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SWJED
05-27-2007, 08:24 AM
Moderator's note 31/12/09: new thread for Yemen created, merging several old threads to give background to a country that is expected to feature more in 2010.


27 May LA Times - Modern Yemen Embraces the Tribe (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-tribe27may27,0,4836200.story?coll=la-home-center) by Megan Stack.


... Pervasive and often overlooked by outsiders, the ancient network of tribes remains one of the most potent forces in the Middle East. The tribes are older than the nations and borders that carve up the Arab world, older than the oil industry, older than the governments in the United States or Europe. They are an older — and, some believe, an even stronger — social force than Islam.

Rather than withering away as the Arab world succumbs to modernity, tribes are only getting more powerful. Weak central governments, civil war in Iraq, an identity crisis born of the clash between modernity and tradition — all of these factors have fortified the role of the tribes...

Jedburgh
11-23-2008, 04:42 AM
Chatham House, 19 Nov 08: Yemen: Fear of Failure (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf)

Yemen presents a potent combination of problems for policy-makers confronting the prospect of state failure in this strategically important Red Sea country. It is the poorest state in the Arab world, with high levels of unemployment, rapid population growth and dwindling water resources.
President Saleh faces an intermittent civil war in the north, a southern separatist movement and resurgent terrorist groups. Yemen's jihadi networks appear to be growing as operating conditions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia become more difficult.
The underlying drivers for future instability are economic. The state budget is heavily dependent on revenue from dwindling oil supplies. Yemen's window of opportunity to shape its own future and create a post-oil economy is narrowing.
Western governments need to work towards an effective regional approach with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in particular Saudi Arabia.
Future instability in Yemen could expand a lawless zone stretching from northern Kenya, through Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, to Saudi Arabia. Piracy, organized crime and violent jihad would escalate, with implications for the security of shipping routes, the transit of oil through the Suez Canal and the internal security of Yemen's neighbours.

ridek
04-08-2009, 05:10 AM
Counterterrorism in Yemen currently falls under the operational jurisdiction of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, and CJTF-HOA falls under AFRICOM. Yemen is geographically under CENTCOM's area of response.

Terrorist attacks in Yemen are up over the last few months, and Gen. Petraeus claims that Yemen is a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Whose shoulders will the problem fall on--AFRICOM or CENTCOM? I ask because there is an overlapping interest, and this will likely be a bureaucratic fight for additional AFRICOM funding in the near future. Thoughts?

MikeF
04-08-2009, 05:14 AM
Hi Ridek,

Obviously, you're wicked smart. Give us some time to absorb. Please take a moment to introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=69564#post69564). Which led to the following being posted:

I am an undergrad at American University, double majoring in International Relations (focusing on US Foreign Policy), and International Business. I also intern for the Hudson Institute Center for Political-Military Analysis in D.C. Most of my study/work has been on security in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and the U.S. intelligence community.

v/r

Mike

Entropy
04-08-2009, 11:15 AM
Rick,

Welcome to the board!

This sort of thing isn't unprecedented. EUCOM, PACOM and CENTCOM had some overlap in the past. If it hasn't happened already, I'm sure the two commands are working on MOU's to define responsibilities.

Jedburgh
08-27-2009, 10:18 PM
OCHA, 5 Nov 09: Yemen - Sa’ada Emergency: Situation Report #12 (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MYAI-7VQ34V-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

Highlights/Key Priorities
A United Nations cross-border assessment mission, facilitated by the Governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, took place in northern Sa’ada (Al-Mandaba, Alb) between 26 and 29 October.
The security situation in Sa’ada and neighbouring governorates is deteriorating, causing serious constraints to humanitarian assistance. Tens of thousands of displaced people have been on the move, and the winter season is fast approaching.
In Al-Jawf Governorate, access remains limited to only one district (Al-Matammah).
Discussions are ongoing over the location for a new camp in Amran. Local authorities have allowed the UN and INGOs to assist IDPs in host communities outside the existing government camp in Khaiwan, which hosts some 50 families.
The draft 2010 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) is under review.
CRS, 7 Jul 09: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations (http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf)

Rex Brynen
08-28-2009, 12:55 AM
Also useful background:

Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb

International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°86 , 27 May 2009


Away from media headlines, a war has been raging on and off in Yemen’s northern governorate of Saada since 2004, flaring up in adjacent regions and, in 2008, reaching the outskirts of the capital, Sanaa. The conflict, which has brought about extensive destruction, pits a rebel group, known generically as the Huthis, against government forces. Today’s truce is fragile and risks being short-lived. A breakdown would threaten Yemen’s stability, already under severe duress due to the global economic meltdown, depleting national resources, renewed tensions between the country’s northern elites and populations in the south and the threat from violent groups with varied links to al-Qaeda. Nor would the impact necessarily be contained within national borders. The country should use its traditional instruments – social and religious tolerance, cooptation of adversaries – to forge a more inclusive compact that reduces sectarian stigmatisation and absorbs the Huthis. International actors – principally Gulf states and the West – should use their leverage and the promise of reconstruction assistance to press both government and rebels to compromise.

After two decades of relative stability that confounded foreign diplomats and analysts alike, the convergence of economic, political and secessionist challenges are testing the regime’s coping capacity. The Saada conflict might not be the most covered internationally, but it carries grave risks for Yemen’s political, sectarian and social equilibrium.

Executive summary and link to full report here (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1) (registration required for the full report).

Jedburgh
08-28-2009, 02:16 AM
Executive summary and link to full report here (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1) (registration required for the full report).
The full report is also hosted (http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/JBRN-7SHFQD-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf) by Relief Web - no registration necessary for access. However, ICG (http://www.crisisgroup.org/) is an excellent resource, and registration is free and painless - and provides you full access to their archived reports.

Jedburgh
09-18-2009, 02:00 PM
CEIP, Sep 09: Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf)

Key Conclusions:

- There are increasing indications that al-Qaeda is regrouping in Yemen. Recent counterterrorism measures in Saudi Arabia have forced extremists to seek refuge elsewhere, with a steady flow relocating to Yemen’s under-governed areas.

- The ceding of authority by the weak central government to local government has proved counterproductive by limiting control over volatile under-governed territories.

- The security situation is rapidly deteriorating. Fighting with Shi’i rebels in north Yemen has strained the army, and Yemen is unable to protect its coast from the recent surge in piracy.

- The poorest in the Arab world, with unemployment at 35 percent, Yemen’s economy has been severely effected by the dramatic fall in oil prices and has few sustainable post-oil, economic options.

- Yemen is running out of water. Rising domestic consumption, poor water management, corruption, the absence of resource governance, and wasteful irrigation techniques are creating frequent and widespread shortages.

- Yemen’s lack of food and water is complicated by the population’s dependence on qat, a quick-cash crop that requires heavy irrigation to thrive. Farmers devote so much land to qat production that Yemen is now a net food importer.

Jedburgh
11-10-2009, 02:55 PM
Waq al-Waq (http://islamandinsurgencyinyemen.blogspot.com/)

This blog was started for a few reasons. We both have been studying Yemen for years, and as the country has risen in importance, the quality of discussion has declined. We wanted to contradict some other individuals, blogs and commentators who have no experience in Yemen or with Arabic, and who turn the facts to fit their opinions. We feel that presenting a thoughtful and nuanced discussion of Yemeni affairs, based in knowledge of its history and culture is in the best interest of all. That said, this is not an academic blog, and provides a lighter tone than our other publications, and also allows us to indulge our unhealthy interests in medieval swords and mysterious islands that color Yemeni history.
Enjoy.

Jedburgh
11-16-2009, 01:28 PM
CEIP, Nov 07: Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemeni_congragation_reform.pdf)

Like Islamist parties across the Arab world, Yemen’s Islamist Congregation for Reform (Islah (http://www.al-islah.net/)) has a religious ideology and platform. Islah participates in legal politics in hopes of accomplishing constitutional and socioeconomic reforms, and over time it has committed itself to upholding democratic procedures internally as well as externally.

Yet Islah differs from most other Arab Islamists. The party combines tribal influences along with those of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood and more radical Salafi groups. As a result, it faces deep internal divisions on key issues, including its relationship with the ruling establishment, its role in the opposition, and the participation of women in politics. Moreover, Islah is not simply an opposition group; until 1997, the party was a junior partner in a ruling coalition.

Under Yemen’s authoritarian regime, President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his General People’s Congress dominate political life, and there are no effective checks and balances among the different branches of government. Since its move to the opposition, Islah has had no choice but to cooperate with the regime in order to gain a degree of infl uence in key political choices. Yet its fractious composition prevents it from developing a clear parliamentary platform, forcing it instead to balance tribal and political interests, differing interpretations of the party’s Islamist platform, and both loyalist and opposition constituencies. As a result, no one knows where the party stands, and it has no clear path toward the reforms it seeks....

Jedburgh
12-16-2009, 04:40 PM
HRW, 15 Dec 09: In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests (http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/southyemen1209webwcover.pdf)

....Since 2007, southern Yemenis have conducted sit-ins, marches and demonstrations to protest what they say is the northern-dominated central government’s treatment of them, including dismissal from the civil and security services. The protests escalated and by 2008 many southern Yemenis were demanding secession and the restoration of an independent southern Yemeni state, which had existed up until the union of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990.

The security forces, and Central Security in particular, have carried out widespread abuses in the south—unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, arrests of journalists, and others. These abuses have created a climate of fear, but have also increased bitterness and alienation among southerners, who say the north economically exploits and politically marginalizes them. The security forces have enjoyed impunity for unlawful attacks against southerners, increasing pro-secessionist sentiments in the south and plunging the country into an escalating spiral of repression, protests, and more repression.....

davidbfpo
12-16-2009, 08:39 PM
From the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8416285.stm


Hundreds of Somali refugees are being forced at gunpoint to join rebels fighting in northern Yemen, a Somali diplomat in Aden has told the BBC.

JarodParker
12-25-2009, 03:56 AM
'Twas the night before Christmas, when all thro' the desert
Not a creature was stirring, not even a terrorist;
Their AK’s were placed on the floor with care,
In hopes that Osama soon would be there;
The jihadists were nestled all snug in their beds,
While visions of 72 virgins danc'd in their heads,

When out on the roof there arose such a clatter,
They sprang from their bed to see what was the matter.
Away to the window they flew like a flash,
tore open the shutter, and threw up the sash.
When, what to their wondering eyes should appear,
but warplanes armed to the gills.

Link (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091225/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_yemen_al_qaida)

Yemen's military hit suspected al-Qaida hideouts, possibly killing a radical cleric linked to the U.S. Army major accused of the Fort Hood mass shooting, as a gathering of top militant leaders was targeted in a remote mountain valley Thursday in strikes carried out with U.S. intelligence help, officials said.

At least 30 militants were believed to be killed in the second such strike in a week. Pentagon officials could not confirm Thursday whether radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed in the strike.

Merry Christmas.

IntelTrooper
12-28-2009, 07:16 AM
Given recent events, it seems that Yemen is figuring more prominently into our, umm, overseas contingency operations.

U.S. quietly takes terror war to Yemen (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34606578/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times//)
Covert front against al-Qaida was opened a year ago, military officers say


WASHINGTON - In the midst of two unfinished major wars, the United States has quietly opened a third, largely covert front against Al Qaeda in Yemen.

A year ago, the Central Intelligence Agency sent many field operatives with counterterrorism experience to the country, according a former top agency official. At the same time, some of the most secretive Special Operations commandos have begun training Yemeni security forces in counterterrorism tactics, senior military officers said.

The Pentagon is spending more than $70 million over the next 18 months, and using teams of Special Forces, to train and equip Yemeni military, Interior Ministry and coast guard forces, more than doubling previous military aid levels.

davidbfpo
12-31-2009, 08:35 PM
At Jarod Parker's request / suggestion I have re-titled this thread - as a "catch all" for matters in the Yemen, on the assumption it will feature a lot more. Secondly I have merged some of the existing threads on the Yemen to this one, so there is a collection of background pointers and comments.

Abu M commends a Yemeni expert Gregory Johnson blogsite which has been mentioned before: http://islamandinsurgencyinyemen.blogspot.com/ and a November 2009 CNAS policy brief on the Yemen, entitled 'Yemen on a knife's edge': http://www.cnas.org/node/3771

Interesting to read the demographic and water parts of the brief.

IntelTrooper
12-31-2009, 09:17 PM
At least 30 militants were believed to be killed in the second such strike in a week.

Interesting.

Winning the War, 30 Taliban at a Time (http://securitycrank.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/winning-the-war-30-taliban-at-a-time/)


Adnkronos, 12/07/2009: “Up to 30 suspected militants were killed in a NATO airstrike on a Taliban hideout in eastern Afghanistan close to the Pakistani border on Monday. The airstrike targeted the village of Sangar Dara in the mountainous Watapur district of Kunar province , the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said.”
SF Chronicle, 12/04/2009: “Air strikes in two areas of the Mohmand border region killed 30 suspected militants, a military statement said. It said the strikes were “highly successful” but provided no further details, including whether any civilians were hurt.”
Xinhua, 11/04/2009: “The military said that the troops have killed 30 more militants during the last 24 hours, bringing the total fatalities to 400, as the operation in the country’s tribal area steadily progressed towards the Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan.”
Xinhua, 08/31/2009: “At least 30 bodies of suspected Taliban fighters were recovered in northwest Pakistan’s insurgency-hit Swat valley on Monday, witnesses said. The Pakistani army said they were killed in fighting with the security forces.”

omarali50
12-31-2009, 09:44 PM
are you saying someone in Kabul is in love with the figure "30"? How does ISAF know how many taliban died in such and such attack?
I can tell you that in Pakistan the PAF's figures for airstrikes are more varied, but totally unreliable. My friends tell me that they make up the figure almost literally by pulling it out of a hat (or their ass, as the case may be). I find that the taliban themselves are much more scrupulous about reporting losses (though they in turn exaggerrate their successes by factors of 100 or more)...

davidbfpo
12-31-2009, 09:52 PM
Hat tip to Fuchs.

Two contrary views found, one by Pat Lang, who served in the Yemen in the 1980's: http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/12/yemen-as-quagmire.html and a curious cross-posting by Juan Cole (who starts off on other matters and goes onto the Yemen. Nice photos of the terrain though)
:http://www.juancole.com/2009/12/top-republican-myths-about-crotch.html

Both liken any US involvement, I assume beyond what is in place already, to entering a quagmire, where the Yemeni's are very adept at playing "power politics" to get support. Almost reminds me of Somalia, a place to avoid which played the "power" game and later fell apart - now largely left alone, piracy excluded.

Another critical voice: http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick12292009.html and his final paragraph:
he Yemeni government will do what it can to show the US it is willing to go after al-Qa'ida. But the threat to its own existence comes from various directions: first, the civil war it is fighting with Shia revivalists – who it claims are backed by Iran – in the northern province of Saada; then secessionism in the south sparked by discontent over the outcome of Yemeni unification in 1990 and the civil war that followed; and finally a growing economic crisis as Yemen's small oilfields, which provide revenue, are running out.

Pressure from the US to pursue al-Qa'ida will be one extra strain on a government which has been unable to cope with these multiple crises.

A strategic viewpoint: http://donvandergriff.wordpress.com/2009/12/30/yemen-opening-a-new-front-in-the-long-war-nicht-schwerpunkt-as-a-prescription-for-defeat-by-a-1000-cuts/

One wonders how the Saudi government will regard greater US involvement, if only for the propaganda impact on their own population.

Answers on a postcard!

MikeF
12-31-2009, 10:08 PM
One of my worst fears is that we extend FM 3-24 past Iraq and A'stan into the extended Middle East and beyond. Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others will pose threats under our current definitions of GWOT or Long War.

We must be just as clear on our definitions of existential threats as we are on our antidotes. It is easy to take down a government. It is nearly impossible to govern or establish good governance under our current constraints in the post-colonial world.

My hope in 2010 is that we gain the wisdom to discern.

IntelTrooper
12-31-2009, 10:47 PM
are you saying someone in Kabul is in love with the figure "30"? How does ISAF know how many taliban died in such and such attack?

It does raise a lot of questions. To get this level of fidelity between the reported numbers, it must be at the ISAF/USFOR-A level. In the vast majority of these strikes, I find it doubtful that anyone was counting bodies afterward.



I can tell you that in Pakistan the PAF's figures for airstrikes are more varied, but totally unreliable. My friends tell me that they make up the figure almost literally by pulling it out of a hat (or their ass, as the case may be). I find that the taliban themselves are much more scrupulous about reporting losses (though they in turn exaggerrate their successes by factors of 100 or more)...
I think you're pretty spot on there.

davidbfpo
12-31-2009, 11:02 PM
Mike F is right to indicate Yemen alone is clearly mission creep and one link suggests the on the ground presence was not requested by the Yemeni government, but used as an indicator of "being willing to help" in the GWOT.

Amidst all the furore in the USA over AQ camps etc in the Yemen it would be difficult for Congress and the Executive IMHO to accept any limits on the size and more of any involvement.

Watch and wait. Or Keep It Small & Simple.

davidbfpo
01-01-2010, 02:59 AM
The UK Prime Minister chimes in:
Mr Brown also wrote about the rising importance of Yemen as "both an incubator and potential safe haven for terrorism". "Pushed out of Afghanistan and increasingly dispersed over the mountains of Pakistan, al-Qaeda's affiliates and allies - in ungoverned or under-governed areas like parts of Yemen, The Sahel and Somalia - have raised their profile," he said. He said the UK was already one of Yemen's leading donors and it was increasing support to its government through intelligence assistance, training of counter-terrorism units and development programmes.

Link that includes this passage:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8436758.stm

davidbfpo
01-01-2010, 08:48 PM
An article by Jonathan Winer, ex-State Dept., on the immediate options in the Yemen and background. I only cite two paragraphs:
President Saleh's strategy for the future of his country is to secure power for his son, who recently turned up as the receipient of corrupt funds from a telecomms company in a U.S. criminal bribery case. The question for the U.S. and other governments is whether it is smart to invest in Yemen's security forces through training and assistance aimed at countering terrorism at the very time that Yemen has been brought to a critical phase of instability due to President Saleh's misrule.

Before getting further into support of President Saleh's regime, conrete tests may be in order. Work with Yemen to identify the locations of Naser Abdel-Karim Wahishi and former Guantanamo detainee Saeed Ali Shehri, two leaders of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Add in the current address in Yemen of Anwar al-Awlaki, whose calls to action helped to inspire the Fort Hood terrorist murders, and who was nearly killed by a US drone December 24. Carry out raids (by drone or in person) to punish, incapacitate, arrest, and deter. Repeat as needed. Successful operations will surely result in continued international assistance, facilitating help to those who deserve something better than a failed state. If instead, critical counter-terrorist operations with Yemen experience leaks and failures, with the al-Awlaki's surviving raids to continue their threats to public safety, other strategies may be needed, including ones that are not predicated on members of the Saleh family being in charge of the country forever.

Full article: http://counterterrorismblog.org (currently lead article)

Tukhachevskii
01-02-2010, 10:51 AM
As-Shabab to send fighters to Yemen;
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5j7cT_03N3ezALj85D5tb1bE3esdw

Anwar Al-Awlaqi survives airstrike;
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki-alive/story?id=9455144

Yemeni security forces raid AQ hideout and arrest 1;
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/30/world/main6037640.shtml

See also the excellent http://armiesofliberation.com/

SWJ Blog
01-02-2010, 10:40 PM
Yemen’s Strategic Boxes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/yemens-strategic-boxes/)

Entry Excerpt:

Yemen’s Strategic Boxes
by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

Download the full article: Yemen’s Strategic Boxes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/339-cline.pdf)

As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news. The December 2009 raids on al Qaida with some level of US support – together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – have re-emphasized Yemen’s importance in regional and international security.

One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country’s impact on external security. Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida’s operations in and from Yemen. Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia. Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how willing the government of Yemen will cooperate with other countries.

From Sana’a’s perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security. Al Qaida certainly is one, but the other two – the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the south around Aden – probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen government. Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap among them in the future is even more worrisome. These specific threats are even further exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact on Yemen’s capability to respond adequately.

Download the full article: Yemen’s Strategic Boxes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/339-cline.pdf)

Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is an associate professor with American Military University, and a contract instructor with the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in national counterterrorism strategy development. He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and OIF.



--------
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Charles Martel
01-03-2010, 03:10 PM
Sure seems like it when we close our Embassy in Yemen and announce that it was due to fears of AQ retaliation for our support of the Yemeni government (http://tinyurl.com/y9mhuxb).

Strategic Communication is the intersection of our actions and our messages, and this action cannot send a more clear message to our adversaries -- although we, our allies, and civilized people across the world are pounding you at every turn, your threats will make us cower inside our outposts in the countries that need our support the most.

I know the counterargument -- DoS aren't Soldiers and are not sent there to be attacked -- but aren't they there to represent the US and doesn't retreating within our ramparts give AQ the psychological advantage over us? We need, among other things, to reassure our valiant allies that we will stand with them throughout the fight. Do we do that when we close our doors? Did YM close down in response to the many threats and actual attacks they have experienced?

Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

Cavguy
01-03-2010, 04:59 PM
We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.

Backing a thug regime under the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" rule hasn't generally worked well for us in the long term, and generally has spawned more terrorists willing to attack the US because we undermine our own stated commitment to democracy and human rights. As a reporter I know said:


do you want to take the side of a dictator against his people? do you want to be identified with that dictator and with his victims? then dont be surprised when they try to blow up your planes

I don't fully agree with the above, but he has a point. I say caution before wading into a civil war we don't fully understand under the banner of chasing AQ.

Cavguy
01-03-2010, 05:02 PM
What the Yemen?

http://securitycrank.wordpress.com/2009/12/21/what-the-yemen/


Which brings us back to that CNAS report. As Jane Novak is quick to point out, the Yemeni government is its own worst enemy: oppressive, violent, discriminatory, capricious, and predatory. CNAS recommends propping them up in order to stave off a broader civil war that might destabilize neighboring countries. Does this make sense? Sana’a has a ton of problems, all of which seem to relate back to its refusal to integrate outlying portions of the population into the political, social, and economic mainstream. Does that seem like the kind of government we want to support and prosper?

There are many ways the U.S. can play a positive role in Yemen. Propping up a failing regime just because it pinky swears to go after al Qaeda, however, is not one of them.

(emphasis mine)

MikeF
01-03-2010, 05:56 PM
What the Yemen?

Agreed. Before we start worrying about FID, SFA, or economic aid to other states, we should fix our own dysfunctional organizational structures. If a dad walks into any agency and says, "I think my son is a danger to himself and others," then he should not get a visa to the US. Period. IMO, this lack of communication and information flow is one of our biggest problems.

davidbfpo
01-04-2010, 09:04 PM
From The Guardian (UK) by a British Muslim, Ed Husain of the Quilliam Foundation, in a wide ranging article:
Yemen is not a willing home to al-Qaeda – it is victim to an ideology exported from neighbouring Saudi Arabia. In our desire to blame and, eventually, bomb, let us not forget the other Yemen: one of the last bastions of traditional, serene Islam. Yemeni Sufis have been imparting their version of normative Islam for centuries through trade and travel. Hundreds of British Muslims have been studying in Yemen's pristine Islamic institutions. They have returned to Britain connected to an ancient chain of spiritual knowledge and now lead several Muslim communities with the Sufi spirit of love for humans, dedication to worship, and service to Islam.

For me, empowering and supporting this Yemeni Islam against the rigid, literalist, supremacist Wahhabite ideology of our Saudi allies in Riyadh is a sure recipe for eventual victory. But will we dare upset the House of Saud? It seems unlikely. President Obama literally bowed before the Saudi king in London last year.

We are now being told that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) runs terrorist camps and this justifies "pre-emptive strikes" on Yemen. But what is AQAP except leading Saudi terrorists – Naser al-Wahishi and Said al-Shihri – who have now set up shop in Yemen, with a ragtag army of 200 men? Who is Osama Bin Laden except a Saudi who wanted political reforms in his own country, failed, and then turned his guns on the western backers of the Saudi regime?

Oh, yes the author has clearly stated views on Saudi Arabia.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/01/muslim-profiling-recipe-insecurity/print

From the US FP blog:
In 2010, ...perhaps the implosion of Yemen into an al Qaeda haven.... For all the talk of American decline, the world will still be looking to Washington for leadership when these ticking bombs explode.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/tick_tock

By a student studying Yemen:
The United States has not helped matters. Washington's continued insistence on seeing the country only through the prism of counterterrorism has induced exactly the results it is hoping to avoid. By focusing on al Qaeda to the exclusion of nearly every other threat and by linking most of its aid to this single issue, the United States has only ensured that al Qaeda will always exist.

Instead of imploding, Yemen is going to explode. And when it does, Yemen's problems of today are going to become Saudi Arabia's problems of tomorrow. This is already foreshadowed by Saudi involvement in the northern conflict and al Qaeda strikes from Yemen into the kingdom. By the time Obama and his team cobble together a smarter response, the time for prevention will have passed and their only option will be mopping up the mess.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/welcome_to_qaedastan

JarodParker
01-05-2010, 03:50 AM
David, thanks for editing the title and modifying the threads.

Cavguy, I think one of the president's aides should recite your comment to him (or possibly "her" in the future) every morning.

We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.

Backing a thug regime under the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" rule hasn't generally worked well for us in the long term, and generally has spawned more terrorists willing to attack the US because we undermine our own stated commitment to democracy and human rights. As a reporter I know said:



I don't fully agree with the above, but he has a point. I say caution before wading into a civil war we don't fully understand under the banner of chasing AQ.


By a student studying Yemen:
Quote:
The United States has not helped matters. Washington's continued insistence on seeing the country only through the prism of counterterrorism has induced exactly the results it is hoping to avoid. By focusing on al Qaeda to the exclusion of nearly every other threat and by linking most of its aid to this single issue, the United States has only ensured that al Qaeda will always exist.

Instead of imploding, Yemen is going to explode. And when it does, Yemen's problems of today are going to become Saudi Arabia's problems of tomorrow. This is already foreshadowed by Saudi involvement in the northern conflict and al Qaeda strikes from Yemen into the kingdom. By the time Obama and his team cobble together a smarter response, the time for prevention will have passed and their only option will be mopping up the mess.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...e_to_qaedastan

The article does a good job of outlining some of the issues, but fails to offer a solution or even suggest options. I need to know, whom should we be throwing money at, whom should we bomb and how soon can we implement a "surge" strategy?

"Welcome to Qaedastan" - btw, great use of the "stan" suffix by the author. :rolleyes:

wm
01-05-2010, 02:18 PM
The background for the current issues in Yemen go back to at least the 1960s and probably much earlier (like centuries ago). I was monitoring the North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic [YAR],Yemen, Sana'a)/South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY], Yemen, Aden) debacle back at the start of the 80's. During the mid-60s, Nasser's Egypt/UAR got hooked up in the region (70,000 troops or so, publicly reported) in a quagmire that has been described as Egypt's Viet Nam, with the Saudis "playing" on the other side.



We have to be careful here. Just because Yemen's so-called "government" (which controls 1/3 of the country) is ostensibly anti-AQ doesn't mean they're worth backing.

The current ruler of Yemen routinely describes all his potential enemies as AQ in order to get assistance to jail/attack/kill them. While AQ is a real presence, not all the rebels in Yemen are AQ, as they are involved in a civil war.I'm not quite sure I agree completely with this assessment of Saleh and his government.
Even if it is correct, the "So what?" question immediately come up. What should be done about his "bad" government?
Involving one's nation in the internecine struggles of other emerging/struggling states is not morally or legally required, barring specific treaty obligations. "Civilized" nations could choose not to choose in this situation (as most did for all intents and purposes in Bangladesh in 1971 and Biafra from 67-70 for example). How Yemen figures significantly in America's national security is unclear (to me at least). Anarchist wackos could (and do) get training all over the world. Maybe we ought to offer "special" UAV-based assistance to Spain to suppress the ETA/Basque movement--after all they might train and dispatch a terror bomber to blow up a plane, train, or automobile in the US in order to make a political statement, too.

davidbfpo
01-05-2010, 07:31 PM
Worth checking: http://www.ginnyhill.co.uk/ and the short intro says:
Ginny Hill is a freelance journalist and filmmaker, writing and broadcasting on the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. She has worked in Djibouti, Egypt, Gaza, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Somaliland and Yemen.
Ginny is the author of Yemen: Fear of Failure, a Chatham House briefing paper (pub. 1998).

Not updated daily, but may offer a different viewpoint.

Pete
01-05-2010, 10:34 PM
Today's Los Angeles Times has a commentary piece on Yemen by Richard Fontaine and Andrew Exum. I didn't see it mentioned in the SWJ Blog or Roundup.


The Nigerian Islamist who allegedly attempted to detonate a bomb on a Christmas Day flight to Detroit, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, has brought Yemen once again into the spotlight as a breeding ground for terrorists. Abdulmutallab is thought to have trained with Yemen's Al Qaeda affiliate, and the group has claimed credit for the failed attack.

Click below to read the entire piece.

http://www.cnas.org/node/3931

wm
01-06-2010, 01:56 PM
The LA Times piece that Pete posted the CNAS link for seems to display the marvelous illogic of at least some US policy advisors. First the article indicates the source of the Yemenis' problem:

Yemen's economy depends heavily on oil production, and its government receives the vast majority of its revenue from oil taxes. Yet analysts predict that the country's petroleum output, which has declined over the last seven years, will fall to zero by 2017. The government has done little to plan for its post-oil future. Yemen's population, already the poorest on the Arabian peninsula and with an unemployment rate of 35%, is expected to double by 2035. An incredible 45% of Yemen's population is under the age of 15. These trends will exacerbate large and growing environmental problems, including the exhaustion of Yemen's groundwater resources. Given that a full 90% of the country's water is used for agriculture, this trend portends disaster.
Then it provides a recipe for how to use American aid:

Over the weekend, Obama pledged to double aid to Yemen, but this money must be spent strategically. Several areas are ripe for foreign help, including training and equipping counter-terrorism forces, bolstering border security and building the capacity of the coast guard, expanding counterinsurgency advice to the Yemeni government and expanding programs focused on basic governance and anti-corruption.
Conspicuous by its absence is any suggestion that the Yemini government and people use the money to come up with a sustainable economy. Is anyone else out there confused, befuddled or bemused?

Seems that rather than buying swords, a better approach might be to beat the ones already on hand into plowshares. But perhaps that would be in opposition to the proven pop-centric COIN technique of "clear, hold, and build."

davidbfpo
01-06-2010, 11:53 PM
Just found this in The Daily Telegraph (UK): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6943108/US-forges-alliance-with-Saddam-Hussein-officers-to-fight-al-Qaeda.html

Raises some interesting points I'd not read recently in the links here.

wm
01-07-2010, 01:44 AM
Just found this in The Daily Telegraph (UK): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6943108/US-forges-alliance-with-Saddam-Hussein-officers-to-fight-al-Qaeda.html

Raises some interesting points I'd not read recently in the links here.

Try this 2004 article (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_93/ai_n6123802/?tag=content;col1) from Infantry Magazine for identifying an apparently longstanding (since at least the 1962 Yemen Civil War) connection between Iraq and Yemen. The author makes some very interesting other points, none of which can I verify without doing a bunch more research, but they certainly make interesting reading and may shed a whole new light for folks on the origins of some of America's issues in the Middle East. Perhaps the JFK/LBJ administrations may well have screwed up stuff in SW Asia/MENA as badly as they did in SE Asia.

slapout9
01-08-2010, 03:38 AM
William Engdahl on the oil transportation choke point and why we are concerned about Yemen.



http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Chokepoint_Yemen/chokepoint_yemen.html

wm
01-08-2010, 02:41 PM
William Engdahl on the oil transportation choke point and why we are concerned about Yemen.http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Chokepoint_Yemen/chokepoint_yemen.html
Might want to do a little extra source validation on Engdahl--his claims to expertise seem sketchy, to me at least.

When looking into the Adelphi publications that the Engdahl article cites, one will note a few interesting things: the two exploration tracts are in what used to be South Yemen; neither has shown any tangible results from E&P efforts, only potentiality based on an understanding of the area's geology and its similarity to two other areas with notable fields (Hassi
Messaoud in Algeria and Bach Ho offshore Vietnam); and that Adelphi sold off its 8.5% share in one of those 2 parcels. With regard to this last point, one wonders why they would do that if it is likely to be such a great future oil source.

Additionally, controlling the Bab el-Mandab "choke point" could become moot if the one believes Engdahl's 15-year-old claim from the

well-informed Washington insider that Yemen contained “enough undeveloped oil to fill the oil demand of the entire world for the next fifty years.” The oil could be piped to either side of the choke point, or both, using existing pipleines from the Marib-Shabwa basin or into the Gulf of Aden from the existing Masilh basin pipeline (which would avoid transiting the chokepoint for deliveries to China). And, compared to the Straits of Hormuz, one should consider another significant point regarding the Bab el-Mandab chokepoint: a work-around exists for seaborne transit of oil were it closed--sailing around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Also worth noting is the following extract from an interesting 2004 summary article on oil choke points here (http://www.allbusiness.com/mining/support-activities-mining-support-oil/171251-1.html)

The Bab el-Mandab could be bypassed (for northbound oil traffic by using the East-West oil pipeline, which traverses Saudi Arabia and has capacity of 4.8 million bpd. However, southbound oil traffic would still be blocked.

omarali50
01-08-2010, 06:25 PM
The way the modern world is structured right now (partly or mostly led by the US), populations have various ways to make a living: some are obvious and "traditional", like agriculture. Some are equally obvious and modern (like industrial manufacturing) and some are based on extraction of valuable minerals (the biggest example being oil). Since in the last category, the extraction is done by a relatively small number of people, frequently foreigners, the way the local population gets the money is frequently problematic. Someone grabs power and takes the money on behalf of the whole nation, but corruption and widespread dissatisfaction with the way the wealth is being shared are almost a given.

All this is old hat. But there seems to be another way to make a living that is less obvious or less noted: i.e. nuisance value. One could argue that if the US ends up paying tens of billions per year to afghanistan to help them "develop", that will be a good use of nuisance value by the afghan people...after all, other equally poor countries are not getting injections of billions of dollars and thousands of highly paid aid workers. Pakistan has more of a real economy than Afghanistan, but the army certainly sells nuisance value too (pay us well or the whole region blows up)....before paknationalists jump on me, I will propose that the same model may apply to the US if the real economy continues to decline. And its not really new. Many of the great conquerors of history were basically using military prowess to grab other people's money, this is just a more refined version of the same scam.
If Yemeni oil is running out, does it not make sense for Yemen to sell nuisance value??

slapout9
01-08-2010, 06:50 PM
The way the modern world is structured right now (partly or mostly led by the US), populations have various ways to make a living: some are obvious and "traditional", like agriculture. Some are equally obvious and modern (like industrial manufacturing) and some are based on extraction of valuable minerals (the biggest example being oil). Since in the last category, the extraction is done by a relatively small number of people, frequently foreigners, the way the local population gets the money is frequently problematic. Someone grabs power and takes the money on behalf of the whole nation, but corruption and widespread dissatisfaction with the way the wealth is being shared are almost a given.

All this is old hat. But there seems to be another way to make a living that is less obvious or less noted: i.e. nuisance value. One could argue that if the US ends up paying tens of billions per year to afghanistan to help them "develop", that will be a good use of nuisance value by the afghan people...after all, other equally poor countries are not getting injections of billions of dollars and thousands of highly paid aid workers. Pakistan has more of a real economy than Afghanistan, but the army certainly sells nuisance value too (pay us well or the whole region blows up)....before paknationalists jump on me, I will propose that the same model may apply to the US if the real economy continues to decline. And its not really new. Many of the great conquerors of history were basically using military prowess to grab other people's money, this is just a more refined version of the same scam.
If Yemeni oil is running out, does it not make sense for Yemen to sell nuisance value??

Yes!

davidbfpo
01-09-2010, 12:10 AM
From Post 31:
The United States has not helped matters..Instead of imploding, Yemen is going to explode. And when it does, Yemen's problems of today are going to become Saudi Arabia's problems of tomorrow.

Previous Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...e_to_qaedastan

An update in a short interview of the student writer:
Part of his bio: Gregory Johnsen, a former Fulbright Fellow in Yemen, is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. Johnsen co-runs the website Waq al-Waq with Brian O’Neill...

New link:http://harpers.org/archive/2010/01/hbc-90006330

Cavguy
01-09-2010, 04:40 PM
Is Yemen's potential explosion really an American concern beyond AQ exports of terror? Or should we let the Saudis handle it, since they have a well equipped army, money, and regional interest at stake?

Stan
01-09-2010, 05:15 PM
Some are equally obvious and modern (like industrial manufacturing) and some are based on extraction of valuable minerals (the biggest example being oil). Since in the last category, the extraction is done by a relatively small number of people, frequently foreigners, the way the local population gets the money is frequently problematic. Someone grabs power and takes the money on behalf of the whole nation, but corruption and widespread dissatisfaction with the way the wealth is being shared are almost a given.

but the army certainly sells nuisance value too (pay us well or the whole region blows up)....

You've perfectly identified a problem that has plagued Africa for at least the last 4 decades.

But nuisance value presumes an awful lot especially in developing nations. We would then presume these folks are even willing to settle and close. Sounds like more of a legal beagle matter that works in developed nations, and in theory, can be applied to the remainder of the world. If we could get the entire lower class in say Afghanistan to just go to work and get paid, would the upper class simply agree?

We tried to give away free filtered water to over a million refugees dying of cholera at a rate of four thousand a day. We flew in fire trucks and personnel, pumped that Sierra to the camps and go figure, the military went haywire (we just took away one of their principle means of income). Oversimplified indeed - but we had yet to piss off the government which would have been even more impressive.

I'd love to hear how this would immediately start functioning without upheavals.

davidbfpo
01-09-2010, 08:56 PM
(Q1) Is Yemen's potential explosion really an American concern beyond AQ exports of terror? (Q2) Or should we let the Saudis handle it, since they have a well equipped army, money, and regional interest at stake?

Cavguy,

Having read many of the links here I hazard an "armchair" answer.

Q1. No, the primary responsibility lies with the people of the Yemen, who appear to be poorly served by their thirty year long government.

Q2. No, part of the problem is the Saudi's involvement, pushing their version of Islam, bribing tribal chiefs; note the revolt by the Al-Huthi is by a Shia tribe and whilst the Saudis have a military capability is it one that is effective in aggressive action? They maybe part of the solution.

davidbfpo
01-10-2010, 02:55 PM
Two post-Detroit articles are on the RUSI website 'home page' under Analysis: http://www.rusi.org/ which contain valuable points:

1) Al-Qa'ida in Yemen: Situation Update and Recommendations for Policy Makers

..neither the threat of this attack nor the danger posed by AQAP to Western interests should be exaggerated. The attempt was a terrorist attack not only in the sense that it targeted civilians, but also in that it instilled fear in Western governments and populations far out of proportion to the actual threat..

Sheikh Naji Bin Abdul Aziz al-Shayef, the leader of the Bakeel tribe, recently stated: The tribes of the Bakeel, whose members number around seven million, stand together against the so-called Al-Qaeda in Yemen and its criminal elements...

The London conference should:
Acknowledge that this is a regional, geo-strategic issue. Yemen is part of an arc of instability and solutions to its systemic problems must involve Arab and African partners.

b. Yemen requires a comprehensive approach. A dependence solely on security force assistance and targeted counter-terrorism operations will prove counter-productive.

c. Whilst attempting to take a holistic approach, it is essential to disaggregate the threats emerging from the differing security challenges in Yemen. Aggregating all those who oppose the Yemeni government or Western policies as terrorists is a mistake. It took several years for militaries to learn the lesson that not all Sunni insurgents in Iraq were members of Al-Qa'ida and that the Taliban are not synonymous with Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. The same mistake should not be made when considering AQAP and other armed actors in Yemen.

d. Radicalisation in Yemen is no longer just a problem for Yemen. Significant numbers of non-Yemenis like Abdulmutallab are travelling to Yemen, resulting in an increased risk of radicalisation and of the subsequent threat of terrorist attacks outside Yemen. Millions of US dollars spent in development assistance in countries like Yemen may prove more effective than billions of dollars of additional defence and homeland security expenditure. Prioritising development is not a soft option, nor merely a good thing to do - it is an act of enlightened self-interest.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B475DF54843E/

2) After the Christmas Day bomb plot: where now for counter-terrorism? This is a wider ranging article and has a section on the Yemen, which I quote at length:
Discussion will naturally focus on the interpretation of Islam in Yemen and whether its theological landscape is conducive to extremists.

This will get rather complicated, however. Historically, Yemen, particularly the Hadramawt valley, has been at the centre of a very sophisticated and anti-anarchical mode of Islamic thought, relying on mainstream Islamic theology, law and spirituality. The results have blossomed into more nuanced and mainstream readings, albeit from a conservative perspective, with a following currently spanning the United States, Europe, East Africa and through to East Asia. Yemen achieved this without state interference or involvement - peaceful preachers have independently and without state patronage encouraged their flock to work within civil society to battle society's ills, marginalise extremes, and encourage indigenous notions of Islamic expression.

Thus, in the UK, authorities have encouraged Yemeni-trained preachers to visit (through the Radical Middle Way initiative), and Muslim communities have been sending their sons and daughters to the Hadhramawt valley for decades now to learn from their example. They come back as vibrant functionaries, often with few if any resources. The effects of their work are yet to be calculated, but it is likely that without their input, the problem of violent extremism we face would be far more pronounced.

To be sure, the positive influence of this Islamic tendency is not always apparent in a Yemen ravaged by conflict. Extremists do certainly operate. But that is more to do with Yemen's fragmented insurgencies and ungoverned spaces, which foreign extremists exploit to find safe haven. Yet, the predominant modes of religious interpretation are not conducive to a large-scale 'Takfiri' type movement, which Al-Qa'ida-style operatives could draw recruits from....

Finally, with regards to Yemen, it is important to understand the country before resorting to hasty reactions. The Yemeni authorities take seriously the threat that faces them, and they have been very clear and open about where they stand. We need to increase co-operation with those authorities, and improve their capacity to the job they know how to do best - not turn them, and the local population, against us.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B475B34EBDA8/

davidbfpo
01-10-2010, 07:56 PM
The long time BBC Middle East correspondent on his visit to the Yemen: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8448393.stm and available on Ipod etc.

His closing sentences:
Many people here have told me that the only way forward is to rebuild Yemen so that its people will not be seduced by the jihadists' violent vision of a glorious martyr's death. That will take time. You can choose, someone said - quick results or good results. Not both.

davidbfpo
01-12-2010, 08:59 AM
A short NYT piece by an ex-US Ambassador to the Yemen:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/opinion/12hull.html?src=tptw

Opens with:
AMERICANS are scrambling to understand Yemen, where Al Qaeda has recently surged and the Christmas Day plot against Northwest Flight 253 was hatched. It’s not easy. Yemen has 5,000 years of history, complicated politics and daunting economic challenges. But we’ve made it more difficult to understand by allowing several myths to cloud our vision. Challenging these misconceptions is a first step toward comprehending and overcoming significant threats to American, Yemeni and international security.

Ending with:
Forging an effective American counterterrorism policy in Yemen will be as difficult as it is necessary. But misreading Yemeni history and society can only complicate its conception and jeopardize its execution.

From this "armchair" there now seems to be a flurry of cautionary articles and those who advocate "more" still pause from specifying what.

Ken White
01-12-2010, 04:47 PM
I suspect the reluctance to expand on 'what' is a function of the costs in all terms...

davidbfpo
01-14-2010, 11:26 PM
A really bizarre exploration of the Yemeni situation: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8459282.stm


The Sheikh (Sheikh Abdulmajeed al-Zendani) is the most influential religious figure in Yemen. He is also on the America's list of those it believes connected to global terrorism. Sheikh Zendani is close to the government here and journalists at the news conference questioned how sincere Yemen could be about co-operating with the US if he was still at liberty.

The more that is revealed about the local situation one hopes the earlier hype to respond quickly with force is now counter-balanced.

davidbfpo
01-17-2010, 10:30 PM
Randy Borum, SWC member, has on his blogsite a series of pointers to recent comments on the Yemen:http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2010/01/yemen-catch-up.html


Trying to get up to speed on the issues? You're in good company. Consider a look at some of the following stories, resources, and analyses. It may not be a one-dose solution, but perhaps a a good first step.

davidbfpo
01-21-2010, 11:35 AM
Copied from the 'What are you reading' thread, hat tip to Sandman:


Just finished ARABIAN ASSIGNMENT written by David Smiley commander of the British involvement in the Middle East during the 60’s. Of particular interest was his work in Yemen. I had forgotten that the U.S. favored the Egyptian invasion while the British supported the Saudi backing of the Emir’s guerrillas. Smiley’s constant struggles with the various tribes’ he tried to unite, helps to provide a window into politics in that country today.

I'd forgotten that the UK-US 'special relationship' did not apply to the Yemeni civil war in the 1960's and the UK ruled Aden 1839-1967, with a relationship with the rest of what was then called South Yemen.

davidbfpo
01-24-2010, 08:51 PM
The BBC's Middle East reporter Paul Wood after a visit to the Yemen writes: http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5704508/part_6/yemen-is-a-lesson-in-the-limits-of-western-power.thtml

Opens with this sub-title:
The Yemeni government tolerated and made deals with the terrorists, writes Paul Wood. But US intervention would only unite the whole country behind bin Laden.and ends with:
The same realities which mean the US must, for the time being, fight only a proxy war in Yemen also mean that President Saleh does not have complete freedom of action, however much western money, arms and training he receives. Yemen is a lesson in the limits of Western power, but one learned early and therefore perhaps less expensively than in Afghanistan or Iraq.

davidbfpo
01-26-2010, 08:31 PM
The BBC TV 'Hard Talk' interviewed the Yemeni Foreign Minister and the IPod is on:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00qg6xf (quite long) and without a summary.

Summary found here on Reuters
:http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60P1LD20100126


Qirbi ruled out allowing a U.S. military base on Yemeni soil or covert foreign operations in the country.

"We will undertake it ourselves. Why do we need outside soldiers to fight when we can do the fight ourselves?".

He said the government had mistakenly allowed foreign intervention in 2002, when a U.S. missile strike killed an al Qaeda leader suspected of planning the 2000 suicide bombing of the U.S. warship Cole.

"It proved to be a terrible mistake, and this is why we don't want to repeat it. We have to do it ourselves and anybody who is interested will have to support us.

I think that means, minus diplomacy, "give us the money". Now have we, especially the US taxpayer, heard that before many times? No, rhetorical question and no answers required.

Vahid
01-27-2010, 07:55 PM
Unfortunately, so many of the comments that I have read here fall short of thrusting to the limelight the genuine instigators of the situation in Yemen. While much of the soul-searching appears to be blaming the Yemeni government for being acquiescent on the growth of terrorism in the country, the core of the blame should be cast on the dreary social and economical indicators in Yemen. In other words, rampant illiteracy, a bare-breaking patriarchy that has thwarted the emancipation of women, diminishing oil resources, and a blind eye turned by the Americans to despotism that reigns in the country. In respect of these indicators, Yemen bears a striking resemblance to Pakistan, where such trends have also been alarmingly widespread.

Although Yemen's northern neighbour, Saudi Arabia, cannot entirely wash its hands from the tendencies of terrorism inside the country, Saudi Arabia still cannot be considered to be a fertile zone as far as the growth and appeal of terrorism is concerned by virtue of the oil revenues that the government has been using to stifle unrest. Notwithstanding, in the case of Yemen, we are mentioning the imposition of similar cultural and political repression minus the oil. Hence, not only the government has been smothering the population, but it has been inept at providing the populace with their fundamental needs. Thus, the lure of terrorism to the disaffected stratum of the population.

davidbfpo
01-27-2010, 09:43 PM
Vahid,

Your comment:
Unfortunately, so many of the comments that I have read here fall short of thrusting to the limelight the genuine instigators of the situation in Yemen.is noted. We have tried to offer some insight from those who have studied and commented on the Yemen. IIRC no-one on SWC has personal experience of the country and so our comments are based on watching other places, yes including Pakistan.

I know my own strategic view is influenced by wishing to stay out of what is a complex and difficult country.

davidbfpo
01-27-2010, 10:16 PM
Two stories from a number as the diplomatic conference on the Yemen looms closer:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012602205.html

This is a quick summary: http://cominganarchy.com/2010/01/26/yemen-geography-matters/ and hat tip to Zenpundit who highlights how the Yemeni tribes fight and get paid, by the Saudis (with emphasis added):
The Saudis are guilty of aggravating and prolonging the conflict. Wary of taking too many losses on the ground and unable to do much by air and sea, they have recruited the Hashed, a local tribe, to fight against the Huthi, the tribe central to the Shia rebels. The Hashed have several incentives to continue fighting for as long as possible—they have a long-standing feud with the Huthi, and make a great deal of money from fighting for the Saudis, and may be coming up with schemes to prolong the conflict. According to a source of Al Jazeera:

If [the Hashed are] given the mission of taking a particular mountain, for example, they’ll call up the Huthi leaders and tell them: ‘We’re getting five million riyals to take the mountain. We’ll split it with you if you withdraw tonight and let us take over’… After the tribesmen take charge, they hand it over to the Saudis… The next day, the Huthi return and defeat the Saudis and retake the mountain… It’s been happening like this for weeks.

davidbfpo
01-31-2010, 12:34 PM
A rather unusual, short article:http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1804&MainCat=6 The Yemen Post is based in the Yemen and has an English website. A careful look found some stories missed, I like this one:
Yemen spent only 7 percent of the pledges announced during the 2006 London Donor Conference, UK's Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said, pointing out that donors promised $ 5.7 billion in 2006, out of which 81 percent was allocated and 40 percent signed.

Link:http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1814&MainCat=3

davidbfpo
01-31-2010, 12:37 PM
Looks like local traditions persist:
Yemen's Shi'ite northern rebels accept the government's terms for a ceasefire, their leader said on Saturday, but there was no immediate response from the authorities.

From:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/30/AR2010013001019.html

davidbfpo
02-10-2010, 03:56 PM
I missed this Chatham House briefing paper on the Yemen, updated in January 2010:http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15712_bp0110yemen.pdf and the author is Ginny Hill - who appeared earlier in this thread.

The much heralded international conference on the Yemen, held in London on the 28th January 2010:
lasting barely two hoursis a reminder how "spin" and diplomacy can falter. In closing the BBC report remarked:
The international interest is there, at least for now, but the Yemeni government will have to deliver on its own reform plans if it is to secure the sustained international help that it so badly needs.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8484224.stm

Some Arab press editorials on:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8485222.stm

Perhaps now the post-Detroit fuss has abated, with serious though devoted to the options, we shall let a "low profile" external role continue and hope the Yemeni's decide themselves what to do.

davidbfpo
02-11-2010, 09:36 PM
From the BBC:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8511705.stm


The Yemeni authorities have announced a ceasefire with Shia rebels fighting government forces in the north. The truce is to start at midnight local time (2100 GMT) and comes after days of negotiations between the government and rebels on how to end the conflict.

davidbfpo
03-03-2010, 08:58 PM
From FP a week ago:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/26/yemens_15_minutes_of_fame


Remember Yemen? For a few short weeks this winter, after the Yemen-trained Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried (and failed) to blow up a commercial airliner in Detroit, the troubled country found itself under a rare media spotlight. Journalists descended on the capital, Sanaa; pundits offered advice for fighting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and ending Yemen's two insurgencies. Congress called hearings. Yemen's foreign minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, was a regular guest on international news networks.

The country was the new Afghanistan, many said, the latest worrisome safe haven for al Qaeda and its affiliates. U.S. Sen. Joe Lieberman declared it "tomorrow's war." And now: nothing....

The lack of attention now is unfortunate because -- despite the media's silence -- quite a bit has happened in Yemen over the last few weeks.

For those who watch Yemen worth checking this IMHO.

Tukhachevskii
03-09-2010, 01:42 PM
Osama bin Laden's former body-guard, Nasir Al-Bahri (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7050537.ece) now residing in Yemen, on being de-radicalised/re-educated (whatever that is), how he wishes he was still back with his boss (wherever he may be), how he would like to work for the US government and seeks its destruction (because, President Saleh is untrustworthy).

davidbfpo
04-15-2010, 08:52 PM
A commentary on the Yemen by IISS: within the careful wording are some direct, polite comments:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/april/mistrust-bedevils-yemens-foreign-relations/

Second paragraph:
During over three decades in power – as president of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1978 until 1990, and as president of the unified Republic of Yemen from 1990 onwards – Salih has displayed a propensity for ruthlessness and manipulation. He has made sure that there are no alternative leaders in the wings or contenders for central power, drawing leverage from his critics’ acknowledgement that dissension around the leadership would benefit only those who favour an even weaker centre. Yet the state itself is under severe pressure and at risk of crumbling.

Near the end:
an international community that feels it has tried everything with Sana’a at one time or another, to no lasting effect. Developments in late 2009 and early 2010 do not promise the fresh start that is needed.

Tukhachevskii
04-26-2010, 10:00 AM
UK ambassador in Yemen Escapes Bomb Blast (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uk-ambassador-in-yemen-escapes-bomb-blast-1954467.html)

and

Suicide Bombers Targets British Ambassador in Yemen (http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63P0AF20100426?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a54:g12:r2:c 0.439653:b33322704:z3)

and

"Suicide Bomber" Targets British Ambassador to Yemen (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7108136.ece). This Times article also contains an interesting, if of doubtful relevance, tidbit regarding the Ambassador's pregnant mistress.

Tukhachevskii
04-26-2010, 03:04 PM
Interesting report from the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) entitled The Consequences of Yemen's Ungoverned Space on the Arabian Peninsula (http://www.inegma.com/?navigation=reports&page=2#);

Police found gangs in remote areas, including Abu-Arish forest in Jizan, who were smuggling contraband from Yemen and Ethipoia respectively to Arabian Peninsula cities. Investigations of the 2002 bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, as well as the simultaneous attempt to shoot down an Arkia Boeing 757 charter jet as it took off from the city en route to Tel Aviv, show how both attacks were facilitated by the terrorists' ability to access relibale transport and financial platforms. Preparation for the attacks incorporated explosives and missiles smuggled from Yemen, planning meetings in six Kenyan towns (Nairobi, Siyu, Mombassa, Nyali, Kikambala, and Lamu) and three external countries (Somalia, Yemen and Tanzania) mostly arranged via coded cell phones, and the electronic transfer of some $100,000 in funding. The African-Arabian Peninsula transnational linkages are not understood well and this is another unknown factor contributing to ungovernable space.

Link doesn't re-direct to required page. Scroll down to find it.

Jedburgh
05-06-2010, 04:01 PM
RAND, 3 May 10: Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf)

For nearly six years, the government of Yemen has conducted military operations north of the capital against groups of its citizens known as “Huthis.” In spite of using all means at its disposal, the government has been unable to subdue the Huthi movement. Along with southern discontent and al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism, the Huthi conflict presents an enduring threat to the stability of Yemen and the regime of its president. This book presents an in-depth look at the conflict in all its sociocultural, political, and military aspects. Basing their research on a wide variety of sources, both Western and non-Western, the authors provide a history of the Huthi movement and its origins in the Zaydi branch of Islam. They discuss the various stages of the conflict in detail and map out its possible future trajectories. In spite of a recent ceasefire, the 2009-2010 round of fighting, featuring Saudi involvement and Iranian rhetorical condemnation of Saudi-Yemeni actions, points to the conflict becoming transnational and increasingly sectarian. These developments run contrary to the interests of the United States and its friends in the region, as they seek to combat al-Qa'ida-related threats and build Yemeni capacity.....
CEIP, 5 May 10: War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf)

Key conclusions about the conflict in Saada:

• Fighting likely to continue. The current cease-fire agreed to in February 2010 is likely to fail as the central government shows little interest in addressing the core grievances of the rebelling Houthis.

• Priorities are misguided. The Southern secessionist movement is Yemen’s more serious security threat, but the regime is more involved in Saada for two key reasons: the government believes the war is winnable, and uses the military operations in the North to send a message to agitators in the South.

• Costs are escalating. In the six years the war evolved from a local insurrection into a national challenge, devastating the economy and consuming crucial resources.

• Burdens disproportionately felt by noncombatants. The six rounds of fighting came with high humanitarian costs. Hostilities displaced over 250,000 people, killed hundreds or thousands (the exact number of casualties is unknown), and destroyed significant civilian infrastructure.

• Conflict expands beyond borders. When Saudi Arabia’s military entered the conflict in November 2009 following Houthi incursions, conditions went from bad to worse. But there is no evidence that the conflict in Saada is a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran as commonly asserted.

Tukhachevskii
06-07-2010, 09:06 AM
Briton among 30 arrested on suspicion of Al-Qaeda links in Yemen (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7145062.ece)

One of the French detainees was identifed as Jeremy Johnny Witter, 23, who had been studying at the Sanaa Institute in the capital's Old City. The school's director, Muhammad al-Anisi, told The Time that he and his staff had become suspicious of the young man, who, like Mr Abdulmutallab, already spoke fluent Arabic and rarely attended classes. Mr Al-Anisi described the student as a "very quiet, very polite and very religious" yong man.
That last staement made me do a double take, having been to Yemen and knowing that the phrase "very religious" generally applies to every young man there. Wouldn't know about the women!

&
Yemen is centre of militant world according to counter-terror officials (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7145237.ece)

Inside the White House, the Pentagon and the US intelligence agencies the fear is that Yemen is more likely to produce a successful suicide mission within the US than perhaps any other country.

davidbfpo
07-08-2010, 04:14 PM
A lenthy NYT article on the Yemen, which pulls the history, culture and far more well together. No surprises, but the culture aspects are well made.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/magazine/11Yemen-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

AdamG
07-12-2010, 03:20 AM
Sana’a, July 11 (IANS) Al Qaeda’s Yemeni wing Sunday claimed responsibility for last month’s attack on the intelligence headquarters in Aden that left at least 11 people dead.
The Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), however, claimed that the attack left 24 people dead.

“The battalion of martyrs broke into the intelligence headquarters’ building in Aden on early June 19 and successfully managed to kill at least 24 security officers, soldiers and police who were in the building at that time,” Xinhua reported, quoting a AQAP statement.

“We killed 15 high-ranking intelligence officers, six intelligence policewomen, all the security soldiers who were guarding the main gate of the building and one cleaning worker, set fire to all offices of the building - including offices of the intelligence director and his deputy and to two police cars, destroyed six other vehicles and looted Israeli-made automatic weapons,” the AQAP statement said.

http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-for-yemen-attack_100394246.html

SWJ Blog
08-15-2010, 09:18 AM
Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/secret-assault-on-terrorism-wi/)

Entry Excerpt:

Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/15shadowwar.html?_r=2&hp) - Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Robert F. Worth, New York Times. In roughly a dozen countries - from the deserts of North Africa, to the mountains of Pakistan, to former Soviet republics crippled by ethnic and religious strife - the United States has significantly increased military and intelligence operations, pursuing the enemy using robotic drones and commando teams, paying contractors to spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists.

Moderator's Note: Copied here from SWJ blog for reference as the focus is on the Yemen.

davidbfpo
08-29-2010, 09:33 AM
I missed spotting this news story two weeks ago, until reading a commentary by Professor Paul Rogers:
In one recent incident in Yemen, a US air strike that was intended to kill an al-Qaida-linked group actually killed the Deputy Governor of Marib Province who had been engaged in talks with local paramilitaries aimed at persuading them to give up their actions.

Link:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/monthly_briefings/a_complex_war_shadows

Not exactly inspiring conducting such a strike. Lack of knowledge on the situation on the ground, including the tradition of negotiation with tribes in conflict with the centre / nation-state and co-ordination with the host state.

This is one news wire report:http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hjjtd-a7G-AoyFQK5OgEARY2hRdw

M-A Lagrange
08-29-2010, 10:54 AM
Surprised no one flagged that one.
8 Yemeni soldiers and 1 civilian killed in an RPG + machinegun attack by AQ in Al-Rai, Jaar, Abyane province on Saturday 28.
(Sorry link in French)

M-A


Yémen: huit soldats et un civil tués dans une attaque attribuée à Al-Qaïda
"Huit soldats ont été tués dans une attaque lancée par des membres d'Al-Qaïda contre un poste militaire dans le quartier Al-Rai de la ville de Jaar, dans la province d'Abyane",
http://fr.news.yahoo.com/73/20100828/twl-ymen-huit-soldats-et-un-civil-tus-da-d79e08a.html

davidbfpo
10-29-2010, 09:27 PM
An odd article, the full title being 'Yemeni officials admit they are losing the battle against al-Qaeda', being a report from:
Zinjibar, the ramshackle principal town of Abyan province..

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6968221/Yemeni-officials-admit-they-are-losing-the-battle-against-al-Qaeda.html

Map:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zinjibar

A wider look at the roots of AQ in the Yemen:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8097875/Cargo-plane-plot-Yemen-focus.html

davidbfpo
11-01-2010, 10:34 PM
A good commentary IMHO on Yemen,a s once again the focus returns to this poor country, hat tip to FB Blog:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/31/ignoring_yemen_at_our_peril?page=0,0

Ends with:
Neither approach -- full invasion or surgical strikes -- will solve the problem of al-Qaeda terrorism in Yemen and make America safer. The United States and its allies have been lucky three times in just over a year. Counting on that luck holding is not a safe bet.

davidbfpo
12-08-2010, 10:36 PM
Yet again hat tip to FP Blog and subtitled:
The WikiLeaks cables show clearly that the Yemeni government diverted U.S. and British counterterrorism funding to fight its domestic rebels.

This sentence sums it all up, not from a leaked diplomatic cable:
Allowing Yemen to draw the United States into standing a mercenary army for Saleh against his domestic opponents, while hoping he uses it against al Qaeda as well, implies a triumph of wishful thinking over experience.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/yemens_double_game?page=0,0

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 08:39 PM
From Abu M a reminder the Yemen has not gone away:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/02/yemen-after-saleh.html

Opening with:
On January 24, President Salih addressed the Yemeni people and offered the compulsively quotable wisdom that Yemen is not Tunisia. But if Yemen is not Tunisia, or Egypt for that matter, then what is it?

Which ends with this sentence:
The United States needs to start making friends now, especially outside of Sanaa, with local and tribal leaders. The tribes are a constant in Yemen; the government, after a 30-some year hiatus, is about to be a lot less so.

Now where have we heard tribes before?

Bob's World
02-02-2011, 11:04 AM
I don't know that the U.S. needs to make "friends" with tribes, we must need to stop making them out to be, or making them into "enemies" or "threats."

Our problem is that once we make someone our "friend" the next thing we want to do is make him President or King, and then we once again find ourselves overly committed to some single man or faction; and right back to where we are right now across the ME.

I argue for a more principled and neutral approach, weighted to support the overall welfare of the populace of any given state rather than some specific government or interest group. I see that this is how the White House is playing it with Tunisia and Egypt so far. I hope the are reaching out to Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, etc with similar messages.

1. These are the principles we stand for.
2. We prioritize the welfare and stability of your overall populace over the sustainment of your government or any other, or any other interest groups outside the government.
3. We encourage thoughtful evolution of government over either continued suppression of popular will, or revolution of government by a populace that feels it is denied any other recourse.
4. Dedicating the power and the influence of the US to encourage proper behavior of all stakeholders.
5. Being willing to embrace and work with whomever ultimately rises to power, and holding them to this same philosophy of thought.

Too often, when some group we disapprove of, or some group that has been placed on a "terrorist list", or when things don't go the way we wanted them to, (The Shah gets tossed in Iran, Hamas wins an election in Palestine, etc) we tend to pout (for lack of a better word) and freeze them out from full participation in free society. Such exclusionary tactics form alliances of necessity of those we place in such categories. I see no profit from our continuing to act in that manner. Sometimes I think we do it merely to have the "threats" to "contain" that are necessary to make that dated approach to grand strategy and foreign policy work.

We have an opportunity in Yemen. Saudi and Yemeni revolutionaries both find sanctuary there, but if we can only see these men as "Al Qaeda" or as "Terrorists" we will trap ourselves into the role of continuing to support governments with little support by their own populaces, and in the role of doing or supporting the dirty work of suppressing those members of their populaces who dare to stand up.

The intel guys are wrong.

The ideologues are wrong.

The Good Cold Warriors are wrong.

It is as much time for the U.S. to evolve in our approach to foreign policy as it is time for these "friendly" governments to evolve in their approach to their domestic policies.

Fuchs
02-02-2011, 11:36 AM
1. These are the principles we stand for.
2. We prioritize the welfare and stability of your overall populace over the sustainment of your government or any other, or any other interest groups outside the government.
3. We encourage thoughtful evolution of government over either continued suppression of popular will, or revolution of government by a populace that feels it is denied any other recourse.
4. Dedicating the power and the influence of the US to encourage proper behavior of all stakeholders.
5. Being willing to embrace and work with whomever ultimately rises to power, and holding them to this same philosophy of thought.

3)
"Encourage" how?

4)
What power? Spending power?
What influence? What source of influence is left in your program?

5)
What "work with"?
Sign air traffic treaties?
Selflessly send trainers (assuming that their expertise is useful and can be transferred)?
Pump billions of aid into the country (unlikely)?
Protect with veto in UNSC?

What meaningful "work with" is on the table?



In the end, the U.S. has more of a domestic mess than it seems to be able to cope with. Its relevance in distant places was and is small unless dirty things are done.

You can bribe a government with "aid" (guess what - there are countries which actually focus on basic needs of populations in their "aid" programs!), you can sell weapons, you can exchange intelligence info (especially from electronic sources), you can sell photo ops with your president in exchange for a favour, you can threaten with coups and assassination. You can also distort the suppression of popular discontent as CT activity.

Yet, once don't do dirty things and are just a distant country with lots of distant friends and a large economy, you're not that special or important any more.
You stopped playing great power games then.

Bob's World
02-02-2011, 02:58 PM
DIME

And while "brand America" is a bit tarnished these days, it is still a brand that carries a very positive connotation in most communities.

What is often cast as "anti-Americanism" is more often a rejection of current U.S Foreign Policy that is often coupled with a sense of betrayal/disappointment that that policy as applied to their people and their nation has drifted so far from the ideals that the nation was founded upon. Simply aligning our actions more closely with our heritage and our words will be a big step in making this happen.

But the US possesses the full bag of carrots and sticks that make up DIME. If we can get NATO to go to Afghanistan, we can encourage positive modifications of governmental behavior, and restraints of popular frustrations as well. This is what governments do. Simply picking some strongman and supporting him through thick and thin is only one COA, and not the most creative one, and certainly not one that is nearly as effective as it used to be.

Ken White
02-02-2011, 05:47 PM
DIME"Brother, can you spare a dime..." American inside joke. Except it's not funny...
And while "brand America" is a bit tarnished these days, it is still a brand that carries a very positive connotation in most communities.That is arguably true but I take exception to "these days." That usage implies that there was a time when there was no bit of tarnish on the old escutcheon. I don't think that's ever been the case though I certainly acknowledge many would like to believe that.
What is often cast as "anti-Americanism" is more often a rejection of current U.S Foreign Policy that is often coupled with a sense of betrayal/disappointment that that policy as applied to their people and their nation has drifted so far from the ideals that the nation was founded upon.I think that's a quite idealistic appraisal. Most people in the world -- to include inside the US -- aren't terribly concerned with our supposed former ideals. They are concerned with themselves and today.
Simply aligning our actions more closely with our heritage and our words will be a big step in making this happen.Which aspects of the heritage? Which words? The words come from Politicians who cater to a domestic audience. The heritage includes over 200 years of interventions, raids and chicanery most aimed to advance US commercial interests.

Note that I think neither of those things is terrible. Politicians are weasels and live for double speak. That's reality, I don't like it but it's acceptable because they are mutually constraining and / or self defeating more often than not. Our strong push for commercial freedom and dominance has in the former aspect been beneficial to the world and in the latter beneficial to us. So that's okay as well. I mention all that only to suggest that belief in the myth of an America that played nice and did only decent things is woefully incorrect. We play rough and we should.

Fuchs said: ""Yet, once don't do dirty things and are just a distant country with lots of distant friends and a large economy, you're not that special or important any more....You stopped playing great power games then."" That too is mythical. Not doing "dirty things" would have meant that we were a vassal of someone who did do "dirty things." We are indeed a distant country from all save Mexico and Canada, a large country -- quite large, almost overly so -- and do have a large economy. What that means, as I suspect he knows, is that we cannot stop playing great power games. Much as I personally wish we would and could, we cannot -- until we reach that vassal level of existence and fragment which is going to happen eventually but is highly unlikely in our lifetime or that of our children. So we're going to keep playing "dirty things"; no choice.

The "dirty things" in my comment are in quotes because 'dirty' is a state of mind, in the eye of the beholder and a relative term. The "dirty things" we have done -- and they are many -- are quite benign on a World scale in comparison to those of many others. We are and were not perfect, not by a long shot -- but we've done far better than most.... :wry:

So we're going to keep doing things. That doesn't mean we cannot go about it more intelligently than we have these last 30 years...:mad:

But the US possesses the full bag of carrots and sticks that make up DIME... Simply picking some strongman and supporting him through thick and thin is only one COA, and not the most creative one, and certainly not one that is nearly as effective as it used to be.True and I think we've finally figured that out...

The acronym DIME places its constituent values in an order. That order is the order in which we should place our efforts in international engagement. Unfortunately, we have since the time of the phrase with which I started this comment but certainly in the last 30 years tended to operate on the concept of EMDI. Phonetically, that's 'empty.' A DIME isn't much, empty is less...

Much as I'd like to see us disengage from a lot of things, we cannot. What we can do is improve our engagement levels and who does the engaging -- the CoComs should go...

We also need to adjust our engagement capacity and capability by avoiding direct involvement of the GPF in FID and such like, developing an ability to perform strategic raids -- using that GPF and several other things. Mostly, we just need to play to our strengths instead of to those of others as we have done for the last 50 plus years.

Surferbeetle
02-02-2011, 07:29 PM
A machine translation website covering Arabic news entitled Meedan (http://news.meedan.net/)

Picked up the link from today's online Economist. Here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meedan) is the wikipedia backgrounder

Dayuhan
02-05-2011, 07:27 AM
We have an opportunity in Yemen. Saudi and Yemeni revolutionaries both find sanctuary there, but if we can only see these men as "Al Qaeda" or as "Terrorists" we will trap ourselves into the role of continuing to support governments with little support by their own populaces, and in the role of doing or supporting the dirty work of suppressing those members of their populaces who dare to stand up.

One of the problems in Yemen is that talk of "the populace", "the insurgents", "the revolutionaries", etc is pretty much baseless. There is no coherent populace, no coherent popular will, no coherent perception of the interests of the populace. It's completely off to see it as a conflict between a despotic government and a suppressed populace yearning for freedom.

You have two separate insurgencies, plus a huge morass of tribal, clan, and sectarian conflict... dozens of groups pursuing conflicting versions of their own interests. The threat in Yemen is not that "the insurgents" will win and replace the government, but that the government will collapse and be replaced by nobody, producing Somali-style chaos.

We don't have the capacity to resolve Yemen's vast array of internal disputes. At this point nobody does, least of all the government.

davidbfpo
03-21-2011, 11:46 AM
Moderator's Note

There is a new thread 'The End in Yemen?' as of today:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12784

I have therefore locked this thread up pending the outcome of events and have added a cross reference to this thread for background reading.