War between Israel -v- Iran & Co (merged threads)

[slapout9]

I think we might have a viable plan if Cavguy is backed up by Ken White and his endless capacity for ass-kicking (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9219). :D


Link to the Ken White Video:D:D:D
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U18VkI0uDxE


"Stay Thirsty My Friends"

[Ken White]

don't like beer and am definitely not interesting. Must be some Dude from north Alabam, up around Fort Payne... ;)

[Ron Humphrey]

This whole lack of "what you want" end-state thing seems kinda confusing to me.

Doesn't pretty much everyone agree that any desired end-state would be;
Don't want to have to be concerned about something major going down by them or someone they supply that would lead to much larger issue's?

In so far as what to do-

Wouldn't it seem that the closer they get without indication of change or at least predictability of consequence the viable counters become less and less numerous and more kinetic in nature?

Last question; is it actually likely that the Iranian Govt or the Revolutionary Guard doesn't realize this?

[JMA]

This whole lack of "what you want" end-state thing seems kinda confusing to me.

Doesn't pretty much everyone agree that any desired end-state would be;
Don't want to have to be concerned about something major going down by them or someone they supply that would lead to much larger issue's?


It seems we live in an everything is negotiable world.

The wishy washy "well we wouldn't like them to have a nuke but we are not going to lift a finger to prevent it" attitude seems to prevail in certain quarters... and that sends out the wrong message to the Iranian regime. Like ostriches they bury their heads in the sand... saying problem, what problem?

[Dayuhan]

It seems we live in an everything is negotiable world.

What's being negotiated, and with whom?

Before we commit ourselves to a goal, we have to assess whether we have the means at hand to achieve the goal, whether the goal is achievable with the resources and within the time frame we're willing to commit to it, whether the expected cost justifies the expected benefit, and what the possible costs of unintended side effects might be. Only when those assessments are made can a realistic decision be made on whether or not the goal is worth pursuing.

The assumption that air strikes will necessarily stop the Iranian nuclear program remains completely unsupported... and if they won't (which is likely), what will? Do you expect the US to invade and occupy Iran to prevent them from getting a nuke? If so, are you willing to pick up the tab? It's not like we can afford it...

[JMA]

Before we commit ourselves to a goal, we have to assess whether we have the means at hand to achieve the goal, whether the goal is achievable with the resources and within the time frame we're willing to commit to it, whether the expected cost justifies the expected benefit, and what the possible costs of unintended side effects might be. Only when those assessments are made can a realistic decision be made on whether or not the goal is worth pursuing.

I understand that you just don't want any action taken against Iran for some or other reason (which you are not prepared to divulge).

Soldiers will tell you that once an aim has been selected you carryout a formal military appreciation which follow follow this sequence:

· Review of the Situation.
· The Aim to be Attained.
· Factors Affecting the Attainment of the Aim.
· Enemy Courses of Action that Affect the Attainment of the Aim.
· Courses of Action Open to us to attain the Aim.
· Selection of the Best Course to Attain the Aim.
· The Plan of Action

Israel would have fewer courses of action available to them as a result of their own military limitations and the risk from "enemy courses of action" including Russian defence of the facilities.

The US on the other hand would have no problem in providing a number of courses available to achieve the aim. These would include courses of action other than the use of nuclear weapons, and probably a number of courses of action which would not result in the release of radioactive fallout. In fact it would be a walk in the park for the US military.

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out. This together with how much public pressure the chattering classes and naysayers can bring to bear on the politicians.


The assumption that air strikes will necessarily stop the Iranian nuclear program remains completely unsupported... and if they won't (which is likely), what will? Do you expect the US to invade and occupy Iran to prevent them from getting a nuke? If so, are you willing to pick up the tab? It's not like we can afford it...

Now you show your ignorance of the use of or the threat of the use of or the limited use of military action. The scenario planners at the Pentagon will know which buttons to push. Your scare and fear mongering may work at some town-hall meeting but will be laughed at by those who know a) where the facilities are located which need to be neutralised, and b) the capabilities of the weapons selected to do the job. Killing the Iranian nuclear programme is not the challenge you make it out to be.

[Rex Brynen]

They've been posted before, but here are two CSIS studies of the feasibility of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel or the US:

Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060407_irannucoptions.pdf) (April 2006)

Outline of Study on an Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Facilities (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf) (March 2009)

The military bottom line is that a military strike would do very serious damage to Iran's nuclear capacity.

However, a strike would not preclude the Iranians rebuilding/dispersing/hardening a renewed and more serious nuclear program, might not prevent them from crash-building a weapon (especially if some enrichment facilities or stockpiles are unknown to the attacker), and would not preclude them from developing CBW capabilities as a deterrent to future attacks. The latter are largely political issues of how Iran would choose to respond to the attack.

This is aside, of course, from any retaliatory action Iran might take (attacks on Gulf oil facilities and exports, massive support to the Taliban, encouragement of Hizbullah attacks against Israel, support for transnational terrorism).

[bourbon]

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out. This together with how much public pressure the chattering classes and naysayers can bring to bear on the politicians.

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran. The potential costs outweigh the potential benefits for America. A nuclear armed Iran is not a significant threat to the US.

There is currently an ongoing information operation by a foreign power to influence the American public and “chattering classes” into supporting a military operation against Iran. The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.

[Entropy]

So it is not a question of it can't be done. It can. All that remains is the question of whether there is the political will in the White House and Congress to carry it out.

That's an unsupported and untrue assertion. The chances of success all depend on the aim. If it's destruction of the Iranian program, that is one thing air strikes can't do. If the aim is to degrade their nuclear capabilities then that might be possible if our intelligence is good enough. Of course Iran is fully aware of our air capabilities and there's no possibility of strategic surprise, so they will surely have taken steps to preserve their capabilities.

You can look at Desert Storm for an example. Despite almost 1000 strikes against various NBC targets we did little but degrade their capabilities. We only struck 2 out of 20 nuclear-targets - we didn't know the others existed. In short, one of the biggest air campaigns in history not only failed to "destroy" those programs, but only succeeded in degrading them temporarily.

And if you read the various testimony and reports (Rex links to just a few), no one with any credibility on the subject actually believes that air strikes along can destroy Iran's program. Therefore, that is not a means that will achieve your stated aim.

And one other thing to keep in mind. The Israeli destruction of Osirak in 1981 was what prompted Saddam to pursue a fast-track to a uranium-based weapon. Prior to that, nukes were kind of a neat idea and potential long-term goal. Osirak, since it was under safeguards, was more of a hedge and method to get access to technology that a plant specifically designed to produce plutonium for an existing weapon's program. The Osirak strike changed that and afterward resources were poured into an effort to make nuclear weapons. One of the myths of the Osirak strike is that it prevent Saddam from building a plutonium weapon - that turned out to be wrong.

So you might want to consider the effect of actions that fall short of destroying Iran's capabilities. In other words, one really should make sure that a particular action does not precipitate the very thing that action is purported to prevent.

[Ken White]

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran...

...The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.I'm not sure about that last, though. I think the opponents will win mostly due to numbers and simply because, as you say, a nuclear Iran is not a threat to the US. I believe most will see little sense in doing something inimical to our interests to only perhaps help out someone else and in an effort that, As Entropy says and Rex noted, would probably do far more harm than good -- and that not just to the US...

[Dayuhan]

Soldiers will tell you that once an aim has been selected you carryout a formal military appreciation which follow follow this sequence:

People who make policy will tell you that after this process the aim has to be reviewed again to assure that benefits exceed costs and that risk is manageable. We don't do blank checks, and shouldn't. "At all costs" is a nice catchy phrase but not consistent with reality.


The US on the other hand would have no problem in providing a number of courses available to achieve the aim. These would include courses of action other than the use of nuclear weapons, and probably a number of courses of action which would not result in the release of radioactive fallout. In fact it would be a walk in the park for the US military.

So you say, without providing any evidence to support your assertion. Others, here and elsewhere, say otherwise. Why should we assume that your opinion means more than theirs?

[Dayuhan]

I understand that you just don't want any action taken against Iran for some or other reason (which you are not prepared to divulge).


You seen rather devoted to a fundamentally flawed assessment of the decision process. We do not simply select a goal and do whatever is necessary to achieve it. We can't.

We have many goals, all over the world. We have limited resources and capacities. Goals have to be prioritized and resources assigned where they are most likely to accomplish something.

Assume we have a goal, and we have a proposed method of achieving that goal. Before pursuing that proposed method, we have to realistically assess:

1. The importance of the goal
2. The probable costs of the proposed method
3. The probability of success
4. The probable risks and potential for unexpected costs
5. The resources we are prepared to devote to the pursuit of this goal

If these assessments do not come up positive, it's not worth pursuing the goal.

I wonder if you're overlooking some of the likely consequences of air strikes on Iran. A few of the more probable ones...

The impact on Iranian domestic politics would be immediate and significant. You can expect the populace to rally behind the existing leadership, completely undercutting the domestic opposition and building the power base of the most radical and most anti-American factions. The Iranian regime's determination to gain a nuclear capacity would be reinforced.

It's also generally accepted that Iran aand its proxies have the capacity to stir up considerable trouble in Iraq, which could add substantially to the expense, duration, and complexity of our engagement there.

Iranian military forces certainly cannot directly engage US forces and survive, but it is likely that they could cause enough trouble in the Arabian Gulf to add a large risk premium to oil prices for an extended period of time. Iran doesn't have to defeat the US in battle: if they can push the price of oil over $100/bbl for 6 months, given the current state of the global economy, they are quite likely to produce another global recession, possibly even a depression.

So, to divulge the reason (I thought it obvious), I don't support military action against Iran at this time because the probability of success is unacceptably low and the ratio of probable cost to probable gain is extremely unfavorable.

[bourbon]

I'm not sure about that last, though. I think the opponents will win mostly due to numbers and simply because, as you say, a nuclear Iran is not a threat to the US. I believe most will see little sense in doing something inimical to our interests to only perhaps help out someone else and in an effort that, As Entropy says and Rex noted, would probably do far more harm than good -- and that not just to the US...
I hope you are right.

[JMA]

Cole,

Obviously one can come up with any number of scenarios where the US might do this or that tactical action in a hypothetical war with Iran. My point was simply to demonstrate the "all options are on the table" rhetoric is needlessly counterproductive because all options are not on the table. We're not going to send Cavguy to lead an armored column to Tehran. We're not going to nuke the place. There are, in other words, a lot of options that are "off the table."

Now you do understand that for the military contingency planners everything remains "on-the-table" don't you?

For the politicians to whom lies, deception and deceit come easily they may well not be prepared to admit that. The Pentagon would be remiss to not cover all the possible bases.

I speak of a number of plans that could be utilized to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and there is no doubt that the US is capable of doing that in a number of ways.

I do not speak of a specific plan as I have enough military background to realise that coming up with a detailed plan is the outcome of a comprehensive military appreciation and planning cycle. If you were a soldier you would know this.

It starts with the Oval Office providing the Pentagon with the aim in a clear and comprehensive but precise form. It should answer the question, "what exactly do you want us to do?"

Settling on a comprehensive and precise aim is normally (90%) of the time very difficult for civilian politicians to achieve. Therefore it is often necessary and indeed probably required for an exercise as complex as the Iran option for a full process to be undertaken to assist in establishing the aim.

Invariably there are some conditions imposed which will affect how the aim may be achieved. These are termed "limitations". In the case of this Iran scenario they may be (for example) that, "there will be no use of nuclear weapons and no action which may result in the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere etc.

The planners will then proceed to work out a number of plans to achieve the aim within the scope of the given limitations.

They may well return to state that there is no possible plan that will succeed in achieving the aim given the imposed limitations. The President will then need to review the limitations he imposed upon the planners or accept that it can't be done. On the other hand they may come up with three or four possible plans and recommend the best of them.

So to think that any possibility would not be considered because some civilian thinks it won't work or doesn't make sense is laughable. In addition the chattering classes would also clearly not be privy to all the information and intelligence that would be available to the Pentagon planners. So it is really difficult to understand on what these analysts base their comments.

To make comments like sending Cavguy up the road to Tehran is a comment which quite frankly shows a lack of understanding and respect for the skill and competence of those involved in such a planning cycle.

The bottom line is that I don't get to decide what remains on the table and you don't get to decide what is off the table.

The problem if one exists lies not in the Pentagon but rather with the Oval Office, the White House and Congress. You voted for them, you get what you deserve.

[JMA]

It is not in the national interest of The United States of America to launch a military strike on Iran. The potential costs outweigh the potential benefits for America. A nuclear armed Iran is not a significant threat to the US.

This few lines is based on what? You just personally believe this or have you some basis on which you base these comments?

I put it to you that your position is pretty tenuous.


There is currently an ongoing information operation by a foreign power to influence the American public and “chattering classes” into supporting a military operation against Iran. The pressure of the forces supporting a strike on Iran, is greater than whatever pressure that the forces that are opposing can bring.

I would say to you that Israel unlike the US and probably Iran due to land mass will not survive a nuclear strike. A response would be pointless as there would be no Israel. Israel learned when they sat in their bunkers while 40 Iraqi scuds rained down on them that their nuclear deterrent counted for nothing when confronting a desperate dictator in a corner. The world was sold a line of crap that Israel was protected by Patriot Missiles per kind favour of Uncle Sam when the success rate of the Patriot was next to zero. I don't know how the US convinced Israel to stay out of the war but will bet my bottom dollar that Israel learned that the can't bank on the US in a time of need.

Israel will settle the matter if the UN or the US does not.

Your opinion seems to be that Israel is expendable. Further that a disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies to the US of around 2.5-3 million barrels per day would not affect the US nor be in its interests to secure. Interesting train of thought.

[Rex Brynen]

A response would be pointless as there would be no Israel. Israel learned when they sat in their bunkers while 40 Iraqi scuds rained down on them that their nuclear deterrent counted for nothing when confronting a desperate dictator in a corner.

Not so much. Deterred by Israel, Iraq made no effort to use CBW warheads. Instead it used largely ineffectual HE warheads on highly inaccurate SCUDs for largely symbolic attacks, resulting in only two Israeli deaths. The marginal damage done to Israel clearly didn't pass the threshold where Israeli leaders felt that there was anything to gain by striking back themselves, and let the coalition do it for them.

Were a future Iran to nuke Israel, Israel would certainly retain sufficient second strike capability to level every major Iranian population centre, and then some.

[Entropy]

JMA,


They may well return to state that there is no possible plan that will succeed in achieving the aim given the imposed limitations. The President will then need to review the limitations he imposed upon the planners or accept that it can't be done. On the other hand they may come up with three or four possible plans and recommend the best of them.

So to think that any possibility would not be considered because some civilian thinks it won't work or doesn't make sense is laughable. In addition the chattering classes would also clearly not be privy to all the information and intelligence that would be available to the Pentagon planners. So it is really difficult to understand on what these analysts base their comments.

I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process. What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

I mean really, airstrikes on Iran have been discussed for at least the past six years. No doubt there has been much contingency planning during that period. We've also had six years of Israel threatening to "do something" but of course, they're not capable of taking the nuclear program out either (unless they use their nukes - and all I can do is pray they are not that stupid). If Israel thought it could succeed with air strikes it would have shut up and done them long ago.

[Dayuhan]

Now you do understand that for the military contingency planners everything remains "on-the-table" don't you?

Everything is not on the table. We're not going to go nuclear and we're not going to invade. We know it and the Iranians know it.



Your opinion seems to be that Israel is expendable. Further that a disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies to the US of around 2.5-3 million barrels per day would not affect the US nor be in its interests to secure. Interesting train of thought.

An alternative opinion might be that a nuclear-armed Iran could be contained in the same way that the nuclear-armed Soviet Union was contained, or China, or North Korea... by the assurance that first use of the weapon would result in absolute destruction. It's worked before.

Given the Israeli capacity for retaliation and the lack of any possible gain to Iran even if a strike on Israel were successful, an attack on Israel doesn't seem a likely eventuality.


I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process. What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

Thank you; I hope that is clear enough to settle that issue.

[JMA]

Not so much. Deterred by Israel, Iraq made no effort to use CBW warheads.

So they had them after all. Who else have you shared this with?


Instead it used largely ineffectual HE warheads on highly inaccurate SCUDs for largely symbolic attacks, resulting in only two Israeli deaths.

They had an alternative to these HE warheads?

The symbolism was that the scuds can hit Israel at will and when someone has a CBW (or nuclear) warhead Israel will have a real problem.


The marginal damage done to Israel clearly didn't pass the threshold where Israeli leaders felt that there was anything to gain by striking back themselves, and let the coalition do it for them.

Yes I would love to know exactly (not through idle speculation) what the US used to convince Israel to sit on its hands.


Were a future Iran to nuke Israel, Israel would certainly retain sufficient second strike capability to level every major Iranian population centre, and then some.

This sounds interesting. You know this for sure or are you just guessing? You have some sources for this?

Now what leads you to believe that Israel will wait to retaliate with a second strike?

You may have missed the fact that twice (1981 in Iraq and 2007 in Syria) Israel has carried out strikes on nuclear facilities. What leads you to believe that Israel will fail to respond this time?

[JMA]

JMA,

I'm an ex-Navy Air Force guy who has participated in real-world contingency planning. I know the process.

That is not evident in what you have posted on this thread.


What I am saying is that air strikes aren't going to get you there. We can wreck a lot of things in Iran with air power - we can pretty much destroy their air force, navy, air defense and economy, but the idea that air power can take out Iran's nuclear program is wishful thinking. Air strikes won't get you there - all they'll do is degrade Iran's capabilities. This isn't Entropy's classified assessment or Entropy blowing smoke or Entropy lacking the cajones. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's has publicly said the same thing, the SECDEF too, as have numerous military experts on the topic and others who are in positions to know.

I appeal to you to maintain some emotional discipline.

You will not be able to ascertain what air power will or will not be able to achieve unless you have knowledge of the aim. On what aim (with what limitations) do you base these defeatist statements on?


I mean really, airstrikes on Iran have been discussed for at least the past six years. No doubt there has been much contingency planning during that period. We've also had six years of Israel threatening to "do something" but of course, they're not capable of taking the nuclear program out either (unless they use their nukes - and all I can do is pray they are not that stupid). If Israel thought it could succeed with air strikes it would have shut up and done them long ago.

Like with the other guy maybe you missed that the Israelis have done something twice before (1981 - Iraq, 2007 - Syria). Now what makes you think they will do nothing this time around?

If you are going to get involved with unemotional contingency planning you need to get beyond prayer and unsubstantiated assumptions. (Seriously)

[JMA]

Everything is not on the table. We're not going to go nuclear and we're not going to invade. We know it and the Iranians know it.

Six months before the invasion of Iraq I remember the pundits and analysts saying that there would be no invasion. A lot can happen in six months. A lot can happen in three months.

I certainly hope it does not come to either but I can guarantee you that there are plans for both right there on the shelf.

But how do you know with such certainly that they are both off the table?


An alternative opinion might be that a nuclear-armed Iran could be contained in the same way that the nuclear-armed Soviet Union was contained, or China, or North Korea... by the assurance that first use of the weapon would result in absolute destruction. It's worked before.

Yes there are a lot of people saying a lot of things (some even get paid for it). I'm not sure of the use of the word contained here.

Perhaps Israel would take the view that they have too much too lose from being on the receiving end of a first strike even if they could get off a second strike in reply. Where the potential opponent already has a nuke then there is no alternative. But where there is the possibility to prevent a potential opponent from obtaining nuclear weapons in the first place one would be absolutely incompetent not to.


Given the Israeli capacity for retaliation and the lack of any possible gain to Iran even if a strike on Israel were successful, an attack on Israel doesn't seem a likely eventuality.

After having been on the receiving end of a first strike (the aim of which would be to inflict maximum damage and to neutralise or minimise any second strike capability) there would not be much of Israel left.


Thank you; I hope that is clear enough to settle that issue.

Nowhere near. You need to apply your mind in a more disciplined manner. Try to be more formal in your approach.

I think you have run out of steam on this one so why not consider why an effort was not made to "buy" the Pakistan nuclear capacity in return for the billions in aid needed after the recent floods? Another chance let slip by these 'smart' guys in the White House and State Department?

[slapout9]

Link to BBC interview of President Carter on the rise of Iran.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7889893.stm

[Rex Brynen]

So they had them after all. Who else have you shared this with?

They had an alternative to these HE warheads?

All you have to do is read the UNSCOM reports. By January 1991 Iraq had developed a number of BW missile warheads, and UN weapons inspectors themselves oversaw the destruction of 30 missile CW warheads, as well as 690 tons of CW agent.



Yes I would love to know exactly (not through idle speculation) what the US used to convince Israel to sit on its hands.


This is well documented, and I've discussed it with both Israeli and US officials. Have you?


This sounds interesting. You know this for sure or are you just guessing? You have some sources for this?


I realize that you are restricted to open sources, but even then it isn't terribly hard:

1) Look up the estimated size of Israeli nuclear arsenal.
2) Regarding those that may be based upon its Dolphin fleet, make the usual assumptions about the number at sea at any moment. Iranian ASW capability is negligible, so you can ignore that.
3) Make reasonable assumptions about the hardening of Jericho II missile silos (if you want to spend the time, you can even find them on Google Earth). Determine the likely psi overpressures require to destroy them. If you want to give the Iranians the benefit of the doubt, ignore BMD and missile fratricide. Make reasonable assumptions about the probable warhead yields and CEPs of future Iranian missile systems. Calculate the probable number of surviving Jericho missiles.
4) Do the same for Israeli F-16 and F15 bases, as well as the Dolphin sub base.
5) If you do the math and determine the number of surviving Israeli nukes, you'll see that if Iran were somehow to develop a handful of weapons in the next 10 years, it would not pose much of a counterforce challenge to Israel's second strike retaliatory capability.


Now what leads you to believe that Israel will wait to retaliate with a second strike?

You may have missed the fact that twice (1981 in Iraq and 2007 in Syria) Israel has carried out strikes on nuclear facilities. What leads you to believe that Israel will fail to respond this time?

Actually, I know quite a bit about those strikes. As Entropy pointed out, the first actually led Iraq to augment its nuclear program. The second was an easy, single target without any local SAM or AAA defences.

As for Israel striking Iran, I haven't said they won't do it. Indeed, I think there is a significant chance they will. I'm merely trying to shift some of the discussion from undisciplined armchair speculation to the facts (in as much as they are known and can be discussed here). There is a certain amount of intellectual rigour required for effective diplomatic and intelligence analysis--the "pray and spray" approach of throwing out provocative and unsupported statements and merely hoping for the best really isn't very productive.

[Rex Brynen]

I think you have run out of steam on this one so why not consider why an effort was not made to "buy" the Pakistan nuclear capacity in return for the billions in aid needed after the recent floods? Another chance let slip by these 'smart' guys in the White House and State Department?

Probably the same reason China didn't offer to buy the US nuclear deterrent after Katrina :D

[JMA]

The Bearer of Bad News on Iran (http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-bearer-bad-news-iran-4033)


The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Monday (6 September) issued its quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, and it contained a grain of good news, but a ton of bad news.

[Entropy]

I appeal to you to maintain some emotional discipline.

It's not emotion but frustration with your fallacious reasoning. For example:


You will not be able to ascertain what air power will or will not be able to achieve unless you have knowledge of the aim. On what aim (with what limitations) do you base these defeatist statements on?

I've made the aim quite clear several times - destruction of the Iranian nuclear program. You've given a similar aim - prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, though you added "at all costs."

As for "defeatist" statements, that is an ideological accusation, not one based on evidence or analysis.


Like with the other guy maybe you missed that the Israelis have done something twice before (1981 - Iraq, 2007 - Syria). Now what makes you think they will do nothing this time around?

As I noted before, the Israeli attack on Iraq precipitated Iraq's weapons program - it did not prevent it. If not for the Gulf War, Saddam would have had nukes.

Secondly, Israel didn't spend half a decade issuing public threats before those strikes took place. Israel's constant threats in the case of Iran ruined the opportunity for strategic surprise and, consequently, tactical surprise will be much more difficult to achieve. They've also given Iran plenty of time to hide it's important capabilities to allow reconstitution and prepare responses. If Israel thought it could achieve any lasting positive effect from air strikes, it would have done them long ago. As it stands, as time goes on, the case for air strikes becomes weaker and weaker.

Third, there is a substantial difference in nuclear technology. Countries pursuing a plutonium track (like Syria) require a nuclear reactor. That is the single "node" that will effectively disable that track to nuclear weapons. There is no such node in the uranium enrichment track. You really want to get the centrifuges and their manufacturing facilities, but centrifuges are small enough that they can be hidden anywhere.

If you've read the IAEA reports on Iran recently, you'll notice Iran hasn't installed any new centrifuges at Natanz for well over a year. The IAEA doesn't have access to the manufacturing facilities, so it's completely possible Iran is still manufacturing centrifuges and is either putting them in storage or into a hidden facility.

And this demonstrates the problem with air strikes. Unlike Syria and Osirak, there isn't a single, large fixed structure that will disable the program. The key parts of Iran's program could be hidden anywhere, and then their is the knowledge and industrial capacity to make centrifuges - two things that are very difficult to destroy with airstrikes. It is not a question of adequate military force, but a question of adequate intelligence. How well do you think Israel and/or the US can track thousands of small tubes? As I noted before, the intelligence on Iraq's program during the Gulf War turned out to be very bad as we only knew of 2 nuclear sites when there were actually 20. Key components of a uranium enrichment program are, unfortunately, very easy to hide. The belief that our intelligence is good enough to allow airstrikes to take out all the necessary nodes to set the program back by a decade or two is not supported by the historical record or a reasonable analysis of the intelligence problem.


If you are going to get involved with unemotional contingency planning you need to get beyond prayer and unsubstantiated assumptions. (Seriously)

This coming from the guy who claims it can be done without ever stating how. No wait, you did say "shock and awe" and intimidation would do the trick and you said we should bomb the Iranian parliament while it was in session. Those are two suggestions that I regard as completely unserious. If anyone here is engaging in faith-based planning it is you. Even worse is that in the face of disagreement with you on these and other points, your response are accusations of defeatism, cowardice, etc. All that does is confirm to me your case is rather weak.

What to do about Iran's nuclear program is a topic worthy of debate. However, I'm finished discussing this with you since you ignore substantive points in favor of ideological and, IMO, inflammatory accusations. So feel free to have the last word - I happy to let my arguments stand on their own.

[JMA]

All you have to do is read the UNSCOM reports. By January 1991 Iraq had developed a number of BW missile warheads, and UN weapons inspectors themselves oversaw the destruction of 30 missile CW warheads, as well as 690 tons of CW agent.

Well quite simply put they would have run the risk of US retaliation had the fired such weapon at that stage. In addition there is some doubt as to whether the fusing mechanism for CW scuds had been perfected. Nice try though.


This is well documented, and I've discussed it with both Israeli and US officials. Have you?

Oh I am impressed. But I suppose I will have to wait until the truth comes out.


I realize that you are restricted to open sources, but even then it isn't terribly hard:

1) Look up the estimated size of Israeli nuclear arsenal.
2) Regarding those that may be based upon its Dolphin fleet, make the usual assumptions about the number at sea at any moment. Iranian ASW capability is negligible, so you can ignore that.
3) Make reasonable assumptions about the hardening of Jericho II missile silos (if you want to spend the time, you can even find them on Google Earth). Determine the likely psi overpressures require to destroy them. If you want to give the Iranians the benefit of the doubt, ignore BMD and missile fratricide. Make reasonable assumptions about the probable warhead yields and CEPs of future Iranian missile systems. Calculate the probable number of surviving Jericho missiles.
4) Do the same for Israeli F-16 and F15 bases, as well as the Dolphin sub base.
5) If you do the math and determine the number of surviving Israeli nukes, you'll see that if Iran were somehow to develop a handful of weapons in the next 10 years, it would not pose much of a counterforce challenge to Israel's second strike retaliatory capability.

Again I am so impressed. But that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about what will be left of Israel after a nuclear first strike. Waiting for that first strike doesn't seem like a good deal to me and don't see any indication that those who matter in Israel believe any different.

OK so lets hear it from the smart guys as to what the scale of Israeli (civilian/military) casualties will be during a first strike? Add to that the collateral damage to Palestinians and assorted others in the area or downwind. And some smart guy is going to convince Israel that this would be an acceptable loss? (The technique that would have to be used would be very similar to that used to obtain volunteers for suicide bombers.)


Actually, I know quite a bit about those strikes. As Entropy pointed out, the first actually led Iraq to augment its nuclear program. The second was an easy, single target without any local SAM or AAA defences.

I'm impressed, so you know all about that too. But may I draw you back to the point... and that was that Israel demonstrated a willingness to conduct such preemptive strikes twice before. That's the point I was making... so if you want to comment please tell me what has changed in that they may be less likely now to consider such a strike now?


As for Israel striking Iran, I haven't said they won't do it. Indeed, I think there is a significant chance they will. I'm merely trying to shift some of the discussion from undisciplined armchair speculation to the facts (in as much as they are known and can be discussed here). There is a certain amount of intellectual rigour required for effective diplomatic and intelligence analysis--the "pray and spray" approach of throwing out provocative and unsupported statements and merely hoping for the best really isn't very productive.

OK so you tell us you are an "insider" and know what is what... and all have to just take your word for it. They real McCoy stuff will be on a strictly "need to know" basis and just how you would be on this need to know basis I can't tell.

My personal view is that Iran should be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon. That's my personal view.

The indications are that Israel will do it on its own if 1) (as is increasingly likely) the sanctions regime fails, or 2) the US doesn't do it either alone or with them.

Whether the US does it or doesn't I can't say. Personally I don't think Obama has the balls for it even though the US military will be able to achieve that quite simply. So its a political call... as these things always are.

[JMA]

Link to BBC interview of President Carter on the rise of Iran.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7889893.stm

One needs to be a little careful about taking anything Carter says seriously.

[JMA]

I've made the aim quite clear several times - destruction of the Iranian nuclear program. You've given a similar aim - prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, though you added "at all costs."

The aim I have thrown around here is merely my opinion and my belief. Nothing that I have said constitutes the kind of comprehensive yet precise aim require for a planning cycle to proceed.

You should have known that. And I must share with you that your harping on about invasions and air strikes is quite ridiculous as you are and have not been privy to the contingency planning that has and continues to take place in the Pentagon. Remember the US's weakness does not lie in the Pentagon but in the White House and in Congress. The Pentagon planners if allowed to do the job will do it according to the supplied aim and it attendant limitations. What we will also not know is what the final aim settled upon by the White House will be. It may be some watered down half ass'd wake up call rather than a "getting right up their nose" effort. Will we ever know?


As for "defeatist" statements, that is an ideological accusation, not one based on evidence or analysis.

That is aimed at those of you who for reasons you seem unwilling to share don't want a strike at any cost or maybe want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons and resort to pulling stuff out of the air like "an air strike will never work". Why not just come clean and say outright what your motive is?


As I noted before, the Israeli attack on Iraq precipitated Iraq's weapons program - it did not prevent it. If not for the Gulf War, Saddam would have had nukes.

Again this is just talk. No substantiation. As I understand it the Israeli strike did set the Iraqi nuclear programme substantially and I suggest that if the Gulf War had not gone ahead you may well have seen another strike by Israel.


Secondly, Israel didn't spend half a decade issuing public threats before those strikes took place. Israel's constant threats in the case of Iran ruined the opportunity for strategic surprise and, consequently, tactical surprise will be much more difficult to achieve. They've also given Iran plenty of time to hide it's important capabilities to allow reconstitution and prepare responses. If Israel thought it could achieve any lasting positive effect from air strikes, it would have done them long ago. As it stands, as time goes on, the case for air strikes becomes weaker and weaker.

That's your opinion and you are entitled to it.

I however, have faith in the Israeli ability to deal with matters of such gravity which affect their very existence. I'll go with them if its all the same to you.


Third, there is a substantial difference in nuclear technology. Countries pursuing a plutonium track (like Syria) require a nuclear reactor. That is the single "node" that will effectively disable that track to nuclear weapons. There is no such node in the uranium enrichment track. You really want to get the centrifuges and their manufacturing facilities, but centrifuges are small enough that they can be hidden anywhere.

And your point is?

Difficult as it may be if the Pentagon is tasked to prevent/disrupt/destroy the programme they will come up with an effective plan. There is no question of that.

What are you trying to say? That it is just not possible to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons?


If you've read the IAEA reports on Iran recently, you'll notice Iran hasn't installed any new centrifuges at Natanz for well over a year. The IAEA doesn't have access to the manufacturing facilities, so it's completely possible Iran is still manufacturing centrifuges and is either putting them in storage or into a hidden facility.

Yes, the IAEA doesn't know the half of it.

So why speculate about something you can't verify? It they are in fact doing all this hide and seek stuff then perhaps it is necessary to take a stronger position against this lunatic regime who is hell bent on make the Dr Strangelove nightmare a reality.


And this demonstrates the problem with air strikes. Unlike Syria and Osirak, there isn't a single, large fixed structure that will disable the program. The key parts of Iran's program could be hidden anywhere, and then their is the knowledge and industrial capacity to make centrifuges - two things that are very difficult to destroy with airstrikes. It is not a question of adequate military force, but a question of adequate intelligence. How well do you think Israel and/or the US can track thousands of small tubes? As I noted before, the intelligence on Iraq's program during the Gulf War turned out to be very bad as we only knew of 2 nuclear sites when there were actually 20. Key components of a uranium enrichment program are, unfortunately, very easy to hide. The belief that our intelligence is good enough to allow airstrikes to take out all the necessary nodes to set the program back by a decade or two is not supported by the historical record or a reasonable analysis of the intelligence problem.

You have got air strikes on the brain. Well hopefully the intelligence community will be able to provide the Pentagon planners with better intel this time. The aim may well be to deal with what they know as they get to know it . Who knows what the aim of the intervention will be?


This coming from the guy who claims it can be done without ever stating how. No wait, you did say "shock and awe" and intimidation would do the trick and you said we should bomb the Iranian parliament while it was in session. Those are two suggestions that I regard as completely unserious. If anyone here is engaging in faith-based planning it is you. Even worse is that in the face of disagreement with you on these and other points, your response are accusations of defeatism, cowardice, etc. All that does is confirm to me your case is rather weak.

Unlike so others around here I lay no claim to omniscience. I am not privy to the detail that would be available to the planners therefore to offer a plan based on nothing would be about as ridiculous as those who claim loudly that this or that won't work based on the same foundation... nothing. I don't intend to make a fool of myself. I'll lead that honour to others.


What to do about Iran's nuclear program is a topic worthy of debate. However, I'm finished discussing this with you since you ignore substantive points in favor of ideological and, IMO, inflammatory accusations. So feel free to have the last word - I happy to let my arguments stand on their own.

Yes better to cut and run.

But do consider coming back when you are prepared to explain your real motivation about not wanting to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons.

[Entropy]

But do consider coming back when you are prepared to explain your real motivation about not wanting to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons.

Yes, that is the argument of an ideologue. Not much point in attempting debate on the merits.

[Rex Brynen]

Yes, that is the argument of an ideologue. Not much point in attempting debate on the merits.

I concur. I think we're best to let this thread rest a bit until we once more get back to the point where people have new, substantive contributions to make.

[outletclock]

this doesn't violate the cooling off period. If otherwise, naturally, feel free to delete.

Thanks
OC

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.7

[outletclock]

I saw this, originally, I think, on Pat Lang's site:

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf

Thanks
OC

[JMA]

Yes, that is the argument of an ideologue. Not much point in attempting debate on the merits.

The merits of what?

I am presenting a personal opinion in that I believe that Iran should be prevented from developing nuclear weapons at all costs.

I further do not believe that the Israeli will consider having to first absorb a nuclear first strike before being able to deal with this threat a sane approach to an Iranian nuclear threat.

I do not accept that the proposition that a strike by Israel and/or the US cannot succeed in disrupting and/or preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Iran.

I (personally) cannot support a policy of appeasement which will lead to more countries developing nuclear weapons and thereby increasing the risk of a future nuclear conflict.

[Jedburgh]

This thread has reached the end of useful discussion and is well into a descent into personality conflict. It is now locked.

To the bickering parties: Do not start a new thread to carry on your personal animosities. Take it to PM or e-mail.