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SWJED
01-15-2006, 05:13 PM
Moderator's Note: Eight historical threads on this complex and divisive issue, hence the thread being locked up. There are more contemporary threads on Iran & Israel. The title has been changed too.


Open thread...


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/bushehr.jpg

Nuclear Reactor - Bushehr, Iran

Credit: Space Imaging (http://www.geoeye.com/)

SWJED
01-15-2006, 05:25 PM
Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=629) - US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph (Nov. 2005) by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson.


As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats.

First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the 1980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states’ oil facilities.

Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States.

Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb.

To contain and deter Iran from posing such threats, the United States and its friends could take a number of steps: increasing military cooperation (particularly in the naval sphere) to deter Iranian naval interference; reducing the vulnerability of oil facilities in the Gulf outside of Iran to terrorist attacks, building and completing pipelines in the lower Gulf region that would allow most of the non-Iranian oil and gas in the Gulf to be exported without having to transit the Straits of Hormuz; diplomatically isolating Iran by calling for the demilitarization of the Straits and adjacent islands, creating country-neutral rules against Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state members who are suspected of violating the treaty from getting nuclear assistance from other state members and making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult; encouraging Israel to set the pace of nuclear restraint in the region by freezing its large reactor at Dimona and calling on all other states that have large nuclear reactors to follow suit; and getting the Europeans to back targeted economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to shut down its most sensitive nuclear activities.

Jedburgh
01-16-2006, 04:44 PM
CSIS, 11 Jan 06: Heading off an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060112_wolfsthal.pdf)

Iran’s January 9th decision to resume its uranium enrichment program creates an immediate international crisis. Iran’s move is a test of the international community’s resolve and ability to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. An inadequate response could leave Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon wide-open and could be a further, potentially fatal blow to the norm of nonproliferation. This, is turn, opens the prospect of future nuclear nations in the years to come. The Bush administration’s support for European negotiating efforts with Iran over the past year has laid the ground work for an international consensus on confronting Iran’s actions, but it remains to be seen if Russia and China are prepared to support such efforts.

Despite its resumption of nuclear research, it is important to remember that Tehran is not yet at the point where is can actually enrich uranium or produce nuclear weapons. That capability might still be years away. The presence of international inspectors, while not a guarantee against diversion, will provide an important resource in tracking Iran’s nuclear progress. But in rejecting international pressure – including coordinated letter of concern from all five veto wielding members of the UN Security Council - and restarting work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, Iran has resumed its on again, off again march toward mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. There should be no question that Iran’s mastery of uranium enrichment – regardless of their stated intentions -- would also give Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons...

Jedburgh
01-16-2006, 04:49 PM
An older article (12 Aug 04) from CNS/MIIS, but still worth the read:

A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm)

At a time when Iraq and the war on terrorism tend to dominate the debate on international affairs, the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has not been a major topic of discussion in the United States. There are reports, however, that the Bush administration has seriously considered this option but opted to put it on the back burner for the time being. Further, on May 6, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 398 in a 376-3 vote, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons." If a similar resolution passes the Senate, it will give President Bush or any future administration the ability to launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities whenever this is deemed necessary.

In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception. On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran." Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession" and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites. This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action...

GorTex6
01-16-2006, 06:31 PM
Natanz (http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/download.php?Number=270878)

Bushehr (http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/download.php?Number=240072)

Esfahan / Isfahan (http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/download.php?Number=182864)

Jedburgh
01-16-2006, 06:36 PM
From the 14 Jan Economist: When the Soft Talk Has to Stop (http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_VPRNQSJ)

A Shortlist of Options
The first step will be to convene an emergency meeting of the IAEA's board, likely later this month, to receive a formal report about what Iran has been up to. America has long pressed for Iran to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for its actions. Short of an about-face by Iran, the Europeans will now press hard for that outcome. A majority on the IAEA's board already favours referral. But for Iran to take notice, Russia, China and others will have to back the idea too. Both countries have been loth to lean hard on Iran in the past. But both are bitterly disappointed that its regime has upped the ante in this way.

Getting to the council is one thing; getting action from it is another. A presidential statement urging Iran to comply with inspectors' requests, and even assigning the IAEA wider investigative powers, might get through, since the point would be to strengthen the inspectors' hands, not take Iran's case away from them. Beyond that, other steps could include political sanctions, such as denial of visas for sporting teams or for members of Iran's regime (similar actions are thought to have helped in the past in dealing with the recalcitrant Serb government, for example). Unlike the North Koreans, who seem not to mind their isolation, Iranians take pride in their growing contacts around the world and are keen to be accorded the status and respect they feel their ancient civilisation deserves. That said, however, Iran's new president, eager to wipe Israel off the map, seems dangerously unfazed by world opinion (see article).

It would be tougher to win widespread support at the UN for economic sanctions. Several key countries, including Russia (which also recently signed a $1 billion weapons contract with Iran), China, India and Japan have been reluctant to put their oil and gas contracts and their pipeline projects at risk. Yet such targeted sanctions might be the one thing that could get Iran's full attention. Its energy industry is dependent on foreign investment for future expansion and modernisation. Meanwhile, India is an important supplier of refined petrol to Iran.

The Europeans have already hinted that if sanctions are blocked at the UN, they will impose their own. They will also try to get others to join them, rather as America has orchestrated the Proliferation Security Initiative, an informal posse of countries prepared to take tough action to block shipments of illicit goods and materials around the world related to weapons of mass destruction.

The Last Resort
Might force be the answer? Mr Bush has always said that no option is off the table. Israel says Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and has suggested that, once Iran has mastered enrichment, perhaps as early as a few months from now, its nuclear programme will have passed “the point of no return”. Might either government be tempted to pre-empt the diplomacy with military strikes?

Israel's air force flattened Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. But Iran has learnt from that episode. It has dispersed, hidden and buried its numerous facilities; some sites, including Natanz, are up to 75 feet underground. Nor is sabotage much of an option. Ploys such as assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists or infecting Iranian computer systems with viruses would cause minimal damage. And yet there are military options, however imperfect and risky.

Only America could hope to demolish Iran's programme. The Iranians are believed to have, in addition to its main sites, at least a score with a role in the programme, and more than 100 sites suspected of having a role. To attack them all, with cruise missiles and fighter-bombers, would require an extended campaign and hundreds of sorties. Corridors would have to be cleared through Iran's air defences and the Iranian air force destroyed. Collateral damage, to Iranian civilians and cities, could be extensive.

A likelier alternative might be to launch an attritional campaign by attacking Natanz and Bushehr, recognising that the resulting damage would at best delay Iran's nuclear progress. This is certainly the most that Israel could contemplate unilaterally. Such an attack would be a declaration of a war which Israel could start but might not be able to finish without American protection. And Israeli fighter-bombers would find it hard to reach Iran without passing through American-controlled airspace.

To attack Iran this way would make sense only if it were thought likely that a friendlier Iranian regime would then emerge. But Iran has no obvious, friendly government-in-waiting. And Iran could strike back—by closing the oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz or hitting American or Israeli interests via proxies in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon and the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israel is well within range of Iranian missiles. Diplomacy has not stopped Iran so far. But military action is by no means an attractive alternative.

Jedburgh
01-16-2006, 06:52 PM
NDU McNair Paper, published last year: Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair69/McNairPDF.pdf)

U.S. Options
In dealing with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, the United States has two basic options: either freeze the Iranian nuclear program with hopes of rolling it back (and constraining it to peaceful applications), or live with the program while containing its negative impacts. On the freeze/rollback side, the prospects for more than a temporary pause are not promising, in our estimation. As long as significant sections of the Iranian program remain opaque, it will be difficult to gauge the success of a diplomatic rollback strategy; and, of course, it would be easier to apply a strategy to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold than to try to reverse acquisition after the fact. Granted, a nuclear-armed Iran could be subject to increasingly onerous restrictions—ranging from diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions to military force and regime change. Military strikes or covert action could also be used to change Iran’s strategic direction or provoke regime change. The likelihood of success using these means, however, is low. Even if there were to be a new government in Iran, it would likely continue to pursue advanced nuclear capabilities, including at some point a weapon. However, an overt regime-change strategy would carry an extremely high risk that the Iranian regime would use its nuclear weapon in a last-ditch attempt to save itself.

Could the United States live with a nuclear-armed Iran? Due to U.S. strategic predominance, many experts believe the Iranian regime would be unlikely to use its nuclear capability overtly unless it faced what it perceived to be an imminent and overwhelming threat. An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons might become more assertive in the region, but superior U.S. conventional capabilities and strengthened regional partnerships would probably deter Iran from significant mischief, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking U.S. forces directly. The United States has options short of war that it could employ to deter a nuclear-armed Iran and dissuade further proliferation. These include reassuring allies and friends in the region, strengthening active and passive defenses, improving preemption and rapid response capabilities, and reenforcing nonproliferation incentives and counterproliferation activities. Nevertheless, the lack of confirmable information on Iran’s leaders, particularly on how they make decisions, what they fear, if they have a concept of deterrence, or whether they appreciate implicit redlines set by countries with whom they have no contact—the United States and Israel—makes forecasting this issue very difficult.

Finally, while some security experts, predominantly Israeli, fear that Iran’s leaders would provide terrorists with nuclear weapons, we judge, and nearly all experts consulted agree, that Iran would not, as a matter of state policy, give up its control of such weapons to terrorist organizations and risk direct U.S. or Israeli retribution. Many specialists on Iran share a widespread feeling that Iran’s desire to be seen as a pragmatic nuclear power would tend to rein in whatever ideological impulses it might otherwise have to disseminate nuclear weapons or technologies to terrorists. There is less agreement, however, on whether the regime in Tehran could reliably control all elements within the Iranian system that might have the means, motive, and opportunity to do so.

Arguably, the costs of rollback might be higher than long-term containment of a nuclear-armed Iran. The United States would be expected to offer incentives to Iran and to governments cooperating with its strategic choices in what could be a long period of rollback. Even if the United States decides to embark on a rollback strategy, it would have to maintain a deterrence strategy while other diplomatic, economic, and military options played out. The good news is that many of the capabilities needed for deterrence and containment are the same as those needed for more robust military options. That may enable the United States to play both strategies for an undetermined length of time.

In our reexamination of the strategic implications for U.S. security policy and planning in the event Iran completes plans for nuclear weapons development, two sets of questions kept intruding on our research. The first involves the discussions between the EU–3 and Iran: What is the full extent of the European Union’s bargaining position; are there more carrots than sticks; would it remain firm in its dealings with an obstreperous Iran; could it possibly succeed in gaining Iran’s commitment to end its efforts to acquire the full cycle of nuclear weapons production; and what would happen if the EU effort fails?

In various unofficial meetings between European, American, and Iranian scholars, the Iranians have accused the Europeans of betraying them to the Americans in order to improve EU–U.S. relations, which had been disrupted by European opposition to the 2003 Iraq war. The Europeans have countered that their objection to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons technology is not directed solely against Iran; rather, it is meant to prevent all new acquisition efforts. If Iran crosses the nuclear weapons threshold, the European representatives said in unison, then the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, indeed, all non- or counterproliferation regimes will be finished. Surely, they ask, Iran could understand the great danger the spread of nuclear weapons posed to everyone. Clearly, the idea that the United States and the Europeans were in consensus on this issue had caught the Iranians’ attention. To offer some insight into the delicate negotiations between the EU–3 and Iran, we have added to this study a timeline describing Iran’s historic path to nuclear power and an appendix on "Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects".

The second question frequently asked concerns Israel’s perception of an Iranian nuclear threat and its options in dealing with what it describes as the greatest danger to its security today. To offer special insight on this issue, we include a paper by Israeli scholar Gerald Steinberg entitled "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments".

Strickland
01-17-2006, 09:33 PM
Are the Iranians signators of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or have they renounced their participation? If they are not a party to this agreement, then what is illegal of their pursuit of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons? Are they any different from India or Pakistan in this regard? North Korea renounced its participation in the NNP Treaty, thus has every legal right to pursue nuclear weapons. Is Iran any different?

As far as the arguement that this would increase the scope of terrorism as it affects Saudi Arabia; I would argue that the Saudis continue to be one of the world's largest sources of terrorists, and wealthiest State sponsor of terror.

SWJED
01-22-2006, 01:12 AM
21 Jan. Associated Press - Talk of Military Action in Iran Standoff (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101010.html).


Israel's defense minister hinted Saturday that the Jewish state is preparing for military action to stop Iran's nuclear program, but said international diplomacy must be the first course of action.

"Israel will not be able to accept an Iranian nuclear capability and it must have the capability to defend itself, with all that that implies, and this we are preparing," Shaul Mofaz said...

Stu-6
01-22-2006, 04:20 PM
Are the Iranians signators of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or have they renounced their participation? If the are not are party to this agreement, then what is illegal of their pursuit of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons? Are they any different from India or Pakistan in this regard? North Korea renounced its participation in the NNP Treaty, thus has every legal right to pursue nuclear weapons. Is Iran any different?

Iran is a signatory and has not renounced the treaty; they are saying that their use of nuclear power is not for the purpose of producing weapons so it is permitted by the treaty.

Strickland
01-22-2006, 05:47 PM
If this is so, then they have every legal right to pursue nuclear energy so long as they allow IAEA inspections, just as every other sovereign nation. I agree that it is silly to believe that they need this alternative source of energy with the proven reserves of oil and natural gas they have; however, the law is the law.

Stu-6
01-22-2006, 07:51 PM
I think they are actually not allowed to pursue weapons and their complaint is that restrictions meant to prevent them from pursuing weapons are preventing them from pursuing legitimate research. Basically the argument is over how the IAEA is interpreting the treaty. I think the bottom line is that they what to at least keep the option of acquiring nuclear weapons open, to guarantee their own security. The catch is that many Israelis feel they can not guarantee their security if Iran has such weapons. Further complicated by the fact that the US has tough talked itself in to a corner on this issue. Finally we add good old fashion nationalistic pride and we get one big mess.

Strickland
01-23-2006, 12:11 PM
Since history shows us that no nuclear powers have gone to general war against each other, unless you count the Siachen Glacier conflict; maybe Iran seeks weapons to ensure its survival and national defense.

GorTex6
01-23-2006, 09:01 PM
Iranian Oil Bourse (http://strategyunit.blogsome.com/2006/01/21/iran-crisis-another-war-for-oil-bourse-and-the-us-dollar/)

Stratiotes
01-23-2006, 10:02 PM
Since history shows us that no nuclear powers have gone to general war against each other, unless you count the Siachen Glacier conflict; maybe Iran seeks weapons to ensure its survival and national defense.

It is interesting too that 3 nations that declined to sign the non-proliferation treaty (Israel, Pakistan, and India) are hardly mentioned. If Iran had wanted to pursue such weapons, they probably should not have signed the treaty.

Jones_RE
01-23-2006, 10:18 PM
But when did Iran become a signatory to the treat? As administrations (or even regimes) change, governmental priorities can change. But it's a lot harder and more aggravating to withdraw from a treaty than it is to not sign it in the first place. This is one reason why the US doesn't sign treaties willy nilly - no guarantee we'll want the landmine ban affecting us fifty years from now, for example.

Ultimately, we need a strategy for living with a nuclear armed Iran and not just containing it. Of course, that takes us well beyond the realm of "small" wars - except to the extent that Tehran chooses to use its influence to liven up neighboring conflicts. Are we seeing the beginning of a South West Asian Cold War?

Stratiotes
01-23-2006, 10:23 PM
It is a tough spot for Iran indeed.... Perhaps they thought that not signing would be considered tantamount to reveling a secret weapons program and so they chose to sign in order to mislead - deception being a good move of political strategy perhaps. After all, is it ever wise to reveal to potential enemies what you are NOT going to do?

I think that expecting anyone to remain without such weapons indefinitely is silly. Every nation is going to want them - some will sign treaties to imply they don't but its only a matter of time. Eventually, they're going to get them. So, as you say, we have to figure out how to live with that.

DDilegge
01-23-2006, 11:35 PM
Maybe international law, but it seems we have a new variable concerning international relations here. That would be a sovereign of a nation perusing nuclear weapons, delivery means and air-defense assets who leads a crazed Islamist regime eager for the paradise of the next world. Give me a break here, while we debate legalities of international law the tick-tock to nuclear Armageddon marches on…

Stratiotes
01-23-2006, 11:58 PM
I have to agree that a nuclear Iran is a scarey thought but I'm not sure what we can do about it.

Even if we stop them with force now, it will only drive them to want them more and probably convince other nations to do the same before the US has a chance to try and stop them with force.

If we resort to force with the attitude that we can ignore international law when we're sufficiently scared, then isn't that playing into the very thinking we would accuse them of?

We cannot stop others from gaining such weapons indefinitely. Anything we do to stop it now will only delay the inevitable. In light of that, I think it would be better to figure out how we are going to deal with the inevitable sooner than later.

Strickland
01-24-2006, 12:14 AM
Maybe international law, but it seems we have a new variable concerning international relations here. That would be a sovereign of a nation perusing nuclear weapons, delivery means and air-defense assets who leads a crazed Islamist regime eager for the paradise of the next world. Give me a break here, while we debate legalities of international law the tick-tock to nuclear Armageddon marches on…

While I concur that a nuclear Iran is scary, it is not any scarier than loose nukes in the former Soviet Union that no one wants to account for, or a nuclear Pakistan in the absence of Musharraf. We should not forget that no matter how crazy Ahmadinejad may appear, he won a popular election that was relatively free.

Merv Benson
01-25-2006, 01:13 AM
When a small group of ayatollahs decides who may not run in an election there is nothing free about it. The current president was permitted to run because the Ayatollahs agreed with his positions. They have excluded all "reformers" from the last two elections.

I tend to doubt the report of missing suitcase nukes simply because if some one like al Qaeda had them they would have used them by now.

Iran has stated its intentions and it would be a mistake not to believe them. Even the guy who lost to the current president has said that Iran could survive a nuclear exchange with Israel, but Israel could not. We are dealing with people with a death cult mentality in Iran and permitting them to have nuclear weapons is not acceptable. If Pakistan ever gets leadership as irresponsible as that in Iran we will have to deal with them accordingly.

Strickland
01-25-2006, 08:12 PM
I must have been mistaken in my assumption that due to the fact that women can vote and hold office, and that the former president, Mohammad Khatami, was touted as a reformer that Iran was relatively free. In relation to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen (all US friends in the GWOT), the Iranians are down right progressive!

Merv Benson
01-25-2006, 09:48 PM
What Khatami and the rest of the reformers found was that they had about as much legislative power a student council does in effecting school policy. Even that was too much for the ayatollahs and almost all of them were excluding from running for reelection. Right now Iraq and possibly post Syrian Lebanon are the only function democracies in Muslim middle east. Saudia Arabia and Kuwait are taking baby steps in the direction of democracy but have a long way to go. But at least they are not threatening to wipe Israel off the map.

The current government cannot be described as representative of the will of the Iranians when people who disagree with the death cult supporting ayatollahs are excluded from the process.

There is strong evidence that Iran is not only supporting anti US terrorist but is harboring at least one of the terrorist responsible for killing Americans in Lebanon.

Stu-6
01-25-2006, 10:12 PM
Iranian elections are more show than anything, real power is held by the religious authorities. That is why I never understand people getting all up set when the Iranian President makes crazy statements; so what, the guy is on par with the Queen of England.

I tend to doubt the Iranian political structure could survive a nuclear exchange with the Israelis. Not only do the Israelis have many more weapons and better delivery systems than Iran is likely to produce in the next 15 years but the Iranian government has too many internal problems to survive such an action. Frankly we could have made a lot of progress towards deteriorating the extremist in the Iranian government had we handled them a little smarter over the last few years.

In the end the Israelis have shown they can take care of themselves. Of course I am an American so I don’t feel the need to worry about Israeli security; I never understood why some Americans are so considered with the security of Israel, I hope their not so naive as to think Israel will return the favor.

Stratiotes
01-25-2006, 10:33 PM
Excuse me while I rant a bit....

I have to agree with Stu-6, let Israel worry about Israel. I don't think anybody elected the US military to be the world's police force in any popular elections either. The fact that our culture and our history has led us to believe that democracy is best for us does not imply that it is best for the Iranian people - let the Iranian people determine what kind of government they have. If they don't like the current one, there are enough of them to do something aout it.

Ghandi, speaking to the colonial superpower that ruled his country, pointed out that a few British rulers could not continue to rule India if the millions of Indians did not want them to. The same is true of Iran - a small group of despots in Tehran cannot continue to rule Iran if 68 million Iranians really do not want them to do so. Patrick Henry said something much the same about British rule to our forefathers. In my opinion, it is not our job to impose democracy on people who have not seen fit in all this time to take it for themselves. I know there are some who wish for it but wishing for it without having the support of the majority is not enough. Either they have to convince their fellow citizens to do something or they have to leave - it’s the same for any people of any country. You either do something to change it, fight to inspire others to join you, learn to accept it and live with things as they are, or you get fed up and go somewhere else. But you don't ask your neighbor to come fight and die to give oyu something your own people have not seen fit to fight and die for themselves already.

As for nuclear weapons - I'm afraid it is impossible to keep them out of the hands of every despot that wants them. I am not especially fond of Pakistan or Nkorea having them either. I'm even less happy that China has them. So what do we do - occupy every country we don't like having them? Its an impractical plan at best and one likely to backfire at worse.

OK, I'm done :)

Strickland
01-25-2006, 10:58 PM
I must concur with the assessment of Israel. In the end, just as the Chinese are asking themselves what they get out of the North Korea relationship, we must ask ourselves, what is it that the Israelis do for us in the Middle East. I agree that comments about wiping out Israel are disturbing; however, no more so than when the Ayatollah Khoemeni made them. Trust that I "get" the State sponsor of terror argument as well; however, when did this become a new revelation? Was it when Hizbollah bombed the Marine Barracks, bombed a military transport in Gander, Newfoundland, kidnapped and executed US citizens? When? To trumpet the State sponsor of terror card after allowing them to do it for the past 25 years is a WEAK argument. Is a nuclear Iran intolerable, but an unstable nuclear Pakistan is ok? I am of the impression the Iranians have long held the capability to close down the Straits of Hormuz with a significant anti ship missile arsenal. Has this been cause to got to war?

In the end, I try to remember that Iran was a democracy before the US and Brits decided to toss out Mossadegh, thus hold out hope. If we attempted a direct military action in Iran, every man, woman, and child would come to fight us. We should remember that they believe 13 year-old Iranian Hussein Fahmidah to be the first suicide bomber, and have buried his remains beside Khoemeni's to honor him. These are not the people we want to fight. No matter how much they may hate the mullahs, they would hate a US invasion more.

At what point do countries not have the ability to defend themselves in any way they see fit so long as it is congruent to international law? The Iranians surely have the right to walk away from the NPT. This is their legal right as a sovereign nation. If we truly wanted to see a peaceful resolution to this situation, why dont we have Israel renounce its nuclear program as a first step.

Stratiotes
01-26-2006, 02:46 PM
We also must face the unfortunate possibility that we are being told about Iran's desires by the same people who told us about Iraq's WMD desires. These are the same sources as the yellow cake sources.

Iran has indicated recently that they would be interested in Russia enriching Uranium for them so they can use it for power stations - if that is indeed true, then it would seem to be evidence that they are telling the truth and not wanting the byproducts of enrichment. Of course, it might not be true and it might be a ploy of some kind - unfortunately, a lot of folks could say the same thing about our own govt.

CNN Report (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/25/iran.russiaplan/index.html?section=cnn_latest)

Stu-6
01-26-2006, 08:57 PM
The current US administration is certainly lacking any credibility on the issue, however I still think it is reasonable to assume that Iran is at least trying to keep their options open on a bomb.

Hansmeister
01-29-2006, 06:38 AM
We also must face the unfortunate possibility that we are being told about Iran's desires by the same people who told us about Iraq's WMD desires. These are the same sources as the yellow cake sources.

Iran has indicated recently that they would be interested in Russia enriching Uranium for them so they can use it for power stations - if that is indeed true, then it would seem to be evidence that they are telling the truth and not wanting the byproducts of enrichment. Of course, it might not be true and it might be a ploy of some kind - unfortunately, a lot of folks could say the same thing about our own govt.

CNN Report (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/25/iran.russiaplan/index.html?section=cnn_latest)

The sources are not the same as the "yellowcake" sources (which proved to be true, by the way, except for one). The IAEA is one of those sources and has stated that Iran can have nuclear weapons in little more than two years.

And Russia enriching Uranium for Iran to use was part of the original deal for Russia to support the construction of the Nuclear reactor at Bushehr, something Iran has reneged on since then. Iran hasn't sunk billions into enriching uranium only to give it up now, just as Iran hasn't sunk billions into nuclear research to develop electricity - with one of the world's largest reserves of natural gas they could've met their energy needs at a fraction of the cost of their nuclear program.

Stratiotes
02-03-2006, 04:42 PM
And Russia enriching Uranium for Iran to use was part of the original deal for Russia to support the construction of the Nuclear reactor at Bushehr, something Iran has reneged on since then. Iran hasn't sunk billions into enriching uranium only to give it up now, just as Iran hasn't sunk billions into nuclear research to develop electricity - with one of the world's largest reserves of natural gas they could've met their energy needs at a fraction of the cost of their nuclear program.

It sounds like the deal is still alive - unless the security council aggrevates the situation:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060203/ap_on_re_mi_ea/nuclear_agency_iran

As an aside, I think how much they spend on power production is a matter for the Iranian people and not us. Whether we can read anything into that or not is questionable in that most governments are less than frugal in how they handle taxpayer money and it is generally the fact that they (governments) are, by nature, wasteful rather than attempting to hide something. It may be suspicious but not condemning evidence.

Fabius Maximus
02-09-2006, 03:28 AM
one that's been waged for 3 generations: Palestinian people vs. Israel.

Who will win? That's the ultimate question for any discussion about war. Not who SHOULD win, or DESERVES to win, or who has the best soldiers, tactics, or equipment. Just the bottom line.

Here's one forecast, explicit with supporting logic:

"The Fate of Israel" by Fabius Maximus

Part two in a series of articles about grand strategy in a 4GW Era.
Demonstrates the difficultly of distinguishing strong from weak in 4GW,
and that choosing the wrong grand strategy can be terminal for a state.

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fate_of_israel.htm

Strickland
02-09-2006, 02:44 PM
The Palestinians should adopt a strategy consistent with that which the west promotes, yet the Israelis find unacceptable in an attempt to demonstrate the reality of the conflict. If the Palestinians pursued a policy of "one man one vote" within the framework of a single-unfied Israel, they would surely win a substantial number of seats in the Knesset simply due to their large population in comparison to the Israelis. This would demonstrate their desire to seek peaceful resolution through the ballot box and representative government, something desirable to the west; however, unacceptable to the Israelis. This strategy would put increased pressure on the Israelis, and thus create a new enthusiasm to create a lasting peace.

Stratiotes
02-09-2006, 03:27 PM
I think both sides will continue to play out the eye-for-eye MAD strategy - each side becoming ever more intent on destroying the other. At best, a coexistence of perpetual war.

I agree with the Major that, if left to majority rule, the outcome might be different. But, I think the Israelis will never allow majority rule. Each new act from either side just feeds the hatred and it will not win unless one side decides to concede to the other - a scenario that is effectively impossible to conceive of.

Merv Benson
02-09-2006, 04:33 PM
There is substantial evidence that the Palestian Authority grossly fudgeed the numbers on the Palestinian census. The numbers may have been off by a factor of 2 million. Notwithstanding that, what the Major has suggested is actually Hamas's position on a Palestian state from the Jordon to the Ocean. Their problem is that they do not control much of that space and it is unlikely that the Israelis will give them that opportunity.

Strickland
02-09-2006, 04:42 PM
If democracy is truly our aim, then we cannot fail to recognize Hamas in Palestine, Dawa and SCIRI in Iraq, the MMA in Pakistan, potentially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or Ahmedinejad in Iran. Our policy cannot be - "democracy as long as you elect who we want." Maybe we should start asking ourselves why these groups are so popular?

Stu-6
02-09-2006, 08:44 PM
I went with the two states. I am assuming that Israel will be able to truly disengage from the West Bank. The path Israel has been on for most of the last 40 years would most likely lead to is ultimate destruction, however resent efforts, such as the withdraw from Gaza, suggest that they might be able to change course. If that happens then the Palestinians would in time establish a viable state. I would imagine that if the two states formed like this they would for sometime refuse to recognize each other, at least in any meaningful way.

Stratiotes
02-09-2006, 11:01 PM
I'm trying to think of similar "arrangements" in the past that might support one or the others - Pakistan and India come to mind as possibly supporting the 2-nations response. I still find it difficult to imagine even a mild détente there but I'm willing to entertain that I might be wrong - I certainly hope I am.

Vietnam seems to fit the one-will-overcome-the-other response. North/South Korea seems to fit the perpetual war idea - if the past 50 years are enough to assume "perpetual." But both of those are rather special cases which could change given a collapse of the system feeding the animosity in one or the other - as it did in East/West Germany. So, just brainstorming a bit, what are some others and how would they be similar and give us some indication of what is possible/impossible?

Jones_RE
02-09-2006, 11:26 PM
Query what a breakdown in order by both sides might look like: rogue settlements staying on the wrong side of the fence, various palestinian militias claiming different towns/neighborhoods, etc. You'd have a very complex geopolitical map (it's there now, really) populated by violent amateurs.

Isreal has been at war, or nearly so, since before its inception. The underlying problems are religious, political AND economic - military force one way or the other won't really solve them. I.e. even should Hamas (or some entity) wipe Isreal off the map the region itself will still be a chaotic, violent mess. And there's always the danger that five hundred years afterwards more Jews will decide to resettle the place again. Likewise, even if the Palestinians themselves were to agree to a ceasefire (or be killed, driven off, etc) there are still plenty of other Arab Muslims around the world who'd have no problem attacking Israel and trying to eliminate it - or just get revenge or whatever.

If the Isrealis *really* want a grand strategy, it will have to be moral, religious and psychological. The war rests in their immediate enemies' heads and not in Kalashnikovs or bomb factories. Note that the USA defeated the American Indians not just through blood, but through destruction of their belief systems - few modern Native Americans even speak their own language, let alone believe in any kind of resistance to the US.

Merv Benson
02-09-2006, 11:53 PM
The Palestinians can elect who they want, but that does not mean the US and others should subsidize their bad choices any more than a parent shouls subsidize a childs bad habits. The Palestinian Authority is basically a begger entity with no indigenous flow of funds. It relies on taxes collected by Israel and charity from the US, the UN and others. If the US disagrees with Hamas on its goal of genocide against Israel, there is absolutely no reason we should continue to offer any financial support. If the Palestinians were forced to create an economy that generate revenue for the PA they would all benefit from getting off the dependency drug. They are the only lose of a war who continue to get subsidized. It is time to stop that.

Fabius Maximus
02-10-2006, 12:44 AM
Excerpt from "The Fate of Israel"
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fate_of_israel.htm


The Palestinians show us the raw power of a primal strategy, a belief in a shared dream. They dream about the extermination of Israel. That is the official goal of Fatah, the former ruling party. Which is in turn losing strength to Hamas and Hezbollah, who seem even more dedicated to eliminating Israel. Their primal strategy forges the Palestinian people into a powerful weapon, against which Israel has few defenses. ...

Why is this so difficult to see? This quote from Col Hammes explains this blindness of western experts to Middle Eastern 4GW, one that applies equally well to the Palestinians and the Iraqi insurgents.

"Today’s insurgents do not plan for the Phase III conventional campaigns that were an integral part of Mao’s three-phased insurgency. They know they cannot militarily defeat the outside power. Instead, they seek to destroy the outside power’s political will so that it gives up and withdraws forces. They seek to do so by causing political, economic, social, and military damage to the target nation.

"After being driven out of Fallujah in November 2004, Abu Musad al-Zarqawi (sic) wrote, “The war is very long, and always think of this as the beginning. And always make the enemy think that yesterday was better than today.” "

“Dealing With Uncertainty”, Marine Corps Gazette, November 2005
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/hammes1.pdf

Jedburgh
02-10-2006, 01:52 AM
From CSIS, dated 9 Feb 06: Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060209_palestforces.pdf)

...A largely secular and pro-peace Palestinian government was suddenly and unexpectedly replaced by a radical Islamist group whose charter still effectively called for Israel's destruction. Some leaders in Gaza and the West Bank did indicate that they would consider a mutual ceasefire. However, Hamas's formal leader, Khaled Meshal, who was based in Damascus, stated that Hamas would not abandon its struggle with Israel and would transform its armed wing into a national Palestinian army.

The political and military map of both the future of the Palestinian's future and the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is now uncertain and may well remain so for years. It may also lead to a major redefinition of how Palestinian forces are shaped and defined. There is no inherent dilemma in labeling a resistance movement as either "freedom fighters" or "terrorists." History has consistently shown that activists can be both at the same time, and that democratic forces can be as ruthless in using terrorist and asymmetric means as authoritarian ones. History provides equal warnings that there is no way to predict how much given movements like Hamas and the PIJ will or will not moderate over time, or whether they will become more extreme and violent.

There is no doubt, however, that Hamas's victory is a further catalyst in a fundamental change in the Arab-Israeli military balance. For years, there has been the steady shift away from a focus on conventional warfighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, to a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has helped drive Israel's neighbors to maintain large conventional forces as a deterrent, but it has also increased their internal security problems. At the same time, it has interacted with the rise of Neo-Salafi Islamist terrorism and efforts to dominate the Islamic world. Like the interaction between Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran; the shifts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have become regional as well as internal. At the same time, the Palestinians have been driven primarily by local tensions and dynamics. They have never been anyone's proxies; they use as much as they are used...

Stratiotes
02-10-2006, 05:49 PM
Politics are never easy to decipher.

For isntance. In our country we argue sometimes vehemently over abortion and our politicians use some wild rhetoric and fear-mongering on both sides about how their consistuents need to vote for them if they want change. Once voted in, the politician has a litany of excuses why he cannot do all the things he promised he would do during the campaign but maybe if he's reelected he will... In the end, neither side does all they promise because to do so would eliminate a hot button issue that is always good for votes - solving the problem would cost them votes so it is counterproductive to solve the problem. My suspicion is the rhetoric will continue with Hamas but I don't think things will get any worse than they already are or would be without Hamas in power. As soon as Hamas gets its stated goals, it will be a group of fanatics without a cause to rally followers - it would be self-defeating. They want to promote their cause but they want power more than the cause. Politicians are all pretty much alike on that score - IMHO.

Fabius Maximus
02-11-2006, 02:26 AM
Mark-

You are, of course, right that politics is never easy to understand.

However you are making one of the classic big mistakes of assuming the other side are like us.

Perhaps so, but it is just an assumption. And we know what happens to soldiers sent in on nothing but assumptions ...

SWJED
02-13-2006, 06:25 PM
13 Feb Reuters - Study: Thousands would die if U.S. attacked Iran (http://today.reuters.com/news/newsarticle.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyid=2006-02-13T170124Z_01_L13774748_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN-STUDY.xml&rpc=22)


Thousands of military personnel and hundreds of civilians would be killed if the United States launched an air strike on Iran to prevent it developing nuclear arms, a British think tank said in a report released on Monday.

The report by the independent Oxford Research Group said any bombing of Iran by U.S. forces, or by their Israeli allies, would have to be part of a surprise attack on a range of facilities including urban areas that would catch many Iranians unprotected.

The report by Oxford Research Group - Iran: Consequences of a War
(http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IranConsequences.htm)


This briefing paper, written by our Global Security Consultant, Professor Paul Rogers, provides a comprehensive analysis of the likely nature of US or Israeli military action that would be intended to disable Iran's nuclear capabilities. It outlines both the immediate consequences in terms of loss of human life, facilities and infrastructure, and also the likely Iranian responses, which would be extensive.

An attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure would signal the start of a protracted military confrontation that would probably grow to involve Iraq, Israel and Lebanon, as well as the USA and Iran. The report concludes that a military response to the current crisis in relations with Iran is a particularly dangerous option and should not be considered further.

Alternative approaches must be sought, however difficult these may be.

Contents:

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. The US Context
4. The Israeli Factor
5. The Iranian Context
6. Current Circumstances in Iran
7. The Nature of US Military Action
8. Pre-empting Iranian Responses
9. Casualties
10. Iranian Responses
11. Wider Responses
12. Israeli Military Action
13. Conclusion

Stratiotes
02-13-2006, 11:32 PM
On another BB I watch, someone linked a news report that indicated there were a good number of Russian advisors at the plant and there were concerns that an air strike could be problematic if any of them were killed/injured.

I don't think that's a good reason in itself to hold off - I would not do it for other reasons but if you are of the persuasion that it will save more lives in the long run and that advisors are there despite warnings.....

Jedburgh
02-22-2006, 09:13 PM
A detailed (223 pages) backgrounder and assessment from CSIS: A Nuclear Iran? The Threat from Iran's WMD and Missile Programs (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060221_iran_wmd.pdf)

There is a long chain of indicators that Iran is proliferating. Iran’s missile development problems only make sense if they are equipped with CBRN warheads. There have been numerous confirmed disclosures of suspect Iranian activity. Iranian nuclear program has been under intense scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent years, and the IAEA reports disclose a pattern of activity that makes little sense unless it is tied to a nuclear weapons program.

Yet, the data on Iranian nuclear weapons efforts remain uncertain. The summary reporting by the IAEA has not stated that there is decisive evidence that Iran is seeking such weapons, although the detailed disclosures made in IAEA reporting since 2002, do strongly indicate that it is likely that Iran is continuing to covertly seek nuclear technology. Neither the US nor its European allies have as yet released detailed white papers on their intelligence analysis of Iranian efforts, and there have been several press reports that US intelligence feels that its knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is less than adequate to make the case for where, when, and how the Iranians will acquire a nuclear weapon.

Iran does have the right to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty (NPT), and the Iranian government has been able to find ways to justify all of its activities to date as research, related to nuclear power, minor mistakes, or the result of importing contaminated equipment. It has claimed that its concealed and secret efforts are the result of its fears that the US or Israel might attack what it claims are legitimate activities.

In fact, Iran may have advanced to the point where it can covertly develop nuclear weapons even if it agrees to the terms proposed by the EU3 and Russia, and appears to comply with IAEA inspection. As the UN’s experience in Iraq has shown all too clearly, there are severe limits to even the most advanced inspection regime. Iran might well be able to carry out a covert research and development effort, make major advances in weapons development, and improve its ability to produce fissile material. Iran might well acquire a “break out” capability to suddenly make weapons or be able to produce small numbers of weapons without detection.

At the same time, it is hard to discuss the case against Iran without raising questions about the mistakes the US and the UK made in characterizing Iraq’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The US in particular, has problems in convincing the international community that Iran is a grave threat to global security. Credibility is a precious commodity, and one that can sometimes be worth more than gold.

The problems in addressing Iran’s capabilities go beyond the ability to determine the facts. Since 2002, the Bush Administration and EU3 have consistently argued that the Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are real and that they must be stopped. The ability of the US, the IAEA, and the EU3 to halt the Iranian nuclear program is complicated, however, by the mistakes that the US and Britain made in dealing with Iraq

It is also impossible to deny the fact that Iran is being judged by a different standard because its regime is associated with terrorism, efforts to export its Shi’ite revolution, and reckless political rhetoric. There is nothing wrong with a “dual standard.” Nations that present exceptional risks require exceptional treatment. The fact remains, however, that Iran was under missile and chemical attack from Iraq, and seems to have revived its nuclear programs at a time that Iraq was already involved in a major effort to acquire biological and nuclear weapons. Iran has major neighbors -- India, Israel, and Pakistan -- that have already proliferated. It must deal with the presence of two outside nuclear powers: Russia near its northern border and the US in the Gulf.

The situation is further confused by the fact there is an increasingly thin line between the technology needed to create a comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear power generation and dual use technology that can be used to covertly develop nuclear weapons. A nation can be both excused and accused for the same actions. This can make it almost as difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively prove Iran’s guilt as its innocence, particularly if its programs consist of a large number of small, dispersed efforts, and larger “dual-use” facilities.

Some efforts at proliferation have been called a “bomb in the basement” – programs to create a convincing picture that a nation has a weapon without any open testing or formal declaration. Iran seems to be trying to develop a “bomb in a fog;” to keep its efforts both covert and confusing enough so that there will be no conclusive evidence that will catalyze the UN into cohesive and meaningful action or justify a US response. Such a strategy must be made more overt in the long-run if it is to make Iran a credible nuclear power, but the long-run can easily stretch out for years; Iran can break up its efforts into smaller, research oriented programs or pause them; focus on dual-use nuclear efforts with a plausible rational; permit even intrusive inspection; and still move forward.

Jedburgh
02-23-2006, 03:00 PM
From ICG, 23 Feb 06: Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse? (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/51_iran_is_there_a_way_out_of_the_nuclear_impasse. pdf)

Here's the ExecSum:

There is no easy way out of the Iranian nuclear dilemma. Iran, emboldened by the situation in Iraq and soaring oil prices, and animated by a combination of insecurity and assertive nationalism, insists on its right to develop full nuclear fuel cycle capability, including the ability to enrich uranium. Most other countries, while acknowledging to varying extents Iran’s right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to acquire that capability for peaceful energy purposes, have a concern – reinforced by Iran’s lack of transparency in the past, continuing support for militant Middle East groups and incendiary presidential rhetoric – that once able to highly enrich uranium, it will be both able and tempted to build nuclear weapons.

But EU-led diplomacy so far has failed to persuade Iran to forego its fuel cycle ambitions; the UN Security Council seems unlikely to agree on sanctions strong enough to force it to do so; and preventive military force is both a dangerous and unproductive option.

Two possible scenarios remain, however, for a negotiated compromise. The first, and unquestionably more attractive for the international community, is a “zero enrichment” option: for Iran to agree to indefinitely relinquish its right to enrich uranium in return for guaranteed supply from an offshore source, along the lines proposed by Russia. Tehran, while not wholly rejecting offshore supply, has made clear its reluctance to embrace such a limitation as a long-term solution: for it to have any chance of acceptance, more incentives from the U.S. need to be on the table than at present.

If this option proves unachievable – as seems, regrettably, more likely than not – the only realistic remaining diplomatic option appears to be the “delayed limited enrichment” plan spelt out in this report. The wider international community, and the West in particular, would explicitly accept that Iran can not only produce peaceful nuclear energy but has the “right to enrich” domestically; in return, Iran would agree to a several-year delay in the commencement of its enrichment program, major limitations on its initial size and scope, and a highly intrusive inspections regime.

Both sides inevitably will protest that this plan goes too far – the West because it permits Tehran to eventually achieve full nuclear fuel cycle capability, with the risk in turn of breakout from the NPT and weapons acquisition, and Iran because it significantly delays and limits the development of that fuel cycle capability. But with significant carrots (particularly from the U.S.) and sticks (particularly from the EU) on the table – involving the appropriate application of sequenced incentives, backed by the prospect of strong and intelligently targeted sanctions – it is not impossible to envisage such a negotiation succeeding.

This proposed compromise should be compared neither to the fragile and unsustainable status quo, nor to some idealised end-state with which all sides might be totally comfortable. The more likely scenarios, if diplomacy fails, are for a rapid descent into an extremely unhealthy North Korea-like situation, with a wholly unsupervised nuclear program leading to the production of nuclear weapons and all the dangerously unpredictable regional consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq-like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and alarming consequences both regionally and world-wide.

Strickland
02-24-2006, 02:53 PM
As I have stated earlier, the Iranian issue should not be a US led issue. Any course of action pursued against the Iranians needs to be led by China, Japan, Germany, France, and South Korea. These nations remain the largest trading partners with the Iranians, thus have the most to gain/lose if instability and military action take over. If the Japanese, Chinese, and French want to demonstrate their place as great nations within the international community, this is the time. We (the US) need to take a back-seat on this one.

Why are we so concerned if the Iranians have a nuclear weapon? Like the North Koreans, they have no means to deliver it to the US, so what is the major concern? Terrorism? Is Iran having the bomb and terrorizing the US the true concern, or is it that the Iranians or potentially Hizbollah would use it against Israel? Are we prepared to go to war with the whole Muslim Middle East over a State that most now agree was a mistake, a destabilizing factor in the region, and done only out of pity? (and came about as the result of a terrorist campaign against the British?)

For all the Reagan fanatics, maybe if we had addressed the issues with Hizbollah in 1983, things would be different now.

Are we truly concerned about a nuclear terrorist attack against the US b/c we continue to remain woefully unprepared for any attack against our nation? Is it because our borders remain undefended and provide virtually unfettered access? Instead of starting a conflagration in Iran, how about we fix our border and port security first. I am sure this will cost less both in money and lives?

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2006, 05:49 PM
Most analysts consider only the small question about such an attack:

Example: Rick Francona, former DIA analyst, describes 2 scenarios by which Israel can attack Iran's nuke facilities (hat tip to John Robb):
http://francona.blogspot.com/2006/03/iran-israels-air-strike-options.html

The big question: what will Iran do in response to an attack by Israel or America -- perhaps helped passively or actively by Turkey or Saudi Arabia? Such an attack is, after all, an act of war against Iran. International Law allows Iran to reply against everyone who assisted.

As so often the case with war, the opening salvo is the most predictable. What comes afterwards is more interesting (survival is always interesting).

Vote, and post a note explaining your view!

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2006, 06:35 PM
Anybody who believes that Iran will not STRONGLY respond if attacked should adjust the dosage of his meds. They have many good options, and will certainly use some or all of them.

The only nations with sovereignty on this planet are those with nukes (bombs, not power plants). A superpower – autonomy and freedom of action – has both nukes and oil.

Iran has one and wants the other – that’s just good sense.

If Pakistan and North Korea can build nukes, Iran certainly can.

Get used to it.

This should be obvious to almost everyone. In ten years the nice suburban boys who write American military and geo-political journals will explain how obvious and predictable this was.

Jedburgh
03-19-2006, 06:43 PM
Rick Francona, former DIA analyst, describes 2 scenarios by which Israel can attack Iran's nuke facilities:
http://francona.blogspot.com/2006/03/iran-israels-air-strike-options.html
A much better look at that scenario is in the SSI pub Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB629.pdf). The pub is actually a big collection of essays - the pdf volume is 322 pages total. The essay I'm referring to, Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel, begins on page 133.

Fabius Maximus
03-19-2006, 06:48 PM
Jedburgh -- That is an superlative link. What's your forecast?

Here's the conclusion from the 322 page SSI study Jedburgh mentions links {above}.


As Iran gets closer to securing {nukes} two questionable courses of action ― bombing or bribing Iran ― have become increasingly popular. Neither, however, is likely to succeed and could easily make matters worse.

Hence they recommend 7 alternative measures, which range from the quixotic to impossible.


1. Diplomatic efforts to discredit the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program. {as if Iran cares}
2. Increasing the costs for Iran to leave or infringe the NPT by establishing more rules under the NPT. {ditto}
3. Securing Russian cooperation in these efforts by offering Moscow a lucrative U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. {ditto}
4. Reducing Persian Gulf oil and gas production and distribution system vulnerabilities to possible terrorist disruptions by building additional back-up capabilities in Saudi Arabia. {not possible on a significant scale}
5. Limiting Iran’s freedom to threaten oil and gas shipping by proposing a Montreux-like convention to demilitarize the Straits of Hormuz and an agreement to limit possible incidents at sea. {diplomatic}
6. Isolating Iran as a regional producer of fissile materials by encouraging Israel to take the first steps to freeze and dismantle such capabilities. {suicidal}
7. Increased U.S. anti-terrorist, defense, naval border security, and nuclear nonproliferation treaties. {nice but limited relevance}

GorTex6
03-20-2006, 05:55 PM
Human waves of plastic key bearing Basij attacking in swarms of suicide bombings......

Robal2pl
03-21-2006, 11:15 AM
I think that main response will be Iranian controlled special operations in southern Iraq, includning suicide bombings or similar attacks as well martime special operations . - attacking US-ships in Guf in similar manner like in 1988 but with more advanced weapons. advancd sea mines coluld be very dangerous for US Navy.
Iran has 4 Kilo class submarines. How they can be used?

Stratiotes
03-21-2006, 05:59 PM
I think any attempt to stop them will only result in delay. Attacks against their right to develop such weapons will only feed their paranoia that the best way to defeat such threats is by getting the weapons they want. Threats are counterproductive.

I've been re-reading Barb Tuchman's book, _The March of Folly_. In the portion on the American revolution she talks a lot about British paranoia about allowing the colonies to make their own decisions. One fear was that the colonies might begin to favor France. The majority in the British govt sought to use coercion with the punitive legal measures and eventually force of arms. Sure enough, like a jealous lover, their paranoia only served to bring about the thing they feared - a colonial alliance with France.

I think any attempts at coercion - political or military - will server only to drive the Iranians deeper into their paranoia which will result in the them gaining the object of our own paranoia. The only form of coercion that might work would be a total takeover of their country and I don't know anybody who thinks that would be an easy task.

As for the oil. I'm not certain they would cut supplies. They may reduce them but I doubt they would cut off the prime source of their money for funding whatever defense they think they need to fund. The greater they perceive the threat, the more funding they will need. Stopping the export of oil would hurt their interests as much as us I would think. But, also as in Tuchmans' book, governments are prone to choose courses that are a detriment to their own self-interests.

Martin
03-21-2006, 09:40 PM
Maybe the Iranian focus could be turned towards itself.

Suppose they had some internal instability, or at least great concern for internal developments coupled with the tying down of resources in perceiving real (foreign sourced sabotage and Iranian political preps for insurgency?) or imaginary threats.

Completely focused on the inside, while assuming/thinking the threat derives partly from the outside (preferably not Iraq/Afghanistan) but be unable to retaliate because of fright of internal situation and uselessness in retaliating against outside states because of their geographical diversity (which would make threatening the source states detrimenial to regional stability and possibly cause the region to turn against them), and expected overwhelming response (including US).

Thus, align ourselves with the people while giving the Iranians the idea that civil war and regional instability is not in their interest because it would further their own demise. Nukes would also not be very practical.

Just a thought that struck me when I read this thread... not 100% realistic as laid out either.

Hmm... considering that there are other sources available for oil (who might be interested in a higher price of oil), what the Iran perceive as a tool against the west maybe could be used to strangle them if blown up a bit here and there.

Sorry guys, got carried away in the fantasies there. :)

Martin

Stu-6
03-24-2006, 11:10 PM
If it is the US; Unconventional escalation in Iraq combined with efforts to spike oil prices and possible terrorist attacks across the globe. Less likely but still possible is the option of missile strikes in Iraq and large scale mining operations in the Persian Gulf.

If Israel; massive terrorist attacks, missile strikes, possible attempts to sink Israeli ships both military civilian, and unconventional escalation in Iraq. Along with an effort to use the action to link Israel and the US, in an effort to weaken the US internationally.

Martin
03-25-2006, 11:46 AM
I wonder how an attack (not invasion) would be perceived in Iran. It would have to be quite substantial to take out the geographically interspersed and protected targets. Even if the regime's position is not immediately threatened, it is not impossible that they would feel it to be long term jeopardized. Quiet, or indirect, or otherwise in the eyes of the population not powerful responses, would that be enough for them to secure their position (if the population does not support them by holy recognition)? So if they feel jumpy, what are they going to do? Attack their own people and thus maybe open them up to foreign influence rather than fear induced calm, due to foreign interest in the region? Escalate to the point of almost going overt in Iraq? Would that motivate or alienate and agitate Iraqis, and just what do they think the USA would do to them after already having passed the threshold of launching strikes in Iran?

I think they would keep trying to accomplish three things in Iraq, only one of which has to succeed:
Incite civil war.
Subvert the current governmental system.
Infiltrate and realign the government, military and police forces. Militia forces to enforce effect.Any of these would move the US intervention far back and could play on US political deficiencies. I think number three is most likely to be the main focus, having the first two along as supportive elements also keeping their enemy busy with multiple focus. Thus, they should be able to win in Iraq even if they lose first. Depends on the will of the Iraqis.

Pakistan is interesting too.

If the west, including Europe but of course most especially the US can stay the course, this can go very well, for us, if we do not have an armageddon. IMHO.

Martin

Merv Benson
03-25-2006, 04:35 PM
Since at least 1979 Iran has been in a state of covert war with the US, primarily through its proxies like Hezballah. It has sponsored many deadly terrorist attacks against the US and Israel. Whether or not its nuke facilities are attacked, it will continue to do so. There is a reason why it has been designated as the chief state sponsor of terrorism for several years. That is why any attack on those facilities should also include attacks on all instruments of Iran's ability to make war. It should be a sustained attack over months, not days.

The idea of attacking just the nuclear facilities and then standing back for Iran's next move, is an invitation to more Iranian terrorism. When we attack we should make it more difficult for Iran to continue making war against us. We should not limit ourseves to air attacks. We should use special forces working with dissident groups in Iran to fix and target the enemy forces. We should target, for example, the facilities where Iran makes the IED's used in Iraq. We should target her missiles and missile production facilities, which threaten Israel and Western Europe. It should be a campaign like that used against Saddam in 1991 and also like the one against Belgrade later in the 90's.

We should also make clear to Iran's proxy warriors that they will be the subject of sustained attacks if they act to aid their sponsors in Iran.

Stu-6
03-25-2006, 07:33 PM
I agree with the general if you go, go all the way philosophy but I think you maybe seriously over estimating our abilities to damage Iran’s capability to attack. For instances, targeting the “facilities where Iran makes the IEDs”, it is a great idea but these facilities are little more than machine shops and are most likely in basement or garage somewhere. We have struggled to identify and target small cells in Iraq which would be considerably easer than targeting something so small and easily camouflaged in Iran. This is the problem with fighting a small relatively low tech enemy; their ability to hide such a weapon negates our technological advantage. The only way we could ensure that Iran would not be able to target US forces in Iran would be for our forces to not be in Iran.

On the other hand major military facilities, weapons manufacturing faculties, nuclear faculties, etc. could be target but to what effect? We could certainly cause extreme damage and set their capabilities back several years but in the long run I am not sure that is the most effect approach. Such action, in much the same way as our “axis of evil” comments, would allow the Iranian regime to use the US to justify its short comings to its people. Let’s not forget that the Iranian revolution was not on the firmest ground until Iraq invaded giving the revolutionaries something to rally the state around. We need to be careful that we do not do the same thing.

Also I think it is worth thinking about that for our long term interest it would be better if Iran was to break apart from with in. The Cold War was won by communism being discredited as a govern philosophy by the collapse of the USSR. The way to defeat the global jihad is to similarly discredit their philosophy. What better way to discredit reactionary Islamic theocracy than by having Iran collapse, not from outside forces, but rather from its own failures.

SWJED
04-02-2006, 08:58 AM
2 April Washington Post - Attacking Iran May Trigger Terrorism (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/01/AR2006040100981.html).


As tensions increase between the United States and Iran, U.S. intelligence and terrorism experts say they believe Iran would respond to U.S. military strikes on its nuclear sites by deploying its intelligence operatives and Hezbollah teams to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide.

Iran would mount attacks against U.S. targets inside Iraq, where Iranian intelligence agents are already plentiful, predicted these experts. There is also a growing consensus that Iran's agents would target civilians in the United States, Europe and elsewhere, they said.

U.S. officials would not discuss what evidence they have indicating Iran would undertake terrorist action, but the matter "is consuming a lot of time" throughout the U.S. intelligence apparatus, one senior official said. "It's a huge issue," another said...

Martin
04-02-2006, 10:13 PM
What would they expect to accomplish by attacking CONUS?

M

Bill Moore
04-03-2006, 01:39 AM
I believe it well known, at least by those who read about these things, that the Iranians have cased a number of potential targets worldwide for “potential” targeting later. Of course many countries do this, to include the U.S. (of course we target military targets instead of civilian airlines, night clubs, and embassies). The key is that knowledge and in some cases capability doesn’t equate to will. The scenario depicted by this think tank is a worst case scenario, but doubtful a realistic one. The Iranian government and crazy Mullahs also have to conduct a risk versus gain analysis, and if the risk is their destruction and thus loss of power, then their response maybe more limited than what this group is speculating.

However, let’s assume they execute the worst case in response to a preemptive attack against their Nuke facilities. They can't do it overnight, and we can assume if we decide to take action that our force protection status will increase, thus making our targets hard to hit. Not only that the host nations where we have facilities and lots of citizens will be obligated to clamp down on Iranian freedom of movement. I obviously can’t give an accurate estimate, but several of the Iranian planned attacks will fail, but some will be successful, so let’s put in perspective. Let’s assume they bomb an Embassy somewhere in Africa, blow up a popular night club that U.S. tourists frequent in Mexico, and successfully bomb a couple of our shopping malls in the U.S.; and maybe successfully blow up a U.S. airline. All of this is tragic, and of course the media will have a feeding frenzy for a couple of weeks, but it will subside. What they can do now pales in comparison to what the British endure in London in WWII. If need be we can take a couple of hits for the greater good. In our risk versus gain analysis we need to assess if it is better to let Iran acquire a nuclear weapon and potentially use it against us, or to strike now (assuming it is required to stop or delay their program).

In my opinion we can’t our mistakes in Iraq paralyze us from taking appropriate action against Iran “if” our leaders believe they are a credible threat. I think the majority of the world will separate the two issues, and if Iran does target civilians in return, they’ll further isolate themselves and give us a green light to decapitate their regime. Yes they can hurt us, but we can do much more than that to them. The first issue now is attempting to validate the intelligence that is making our nation have this discussion.

Martin
04-03-2006, 10:44 AM
Thanks!

Martin

Stu-6
04-04-2006, 09:12 PM
What would they expect to accomplish by attacking CONUS?

M


Preservation of legitimacy. If they are attack and don’t respond aggressively the regime would lose any legitimacy it had in the eyes of its people, after that it would only be a matter of time before there was a massive change in leadership.

Strickland
04-05-2006, 05:50 PM
Treat Iran or China as a threat, and they will surely become one.

Martin
04-05-2006, 05:54 PM
Treat Iran or China as a threat, and they will surely become one.
Do you think the opposite is true?

M

Strickland
04-05-2006, 11:34 PM
What would they expect to accomplish by attacking CONUS?

M
I would imagine that by demonstrating an ability to conduct attacks against US targets worldwide, regardless if in DC or Kuwait, the Iranian Regime would try to establish its power projection capabilities and operational reach. Isnt the point of terror to create asymmetric effects in relation to the predicate act? I would imagine that by hitting ANY target in the US, they would create a potential social paralysis as well as a tremendous expenditure of financial resources.

Jones_RE
04-06-2006, 04:04 PM
I disagree with some of that assessment. Strikes within the territorial limits of the United States, as opposed to attacks on American interests or targets abroad, would lead to (among other things, including social paralysis and expenditure of resources) a serious backlash by the American people.

Right now, insurgency (and terrorism, if I read this correctly) is a matter of comparative stakes. Victory in its effort to maintain political and military security and indepedence means everything to Iran. Iran's dominance of the Middle East means fairly little to the average American. If the Iranians show the capability to attack the United States within its own borders they will succeed in raising the stakes for Americans. They could well raise those stakes to the point that the political will exists for the total destruction of multiple Iranian cities.

In fact, Iran's best response is to attack American interests in a way that ties our foreign policy leadership's hands, rather than handing them a provocation they can ride all the way to Tehran. In turn, the best way to do that is to cut our alliances with friendly Middle Eastern states. Qatar, Dubai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are all on friendly enough terms, but all are also threatened by Iran and see a weak US security establishment. If I were to try to reduce American influence in the Middle East, I'd start with the soft underbelly - our least reliable coalition partners.

SWJED
04-09-2006, 02:33 AM
17 April issue of the New Yorker - The Iran Plans (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060417fa_fact) by Seymour Hersh.


The Bush Administration, while publicly advocating diplomacy in order to stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, has increased clandestine activities inside Iran and intensified planning for a possible major air attack. Current and former American military and intelligence officials said that Air Force planning groups are drawing up lists of targets, and teams of American combat troops have been ordered into Iran, under cover, to collect targeting data and to establish contact with anti-government ethnic-minority groups. The officials say that President Bush is determined to deny the Iranian regime the opportunity to begin a pilot program, planned for this spring, to enrich uranium...

There is a growing conviction among members of the United States military, and in the international community, that President Bush’s ultimate goal in the nuclear confrontation with Iran is regime change. Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has challenged the reality of the Holocaust and said that Israel must be “wiped off the map.” Bush and others in the White House view him as a potential Adolf Hitler, a former senior intelligence official said. “That’s the name they’re using. They say, ‘Will Iran get a strategic weapon and threaten another world war?’ ”...

The rationale for regime change was articulated in early March by Patrick Clawson, an Iran expert who is the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and who has been a supporter of President Bush. “So long as Iran has an Islamic republic, it will have a nuclear-weapons program, at least clandestinely,” Clawson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2nd. “The key issue, therefore, is: How long will the present Iranian regime last?”...

A senior Pentagon adviser on the war on terror expressed a similar view. “This White House believes that the only way to solve the problem is to change the power structure in Iran, and that means war,” he said. The danger, he said, was that “it also reinforces the belief inside Iran that the only way to defend the country is to have a nuclear capability.” A military conflict that destabilized the region could also increase the risk of terror: “Hezbollah comes into play,” the adviser said, referring to the terror group that is considered one of the world’s most successful, and which is now a Lebanese political party with strong ties to Iran. “And here comes Al Qaeda.”...

SWJED
04-09-2006, 05:01 AM
9 April Washington Post - U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR2006040801082.html).


The Bush administration is studying options for military strikes against Iran as part of a broader strategy of coercive diplomacy to pressure Tehran to abandon its alleged nuclear development program, according to U.S. officials and independent analysts.

No attack appears likely in the short term, and many specialists inside and outside the U.S. government harbor serious doubts about whether an armed response would be effective. But administration officials are preparing for it as a possible option and using the threat "to convince them this is more and more serious," as a senior official put it.

According to current and former officials, Pentagon and CIA planners have been exploring possible targets, such as the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Although a land invasion is not contemplated, military officers are weighing alternatives ranging from a limited airstrike aimed at key nuclear sites, to a more extensive bombing campaign designed to destroy an array of military and political targets.

Preparations for confrontation with Iran underscore how the issue has vaulted to the front of President Bush's agenda even as he struggles with a relentless war in next-door Iraq. Bush views Tehran as a serious menace that must be dealt with before his presidency ends, aides said, and the White House, in its new National Security Strategy, last month labeled Iran the most serious challenge to the United States posed by any country.

Many military officers and specialists, however, view the saber rattling with alarm. A strike at Iran, they warn, would at best just delay its nuclear program by a few years but could inflame international opinion against the United States, particularly in the Muslim world and especially within Iran, while making U.S. troops in Iraq targets for retaliation...

Jedburgh
04-09-2006, 06:27 PM
The Hersh article makes several statements of doubtful validity. He's been doing that a lot lately.

But here's a good look at the available options, from CSIS (7 Apr 06):

Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060407_irannucoptions.pdf)

SWJED
04-15-2006, 12:44 AM
24 April edition of the Weekly Standard - Target Iran (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/101dorxa.asp) by Thomas McInerney.


A military option against Iran's nuclear facilities is feasible. A diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis is preferable, but without a credible military option and the will to implement it, diplomacy will not succeed. The announcement of uranium enrichment last week by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shows Iran will not bow easily to diplomatic pressure. The existence of a military option may be the only means of persuading Iran--the world's leading sponsor of terrorism--to back down from producing nuclear weapons.

A military option would be all the more credible if backed by a new coalition of the willing and if coupled with intense diplomacy during a specific time frame. The coalition could include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, Britain, France, and Germany. Solidarity is important and would surely contribute to potential diplomatic success. But should others decline the invitation, the United States must be prepared to act.

What would an effective military response look like? It would consist of a powerful air campaign led by 60 stealth aircraft (B-2s, F-117s, F-22s) and more than 400 nonstealth strike aircraft, including B-52s, B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-18s. Roughly 150 refueling tankers and other support aircraft would be deployed, along with 100 unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and 500 cruise missiles. In other words, overwhelming force would be used...

This coalition air campaign would hit more than 1,500 aim points. Among the weapons would be the new 28,000-pound bunker busters, 5,000-pound bunker penetrators, 2,000-pound bunker busters, 1,000-pound general purpose bombs, and 500-pound GP bombs. A B-2 bomber, to give one example, can drop 80 of these 500-pound bombs independently targeted at 80 different aim points.

This force would give the coalition an enormous destructive capability, since all the bombs in the campaign feature precision guidance, ranging from Joint Direct Attack Munitions (the so-called JDAMS) to laser-guided, electro-optical, or electronically guided High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) for suppression of Iranian surface-to-air missiles. This array of precision weapons and support aircraft would allow the initial attacks to be completed in 36 to 48 hours.

The destruction of Iran's military force structure would create the opportunity for regime change as well, since it would eliminate some or all of Ahmadinejad's and the mullahs' ability to control the population. Simultaneously or prior to the attack, a major covert operation could be launched, utilizing Iranian exiles and dissident forces trained during the period of diplomacy. This effort would be based on the Afghan model that led to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Not only would the overt and covert attacks weaken the ability of Iran's leaders to carry out offensive operations in retaliation, they would cripple the leaders' power to control their own people...

SWJED
04-15-2006, 01:22 AM
15 April London Times - Israel Will Soon be History, Says Iran's President (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2135387,00.html).


The President of Iran further fuelled the flames of confrontation with the West yesterday by saying that the “Zionist regime” in Israel would soon be annihilated.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech will alarm the US, coming days after he declared that Iran had joined the “nuclear club” by successfully enriching uranium. President Bush has stated that the US would use force to protect Israel from being, in the words of President Ahmadinejad last year, “wiped off the face of the map”.

The Iranian leader, appearing at a conference on the Palestinian issue yesterday, said that Israel was “heading towards annihilation”, questioned whether the Holocaust had ever happened, and predicted that the Middle East would “soon be liberated”.

He said that the existence of Israel was a threat to the Islamic world, but added that “the Zionist regime is a rotten, dried tree that will be eliminated by one storm”. Even if the Holocaust were true, he said, “why should the people of this region pay the price? Why does the Palestinian nation have to be suppressed?” ...

SWJED
04-18-2006, 07:05 PM
24 April edition of the Weekly Standard - To Bomb, or Not to Bomb (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/100mmysk.asp) by Reuel Marc Gerecht.


... a French diplomat explained to me why he--and many others in the French foreign ministry--thought the United States would, in the end, bomb Iran's nuclear-weapons facilities. Owing to Chinese and Russian obstreperousness, the United Nations would probably fail to agree on any sanctions, let alone a sanctions regime with sufficient bite to intimidate the mullahs. The Europeans--at least the French, Germans, and British if not the Italians--would do a bit better, primarily because the French, despite their laissez-passer cynicism and their Gaullist pride vis-à-vis the United States, have developed a strong distaste for the clerics. The mullahs did, after all, once bomb Paris and kill a slew of prominent Iranian expatriates on French soil; and the French don't particularly care for religious Third Worlders' joining the nuclear club. France might even lead the sanctions charge against Tehran--an astonishing historical moment for the Fifth Republic, which has usually aligned itself with Muslim Middle Eastern regimes or cultivated a profitable neutrality, especially when the United States was involved on the opposite side.

But this nouvelle différence française, alas, would not in all probability dissuade the Islamic Republic's nuke-loving theocrats. The Iranians would proceed, my French friend thought, with little of the dialogue-of-civilizations finesse and moderation they exhibited during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami--probably the period when the clerical regime made its greatest advances in its nuclear-weapons program. Iran's most politically savvy cleric, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, is trying hard to align most of the clerical establishment behind him, even
the reformist and dissident mullahs who hate his guts, to ensure the fire-breathing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, doesn't scare foreigners too much with his Khomeinist language and thought. Rafsanjani, the true father of the Islamic Republic's nuclear "energy" program, loathes the diehard ex-Revolutionary Guard Ahmadinejad, who threatens to ruin, among other things, Rafsanjani's hitherto successful strategy of dividing the Europeans from the American.

But Rafsanjani probably won't be able to corral Ahmadinejad. (He who triumphs at home is likely to triumph abroad, and the new president has been remarkably successful in replacing provincial governors and appears to be commencing a fresh purge of the country's universities.) In any case, the Americans will grow more anxious. Tehran will likely become even more bellicose toward the United States and Israel. Adding fuel to the fire, the clerical regime will continue to test new and improved ballistic missiles, extending range and payload.

The Iranian-American enmity will, my French friend reasoned, kick into high gear. The White House will admit that it can no longer diplomatically maintain the international processes designed to thwart the mullahs' acquisition of nuclear weaponry. George W. Bush, who has described a bomb for the terrorism-fond clerics as "unacceptable," will decide that further delay in attacking the known crucial facilities will only allow the mullahs to disburse clandestinely sufficient enriched uranium to fabricate nukes. The administration may well get a strong indication, either through its own resources or those of a foreign-intelligence service, that Iran is very near the red line in the production of weapons-grade uranium, and all the geostrategic and terrorist possibilities of a clerical nuke that now seem frightening but abstract will seem imminent. Therefore, so they reason, the Americans will let loose the U.S. Air Force and Navy even though George W. Bush, the State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon really would prefer to do anything else...

GorTex6
04-18-2006, 09:46 PM
Basij (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2006/04/ahmadinejads_de.html)

"Ahmadinejad's Demons"
"Since Ahmadinejad became president, the influence of the Basiji has grown. In November, the new Iranian president opened the annual "Basiji Week," which commemorates the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War. According to a report in Kayan, a publication loyal to Khameini, some nine million Basiji--12 percent of the Iranian population--turned out to demonstrate in favor of Ahmadinejad's anti-liberal platform. The article claimed that the demonstrators "form[ed] a human chain some 8,700 kilometers long. ... In Tehran alone, some 1,250,000 people turned out." Barely noticed by the Western media, this mobilization attests to Ahmadinejad's determination to impose his "second revolution" and to extinguish the few sparks of freedom in Iran.

SWJED
04-19-2006, 02:15 PM
19 April USA Today - War Game Will Focus on Situation with Iran (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060419/a_iran19.art.htm).


Amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran over the future of Iran's nuclear program, the Pentagon is planning a war game in July so officials can explore options for a crisis involving Iran.

The July 18 exercise at National Defense University's National Strategic Gaming Center will include members of Congress and top officials from military and civilian agencies. It was scheduled in August, before the latest escalation in the conflict, university spokesman Dave Thomas said.

It's the latest example of how otherwise routine operations are helping the United States prepare for a possible military confrontation with Iran. On Tuesday, President Bush refused to rule out military action — even a nuclear strike — to stop Iran's nuclear program.

“All options are on the table,” Bush said in the Rose Garden.

The exercise is one of five scheduled this year, including others envisioning an avian influenza pandemic and a crisis in Pakistan. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld started the exercises involving members of Congress in 2002 to help the legislative and executive branches discuss policy options.

Such exercises do not involve military members simulating combat. Instead, officials gather for a daylong conference and discuss how to react to various events presented in a fictional scenario...

SWJED
04-23-2006, 01:42 AM
23 April London Times - Iran’s President Recruits Terror Master (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2147683,00.html).


Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, attended a meeting in Syria earlier this year with one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, according to intelligence experts and a former national security official in Washington.

US officials and Israel intelligence sources believe Imad Mugniyeh, the Lebanese commander of Hezbollah’s overseas operations, has taken charge of plotting Iran’s retaliation against western targets should President George W Bush order a strike on Iranian nuclear sites.

Mugniyeh is on the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorists” list for his role in a series of high-profile attacks against the West, including the 1985 hijacking of a TWA jet and murder of one of its passengers, a US navy diver...

aktarian
04-24-2006, 06:41 PM
1. Fire every available SSM at oil facilities in Gulf
2. Use air force and navy to strike at outbound tankers
3. Claim you have dropped large numbers of free floating mines in Gulf and drop couple so they are discovered and seen
4. Cut oil exports

Strickland
07-13-2006, 08:20 PM
While consistent with US Small Wars Doctrine, is Israel justified in attacking Lebanon and Gaza in response to the kidnapping of 3 Israeli soldiers? If yes, would the US then be justified to attack Mexico in order to retrieve the 40+ US citizens being held across the border?

How is State sponsership relevant here? If Iran and Syria are State sponsors of Hamas (a democractically elected gov't), then is US the State sponsor of Israel?

Stu-6
07-13-2006, 09:55 PM
Justified? Yes, smart? That is a different question all together. The possible exception to the justified argument would be the attacking Lebanese targets since their ability to influence Hezbollah is debatable at best. Hamas and Hezbollah however would constitute legitimate targets since by attacking and taking prisoners they committed an act of war against Israel.

I think the US is viewed as a sponsor of Israel throughout the Arab world; and due to our ridiculous policy towards them I can understand why.

Jones_RE
07-13-2006, 11:26 PM
The United Nations charter prohibits the use of force in the settlement of disputes between nations, with two exceptions. Force is legally permissible when the United Nations Security Council has authorized it through a mandatory resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. Force is also legally permissible in "self defense." The UN Charter does not define self defense so international lawyers turn to customary international law, which has produced a substantial body of writing on the subject.

Self defense between nations as a legal concept arose during the 19th century (Daniel Webster was instrumental in the creation of the doctrine). The Caroline incident makes for a fascinating story in itself, but I'll skip the burning steamship going over Niagra falls and get straight to the boring legalities, which boil down to necessity and proportionality:

1) The use of force must be necessary to remove the threat. That means that lesser options like warnings, etc. must be insufficient.

2) The use of force must be proportional to the threat. If a half dozen commandos sneak across the border you can chase them down with forces of your own, but you can't nuke the opposition.

There have been refinements and accretions over the years. Many decades ago, it was determined that the use of force in reprisals is illegal. The US invasion of Afghanistan was conducted on self defense grounds, even though the government of Afghanistan itself was arguably innocent of involvement in the various September 11 attacks. The rescue of hostages held in a foreign country is generally legal, as is the evacuation of foreign noncombatants from a war zone. It's also permissible to help another country defend itself, even if the helping country hasn't been attacked (this is known as collective self defense). Finally, force is legal if a host country grants permission.

Israel's response to attacks on its territory by Hamas and Hezbollah present a difficult case study. I'll start with Gaza (and ignore questions of Palestinian sovereignty, treating Gaza as part of a bona fide nation state because that's by far the majority position).

Taken in isolation, the kidnapping and murder of a handful of soldiers is indeed sufficient to merit a forceable response in self defense. Certainly a commando raid to try to rescue their trapped soldier would be allowed. So would an attack on any identifiable Hamas units that might be poised to launch another such sneak attack. However, a large scale offensive (as has been conducted) seems quite out of proportion to the level of threat involved. But of course, Hamas hasn't limited themselves to simply that one operation - they've launched a large number of rockets at civilian targets. Given that ongoing and continuous pattern of attacks, Israel would be justified in a much higher level of force. Pretty much any sort of search and destroy operation to take down the rocket teams themselves is allowed. Likewise, trying to cut supply lines to the teams. None of this deals with the requirements of the Laws of Land Warfare to mitigate harm to civilians, of course.

Israel's seizure of high level Hamas leaders, however, does not appear to be necessary to achieve the cessation of rocket attacks or the rescue of their soldier. Likewise, attacks on power stations, water supplies and so forth have no place in national self defense of this sort.

Lebannon is a different case study. Air strikes against bridges and airports may be necessary (tactically and therefore legally) to prevent the movement of their soldiers from beyond help of rescue. However, these attacks are NOT proportional to the harm inflicted by Israel's air attacks. Israel would do better to make efforts to mitigate the civilian losses caused by these measures - for example psychological operations to convince civilians to evacuate the affected area. Attacking non-Hezbollah targets in Lebannon would be legitimate under the same rationale as attacking Taliban targets to get at al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

In a real sense, this is a completely academic discussion. You can't be put in "international jail" and no one can compel Israel to defend its actions in court. However, that doesn't mean that international law is without important consequences! Other nations shape their reactions based on the conduct of the nations that are parties to a conflict. Europe, especially, is sensitive to concerns of international law. Various middle eastern nations with a stake in seeing Israel suffer can use this "violation" as a propaganda tool and to justify sending assistance to their side. Of course, Israel may have concluded that Europe and the Middle East will view any armed response by Israel as immoral, vicious and wrong (not far from my assessment, actually), and also that Europe and the Middle East will not do a damned thing in response to violations by Hamas, Hezbollah, Lebannon, Syria or Iran (completely true).

So, to sum up:

1) State sponsors of terrorism are legitimate targets, with or without UN approval.
2) Nevertheless, military operations must be necessary (to stop the threat) and proportional (to the threat).
3) Not all of Israel's operations have met this dual standard. However, the ramifications of those violations are (in this instance) minor at best.
4) The U.S. would be justified in sending our forces to Mexico to rescue 40 hostages - or 1 hostage. However, we'd have to be quite careful in how much damage we inflicted along the way.
5) As for the U.S. as a state sponsor of Israel, no doubt it looks that way. However, Israel's actions are acts of war rather than terrorism. I can't give you a precise definition explaining why because no one has a precise definition of terrorism.
6) Nevertheless, terrorist organizations will use these latest attacks to recruit individuals to attack Americans and America based on our "sponsorship."

Strickland
07-14-2006, 01:16 AM
Excellent response; however, I am biased towards answers founded in things like "the law."

Question concerning State sponsorship - the US currently extends "protected persons" status to the MEK in Iraq, a designated FTO. The Iranians in particular have grievances with the MEK, so if they attacked us for protecting them, would they in fact be committing a lawful act by attacking a State sponsor of terrorism?

Jedburgh
07-14-2006, 02:54 AM
Question concerning State sponsorship - the US currently extends "protected persons" status to the MEK in Iraq, a designated FTO. The Iranians in particular have grievances with the MEK, so if they attacked us for protecting them, would they in fact be committing a lawful act by attacking a State sponsor of terrorism?
In your hypothetical situation.....If we permit / encourage / train, equip and target - the MEK to launch terrorist attacks in Iran out of Iraqi territory, and provide them protection when they come back across the border into areas under our control, then Iran would be fully justified in their counter-attack.

slapout9
07-14-2006, 03:11 AM
Jed, I would agree because we would in fact be engaging in a conspiracy to attack another country without a declaration of war.

Tom Odom
07-14-2006, 04:18 PM
This recent explosion of violence is an excellent example of one article in SWJ Magazine on expedient responses. I agree that Iran is probably pulling the strings here and in doing so it is a classic case of using unconventional means to provoke a heavy response.

Viewed in terms of strategy, it is ultimately in Israel's best interest to encourage and facilitate both a healthy Palestinian and a healthy Lebanese government. That means a strategy that is willing to accept tactical losses along the way as a means toward achieving strategic goals. Call it strategic patience as we teach tactical patience in developing a tactical situation.

But instead Israel responds tactically with overwhelming force. That satisfies the Israeli domestic community and others who first say do something without putting it in a longer context. The result is of course tactical victory for Israel and strategic victory for her enemies. It has taken years to move Lebanon toward a more stable and powerful government; such an event is in the strategic interest of Israel. It would provide a more secure border and it would buffer Syrian adventurism. Repeated tactical application of force against Lebanese infrastructure and political force against the government only strengthens Hizballah. The very same dynamic is taking place in Gaza.

This is why several months ago when the question of whether Israeli strategy is working, I responded that Israel does not pursue a strategy beyond repetitive application of force.

best
Tom

Stu-6
07-15-2006, 12:00 AM
Good point about satisfying the domestic community or as Tip O’Neil put it “all politics is local”. On of the major weakness of democracies in international relations is the urge to respond to respond constituents who are often demanding that their government “do something”. This can causes ill thought out actions centered around short term results, or election cycles not long term strategic interest.

Merv Benson
07-15-2006, 12:08 AM
I think Israel and Lebanon stand to gain from Israel's destruction/disarmament of Hezballah. The UN resolution in place already requires that Lebanon disarm Hezballah and take over the border patrols. If Israel is successful that should happen and both Israel and Lebanon will be better off. Hezballah is an Iranian proxy and its destruction is a plus for everyone but Iran. The Lebanese are very unhappy with what Hezballah has done and right now that group is getting the blame for not only the destruction currently occurring, but also for ruining the tourist trade which is important to the Lebanon economy.

While it is still not clear how Israel intends to remove the 10,000 Iranian/Hezballah rockets on its northern border, it does appear that Israel is isolating and preparing the battlefield for that eventuality. It is also possible that Israel may be able to discover whether Iraq WMD has really been hidden in the Bekka Valley as several intelligence sources have suggested.

The important thing that needs to happen now is that Israel not be stopped before it completes its destruction of Hezballah. The chances are remote to non existant that Hezballah will ever be a peaceful neighbor with Israel. Their issues are based in ingrained religious bigotry, which has convinced them that any tolerance for Israel's existance condemns them to hell.

SWJED
07-15-2006, 12:37 AM
The important thing that needs to happen now is that Israel not be stopped before it completes its destruction of Hezballah.

I may take some grief on the board - but I am in complete agreement on this issue. I have read and read, studied and studied all of the arguments concerning a political solution to the Hizballah situation. There is no doubt in my mind that they have to be erased (read- extreme prejudice) from any Middle East peace equation.

Of course that means that Iran and Syria have to be dealt with - and that is the 'wild card' - but they have to be dealt with - firmly - as diplomacy seems to escape both of these state-sponsors of terrorism.

With our commitments to the GWOT and its extensions in Iraq, Afghanistan, HOA, SEA, and South America we can hardly afford to concentrate on (or encourage) long-term negotiations with a non-state entity that is sworn to erase the nation of Israel. Same – same with the state-sponsors – there are many indications that the current situation was sponsored by Iran and Syria as a diversion from their own particular problems in dealing with the civilized nations…

On edit - Did I forget to mention we have to deal with the DPRK too? Same-same since 1994 - extortion that even the Sorpanos would be proud of...

cmetcalf82
07-15-2006, 07:52 AM
Of course that means that Iran and Syria have to be dealt with - and that is the 'wild card' - but they have to be dealt with - firmly - as diplomacy seems to escape both of these state-sponsors of terrorism.

While I agree completely that Hizballah, Iran, and Syria all need to be dealt with how do we convince other nations to help while we are strung so thin? Israeli action is not generating support for dealing with the root problem - which is Hizballah's continued existence and ability to strike Israel from Lebanon.

No one, and especially the U.S., can truly fault Israel for their actions which have been taken to protect not only their military but their civilan population. It seems that not enough attention is paid to the fact that there is a U.N. Resolution that called for Lebanon to disarm/control Hizballah - something they have not done. Would the U.S. stand by and allow any organization to launch rocket/mortar attacks from Mexico or Canada?


Viewed in terms of strategy, it is ultimately in Israel's best interest to encourage and facilitate both a healthy Palestinian and a healthy Lebanese government

Finally I again agree it is in Israel's strategic interest to see a stable and healthy Lebanon and Palestine, but how long can they be expected to tolerate attacks from the territory of a soverign nation before they act?

Jedburgh
07-15-2006, 05:49 PM
I have read and read, studied and studied all of the arguments concerning a political solution to the Hizballah situation. There is no doubt in my mind that they have to be erased (read- extreme prejudice) from any Middle East peace equation.
If only it were that easy. Remember, Hizballah is a legitimate political party in Lebanon and holds several elected seats in the Lebanese parliament. They have also been heavily engaged in public works over the past decade+, especially in South Lebanon - building schools, funding small farmers and sending kids to overseas universities. To top all that off, to many Lebanese (not just Shi'a) they are viewed as Heroes for facing up to the IDF and forcing their withdrawal from the occupation of South Lebanon.

Sure many Lebanese haven't been happy with their retention of an armed militia antagonizing Israel along the border. They are also not exactly pleased with the continuing influence of Syria and Iran that the activities of the militia imply. However, the Lebanese people are also very strongly nationalistic - and the current Israeli blockade and destruction of infrastructure - along with the comcomitant civilian casualties - only serves to unite Lebanese factions against Israel.

Of course that means that Iran and Syria have to be dealt with - and that is the 'wild card' - but they have to be dealt with - firmly - as diplomacy seems to escape both of these state-sponsors of terrorism.

With our commitments to the GWOT and its extensions in Iraq, Afghanistan, HOA, SEA, and South America we can hardly afford to concentrate on (or encourage) long-term negotiations with a non-state entity that is sworn to erase the nation of Israel. Same – same with the state-sponsors – there are many indications that the current situation was sponsored by Iran and Syria as a diversion from their own particular problems in dealing with the civilized nations…
"Our commitments" is the key phrase. We are already spread out attempting to manage the problems that have arisen from attempting to execute complex strategic missions with a minimal footprint in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The drain on our intel and SOF assets for those missions puts a strain on arguably more critical under-the-radar missions around the globe - and effectively makes it almost impossible to execute anything meaningful in the area under discussion. But to give even the appearance through speech and actions that Israel is our proxy in this matter will do incalculable damage to our image in the entire region.

Tom hit the nail on the head - we need a strong government in Lebanon. Once again, we failed to exploit an opportunity - the "Cedar Revolution" and the withdrawal of Syrian forces. At the time, I'm sure it appeared to be too much of an effort given "our commitments". However, the current Israeli approach, although it will certainly disrupt Hizballah, has no chance of "erasing" it. On the contrary, the short-term disruption of the organization will be exchanged for long-term strengthening of its support networks after the inevitable cease-fire takes effect.

Part of this will be due to the weakening of the Lebanese government by Israeli attacks, and part due to Iranian funding enabling Hizballah to launch an immediate humanitarian campaign. This occurred after "Operation Grapes of Wrath", when the Israelis conciously set out through calculated destruction in the south to create large refugee flows that would put pressure on the Lebanese government regarding Hizballah. Their strategy failed utterly, and after the cease-fire, Hizballah rebuilt all the homes that had been destroyed by the Israelis, repaired infrastructure, and increased subsidies to students and farmers - all while the Lebanese government was still trying to figure out how to go about the recovery.

Yes, Hizballah's military wing needs to be disarmed, and the political organization needs to either be brought fully into the Lebanese mainstream and de-linked from its foreign patrons - or it needs to be delegitimized and its support cut away. Unfortunately, in the long-term strategic view, the current Israeli campaign will only have the opposite result.

Merv Benson
07-15-2006, 07:32 PM
Lebanon's Prime Minister has asked for a UN sponsored cease fire (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060715/ap_on_re_mi_ea/lebanon_israel;_ylt=AtPghIMUr70fDDHWmmTvplCs0NUE;_ ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNlYwN0bQ--) that would give Isreal just about everything it has asked for in regard to Hezballah. While the wording is probably still a little murky, it calls for the removal of Hezballah from the border with Israel to be replaced by Lenanon's army. It also calls for the enforcement of the prior UN resolution that required the disarmament of Hezballah. That appears to give Israel its main strategic objectives. Other parts of the proposal may be more problamatic especially the prisoner exchange. If a mechanism can be found for enforcing the disarmament of Hezballah, I would say this deal is a clean win for Israel. It is also a win for Lebanon. The main loser is Hezballah which at best gets the prisoner exchange it wanted, but at a very high price. If Syria and Iran have their main proxy disarmed they also come out the loser in the proposed deal. If Hezballah is disarmed, its war making capacity should be effectively destroyed.

Jedburgh
07-16-2006, 03:26 PM
From CSIS:

Commentary by the director of its MidEast program:

Different Conflict: A Commentary on the Latest Cycle of Arab-Israeli Violence (http://www.csis.org/images/stories/mideast/060714_alterman_commentary.pdf)

Where Israel finds itself now is much where the United States found itself after September 11, as articulated in the two versions of the National Security Strategy the White House has issued since. National security threats from non-state actors are just as difficult as ones coming from states, and in many ways they are more difficult to resolve. The old notions of rogue states and state sponsors of terrorism break down in the face of complex networks of like-minded, but sometimes loosely coordinated groups. The solution is not so simple as negotiating with groups bent on their destruction—something Israel is unlikely to do, and should not do. At the same time, they need to engage in policies that undermine the support these groups enjoy. Military might has its limits.
A longer paper from Cordesman: Lebanese Security and the Hezbollah (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060714_lebanese_security.pdf)

...Lebanon needs to develop forces that can secure its borders, and act as a deterrent to any further Syrian and Israeli incursions. It needs forces that can bring the Hezbollah and Palestinian paramilitary and terrorist elements under control and fully disarm them, and that can ensure that Iran, Israel, and Syria cannot use Lebanon as a proxy in their conflicts and struggles. Once again, this requires national unity from a nation that has been self-inflicted sectarian wound for more than half a century. Lebanon also faces the following more detailed strategic challenges:

• Continuing to train and organize truly integrated and national military, paramilitary, and security forces.

• Removing officers and elements penetrated by Syrian intelligence and subject to Syrian influence.

• Establishing full military and security control over both the Syrian and Israeli border areas.

• Disarming Hezbollah and Amal, seizing the hidden military assets of other militias.

• Preventing Palestinian military or terrorist activities from being planned and supported in Lebanon, and infiltration across Lebanon’s borders with Israel.

• Organizing and modernizing its military forces to deter Israeli and Syrian military incursions, including air and naval forces capable of deterring incursions into Lebanese air space and waters.

• The risk Jordanian territory or air space could be involved in any exchange between Iran and Israel, and that if Iran develops nuclear armed missile, Jordan might have to deal with an inaccurate missile or fall out.

Lebanon cannot prepare for large-scale conventional war, or even play a significant military role on the periphery of a broader Arab-Israeli conflict. It can, however, become involved in such a war if Iran, Syria, and or the Hezbollah involve the Hezbollah in a serious proxy war with Israel or missile attack on northern Israel.

If Lebanon is to be a player, rather than simply played, it must develop equate capabilities to deal with internal security threats and to deter a limited expansion of a conflict between its neighbors into Lebanese territory, waters, or air space. The key to such success is bringing the Hezbollah under central government control, disarming the Hezbollah and the concealed weapons stashes in other militias, and putting Lebanese central government forces truly in control. It must also be to fully expel the remaining Syrian and Iranian intelligence and security presence in the country, and stop the expansion of Sunni Islamist extremist activity before it becomes yet another threat...

Tom Odom
07-17-2006, 01:28 PM
Dave,

No grief. I have little love for Hisballah after Rich Higgins' murder. The issue is simply one of capability; chances of Israel "wiping out" Hisballah given the history behind the organization and the Shia in Lebanon--and Israel--are slight.

The greatest hope for containing Hizballah is through a strengthened Lebanese government and therein lays the tactical versus the strategic dilemma. Beirut has been moving to reduce Syrian influence and it has been costly along the way. The Shia in Lebanon have long been on the low end of the totem pole; they originally welcomed the 1982 invasion as a way of getting rid of the PLO. When the IDR made things permanent, Hizballah with Iranian training and money came into being. Its ties to Syria are similarly colored by religious affiliation. The Syrian government is a minority Shia affair that has long sought to encompass at least the Shia strongholds in Lebanon to bolster its hold over Syria.

Lebanese capacity to reduce Syrian and Iranian influence has made some gains. A direct challenge to Hizballah is not in the Lebanese military's capabilities list ---without risking a renewed civil war and a large scale return of Syrian troops, neither of which is in the strategic interest of Israel.

As for a UN force doing the job, I will believe that when I see it. First of all UNIFIL has been in south Lebanon and Israel never allowed the UN force to create a continuous zone across the south of Lebanon. Instead, Israel kept the Litani River valley open so that its forces had immediate access to the south end of the Bekka valley. It would take a major shift in tactics (mandate) for UNIFIL to secure the area, especially given the range of the rockets hizballah has been shooting.

as for Israel "tolerating attacks from a sovereign nation," Israel is the local super power in the Middle East but its power base is entirely military. Developing a more centered stance based on "soft" power ---say by working with the Lebanese government--is Israel's greatest chance for reducing these type of attacks. That however would take a major shift of internal Israeli politics, one I fear is unlikely to happen.

In sum, I don't see a neat outcome to this one. I may be wrong but my experience on the ground in southern Lebanon makes me less than optimistic.

best

Tom

Jedburgh
07-26-2006, 02:21 PM
ICG, 25 Jul 06: Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/57_israel_palestine_lebanon___climbing_out_of_the_ abyss.pdf)

...This report pieces together the strands of this multiheaded crisis in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and elsewhere, based on talks with officials and others, including Hamas and Hizbollah representatives. There are many dimensions to the explanation of why the
capture of three soldiers has, so suddenly and so intensely, escalated at an extraordinary pace into a deep and widespread conflict: local ones like Hamas’s struggle to govern and Hizbollah’s desire to maintain its special status in Lebanon; regional ones, notably the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s interests in Lebanon, and the growing Sunni-Shiite divide; and wider international ones, especially the confrontation between Washington and Tehran....

SWJED
08-16-2006, 11:30 AM
16 August Los Angeles Times - Group Says Iran Is 'Not a Crisis' (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-generals16aug16,1,3111561.story?coll=la-headlines-nation) by Peter Spiegel.

(SWC Note: While most certainly connected to and meant to influence the mid-term congressional elections, this story is presented here for discussion...)


Seeking to counter the White House's depiction of its Middle East policies as crucial to the prevention of terrorist attacks at home, 21 former generals, diplomats and national security officials will release an open letter tomorrow arguing that the administration's "hard line" has actually undermined U.S. security...

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, one of the letter's signers and a former military assistant to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in the 1960s, said the group was particularly concerned about administration policies toward Iran, believing them to be a possible prelude to a military attack on suspected nuclear sites in that country.

Gard said the signatories — who included retired Marine Corps Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, head of U.S. Central Command from 1991 to 1994, and Morton H. Halperin, a senior State Department and National Security Council official during the Clinton administration — did not believe that Iran had the wherewithal to build a nuclear weapon in the immediate future and would push the administration to open negotiations with Tehran on the issue.

"It's not a crisis," Gard said in a telephone interview. "To call the Iranian situation a 'crisis' connotes you have to do something right now, like bomb them." ...

SWJED
08-23-2006, 08:40 AM
23 August Los Angeles Times commentary - Israel Should Hit Syria First (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-boot23aug23,0,5533737.column?coll=la-opinion-rightrail) by Max Boot.


"We are walking with open eyes into our next war."

The pessimism of a senior Israeli official who made that comment on Aug. 13 was striking because he had just finished telling a group of security analysts brought to Israel by the American Jewish Committee that the United Nations-brokered cease-fire had achieved many of Israel's goals. But he had no illusions that this would represent anything more than a temporary halt in the fight between Israel and the Quartet of Evil seeking to dominate the Middle East — Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah.

The war wasn't a total loss for Israel. But it was far from a victory. Hezbollah lost more than 500 fighters as well as most of its medium- and long-range missiles and its bunker network in southern Lebanon, while inflicting scant damage on Israel. Israeli intelligence analysts are convinced that Tehran isn't happy about this turn of events because it was holding Hezbollah's rockets in reserve for a possible retaliatory strike if Israel or the U.S. hit Iran's nuclear weapons complex.

But rockets are easily replaced, and Iran and Syria will now undertake a massive effort to make good Hezbollah's losses, and then some...

Israel had managed to defeat the terrorists' previous wonder-weapon, the suicide bomber, by walling off the Gaza Strip and West Bank. But a fence won't stop missiles. Israel will now be loath to retreat any further from the West Bank. Hamas, for its part, will have strong incentive to stockpile rockets in its Gaza redoubt and launch a "third intifada," as suggested by a columnist in the Hamas newspaper Al Risala.

Israel had hoped that this conflict would reestablish its deterrence, but, if anything, the unsatisfactory outcome will only embolden its enemies. The problem is that wars of attrition against fanatical jihadists who do not fear death and who hide among civilians negate to some extent the Israeli Defense Forces' superior firepower. Additionally, Iran, the ultimate source of terrorist money and arms, is too far away for effective Israeli retaliation.

Syria, however, is a weak link in the quartet.

Syria's importance as an advance base for Iran — the two countries concluded a formal alliance on June 16 — cannot be exaggerated. It is the go-between for most of the munitions flowing to Hezbollah. It is the sanctuary of Hamas honcho Khaled Meshaal. It is also, according to Israeli intelligence sources, the home of a new Iranian-Syrian intelligence center that tracks Israeli military movements and relays that information to terrorist proxies...

History suggests that only force, or the threat of force, can win substantial concessions from Syria. In 1998, Turkey threatened military action unless Syria stopped supporting Kurdish terrorists. Damascus promptly complied. Israel may have no choice but to follow the Turkish example...

Jones_RE
08-23-2006, 11:54 PM
The current Assad regime has been consolidating its power base for some years now. Immediately after 9/11/01 Syria became an important partner in working against al Qaeda. Bashar Assad also briefly courted the idea of a more open Syrian society.

Now, Syria is the prime conduit for foreigners who wish to wage Jyhad in Iraq against US forces. Syria has also cemented an alliance of convenience with Iran (Syria is governed by a ruling clique that subscribes to a sect of Shiite Islam). Syria has also continued to commit espionage and murder in Lebannon as well as supporting Hezbollah directly in its war with Israel.

I think it's pretty clear that the Assad regime is basically weak - militarily, economically and politically. Thus, their choices are based on survival rather than desire. It's extremely disturbing to note that Syria's realignment indicates that in their judgment the West will not be successful in the Middle East.

Moreover, Israel would stand to gain only in a very limited set of circumstances in any conflict with Syria. If Israel uses too much force, the Assad government could fall. In the current climate, I can see no way in which a successor government would be more friendly to Israel. Too little force, however, and the Assad government will only be emboldened. Worse, Syrian public opinion is at issue: a weak reaction by the Assad government could leave them open to charges of cowardice and prompt internal rebellion. Worse, such a rebellion would likely be successful if the most effective (and loyal) elements of the Syrian military are destroyed. Finally, even in a situation of complete anarchy in Syria (akin to Iraq, say), arms could still be transshipped by Iranian agents. In fact, it seems fair to suggest that Iran would have an easier time supplying Hezbollah through such chaos. While there would be considerable "shrinkage" from banditry, bribes and Israeli interdiction, such shipments would still be impossible to track and stop.

For the moment, Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas are able to club Israel with impunity. Israel's strategic situation is unfavorable because it's ability to use force is constrained by international and domestic pressure - constrained to a level below that which is sufficient to deter, defeat or even significantly degrade any of its enemies apparently.

SWJED
08-24-2006, 01:03 AM
I got much more out of your reply than from Boot's commentary - good analysis - thanks.

Uboat509
08-24-2006, 03:32 AM
I agree with everything that Jones said except for the last line. "Israel's strategic situation is unfavorable because it's ability to use force is constrained by international and domestic pressure - constrained to a level below that which is sufficient to deter, defeat or even significantly degrade any of its enemies apparently."

I am not sure that international pressure played much of a role in their halting their advance into Lebanon. I'm not sure that international pressure plays a role in anything Israel does. Internal pressure seems to have been pushing them on not trying to halt them. Israel has always had a keen survival instinct and, to my mind at least, has never allowed foreign or even domestic opinion interfere with that instinct. I suspect that the constraints on Israel's military are more economics coupled with an acute awareness that part of Israel's defense is predicated on the appearance of invincibility. I'm not saying that Israel is weak, far from it but it has taken on mythological prowess. To hear some people tell it the only thing that is stopping the IDF from single handly taking over the ME and destroying Islamic terrorism once and for all is liberal public oppinion in Europe and New England. As you wander the blogesphere you will hear many people speaking in awed tones of just how invincible the IDF really is and people get really defensive about it. When I posited on another website that Israel's military may have some serious problems and posted the articles posted here as evidence I was attacked. I did not say or imply that Israel was in the wrong to attack Hizbullah or that Israel didn't have a right to defend itself, I simply suggested that Israel has some problems that it needed to adress in its military. You would have thought that I was the Jonbennet Ramsey killer. I suspect that if you replace the awe with hatred then you will have the Arab view of Israel. But this is not 1967. Israel's enemies aren't armed with the old saggers any more. The IDF is still better than any of it's enemies and Israeli air power is still unmatched but Lebenon served to illustrate that technology allows Israel's enemies to make up some of the distance between them. More than that it showed that however powerful the IDF is, it is not invincible. Am I saying that Syria or Iran could attack and destroy Israel? Of course not but any large scale fight is likely to be bloody and costly for Israel in men, material and treasure. It's not an option that they are going to seek out. They are constrained by the fact that they don't want the Arab world's hatred of Israel to overcome thir belief in Israel's invincibility. That's how I see it anyway.

SFC W

Jones_RE
08-24-2006, 05:01 PM
If by domestic and international pressure you mean the public pronouncements of various diplomats from the UN, the EU and so forth, or public demonstrations of the usual anti-war variety, then absolutely these have no impact on Israeli policy.

However, I believe Israeli policy is subject to pressure from both within and without. I'll start with the domestic side. Firstly, the Israeli body politic is famously divided: "Israel has three opinions for every two Israelis." While folks showed remarkable unity early in the crisis, that unity has since faded. Moreover, it is not reflected in the Knesset where no single party holds a majority. Kadima, the "ruling" party, may well have lost its mandate the moment Hezbollah crossed the border (before any fighting even began). In a very real sense, this war was fought to regain Kadima's political power to withdraw from the West Bank. That's one reason for the air power emphasis, to show that threats to Israel could be controlled without controlling the land around it.

Another source of pressure is from an Israeli desire to avoid casualties. This is admirable, but can hamstring operations that call for daring - it makes you fight like a coward even if you aren't.

There is also a great public demand to "do something" to rescue any Israeli hostages. Wonderful, but fewer hostages might be taken if Tel Aviv was willing to stand fast in the face of such outrages. As it is, thousands (mostly innocent civilians in Gaza and Lebannon) have died in an ineffectual attempt to secure the release of three men who may already be dead.

There is very strong public pressure not to show weakness or negotiate with terrorists or Arabs in general.

There is also strong pressure to keep fighting short. This is both political and economic - the IDF relies on reservists to supply much manpower and those reservists can't work if they're fighting, also fighting cuts into Israel's significant tourism industry.

All of this strongly shaped the fighting, and will shape future wars involving Israel. Yes, Arab strategists are very well aware of the above.

On the international side, Israel is unconcerned by the pronouncements of Chirc, Kofi Annan, etc. However, the slightest whisper from George W. Bush and they'll sit up and take notice. The IDF gets 20% of its budget and a lot of big ticket weapons from the US, it would be a grave strategic loss to endanger that. Moreover, Israel did not seek to engage either Syria or Iran at this time. They could not afford to escalate the fighting to a level that would demand their direct involvement.

I think you can agree that Israel, the Kadima government and the IDF are in fact subject to outside opinion as well as domestic concerns - and a brief examination of those concerns illustrates a number of apparently erroneous tactical decisions in the fighting. The reliance on airpower and artillery, operating from buttoned up armored vehicles, the lack of long range planning and especially the weak diplomatic efforts by Israel to secure its soldiers are all at least partly the result of both domestic and international concerns. Israel had to fight, but the IDF had one hand tied behind its back from the beginning.

Stu-6
08-24-2006, 09:04 PM
It seems to me there maybe a comparison here with the US and Iraq. By this I mean it is a frustrating problem and military forces may look like a quick solution due to past victories. The problem with this, as has been seen in Iraq, is just because you can take down a problem regime doesn’t mean you can create a more favorable situation, and can easily make things worse. Obviously this is not an ideal comparison since there are a lot of differences, just a lesson about unintended consequences.

I don’t think there is any kind of limited strike option here; since the Assad regime would likely be very threaten internally if they didn’t respond very aggressively to an Israeli strike. After seeing HAMAS and Hezbollah rise to power by attacking Israel while the PA and Lebanese government were pushed aside, only a foolish Arab government would not offer a massive response to an Israeli attack, make rapid escalation all but unavoidable.

SWJED
09-03-2006, 09:53 AM
3 September London Times - Israel Plans for War with Iran and Syria (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2340486,00.html) by Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter.


Threatened by a potentially nuclear-armed Tehran, Israel is preparing for a possible war with both Iran and Syria, according to Israeli political and military sources.

The conflict with Hezbollah has led to a strategic rethink in Israel. A key conclusion is that too much attention has been paid to Palestinian militants in Gaza and the West Bank instead of the two biggest state sponsors of terrorism in the region, who pose a far greater danger to Israel’s existence, defence insiders say.

“The challenge from Iran and Syria is now top of the Israeli defence agenda, higher than the Palestinian one,” said an Israeli defence source. Shortly before the war in Lebanon Major-General Eliezer Shkedi, the commander of the air force, was placed in charge of the “Iranian front”, a new position in the Israeli Defence Forces. His job will be to command any future strikes on Iran and Syria.

The Israeli defence establishment believes that Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear programme means war is likely to become unavoidable.

“In the past we prepared for a possible military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities,” said one insider, “but Iran’s growing confidence after the war in Lebanon means we have to prepare for a full-scale war, in which Syria will be an important player.”

A new infantry brigade has been formed named Kfir (lion cub), which will be the largest in the Israeli army. “It is a partial solution for the challenge of the Syrian commando brigades, which are considered better than Hezbollah’s,” a military source said

There has been grave concern in Israel over a military pact signed in Tehran on June 15 between Iran and Syria, which the Iranian defence minister described as a “mutual front against Israeli threats”. Israel has not had to fight against more than one army since 1973...

Jedburgh
09-03-2006, 12:31 PM
..."It's not a crisis," Gard said in a telephone interview. "To call the Iranian situation a 'crisis' connotes you have to do something right now, like bomb them." ...
From CSIS, 30 Aug 06: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060830_iranoptionssanctions.pdf)

Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is not simply a struggle over issues of national prestige or "rights." It has a major potential impact on regional stability and future war fighting. If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it is possible that it will use them largely as a passive deterrent and means of defense. It is also possible, however, that Iran will use them to put direct or indirect pressure on its neighbors, threatening them to achieve goals it could not achieve without the explicit or tacit threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Iranian possession of nuclear weapons, or of highly lethal biological weapons for that matter, would change the military map of the region. It would almost certainly lead to contingency planning by other nuclear powers to attack Iran -- certainly Israel and possibly Pakistan and India. Such planning in potentially "existential" conflicts takes place when there is a possibility, even if there is not a probability.

US and allied forces in the Gulf would have to plan for nuclear war or the risk of nuclear escalation, and for preventive, preemptive, deterrent, and retaliatory options. Iran's would target cities, key civilian facilities, and military targets with nuclear weapons and be targeted in return. The risk of misunderstandings, misperceptions, and miscalculations would be significant in a crisis or war both before any use of nuclear weapons, and during the transattack and conflict termination phases.

At the same time, the previous chapters have shown that it can be difficult to stop a truly dedicated Iran with either military operations or steps like sanctions. They might well simply push Iran into more concealment, more drastic options, or alternatives like biological weapons. This does not mean such options cannot be effective, either in slowing any Iranian efforts or even halting them if political conditions in Iran should change. It does mean that no single set of actions to halt Iran can be decisive if Iran is determined to continue and willing to pay the cost...

Uboat509
09-03-2006, 07:40 PM
Some voices in the Pentagon are not impressed by that argument.

“If Syria spirals into chaos, at least they’ll be taking on each other rather than heading for Jerusalem,” said one insider.


Which voices? The belief seems to be that if Sadaam did indeed have large stockpiles of WMD (And I believe he had some though perhaps not the massive amounts we origionally thought) the many of them were shipped to Syria before the war. Given that I have a hard time believing that anyone thinks that chaos in a country with a significant amount of WMD is a good thing. If memory serves, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused significant stress in as much as there were a lot of Soviet WMDs in the former Soviet satilite countries and there was (and still is, I think) a great deal of concern that it would be very easy to "lose" some of these WMDs. And those governements aren't openly hostile to us. Assad is most definitely our friend but at least he is an enemy we know. He is in a precarious position in his country and he knows it. He wants to destroy Israel but he also wants to stay in power which means, although he provides weapons and training to Hezbollah he has not provided any overt assistance (ie ground troops) or WMDs to Hezbollah. Anything more that that and Israel will probably have no choice but act. With Assad taken out, the ensuing chaos would probably see more advanced weaponry, perhaps ground troops and perhaps even WMDs finding their way into Hezbollah's hands. It is in effect MAD on a smaller scale.

SFC W

Jedburgh
09-23-2006, 04:11 PM
From CSIS: Judging the Iranian Threat: 20 Questions We Need to Answer (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060919_20questions.pdf)

Iran’s actions in the last year have unsettled many around the world, provoking an active and rich debate as to how nations should best respond. Embedded in this debate are widely divergent assumptions, assessments, and conclusions about Iranian intentions and Iranian actions.

To add clarity and intellectual rigor to this debate, CSIS has prepared a list of issues—“20 questions”—intended to highlight these points of divergence. Few people will agree on the answers to all 20 questions. They differ sometimes on the basis of fact, and other times on the basis of judgment. Yet, it is precisely those answers that determine both the threats and opportunities contained in Iran’s actions and the world’s potential responses.

In the interest of promoting a healthy debate on these issues, CSIS has not only laid out the questions, but it has also prepared two opposing responses for each question to help illustrate the vibrancy of the debate. Although CSIS as an institution has no position on these questions, the wide range of experts at CSIS provides equally wide-ranging analysis.

Strickland
09-25-2006, 08:44 PM
Maybe international law, but it seems we have a new variable concerning international relations here. That would be a sovereign of a nation perusing nuclear weapons, delivery means and air-defense assets who leads a crazed Islamist regime eager for the paradise of the next world. Give me a break here, while we debate legalities of international law the tick-tock to nuclear Armageddon marches on…

I see Ahmadinejad as an Iranian populist, and thus, someone who says what he thinks his people want to hear.

Question - I wonder what the average Iranian's perception was of President Bush after his infamous "Axis of Evil" speech? I wonder how closely these perceptions match up to Americans perceptions of Ahmadinejad after he made disparaging remarks about the US and Bush.

SWJED
09-25-2006, 08:56 PM
25 September Reuters - Israel Seen Lifting Nuclear Veil in Iran Stand-off (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/25/AR2006092500290.html) by Dan Williams.


In October 1973, with its forces battling to repel invasions by Egypt and Syria, Israel did what had previously been unthinkable: It briefly wheeled its nuclear-capable Jericho-1 missiles out of their secret silos.

That, historians believe, was picked up by U.S. spy satellites and stirred up fears in Washington of a catastrophic flare-up between the Jewish state and the Soviet-backed Arabs. Message received, an urgent American shipment of conventional arms to Israel was quick to follow, and helped turn the war.

With Israel's current arch-foe Iran seen gaining the ability to produce nuclear weapons within a few years, and preventive military options limited, some experts now anticipate another "lifting of the veil" on the assumed Israeli atomic arsenal.

Were that to happen, experts say, the objective would be to establish a more open military deterrence vis-a-vis Iran and perhaps win Israel's nuclear option formal legitimacy abroad...

SWJED
09-27-2006, 12:36 PM
27 September Miami Herald - U.S. Broadcasts Into Iran Called Too Soft (http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/15617041.htm) by Warren Strobel and William Douglas.


In another indication that some in the Bush administration are pushing for a more confrontational policy toward Iran, a Pentagon unit has drafted a report charging that U.S. international broadcasts into Iran aren't tough enough on the Islamic regime.

The report, a draft of which McClatchy News Service obtained this week, appears to be a gambit by some officials in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's office and elsewhere to gain sway over television and radio broadcasts into Iran, one of the few direct tools the United States has to reach the Iranian people.

McClatchy obtained a copy of the report this week, and it also has circulated on Capitol Hill. It accuses the Voice of America's Persian TV service and Radio Farda, a U.S. government Farsi-language broadcast, of taking a soft line toward Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime and not giving adequate time to government critics.

U.S. broadcasting officials and others who have read the report said it's riddled with errors.

They also see it as a thinly veiled attack on the independence of U.S. international broadcasting, which by law is supposed to represent a balanced view of the United States and provide objective news. ''The author of this report is as qualified to write a report on programming to Iran as I would be to write a report covering the operations of the 101st Airborne Division,'' Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, said in a statement on Tuesday.

Larry Hart, a spokesman for the board, which oversees U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting, said that the radio and TV operations have covered Iran's human rights abuses extensively and have featured appearances by dissidents -- who sometimes telephoned from Iranian jails.

Surveys have shown that Radio Farda is the most-listened-to international radio broadcast into Iran, Hart said...

Jedburgh
09-27-2006, 02:23 PM
It's a month old, but here's the Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, dated 23 Aug 06:

Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat (http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/IranReport082206v2.pdf#search=%22recognizing%20ira n%20as%20a%20strategic%20threat%20pdf%22)

...Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte provided his assessment in his 2006 Annual Threat Report that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. America's intelligence agencies have also assessed the following about the Iranian threat:

• Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, and despite its claims to the contrary, Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. The U.S. Intelligence Community believes that Tehran probably has not yet produced or acquired the fissile material (weapons-grade nuclear fuel) needed to produce a nuclear weapon; Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte has stated that Iran will not be “in a position to have a nuclear weapon” until “sometime between the beginning of the next decade and the middle of the next decade”.

• Iran likely has an offensive chemical weapons research and development capability.

• Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program.

• Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. The U.S. Intelligence Community has raised the concern that Tehran may integrate nuclear weapons into its ballistic missiles.

• Iran provides funding, training, weapons, rockets, and other material support to terrorist groups in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and elsewhere.

• Elements of the Iranian national security apparatus are actively supporting the insurgency in Iraq.

Jedburgh
09-27-2006, 02:32 PM
27 September Miami Herald - U.S. Broadcasts Into Iran Called Too Soft (http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/15617041.htm) by Warren Strobel and William Douglas.
Here is Radio Farda (http://www.radiofarda.com/), which is essentially a branch of RFE/RL's Iran section (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/iran.html). The VOA Farsi program (http://www.voanews.com/persian/) is unrelated, although still government sponsored.

Jedburgh
11-01-2006, 03:27 PM
ICG, 1 Nov 06: Israel/Hizbollah/Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/59_israel_hizbollah_lebanon___avoiding_renewed_con flict.pdf)

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 halted the monthlong fighting between Israel and Hizbollah but did little to resolve the underlying conflict and, if poorly handled, could help reignite it. The resolution has held remarkably well, with only limited violations. However, the temptation by either party to overreach could trigger renewed fighting. The greatest threats would be attempts by Israel or UN forces (UNIFIL) to use 1701 as a blunt means of disarming Hizbollah in the south or by Hizbollah to test UNIFIL’s resolve. 1701 should be seen as a transitory instrument that can stabilise the border by containing both sides’ military impulses until bolder action is taken to address both domestic Lebanese matters (reforming and democratising the political and electoral systems; building a strong sovereign state and army; resolving the question of Hizbollah’s armaments) and, especially, regional issues (in particular re-launching the Syrian track and engaging Iran). In short the international community must be modest in implementing 1701 for as long as it is not prepared to be ambitious in its regional diplomatic efforts...

aktarian
11-01-2006, 06:17 PM
I just wonder how Iran could be kept out of this war. they have good relations with Syria at least since 1980s and Iran is financing some of Syrian arms purchases (mostly air defences). And once Iran gets into it it's anybody guess what their reaction will be. Making troubles in Iraq? Making troubles in Persian gulf (as in threatening shipping)? Making troubles in gulf states? direct confrontation with Israel?

Jedburgh
11-01-2006, 10:29 PM
U.S. accuses Syria, Iran, Hezbollah on Lebanon (http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-11-01T212717Z_01_WBT006156_RTRUKOC_0_US-MIDEAST-LEBANON-USA.xml&src=110106_1635_TOPSTORY_u.s._warns_syria%2C_iran_ and_hezbollah)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday accused Syria, Iran and Hezbollah militants of plotting to topple the Lebanese government and warned them to keep their "hands off."

The United States has held up Lebanon as an example of emerging democracy in the Middle East.

"We are therefore increasingly concerned by mounting evidence that the Syrian and Iranian governments, Hezbollah, and their Lebanese allies are preparing plans to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government," White House spokesman Tony Snow said in a statement...

SWJED
11-10-2006, 09:56 PM
10 November Voice of America - Senior Israeli Official Warns of Possible Pre-emptive Strike Against Iran (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-11-10-voa38.cfm) by Robert Berger. Reposted here in full per USG guidelines.


A senior Israeli official has suggested that Israel might launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel wants tougher international action to stop Iran before it is too late.

Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh says Israel might be forced to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. In a newspaper interview, Sneh said he is not advocating a pre-emptive strike and sees it as a last resort. But sometimes, he said, "the last resort is the only resort."

It was the clearest threat yet by a senior official, and underscores Israel's growing concerns about Iran's nuclear program. A year ago, the Iranian president threatened to "wipe the Jewish state off the map," and since then Israel has warned repeatedly that it cannot allow Iran to acquire a nuclear bomb.

Miri Eisen is spokeswoman for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

"The Iranian issue is a core issue," she said. "The prime minister has defined it as an existential threat. This is a potential threat to the destruction of the state of Israel. This is an impossible situation."

Analysts here say Israel is considering a pre-emptive strike, because it believes the international community is moving too slowly to stop Iran. Europe has opted for negotiations and Russia and China oppose U.N. sanctions. And now, Israel fears that President Bush has been weakened by the Republican defeat in the U.S. elections.

"The president's ability to do anything military in terms of Iran has been somewhat diminished as a result of the Democratic victory, because the Democrats will be much more vigilant that the president does not do anything unilateral," said Israeli analyst Alon Pinkas.

Iran will top the agenda when Mr. Olmert meets with President Bush at the White House on Monday.

Culpeper
11-11-2006, 12:04 AM
They did it against Saddam in Jun-81. I would take the threat as a real warning if I was in Iran. Iran talks a lot. Israel doesn't. What confuses me is that Israel said anything at all.

Rob Thornton
11-11-2006, 06:00 AM
This goes against many regional animosities, but I wonder how many Middle Eastern Governments really think Persian, Shiite Tehran having their finger on a nuclear button really benefits them? To accept Tehran's good will what will it cost them? How many think Tehran being the big man on campus is a good idea?

Israel is at least a known quantity. They are also subject to international opinion, financial ties, and generally have an understanding with their block after the last 40 years. They may not be the perfect neighbors, but they're not trying to convert the rest of the neighborhood either.

Since the problem with worthwhile sanctions seems to be China and Russia who both are more concerned with sealing good deals on short and long term energy needs vs. concerning themselves with enhancing the regional position of a radical Shiite Islamic state that has given birth to some leadership that seem to have the manifest destiny aspirations of Darius, perhaps the people we should be engaging on this are the petrol producing Arab states and the border states around Iran.

Iran alone cannot meet China's and Russia's energy needs for the long term. The Arab petrol producers need to consider how an Iran with regional primacy will affect them. Unless they wish to play to the tune of Tehran, they should act in their own best interests and assist in limiting Tehran's influence to something more manageable. A nuclear ICBM equipped Tehran is not manageable. If they threaten a reduction in exports to those states on the basis of protecting their security needs, Russia and China may reconsider their relationship with Iran as its Security Council pair of aces.

Unless something is done to thaw the progress on sanctions and help Iran see that they have to pursue other instruments of regional power such as economics, etc., Israel will act as we know they will. No one should feign surprise when it happens, and we should all have a plan that considers the fall out (no evil pun intended)

aktarian
11-11-2006, 08:40 AM
They did it against Saddam in Jun-81. I would take the threat as a real warning if I was in Iran. Iran talks a lot. Israel doesn't. What confuses me is that Israel said anything at all.

What confuses me even more is that this is at least third such announcement in past few years

Martin
11-12-2006, 07:08 PM
What confuses me even more is that this is at least third such announcement in past few years
Prepares international public opinion before action is taken, and people tend to forget. They are pushing the danger of the threat while diplomatic approaches are still on the table, which shows both that they have given diplomacy a chance as well as motivates the immediacy of nuclear development removal. It puts pressure on the negotiating parties that it needs to be resolved or they will be forced to defend themselves, IMO drawing clearer lines in the sand of Who's Who. In this way, they have the chance to frame perception of the conflict as a continuing and increasing problem where they are active participants, but less likely to be seen as aggressors.

Perhaps they will still be chastizised, but at least they move some people towards an understanding of their position instead of letting others define it for them.

On the other hand, that's just first impression gut feeling, and I did get a kick to the head two hours ago...

What do you think?

SWJED
11-12-2006, 07:49 PM
While the question was not directed to me, I thought I would chime in.

Personally, I believe Israel has determined it cannot abide (or survive for that matter) a nuclear weapons capable Iran. Under immense pressure now (much more than during the pre-emptive Iraq strike) Israel is sending an IO message to the world (not Iran) - to, at the very least, have that "warning" to fall back on post-strike during the world opinion fall-out. Will it lessen the fallout? Probably not, but at the least they can say "we told you."

Moreover, these warnings also serve as a means to survey Israeli public opinion - very important these days considering the grief the government and IDF took following the recent Lebanon operations.

As far as the U.S. position – it is probably a bit of damn if you do, damn if you don’t. An Israeli strike will of course cost the U.S. political capital world-wide but at the same time might be of a relief of sorts in that “we didn’t have to do it ourselves.” Eventually it would have to be done considering the recent rhetoric emanating out of Tehran.

aktarian
11-13-2006, 06:30 AM
What do you think?

I agree with most of it. I think this serves two purposes:
-internal, to boost Israeli domestic morale specially after this summer fighting
-pressure on rest of the world, specially US, saying "if there is no diplomatic solution we'll use military". Specially as these type of announcements always add that Israel destroyed Iraqi facility

For those who have access to it, magazine AirForces Monthly had an article about various military options against Iranian facilities few years back. How US could do it, how Israel could do it, limited/all out strike etc.

RTK
11-14-2006, 07:41 PM
This sounds like its going to turn out poorly. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/14/AR2006111400230_pf.html)

SWJED
11-14-2006, 09:57 PM
From the AP report:


International Atomic Energy experts have found unexplained plutonium and highly enriched uranium traces in a nuclear waste facility in Iran and have asked Tehran for an explanation, an IAEA report said Tuesday.

The report, prepared for next week's meeting of the 35-nation IAEA, also faulted Tehran for not cooperating with the agency's attempts to investigate suspicious aspects of Iran's nuclear program that have lead to fears it might be interested in developing nuclear arms.

And it said it could not confirm Iranian claims that its nuclear activities were exclusively nonmilitary unless Tehran increased its openness.

"The agency will remain unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran," without additional cooperation by Tehran, said the report, by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei.

Such cooperation is a "prerequisite for the agency to be able to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program," it added.

As expected, the four-page report made available to The Associated Press confirmed that Iran continues uranium enrichment experiments in defiance of the U.N. Security Council.

Both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can be used to make the fissile core of nuclear warheads, and Iran is under intense international pressure to freeze activities that can produce such substances...

Jedburgh
12-15-2006, 11:07 PM
UK commentator, edited content....

...elections on 15 December were held to the Assembly of Experts, the 86-member congressional body that has the power to select, dismiss and supervise the Islamic republic's ultimate source of political authority, the supreme leader.

The fundamentalist faction that revolves around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hoping that its candidates will perform strongly in the elections, thereby paving the way for a successor to the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who favours a weaker parliament and a stronger presidency. However, clerical traditionalist members of the powerful Guardian Council, which vets election candidates, have reduced the chances of substantial fundamentalist gains by eliminating a number of the faction's candidates. Independent or clerical traditionalist candidates are likely to perform strongly in the elections, though a low voter turnout could favour the fundamentalist faction in areas outside the capital Tehran. The election's outcome is unlikely to affect the position or policies of the supreme leader.

The elections will be contested primarily between personal and political networks that revolve around influential figures. In the capital Tehran, the contest between former president and current Assembly of Experts deputy-speaker Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah-Yazdi, the favoured candidate of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will be especially significant. Rafsanjani has been mobilising centrist and reformist clerics and candidates in a bid to prevent the fundamentalist faction from increasing its presence in the assembly and in this appears to have the support of circles that are close to Khamenei. Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad have been locked in a power struggle since they contested the June 2005 presidential election and Ahmadinejad's assertive campaign to remove corruption from the oil industry is threatening Rafsanjani's interests and reputation.

Candidates who are perceived to be loyal to the Islamic political system but as threatening Khamenei's position were sidelined during the selection period; they included three current assembly members and one former member of the Guardian Council. In the capital, which often provides a good indication of national election trends, fundamentalist candidates will only contest 12 of the city's 16 seats. Overall, vetting has reduced the number of candidates to less than 30% of the initial 492 candidates who originally declared their intention to stand, meaning that some seats will not be contested.

Iran's clerical traditionalists broadly support a patriarchal Islamic government; the incorporation of Islamic concepts of law and society into the political system; and in preserving the wealth of the country's influential merchants. "Reformists" also want to ensure the survival of the Islamic regime, but hope to achieve this through opening the country up to the West economically; introducing socio-cultural reforms that address the desires of many young people; and increasing popular participation in the political system.

Within the clerical traditionalist movement is the fundamentalist faction to which Ahmadinejad and several other government officials belong. Fundamentalists share a political outlook that combines nationalist and Islamist ideology and believe that the "old generation" of leaders who took part in the 1979 Islamic revolution has allowed the revolution to denigrate into corruption, inefficiency and concessions to the West. They want to establish a key minimum of support through the holding of elections under restricted conditions, patronage and economic development, while also asserting Iran's culture, independence and regional status....

Culpeper
01-07-2007, 03:05 AM
ISRAEL has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities with tactical nuclear weapons. (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2535310,00.html)


Two Israeli air force squadrons are training to blow up an Iranian facility using low-yield nuclear “bunker-busters”, according to several Israeli military sources.

The attack would be the first with nuclear weapons since 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Israeli weapons would each have a force equivalent to one-fifteenth of the Hiroshima bomb.

SWJED
01-07-2007, 04:05 AM
Here is another article from the same issue that talks about the military preparations for a mission such as this - Focus: Mission Iran (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2535177,00.html).

Culpeper
01-07-2007, 04:29 AM
I never underestimate Israel's desire to exist and take risks to maintain that existence.



Strike one: Israel took out Saddam’s reactor in 1981

IF Israeli forces attack nuclear sites in Iran, it will not be their first pre-emptive strike against a perceived nuclear threat. In 1981 Israeli jets bombed a reactor in Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein getting nuclear weapons.

The Iraqi dictator had built a 40-megawatt research reactor just south of Baghdad with the aid of France, which supplied technology, expertise and about 27lb of uranium-235.

Fearing this could be used in the long term to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, Israel decided to destroy what became known as the Osirak reactor. Israel’s first move was in 1980 when war broke out between Iraq and Iran: its chief of army intelligence urged Iran to bomb Osirak.

A pair of Iranian jets attacked the site, but damage was minor. So Israel decided to bomb it, secretly building a dummy site and carrying out full dress rehearsals. On June 7, 1981, Israel launched Operation Opera: six F-15I and eight F-16I jets flew over Jordanian and Saudi Arabian airspace and caught Iraqi defences by surprise.

The raid crippled the reactor. Many countries, including the United States, condemned the attack. Opposition parties in Israel claimed that it had been cynically timed to coincide with a looming election.

Some Iraqi scientists later said the attack spurred Saddam to redouble his efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Attempts were made to rebuild the Osirak facility. However, Saddam’s nuclear ambitions were again halted when coalition forces bombed Osirak during the 1991 Gulf war.

Jedburgh
01-07-2007, 04:45 AM
This "sabre rattling" on the part of Israel has been going on for a long time....an article back in Aug 04 from CNS/MIIS:

A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm)

...In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception. On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran." Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession" and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites. This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action...

SWJED
01-07-2007, 11:56 AM
7 January AP - Israel Denies Planning Iran Nuke Attack (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/07/AR2007010700219.html).


A British newspaper reported Sunday that Israel has drafted plans to strike as many as three targets in Iran with low-yield nuclear weapons, aiming to halt Tehran's uranium enrichment program. The Israeli Foreign Ministry denied the report.

Citing multiple unidentified Israeli military sources, The Sunday Times said the proposals involved using so-called "bunker-buster" nuclear weapons to attack nuclear facilities at three sites south of the Iranian capital.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's office said it would not respond to the claim. "We don't respond to publications in the Sunday Times," said Miri Eisin, Olmert's spokeswoman...

Culpeper
01-07-2007, 05:39 PM
7 January AP - Israel Denies Planning Iran Nuke Attack (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/07/AR2007010700219.html).

I like this part the best...


"I refuse to believe that anyone here would consider using nuclear weapons against Iran," Reuven Pedatzur, a prominent defense analyst and columnist for the daily Haaretz, told the AP. "It is possible that this was a leak done on purpose, as deterrence, to say 'someone better hold us back, before we do something crazy.'"

IRAN barks back...

Teheran: Israel will regret any attack (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1167467674699&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)


In response to a report on Sunday that Israel planned to attack Teheran's nuclear sites, Iran declared that any attack would provoke a reaction and that "anyone who attacks will regret their actions very quickly."

According to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Muhammad Ali Husseini, the report published in the London-based Sunday Times proved that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons.

Jedburgh
01-11-2007, 04:35 PM
Five Scenarios for the Iranian Crisis (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Prolif_Paper_Perkovich_Iran_Scenarios.pdf)

...This essay explores five broad pathways by which Iran and the international community can try to resolve the nuclear standoff. It emphasizes that the Bush Administration after years of indecision has invested seriously in a diplomatic strategy to induce Iran to forego uranium enrichment and is prepared to pursue behavior change rather than regime change in Iran. However, Iranian resistance continues to raise the prospect that the international community will favor the competing approach of capitulation, which in turn would re-raise the prospects of military attack.

1. Capitulate to Iran and welcome limited uranium enrichment.

2. Offer sanctions and positive incentives to persuade Iran not to produce nuclear fuel (for an agreed substantial period of time)

3. Attack Iran's nuclear facilities and/or military assets.

4. Foster regime change in Iran.

5. Try options 1 or 2, while strengthening deterrence and containment...

goesh
01-11-2007, 05:19 PM
We recently saw some students protesting against the autocrats and they've done it before, which gives us hope but most likely resulted in a few of them simply disappearing later, never to be seen again. We have a ready force to start destablization and bleed assets via the Kurds. They are already in action against the bassiji and Iranian security forces but full support from us would make Turkey very nervous and unhappy and I don't think the Kurds would settle for just a small piece of Iran to call their own either- it's whole hog with them boys or none IMHO. How about discreetly slipping IDF a few billion with a note attached requested Iran's nukes be taken out? That seems the only real option. Iran's infrastructure and energy capabilities remain intact, China continues to gets its energy, Europe doesn't have to worry about retaliation and it will greatly encourage internal forces for regime change as well. Let the world condemn the Jews - they're used to it. Does anyone really think Iran would want to try slug it out with us on 3 flanks if IDF does what they did to saddam?

Tom Odom
01-11-2007, 06:44 PM
Does anyone really think Iran would want to try slug it out with us on 3 flanks if IDF does what they did to saddam?

Yes

The Israeli reactor strike was a simple operation compared to what Iran would require. More importantly, the vote on the effectiveness of that strike is still out; SSI published a paper recently on the issue of preemption and the Israeli reactor strike was cited as a key factor in pushing Saddam to broaden his efforts in WMD and especially the "supergun" program.

The Kurds know us better than we know ourselves when it comes to using them as instrument of destabilization. With the Shah's support, we used them against Iraq and then abandoned them. You are absolutely correct when you say the Turks would not want us in such a game.

Jed listed options; I would pick 5 at this juncture.

Best

Tom

jonSlack
01-12-2007, 01:11 AM
Hardline Iranian leaders do not fear an invasion from us.

They know they will lose the majority of their major conventional weapons in our "march-up" but they accept that. Elements of their conventional military will stand and fight, national pride demands it regardless of how fool hardy it is.

Their tactic is/will be to establish weapons and ammo caches throughout the country and bleed us through the occupation. During the march up, the IRGC will disappear and blend with the population and they will form the cadre of the Iranian opposition and provide leadership and technical and tactic expertise while the basij will be used as the grunts of the opposition: IED planters and simple direct fire ambushers. Also, if they can, I think you will see more religiously fanatical supports infilitrate from Lebanon and Palestine to serve as the suicide bombers and VBIED drivers.

They believe they will be able to cause casualities on a scale that would force us to withdraw due to the political cost. At that point, elements of the deposed regime will reappear and claim victory over us.

Obviously, Iran has political interests they are attempting to further in Iraq. But they are also using it as an ultra-realistic CTC of sorts as well as a range where they can test munitions, such as improved EFPs, against our vehicles, especially our M1A2 SEPs, Bradleys, and Strykers.

pcmfr
01-12-2007, 02:13 AM
Hardline Iranian leaders do not fear an invasion from us.

They know they will lose the majority of their major conventional weapons in our "march-up" but they accept that. Elements of their conventional military will stand and fight, national pride demands it regardless of how fool hardy it is.

Their tactic is/will be to establish weapons and ammo caches throughout the country and bleed us through the occupation. During the march up, the IRGC will disappear and blend with the population...

They would do exactly what you suggest... if we were stupid enough to try to invade/occupy. But why would we ever want to invade Iran on the ground, and how could we, considering our committments with their neighbors to the East and West? Iran's CoG is its Navy/IRGCN. If we eliminate that threat, they lose any type of asymmetric leverage against us as well as their ability to control the SOH and the oil that flows through it.

I am in favor of a preemptive strike against their Navy, Nuke facilities, and selected leadership targets if other options fail to keep them contained. I know this is the Small Wars Council, but this problem needs a big dose of American firepower, not another COIN fight. If it's not us, the Israelis will do this, with the fallout that would bring to the Arab world.

What are the 2nd/3rd order impacts of a US strike? 1) Iran may try to step up the fight in Iraq or outside using Hez as a proxy, but I think we are ready for that. 2) The Muslim world hates us, but not much new there. 3) Iran is put back in the box for at least another decade, and hopefully the people, largely untouched by their nation's military defeat, will see that their leadership aren't doing them any favors.

Jake
01-12-2007, 03:05 AM
Just a thought here, my guess is there would be some impact on the oil flowing out of the Gulf of Hormuz.

goesh
01-12-2007, 05:09 PM
listen least to the UN. We see how Saddam was able to defy the UN despite the horrendous attrition he suffered from Desert Storm and the embargos and air corridors imposed on him. Compare his situation to present day Iran and it becomes apparent the notions of containment and sanctions as a means of curtailing Iran's nuclear pursuit are but pipe dreams. Mullahs with oil revenues and hot-tipped missles can equal only one thing: expansion of influence and control. They sure aren't going to be putting their money and energy into the expansion of human rights and equal opportunity at home. The southern Shia corridor of Iraq gives access to Jordan and a destabalized Jordan give access to Israel, the only real obstacle in the ME in path of the Caliphate. Destabalize Jordan, cripple Israel and the suez canal is yours for the taking. Those would be my goals if I were a mullah with alot of cash and nukes. Who would stop me, a willing coalition of Liberals with the likes of Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Ted Kennedy, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, John Kerry and Obama Barak at the helm?

Jedburgh
01-12-2007, 05:20 PM
...The southern Shia corridor of Iraq gives access to Jordan and a destabalized Jordan give access to Israel, the only real obstacle in the ME in path of the Caliphate. Destabilize Jordan, cripple Israel and the Suez Canal is yours for the taking....
The Caliphate is a purely Sunni concept; it has nothing to do with the more radical Iranians' notions of gaining greater political influence throughout the region.

goesh
01-12-2007, 06:18 PM
Muahmmad al-Mahdi , assuming he makes his appearance, probably wouldn't quibble much over the term applied to controling the Ummah and I don't think the likes of Hizb ut-Rahrir much care what word or words and are used to describe the spread and influence of Islam and what sects/branches of Islam are in the forefront of it. It's all masking rhetoric and a front for power.

SWJED
01-14-2007, 10:13 PM
This week's column (http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2007/01/this_weeks_column_3.html) - Iran: This emperor has no clothes.


Americans swallow enemy propaganda at face value, subjecting us to knee-jerking manipulation by fiery orators. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with a few choice phrases, successfully elevates himself to the status of a Muslim "Hitler." But this populist windbag is already losing his grip in Tehran, giving Washington a strategic opportunity we don't yet appreciate.

While American neocons and Israeli hawks would bomb Iran today, lest it continue enriching uranium, try viewing the situation less emotionally...

Jedburgh
02-01-2007, 02:55 AM
USIP Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention - Iran Policy Forum

On January 16, 2007, the United States Institute of Peace inaugurated its Iran Policy Forum, a group of government and non-governmental experts that will meet regularly to discuss current issues relating to Iran.

During this meeting, USIP and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) conducted a briefing on new data from their survey of Iranian public opinion (http://www.usip.org/iran/iran_presentation.pdf). This survey, fielded in conjunction with Search for Common Ground and an Iranian research agency, breaks much new ground and covers a wide array of international policy issues. Public opinion polling in Iran that is fully available to international audiences is rare. This survey is based on a nationally representative sample of 1,000 persons obtained through in-depth, in-person interviews, and the methods and questionnaire are fully documented (http://www.usip.org/iran/survey_methods.pdf). During this meeting, PIPA presented top-line results of this unique contribution to ongoing policy debates about Iran.

In coming months, USIP and PIPA will be authoring further analyses detailing the national regional findings of this survey on vital issues such as Iran’s nuclear program, attitudes toward the U.S. and international institutions such as the UN and the IAEA, among others.

Jedburgh
02-16-2007, 11:19 PM
CSIS, 15 Feb 07: Iran's Developing Nuclear and Missile Programs (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070216_iran_proliferation.pdf)

US Strategic Options

•Play out negotiating options without accepting proliferation:
–“Good cop, bad cop”and “arm wavers”help.

•Seek to lead allies to firmer action if Iran does not cave.
–Overcome the legacy of Iraq
–Prepare for bringing issue to the UN.
–Consider backup-plan if UN action/sanctions do not work

•Improve intelligence, seek hard facts and “smoking guns.”
–Same data needed for negotiating, arms control and targeting.
–Look at missiles, chemical and biological weapons, not just nuclear.

•Restrict overt and covert acquisitions of Iranian weapons?.

•Preserve and improve military options.

•Develop missile defenses –extended deterrence.

•Support regime change/Iranian factions who are against a nuclearprogram

•Act through proxies

Jedburgh
02-21-2007, 08:41 PM
CSIS, 2 Mar 07: Iran: Weakling or Hegemon? (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070302_iranheg.pdf)

...Viewed from the perspective of its capabilities, rather than its intentions, Iran presents five major kinds of current and potential threats:

• The first is as a conventional military power. Iran has limited capabilities today but could become a much more threatening power if it modernized key elements of its forces and its neighbors did not react.

• The second is as an asymmetric threat that can seek to intimidate or attack using unconventional forces. Iran has established a large mix of unconventional forces that can challenge its neighbors in a wide variety of asymmetric wars, including low-level war of attrition.

• The third is to some extent an extension of the second. Iran’s asymmetric and unconventional capabilities give it the ability to use proxies and partners in the form of both state and non-state actors. Iran’s support of Shi’ite militias in Iraq, ties to elements in the Iraqi government, partnership with Syria, and ties to the Hezbollah in Lebanon are all practical examples of such activities.

• The fourth is a potential nuclear power armed with long-range missiles. Iran is a declared chemical weapons power. Its biological weapons efforts are unknown but it seems unlikely that it remained passive in reaction to Iraq’s efforts. It has openly made the acquisition of long-range missile a major objective, and its nuclear research and production programs almost certainly are intended to produce nuclear weapons.

• Finally, Iran presents a potential religious and ideological threat in a region and Islamic world polarized along sectarian lines. For all of the talk about a clash between civilizations, the potential clash within Islam seems far more dangerous. The risk that Sunni and Shi’ite extremists can provoke a broader split between sects and nations could push Iran into a more aggressive religious and ideological struggle.

These are potential threats, not predictions of Iranian actions. They all can be contained with the right choice of policies and military actions. Barring major shifts in its regime, Iran not only is deterrable, but a nation that will probably respond to the proper security incentives over time. The real question may well be whether Iran’s neighbors and the US provide the right mix of deterrence and incentives, and not Iran’s current and potential strength....

SWJED
02-22-2007, 09:34 PM
Here is a copy (via the Washington Post in pdf) of the IAEA report (http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/Iran_IAEA2007.pdf) released today on Iran's nuclear program.

VOA has this:


A report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency concludes that Iran has expanded uranium enrichment since December, when the Security Council ordered a freeze on such activities. The six-page report says the Tehran government has continued construction of a nuclear reactor that could produce material used in weapons.

Iran has repeatedly denied having any intention to build nuclear weapons, and maintains its enrichment activities are aimed at producing energy.

But the six-page report written by IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei says Iran's refusal to cooperate has left the agency unable to verify that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. The report also says Iran has installed two uranium enrichment networks at its underground nuclear facility in Natanz, although no uranium has been fed into the system.

Jedburgh
03-07-2007, 04:02 AM
CSIS, 5 Mar 07: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran: A Speculative Analysis (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070305_iran_israelius.pdf)

...There are no risk-free military options for Israel, the US or neighboring states. Tehran's known nuclear research facilities are dispersed around the country, generally large, and have constant new construction. Many key sites are underground and many others may be unknown or are not identifiable. IAEA inspections have identified at least 18 sites, but others argue that there might be more than 70. A great deal of the equipment other than major centrifuge facilities is also easy to move or relocate. Iran may already be playing a shell game with key research facilities and equipment, constantly changing the targeting pattern.

Tehran has had a quarter of a century to learn from the experience of Israel's attack on Iraq in 1981. Iran may have built redundant sites, underground facilities, and constructed high level of protection around its known nuclear research centers. Others have argued that Iranian nuclear sites may have been deliberately built near populated areas or in facilities with many other “legitimate” purposes so Israel and the US would be confronted with the problem of collateral damage or being charged with having hit an “innocent target.” The previous chapters have also strongly suggested that many of Iran's research, development, and production activities are almost certainly modular and can be rapidly moved to new sites, including tunnels, caves, and other hardened facilities....

SWJED
05-12-2007, 08:40 AM
12 May NY Times - Cheney, on Carrier, Sends Warning to Iran (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/12/world/middleeast/12cheney.html?ref=world) by David Sanger.


Vice President Dick Cheney used the deck of an American aircraft carrier just 150 miles off Iran’s coast as the backdrop yesterday to warn that the United States was prepared to use its naval power to keep Tehran from disrupting oil routes or “gaining nuclear weapons and dominating this region.”

Mr. Cheney said little new in his speech, delivered from the cavernous hangar bay of the John C. Stennis, one of the two carriers in the Persian Gulf. Each line had, in some form, been said before at various points in the four-year nuclear standoff with Iran, and during the increasingly tense arguments over whether Tehran is aiding insurgents in Iraq.

But Mr. Cheney stitched all of those warnings together, and the symbolism of sending the administration’s most famous hawk to deliver them so close to Iran’s coast was unmistakable. It also came just a week after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had talked briefly and inconclusively with Iran’s foreign minister, a step toward re-engagement with Iran that some in the administration have opposed...

Jedburgh
06-13-2007, 08:11 PM
Transcript of a Brookings Institution event held on 5 Jun 07:

A Long, Hot Summer: What the Lebanon and Gaza Crises Mean for U.S. Policy in the Middle East (http://www3.brookings.edu/comm/events/20070605lebanon.pdf)

As the Lebanese Armed Forces battle al-Qaeda-inspired Islamic militants near Tripoli, and violence between Fatah and Hamas heats up to a level that may force Israel to carry out a ground incursion into Gaza, it is clear that this is going to be a difficult summer in the Middle East. With the status quo shaken and instability spreading, how can the United States adapt its policies to stem the spread of violence and help cool the sweltering tensions in the region?

Moderator: Carlos Pascual
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution (http://www.brookings.edu/)

Panelists:

Martin S. Indyk
Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy (http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/sabancenter_hp.htm)

Robert Malley
Middle East and North Africa Program Director, International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm)

Hisham Milhem
Washington Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya (http://www.alarabiya.net/english.html)

Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

AdmiralAdama
06-22-2007, 06:02 PM
Iran moves closer to Nuclear Bomb (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/22/wnuke122.xml)




Iran claimed today to have stockpiled 100kg of enriched uranium, enough in theory to create two nuclear bombs of the kind that destroyed Hiroshima.

An exhibition in Teheran in 2005 to commemorate the Iran-Iraq war: Iran has moved closer to acquiring the ability to build a bomb
A war exhibition held in Iran in 2005

The news will once again stoke fears that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime is seeking to build a nuclear weapon.

Iran would need 50kg of weapons-grade uranium in order to make one nuclear weapon equal in power to the one dropped by the Americans in 1945.

walrus
06-22-2007, 08:18 PM
With the greatest of respect. The report of this matter did not specify that what was in Iran's posession was weapons grade uranium, and in any case the Iranians have since denied it.

That's not going to stop us bombing Iran however.....

AdmiralAdama
06-22-2007, 09:25 PM
Iran's Hormuz fleet includes more than 1,000 heavily armed speedboats (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/me_iran_06_22.asp)


The U.S. Navy has determined that Iran has amassed a fleet of fast patrol boats in the 43-kilometer straits. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, responsible for strategic programs, leads the effort.

At this point, officials said, IRGC has deployed more than 1,000 FPBs in and around the straits. The vessels, armed with cruise missiles, mines, torpedoes and rocket-propelled grenades, are up to 23 meters in long and can reach a speed of 100 kilometers per hour.

Ironhorse
06-22-2007, 10:29 PM
So they were listening to Millenium Challenge, eh?

http://www.fountainpowerboats.com/teamfountain/images/ft_hooters_mn.jpg

Rob Thornton
06-23-2007, 12:02 AM
Damn, there goes my frachise idea:mad: Well, back to my neon & car stereo :wry:shops then

Ken White
06-23-2007, 06:44 PM
From the NY Times:

LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/magazine/24ngo-t.html?ex=1183262400&en=ef93f273f170dbda&ei=5123&partner=BREITBART)

"""Hard Realities of Soft Power

As a senior adviser to the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, David Denehy is charged with overseeing the distribution of millions of dollars to advance the cause of a more democratic Iran. Affable, charming and approachable, he is bearlike in stature and manner. His voice is pleasantly rumbly; his smile is so wide that it seems to have been drawn onto his face with a crayon. Over the last two years, Denehy has canvassed dozens of pundits, students, journalists, bloggers and activists across the world about how he might best go about his work — what he calls, echoing President Bush, “the freedom agenda.” He has shaken hands with millionaire exiles, dissidents, monarchists, Communists, self-styled Mandelas and would-be Chalabis. He is the public face of “the democracy fund,” as it has come to be known, or simply “the $75 million.”

On Feb. 14, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and called for $75 million to be spent on advancing freedom and human rights within Iran. Though this would be the third year of requests for such financing, previous appropriations had been much smaller, ranging from $1.5 million to $11 million; $75 million was a considerable jump. “We are going to work to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom in their own country,” Rice told the assembled senators. The initiative would pour $36.1 million into existing television and radio programs beaming into Iran, while $10 million would pay for public diplomacy and exchange programs, including helping Iranians who hope to study in America. (“I’ve read that it is forbidden in some quarters to play Beethoven and Mozart in Tehran,” Rice said. “We hope that Iranians can play it in New York or Los Angeles.”) Perhaps most contentiously, $20 million would support the efforts of civil-society groups — media, legal and human rights nongovernmental organizations — both outside and inside Iran."""

Lastdingo
06-23-2007, 10:26 PM
So Rice wants money from the US taxpayer to pay muslim Iranians - citizens of a soo-called rogue state - to live and work in theUS.
This in a time when many consider muslim foreigners as potential terrorists.

Who does still believe that this administration is sincere in fighting terrorism and not focused on offensive great power games like trying to install puppet regimes in so far unfriendly places?

Ken White
06-24-2007, 01:26 AM
Lots of different ways to do things; it doesn't have to be your way -- or mine -- to work or even be right.

We do a lot of dumb stuff but I do believe anyone who had delusions of installing puppet regimes in unfriendly places has been pretty thoroughly disillusioned...

Tom Odom
06-24-2007, 12:53 PM
Lots of different ways to do things; it doesn't have to be your way -- or mine -- to work or even be right.

We do a lot of dumb stuff but I do believe anyone who had delusions of installing puppet regimes in unfriendly places has been pretty thoroughly disillusioned...


Agreed and I feverently hope we are both correct :wry:

Tom

goesh
09-17-2007, 12:41 PM
The Jerusalem Post is reporting that al-Shammari of the Islamic Army in Iraq has claimed to al-Jazeera that al-Maliki's loyalties are with Iran.....

Word is out too that ol' Dagan, head spook of Mossad, had some of his lads on the ground in that recent IDF strike in Syria and not just using lasers to tag bunkers......

Assar Iran, a news website, is telling the world that Iran will fire 600 missles at Israel if attacked. Their Shihab missles reportedly have a 1300km range.....

French Foregin Minister Kouchner has said the Iran crisis forces the world to prepare for the worst......

The JP is also reporting that the US and Jordan have signed an agreement so Jordan can start a nuclear program......

My advice to young male readers is to buy some Gold coins for your family to have and head to the nearest Recruiting station

JP link:http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411419433&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

goesh
09-17-2007, 05:03 PM
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1188392557184&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
"Speaking to The Jerusalem Post ahead of next week's Seventh Annual International Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Conference at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, former Mossad chief and current ICT chairman Shabtai Shavit says only military force can stop an Iran bent on achieving nuclear capability.

Looking across the Middle East, Shavit argues that the US cannot afford to retreat from Iraq to "Fortress America"; decries the Israeli government's lack of a pro-active strategy against Hamas in Gaza; and says an open conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the West Bank is not far down the road.

It hasn't always been easy to convince partners that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, says Shavit, who directed the Mossad from 1989 to 1996. Even today, there are people who still believe the Iranians are enriching uranium for energy purposes.

"When the first Gulf War ended in 1991, we raised the red flag: The Iranians were taking steps to achieve unconventional weapons capability. People looked at us like aliens who landed here from outer space. Nobody believed us. And when nobody believes you, what can you do? You carry on monitoring and collecting intelligence, analyzing and accompanying processes. Along this road you eventually manage to convince people of your assessment, and you win over supporters, both at home and in America. One morning they wake up and say, 'Oh, that's right, the Iranians really are working to produce a nuclear bomb, as well as surface-to-surface missiles with warheads that can carry nuclear bombs.' At that stage the issue becomes very relevant, very acute and very pressing," he says.

Nothing short of military intervention will stop the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapons program, says Shavit, careful with his choice of words: military intervention, not war - as war carries with it connotations of land, sea and air forces. He is equally cautious with his use of the word "stop" - as in stop the Iranian nuclear march. He prefers "set it back."

JJackson
09-18-2007, 05:31 PM
A view from the other side.

A proud nation once a great global power. In more recent times Iran has had its natural resources plundered by western powers, democratically elected a popular leader to have him assassinated by the west and replaced with the west’s totalitarian puppet whose security apparatus inflicted atrocities upon the people, eventually overthrown by a popular uprising. A war of aggression by a neighbour – again with the west backing the aggressor – and surrounded by Sunni states which are being armed to the teeth by western powers with high end weapons.
Now they are endeavouring to develop a domestic energy production program in accordance with IAEA & NTP rules and having sanctions imposed upon them, they have stated they have no nuclear weapons intentions. The countries pushing for sanctions are trading with, and arming states, that have developed nuclear weapons outside the NTP and making noises about attacking them and regime change in contravention of the UN charter they have signed up to. These same countries are accusing them of state sponsored terrorism while being the main exporters of the exactly that. Why is it OK to arm and train the Mujahideen in an attempt to overthrow a Soviet puppet in Afghanistan but not to remove the occupying coalition forces in Iraq? We are back to the one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter argument.

Personally I not convinced that Iran might not try and build a bomb and if I was Iranian – given their history and the US, French and Israeli positions I would be in favour of it as the only viable means of self-defence – it would not be of any greater concern than the Israeli or Pakistani bombs. While the US has such disparity in conventional military hardware and declares its unilateral declaration of independence from the jus cogens through its adoption of the doctrine of pre-emptive war, not being a nuclear power seems a dereliction of duty by any state that the US might view unfavourably.

I know the above is not likely to be popular given this forums political equilibrium but I am here not as agent provocateur but to try and understand the position of those who do not think like me.

Rex Brynen
09-18-2007, 06:09 PM
I know the above is not likely to be popular given this forums political equilibrium but I am here not as agent provocateur but to try and understand the position of those who do not think like me.

On the contrary, it is spot-on in terms of the viewpoint of a great many Iranians. Analytical/assessment work is about what the other folks are thinking/doing, not about what you would like to think they are thinking/doing.

Great post.

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 06:54 PM
.....I know the above is not likely to be popular given this forums political equilibrium but I am here not as agent provocateur but to try and understand the position of those who do not think like me.
JJ, I feel your statement about your post being "unpopular" is an unnecessary caveat here. Understanding the perspective of the other is critical to all aspects of Small Wars, and I believe you will find much discussion on this board that is contrary to what you may believe is the "popular" tenor. Following your line about Iran, I've copied an earlier post from the other Iran thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1590) with another look from that perspective:

Military Review, Jul-Aug 07: Surrounded: Seeing the World From Iran's Point of View (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug07/Sadri.pdf)

...An initial sense of the Iranian leadership’s current worldview may be best perceived simply by looking at a map of the Middle East as seen through their eyes. As a Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) officer once expressed to me while discussing Iran’s security situation depicted on a map on his office wall, most Iranian leaders now share, with increasing anxiety, the common view that the U.S. is following a policy of gradually encircling Iran with hostile American forces based in neighboring countries. They note that 30 years ago the U.S had only a couple of military bases in the region—ironically, located in Iran itself. Now, U.S. bases are in all the Persian Gulf states except Iran, and in one form or another, U.S. forces are in all of Iran’s neighboring states—Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey—except for Turkmenistan. Moreover, the U.S. has special ties with Pakistan (a supposed ally against Al-Qaeda), Turkey (a NATO ally that has a special defense treaty with Israel), and Azerbaijan (where hundreds of American military advisors with equipment are pouring into a country whose oil industry is already closely tied to U.S. interests). Along with this gradual buildup of forces, U.S. leaders from both political parties have kept up a steady stream of threatening rhetoric, publicly calling for regime change in Iran. This is a cause for special alarm, given U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001....

georgev
10-31-2007, 03:05 PM
A possible U.S. attack against Iran has been a hot topic in the news for many months now. In some quarters it has become an article of faith that the Bush administration intends to order such an attack before it leaves office. It remains a mystery whether the administration plans an actual attack or whether it is using the threat of attack to try to intimidate Iran -- and thus shape its behavior in Iraq and elsewhere.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/gir.php?utm_source=071030-GIR&utm_medium=email-strat-html&utm_content=071030-GIR-header-read&utm_campaign=GIR

goesh
10-31-2007, 04:32 PM
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380691458&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

"Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni wrapped up her visit to China Tuesday without any sign of having broken down Beijing's opposition to new United Nations sanctions against Iran. "

tequila
10-31-2007, 08:12 PM
Livni behind closed doors: Iranian nuclear arms pose little threat to Israel (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/916777.html)- Haaretz.


Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said a few months ago in a series of closed discussions that in her opinion that Iranian nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat to Israel, Haaretz magazine reveals in an article on Livni to be published tomorrow.

Livni also criticized the exaggerated use that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is making of the issue of the Iranian bomb, claiming that he is attempting to rally the public around him by playing on its most basic fears. Last week, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy said similar things about Iran ...

Brian Hanley
10-31-2007, 10:46 PM
Earlier in this thread there is some discussion that seems to indicate that there is fuzziness about the matter of Sunni and Shiite. While there are quite a few sects of Islam (I have an outline map of some of them I made) most are Sunni or Shia. Koran specifies that heretics are to be executed. (Which explains why Taliban were conducting ethnic cleansing operations in Western Afghanistan on Shias there.)

This explains a great deal if you understand it. While Sunni and Shia can be forced into a corner and use certain verses to call for unity against infidels, there is always this fundamental problem. That is why the Sunni world was and is so reluctant to support the USA in Iraq. They know that if anything like fairness ensues that territory will be lost to Sunni rule, probably for centuries if not forever. In Iraq, for centuries, it's mostly been a pretty good deal to be a Sunni. The Shia are convenient to oppress, abuse and squeeze for money. Most cultures are reluctant to give that up, especially when lacking any moral imperative to do so.

They are mutual heretics and both sides have their fanatics who are quite active. The sheep on both sides passively agree to what the fanatics say because it is so obviously true according to scripture. For this reason, they are formally sworn to destroy each other. (This is also why Sunni and Shia from overseas when they see that there are rare mosques in the USA where Sunni and Shia worship together they are shocked if not outraged.)

Rex Brynen
11-01-2007, 12:21 AM
Earlier in this thread there is some discussion that seems to indicate that there is fuzziness about the matter of Sunni and Shiite.

I'm not sure there is much fuzziness about the religious contours of the Muslim world among most SWC posters, nor much doubt as to how significant they can be.

On the other hand, its important not to fall into a simplistic Sunni vs Shiite analytical trap, since there a range of factors that motivate individual, collective, and state behavioiur. After all, polls show that two of the most popular political figures in the (largely Sunni) Arab world are Shiites (not to mention one of the most popular pop singers (http://www.248am.com/images/haifa.jpg)!); despite sectarian atrocity there are large numbers of mixed Sunni-Shiite marriages in Baghdad (and also mixed tribes); largely Shi'ite Iran has (for reasons of realpolitik) supported (Sunni) Hamas in Palestine, and may have begun to throw some support even to the Taliban, and so forth.

Moreover, the Sunni-Shiite split is really only important in the domestic politics of Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

Finally, I just listened to the very Sunni Pakistani senior general argue yesterday what a bad idea it would be to bomb Shiite Iran, while highlighting the threat posed by Sunni radicals.

Again: yes, sectarianism is important. The war in Iraq has sharpened it, not only in Iraq, but in many ways more broadly. But no, its not the only driver of politics.

Brian Hanley
11-01-2007, 12:45 AM
I'm not sure there is much fuzziness about the religious contours of the Muslim world among most SWC posters, nor much doubt as to how significant they can be.

there a range of factors that motivate individual, collective, and state behavioiur.

Moreover, the Sunni-Shiite split is really only important in the domestic politics of Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

yes, sectarianism is important. The war in Iraq has sharpened it, not only in Iraq, but in many ways more broadly. But no, its not the only driver of politics.

Agreed. You are quite correct that there are a number of leaders who are primarily secular, and that many Muslims would like to be nominal if possible. I would also say though, without any personal knowledge of this general or his situation, that what people say publicly in that part of the world is not always to be taken at face value. They are steeped in ages of saying what audiences want to hear. They also know that the Western media (and to a significant degree intelligence services) are restricted to english and they can say what they like publicly in their own language.

I would also note that Tehran's support of proxy war against Israel is a type of realpolitik. It's a cheap form of warfare that has no domestic cost. Pretty much all upside domestically, no domestic downside.

Ken White
11-01-2007, 12:57 AM
posit that the Sunni - Shia divide in Iraq was in part provoked by western 'expert' and media beating that schism drum a little too heavily.

I realize it's far more complex than that and many other factors, not lest fear of loss versus payback intrude; I'm merely suggesting that all that was to an extent exacerbated by a simplistic western assumption.

That and the IO factor that made that schism into a 'cause' grabbed by both sides that could reinforce the stereotype and used to justify actions. It is possibly noteworthy that Iraqis in exile gather, socialize and marry without regard to that divide...

MattC86
11-01-2007, 03:49 AM
Additionally, given the title of the thread, I'd be interested to know what the fine folks of SWC think about the likelihood of military action against Iran. . .

Matt

Norfolk
11-01-2007, 05:34 AM
We live in interesting times... :D

Isn't there some old Near Eastern curse (uttered in a typically polite fashion such that its real meaning completely escapes the common Westerner) that goes, quote, "May you live in interesting times", unquote? :wry:

Personally, I prefer boring. Boring is good, or at least safe. Interesting can be exciting, but not sometimes not particularly safe. Besides, I'm having too much fun in my boredom sitting at my boring computer typing boring posts to return to my old Regiment and seek excitement in interesting places meeting interesting people engaging in interesting interactions with them. When I think about that, I'm not so sure I really miss my younger days quite the same. As long as some interesting people don't come knocking at my door,:eek: and just leave me in my boredom. Safe.:rolleyes:

Well, things are rather interesting at the moment, and there's all sorts of hope for more to come: Turkey perhaps attacking Northern Iraq, some future unpleasantness between the US and Iran, Ethiopia and Eritrea gearing up as if they were to go at it again, and funny noises coming out of Israel about things that have occurred, or may occurr. And that's just off the top of my head.

Until a few weeks, maybe even a few days, before the invasion of Iraq, I honestly didn't believe that the US was going to do it, especially since I didn't see either the US or Britain send anything that really compared to Desert Storm. Now, as far as a possible war with Iran goes, there are a number of very senior flag officers who are not so kindly inclined. But there were a few very senior flag officers who were not exactly brimming with enthusiasm about invading Iraq, either.

Iran is more dangerous than Iraq was, but the Ayatollahs, even with nukes, I suspect will not be inclined to restage the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. They know perfectly well that the US (let alone Israel) would not react with sympathy and understanding to such Iranian indiscretions. But it's not so much the rational factors as the irrational factors at play, on both sides, that I fear may force the matter one way or the other. If it wasn't for the latter factors, I might have said with some confidence that a nuclear Iran and the US might have learned to avoid getting too serious.

Russia and China are playing their cards here too, most conspiciously with invisible hands.

Armchairguy
11-01-2007, 07:26 AM
I think it would be lots cheaper in the long run to take a few hundred billion dollars and promise it to Israel and Palestine if they can put together a peace deal in the next 6 months. Or possibly offer the bulk to one or the other to give up their sticking points for a peace deal. If we could get a Palestinian state at peace with Israel then at least the stated reason for destroying Israel would be gone, a large part of the AQ recruiting drive would be useless, the average arab in the streets would have a hard time hating America, the Europeans might start to like America again and it wouldn't be chic to hate someone who pulled off that trick.

The cost of attacking Iran could/would be immense and not just in the cost of bombs. Without lots of international support (not just eastern europe and france?) America would become a pariah. We're already pretty low in the polls. If we attacked Iran it would knock the remaining nay sayers off the fence solidly against us. Next we've got the damage Iran could do in return and the uncertainty in actually taking out all of their facilities and materials. Who knows maybe AQ Khan already gave them a bomb?

As far as nuclear proliferation is concerned I'd say the genie's been out of the bottle for some time and we'll be lucky even without Iran developing a nuke to keep them out of AQ hands.

We need to win the international hearts and minds and eliminate the reasons for wanting nuclear weapons.

goesh
11-01-2007, 11:50 AM
We can better predict the path and aftermath of war than the uncertainty of a nuclear Iran, be it done by think tanks and computers, bones or yarrow, we just don't know. It is a gnawing uncertainty that Europe is hiding from and China is so desperately hoping goes quitely away. It's best to let Israel do the dirty deed and be the scapegoats - the Islamic world couldn't possibly hate them any more than they already do. Given the preemption of Iraqi nuclear capability and whatever non-conventional mischief Syria was developing, it is ludicrous to imagine Israel will stand down while those obnoxious Persians attain tactical nuclear capability.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380704832&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

"Israel can destroy Iran's growing nuclear program, a senior IDF officer was quoted as saying by 'The Canadian Jewish News' Web site on Wednesday"

Brian Hanley
11-01-2007, 08:52 PM
That and the IO factor that made that schism into a 'cause' grabbed by both sides that could reinforce the stereotype and used to justify actions. It is possibly noteworthy that Iraqis in exile gather, socialize and marry without regard to that divide...

The fanatics on both sides the core of Iran (viz. Ayatollah Khomeni's quote, "Those who say Islam is not about war know nothing of Islam.") and the "Shade of the Koran" boyz made that one. They pulled it straight out of doctrine. The provocation of the West by Al Qaeda was intended to bring boots on the ground to their region to force the "bad muslims" to take sides. (It appears they had bought their own propaganda that it was Al Qaeda/Taliban heroes who defeated the USSR.) The achilles heel of the fanatic is that they tend to believe that others will be as outraged as they are.

The core population of Iraq, as with most (one can see the same thing in Nazi Germany history), just wants to live a decent life. They'll go along when things are improving for them and ignore problems. That Iraqis in exile gather together with little regard for schism way is not surprising. They are a self-selected sample consisting of: A. the better educated and wealthier classes B. the secular.

Ken White
11-01-2007, 11:27 PM
Amatuers r us... :o

Ken White
11-02-2007, 02:51 AM
1936. Maybe it was '37. Only excuse I have for that softness is that I was young... :D

I did just happen to broadly agree with what you said. Could always quibble about the edges but I generally try to avoid that (not always successfully :o ). I do think our foreign policy since about 1976 has been below amatuerish. Seems to be getting worse, too...

I'd have to think about your proposal for a bit; see some pluses and minuses. In any event, I suspect the probability of the Congress laying down for that is, for a variety of good and bad reasons, virtually non-existent. :wry:

goesh
11-02-2007, 02:27 PM
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,307516,00.html

"WASHINGTON — Sen. Barack Obama said Friday that as president he would personally negotiate with Iran, offering economic incentives and a chance for peaceful relations if Iranian leaders would forego pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of terrorists."

~send some cheap Mexican labor their way, Obama - call it the Peons for Progress and Partnership Program (PPPP) for those here who hanker for acronyms

JeffC
11-24-2007, 12:20 AM
The impending showdown over Iran's uranium enrichment program, and its failure to abide by the IAEA's requirements for full transparency will now be moving toward a third round of U.N. sanctions with the impending threat of military action by the U.S. if diplomatic efforts fail.

Unfortunately, a military strike may make matters much worse. China will certainly act to protect her strategic interests in Iran, not to mention her 100 or so companies doing business there, but even worse may be the world-wide economic fallout if Iran closes the Straits of Hormuz.

I've explored the history of this problem, as well as some possible scenarios for the outcome in a paper that's now available at IntelFusion (http://idolator.typepad.com/intelfusion/2007/11/analysis-chin-1.html) - "China, Iran, and the Nuclear Imperative". As usual, your feedback is much appreciated.


Open thread...


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/bushehr.jpg

Nuclear Reactor - Bushehr, Iran

Credit: Space Imaging (http://www.geoeye.com/)

Jedburgh
11-26-2007, 07:28 PM
CSIS, 25 Nov 07: Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Status Report (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf)

This presenation covers what is and is not known about Iran’s nuclear weapons and missile developments. It is important to note that it does not speculate where hard data are lacking. It does not make worst-case judgments, or attempt to go beyond the evidence provided by the IAEA and unclassified judgments of the US intelligence community.

No official source has yet claimed to have a “smoking gun” that shows conclusively Iran is developing a nuclear weapons production program. At the same time, the available evidence provides strong indications that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and is seeking to deploy a long-range missile force that can be armed with nuclear weapons.

Specifically, Iran is known to have made significant efforts in all of the following areas, most of which have been tracked by the IAEA for some time:

- Beryllium (neutron reflector)
- Polonium (neutron initiator)
- Plutonium separation
- Uranium enrichment
- Machining of Uranium hemispheres
- Re-entry vehicle design
- Acquisition of North Korean (Chinese) weapons design? AQ Khan network transfers
- High explosive lenses

At the same time, the briefing points out that there are many key uncertainties that affect Iran’s nuclear program:

- When centrifuge plants will be able to produce fissile material and at what rate.
- State of “passive” testing of key components and weapons assemblies using non-fissile material.
- Efforts in boosted and fusion weapons design.
- Criteria for reliability and safety.
- Intentions with heavy water reactor project.
- Remote and unknown site activity, including P-2 centrifuge design, and weapons and warhead design.
- Plans for testing; progression from device to weapons.
- Force deployment plans once weapons are available.
- Dates for ability to test first device; first weapon, and deployable bombs and warheads: 2010-2015?

The data gathered for this report also shows that major uncertainties and differences exist from source to source in describing Iran’s long-range ballistic missile programs, including key factors like the number and nature of Iran’s programs and the range-payload, set-up and reaction time, accuracy, and reliability of the systems that are known to exist.

These uncertainties might be resolved in if key intelligence judgments were declassified. Three critical areas need to be addressed in fully characterizing Iranian efforts to design nuclear weapons and create missile warheads:

- There are no reliable unclassified surveys of the nuclear weapons and dual-use technology, components, and literature Iran is known to have imported.

- Iran has denied it has made efforts to design nuclear weapons and create missile warheads, but the national intelligence that led the IAEA to seek clarification about Iranian efforts like the “Green Salt Project” indicate that there may be more evidence about such Iranian activity than have been declassified to date.

- Britain and the US have not fully declassified the level of Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons and warhead design data made available to Iran through the AQ Khan network and related sources.
Complete 85 slide presentation in pdf at the link.

JeffC
11-27-2007, 12:39 AM
CSIS, 25 Nov 07: Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Status Report (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf)

Complete 85 slide presentation in pdf at the link.


Regardless of Iran's poor showing before the IAEA, not to mention its history of telling outright lies, no one believes that they have 25,000 centrifuges operating at one time (which is the estimated number needed to fuel one nuclear reactor). Iran claims to have 3,000 centrifuges, but even that figure hasn't been confirmed, and while they may have them, that doesn't mean that they're operational. Even if Iran's claim of 3000 is true, and assuming that they're all working together, it would take one year to make enough fuel for one nuclear warhead.

With that in mind, I think its important to weigh the very slight threat that Iran offers from a nuclear perspective against the major repercussions of a military attack against Iran. I'm convinced that this must be resolved diplomatically and with great firmness by the nation members of the Security Council. It's too bad that the U.S. initiated this program back in the 50's and supported the Shah in his nuclear ambitions up until the '78 Iranian Revolution. Now we once again have to deal with the repercussions of our past mistakes.

bourbon
11-27-2007, 06:15 AM
It's too bad that the U.S. initiated this program back in the 50's and supported the Shah in his nuclear ambitions up until the '78 Iranian Revolution. Now we once again have to deal with the repercussions of our past mistakes.
While it's overly facetious to point out who in the Ford Administration pushed for the Westinghouse/GE – Iran nuke deal, the irony is too caustic not to note. I doubt it's lost on the Iranian people. The patterns that ripple in this universe never cease to amaze me.

JJackson
11-27-2007, 06:17 PM
In light of bourbon's post above you may enjoy this from 2005 'Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy'
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3983-2005Mar26.html

Which I found as a footnote in this ( www.ifpa.org/pdf/Iran_102307/Contain_and_Engage.pdf ), which is one of the better reports I have read on the subject. I checked out the footnote as it was the source for the rather surprising claim the US had approved plans for Iranian uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities which I had not previously been aware of.

The best document I have read so far is http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/wouldairstrikeswork.pdf which has an excellent section on all the sites in Iran (hat tip davidbfpo & Jedburgh for that one).

The final link is to the latest IAEA interim report
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_11_07_iran_iaeareport.pdf

And now for my question. As their is so little hard data and so much speculation when addressing important questions like 'how close is Iran to achieving reliable working centrifuge cascades?' we are often left with 'expert opinions' and in this area that is often from a think tank or similar. My problem is it seems to be getting harder and harder to find any kind of purportedly independent analysis that is really that. I am looking for a simple way to try and check out if the 'XYZ peace and freedom institute', or similar, are for real or a wholly funded by Lockheed's PR company. Can you help? I did find this http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch which is a Wiki trying to do pretty much what I need but when I tried to use it I found it had not yet got much data in it - at least not on the groups I was interested in.

SteveMetz
11-27-2007, 06:46 PM
Published by the American Foreign Policy Council and McCormick-Tribune Foundation. I'd be happy to pass along a .pdf to anyone interested (it's too big to upload here).

Executive Summary

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran looms large on the agenda of policymakers
in Washington. Over the past several years, it has become clear that the Islamic Republic is pursuing a massive, multifaceted endeavor to acquire a nuclear capability—and that it is making rapid progress toward this goal, despite pressure from the world community. Yet Iran’s nuclear program is just part of a larger picture. The Islamic Republic’s enduring support for terrorism, its growing and pernicious regional role, and its radical, uncompromising ideology currently also pose serious challenges to the United States, its allies and American interests in the greater Middle East. So far, policymakers in Washington have failed to muster an adequate response on any of these fronts. As a result, the Islamic Republic has gained precious time to entrench itself in Iraq, expand its support for terrorists and bring added permanence to its nuclear effort. The logical conclusion of the current status quo is a mature Iranian nuclear capability, continued Coalition casualties in Iraq, and emboldened terrorist groups across the region. If it hopes to avoid such an outcome, the United States must harness all the elements of national power into a strategy that focuses on three concrete goals vis-à-vis Iran: counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. This will require:

Diplomatic and informational efforts aimed at:
• educating the American public about the contemporary threat posed by the
Islamic Republic;
• enhancing existing broadcasting into Iran;
• expanding the reach of Western ideas within the Islamic Republic;
• leveraging new sources of media to better communicate with the next
generation of Iranian leaders;
• delegitimizing the current Iranian leadership;
• empowering regime opponents and;
• speaking clearly to the Iranian regime about the costs associated with their
continued rogue behavior.

Intelligence initiatives geared toward:
• reviving human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities within Iran;
• better accessing allied information on Iran;
• restructuring and reforming the existing intelligence bureaucracy to better
respond to—and coordinate against—the Iranian regime and;
• forging a new legal framework for intelligence operations that provides greater latitude for efforts to “get smart” on Iran.

Economic measures such as:
• exerting greater pressure on Iran’s trading partners;
• enforcing unilateral sanctions against countries and companies that continue
to do business with the Islamic Republic;
• considering the imposition of embargos and blockades, particularly on Iran’s
vulnerable energy sector and;
• elevating divestment efforts from the state to the federal government level.
Military measures, among them:
• conducting a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s operational and tactical
vulnerabilities;
• building the capacity for unconventional warfare within Iran;
• targeting Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal as a way of downgrading its offensive
and nuclear capabilities and;
• severing Tehran’s ties to its terrorist proxies—with force, if necessary.

The United States stands at a crossroads. It has become increasingly evident that security and stability in the greater Middle East, as well as American objectives there, hinge upon America’s ability to confront and defuse the strategic challenge posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. And yet, our capacity to do so is rapidly dwindling. Soon, America will be left with just two options: to allow Iran to “go nuclear,” thereby cementing the expansion of its radical revolution, or to use military force to prevent it from doing so. A comprehensive, multifaceted strategy that employs all elements of American power is needed to prevent such a choice. Such an approach is outlined in the pages that follow. Our hope is that American policymakers will use
the limited time that remains to implement it wisely.

JeffC
11-27-2007, 10:26 PM
JJackson:

Iran signed the NPT in 1968, which permits signers the ability to perform unranium enrichment and doesn't exclude dual-use. They're still beating that drum today.


As to finding a truly independent thinktank, I'm afraid that's an impossible quest. Every institute is funded by somebody with a point of view. Some are more balanced then others, but that's a matter of perspective. My suggestion is to try to get a consensus from multiple sources and then apply some of your own common sense.

JeffC
11-27-2007, 10:54 PM
[QUOTE=SteveMetz;32638]Published by the American Foreign Policy Council and McCormick-Tribune Foundation. I'd be happy to pass along a .pdf to anyone interested (it's too big to upload here).

Wow, a bit too Right-wing for my taste. How do the authors even begin to justify the second sentence of that Executive Summary, which reads: "Over the past several years, it has become clear that the Islamic Republic is pursuing a massive, multifaceted endeavor to acquire a nuclear capability—and that it is making rapid progress toward this goal,"?

Iran's been working towards becoming a nuclear power since before 1960 and is a signer of the NPT which assures them the right to have nuclear power for civilian purposes. And what evidence do the authors have to support the statement that Iran is "making rapid progress toward this goal"? The IAEA certainly doesn't have that evidence yet.

Then there's this quote:
"The logical conclusion of the current status quo is a mature Iranian nuclear capability, continued Coalition casualties in Iraq, and emboldened terrorist groups across the region."

That's the only conclusion that the authors can arrive at? How about a more likely scenario that Iran does provide the remaining information about it's enrichment program to the IAEA; that it joins with the GCC in a pan-Arabic nuclear energy pact and outsources it's enriched fuel needs to Switzerland? (all of which are under discussion now).

And then there's "expanding the reach of Western ideas within the Islamic Republic". Talk about Ethno-centrism in action.

Thanks but no thanks, Steve.

bourbon
11-28-2007, 05:24 AM
My problem is it seems to be getting harder and harder to find any kind of purportedly independent analysis that is really that. I am looking for a simple way to try and check out if the 'XYZ peace and freedom institute', or similar, are for real or a wholly funded by Lockheed's PR company. Can you help? I did find this http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch which is a Wiki trying to do pretty much what I need but when I tried to use it I found it had not yet got much data in it - at least not on the groups I was interested in.

politicalfriendster.com (http://www.politicalfriendster.com/)
Discover the Networks (http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/) - covers the left and Islamic groups
Activist Cash (http://activistcash.com/) - good source that covers alot, from the Center for Consumer Freedom (which in reality is a shell for a big lobbying firm)
Right Web (http://rightweb.irc-online.org/) - covers individuals, organizations and companies on the right

bourbon
12-03-2007, 09:13 PM
December 12, 2007: National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf), Office of the Director of National Intelligence.


Key Judgments

A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)

• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.

• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.


B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.

• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.

• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.

F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

JeffC
12-04-2007, 12:50 AM
December 12, 2007: National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf), Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Sweet vindication.

I wonder what Michael "Iran with the bomb, or bomb Iran" Ledeen will have to say about it.

Ken White
12-04-2007, 02:19 AM
same folks who five years ago said Saddam DID at the time have WMD... :rolleyes:

Ron Humphrey
12-04-2007, 05:10 AM
I,m not sure if I got this straight or not.

They don't have a weapons planning program anymore but they are getting closer to enriching uranium and they have bigger and better missles.

They don't have a weapons planning program any more, but
Achoomini jiadd has made it very clear to everyone in that region and elsewhere that they will be a nuclear power(hint,hint) and most of those countries aren't exactly acting like they are not worried.

They don't have a weapons program anymore, but I don't remember
reading about the one time at band camp where they burned or lost all of the designs, plans ,etc that they had come up with when they did have a nuclear weapons program

Long and short-

Talk a lot, pressure a lot, don't forget to bring your big cousin with you if you plan on staying in the area for long.

bourbon
12-04-2007, 05:53 AM
November 15 IAEA Board of Governors report by ElBaradei:

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747 in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20071115IAEA-report.pdf)(PDF)


F. Summary

39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.

40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme: Iran’s past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.

42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran’s active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.

43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran’s undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.

44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

tequila
12-04-2007, 06:49 AM
JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B (http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/061603.html)" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

Ken White
12-04-2007, 07:03 AM
a lot of folks involved with a lot of different agendas. While there are elements of truth in what you said, there are those who have quite different agendas playing in the game. You linked to the old Team B bit -- that's an example of bending one way -- there are also those who bend the other way.

It ain't simple and I look forward to your interface with the intel community at echelons above reality. ;)

bourbon
12-04-2007, 07:09 AM
JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B (http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/061603.html)" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence. (By Which We Do Not Mean Nous) (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/leo_strauss_and_the_world_of_intelligence.pdf). Gary J. Schmitt and Abram N. Shulsky, 1999. (PDF)

Norfolk
12-04-2007, 01:42 PM
Not only did I use a lot of Strauss's works for my studies in university, but my M.A. advisor had Leo Strauss as his Ph.D. advisor. I asked him a couple of times about Strauss, and even after 30 years, it was clear my M.A. advisor was still impressed by Strauss.

That said, I never found anything particularly noxious about Strauss's works; I simply found them to be either brilliant restatements of the Classics, or very illuminating commentaries on some trends in modern political philosophy. I suspect some of the "Straussians" may have done better if they'd took some of Strauss's own teachings a little closer to heart, or at least understood them rather better. Neo-conservatism, like any ideology, is just so much nonsense.

JeffC
12-04-2007, 04:38 PM
JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "Team B (http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/061603.html)" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.

It's already happening, and by people that I expected better from. :(

Ron Humphrey
12-05-2007, 02:05 AM
It's already happening, and by people that I expected better from. :(

I never find it unexpected, nor surprising that politicians will be politicians. What I often do fail to grasp is how those who carry the burden of responsibility for protection seem so easily drawn off the path of reasoned caution when it purtains to actions and intent of foriegn entities.

I am pretty sure noone really thinks Iran as a country(different from governance) wants to blow up Israel or us. I do however think it only prudent that we look at history when it relates to what those in governance tend to do when they are suffering issues within their own playground which cannot be addressed internally without signifigant changes to existing protocol.

World War I - Pick your Country
WWII- about the same

First although some might wish to bite into this as opportunity to analyze our own circumstances I would simply say that although there may be some similarities we at least have the ooportunity to actively engage in what happens.

In reference to Iran however, considering the absolutely stunning :rolleyes: successes they have had in economic and social governance one can only imagine how they can expect to continue in power unless they bring something different to the table and quick.

I humbly refer back to my earlier posting and ask the same questions.:confused:

JeffC
12-05-2007, 02:55 AM
In reference to Iran however, considering the absolutely stunning :rolleyes: successes they have had in economic and social governance one can only imagine how they can expect to continue in power unless they bring something different to the table and quick. I humbly refer back to my earlier posting and ask the same questions.:confused:

I don't pretend to understand the mindset of anyone who lives in a Theocracy in the Middle East, however I can relate to Ahmadinejad playing the fool as regards his nation's "supposed" nuclear weapons capabilities in order to raise his bargaining position with the White House. After all, it worked for North Korea, so why shouldn't it work for his country? This is the explanation that George Friedman (STRATFOR) gave in his blog post yesterday about why the 2005 and 2007 NIE's flip-flopped on Iran, and I think it makes perfect sense. The bottom line is that when you strip away all the B.S., Tehran's ruling clerics are smarter negotiators then anyone in the West has given them credit for. They don't want a war. They want what we will give them in exchange for not building something that they've managed to convince our "brain-trust" that they've got.

Watcher In The Middle
12-05-2007, 03:37 AM
Originally posted by JeffC:

The bottom line is that when you strip away all the B.S., Tehran's ruling clerics are smarter negotiators then anyone in the West has given them credit for. They don't want a war. They want what we will give them in exchange for not building something that they've managed to convince our "brain-trust" that they've got.

....for Iran. What they have gotten so far out of all of this is a ratcheting up of economic sanctions, along with a concerted effort by the West (US, in the lead) to cripple Iran's economic access to capital (at least through the IRGC).

The real problem is that IF the 2007 NIE is valid in it's conclusions (and again, assume it is valid), there is actually (from a political viewpoint) greater justification for continued, if not increased economic sanctions against Iran, with the goal of further extending out their development cycle in any attempts to develop a nuclear capability.

From a purely political standpoint (if I'm a pol) with the 2007 NIE being out there, I don't want military intervention, but I certainly want to make sure that Iran knows that any path they take toward developing a nuclear capability will be as expensive and drawn out as it can possibly be (with our complements).

And if Iran did in fact reverse their trend toward developing a nuclear capability in 2003, and it can be even partially attributed to the effects of economic sanctions at that time, well, what's the reason for the West to discontinue those?

I mean, if the goal for Iran was to deal something that was mostly all smoke & mirrors for something tangible, well, looks like that deal is blown. The 2007 NIE just blew that type of deal away.

I'm looking at this from a pol standpoint and trying to figure out where all the 80% who are pretty much in the middle of the road are going to go with all of this.

Thoughts?

Norfolk
12-05-2007, 04:03 AM
Originally posted by JeffC:


....for Iran. What they have gotten so far out of all of this is a ratcheting up of economic sanctions, along with a concerted effort by the West (US, in the lead) to cripple Iran's economic access to capital (at least through the IRGC).

The real problem is that IF the 2007 NIE is valid in it's conclusions (and again, assume it is valid), there is actually (from a political viewpoint) greater justification for continued, if not increased economic sanctions against Iran, with the goal of further extending out their development cycle in any attempts to develop a nuclear capability.

From a purely political standpoint (if I'm a pol) with the 2007 NIE being out there, I don't want military intervention, but I certainly want to make sure that Iran knows that any path they take toward developing a nuclear capability will be as expensive and drawn out as it can possibly be (with our complements).

And if Iran did in fact reverse their trend toward developing a nuclear capability in 2003, and it can be even partially attributed to the effects of economic sanctions at that time, well, what's the reason for the West to discontinue those?

I mean, if the goal for Iran was to deal something that was mostly all smoke & mirrors for something tangible, well, looks like that deal is blown. The 2007 NIE just blew that type of deal away.

I'm looking at this from a pol standpoint and trying to figure out where all the 80% who are pretty much in the middle of the road are going to go with all of this.

Thoughts?

Very much agreed that the NIE's revelations pretty much blow away Iran's diplomatic options (other than total "capitulation" - a la Libya), and may severely constrain even those of the U.S.:(

As for what way the more or less undecided 80% go, I offer the following possibilities:

1. There's a media brawl between opponents and proponents of an attack on Iran as they duke it out on international TV and each goes for the hard sell on their position.

2. The US, and perhaps others', media more or less go along as they did in 2003 and help to persuade enough people that there is a grave, direct, and imminent threat to the survival of the West if Iran's atomic capabilities are not completely and permanently eradicated, leading to enough popular "support" for said.

3. This is just another shot in the behind-the-scenes war that the military brass and senior intelligence officers are waging against the current Administration in an attempt to block/hinder/forestall/stave off, etc., any new war or major combat operation that the latter may be contemplating. As such, they may be more events like this one in the weeks and months to come until the issue is decided one way or the other.

In any case, I fear that if this was a case of number 3, that the exercise may have backfired in the longer-term even as it takes the wind out of the sails of the man-o'-war momentarily. And given the long silence in Congress until the last couple days on the matter of a military strike upon Iran, I'm not sure that there is the political will there to vigorously oppose said. Time will tell. And the undecided 80% will mostly bend whichever way the prevailing political and media winds blow.

JeffC
12-05-2007, 05:11 AM
Thoughts?

The U.S. isn't the only player in this game. The heavy hand that the U.S. has played, has helped create a sympathetic ear for the member nations of the GCC, who Iran has approached for a Pan-Arab union for nuclear energy development. Every nation in the Middle East is interested in nuclear power as an energy source, and that's what Iran is going to wind up with. Last year, Germany and other members of the U.N. Security Council were offering Tehran a package of economic incentives to stop its HEU program. Switzerland has offered to provide the nuclear fuel for Iran and other Middle Eastern nations that want nuclear power if Iran will stop its enrichment program (which it can barely do anyway).

Iran doesn't need a nuclear arsenal today. It has China and Russia for that. And frankly, with the release of the NIE, neither China nor Russia will support an increase in economic sanctions against Iran, and they clearly don't care what Washington thinks. From Tehran's perspective, Iran has come out ahead in all of this.

Ken White
12-05-2007, 05:56 AM
Iran doesn't need a nuclear arsenal today. It has China and Russia for that...

Though I'm not at all sure that the last sentence is true or realistic.

...And frankly,with the release of the NIE, neither China nor Russia will support an increase in economic sanctions against Iran, and they clearly don't care what Washington thinks...
In this case I agree with the last sentence but am not all sure you're correct on the first one. Time will tell.

From Tehran's perspective, Iran has come out ahead in all of this.
Nor do I see any basis for that statement; they will certainly shout that they are ahead, as you said above, they've been playing the bluff and fall back game like North Korea (though not quite as well) since '79. So they'll make hooray! noises -- whether they really think that or wonder what in the world we're up to now is a totally different thing.

The turn around from the 2005 NIE is bound to give them pause. They've miscalculated on us before and are rather cautious in fear of doing it again. They want respect for the Persian Empire and foreign investment but they are too proud to say that, they have to demand it indirectly, even while really understanding that is not a good approach. Complex folks.

Watcher In The Middle
12-05-2007, 05:21 PM
Originally posted by Ken White:

whether they really think that or wonder what in the world we're up to now is a totally different thing.

That's probably true, only because right now we're probably not sure what we're up to now. Got to be tough being an analyst for the folks on the other side - your bosses call you and ask what the Americans are up to now, and I doubt one wants to respond with "We don't think they know what they are doing" (might have a negative effect on one's job standing).

Actually, looks like two things are happening. First, as the 2007 NIE hit right at the entryway of the primary election cycle, there's being an abundance of caution by all the candidates. They are looking at this as (a) What's this to do for/to me as a player, and (b) What's this do for/to "them other folks" as a player.

Right now, nobody's really in a hurry to bring it up, because they know that if they do, they'll get asked the same type of question(s).

The second thing that's happening is a far more subtle, but is really interesting. Old rule is "Never try and con a Con (Artist)". If you are a pol and are a player, you're going to have some of those Con Artist aspects to you - it's required, part of the job. Can't do it - don't run for office.

Iran was trying to pull a "Con of a Con", only it was on all of these political players. The 2007 NIE just blew that up. But the point is, it's now out there for everybody to see, and truth is, when pols feel like they are being played as "easy marks", they tend to get blood in their eyes, and they don't forget anytime soon.

I can see this effect causing a whole lot of problems in normalizing relations with Iran, because it's always going to be "Don't you remember what happened last time we went down this road" thrown up in people's faces.


The turn around from the 2005 NIE is bound to give them pause.

This is interesting to me. Seeing Ahmadinejad's response (best categorized as the "We Done Been Wronged" speech), it almost looks like he's trying to make the best out of a less than favorable outcome. It's like Ahmadinejad and his team never fully expected the 2007 NIE output to be so radically different, and now they are scrambling. It's almost like they figured that the GWB administration had so much invested in the 2005 NIE outlook that the 2007 NIE had to follow the same path, no matter what the information. Thoughts?

Ken White
12-05-2007, 06:28 PM
a political document -- and by that I mean Intel community internal politics and leanings more so than the national or international variety...:rolleyes:

Lot of chatter, most ill informed and off the mark -- in the Op-Ed pages this morning. I got the impression that most of the punditocracy were relying on what others had said as opposed to actually reading the Estimate. I Read a bunch of articles; this LINK (http://blog.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/?hpid=news-col-blog) was probably the most accurate... ;)

Poor old Ahmadinejad is indeed scrambling, I'm sure and Khameini is lambasting his spooks for allowing them to be surprised. I suspect W was told some time ago what the Estimate was going to say and played along to heighten the surprise. :cool:

We aren't nearly as dumb as we sometimes appear... :D

JeffC
12-06-2007, 02:30 AM
Though I'm not at all sure that the last sentence is true or realistic.

What I mean't by that is that Iran is patient. While their ambition is to acquire nuclear weapons, they've been trying to do it for 50 years. They don't need to draw a line in the sand or instigate a war over it today! If they walk away from this with economic incentives to give up their measely 3000 centrifuges that probably don't work properly, then what have they lost? Nothing. And they gain whatever incentives and aid that's been offered.

Regarding China and Russia not supporting further resolutions against China, both countries have already announced their intention to not support further sanctions since the release of the NIE.

Norfolk
12-06-2007, 03:10 AM
What I mean't by that is that Iran is patient. While their ambition is to acquire nuclear weapons, they've been trying to do it for 50 years. They don't need to draw a line in the sand or instigate a war over it today! If they walk away from this with economic incentives to give up their measely 3000 centrifuges that probably don't work properly, then what have they lost? Nothing. And they gain whatever incentives and aid that's been offered.

Regarding China and Russia not supporting further resolutions against China, both countries have already announced their intention to not support further sanctions since the release of the NIE.

I'm no ME expert here, but I do not associate ME cultures or politics in general or Iranian culture or politics specifically as being particularly patient. Prone to fatalism perhaps, but patience is not one of their stronger suits, and certainly not when compared to a culture like that of say, China. And Iran is sitting on top of a demographic time-bomb of sorts along with an economy that is not expanding to support its young and expanding population.

I suspect that Iran's options are narrowing and they are running out of time in which to make some important decisions. They may find themselves having to search for a way in which to pull a Libya without it looking like an outright capitulation. They know that someone's gunning for them, and that if the trigger is pulled, it will most certainly be sooner rather than later. This issue will almost certainly be decided one way or the other within a year, and probably much less than that. This is not a good situation, and especially not for Iran.

Watcher In The Middle
12-06-2007, 04:33 AM
Originally posted by Norfolk:

I suspect that Iran's options are narrowing and they are running out of time in which to make some important decisions. They may find themselves having to search for a way in which to pull a Libya without it looking like an outright capitulation. They know that someone's gunning for them, and that if the trigger is pulled, it will most certainly be sooner rather than later. This issue will almost certainly be decided one way or the other within a year, and probably much less than that. This is not a good situation, and especially not for Iran.

...can't buy into your logic in getting there. Here's why (realize, this is coming from a pol perspective):

01 The 2007 NIE really seriously damaged any efforts at building a coalition supporting military action again Iran. As long as Iran doesn't get stupid from where we are today, they've got a odds-on pass through November, 2008.

02 The problem Iran has vrs. relations with the US is that things are unlikely to change from now, regardless of political Administration, from now probably through the first term of the next POTUS. I mean, think about it - Iran basically has 3 doors to choose from (or no change):

Door 1: Current Administration. Door is good through 11.2008, expired after that.
Door 2: New Administration (Democratic): Assume most likely candidate for position is H. Clinton. How is Ahmadinejad going to make those negotiations work? (You've got elements of a religious repressive society, a host of women's issues, wants to eliminate Israel, homosexual oppression, and a whole host of other issues). There's going to be all sorts of SIG's (Special Interest Groups) all over this one, and they'll win.
Door 3: New Administration (Republican): Assume most likely candidate for position is R. Giuliani. How is Ahmadinejad going to make those negotiations work? (You've got elements of a religious repressive society, wants to eliminate Israel, a host of women's issues, homosexual oppression, and a whole host of other issues). Again, there's going to be all sorts of SIG's all over this one.

Honestly, looking at the above, we might as well put the US-Iran relations into the freezer and come back and re-visit them sometime in 2013.

As crazy as it sounds, the best US-Iran dealmaking climate looks to be right now (because a lame duck POTUS can tell all the SIG's to go sit on it & spin until it feels good). And more importantly, everybody else wanting the job will want this one off the table before their watch kicks in.

My question would be how Ahmadinejad, and more importantly, Khameini view dealing with the US? They might just be fine with putting any national relationship change with the US on hold all the way into 2013. Because once there's a new POTUS, nothing is likely to happen first term re: Iran (unless both/either party gets stupid). Thoughts?

Ken White
12-06-2007, 05:12 AM
What I mean't by that is that Iran is patient. While their ambition is to acquire nuclear weapons, they've been trying to do it for 50 years...

some, I could agree. Iran is not monolithic. Even among the Ayatollahs, there's disagreement on that score. What's the basis for your 50 year claim?


...They don't need to draw a line in the sand or instigate a war over it today! If they walk away from this with economic incentives to give up their measely 3000 centrifuges that probably don't work properly, then what have they lost? Nothing. And they gain whatever incentives and aid that's been offered.

Haven't seen anyone offering any aid thus far; may happen, may not. Why would anyone give them any incentives? Incentives for what? They've already agreed to better cooperate with the IAEA. We just said we didn't think they were trying to build nukes and they agreed they weren't, loudly and predictably claiming yet another victory over the Great Satan -- so incentives to do what?


Regarding China and Russia not supporting further resolutions against China, both countries have already announced their intention to not support further sanctions since the release of the NIE.

I've read articles today that said that and others that say China is still supportive of some efforts and Russia is not, other articles that say the reverse; Russia supports but China does not plus still others that say both are still leaning toward sanctions. All speculation by a clueless media and I doubt either nation has decided what they will do yet -- they know that NIE is virtually meaningless as a reality check; it's a relatively pointless political document pure and simple.

In any case, what China and Russia will do or not do is not material to the fact that Iran achieves no real benefit from the NIE other than a possible lessening of tension and rhetoric -- and they still don't know what we're up to... :D

Ken White
12-06-2007, 05:17 AM
I think W just punted and the broadcast crew missed it. :D

Though the Bear and the Dragon probably didn't. The Mullah's OTOH get to ponder. Deeply... :cool:

Norfolk
12-06-2007, 05:21 AM
01 The 2007 NIE really seriously damaged any efforts at building a coalition supporting military action again Iran. As long as Iran doesn't get stupid from where we are today, they've got a odds-on pass through November, 2008.

02 The problem Iran has vrs. relations with the US is that things are unlikely to change from now, regardless of political Administration, from now probably through the first term of the next POTUS. I mean, think about it - Iran basically has 3 doors to choose from (or no change):

Door 1: Current Administration. Door is good through 11.2008, expired after that.
Door 2: New Administration (Democratic): Assume most likely candidate for position is H. Clinton. How is Ahmadinejad going to make those negotiations work? (You've got elements of a religious repressive society, a host of women's issues, wants to eliminate Israel, homosexual oppression, and a whole host of other issues). There's going to be all sorts of SIG's (Special Interest Groups) all over this one, and they'll win.
Door 3: New Administration (Republican): Assume most likely candidate for position is R. Giuliani. How is Ahmadinejad going to make those negotiations work? (You've got elements of a religious repressive society, wants to eliminate Israel, a host of women's issues, homosexual oppression, and a whole host of other issues). Again, there's going to be all sorts of SIG's all over this one.

Honestly, looking at the above, we might as well put the US-Iran relations into the freezer and come back and re-visit them sometime in 2013.

As crazy as it sounds, the best US-Iran dealmaking climate looks to be right now []. And more importantly, everybody else wanting the job will want this one off the table before their watch kicks in.

My question would be how Ahmadinejad, and more importantly, Khameini view dealing with the US? They might just be fine with putting any national relationship change with the US on hold all the way into 2013. Because once there's a new POTUS, nothing is likely to happen first term re: Iran (unless both/either party gets stupid). Thoughts?

I think the way that I'm looking at it is that the current Administration is more or less determined to bring the Iranians to heel, definitively, before it's out of office. That means either the Iranians do what Libya did, or the US will work them over real good. The Administration would prefer a diplomatic coalition, but I don't think that it believes that it is absolutely necessary. Politically, they have less to lose now and over the next several months by striking Iran, than they did if have had done so even as recently as six months ago.

I suspect that one of the strongest constraints upon an Administration decision, right now and perhaps for the time being, to strike Iran is not in the political realm, either diplomatically or with regards either to Congress or even public opinion, but from the military and from the intelligence services. There has been some very heavy opposition to Administration military plans, such as notions of putting up to 4 carriers in the Gulf (the 3-Star Admiral in the area put it almost bluntly to the Prez that there was no way more than 1 or 2 carriers were going to be in the Gulf and environs), and of course the intelligence services have been working hard to parry the Administration's thrusts for action against Iran for the past year or two (at least).

With the release of the 2007 NIE and the Administration's unequivocal response to it, it really does seem that there is, or will soon be, the political will and the decision made, to deal with Iran in a manner that is intended to be decisive in its results - one way or the other. I think that other political factors have actually lost some of their potency, as it seems increasingly clear that the Adminstration, having had the Intelligence Services strip away an imminent justification for immediate action, nevertheless came right out anyway and all but say that Iran will be dealt with. The clock may already be set and time's running out. It may take a lot to stop this.

JeffC
12-06-2007, 06:42 AM
some, I could agree. Iran is not monolithic. Even among the Ayatollahs, there's disagreement on that score. What's the basis for your 50 year claim?

I wrote a paper on it: "China, Iran, and the Nuclear Imperative (http://idolator.typepad.com/China_Iran.pdf)". You can read the chronology there. Ironically, the U.S. gave Iran it's first piece of nuclear hardware in the 1950's.



Haven't seen anyone offering any aid thus far; may happen, may not. Why would anyone give them any incentives? Incentives for what? They've already agreed to better cooperate with the IAEA. We just said we didn't think they were trying to build nukes and they agreed they weren't, loudly and predictably claiming yet another victory over the Great Satan -- so incentives to do what?

Incentives were offered last year by Germany and other UNSC member nations. Russia has agreed to help them finish the Bushehr reactor. Switzerland has offered to provide them and other ME countries with enriched uranium solely for nuclear energy use. But you've got to do some digging to find out about that. All of these incentives are for Iran to agree to not create a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

Ken White
12-06-2007, 07:21 AM
I wrote a paper on it: "China, Iran, and the Nuclear Imperative (http://idolator.typepad.com/China_Iran.pdf)". You can read the chronology there. Ironically, the U.S. gave Iran it's first piece of nuclear hardware in the 1950's.
Used to live and work there and still communicate with friends and acquaintances from there (both here and there), so I was aware of all that. Fairly good summation though. Your earlier comment to which I responded I took to mean nuclear weapons had been sought for 50 years, I believe that 17 or 18 would be more nearly correct on that score.

Incentives were offered last year by Germany and other UNSC member nations. Russia has agreed to help them finish the Bushehr reactor. Switzerland has offered to provide them and other ME countries with enriched uranium solely for nuclear energy use. But you've got to do some digging to find out about that. All of these incentives are for Iran to agree to not create a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
Also more than aware of all that -- my point was and is, the NIE effectively changes almost nothing (all of those incentives pre-date and none are, thus far, impacted by the NIE). It certainly gives Iran no advantage, probably makes them wonder as stated and shows our Intel community isn't too bright (IMO).

The only minor advantage is that it takes Iran as a US domestic political pressure point away if its handled right -- and continues that dummy Bush's rather neat and successful plan to rope the next few Presidents into his plan for the ME et. al. -- and give he or she who is next a minor break (unless that person gets a second term... ;) )

I note that, like me, the IAEA is inclined to skepticism LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html?ex=1354510800&en=683c903c4e3a69dd&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss). That may have a larger impact on the future actions China and Russia than anything the US Intel community says... :D

Rex Brynen
12-06-2007, 12:38 PM
..when politicians and officials discuss sensitive methods and sources with and in the press? Sheeesh.

Details in Military Notes Led to Shift on Iran, U.S. Says (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/middleeast/06intel.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin)
NYT, 6 December 2007


WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 — American intelligence agencies reversed their view about the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program after they obtained notes last summer from the deliberations of Iranian military officials involved in the weapons development program, senior intelligence and government officials said on Wednesday.

wm
12-06-2007, 02:47 PM
I think the way that I'm looking at it is that the current Administration is more or less determined to bring the Iranians to heel, definitively, before it's out of office. That means either the Iranians do what Libya did, or the US will work them over real good. The Administration would prefer a diplomatic coalition, but I don't think that it believes that it is absolutely necessary. Politically, they have less to lose now and over the next several months by striking Iran, than they did if have had done so even as recently as six months ago.

I suspect that one of the strongest constraints upon an Administration decision, right now and perhaps for the time being, to strike Iran is not in the political realm, either diplomatically or with regards either to Congress or even public opinion, but from the military and from the intelligence services. There has been some very heavy opposition to Administration military plans, such as notions of putting up to 4 carriers in the Gulf (the 3-Star Admiral in the area put it almost bluntly to the Prez that there was no way more than 1 or 2 carriers were going to be in the Gulf and environs), and of course the intelligence services have been working hard to parry the Administration's thrusts for action against Iran for the past year or two (at least).

With the release of the 2007 NIE and the Administration's unequivocal response to it, it really does seem that there is, or will soon be, the political will and the decision made, to deal with Iran in a manner that is intended to be decisive in its results - one way or the other. I think that other political factors have actually lost some of their potency, as it seems increasingly clear that the Adminstration, having had the Intelligence Services strip away an imminent justification for immediate action, nevertheless came right out anyway and all but say that Iran will be dealt with. The clock may already be set and time's running out. It may take a lot to stop this.

I see the NIE as taking a US military option off the table--we no longer have the WMD card to play as we did to justify operations in Iraq. I further see the NIE as a way to "solve" the Iran problem that has been around ever since the Embassy takeover. The takeover and subsequent inability to rescue the hostages is a case of having been a "loss of manhood" issue for the conservative Republican power brokers ever since it happened. Dubya now has a chance to close the book on it and do the "one up on Dad and his cronies" thing that may also be part of the reason for OIF.

I'd watch for more making nice gestures between the two countries. Here's a possible playbook:
US apologizes for demonizing Iran as a budding nuclear power if Iran apologizes for violating American soveriegnty in the Embassy takeover. Iran calling the new NIE a victory is the first step in this process.
--Iran says:"See, we really aren't such bad guys, we 've been telling you all along that we weren't going to build nukes."
--US replies, "How about proving how nice you are by apologizing for that embassy thing back in 1978? We'll apologize for the nuke story if you apologize for holding Americans for so long. Okay?"
Every one then kisses and makes up.
The countries become best buds like back in the days of the Shah. (But, I think the likelihood of that actually happening is about the same as my hitting a Powerball lottery win.)

Norfolk
12-06-2007, 02:56 PM
I very much do hope you're right wm. The 2007 NIE certainly took the wind out of the sails of the WMD in the immediate future, but it also seems to me to provide a basis for the Administration to claim that action of one sort or another would be justified by the potential for Iran's intentions to change; it has the basis to develop an atomic-weapons capability.

I hope that more is forthcoming to bury any hopes of a strike on Iran, but given the Administration's defiant and strident response to the NIE, a lot more may be necessary to stop the adventurist urges here.

I do hope that your playbook, or something like it wm, is what in fact transpires. Until I see a follow-up by the Administration in that general direction, I still fear that another direction is intended.

It is interesting that Iran is relatively restrained in its responses, at the moment anyway. Let's see if the Administration is willing to entertain any would-be Iranian feelers.

tequila
12-06-2007, 02:57 PM
There are too many factions within the Administration and the Party base dedicated to eternal hostility to the Iranian theocracy for such warming measures to extend beyond the cosmetic.

Nonetheless, I agree that the release of the NIE has pretty much kneecapped this Administration's argument for military action against Iran. I mean, if even Bob Kagan is now arguing that we need to talk first before the inevitable bombing campaign, that's a significant shift.

Norfolk
12-06-2007, 02:58 PM
There are too many factions within the Administration and the Party base dedicated to eternal hostility to the Iranian theocracy for such warming measures to extend beyond the cosmetic.

Nonetheless, I agree that the release of the NIE has pretty much kneecapped this Administration's argument for military action against Iran. I mean, if even Bob Kagan is now arguing that we need to talk first before the inevitable bombing campaign, that's a significant shift.

And that's a good sign.

kehenry1
12-07-2007, 01:28 AM
I suspect that one of the strongest constraints upon an Administration decision, right now and perhaps for the time being, to strike Iran is not in the political realm, either diplomatically or with regards either to Congress or even public opinion, but from the military and from the intelligence services. There has been some very heavy opposition to Administration military plans, such as notions of putting up to 4 carriers in the Gulf (the 3-Star Admiral in the area put it almost bluntly to the Prez that there was no way more than 1 or 2 carriers were going to be in the Gulf and environs), and of course the intelligence services have been working hard to parry the Administration's thrusts for action against Iran for the past year or two (at least).

Um...isn't this more about the navy not wanting to commit too many resources in a restricted and restrictive battle space. Like putting them all in a bathtub. You could knock them out with a pea shooter. That's about strategic reserves, not about political policy.


With the release of the 2007 NIE and the Administration's unequivocal response to it, it really does seem that there is, or will soon be, the political will and the decision made, to deal with Iran in a manner that is intended to be decisive in its results - one way or the other. I think that other political factors have actually lost some of their potency, as it seems increasingly clear that the Adminstration, having had the Intelligence Services strip away an imminent justification for immediate action, nevertheless came right out anyway and all but say that Iran will be dealt with. The clock may already be set and time's running out. It may take a lot to stop this.

I've been thinking that all things are related and it is unlikely that we would have made these assumptions without other political and actual acts. NK pledges to shut down their uranium enrichment at Pyongyang and give US access to verify and dismantle. A nuclear site, either a reactor or weapons or materials, was bombed in Syria after Israeli fighters, probably with US assistance, negotiated the Russian made air defense system without one loss.

It is my position that our knowledge of this site and NKs involvement with the subsequent destruction, convinced NK to come to the table. Or, NK was in such bad economic and physical condition that they had to play ball and gave us the information and pledge for that assistance. Either way, it is likely that we gathered a lot more information on the nuclear situation in Iran and Syria and NKs involvement.

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 02:05 AM
Um...isn't this more about the navy not wanting to commit too many resources in a restricted and restrictive battle space. Like putting them all in a bathtub. You could knock them out with a pea shooter. That's about strategic reserves, not about political policy.

It was certainly about policy in so far as that the Administration (Cheney's speech in May to representatives of the Gulf States) had promised a deployment of 4 carrier groups in and around the Persian Gulf region in order to pressure Iran, and the local Navy commander basically said "no". This effectively prevented the required build-up of naval air power in the region necessary (4 carrier air groups, one of which was to be in the Red Sea) for anything other than rather minor operations, and effectively removed any military strike options that may have been afforded by carrier air power. One carrier air group doesn't cut it. Three or four can.

Ken White
12-07-2007, 02:11 AM
It was certainly about policy in so far as that the Administration (Cheney's speech in May to representatives of the Gulf States) had promised a deployment of 4 carrier groups in and around the Persian Gulf region in order to pressure Iran, and the local Navy commander basically said "no". This effectively prevented the required build-up of naval air power in the region necessary (4 carrier air groups, one of which was to be in the Red Sea) for anything other than rather minor operations, and effectively removed any military strike options that may have been afforded by carrier air power. One carrier air group doesn't cut it. Three or four can.

that's what occurred?

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 02:17 AM
that's what occurred?

I read about this during the late summer or early fall. I'll see if I can dig up the articles. Anyway, when the Admiral in the Gulf was told about this, he in turn told them that "there was no military need for more than 1-2 carriers" in the ME and environs; he repeated this to a journalist who interviewed him. I don't rmember his name, but the Admiral in question was the 3-Star in charge in the Gulf (in Bahrain I believe). Give me I bit and I'll see what I can dig back up.

Edit:

The name of the Admiral is Kevin J. Cosgriff...still searching...

Ron Humphrey
12-07-2007, 02:18 AM
Used to live and work there and still communicate with friends and acquaintances from there (both here and there), so I was aware of all that. Fairly good summation though. Your earlier comment to which I responded I took to mean nuclear weapons had been sought for 50 years, I believe that 17 or 18 would be more nearly correct on that score.

Also more than aware of all that -- my point was and is, the NIE effectively changes almost nothing (all of those incentives pre-date and none are, thus far, impacted by the NIE). It certainly gives Iran no advantage, probably makes them wonder as stated and shows our Intel community isn't too bright (IMO).

The only minor advantage is that it takes Iran as a US domestic political pressure point away if its handled right -- and continues that dummy Bush's rather neat and successful plan to rope the next few Presidents into his plan for the ME et. al. -- and give he or she who is next a minor break (unless that person gets a second term... ;) )

I note that, like me, the IAEA is inclined to skepticism LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html?ex=1354510800&en=683c903c4e3a69dd&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss). That may have a larger impact on the future actions China and Russia than anything the US Intel community says... :D

Looks like theres no small number of recievers trying to catch the ball either:D

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 02:50 AM
Sorry, it was Admiral Fallon himself who said that: I haven"t got the quote yet, but here's a look to partial info from EIR:

http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2007/3423hitler_1938.html

Go over halfway down - it says under the section of the article "Revolt of the US Generals" that Fallon - and I'm practically quoting the article here - is on public record as opposing a confrontation with Iran and that he petitioned Washington to send one of his two carriers back to the US as a third carrier was arriving in order to avoid creating more tension.

I'll get back when I've dug up more.

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 02:58 AM
Here's the piece on Admiral Fallon in May:

http://thinkprogress.org/2007/05/16/fallon-carrier/

Still working on the 4 carriers bit...found a blog mentioning it but it was referencing DEBKA File and I want something more solid.

Edit: Here's a fuller version of the piece from IPS itself:

http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=37738

Ken White
12-07-2007, 03:06 AM
Sorry, it was Admiral Fallon himself who said that: I haven"t got the quote yet, but here's a look to partial info from EIR:
. . .
I'll get back when I've dug up more.

Fallon is the CincCent; he came on board saying that, no surprise there. Fallon's job is to worry about the whole CentCom area, not just Iran or Iraq; he's got a big AO and a total force to worry about. He made a statement to the press -- that's not the same thing at all as "bluntly telling the Prseident." I can assure you that no Admiral is likely to do that (and that is why I questioned your Comment).

Cheney's speech in the Gulf was aboard the USS John C. Stennis (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051100572.html), not TO the Gulf States and that he said there were two CSGs there. There was a lot of idiotic garbage by the talking heads and in the lefty blogosphere about three or four CSGs but the incompetents in the media missed the fact that there was a long scheduled exercise plus a routine changeover underway (LINK) (http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2007/07/5th-fleet-focus-let-rotations-begin.html). Cosgriff took over fifth Fleet from Walsh last spring. I suspect he was alos asked by some clueless journalist how many carriers he needed and he answered the question -- I again suggest that is not the same thing as "...bluntly telling the President" -- which no Vice Admiral is likely to do ever.

Much ado about nothing... ;)

As for your fear that the Administration still intends to "do something about Iran," your prerogative. I suggest a simple way to enhance or degrade that fear, which ever you wish, is to read the US media who are relatively clueless and prone to promote panic to sell ad space to raise your fears or you can simply watch what the Administration does vice paying any attention to what any politician says to lessen that fear.

I suggest you take most stuff in the blogosphere with a dump truck full of salt as well; there's an appalling amount of ignorance out there that likes to pass itself off as informed comment and I'd take two truckloads to the Larouche site... :D

Added: or debka File. I could add a couple of others but I don't want to get SWJ in trouble :)

Personally, barring something really stupid from Ahmadinejad & Co, I'm not about to lose any sleep over it. :cool:

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 03:07 AM
As for the fourth carrier, the one that was to be sent to the Red Sea, here's another blog referencing DEBKA File:(: - it's about 2/3rds down the page.

http://www.bloggingthejihad.com/

I'll keep trying to find a better source for that one.

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 03:13 AM
Fallon is the CincCent; he came on board saying that, no surprise there. Fallon's job is to worry about the whole CentCom area, not just Iran or Iraq; he's got a big AO and a total force to worry about. He made a statement to the press -- that's not the same thing at all as "bluntly telling the Prseident." I can assure you that no Admiral is likely to do that (and that is why I questioned your Comment).

Cheney's speech in the Gulf was aboard the USS John C. Stennis (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051100572.html), not TO the Gulf States and that he said there were two CSGs there. There was a lot of idiotic garbage by the talking heads and in the lefty blogosphere about three or four CSGs but the incompetents in the media missed the fact that there was a long scheduled exercise plus a routine changeover underway (LINK) (http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2007/07/5th-fleet-focus-let-rotations-begin.html). Cosgriff took over fifth Fleet from Walsh last spring. I suspect he was alos asked by some clueless journalist how many carriers he needed and he answered the question -- I again suggest that is not the same thing as "...bluntly telling the President" -- which no Vice Admiral is likely to do ever.

Much ado about nothing... ;)

As for your fear that the Administration still intends to "do something about Iran," your prerogative. I suggest a simple way to enhance or degrade that fear, which ever you wish, is to read the US media who are relatively clueless and prone to promote panic to sell ad space to raise your fears or you can simply watch what the Administration does vice paying any attention to what any politician says to lessen that fear.

I suggest you take most stuff in the blogospher with a dump truck full of salt as well; there's an appalling amount of ignorance out there that likes to pass itself off as informed comment and I'd take two truckloads to the Larouche site... :D

Personally, barring something really stupid from Ahmadinejad & Co, I'm not about to lose any sleep over it. :cool:

Good thing you're around to keep young'uns like me in line, Ken.:D

wm
12-07-2007, 12:03 PM
Norfolk,
As Ken said, probably much more politely and elegantly, there's a lot of tripe out on the web masquerading as good information. Before you start to buy into the "reporting" by various websites, it probably would be a good idea to check on the axes they have to grind. When you consider that even the more respected publications of the MSM have editorial biases, finding distortion in the "free press" of the Web (AKA Blogosphere) ought not be too surprising. Consider this Time article (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1691241,00.html) as a counterpoint to your other sources.

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 02:49 PM
Norfolk,
As Ken said, probably much more politely and elegantly, there's a lot of tripe out on the web masquerading as good information. Before you start to buy into the "reporting" by various websites, it probably would be a good idea to check on the axes they have to grind. When you consider that even the more respected publications of the MSM have editorial biases, finding distortion in the "free press" of the Web (AKA Blogosphere) ought not be too surprising. Consider this Time article (http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1691241,00.html) as a counterpoint to your other sources.

I indeed stand corrected, wm.:o

And hopefully the article that you provided the link to is in fact the eulogy of the "strike Iran" movement.

Ken White
12-07-2007, 06:41 PM
vocalization of a number of folks who aren't nearly as bright as they they think they are -- and who will have absolutely no responsibility were that to occur. Idiots like that need careful watching lest they get out of control but one need not put much stock in what they say as being policy. Nor should one put much stock in the media reports that listen to those squirrels.

OTOH, the Administration -- this or any other -- has to say certain things in order to attempt to control things on a worldwide basis. Whether we like it or not, what the US does affects the whole world in many ways and every Admin has to be very aware of that and tailor what they say in public accordingly. In the case at issue, Bush has to tell Iran they're being dumb in his view and do that forcefully enough to have some credibility yet not so forcefully as to panic the world over yet another war. Hard line to balance upon... :o

Watch what happens, not what's said. I don't believe much I see in the media or on the web until I see it corroborated in at least three competing sources; it's all F6 initially. :D

Also have to remember that a Rifle Co moving down the road which receives fire almost always will report that they are receiving killing fire from a reinforced Regiment as well as air strikes and are taking massive casualties. Then, after everything gets sorted out, turns out it was about 20 guys with a couple of RPDs and a couple of RPGs -- and the "air strike" was one of the RPG gunners firing way high and they "massive casualties" are five men WIA. Initial reports are most generally overblown and most always inaccurate due to a logically and naturally confused situation, have to wait until all the info comes out and gets sorted. With most so-called news reports, that takes from a couple of weeks to a few months. :rolleyes:

selil
12-07-2007, 09:54 PM
Norfolk,
As Ken said, probably much more politely and elegantly, there's a lot of tripe out on the web masquerading as good information.

He some of us work hard on our tripe. It's specially seasoned and full of good vitamins. It will give you a manly physique and make you smarter too. Really.

If you want an interesting perspective on the US and Iran conflict ask a Persian. They're the people who are from Iran and when you call them an Arab they are truly offended and will correct you. They have a long memory and talk about how many thousands of years their family has been living in the same compound. I can't remember my last address. I was talking with an Iranian student and she said she was worried the war would last to long and she would have to skip going home this summer. I'm still processing that little bit of information.

Ken White
12-07-2007, 11:38 PM
He some of us work hard on our tripe. It's specially seasoned and full of good vitamins. It will give you a manly physique and make you smarter too. Really.

Of course, I'm living proof of that... :rolleyes:


If you want an interesting perspective on the US and Iran conflict ask a Persian. They're the people who are from Iran and when you call them an Arab they are truly offended and will correct you. They have a long memory and talk about how many thousands of years their family has been living in the same compound. I can't remember my last address. I was talking with an Iranian student and she said she was worried the war would last to long and she would have to skip going home this summer. I'm still processing that little bit of information.

Too true on the Empire, they really believe...

The student's thoughts typify 'em. They are deeply entwined with the past; the future -- most take the Alfred E. Newman approach; Be Omehdi Xoda. Got an acquaintance here whose family is there, in Mashad. Their plan is to got to Afghanistan until the war is over... :)

Norfolk
12-07-2007, 11:42 PM
Got an acquaintance here whose family is there, in Mashad. Their plan is to got to Afghanistan until the war is over... :)

Well, I used to joke about laying low in Detroit for a few days, but Afghanistan?:eek:

Ken White
12-07-2007, 11:59 PM
always impeccable... :D

In fairness, the western 'Stan is mostly Shia, speaks Farsi and Herat is pretty quiet. There are probably a couple of good Italian restaurants there now. ;)

Jedburgh
12-09-2007, 02:32 PM
This thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close this thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat.

New thread: NIE: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4491)

tranquill
07-27-2008, 11:34 AM
Israeli analyst*suggests turning nuclear Iran against Egypt.
He argues that Shia dominance is prefereable to the Sunni's.
See this: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/use-iran-against-egypt.htm

Rex Brynen
07-27-2008, 12:33 PM
Israeli analyst*suggests turning nuclear Iran against Egypt.
He argues that Shia dominance is prefereable to the Sunni's.
See this: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/use-iran-against-egypt.htm

As commented before (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=48873&postcount=7), samsonblinded.org falls into tin-foil-hat-territory--it is not a source that anyone should take seriously.

William F. Owen
07-27-2008, 02:09 PM
Israeli analyst*suggests turning nuclear Iran against Egypt.
He argues that Shia dominance is prefereable to the Sunni's.
See this: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/use-iran-against-egypt.htm

I very doubt he or she is even Israeli. Most of the unacceptably racist views held by the Zionist extreme right wing are held by those who don't actually live in Israel.

As Rex Brynen correctly points out, samsonblinded.org are a bunch of hate-mongering extremists, vastly at odds with the majority of Israeli society.

Presley Cannady
09-25-2009, 03:08 AM
...Israeli aircraft have made their way to Iran and taken out their targets.

What happens next...?

jcustis
09-25-2009, 03:43 AM
Rockets resume raining down on the border area, from within Lebanon.

Zack
09-25-2009, 04:09 AM
Public dissent within Iran vanishes.

watchful1
09-25-2009, 04:09 AM
Iranians lay mines in the Strait of Hormuz

Schmedlap
09-25-2009, 04:12 AM
A bunch of unemployed Arabs take to the streets in Mideast cities chanting death to Israel and a bunch of unemployed Americans take to the streets in US cities, holding up placards that blame it on Bush.

Zack
09-25-2009, 04:13 AM
Shoot Sunburns and such at tankers

watchful1
09-25-2009, 04:19 AM
Financial markets open and oil starts heading towards $100 barrel, insurance rates sky rocket for tanker and cargo ships in the gulf

Rex Brynen
09-25-2009, 09:59 AM
I'm not convinced that Hizbullah retaliates on Iran's behalf--it would do the organization political damage in Lebanon to be seen to be acting so clearly at Tehran's best, and so clearly at odds with Lebanese national interests. It might in the event of a sustained Israeli air campaign, rather than a one-off attack.

Israeli embassies (or Jewish community centres) explode? Similar sorts of attacks? Possibly.

Mining the Straits? Very much depends on the size of the strike, and whether it is seen as a one-off or a continued campaign.

Shahb 3s fired at Israel (possibly even at Dimona)? Certainly possible, although they're not likely to hit anything.

Much also depends on whether the US is seen as complicit. In the latter case, we might see sponsored attacks against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly even opening of a major arms/money/logistical pipeline to the Taliban, notwithstanding past Iranian-Taliban (and Shiite/Sunni) differences.

Major commitment of Iranian resources to construct a nuclear weapon, and develop other retaliatory capacities? Fairly likely. Indeed, one of the key arguments against an Israeli strike is that it actually increases the long-term probability of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

davidbfpo
09-25-2009, 10:03 AM
Bad news: the mission fails and hits a girls school. Two Israeli pilots are captured and appear on TV. One Israeli plane crashes in Afghanistan and a tanker crashes in Saudi Arabia. Unlikely? Yes, could one scenario happen? Yes.

davidbfpo

Fuchs
09-25-2009, 10:10 AM
Iran calls for a condemnation by the UNSC and exposes the U.S. veto as partisanship.

Domestic opposition would likely be much reduced for about two years (not long enough for next election).

Russia would probably be irritated because it's now in the boat for some political pressure for the same goal.

Russian air defence system exports would rise, probably French ones as well.

The CIA will expect additional backlash for the next 20 years, and it may depend on publicized opinions at whom this backlash will be directed.

slapout9
09-25-2009, 01:51 PM
3 luxury cruise ships are attacked with guided sea skimming missiles off the coast of Israel. 2 sink 1 is badly damaged. Causalities are huge, long term effect on Israeli tourism is huge.

tequila
09-25-2009, 02:11 PM
Would the Iraqis grant overflight privileges for Israeli aircraft?

Now of our two allies, obviously we will choose Israelis over Iraqis, but I wonder at the political consequences in Iraq if (when) we reject an Iraqi request to enforce control of Iraqi airspace to escort Israeli aircraft out of it.

Bob's World
09-25-2009, 02:29 PM
King of Saudi Arabia celebrates the news and congratulates himself on his ability to keep his greatest enemy in check through a very sophisticated application of the Indirect Approach; leveraging America's addiction to his oil and their equally mind befuddling degree of support for Israel to continue to manipulate such overt action against Iran without having to get his hands dirty.

Most Americans and Israelis remain oblivious to the subtle manipulations of the Saudis to keep the heat burning between the US and Iran; Similarly the Iranian populace also focuses their anger on the US and Israel as well.

Big winners:
The current government of Iran, as they regain lost ground with their populace; and support of Muslim populaces in general
The Government of Saudi Arabia, as their perception as the "good Arabs" is enhnaced in the West, and their greatest local threat is atritted.
Bin Laden, as his rhetoric receives validation, helping him to gain inroads with frustrated Shia Muslims as well as his primary Sunni audiance.

Normalization between Iran and US is delayed another 10 years; Hezbollah attacks against Israel increase; and Iran ramps up efforts to attain a nuclear capability to prevent this from happening again.