting it against a relapse, and then building local capacity to deal with future threats and subversion. Clear, Hold and Build represents that to me; someone said on these forums that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory(TM).

Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight - something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. The enemy is going to change, especially after you move forces into an area, attack his network, and start attacking his legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.

...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.

Infanteer,

I believe it was Bob's World that made the comment


"that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory."

I distinctly remember that post and it stuck with me for a bit. I agree or at least can relate to much of what your saying so I don't think our views are too off. I'll attempt to readdress some of your points for clarity.


I'm more of a KISS principle guy. Totally agree for an operations order. I've never giving an order that could not be dictacted through radio transmissions. In fact, probably 70% of all orders that I've ever given were on the radio. Clear and concise; however, IMO, design and the orders process is different. When we are intellectually lazy, then we come up with stupid soundbites like "speed kills" that minimize the greater challenges that we will face. During the problem solving phase, the questions are broad and complex, and we must tackle difficult courses of action IOT come up with a simple plan.


I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear". I honestly don't care for cool slides that look good. I've been working with presentations that provide "Aha" moments to junior leaders. Things that work.


Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight. If that works for you, then great. From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance. These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume :D. I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.


something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. Agreed as I said in my previous post, "which remains simultaneous in later efforts." You're always doing recon and surveillance IOT to guage the enemy and populace reactions to your actions.

I hope this clarifies my position to some degree.

v/r

Mike

Ken White
05-01-2010, 01:49 PM
I honestly don't care for cool slides that look good.I totally agree but many -- perhaps too many -- seem to do so...:mad:
From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance.Change that to:

'The US Army rarely takes time to do sensible and adequate reconnaissance.'

and I'd agree...
These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume :D.True dat. :eek:
I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

Simply put one should understand as much about a problem as is possible before one attempts to solve it. The Clausewitzian quote appropriate is "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking." That's macro. One could use the US invasion of Iraq as a prime if large example.

On a micro , tactical and operational, level, our impatience and unwillingness to do thorough reconnaissance does untold damage constantly. That is, regrettably, the US Army way.

MikeF
05-01-2010, 01:58 PM
Here's an example of how things could be a bit different if we better understood the environment (H/T Gulliver and the Inkspots crew).

In a WSJ letter to the editor, Major Tim Connors explains (http://online.wsj.com/public/page/letters.html) what he learned in Korengal.


I was a member of the first U.S. patrol to enter the Korengal Valley in 2002, so I read Bing West's explanation for our retreat from there with some interest ("The Meaning of the Korengal Retreat," op-ed, April 23). Mr. West concludes that our efforts were thwarted by "Islamic extremism and tribal xenophobia."

The Korengalis I knew were not predisposed to join an extremist fight against Western outsiders. Nor were they naturally inclined to be our friends. Our aggressive tactics, focused exclusively on rooting out Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, drove them into the enemy's camp. A patient approach of relationship-building, relatively minor infrastructure improvements and a firm commitment not to interfere with the wood trade on which the Korengalis rely for their livelihood might have won a steadfast ally. In the long run, the Taliban and al Qaeda, outsiders themselves, have nothing to offer Korengalis but extremism and xenophobia. Perhaps after ending our permanent presence there, we will be better positioned to win that argument.

The only way to determine the proper approach (direct or indirect) prior to intervention is through the art of reconnaissance and surveillance.

On an unrelated note, Maj Connors bio is here (http://law.nd.edu/features/alumni-spotlights/alumni-spotlight-timothy-connors-mba97-jd00/), and he has written (http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr_04.pdf) and advised police forces on counterterrorism along the same lines as LAPD's John P. Sullivan and SWJ's own Slapout. He's I guy that I look forward to reading more about.

MikeF
05-01-2010, 02:14 PM
I totally agree but many -- perhaps too many -- seem to do so...:mad:Change that to:

'The US Army rarely takes time to do sensible and adequate reconnaissance.'

and I'd agree...True dat. :eek:Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

Simply put one should understand as much about a problem as is possible before one attempts to solve it. The Clausewitzian quote appropriate is "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking." That's macro. One could use the US invasion of Iraq as a prime if large example.

On a micro , tactical and operational, level, our impatience and unwillingness to do thorough reconnaissance does untold damage constantly. That is, regrettably, the US Army way.

As usual, good points Ken. I guess that's what we're all trying to figure out- how do we describe "describe?" :D

Ken White
05-01-2010, 04:34 PM
I guess that's what we're all trying to figure out- how do we describe "describe?" :DBest way I've found is rapidly, accurately and totally unemotionally.

I just haven't figured out how to get all the non-sociopaths to that capability . Yet. ;)

jcustis
05-01-2010, 05:19 PM
...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.

I have already come to learn the validity of this point infanteer makes. Especially in my AO, the nexus of drug trafficking and insurgent activity is so closely knit that the success or failure of the poppy crop (an the fighter salaries involved) can have an effect on whether you are fighting the same knucklehead the next day.

I would already adjust the model to break the question down to a more individual level, and ask what the individuals on the insurgent side are fighting for, and attempt to define the nature of the problem by analyzing the ideological, financial, and cultural (like any issues of badal) aspects at the individual fighter level. Attacking the problem at the micro level can have some value as the effect accumulates.

Infanteer
05-01-2010, 06:34 PM
I hope this clarifies my position to some degree.

Roger,

I guess my viewpoint is a bit of a reactionary stance against concepts which seemed to be added to thought models that don't really add much to the model itself but seem to be tacked on because they brief well. Not saying that was your intent and I agree with your points.

I just begin to wonder if concepts lose clarity when more things get stacked onto them like define, shape, enable, etc, etc.

To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire.

My 2 cents.

MikeF
05-03-2010, 11:40 AM
I guess my viewpoint is a bit of a reactionary stance against concepts which seemed to be added to thought models that don't really add much to the model itself but seem to be tacked on because they brief well. Not saying that was your intent and I agree with your points.

I understand your frustration. It seems like once words or concepts get routinized into a bureaucracy, then they become "talking points" that are overused or take away from the original meaning. For example, Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point. Gladwell's study was actually very technical in the phenomena of epidemics, and he chose to describe it in prose. Now, the term is used to describe anything.

Moving on, JCustis gives us an interesting example that we can further analysis to find some understanding of what shape and recon are...


I would already adjust the model to break the question down to a more individual level, and ask what the individuals on the insurgent side are fighting for, and attempt to define the nature of the problem by analyzing the ideological, financial, and cultural (like any issues of badal) aspects at the individual fighter level. Attacking the problem at the micro level can have some value as the effect accumulates.

This is what I described to my scouts as recon in the human terrain. This transition was fairly simple for my guys when properly translated. I would suggest that this is the first step just to get out and talk to the people. Develop a dual personal and professional relationship, the former hopefully assisting with the latter. However, now one has a host of other considerations that they must learn discretion and discernment when determining whom to trust. Particularly in a denied area, trust and truth are often elusive.

-What is this individual's motive or incentive to tell me the truth?
-What does he want from this engagement?
-Why is he willing to talk to me?

When striking up conversation, we must remember or find out what the perception of the locals is of us and their relationships with each other. In my experience, a lot of the "intel" we received was merely rumor or disinformation designed to force our intervention on a competing family, tribe, or town. I'm not sure if this is something that can be taught or if it's just one of those things that you learn through practice and trial and error.


To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire

This is a very good point. I think that "clear" is merely a means to getting a foothold in the village. The real work and heavy lifting comes during the "hold" phase, but we have to have some mechanism to determine how or if we should go in at all.

As Ken White said,


Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.

That's why I think we need a definitive phase prior to clear. Through covert tactical reconnaissance (going in at night and observing) or discreet messengers and negotiations, we may find a better way to have access to the village other than driving there and establishing a patrol base. Shape may not be the precise term. Maybe it's simply investigate.

jcustis
05-04-2010, 06:17 PM
Ted pushed a find over in the Marjah thread that bears cross-referencing. I'm only half-way through, but page 7 starts an interesting discussion of why young Afghan men are taking up arms. More at the link:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97835&postcount=78

Surferbeetle
05-04-2010, 07:46 PM
Richard Florida on the topic of economic geography (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_geography) in the March 2009 Atlantic: How the Crash Will Reshape America (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-will-reshape-america/7293/1/)


The University of Chicago economist and Nobel laureate Robert Lucas declared that the spillovers in knowledge that result from talent-clustering are the main cause of economic growth. Well-educated professionals and creative workers who live together in dense ecosystems, interacting directly, generate ideas and turn them into products and services faster than talented people in other places can. There is no evidence that globalization or the Internet has changed that. Indeed, as globalization has increased the financial return on innovation by widening the consumer market, the pull of innovative places, already dense with highly talented workers, has only grown stronger, creating a snowball effect. Talent-rich ecosystems are not easy to replicate, and to realize their full economic value, talented and ambitious people increasingly need to live within them.

Big, talent-attracting places benefit from accelerated rates of “urban metabolism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_metabolism),” according to a pioneering theory of urban evolution developed by a multidisciplinary team of researchers affiliated with the SantaFe Institute. The rate at which living things convert food into energy—their metabolic rate—tends to slow as organisms increase in size. But when the Santa Fe team examined trends in innovation, patent activity, wages, and GDP, they found that successful cities, unlike biological organisms, actually get faster as they grow. In order to grow bigger and overcome diseconomies of scale like congestion and rising housing and business costs, cities must become more efficient, innovative, and productive. The researchers dubbed the extraordinarily rapid metabolic rate that successful cities are able to achieve “super-linear” scaling. “By almost any measure,” they wrote, “the larger a city’s population, the greater the innovation and wealth creation per person.” Places like New York with finance and media, Los Angeles with film and music, and Silicon Valley with hightech are all examples of high-metabolism places.



Every phase or epoch of capitalism has its own distinct geography, or what economic geographers call the “spatial fix” for the era. The physical character of the economy—the way land is used, the location of homes and businesses, the physical infrastructure that ties everything together—shapes consumption, production, and innovation. As the economy grows and evolves, so too must the landscape.

Walther Christaller's central place theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_place_theory)


Central place theory is a geographical theory that seeks to explain the number, size and location of human settlements in an urban system.[1] The theory was created by the German geographer Walter Christaller, who asserted that settlements simply functioned as 'central places' providing services to surrounding areas.[1]

Demographic gravitation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_gravitation)


Demographic gravitation is a concept of "social physics"[1], introduced by Princeton University astrophysicist John Quincy Stewart[2] in 1947[3]. It is an attempt to use equations and notions of classical physics - such as gravity - to seek simplified insights and even laws of demographic behaviour for large numbers of human beings. A basic conception within it is that large numbers of people, in a city for example, actually behave as an attractive force for other people to migrate there, hence the notion of demographic gravitation. It has been related[4][5] to W. J. Reilly's law of retail gravitation[6][7], George Kingsley Zipf's Demographic Energy[8], and to the theory of Trip distribution through gravity models [5].

Material Flow Analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_flow_analysis)


Material flow analysis (MFA) (or substance flow analysis; SFA) is a method of analyzing the flows of a material in a well-defined system. MFA is an important tool of industrial ecology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_ecology), and is used to produce better understanding of the flow of materials through an industry and connected ecosystems, to calculate indicators, and to develop strategies for improving the material flow systems.

MikeF
05-05-2010, 12:44 AM
Ted pushed a find over in the Marjah thread that bears cross-referencing. I'm only half-way through, but page 7 starts an interesting discussion of why young Afghan men are taking up arms. More at the link:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97835&postcount=78

The International Counsil on Security and Development commisioned that report. Their website is here. (http://www.icosgroup.net/) From what I can tell, they interviewed enough people to be statistically relevant, and the questions were good. It'll be interesting to see if the Marine Corps responds.


To strengthen humanitarian aid capacity, a series of fully resourced aid initiatives should be rolled out, starting with fully-equipped field hospitals and ambulance system. These measures should also include “camps in a box” to provide shelter, food, water and active engagement with displaced people to help them move to the camps or, when possible, to return to their homes. A surge of food aid capacity is needed. Aid agencies should be integrated into military planning processes, provided with the resources and capacity necessary to deal with the needs at hand, and if necessary, NATO forces should be integrated into relief and aid activities.

Good idea for "camps in a box," but I wonder how many displaced persons would relocate to them in the short-term? Lots to consider.

v/r

Mike

Steve the Planner
05-05-2010, 01:13 AM
Mike:

I think the idea is that if and when operations push large volumes of refugees, you find out where the refugees are and deliver the "camps in a box" to where they end up.

Beetle:

Good recap. I ran into John Adams last April. We were discussing the disconnects between US mil/foreign reconstruction efforts and basic economic geography. Would make a big difference is things connected better.

Reality, as Paul Krugman became famous in the econ world for noting, is that geographic differences create their own limitations/ opportunities that define outcomes in particular places and in different way (duh!)

Funny how the more technically sophisticated we become as a society, the less our bureaucracies seem to remember the basics.

Steve

Surferbeetle
05-05-2010, 05:57 AM
Beetle:

Good recap. I ran into John Adams last April. We were discussing the disconnects between US mil/foreign reconstruction efforts and basic economic geography. Would make a big difference is things connected better.

Reality, as Paul Krugman became famous in the econ world for noting, is that geographic differences create their own limitations/ opportunities that define outcomes in particular places and in different way (duh!)

Funny how the more technically sophisticated we become as a society, the less our bureaucracies seem to remember the basics.

Steve,

If you are up for it, I would appreciate any links to case studies and/or additional economic geography concepts which would be of assistance in examining business clustering (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_cluster).

The Army has some 'in-a-box' micro concepts which are useful and valuable however the deeper analysis which helps to predict sustainability needs additional work. Finding military case studies or doctrine for how to examine existing local economic systems or identifying/quantifying/modeling key nodes and linkages in order to start/restart such systems is not a high payoff activity. FM 3-07, FM 3-24, and the CA FM's have some info which facilitate a METL crosswalk (work breakdown structure (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work_breakdown_structure) and business mapping (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_mapping)) but I am finding that I have to go to internet and physical clusters of like-minded individuals in order to find that which is needed.

I watched the concept of business clusters in Mosul with construction companies and thought more about it while working on a business plan for a (future) company in order to complete my MBA. My business plan included a recon (site & google earth photo's, equipment comparisions, price surveys, real-estate searches, vehicle title searches, traffic comparisons, weather pattern reviews, noting existing businesses and searching for future business openings in the area of interest) followed an analysis which included stating assumptions, crunching numbers (sensitivity analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitivity_analysis) and monte carlo analysis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Carlo_method)) and comparing the results to standard financial ratios (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_ratio) for the industry.

It's all interesting stuff with a real world payoff...

Surferbeetle
05-05-2010, 11:34 AM
Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems: Irregular Warfare Correlations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/298-grange.pdf) by David L. Grange and J.T. Patten


In December 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a “Directive-Type Memorandum” whose subject was a DoD Counter-Threat Finance (CTF) Policy that included priority purposes to counter financing used by illicit trafficking networks in support of adversaries’ activities, which may negatively affect U.S. interests. Countering threat finance included memorandum policy to deny, disrupt, destroy, degrade, and defeat these adversarial networks with many “counters” relying on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that follow Irregular Warfare concepts. Targeting and assessing the greater illicit funding mechanism within conflict ecosystems demands the same below-the-waterline tacit knowledge, situational understanding, and intelligence creation that most complex and unconventional operations require while keeping local populations out of the fray.

davidbfpo
05-05-2010, 08:16 PM
Taken from MikeF's citation of the new Marjah report, which i will read when able to:
These measures should also include “camps in a box” to provide shelter, food, water and active engagement with displaced people to help them move to the camps or, when possible, to return to their homes.

Can I ask, no remind, readers that serious thought is given to the information aspects of 'camps in a box'. Do they really have to be delivered by the military? Are there not capable partners outside ISAF and GIRoA? Years ago the UK-based NGO Islamic Relief had a large support programme in place.

I am very wary of the concept and practice of 'camps in a box' being easily labelled locally by the Taliban and other enemies as 'Protected Villages' etc.

MikeF
05-06-2010, 01:56 PM
Can I ask, no remind, readers that serious thought is given to the information aspects of 'camps in a box'. Do they really have to be delivered by the military? Are there not capable partners outside ISAF and GIRoA? Years ago the UK-based NGO Islamic Relief had a large support programme in place.

I am very wary of the concept and practice of 'camps in a box' being easily labelled locally by the Taliban and other enemies as 'Protected Villages' etc.

Good catch David. This action could be viewed with shades of Briggs and Malaya. It can be one of those unitended consequences of trying to help but hurting. I've done a little bit of reading on the NGO and Int'l relief efforts in Kashmir and Haiti after earthquakes. It is interesting to see how good samaratan actions can be misconstrued.

Early on in my last deployment to Iraq, while the situation was deteriorating, probably early OCT 2006, we were enroute to an emergency Nahiya meeting to try and persuade the local governments to remain intact and ride out the storm. While on Blue Babe Highway, we noticed a truck headed east packed full like the Beverly Hillbillies (http://wagthedog.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/beverly-hillbillies.jpg). I had the convoy stop so that I could talk to the driver.

He was a father and farmer who had all of his family and possessions in the truck. I asked him where he was headed.

"Sadi, I'm leaving Zaganiyah and moving to Baghdad. It is far safer there."

That scene stuck with me for a long time as I tried to comprehend what perceived fears must persist to have one risk everything to attempt to move his family to safety.

Displaced persons is something we typically do not consider in planning and execution.

v/r

Mike

JMA
05-06-2010, 03:09 PM
A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

Villages and other populated areas can be considered sanctuaries for insurgents until counter-insurgent forces wrest control away. As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way, and they need not be a black or white proposition that has been sensationalized in recent media offerings.

ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have been slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night, to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

You need to start with who is in the pocket of the opium "big men". Clearly it has got to be understood that there is very senior Afghan government involvement in the opium trade or at least pay-offs at the highest level for poppy cultivation to be continuing with the positive acceptance of the US government and military. (maybe someone should turn over a few stones there as well)

Take a step back for a moment and look at the insanity of it all. Effectively the US and British militaries are allowing the poppy cultivation which in effect pays for the components for the IEDs which are killing the majority of US and British troops in the country... and in addition to which much of the resulting heroin ends up on the streets of the US.

No matter which way you look at it it is absolute insanity.

davidbfpo
05-06-2010, 09:10 PM
JMA,

Partial quote:
Effectively the US and British militaries are allowing the poppy cultivation which in effect pays for the components for the IEDs which are killing the majority of US and British troops in the country... and in addition to which much of the resulting heroin ends up on the streets of the US.

No matter which way you look at it it is absolute insanity.

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/04/have_helmand_troops_been_told.html

Surferbeetle
05-07-2010, 06:35 PM
Leans more towards a thought piece than a how-to ttp but it's an interesting article nonetheless.

James E. Shircliffe, Jr. in Military Review: The Need for Intelligence Preparation for Economic Operations (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100430_art013.pdf)

It is often difficult for commanders to determine the best use for the development assets and resources at their disposal. Blindly throwing money and people at a problem is not a viable solution because the force rarely achieves the level of impact commanders seek, and in a world of scarce resources, more problems exist than there are assets to throw at them. Like battlefield operations, economic operations require the commander to develop and choose a course of action with its own unique requirements and risks. The Army needs to practice intelligence preparation for economic operations using “economic operations intelligence cells” that enjoy the level of dedicated support the Army gives to battlefield intelligence.

JMA
05-08-2010, 02:35 PM
JMA,

Partial quote:

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/04/have_helmand_troops_been_told.html

There is a need to put the finger on the button here.

It is common knowledge that drug money can corrupt anyone if the quantity is right. This surely applies to the US and British military as well? Is counter-intelligence keeping and eye on the generals?

Bob's World
05-08-2010, 03:35 PM
JMA,

Partial quote:

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/04/have_helmand_troops_been_told.html

While it is certainly true that the Coalition is not attacking Poppy at the farmer-level currently (in a system where farmers borrow heavily inadvance on their crops and are ruined if the crops are lost; in a system where the Taliban tax the farmer's heavily regardless of yield; in a system where eradication efforts are all too often employed by shady Police Chiefs who appear to be diligent eradicators to their Western observers, but who the locals all know are only eradicating the crops of their political/economic opponents in an effort that builds their favor with the Coaltion while also builds their relative power in the region.). To attack the populace's livlihood is lose the battle of the narrative with the insurgent.

This does not preclude efforts to attack the product downstream from the farmer. The harvest is concluding in the south, and moves in a clockwise arch across Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. No amount of targeting dope is going to have a (positive) measureable effect in the timelines allowed the Coalition to show such effects, but could certainly have a negative effect if executed clumsily. And given the lack of true understanding of the complex interconnectivity of the drug business with every other business, to include governance, I don't know how we could be other than "clumsy." Meanwhile, all of the migrant workers fresh from the poppy fields are lookng for work, and the TB has cash for work...

JMA
05-09-2010, 02:54 PM
While it is certainly true that the Coalition is not attacking Poppy at the farmer-level currently (in a system where farmers borrow heavily inadvance on their crops and are ruined if the crops are lost; in a system where the Taliban tax the farmer's heavily regardless of yield; in a system where eradication efforts are all too often employed by shady Police Chiefs who appear to be diligent eradicators to their Western observers, but who the locals all know are only eradicating the crops of their political/economic opponents in an effort that builds their favor with the Coaltion while also builds their relative power in the region.). To attack the populace's livlihood is lose the battle of the narrative with the insurgent.

This does not preclude efforts to attack the product downstream from the farmer. The harvest is concluding in the south, and moves in a clockwise arch across Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. No amount of targeting dope is going to have a (positive) measureable effect in the timelines allowed the Coalition to show such effects, but could certainly have a negative effect if executed clumsily. And given the lack of true understanding of the complex interconnectivity of the drug business with every other business, to include governance, I don't know how we could be other than "clumsy." Meanwhile, all of the migrant workers fresh from the poppy fields are lookng for work, and the TB has cash for work...

It is so difficult to try and defend corruption and misguided policies.

The income to farmers appears to be $1 billion per annum.

The cost of the war is around $3.6 billion per month.

I put it to you that the exercise in taking poppies out of productions in the fields at an annual cost of $1 billion is the most simple of all propositions.

The problem lies with the other elements in the drug distribution chain who make $3 billion per year.

Neither the US government, the UN, NATO nor anyone else has the guts to take the drug mafia on over the worlds majority heroin supply chain.

Russia blames NATO for the increase of heroin production which enters Russia in increasing quantities. Why blame NATO?

It is due to current US administration policy that Afghan is turning into a NARCO state. The US military should not allow itself and its soldiers to become complicit in this criminal negligence.

This is such a bizarre decision and policy that I would suggest that with out any doubt that drug money has corrupted to a high level within the US administration. Watch them closely.

jcustis
05-09-2010, 06:06 PM
After being on deck for only a short while, the single most important factor that stands out over and over again is a simple one...you have to be there. not everywhere, but just be there and be relevant to the people. If not, you are wasting time.

JMA
05-09-2010, 11:28 PM
After being on deck for only a short while, the single most important factor that stands out over and over again is a simple one...you have to be there. not everywhere, but just be there and be relevant to the people. If not, you are wasting time.

How do you achieve that?

jcustis
09-06-2010, 06:13 AM
Found this in a 26 June edition of The Economist:


NATO's main enemies, the Taliban and two other insurgent groups, both linked to al-Qaeda and led by former commanders of the anti-Soviet jihad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, are based across the border in Pakistan-in the city of Quetta, in Baluchistan, and the rugged tribal areas. This makes them virtually unbeatable: no counter-insurgency has been won against enemies enjoying such a sanctuary.

I have no idea what the author based this statement off of, but can anyone recite similar facts to take this from the anecdotal and into the historical? The clincher seems to be the term "such a sanctuary," where the discussion could get hung up (happens all the time here already eh?). Anyone able to hazard a guess at what the article is getting at with this statement, or the historical information to support the point?

davidbfpo
09-06-2010, 11:09 PM
Jon,

I suspect the part-citation:
no counter-insurgency has been won against enemies enjoying such a sanctuary comes from an article on the Kings of War website and reflects an associated academic's work on the role of a sanctuary.

After a quick read I think the academic is Mike Innes, who IIRC has posted a few times here and this was the most relevant KoW comment found:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2009/10/deadly-spaces/

IIRC The Economist has a regional correspondent based in New Delhi, who writes on Afghanistan. Personally I find their comments well-written, but with a too mid-Atlantic perspective.:rolleyes:

Hopes this helps!

jcustis
09-06-2010, 11:20 PM
It did help David, as always.