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Jedburgh
01-05-2010, 01:08 PM
CNAS, 4 Jan 09: Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf)

Mod's Note the title of this thread was changed in 2012 to MG Flynn, Fixing Intel so Relevant in Afghanistan & beyond and in January 2015 was charged to MG Flynn (on intell mainly) (ends).


This paper, written by the senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan and by a company-grade officer and a senior executive with the Defense Intelligence Agency, critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself – from a focus on the enemy to a focus on the people of Afghanistan. The paper argues that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.....

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 04:55 PM
Jedburgh:

I read this yesterday and, for the first time, said to myself, "Eureka!"

Somebody was getting closer to the problems and solutions.

Having served in that capacity on an ad hoc basis in Northern Iraq for a year, it was nice to see that somebody is finally getting it---the need to synthesize a reasonable and cohesive picture across all the bands and boundaries.

On my first arrival in Iraq in December 2007, I started data gathering---only to find out how little anyone knew, or, if somebody did have a nugget, it all too often later proved to be of little value---especially the stuff I got from Baghdad and hauled up to Tikrit.

Start with the most basic elements:

I obtained three different provicial/district maps from US sources---on close analysis (which is what I do), I found that most of the boundaries and lines were different, and or inconsistent/irrational. Looked great printed on big official colorful maps, but, for example, How could the District boundaries of Bayji District in Salah ad Din not actually include the district capital, Bayji, which was shown as part of Tikrit District? How could parts of Taji, extending all the way into Baghdad, be part of Salah ad Din?

So I started collecting population data---just basic stuff like how many people in each province and district. Everybody had data, but, if you put them side by side, they were all different, and some were so way-wrong as to be foolish. How could there be either 200,000, 300,000 or 450,000 people in the walled enclosure of Samarra? It had to be one number or another.

Why did this kind of basic stuff matter?

First, if you didn't know where the provincial and district boundaries were, how could you build civilian capacity, align US civ/mil activities to civilian government, know who was supposed to be (or become) in charge?

Second, if you didn't know whether there were 200,000 or 450,000 people in Samarra, how could you plan and resource anything credible---civ or mil?

It was in the Odyssey that followed---collecting the right information---that I learned so much of why we were stumbling around for so long. Especially when you returned to the states and saw so much of the contracted intel---tribal maps, etc...---that were, too often, not worth the paper they were printed on. Or worse, the windshield "Humint" stuff "collected" by some PhD staring out the grimy window of a gun truck...

All too often, I found that folks in the field distrusted most of it, and for damned good reasons---but not having a clear picture left a lot to be desired, and precluded, in many instances, rapid and effective comprehensive strategies. (Iraq: Six years, one year at a time; A whole country, one battlespace at a time)

When I was re-targeted to the UN DIBS Team in August 2008, we began a systemmatic assessment of the disputed internal boundaries, and all the very successful COIN strategies which Sadaam had employed for twenty-five years---mass resettlements, genocide, town destruction, tribal and factional cooptation, etc....

Simply mapping and documenting that whole history was instructive---certainly, studying the ruthless and effective Sadaam Campaign, modelled directly on the "successful" British stuff, gives me a very uncomfortable perspective on many of the happy-talk COINISTA perspectives (it is about power). But it also laid bare most of the problems and potential solutions---not the windshield crap coming out of DC.

Why were we stumbling around so long getting hit high and low from problems we didn't understand and enemies that were unforeseen? I don't know all the answers, but I saw the path to them....

A few months ago, I started a blog about Afghan national population counts. Between input from Entropy and others, we settled on numbers far below the published figures of 33.6 million---around 25 instead. Then the CIA Factbook---oracle that it is---made a major revision. Instructive to me was not the revision, but the explanation: The figures had been developed by a desk jockey in the Census Bureau from old 1970's Era data projected forward. Here we are in a big war, and the best we know about the place is from outdated data projected forward by a Census Bureau deskjockey.

No wonder...

Now, at least, an authoritative group on the inside has laid out some of the basics.

A good start after a decade in this business.

Steve

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 05:44 PM
The AFP story quotes MG Flynn:

"Major General Michael Flynn, the top NATO and US military intelligence chief in Afghanistan, said US-led forces in Afghanistan were "so starved" of accurate intelligence "many say their jobs feel more like fortune telling.""

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gb9QsgaMhfRQHDczFC7AtcHP8fnw

This article, more than anything, pounds home the points:


US intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency said Flynn's report, released by a Washington think-tank.


A failure to understand who the local Afghan powerbrokers are and ignorance of local economics and landowners had contributed to "hazy" knowledge, said the report on the website of the Center for a New American Security."

What Sadaam had, which made his operation work, was a huge network of intel and controlsinto every aspect of Iraqi life. Between the census data, and and formally adopted political governance structures, nothing got past central view.

One of the key things I was working on was development of a civilian declassified GIS system for Iraqi civ use. In the process, I worked with their internal census data, made based on UN guidelines.Even in 1990s, they knew every bongo truck, camel, irrigation ditch, well and internet cafe in the Country. They had maps of every major business, infrastructure component, and more often than not, the owners and associated details about each. Their land and tax records accounted for everybody and everything.

So, while we were stumbling blindly, it was all there.

What we were trying, and largely succeeded at doing in 2008, was not just pop/pol mapping, but basic infrastructure, industry, value chains, and trade patterns. Answering stupid questions like how much asphalt and cement capacity exists in a regionial critical, too, in determining how much reconstruction (especially for roads and bridges) can occur within available supporting resources. Dumb stuff, but critical.

I sat through a briefing earlier this year where a group had been trying to glean tribal/familial relationships in Iraq. I shook my head: They were trying to read tea leaves and fortunes while the Iraqi land records showed everybody by name, and every piece of property, and we had already digitized most of the cadestral/property records, so it would have just taken a push of a button to reconcile names/families/tribes to actual properties; from their, any kind of regionalized data analysis would have been easy.

The only gap, then, would be to field reckon the changes between pre-and post-occupation (resettlements, refugees), which, of itself was a driving measure of instability... Lots of accurate, easy targeting to do.

In Iraq, they didn't have computerization, so they put everything on maps and hand-written records. The Ottomans had started that, then the Brits refined it, and the UN in the 1990's taught the mastery of it---basic enterprise accounting and management by the numbers.

Afghanistan does, in fact, have a history of UN training, and some systems, like the Afghan Census agency (and UNDP), that follow that field. But, I suspect that for most places, the "shadow" has it all in his head, and doesn't need our technological approaches---but we do, if we are to out-maneuver him.

Fortune-telling will not work in defeating the Shadow.

Steve

Entropy
01-05-2010, 06:00 PM
Haven't read this entirely yet, but I have some problems with the introduction:


The paper argues that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.

and:


Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the cor-
relations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.

Oh boy, where to begin, especially with that second part.

CENTCOM and ISAF/USFOR-A Commanders set guidance with respect intelligence through their PIR's (priority intelligence requirments). PIR's are what drive intelligence collection and analysis. They tell the intelligence function what information a Commander requires in order to conduct the operations he/she wants to conduct. Higher priority requirements naturally receive the majority of collection and intelligence support.

PIR specifics obviously can't be discussed in an open forum, but let me suggest that one reason the intel community is "unable" to answer those questions is because it hasn't been directed to answer them. Anyone with SIPR or JWICS access can read the Commander's PIR's for themselves and what one will find is that the PIR's today are not substantially different from what they were five years ago.

In many ways, however, I do agree with the criticisms in that we are institutionally ignorant of some of the fundamentals. I know that I've personally tried to educate myself to at least address my personal deficits, but without institutional guidance from Commanders and policymakers the system isn't going to respond.

Entropy
01-05-2010, 06:22 PM
One more thing. We don't know about the economics, landowners and who the powerbrokers are at the local level because there is currently little capability to collect such information, even assuming there is a definitive answer (ie. who "owns" land is often in dispute). We haven't (and still don't) have the forces to spend time with locals to learn this information, we have a huge (and probably enduring) language deficit, and we continually run into the problem where Afghan expertise is, at best, biased and at worst, completely compromised. This is why much of our intelligence in this area is based on acadmic work, much of it historical. All the analysts in the world cannot overcome a collection deficit, nor the fact that Afghanistan, until recently, has played second fiddle to Iraq in terms of resources.

I'm going to read this today - hopefully it addresses these issues in depth.

IntelTrooper
01-05-2010, 06:36 PM
Entropy:

I think we're of a similar mind on a lot of this (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/changes-to-intelligence-missio/#comment-6474), though I applaud that a CJ2 is taking interest in the process to this extent.

I too, think commanders and prior S/G/J-2s are to be held accountable for not asking the right questions. PIRs were either nonsensical or simple-minded when I was in theater last year.

Also, I do have some trouble with fielding hordes of "analysts" who are also collecting while there is a simultaneous collection effort by HCTs, HETs, HATs, and other agencies. Perhaps they will refine the roles of properly trained HUMINT collectors to continue focusing on targeting while these "analysts" focus on more readily available information. I hope that is the case, because we were constantly pulled in every direction.

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 06:42 PM
Entropy:

Right. It is the system, and it is tactically driven.

The gap really underscores my on-going criticism of the Humint effort, too heavy on anthropology, and devoid of the basic background studies needed to understand the problems and solutions.

Myself and a group of NGA staff in Baghdad last summer could have written the same report, about a critical background problem that has been in our faces for at least a few years now.

Social sciences include basic geography, geology, economic, market and infrastructure information, demography and demographics (actually two materially different specialties), history, ... and anthropology.

We do not have the basic suite of tools for Afghanistan that would be a bedrock for any routine public administration functions---including analysis and planning. Why? Who is responsible?

Well, we can point to the stripping bare of US State and USAID in the 1960s-2000s as one answer, and to the fact that CIA, too, seems to be tactical, and not strategic. That defines the problem, but not the solution.

The bottom line of Humint was, as I understood it, supposed to be that we understood that the US no longer that strategic, background framework which the DoD knew it would need in these new missions. So, where is the product? When is it going to be created? Can't Humint or NSC jump on this immediately? Can't ISAF staff, and or direct an immediate solution (as you have described)?

In the field, and here, I find so many people reluctant to use US background data, and I agree. The stuff they get from the present system isn't worth the paper its printed on, let alone the millions spent for it.

But, as this report notes, the problem is not fixed.

I believe the recommendations are a good first step, but wisdom cannot be gained by scurrying from one place to another. Somebody has to take charge of and focus on establishing a background framework of what is needed, assign people with the appropriate training and wisdom to pursue and collect it, then compile it, and use it for immediate actionable results. The RC levels are the right place, linked both higher and lower.

But a lot of this work, from experience, could be better done stateside as long as it is directed and closely linked to the field.

If, like the DoS Civilian Reconstruction Corps, it becomes a bureaucracy in evolution that, at best, creates demonstration projects, the effort will be wasted. MG Flynn needs to target, resource, and direct it---now---or it will not happen.

Steve

wm
01-05-2010, 07:03 PM
Why do three members of the DoD have to use a Think Tank for publishing their analysis. I seem to remember a huge furor within the last year (AUG 09 IIRC) when their boss made comments about a broken system/strategy for ops in that region in a poublic forum in the UK.

Jason Port
01-05-2010, 07:09 PM
The issue in my tactical brain is that we have again brought in "help" from on high, when in fact, we have enough brain power on the ground to conduct the "analysis" that the paper talks about. In the case before us, we have analysts who will visit the tactical level to do collection - interviews of the ground forces. However, in a country the size of texas, we have a large number of troops all of whom have key data to the solution. Asking these analysts to fly around Afghanistan and interview these folks will only place a dent in the collection problem while increasing the helicopter mission requirements, likely taking them away from supporting tactical forces.

This issue is further compounded by the fact that all data in Afghanistan is contextual (like elsewhere, but maginified by the very specific and intensive tribal differences.) Sending an analyst to cover Helmand province one week and another the next may result in very skewed reporting. Like sending the Dallas reporter to cover the Philadelphia Eagles training camp and expecting unbiased reports.

In addition, this will not solve the larger investigative questions like project data and other information that requires longer term collection efforts. I think the paper talks about how many telephone poles are in a given area - shows infratstructure improvement - but there is no way a visiting analyst will capture that. In turn, we would need to get boots out on the ground to conduct these surveys.

Therefore, we need to get a real solution in place - one which allows us to capture information (whatever available information there is) right from the source - the warfighter. Feed these troops managed, real, and beneficial IRs from the commander, prioritized based on timeliness of the needs (rather than the 100 most important questions of the day). This information needs to be managed and stored and shared to these analysts as well as back down to the lowest echelons.

And after 4 years of screaming this message, we are still trying to force help from above (and after 4 years, I know the warfighter wants less help and just better requirements to respond to. . . )

IntelTrooper
01-05-2010, 07:27 PM
The issue in my tactical brain is that we have again brought in "help" from on high, when in fact, we have enough brain power on the ground to conduct the "analysis" that the paper talks about.

I think the problem is and has been that far too many tasks demand the attention of the troops, and without an infrastructure and reporting system, not to mention people to maintain the records, that vital information has repeatedly been collected, reported, and lost.

In multiple meetings with government officials, village elders, etc., I was chastized as I ran down my list of questions -- "Every time a new one of you shows up, you ask us these same questions. Why don't you record this information somewhere, or why don't the people before you tell you about this?" It was incredibly embarassing to get schooled by rural Afghans, who have little understanding of the complexities of our ridiculous bureaucracy, and still understood that we were lacking this minor capacity.



Asking these analysts to fly around Afghanistan and interview these folks will only place a dent in the collection problem while increasing the helicopter mission requirements, likely taking them away from supporting tactical forces.

I think the helicopter thing was a selling point for higher-ups, not neccessarily a realistic scenario. What I took away that instead of being static as part of the battalion or brigade headquarters, that these analysts could spend time in their assigned area of expertise. I hope that's the case.



Sending an analyst to cover Helmand province one week and another the next may result in very skewed reporting. Like sending the Dallas reporter to cover the Philadelphia Eagles training camp and expecting unbiased reports.

My understanding was that analysts would be tasked geographically, so someone working on Helmand would only work on Helmand.



In addition, this will not solve the larger investigative questions like project data and other information that requires longer term collection efforts. I think the paper talks about how many telephone poles are in a given area - shows infratstructure improvement - but there is no way a visiting analyst will capture that. In turn, we would need to get boots out on the ground to conduct these surveys.

I agree that using these analysts as collectors is not a good solution and that the troops need to be collecting the information. Again, I'm hoping that the real difference here will be having someone assigned and responsible to track and maintain these types of records for an extended period, rather than just getting assignments to collect information on a whim of the PRT S-2 or battalion S-3, which they eventually forget and all the collected information disappears into the ether.

Hacksaw
01-05-2010, 07:28 PM
I couldn't agree more that at the tactical level... it is more about arming a patrol with the right/managable IRs/questions than it is getting some data dump from on high... and to be honest from on valley to the next the questions may very well differ...

However, because of that nature... how do you/can you aggregate those data points into a coherent larger picture? and does it even make sense to do so??? Of course that begs the question and obsession with metrics of success because that is how "policy/strategy" has been quantified... ugh its enough to make the head hurt...

However I will say this... even though a series of local optimized solutions doesn't always add up to a perfect "big picture" outcome, its not a bad start... and all those PLT-sized local solutions are within the means of a company commander to integrate, and CO-sized for a BN to integrate, yada yada yada...

Am I wrong, but I've been under the impression that much of the junior officer and mid to junior grade NCO ranks have largely added this ability to their personal kit bag? I have far more faith in the ability of CO-level leaders and operations to get their piece of Aghanistan straight, than I do some top down effort... I'd think we (the Coalition) could live with that outcome...

now that i've spun myself into the ground I will end

"Inconceivable"
"I do not think that means what you think that means"

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 08:14 PM
First, as many have noted, and I found in Iraq, most of the information, or the brain power and boots, was already there for big pieces of immediate solutions---they just needed to be drawn out and consolidated.

Second, drilling down for fine details in any region is at least a six month focused effort at teaching people and establishing links for what you are looking for---then it starts to feed together.

In MND-North, it took about three months, as a side project by DivEng/Terrain/CA to assemble a complete map and assessment of most individual infrastructure sectors. Then, you could understand the context of activities.

But some immediate sectors and problems--roads and bridges, electrical, etc..---where already there--just needed to be brought together, assessed on a coordinated basis---and used.

Putting the stuff together from on high would just be more of the same GIGO. It needs to be consolidated through networks of contacts up and down before people believe in it, use it, and feed it to make it work even better.

It is an information system, and a dynamic one. Just tracking populations, is a real-time thing which has to be coordinated with UN refugee trackers, and real-time field work. Using Now Zad as an example, the population has ranged from 30,000 to zero to maybe 3,000 in a year. If you are going to plan mil or civ activities, you need some clue of now, not then.

What was beautiful about the Sadaam Era systems, like those of any good totalitarian dictatorship or our techno-data, by knowing what was, what is, and what is changing, you can start to identify trends and patterns, chart trading systems (instead of stumbling across seven tractor trailer loads of pot), and finding where the key points are for whatever kind of targeting.

It's a process that has to link to the field, be dynamic, grow organically, and become useful and trusted. Otherwise, it is just another contract or a program.

In civilian planning and public adminstration, we use real-time, field tested stuff. The US needs at least some proxy of rough but actionable systemic data to see bigger pictures. None yet.

Steve

Woland
01-05-2010, 09:21 PM
I've not got time now to properly look at which of Gen Flynn's conclusions could be applied to the British, but a quick browse suggests 'lots.' It is so fundamentally important that this kind of introspection is taking place. Perhaps I'm pessimistic, but it's difficult to see the British military carrying out such rigorous and critical self review so publicly, irrespective of how much it might be needed.

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 09:34 PM
Woland:

No offense, but while I was in Baghdad (both for US and UN), I was hard-wired to US Terrain, NGA, etc...

But the one guy that guy that was always on my heels about maps, pop studies, etc... was the top British pol-mil---on duty, off-duty, we were always joined at the hip.

Brits understand maps. Whether they could use what they knew to shape or improve the US effort is an entirely different matter. What is emerging from the British Iraq hearings is what I expected---they had a hard time engaging the US on a meaningful level.

Steve

Entropy
01-05-2010, 09:43 PM
Ok, I've read the piece now and there is some good and bad. I can't comment extensively at present so, for now, some bullet points:


1. The Good: I liked the focus on Commander responsibility and the fact that Commanders set intelligence requirements. The bad: If Commanders are responsible for intelligence and if they are not, as the authors seem to indicate, providing proper guidance to support COIN, then why all the negative waves at the intel community? One example of many: "The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign." The intelligence community fell into that trap? Who is the tail and who is the dog here?

2. The Good: The report does a good job identifying many of the systemic problems. The Bad: Most solutions offered are unnecessary reinventions of the wheel. Example: Bandwidth should not be an issue for transmitting narrative reports from the field - you can't tell me we don't have the bandwidth to transmit a few pages of text daily.

Even if there is no bandwidth available, there are more efficient ways to get info from the field than sending people out to collect it by hand. We used to do this before we had all these fancy intel IP-based networks. You pop a disc into the theater mail system, or you mail actual paper containing written or typed reports! We can get stairmasters out to BFE Nuristan but we can't get a disc or some paper to HHQ without sending someone out to collect it? I don't buy it.

Additionally, we don't need a massive proprietary database to store information - all we need is info posted in web format and accessible by a search tool like google (and regardless, the best tools are made by enterprising junior folks in-house). All one needs to do is provide every unit a web-space where they can upload their text reports and any images (with metadata!) - search engine spiders will take care of the rest.

Alternatively, we already have wiki's that are ready to use but remain are largely unused and maintained by a few evangelists - mostly on their own time. To turn them into information clearing houses, all that's required is one order to institutionalize them along with a small staff of editors & researchers to maintain it.

3. The Good: "Information centers" focused on "white" information. The bad: The paper says these need too be staffed by civilians. How is ISAF/USFOR-A going to get national agencies to cough up the bodies and buy-in to this idea? Does the military really need outside analysts, over which it will have no operational control, to analyze and disseminate information derived from military units on the ground?

The biggest take-a-away issue I get from this paper is the lack of information sharing. This IS a real problem and information at the lowest levels is not shared or retained. Inteltrooper - your anecdote about meetings with locals and asking the same questions is no surprise to me and is an illustrative example of this. It just seems to me that is an easy fix - hold Commander's accountable for sharing information up the chain to senior Commanders and HHQ and provide a proven, existing and easy way to help them do so. Structural solutions that require buy-in from agencies outside the military are unnecessary and ill-advised. This is one area where KISS can go a long way.

davidbfpo
01-05-2010, 09:52 PM
Well I enjoyed reading the CNAS report, forthright in places, without attributing blame or responsibility - perhaps another version within DoD calls for an explanation? I noted that the youngest officer is an ex-journalist, that aside I could not understand why it had been published by CNAS.

The "solutions" suggested were not convincing. Yes, they may provide lots of required and supplied information from collectors. Will this be manageable and converted into providing context and insight? I am not convinced from my faraway "armchair". 'Reach back' can work, a weakness will be that do these analysts really know the context?

My experience is that setting requirements for intelligence is rarely done, so the "experts" do what they consider is appropriate - hence the all too frequent criticism that intelligence is a "black hole". Providing a simple, robust search engine for basic information retrieval is vital: names, photos, phones, addresses and vehicles.

BayonetBrant
01-05-2010, 09:59 PM
PIRs are supposed to be tied to decision points: "I need to know this so I can decide A or B". How many of the PIRs out there actually do that, or are just "things to wake up the commander for" like the death of a soldier?
(Note: I'm not trying to minimize the death of any of our soldiers, just pointing out that it's likely not a PIR that's tied to a decision point within the context of an operation)


Additionally, the understanding of the environment and area in which people operate won't happen when we rotate units every 6-9 months, and rotate them back to different areas within the country, or different countries altogether. No one wants to advocate for longer tours, but that's probably what's actually needed for Joe-on-the-ground to really get a good understanding of his environment.


Finally, many of the digital toys that would support this level of information collection, management, sharing, and visualization already exist, but are held up in some form of contracting, development, certification, documentation, or outright miscommunication process within the current commands trying to get involved in the fight. Not everything can (or should) get dumped into CIDNE and there's a lot of information that could be disseminated that's not because of bureaucratic hold-ups.


Sigh. I'm depressed now.

Steve the Planner
01-05-2010, 10:40 PM
Entropy's comments:

Agree. Bandwidth ain't the issue. Even in Iraq, we were flying maps and DVDs around in helos. But basic stuff like large-format scanners were a huge whole, especially when we were trying to quickly borrow, scan and return sensitive stuff from the civilian side (yes, they have sensitive stuff too).

As a "blue badger" (DoS), I can assure you that that blue badge allowed me to cross many more boundaries than a DoD or mil badge could. Military folks felt comfortable passing on stuff that they couldn't float upward very easily, and civilians, including Iraqis in sensitive positions, and with important data, would not engage with.

As many people know, CIDNE has a great many holes (including Legacy data), and, as BayonetBrant pointed out, RIPTOAs are killers of data, when the computers are shipped away with all that good stuff on them.

What is needed is not a map, or a data source, but a data system--- a process to collect, update, and use current and valuable stuff. That's not going to come from an outside contractor, or just be tied to a rotational element or command.

It is something else. But the framework and templates already exist---they just need to be focused on this purpose. Example: NGA Country Teams go back and forth all the time on six month rotations---same folks, same work, same continuous links to the same mapping data. Some of thjem can get as much if not more work (of certain types) done in Bethesda than at Baghram, but they need a continuous feeder system back to Afghanistan to make it work.

NGA is one of those many agencies with the capability to tackle some pieces, but not all. It's something else.

Steve

BayonetBrant
01-06-2010, 02:35 PM
What is needed is not a map, or a data source, but a data system--- a process to collect, update, and use current and valuable stuff. That's not going to come from an outside contractor, or just be tied to a rotational element or command.

....

NGA is one of those many agencies with the capability to tackle some pieces, but not all. It's something else.

http://defense-update.com/features/2009/october/mapht_141009.html
http://mapht.org/

Steve the Planner
01-06-2010, 05:38 PM
BayonetBrant:

I'm still trying to figure out how to figure this out.

I spent two months in 08 listening to the drumbeat for CIDNE---the magical all-purpose elixir. Then, it gets to Iraq, and needs to be populated---it's like a GIS system with no shapefiles. Then the population problems.... Then the transitional control problems (iraqi turnover?). Then....

Now, we move to a new, and no doubt, very expensive mapht. Go figure?

Starts to sound like USAID. Why solve a problem if you can just let a contract.

OK. OK. HT is the way forward. Wasn't that the message a few years ago? So where's the result?

OK. It's complicated, and will take many years (strategic patience). Ok, but where's the path, what's the schedule? How many years? Who has the plan?

Is it so complicated that we can't have a plan until later?

It always seems to come back to the same old anthropological/tribal stuff but no hard data, no focused background information. Tactics. Tactics. Strategy requires something else.

I had a few interactions with people involved in the big review. Like MG Flynn describes, they were looking for normal and typical hard data, and nobody had it---fortune telling.

Then the double-barrels from UN and CSIS (Cordesman: Winning battles, losing the war). All of them need something more than: "It's complicated!"

And not just for us, but for the Afghans. A colleague send me the news about the 4 kids killed today; 80 injured. Real and focused answers are needed by everybody else. Or the mission will not be able to continue. (Just the facts of life).

I truly hope that Fixing Intel means more than "do more of what we have been doing."

Was it a call for something different, or just do the same better? Was it a path to better answers: How to be ahead of problems rather than just reactive?

I guess that's what we'll find out soon enough.

Steve

BayonetBrant
01-06-2010, 06:46 PM
To me the biggest thing that intel supports is making the right decisions at the right times for the right reasons to create the right effects.

Blow stuff up? We know the calculus on that.

Population-centric warfare, where the population is not an inherent component of the enemy, but the environment in which he operates? I'm not sure we know what the "right" effects are, and some of the answers that we're pretty sure are right we (honestly) don't have the stomach for.


Until we know what the right effects are, we can't begin to define what tools can be used to create those effects.

Until we know what tools we can use, we don't know what the contraints are within which we can operate.

Until we know what the constraints are, we don't know what information we do/don't need to make the right decisions on implementation of tools for the purposes of creating the effects we desire.


Someone *really* needs to start with the effects and work backwards from that.


The Map-HT tools are a set of population-focused tools that are designed to offer a robust picture of the "green COP" and not just an S2/S3 'maneuver-focused' SITREP. There's a lot more that can be handled in that toolkit and it colors shades of gray for the commander quite nicely. More to the point - it forces the collectors/assessors to spend time digging for real information to support the non-kinetic analysts rather than just rolling into town and counting AK47s on a drive-by basis. It gets the non-kinetic questions out of the S2's hands and into the S9 where they belong.

All that said, until you can answer the questions about effects, it's just collecting data to collect data, so that criticism is spot-on.

Steve the Planner
01-06-2010, 07:13 PM
Eloquent answer beyond: It's complicated.

Effects on the land and people---I think that starts with the ways to define and differentiate the land and people---then to start thinking about how to model effects on them.

I think one of the gaps, which the military only has to do as the force of last result, is to now look at what is beyond the conflict issues.

We saw today in the kids killed and injured what many people have talked about as a challenge to typical COIN practices. Troops bring conflict. How does that get factored into obvious effects?

Also, sometimes troops bring population displacement.

Talk on another thread about safe zones and refugee areas. Do those get factored in before conflict? Are they a critical component of winning hearts and minds while not losing population? Is there a process? (Warn. Resettle. Clear. Rebuild. Repopulate. Hold.)

I keep watching the metric of 6.5 million in schools and growing. What are they going to do when they graduate? Better educated opponents, or a central part of the solution? (Tick. Tick. Tick.)

There was a poultry processing plant in Tikrit, and every new deployment would bring folks who spent US dollars trying to restart it (for the supposed thousands of jobs), but it wasn't going to work until you restarted agriculture. I sure as hell hope that these kids can be uptrained to be the Johnny Appleseeds instead of, every year, another deployment of US ag teams.

Be nice to understand the framework and processes of sequenced job evolution before what the UN calls the Ticking Time Bomb (one million per year graduating form school).

Those big factors are, I believe, the more critical gap that is separating us from a clear picture. Lots of bits around to assemble, but bits don't make strategy.

Etc...

Steve the Planner
01-06-2010, 10:06 PM
Cross-posted from the Sanctuary Thread:

Beetle:

Major Madera does a great job in providing an overview of CIMS -Civilian Information Managament Systems as:

demographics, economics, social constructs, political processes, political leaders, civil-military relationships, infrastructure notes, non-state actors in the area of operations, civil defense, public safety and public health capabilities, the environment.31 In short, CIMS capture the sort of information that paints a clear picture of the ecology of insurgency.

If he were updating this 2006 paper, I would suggest that he add: cadestral/property ownership (What MG Flynn calls out), and the basic topo, soil type and hydro data sets for cursory reconstruction/manuever stuff.

In Iraq, we used roads and bridges (with identification of the agency responsible for the component-state, provincial, local), ag components (the whole value chain for each applicable sector), reconstruction assets (asphalt & cement plants), major industrial/economic components, and important government activities (schools, clinics)/repair facilities.

Other special purpose maps "might" have included appointed/elected official's homes (for a variety of reasons).

Key thing in Iraq and Afghanistan, where UN demographics were used, was to set up shape files for each census boundary, even if political boundaries may have changed since. Important to, is to integrate real time, refugee, and pop displacements best estimates whenever you can suck them in.

As much as you can get whenever you can get it.

I'll cross post this on the Fixin's thread.

Steve

Citation from SurferBeetle:

"From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve"

Pete
01-06-2010, 11:48 PM
Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

Entropy
01-07-2010, 12:32 AM
Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

I don't have a problem with publishing an article, but this wasn't just an article - it was also an order which, to me, is extraordinary.

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 12:50 AM
In a strange quirk of fate, somebody on Tom Ricks blog pointed out that MG Flynn's positions on intel were directly parallel to those made by the White House re: CIA.

So, in September Gen. McCrystal is criticized in the press for appearing to oppose the White House (although that is no longer obvious).

Now, perhaps by accident/incident, the two elements are in lock-step, and at the same time.

Isn't that news?

No chance that it is anything other than compatible, and for all we know, synchronized. If modern war, and especially this one, is a public policy matter, the two are earnestly chasing the same rabbit down the same hole.

Wired made the interesting comment that laid off journalists ought to be applying for the Stability Ops positions, since: (1.) they are trained as journalists to scurry around and get intel from many obstinant sources; and (2.) most everybody is relying on journalism, vs. intel sources, anyway.

Toynbee's big point. If a political structure fails to adapt to challenges, it will be bypassed. Darwinian....

Oh, Brave New World!

Steve

IntelTrooper
01-07-2010, 01:37 AM
Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

I think it has the effect of making pseudo-spooks realize that their little world isn't above scrutiny.

Pete
01-07-2010, 01:37 AM
One of the people leaving a comment to Tom Ricks' blog said CNAS is a centrist-Democratic think tank and that putting the article there was like a DoD information operation aimed at gaining support from the Democrats. When I first heard the "Hearts and Minds" expression during the Vietnam War around 1965 it seemed like the addition of an LBJ Great Society program to warmaking.

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 02:45 AM
Inteltrooper:

The risk is that a spook, or quasi-spook, becomes to vaporous.

Just can't seem to touch the ground.

Steve

Pete
01-07-2010, 03:08 AM
There are some great quotations in the article. After describing how intelligence information usually flows from top to bottom during conventional conflicts, the authors state:


In a counterinsurgency, the flow is (or should be) reversed. The soldier or development worker is usually the person best informed about the environment and the enemy. Moving up through levels of hierarchy is normally a journey into greater degrees of cluelessness.

On PowerPoint briefings:


Microsoft Word, rather than PowerPoint, should be the tool of choice for intelligence professionals in a counterinsurgency.

Does this mean that the "PowerPoint Ranger" tab will soon be a thing of the past?

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 03:37 AM
Pete:

Bottom to top sounds right to me.

I think the best recommendation for Powerpoint is below.

Somebody on SWC considered, in 2005, CERP funding to fit AQI out with Powerpoint.

If only they had done that AQI would have been lost in briefings forever, and miss the whole point of everything.

Maybe, as a last ditch, we could rig-up the Taliban. I know it takes a few years before effective PP paralysis sets in, but might be worth the effort with, say, a target date of 2013.

Strategic patience,

Steve

Pete
01-07-2010, 03:58 AM
From the essay "Dumb-dumb Bullets" in the July 2009 issue of Armed Forces Journal. I wouldn't have known about it had I not read about it in an endnote to the Flynn article.


Make no mistake, PowerPoint is not a neutral tool — it is actively hostile to thoughtful decision-making. It has fundamentally changed our culture by altering the expectations of who makes decisions, what decisions they make and how they make them. While this may seem to be a sweeping generalization, I think a brief examination of the impact of PowerPoint will support this statement.

Click on the link below to read the entire article.

http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4061641

BayonetBrant
01-07-2010, 02:05 PM
On PowerPoint briefings:

Microsoft Word, rather than PowerPoint, should be the tool of choice for intelligence professionals in a counterinsurgency.
Does this mean that the "PowerPoint Ranger" tab will soon be a thing of the past?

Probably not. After all, how many of the briefings out there are time-wasters generated by someone other than the intel guys?

I can already see what'll happen - the intel guy will write a beautiful 4-page narrative on the local situation, and because it'll take more than his allotted 5 minutes in the evening CUB, some assistant to the assistant deputy night ops officer will bulletize the whole thing into 2 slides to "help him out" and everyone will collectively miss the point.

Bob's World
01-07-2010, 05:01 PM
Hmmm. A call for a shift from a threat-centric approach to a populace-centric approach; with intel being the ones who need to change the most.

I have read this somewhere before...

(though I do find amusing all the intel guys who have been pumping threat threat threat up their commander's backside for years now all crying how they were victims, and only giving the boss what he wanted.... Bull. If I had a dollar for every time I've asked the intel guys to stop dronning on about HVIs and to give us some info on the environment and the populace; and gave back 90 cents for everytime those same intel guys smugly replied "that's not our job, we just do threats," I'd still be rich. Sure there are plenty of commanders who only want to know about the bad guys, but that doesn't relieve one of the duty to develop the critical intel he doesn't ask for.)

IntelTrooper
01-07-2010, 05:35 PM
Inteltrooper:

The risk is that a spook, or quasi-spook, becomes to vaporous.

Just can't seem to touch the ground.

Steve

What about semi-spooks? ;)

IntelTrooper
01-07-2010, 05:39 PM
(though I do find amusing all the intel guys who have been pumping threat threat threat up their commander's backside for years now all crying how they were victims, and only giving the boss what he wanted.... Bull. If I had a dollar for every time I've asked the intel guys to stop dronning on about HVIs and to give us some info on the environment and the populace; and gave back 90 cents for everytime those same intel guys smugly replied "that's not our job, we just do threats," I'd still be rich. Sure there are plenty of commanders who only want to know about the bad guys, but that doesn't relieve one of the duty to develop the critical intel he doesn't ask for.)

The intel community is certainly not blameless, but some of us lack the standing and resources to effectively challenge the threat-centric system that has been in place since the beginning, in spite of our best efforts. I've recommended population-centric PIRs to battalion and brigade S-2s, only to get blown off.

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 06:12 PM
Bob:

Right. Counter Terrorism is about threat assessments. No doubt, there is an enemy, real or imagined, under every rock and behind every tree.

COIN, to the extent it involves understanding, control and or changing the land, its people and activities, requires understand them---and it gets pretty broad (and ill-defined).

Appropriate intelligence for COIN is, necessarily, about the land and people, and not the enemy.

The kinds of basic CIMS data appropriate for assessing the land and people is different, and needs to be created to get an appropriate operating picture.

We faced this problem in Iraq in 2008, and dealt with it on an ad hoc basis. Now, for Afghanistan, the request is a bit more formal.

But, underneath this immediate report for Afghanistan, and the ad hoc solutions for Iraq, is the fundamental question about the current intel foundation.

If it was the wrong tool for Iraq and Afghanistan, where else is it wrong.

My guess is that, like the miser who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing, we have exhaustively evaluated the threat of everything, but missed substantial alternative analyses and opportunities.

Was the real point of MG Flynn's report to decsribe another ad hoc fix, or to advice the outside world of a systemic problem that needed to be resolved?

I believe it was the latter, but, as you suggest, it may not be very well accepted, or adopted.

Not every system is capable of learning. We know the military does (even if it stumbles around sometimes before it gets there). But...

Steve

BayonetBrant
01-07-2010, 06:49 PM
The threats aren't always those of direct bodily harm. The "threat" might be that the local populace doesn't have enough water.

The problem is that we've drawn a ring around the S2 and declared him the "Threat Guy" when much of the info that matters is not his - it's the S9's. Unfortunately, the S9 is just seen as a sidekick to the S2 who just dumps occasional useful nuggets to him.

The commanders need to shift who they're asking for info as much as the intel guys need to shift what they collect, and the S9 needs to seriously assert himself as the keeper of the info MG Flynn says is actually important.

And Bob - how often did the S9 already have the info that the commander was banging on the S2 about (or should have been banging on him about)?

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 07:17 PM
Right.

If the S9 didn't have it, he could easily get it.

As a dumb-ass DoS civilian reconstruction guy stumbling around a Division Command in Iraq in Jan 2008, it took a little while to figure out who, in a mil structure, had the best reconstruction info.

At COB Spiecher, I was introduced at a conference and made some comments about locating things needed for reconstruction planning.

As I walked out, two guys came up and explained that they did targeting: One said: I do kinetic targeting. The other said: I do non-kinetic targeting.

So, I went to visit them at the Div HQ.

Obviously, they had mapped and located a lot of stuff to either blow up or not. It was ahiuge amount of good stuff.

Then, as I walked through the building, the Div Eng folks opened their doors: roads, bridges, electrical systems. There wasn't a whole lot that they didn't have in their sphere, or terrain didn't have access too.

By the time I got to S9/CA, they were tracking agriculture, economics, etc..., etc...

No offense, but, for my purposes, there was only a little that S2 had that I needed. Everybody else was so helpful and contributing that, like them, I could run the risk of having so much information that a Tower of Babel could begin to grow.

Same at MND-C, etc...

What I learned was that 90% of anything I needed to know was there. It just hadn't been asked for for my purposes or format. Getting to 99% was just a moderate effort.

Funny thing is that when you went "upstairs" to the Palace (and even to Al Faw), they had a lot less quality info, and what MNDs knew was not trickling up, mostly because they seemed to be focused on sending out and collecting answers to specific requests rather than wandering around to see what was known.

All the info flow, but without adequate wisdom flow...

And it didn't take long to figure out why. Short-tour rotating collection folks there were fixatedon (and swamped with) creating monthly reports, building information, not knowledge. They got their accountabilities in.

How to fix it?

Steve

Surferbeetle
01-07-2010, 07:51 PM
The problem is that we've drawn a ring around the S2 and declared him the "Threat Guy" when much of the info that matters is not his - it's the S9's. Unfortunately, the S9 is just seen as a sidekick to the S2 who just dumps occasional useful nuggets to him.

The commanders need to shift who they're asking for info as much as the intel guys need to shift what they collect, and the S9 needs to seriously assert himself as the keeper of the info MG Flynn says is actually important.

And Bob - how often did the S9 already have the info that the commander was banging on the S2 about (or should have been banging on him about)?


Lets agree and say that we would like our taxpayer funded commanders to have a holistic understanding of the AO which our Democracy has sent them to. Presumably this holistic understanding would, at minimum, include actionable knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge) about the security, economic, and governance systems. Presumably we are structured, with the resources we have (total number of mil & civ USA, USMC, USN, and USAF), to support this desire. Lets consider how we are currently allocating DoD capital to provide our commanders with the holistic knowledge that they need for the AO.

Resources or Capital can be defined as "assets available for use in the production of further assets" (http://www.google.com/search?q=define%3Acapital&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a) and classified as land, labor, capital goods, and in some cases knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factors_of_production).

How much DoD capital is allocated to analyzing and interacting with each of the security, economic, and governance systems of an AO? Is a 94%, 3%, 3% split a fair estimate?

How much capital is allocated to the Army Band? Is it larger or smaller than the amount of DoD capital allocated to to analyzing and interacting with economic, and governance systems of an AO?

What existing structures can provide knowledge concerning the economic, and governance systems of an AO? I would say that includes all US troops who work outside the wire, (infantry, SF, MTT's, the S9/CA-bubbas, the S2 bubba's, etc.) contractors who work outside the wire (HTT's etc.), reachback folks in the US, and most importantly the locals who live in the AO.

So, how are we allocating existing DoD capital to collect, process, and deliver this knowledge about about the security, economic, and governance systems to those whose job it is to complete the mission in the AO?

The larger picture which needs to be considered is how the USG as a whole is allocating it's capital (DoD, DoS, DoJ, USAID, etc.) in order to develop the knowledge to shape the security, economic, and governance systems of the AO of concern. Understanding what structures receive capital help us to understand what type of solutions are provided/desired....

Ken White
01-07-2010, 08:03 PM
My experience mirrors his on the IC fascination with PROVEN threats -- and noting that they are reluctant to discuss possible threats. As one guy I knew once said, "They want to write history..." :rolleyes:

I've gotten about an equal mix of bad and good threat info over the years and only from the rare and quite exceptional (in the good sense of the word) J/G/S2 / MI Det or unit any useful cultural or populace info.

Intel Trooper: I believe they are commonly referred to as "Half Fast Spooklets"

You're also correct in that the 'system' wants to be threat centric. I believe because that way it's hard to say that the system erred. Thank you for being one of the good guys who pushed that envelope... :cool:

Surferbeetle's right -- we have a major priority problem in funding and degree of support from on high. :mad:

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 08:33 PM
First, we are in awe of having comments from the illustrious Ken White.

Second, the problem goes way beyond the military.

The ground military is, in fact, the only current information source available for governmental collection and interpretation of the situation in Afghanistan.

The so-called three Ds (defense, diplomacy and development) are not equally shared.

If anybody actually believes that the CIA has a complete Common Operating Picture for Afghanistan, I have bridge I'd like to sell them. They just don;t do that kind of deep background information stuff.

NGA does geo-physical and sat/mapping stuff, but is too small and under-resourced to build Big Pictures, or even penetrate small ones like cadestral mapping.

DoS has no serious or deep country-level or below analytical capabilities, and USAID only has contract managers (and is in the limbo of awaiting a determination of its future under State).

So, if the ground military does not have the COP, nobody has it. And it is a house of cards (maybe) until one emerges---fortune telling is not a COP.

I really think that there are a lot more components to this than meet the eye.

How could the White House have a clear picture of an end game, if the basic info for it doesn't exist?

How can the hodge-podge of State/UN/USAID/NGO/FAS actors synchronize any meaningful actions on the civilian side?

There were actually three shots fired last week at Afghanistan. One from the UN "assistance" mission chief (serious risks of failure from lack of synchronized efforts), one from CSIS/Cordesman (winning battles, losing the war), and one from the guy that the whole-of-US-government is looking to for answers (McChrystal/Flynn).

The two new "implicit" impositions on the military must be recognized: (1.) as the only governmental source for relevant US ground truth; and (2.) under COIN, to develop an intel framework way beyond instant threat levels.

Talk about a challenge.

Steve

Entropy
01-07-2010, 09:00 PM
Hmmm. A call for a shift from a threat-centric approach to a populace-centric approach; with intel being the ones who need to change the most.

I have read this somewhere before...

(though I do find amusing all the intel guys who have been pumping threat threat threat up their commander's backside for years now all crying how they were victims, and only giving the boss what he wanted.... Bull. If I had a dollar for every time I've asked the intel guys to stop dronning on about HVIs and to give us some info on the environment and the populace; and gave back 90 cents for everytime those same intel guys smugly replied "that's not our job, we just do threats," I'd still be rich. Sure there are plenty of commanders who only want to know about the bad guys, but that doesn't relieve one of the duty to develop the critical intel he doesn't ask for.)

Leadership comes from the top and Afghanistan, until very recently, has not been a COIN effort, population-centric or otherwise. Until this past year, resources for Afghanistan, especially intelligence, were under-resourced for anything but the explicit missions we were given which was not COIN. Those were decisions made at the highest levels. What you seem to be suggesting is that the intel people should have diverted some of those intel resources (collection and analysis) away from the Commander's explicit intent to something else. That's simply not going to happen.

Some of us who have been invested in Afghanistan for many years - long before the current COINdinista crowd became interested - took it upon ourselves to explore many of the issues you've raised in this forum in an attempt to gain a deeper understand of the environment and context in which we conduct operations. For me personally, this was done almost entirely on my own time and at my own expense (as my private library of Afghanistan publications attests) and consisted almost entirely of unclassified, open-source material. Why? Because I had no authority to formally task collection assets or to submit RFI's to relevant agencies to collect such information. Why? Because the Commander's intent, as clearly spelled out in his intelligence requirements, did not focus on these areas and our authority to task assets and spend analytical resources derives directly from those requirements. Outside of a good-old-boys network and informal RFI's (ie. emailing my buddies in other agencies) the system is explicitly designed to prevent intelligence assets from being used (or misused, depending on one's perspective) contrary to a Commander's published intel requirements. Even if I got my immediate Commander's approval to ask some of these questions, they were shot down at the theater level because of, guess what? The theater PIR's!

So your suggestion that intel people have a responsibility to "develop critical intel he doesn't ask for" is not possible for two reasons: First, we can't get information to develop such intel because collection is not driven by analysts but Commander PIR's. No information, no authority to collect information means no analysis and no answers to the relevant questions. Secondly, which intel is "critical" and which intel isn't is defined by the Commander and not the intel professional. Obviously if an intel person thinks something might be critical he/she needs to inform the Commander immediately, but it's still the Commander who decides. Additionally, because intel assets (both collection and analysis) are always limited, the system is purposely designed to prevent the very thing you are asking for - which is diverting assets away from a Commander's stated desire.

As late as last month the theater requirements had not substantially changed from what they've been for the past several years, which is largely threat-focused. Until they do change, pop-centric COIN information is inevitably going to play second fiddle. Maybe things are different today with the publication of this report and the orders that were reportedly promulgated through official channels. I don't yet know.

This passage in the MG Flynn's report struck me particularly:


The problem is that these analysts – the core of them bright, enthusiastic, and hungry – are starved for information from the feld, so starved, in fact, that many say their jobs feel more like fortune telling than serious detective work.

Yes, that's been an enduring problem and it's a big reason why the vast majority of my personal research over the years has been confined academic and open-source work. That problem is not an intelligence problem, but a Command and leadership problem. The intelligence function cannot force units to provide us information - that can only be directed by Commanders. So, again, the issue comes back to Commanders and command responsibility.

Finally, if your intel guys are smugly giving you information and intelligence that you don't want - indeed, information that you are hostile to, then why are they still your intel guys? Where is the accountability? Intel people should be held accountable like anyone else and if they are not performing or if they are feeding you a line of BS then they need to be put in their place and held accountable. If my immediate Commander wants info that falls outside the scope of the HHQ and theater PIR's, then I'll try like hell to provide that while explaining the LIMFACs on collecting new information and answering that request. In essence, all I can usually do is search existing information which is often insufficient. So, as MG Flynn said in his report:


This memorandum is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals. If intelligence is to help us succeed in the conduct of the war, the commanders of companies, battalions, brigades, and regions must clearly prioritize the questions they need answered in support of our counterinsurgency strategy, direct intelligence officials to answer them, and hold accountable those who fail.

That about says it all, IMO.

And, just to be clear, I do think there are valid criticisms against intel people and the intel profession and system, particularly military intel people. Yes, we, as a group, are more comfortable with threats, but realize that's how we are trained. It would be interesting if any Army people here could tell us what the current MI curriculum is at the school house and how much of it, if any, deals with intelligence support to COIN. I know in the Air Force and Navy the school-houses have not changed much and support to large-scale conventional warfare requirements dominates. For imagery analysts, full-motion video analysis is still an afterthought in the imagery course. Our new IA's at my predator unit get almost no training in FMV exploitation despite the fact this is 95% of their job. That is one place we can start cleaning house.

davidbfpo
01-07-2010, 10:01 PM
From Abu M:
Some folks in the public affairs shop at the Pentagon were predictably upset that they were not in the loop regarding the report's release, but this is Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell speaking today on behalf of his civilian boss, the Secretary of Defense:

[The report] is exactly the type of candid, critical self-assessment that the secretary believes is a sign of a strong and healthy organization. This kind of honest appraisal enriches what has been a very real and hearty and vigorous debate that, frankly, has been taking place within this building, within this department and within this government for years now.

Link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/01/crisis-what-crisis.html

Well that's my earlier puzzlement answered why in the public domain.

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 10:20 PM
Entropy has laid it out correctly.

In January 2008, MND-North held a conference on Reconstruction for Military and PRT actors.

MG Hertling's big point: If my orders now include reconstruction, and support or reconstruction, I need a plan to do that, or to know what the plan is to align my plan to it.

The week before, a big VTC was held at which TF Brinkley produced its "Plan" for recconstruction of Iraq. Disappointingly, it was like a generic textbook 101 edition of economic development, and had little use or purpose for ground direction. The consultant's answer was, we figured you would be responsible for ground-truthing our recommendations.

For the conference, the entire Embassy staff---Phyllis Powers (OPA Director) on down made presentations---each agency and department describing what they did.

After a few very disappointing Q&A's from the audience, MG Hertling took the mkie and clearly explained the problem. He ran a division of capable people with resources whose mission was now to deliver and/or support reconstruction and stability operations. They function on plans, and need to know what the civilian plan is to coordinate to and support it. What is the plan?

Stunning silence for a few minutes.

He asked again, looking directly at the OPA director. More silence.

Then he said. I need a plan to accomplish my mission. If you don't have a plan to reconstruct Northern Iraq, I need to create one. More silence.

Then he explained that, absent any plan form them, he would create one.

That's where and when the authorization, commitment and resources came to develop the research, analysis and strategies for Northern Iraq stability and reconstruction.

MND-North's entire operation yeilded and contributed to it. NGA got task orders. Systemic and synchronized strategies began. "Helicopter diplomacy" began---using MND-North helos to bring ministers to the problems. And conferences were held: Energy, Development, Water, etc... and things started moving.

Entropy's point: If they don't ask, they don't get. If they do, they do.

But, unlike Iraq, where there was one Crocker and one Petreaus working hand in glove, Afghanistan has many actors, and, many plans, and, I assume, no centralized responsibility chain equivalent to that of an MND CG in Iraq. "If everybody is in charge, nobody is!"

So, is MG Flynn really having the same "conversation," but at the higher level?

If so, does it create the watershed for resources that Hertling set off in Northern Iraq, or is it less than that?

How can the top intel officer indicate that his intel folks are reading tea leaves, and his field commanders reading the news accounts for current info, without a major signal to the White House and its civilian agencies that there is a huge gap between meaningful strategies and ground truth?

Entropy is right, but the question should not have ended with the intel folks.

Steve

Steve the Planner
01-07-2010, 10:39 PM
If, as Entropy indicated, so many of us are trying to build this picture on the side, from bits and pieces of open and not-so-open sources, isn;t that just so much amateur hour?

Where is the fruit of our multi-billion dollar intel investment?

It really burned me up last month at a national planning conference when it came up that Afghanistan was one of the countries asking for pro bono planning help from the Global Planners Network. The same listening to Mssrs. Hadley and Ghani talking about the need for immediate and substantive changes to the civilian effort.

Where are the resources for reconstruction analysis and planning....or is it just like Iraq---throwing projects at the wall to see if they will stick.

I think it's time somebody way above all of our pay grades sorts it out.

Steve

Bob's World
01-08-2010, 01:35 AM
My point is that the commander doesn't know what he doesn't know. The job of the staff is not to merely validate and inform what the commander cares about, particularly when those types of operations aren't being particularly effective.

And one can try to make an intellectual separation (many do) between "COIN" and "CT"; but that is kind of like the difference between rifles and bullets; or farts and bad smells. Most men who we slap the "terrorist" brand on are waging an insurgency in their home country. When they take those acts of terrorism to attack the populace or government of a totally separate country, one has to do the causal analysis to ask the question "why."

I realize the answer to the question "why" has been packaged up and handed to us up front by a bunch of politicians; but (to link this to other threads on Operational Design) when you are given a mission you have a duty to analyze the problem handed to you as well as the specific solution set you are asked to employ. And sometimes the answer is you go back to the boss and tell him he has it wrong, he's asked you to do the wrong thing, and here is why. Maybe he tells you "interesting, but just do what I told you in the first place," but at least you will have done your duty.

Why are most of the 9/11 "terrorists" Saudis? Why are most "foreign fighters / terrorists" Saudis? Is there an ideological component? Sure. Is there a leadership/influence component? Sure. But to my way of thinking there is some extreme arrogance when one's unassailable assumption is that those who attack you do it for a hate of your country that is greater than their love for their own country.

CT is a cop out. It places the entire blame on those who dare to attack the establishment and simply seeks to eradicate them. COIN (as currently practiced by the US) is a little bit better in that it recognizes that the countries many of these men come from have problems that need to be addressed. I just hope it’s not another 8 years before we make the next causal link as to how the nature of Western foreign policy over the past 2-300 years (colonialism followed by coldwarism) have combined to rob people of their culture, their dignity, and their right to self-determination; and united and empowered by the modern tools of this information age they are rising up and pushing back. Pushing back against governments at home that draws their legitimacy from others rather than themselves. Pushing back against the external powers has in fact provided the legitimacy for those same governments. Western foreign policy is dangerously obsolete and out of touch with the times we live in; and sending the military out to suppress those who dare to complain is a losing game that virtually every fallen empire has chosen to play. The British Empire is just one of many that were disassembled one military "victory" at a time. They too likely had Intel guys who could tell them all about "the threat," but very little about what really threatened them...

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 01:51 AM
Bob:

"all about "the threat," but very little about what really threatened them... "

Wow. I'm just going to let that great phrase percolate for a while.

Like one of those small books that takes years to understand.

Steve

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 02:26 AM
Latest quotes from Ambassador Holbrooke sounds like Bob wrote. Who is the "threat?"

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010710.shtml

Enticing non-ideological militants to quit the fight could help US forces turn the tide of the Afghan insurgency against the Taliban.


They fight for various reasons; they are misled about our presence there. They have a sense of injustice or personal grievances. Or they fight because it’s part of the Afghan tradition that you fight outsiders and they have the [International Security Assistance Force]/NATO/U.S. presence conflated with earlier historical events, some of which are not too far in the past, Holbrooke said, referring to non-ideological combatants.

The United States did not focus on winning over non-ideological militants to the government’s side during the first year of Holbrooke’s tenure largely because last year’s presidential election diverted his team’s attention. It will become a priority in 2010, however.
"It’s absolutely imperative that we deal with this issue. If we don’t deal with it, success will elude us. Holbrooke said.

Bob's World
01-08-2010, 03:13 AM
Bob:

"all about "the threat," but very little about what really threatened them... "

Wow. I'm just going to let that great phrase percolate for a while.

Like one of those small books that takes years to understand.

Steve


The point is that we are very focused on what I would call symptoms of a much larger problem. We have deemed these symptoms as "the threat", and the cure for the symptoms, to my way of thinking, actually makes the underlying root cause conditions worse. Temporary relief that lulls you into a false sense of security to continue to ignore that growing, malignant cancer.

"What really threatens" is the underlying root cause, but so long as we drill and drill and engage and engage on the symptoms, we never get to it. The role of the military is in large part to manage these symptoms; it only becomes a dangerous situation when one comes to see the symptoms as the actual problem.

Militaries cannot truly resolve an insurgency. I stand on that. Not unless you are willing to be absolutely ruthless and are cool with having a fearful, spiritless populace peacefully submitting to your benevolent rule. Until the Political / Policy types come to fully accept and address that these violent reactions among the people are a result of THEIR failures; and not some evil opponents SUCCESSES; you can't get in front of the problem.


As an aside, I had an interesting discussion with the head state department guy here in Kandahar earlier this week. Trying to make the case that for the Surge to truly succeed we need to take full advantage of this wonderful gift of popularly accepted democracy that exists uniquely here; and demand that Karzai call for a true Loya Jirga. It should be the condition precedent to any surge of US military power. It is beyond Karzai's manipulation, it is not constrained by the Constitution, and it cannot be controlled by Western Powers. It could well put guys like Omar or Haqqani (or people connected to them) into the government. "That would be beyond the pale!" he exclaimed. When I told him "Last time I checked, this isn't the United States of America, and it really isn't our call as to who the people choose to lead them." He gave me a look of shock and disgust, and spun on his heels and stomped off.

Sometimes you have to tell people what they don't want to hear.

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 03:40 AM
Tom Ricks played his usual role of devil's incitor with a report from one of those unnamed experts that, within five years, Iraq would be carved up by Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Like he really believed that could be possible.

Of course, Afghanistan is a whole different thing. Who knows what could come out of a true national Loya Jirga.

The mark of genius is the ability to simultaneously maintain two opposing ideas in your head (some old quote)

If the Ambassador is correct that our 2010 focus will be aligning with the majority of Taliban, it certainly will raise the threshold for genius in the field.

In Iraq, the best way to get started on a relationship with provincial, local officials was to let them vent about the problems they experienced from the Americans, then start talking about solutions.

Problem was that, all too often, their problems were both accurately identified, and caused by the Americans. (Sometimes the locals do not what they are talking about).

Great to have all the answers before you get there, and to be immune from any learning or independent experience---oh, the unexamined life. The good news is that once State puts out that the Taliban are our friends, your Khandahar "colleague" will be on board with that, too. but not until.

Is it 1984 yet?

Hacksaw
01-08-2010, 02:53 PM
"He asked again, looking directly at the OPA director. More silence.

Then he said. I need a plan to accomplish my mission. If you don't have a plan to reconstruct Northern Iraq, I need to create one. More silence.

Then he explained that, absent any plan form them, he would create one."

Hmmm...

for what it's worth... I wrote a plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of Northern Iraq on behalf of MG Petraeus Apr-May 2003.... It was the chewy of choice in the day (chewy = planner's product that the commander gives to visiting dignitaries as one would give a "chewy toy" to a dog)... not sure might even still have it (but unlikely since I've been retired for a couple of years...

I had recently spent 6 mths before the 101st initial deployment to Iraq on TCS assignment to CENTCOM... as you might expect I tried to use my connections to find out what was out there as a larger plan for me to link our plan to.... answer none existed (since I've ran across a couple of ARCENT Planners who insist a plan did exist, never saw it myself)...

So I staffed the plan with the Dept of Soc Sci at USMA and whomever they wished to share it with for a sanity check... not perfect, but I bet it wasn't that far out from what you developed....

Ironically, while I didn't participate in the writing of FM 3-24... and Petraeus really didn't provide any significant vector adjustment... for the most part it operationalized 3-24...

Does that mean I was well inside Petraeus head (a scary place I can assure you :eek:)... or did it mean we both looked at the situation similarly and came to same logical conclusions... I've often wondered... :rolleyes:

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 05:29 PM
Every time we looked at a problem in 2008, I wondered how many time that same problem had been looked and a plan made.

1AD HQ had been around Bgahdad, Diyala, etc..., so they all knew the background---made a huge difference.

What was the biggest diff between 03 and 08? DoS.

But I tried to explain to some of the DoS folks that when a unit leaves, it takes everything with it. Some transitioning, but it really is "another group, another year." They never did get it.

Difference was we were on "Last Call," so we got done what we had to to make the transition work...

Go figure...

That's what I think about this Fixing Intel, too. It is not just about fixing one piece for one unit, but developing some kind of "process" that can continue and evolve (and be trusted and contributed to---up and down). Otherwise, it is just a report or plan from one bunch, forgotten by the next.

And where does it reside? I think the report has it right---at Division commands as the Goldilocks choice. Not too high, not to low.

reed11b
01-08-2010, 05:48 PM
Not the most original thought I am sure, but, is part of the problem that we are trying to get "quantity" of information, without creating a sorting formula to prioritize what information is critical and needs to be acted on or shared? Minus a clearly defined mission, or better yet, a plan of action, how is the intelligence community supposed to be able to figure what information is critical and how to sort it? Isn't timely information more important then "complete" information too late? Or do we still believe on a subconscious level that modern technology should allow us to see and know all? Sorry for the rambling post, but to summarize, to fix intelligence, you need an effective way to determine and sort quickly what information is relevant and to whom it goes. In order to begin to create this "formula" you need to know what the plan or basis of action is. The clearer the plan of action the easier it is to create an intelligence plan to support it. (Note*: It is perfectly OK to have multiple plans of action, in fact, many small clear plans is preferable to one big fuzzy plan IMNSHO). SO, what specifically is the mission priority for intelligence to support? Go from there.
Reed

Entropy
01-08-2010, 05:49 PM
My point is that the commander doesn't know what he doesn't know. The job of the staff is not to merely validate and inform what the commander cares about, particularly when those types of operations aren't being particularly effective.

That's certainly true and I admit my comments were a tad simplistic (for the sake of brevity). Ideally, a Commander and J2 will work together and the J2 will help the Commander explore options, identify intelligence gaps, etc. Unfortunately, that kind of collaboration is too often absent.


And one can try to make an intellectual separation (many do) between "COIN" and "CT"; but that is kind of like the difference between rifles and bullets; or farts and bad smells.

While there is certainly a lot of commonality I think there are substantial differences in relative priority with CT more at the kinetic end. From an intel perspective that means comparatively more resources will be allocated to targeting, HVI's, etc. Allocation of resources can make all the difference.


Most men who we slap the "terrorist" brand on are waging an insurgency in their home country. When they take those acts of terrorism to attack the populace or government of a totally separate country, one has to do the causal analysis to ask the question "why."

You'll notice I don't use that term with Afghanistan and I do realize that a lot of intel people (especially the junior ones) do and call anyone who opposes us "terrorists"
which makes me cringe. Of course, one gets that from Commanders and others as well and it's a difficult notion to disabuse once set.


I realize the answer to the question "why" has been packaged up and handed to us up front by a bunch of politicians; but (to link this to other threads on Operational Design) when you are given a mission you have a duty to analyze the problem handed to you as well as the specific solution set you are asked to employ. And sometimes the answer is you go back to the boss and tell him he has it wrong, he's asked you to do the wrong thing, and here is why. Maybe he tells you "interesting, but just do what I told you in the first place," but at least you will have done your duty.

Agreed. Part of the problem here though is that ignorance on things Afghanistan is not confined to intelligence. When MG Flynn talked about the difficulty in scraping together basic demographic, economic and other information for a single province, it did not surprise me at all there was so little information available. The call to obtain that kind of information is nothing new - in fact it's mentioned in almost any report on the subject going back several years.

But identifying a need for information and obtaining the information are different animals. The problem of actually acquiring that kind of local information is extremely difficult since it requires people on the ground for extended periods of time that have the trust of local elites. That's not easy in Afghanistan where locals have an inherent distrust of outsiders (especially foreigners) and the local relations are very complex and in constant flux. It's not enough to understand one village or valley, you have to understand the adjacent villages and valleys not only to figure out the local interactions, but to ensure you aren't being played to settle a local conflict. We are still feeling the repercussions of the latter in places like Konar and Afghans have a long history of using outsiders to settle local disputes in their favor. So to fulfill this information requirement requires a lot of people on the ground for an extended period of time or a few academics working over decades - which not easy in a war zone. The intel function has few resources at its disposal to do that kind of extensive on-the-ground collection and those resources are concentrated elsewhere because of those PIR's I keep talking about. This is one reason the HTT's were created and it's kind of odd they aren't even mentioned in MG Flynn's report.

Prior to 1979 we had academics who went to Afghanistan and studied the populations. Louis Dupree is perhaps the best known American, but there are others. Of course, once the anti-Soviet Jihad began everything changed and that historic work has not been replicated except in a very few cases. Still, it represents some of the best - and only - information on locals we have.

So anyway, the question is how can we get this information? MG Flynn's report seems to suggest we'll use US troops for that which is fine as long as one understands the limitations.


Sometimes you have to tell people what they don't want to hear.

Well, sir, then this might be one of those times! ;)

Your characterization of Loya Jirga's is not accurate. They are not "democratic" because they are composed of elites and, most often, headed by whoever is in power. Since they are composed of elites, it would be impossible to put it beyond Karzai's manipulation, especially considering Loya Jirga's have historically be used as tools to legitimize the decisions of those at the head of government. In fact, that's exactly what Karzai plans to do - he announced after "winning" the election that he'll hold a Loya Jirga before this summer's parliamentary elections, though he didn't say if it would be a Constitutional Loya Jirga or something else.

A Loya Jirga also will not put Haqqani or Omar in government or any of their leaders beyond the sympathizers that currently exist in small numbers in the parliament. Haqqani, Omar and the other opposition leaders have clearly stated they will not negotiate or participate in any kind of negotiation or communal decisionmaking apparatus until all foreign forces are off of Afghan soil. That is a position they are unlikely to change except in extraordinary circumstances.

A Loya Jirga could be useful to fulfill its traditional purpose - which is legitimizing constitutional changes. The biggest flaw in the current government, in my opinion, is that it is over-centralized and gives the President too much power over the provinces by controlling the governorships as well as the flow resources through the ministries. A more federalized, distributed system based more on local governance would be preferable, though that also carries some significant downsides because one man's legitimate local leader is another man's tribal warlord.

Anyway, for more on Loya Jirga's read this (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2007/10/21/the-myth-and-reality-of-the-loya-jirga/) and the source documents, particularly the Hanifi piece, which is informative but also entertaining for it's serious Gramsci slant.

Finally, I'll relate one intel community failure I find particularly galling:

The guy who wrote the post I linked to above runs a very useful site called Afghanistan Analyst (http://afghanistan-analyst.org/default.aspx). The first thing you'll find there is an Afghanistan bibliography which is very extensive and continually updated. To my knowledge, no one in our government has bothered to acquire all the publications on that bibliography, much less make them accessible over NIPR, SIPR and JWICS for analysts. Getting that done would be a minimal effort compared to the billions we are spending. It would require a few months, one or two people who know their way around a library, some TDY money to acquire some documents hidden in archives around the world, and someone to digitize the publications. It ain't rocket science and it should have been done eight years ago. That bibliography should have been created and maintained by someone in government (CIA or State probably) and not as a side project for a grad student who's dissertation and research isn't even on Afghanistan.

So, sir, since I have your ear and since you've got eagles and are in Kabul, maybe that is something you could make happen? It's a small start and much of the information is likely historic, but it would provide a good foundation and a base of understanding.

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 07:53 PM
Tom called out Mr. McCreary's blast on Nightwatch>

Seems to hit everything...

http://nightwatch.afcea.org/NightWatch_20100106.htm

Surferbeetle
01-08-2010, 11:25 PM
Posted on the Tom Ricks blog on FP The Flynn report (IV): Cordesman's take (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/08/the_flynn_report_iv_cordesmans_take) and written by Anthony H. Cordesman (http://csis.org/expert/anthony-h-cordesman)


It may not be tactful to point out just how much the popular war has moved towards calls for an exit strategy, and how serious the level of Congressional and media doubt has become. The fact is, however, that the country team must now demonstrate competence, unity, and progress or lose the war.

This raises a key issue not addressed in Fixing Intel. How can the release of unclassified assessments and metrics reverse this situation and help win. Until the recent release of new unclassified metrics by USCENTCOM, no element of the US military or Executive Branch began to address this issue. The fact is, however, that intelligence should be a key element of a process of strategic communications that helps to correct the mistakes made in presenting and supporting the President's speech, that reinforces the broad themes raised in the testimony to Congress that followed, that establishes broad credibility, and shapes as much of the reporting on the war and perceptions of its progress as possible. This is as critical a part of Fixing Intel as any addressed in the paper.

Steve the Planner
01-08-2010, 11:43 PM
Beetle:

We've been beating these subjects to death for months now, haven't we?

Good to see them finally at front and center.

Steve

Schmedlap
01-09-2010, 04:57 PM
D'oh. I wrote a rambling blog entry on this yesterday, not noticing that the discussion had already begun.

I am in near 100% agreement with what Steve (the planner) and Entropy wrote - particularly on the first page of this thread.

The most encouraging thing that I see in this (proposal/directive/idea?) is the establishment of some system that will reduce duplication of effort and reign in the ridiculous over-classification of information. An added benefit that I hope will occur is that there will finally be some consolidation of information that is continually added to. This was a pet peeve of mine on my 2nd and 3rd deployments. After a year in one location, the 2 shop and anyone who does any patrolling has a ton of useful knowledge about the AO. Where does that knowledge go upon RIP/TOA? It goes home with the outgoing unit and is immediately rinsed out of their brains with alcohol.

This was not just a problem at the beginning of a deployment, either. Seven months into a deployment, I would hit up my S-2 for information and he would direct me to a stack of raw intelligence reports that were six months old. I would always ask, "does this intelligence ever get compiled into a continually updated assessment of the area?" I would then be directed to a table of red, yellow, and green dots that signify some mysterious, arbitrary assessments of various "lines of operations." What does a yellow dot tell me? Oh, wait, here it is: :). Apparently the yellow dots mean that everyone is happy.

What left me shaking my head as I read the document was that many problems were identified, but the solutions posed do nothing to address those problems. I think the solutions of the regional information efforts will help with over-classification and duplication of effort. Great. But what about the other problems cited? Units are unable to answer the most basic of intelligence requirements, personnel at BDE are being misused, and BN is often undermanned. I see no solution to those problems in this paper. Just to be clear - I don't think those problems are the purview of the CJ2 or any other staff officer. They are leadership issues that commanders need to address. If your unit is not gathering basic IR's (such as the examples given on page 8), then that is purely a leadership issue. Reinventing intelligence is not going to reverse a situation where tasks are assigned and not accomplished or no thought is put into the IRs by the command and staff. Why bother raising those issues? It seems like this solution is being presented as a cure-all. I suspect that was done because the scope of the changes is enormous, but the ills that will be cured are few and narrow.

Steve the Planner
01-09-2010, 05:59 PM
Schmedlap:

I figured you were keeping your powder dry...

Once I got known and accepted around MND-North (as an OK DoS guy), the folks at DivEng and CA would pass on their file dumps of good ideas they collected but couldn't get around to.

That was what convinced me that we had some truly bright and capable folks out in the field but no system to collect and use it all.

In Jan 08, a departing LTC gave me a file containing photos and field assessments of virtually every grain storage silo in the North. He had been collecting it for a while as a side project since, back home, he understood that area.

After a while, folks like that realized that MND-North's terrain folks would compile it if they passed it on, so they started to. Then, it became a measurable of contributing to MG Hertling's clearly stated effort of civilian engagement/Reconstruction, so it was not only good, but good for ya.

But that was in 2008. We all know that hundreds of bored and cuious US folks gathered this kind of stuff, but it didn't find a home, or build on an existing framework. We could have known twice as much in half the time.

In Summer 08, I went to a meeting on CIDNE about the Legacy data. They said: Sure, we have it." When we started, we sent out requests for all prior units to send it. So, we did that.

When asked the important question: How much did you get? the answer was, Well, none yet.

Go figure.

Steve

Outlaw 7
01-09-2010, 06:27 PM
Gen. Flynn's article brings to the forefront a core discussion that has been moving under the radar screen since 2007. It highlights the core difference between anti-insurgency which is focused on kill/capture and the elimination of IED cells/networks or true counterinsurgency which focuses to a high degree on population control and security.

It is interesting that FID and unconventional warfare which were the bread and butter of Special Forces from their inception to the early 1970s was forced into extinction by the big Army as they drove to disband Special Forces who had to rebrand themselves as the "Strategic Recon types" in the 80s/90s in order to survive. This rebranding cause internal problems for SF when they discovered the need to shift back to FID/UW.

Now we are back to FID and unconventional warfare and big Army went left in Iraq and that is now not working in Afghanistan which went right and is a true insurgency with characteristics of a full blown phase three guerilla war. It is refreshing to see a Spad called a Spad.

Now just maybe big Army can focus in learning just what is insurgency, what drives an insurgency, and how does that insurgency evolve--and not learning it out of the COIN FM or from CTC scenario rotations. It is amazing that many in the old guard (Vietnam vets) have pointed to key lessons learned about FID, but were brushed off and now there is the sudden interest in books written about FID in Vietnam--lessons learned though from the Special Forces CIDG program seem on the other hand to still be ignored. One of the most important books written in the early 80s "Silence As A Weapon" written by retired COL. Herrington goes along way in describing the use of silence by an insurgency in the control of populations.

Since Gen. Flynn has gotten some attention on the MI side maybe attention should be paid to a concept developed by John Robb called "open source warfare" (2004/2005) and just recently scientifically verified by the Nature magazine article "Ecology of Human Warfare". For the first time via computer research one can make specific outside changes/impacts to the insurgency environment and see the results on the insurgency movement without having boots on the ground. And it goes a long way in explaining the media impact of their operations which can be verified by the impressive increase in video releases on the part of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2008.

Jedburgh
01-09-2010, 06:44 PM
Since Gen. Flynn has gotten some attention on the MI side maybe attention should be paid to a concept developed by John Robb called "open source warfare" (2004/2005) and just recently scientifically verified by the Nature magazine article "Ecology of Human Warfare". For the first time via computer research one can make specific outside changes/impacts to the insurgency environment and see the results on the insurgency movement without having boots on the ground. And it goes a long way in explaining the media impact of their operations which can be verified by the impressive increase in video releases on the part of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2008.
I would hesitate to say it is "scientifically verified". A magazine article doesn't verify anything, and the research is far from conclusive.

This link is to the full Nature article (http://mathematicsofwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/WarEcologyNature-2.pdf) and this one is to the supplementary notes (http://mathematicsofwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/24NovJohnsonSI-1.pdf). The Mathematics of War (http://mathematicsofwar.com/) website was set up by the authors to accompany the publication of the article and provide additional background.

Here is a critique of the Nature article by Drew Conway: On the Ecology of Human Insurgency (http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=1623).

Which elicited a response from John Robb (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2009/12/journal-a-critique-of-open-source-warfare.html) and more discussion from Drew Conway (http://www.drewconway.com/zia/?p=1652). None of which really settled anything.

Surferbeetle
01-09-2010, 07:44 PM
Beetle:

We've been beating these subjects to death for months now, haven't we?

Good to see them finally at front and center.

It's not just limited to our tree, the forest is in an uproar as well...

From the Harvard Business Review blog by Umair Haque: The Builders' Manifesto (http://blogs.hbr.org/haque/2009/12/the_builders_manifesto.html) (H/T John Robb)


So the question is this: are you merely managing an organization, just leading an organization — or are you building an institution? 99.9% of the world's leaders are, well, just leaders. But today, leadership alone can't get you from the 20th century to the 21st.

Of course, everyone has their own definition of leadership — and that's why it's a tricky subject to discuss. The "leadership" I'm challenging is of the orthodox, B-school 101 one, that has to do with motivation, influence, and power.

Steve the Planner
01-09-2010, 09:18 PM
Like the Structure of Scientific Revolutions---a time to change, and a time tpo implement.

When it's time to change, you adapt or you don't.

Headline from Jalalabad:

"Vaccination Diplomacy': Taliban Helps UN, Karzai"

http://www.newser.com/story/77839/vaccination-diplomacy-taliban-helps-un-karzai.html

Somebody is out there learning and adapting every day.

Steve

Entropy
01-10-2010, 03:03 AM
Interesting context to MG Flynn's article (http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/01/isaf-state-of-the-insurgency-231000-dec.ppt) (PPT file). First, this is one of the most complete unclassified assessments I've seen. Secondly, it's a bit ironic that it's done on powerpoint. Courtesy of Danger Room (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/afghan-insurgency-can-sustain-itself-indefinitely-top-us-intel-officer/).

Bob's World
01-10-2010, 03:54 AM
Just to clarify an easily misunderstood comment I made about COIN and CT. What I meant was that the intel community is too quick to label insurgents who engage in acts of terror as "terrorists"; and that we then apply CT tactics against these insurgents (which is really counterinsurgent or CI I guess) operations.

I have never seen much value in CT as a mission set as it does not create any new TTPS to train, organize, or operate. It is merely DA and SR applied against a particular type of actor. It think it confuses more than it clarifies. I have suggested to that having a "State-CT" section as the lead for DOS on GWOT is VERY wrong-headed for our primary governance engagement department. It distracts them from what they really need to be doing to put terrorism back in the box: Focus on fixing policy, not fixing terrorists. Similarly having "NCTC" as the lead agency for GWOT also creates the same distracting effect of overly focusing efforts to reduce a symptom (the terrorist) as opposed to devising holisic programs aimed at root causes.

There are a lot of insurgencies going on out there, at various stages, and each unique to is own country. Many of these are in countries the US considers as allies; and many of those insurgents believe they must attack the US to prevail at home. AQ plays on that belief. We must target that belief. CT focuses us on targetting the actor, the symptom. We must shift to targeting those facts and perceptions that lead to the the belief itself. Change the nature of our relationships, adjust our Ways and Means to persue our Ends.

So, while MG Flynn's paper is a great start, it also a very tactical perspective. How to be more tactically effective in Afghanistan. Great start. Now let's back up and expand the aperture to the Corps of intel guys at the national level. They too are focused in large part on the wrong things because we have focused everybody on the wrong thing. Focused them all on defeating "terrorists" and "terrorism" (both symptoms) instead of developing the information we need to truly understand and address the root causes.

I have my theories, but they are just theories. Perhaps once the intel is developed to explore such theories they can become more than that.

Steve the Planner
01-10-2010, 04:28 PM
Bob:

Military perspective aside, when I first saw that ppt, I was looking at the civilian dimensions.

International economic development had not matched local expectations. What does that mean? How do you "Cure" that with quick hits and low-hanging fruit?

Maybe wrong, but I read the "Shadows" as an inevitable result of the above, plus failure to extend the basic writ and services of local government (basic civil/criminal justice, humanitarian services, and, above all, security). People find a way to representation, and, for better or worse, the troublesome election, the continued lack of government effectiveness, and the lack of focus on basic constitutional reforms (a Loya Jirga to move to locally elected governors, for example)plus the fact that international forces are being portrayed as the cause or attractor of population insecurity. While it is easy for us to dodge these fundamental issues, it is inevitable that the dodge has consequences.

Is COIN so all encompassing as to address issues raised elsewhere in SW: What if we are representing a bad government? What if opposition is fairly grounded? What if the opposition, despite our views, is perceived as "better than ours?

Tony Cordesman's report about winning the battles and losing the wars is, in my opinion, not really a military critique, but a "whole-of-government" critique.

He punches hard on the lack of metrics, lack of focus, lack of results on the civilian side. Great, we built a new road somewhere: How did that project related to the short, medium, long range issues at the core of instability in this town or district?

What are the causes of instability in this town, district, province? Are there credible and effective projects highly-targeted at those, or are we just building a road because we can, and doing nothing significant to address the high-priority causes for instability?

Great. 1,000 civilians descended on Afghanistan. How did that help? What are they doing? What were the problems of importance? What are they doing about those?

No offense, but I hear a lot of crap about this human terrain analysis stuff, and the reconstruction stuff, but I don't see the results. We don't do this well, and aren't going to change absent a well-placed boot (or a shocking failure).

I get it that Afghanistan is more complicated than Iraq, but our civilian/ht, reconstruction in Iraq was abysmal. If we just do that quality and caliber of work in Afghanistan, it is no wonder the "yellow" is bleeding across the map.

Behind it all, I remain deeply concerned that the US is not following the consequences of urbanization (by UN definition), including the growing urban refugee pops in "informal settlements."

Kabul alone has exploded to 4.5 million people, and we are busy chasing bad guys on the frontier, while token protests are beginning to emerge in the cities. What are we credibly doing to assure that those token protests, and the causes of their protests (which go beyond the surface complaint) are being addressed/controlled/minimized/resolved/eliminated?

These refugee "cities", throughout history, are the place where there truly "Be Dragons," and provide an abundant opportunity for the next regional Sadrs to emerge, safe operational havens for current opponents, and the breeding ground (as we see in Pakistan) for Madrahsas.

If anything, I believe the Flynn report goes far beyond the military. I assume, in part, that is why it is public.

Just my ten cents.

Steve

Entropy
01-11-2010, 01:20 AM
BW,


Just to clarify an easily misunderstood comment I made about COIN and CT. What I meant was that the intel community is too quick to label insurgents who engage in acts of terror as "terrorists"; and that we then apply CT tactics against these insurgents (which is really counterinsurgent or CI I guess) operations.

That does clarify things and I agree completely. I do think there are many intel people who are uninterested in motivations which is lazy thinking and counterproductive.

Steve the Planner
01-11-2010, 12:38 PM
http://nightwatch.afcea.org/NightWatch_20100108.htm


Special comment: In 42 years, NightWatch has never seen a Presidential directive to intelligence and security entities remotely like that promulgated this week. It is a worthy document in intent and precision.

Its weak point is that implementation relies on the same people who failed, twice.

The two most extraordinary Presidential directives to the Director of National Intelligence have received no media coverage. The first is to “take further steps to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of tradecraft of intelligence analysis …” In other words, the analysts failed. They need more rigor in their analyses and better “tradecraft.”

The intent of the directive is clear, but its execution is problematic. Analytical tradecraft is in the dock. Commentators and very experienced practitioners frequently cite the “new” challenges in this “new” form of war. (Counter-insurgency is hardly new.)

The pubic is bombarded with “Newness,” but no transformation has occurred.

NightWatch senses that the intelligence failings cited by the President and cited by General Flynn are not failings of insight about new threats; they are the longstanding failings of complaisant analysts and supervisors, who shirk their responsibilities.

The 1978 HPSCI report on Warning found that in every crisis since Pearl Harbor, there always was enough information for competent analysts to issue actionable warning. The intelligence failures of the post-World War II era and the Cold War always were failures of analysts, not collectors and not systems.

President Obama’s statement repeats those findings in spades, 32 years later!

If it means anything, analysis transformation has to mean creation of a systematic, structured approach to analysis that always and everywhere is replicable, auditable, non-idiosyncratic and non-anecdotal and which has application across boundaries and groups.

There are few lessons for young analysts in idiosyncratic and anecdotal personal expertise. No one can live another person’s experiences and experts seldom agree on the significance of their experiences. So how can that mess be taught? Intelligence must escape this trap.

NightWatch insists that “expertise is necessary but not enough” to achieve actionable warning. To that assertion must now be added that sharing is not enough.

High predictability and the ability to warn in an actionable time frame require knowledge of threat phenomenology, the study of which has been neglected, except possibly at the tactical level. For example, two pieces of evidence – payment in cash for a transatlantic air trip and without checked luggage -- are the embodiment of actionable, phenomenological data.

Cash and no bags are universal red flags of threat that create a reasonable suspicion that justifies, nay compels, fail-safe security measures. This should be a “no-brainer.“

The other Presidential directive of special interest is, “Ensure resources are properly aligned with issues highlighted in strategic warning analysis.” The President issued a new directive on strategic warning analysis; not risk management, but warning. That has not happened since before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

One odd thing, though, is that the Defense Department and all its agencies, except the National Security Agency, received the directive but no direct guidance. DoD has more counter terrorism analysts in its national-level agencies and in the combatant commands than all the other agencies combined. Hmmm…

End of NightWatch for 8 January.

wm
01-13-2010, 06:55 PM
Here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=91032#post91032)



Something about intelligence theory is basic. The more you know and learn, the more you can know and apply.

Professionally, I would rather use data (scrounged and verified by any sources) to cross-check against field verification and systemic consistency (smell test)) in sets, and update those sets with field changes on as real-time a basis as possible. Then, use that knowledge base to fill in gaps for people while they fill mine. If it isn't engaged and actionable, its just another contract..

Question is: What is needed?

You are correct with the last question--what is needed. We answer that question by knowing what the mission is IMHO and that brings us around to the discussion of the MG Flynn CNAS report.

The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position "the more one knows, the more one can know" (which is fine) to the position "the more one can know, the more one must know."

I'm not at all convinced that simply because we can know, for example, that the soil 10 feet below the surface at UTM grid LC 1234554321 consists of a specific form of clay that we usually need to know that. If I am planning to build another Burj Kahlifa I might need that knowledge, but I doubt it is important if I'm trying to decide where to erect my TACSAT antenna.

Ken White
01-13-2010, 08:04 PM
Though I'd suggest that while Bob is correct on the tactical versus the strategic focus, he and the problem seem to forget that our political system is not conducive to long term strategies. That said, he is correct that our threat-centric intel focus is just really dumbb -- with two 'b's. :mad:

Ergo, a policy reform is required...

Entropy is correct in that many 'intel' errors are a result of lazy thinking and counterporductive (i.e. excessive classification, parochialism and turf battles, political expediency among other facets) actions by some analysts and many Bosses.

Seems like a policy reform might help...

Steve's quote from Night Watch has this gem:
"Its weak point is that implementation relies on the same people who failed, twice."Yet another case of a policy error IMO. Fire a few "pour l'encouragement d'les autres..."

Lastly, WM hits a nail squarely:
"The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position 'the more one knows, the more one can know' (which is fine) to the position 'the more one can know, the more one must know.' "There is no policy that explicitly says do that, rather, our policies -- and our Congress -- lead us to do that because the system has developed numerous rules and even laws to protect itself from accountability. Our deeply flawed budgetary process leads to a winner takes all approach and a 'go along - get along' attitude and set of turf allocations all too often that create a series of very discrete stovepipes that foster the idea that more is better when we should instead establish and encourage competition between agencies and units to produce meaningful intel. Reward those who get it right to spur the competitors to better efforts.

There's little doubt in my mind that sharp analysts in many agencies are delivering good product to their Bosses. The problem is they are being constrained by politically (in all senses of that word) oriented supervisors and / or units or agencies who do not want their Honcho to get upset by hearing things he or she would prefer not to hear.

That too would seem to indicate a needed policy change -- fire about half the senior people in order to get the rest to do what they should be doing instead of what they think the Boss might want.

And foster competition. While centralization will always be more efficient it will also always be less effective. In my view, effective intel trumps the 'efficient' production of something that is not really intel but is instead all too often platitudinous garb -- er, information -- of marginal value...

Steve the Planner
01-13-2010, 08:28 PM
Ken:

Two comments.

First, about secrecy. As I scurried about Iraq in 2008 to collect huge amounts of data, I always heard criticism from others that secrecy would prevent it (they'll never give you that). In fact, everybody I went to (short of a small bunch of spooks) was bending over backward to get civilian=ized declassified versions of things to me. NGA sent a team over to work the whole civilian shapefile/imagery declass and licensing process.

Scrubbing national-scale metadata is a huge undertaking, but they did it, and Al Faw was 100% behind us.

The spooky characters, as I realized later, were the ones who had little to offer, just their own "secret crap" that they didn't know what to do with, and by lack of reciprocity, didn't get anything else. Not productive players, for whatever team they were working with(?).

Second, some of the big obstacles from folks I was working with fell into two categories: Budget and staffing. There was never a time that people didn;t try like crazy to accommodate, but, where they couldn't, it was budget and staffing.

What I did learn, however, was that between reach-back and field, there were huge duplications of service. A lot of work was being done, but of the wrong kind (duplicates) that could have been systematized, freeing up those same people to don more creative and better work.

Lately, what attracts my attention for Afghanistan is how to susbstantially reduce unnecessary deployed staffs, and the obnerous supply chains that go with it. If we get strangled, it will be by logistics and budgets, so why not optimize unity and synchronization of efforts. Less reports, meetings and staff time on duplicating the SOS and PPT, and more point spear stuff (Civil or mil).

Steve

Steve the Planner
01-13-2010, 08:41 PM
Somebody somewhere has built an old fashioned input/output model with constraints on transportation movements (probably Mullah Omar from his new digs in Peshawar), and that will tell the whole story under our latest staffing/deployment models.

I keep reading back to 1920s Iraq. Winnie going for chemicals and air bombardments because it makes the budget and staffing model work on a constrained and extended colony.

Beat that model, and the clocks built into it, and you can win the game.

Steve

Pete
01-15-2010, 12:02 AM
Tom Ricks' blog includes the following commentary from a major working on counterterrorism issues at the Pentagon:


We are currently involved in an insurgency in Afghanistan against a force that is routinely better informed than US forces. The enemy provides a painful example of doing more with less. What's that you say? In the age of information dominance are we not the standard bearers for information gathering and sharing at the speed of light? Yes, we are in the academic sense of having forms to fill out, processes to follow, and more systems than we can efficiently use. We must be dominant because we have a line and block diagram for every occasion. Unfortunately, we focus on the form far more than the function of intelligence.

The entire piece is available using the link below:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/14/does_the_intel_suck_here_s_why

Steve the Planner
01-15-2010, 02:02 AM
Pete:

In civilian life, I do court testimony as an expert.

I'm currently preparing muy reports and testimony for a very complex government case that has been going on for ten years, so I am sitting here going through mountains of records, evidence, underlying court rulings, and trying to develop a deep and richly-supported analysis against the realization that whatever I write or testify to will be grilled to death by two economics professors on the other side armed by the largest law firm in the world.

All kidding aside, the case is about money and government authority---no lives on the line whatsoever, and, ten years from now, no one will ever remember it.

It really is incredible that, where lives are on the line in such a complex circumstance, the so-called warfighter support is so poor.

I have written (or should I say: overwritten factual inaccuracies) in Wiki too often to know the limits of some of the electronic sources.

What's really funny to me in expert testimony matters, too, is that increasingly I see opposing counsel working from electronic research in regulatory cases. The applicable regulation comes up one section at a time despite that a regulation must be read across its entirety. So often, the next section alters the intent and meaning of the last, and they miss that.

E-lawyers versus the old guys that review a printed copy of the entire regulation, which they read cover to cover before developing any positions.

Oh, Brave New World!

Steve the Planner
01-15-2010, 06:42 AM
Pete cites Tom Ricks piece from a Major Nathan Murphy (intel sucks: Here's why).

In his report, the Murphy describes the pressures for quick answers, and the frequent Googling for answers.

One of MG Flynn's criticisms was the lack of relevant provincial/district political/administrative information.

I have a specific interest in provincial/district boundary shifts, particularly in and around national border areas, so I decided to compare what I know to what I could google.

I have a composite map of provinces and districts in Afghanistan and Pakistan which I use to follow events in all these places. The one I use shows the district of Delaram in Farah,with an asterisk that Afghanistan does not formally accept the transfer of Delaram from Nimruz to Farah.

Despite the asterisk, the Census Bureau clearly shows the transfer of the 20,000 residents from Nimruz to Farah four years ago, so somebody accepts it.

Anyway, I wiki-ed the two provinces. For Nimruz, the wiki provincial boundary map includes Delaram in Nimruz, but doesn't list Delaram as one of its districts, nor its component population.

For Farah, it does not show Delaram as one of oits districts or the population of Delaram in its component counts.

Both wiki cites claim to use the 2005 Census, but, probably because the changed circumstance didn't conform with their data transfer, Delaram just disappeared.

Farah/Nimruz, like Uruzgan/Daykundi is one of those places of recent changes. 1970's era maps for Nimruz show it extending up to include Lash-e Juwayn (adjacent to Iran and now a part of Farah), so both provincial boundaries have changed by one hundred miles or more.

When there is not much development/administration going on, these "minor" changes and discrepancies don't seem to matter, but become very important if you want to do something like plan and extend government services.

Particularly, if a place like Delaram, adjacent to Washer and Nad Ali districts in Helmand, is only a short hop (so to speak) from places like Now Zad. Great to have a "hole in the wall" or nonexistent district nearby if you are traveling off-the-record.

So wiki is nice, but it isn't always accurate, or timely.

(Yes, I'll update it when I get a chance).

Steve

Steve the Planner
01-16-2010, 06:42 AM
SWJ has published an article containing the detailed outline of the new Host Nation Information program.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9504

Setting aside the jargon, acronyms and flow charts, the issues, now are:

First, does the system create new and actionable insights into the situation?

Second, how do those insights find their way into application, staffing, activity organization, and, in the end, actions?

In Iraq, our purpose in structuring and assembling this type of information was in order to find a framework for synchronized and properly targeted actions in the post-conflict reconstruction environment.

What resulted was were several key understandings. First, that there had not been an effective plan and course of action. Second, that there needed to be one, and that it must be heavily driven by Iraqis, and based on sound hierarchical actions, and sustainable strategies.

The results were a simplification of focus on clearly identified first-things-first: security, water, energy and power (the preconditions for any future successful efforts). From there, US DoD resources to see, assess, travel, and plan/engineer were used to systematically assess and prioritize project needs (roads, bridges, fuel movement, water & wells, etc...); CERP and other resources were targeted consistent with the priorities (and Iraqi sourced projects were not CERPed in order to focus US funding away from duplication of Iraqi activities. Then, after identifying the Iraqi implementing agencies (mostly national ministries), the MND-N CG implemented a process of "helicopter diplomacy" to substantially reconnect the ministries to the provinces, and link the ministries with the problems.

One critical factor behind the Iraqi strategy was the recognition that relevant Iraqi agencies and leaders had twice rebuilt their country from two devastating wars, and one of which was done under hugely restrictive sanctions. This may not be the case in Afghanistan.

In my view, the effort in Northern Iraq in 08 was to identify the way through to improved post-reconstruction, which, in that circumstance, identified Iraqi-focused solutions to connect Iraqi provinces and ministries, and deliver to them (not us) the knowledge, responsibility and power to move forward on their own. This may not be practical in Afghanistan.

The questions in Iraq were answered there, and thpose answers dictated specific solutions and actions.

If the new information systems answers the same basic questions, what will the answers be, and how we they drive solutions in Afghanistan?

Clearly, it is unlikely that the answers should be the same. Let's see what they learn...

davidbfpo
01-16-2010, 10:30 PM
'Babatim' has commented on MG Flynn's report, as an "on the ground" commentator and outside officialdom worth reading IMHO: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2479


(My added emphasis)This white paper is full of good things but all good things must come to an end and at the end of this paper there are no good things which I can detect.

He then adds a comment by a regular poster on the blog, by an in-country US intelligence analyst:
I read MG Flynn’s paper as well, and while he makes some excellent points, he failed to mention that part of the reason our intelligence sucks is that all our collectors are mostly stuck on the FOB. That’s why we’ve become so hooked on technical intelligence. The kind of relevant intelligence that Flynn yearns for comes from meaningful interaction with the populace, period. In my experience with Afghans, especially Pashtuns, if you suddenly roll up into their village with your MRAPs, Star Ship Trooper suits, and “foreign” interpreters (even if your terp is from Afghanistan, if he’s not from the neighborhood, he’s “foreign”), they will tell you two things: jack and sh*t. We are reminded constantly that Afghanistan is a country broken by decades of war; no one trusts one another. But trust is only obtained by building meaningful relationships with people, and our current force protection policies make the process of building rapport impossible. As I sit here at my desk, on an unnamed FOB in Regional Command East, I would dearly love to grab a few of my soldiers and head out to the local market to see what’s going on in town today. Perhaps I could report back to my leadership that local farmers are concerned about a drought next year because of the light snowfall this winter, or that the mullah down the street is preaching anti-coalition/government propaganda. I’d get this information from shop keepers and kids that I’ve built a relationship with over the past few months. But I cannot just walk off the FOB because that would be the end of my career. Instead, I’m going to check out BBC.com, call a couple guys I know like Tim, and continue to be disgruntled that I have NO idea what’s going on outside my FOB.

I think relationship building has featured before on many Afghan threads.

Ken White
01-16-2010, 10:34 PM
The one precludes the other. You'd think someone would tumble to that simple little fact...

Excellent catch, David.

Pete
01-19-2010, 05:00 AM
The following comments on the Flynn report are by Adam L. Silverman, Ph.D., a civilian analyst who was imbedded with the 1st Armored Division in Iraq:


I have sat in meetings dealing with this issue where the question was repeatedly brought up: "how come we don't have any information from this area?" Looking at the part of the map being referred to the simple response is that there is no military presence in the area, which means no PRT, no CA, and no HTT there either. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil Affairs, and Human Terrain members work very hard, but even they can't bring back primary source data from places that no one is operating in.


My second concern is that the military in general, seemingly derived from military intelligence, has two negative reinforcing dynamics: if you needed to know it you already would and if I know it and you don't, then I'm more powerful than you. Operationally relevant knowledge management will never be effective, regardless of the system that is put in place, until or unless this dynamic is broken! My third concern is that aggregation and collection of data into a centralized location, is still not going to solve the problem. The operational side of the House, whether hungry for information for non-lethal operations or intelligence for lethal ones must be fed!

The entire piece can be read using the link below.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/18/the_flynn_report_v_how_to_feed_the_beast

William F. Owen
01-19-2010, 06:42 AM
Hmmmm... The book on how to collect relevant and actionable intelligence on Irregular Forces is vast and well covered. Maybe someone should study it and make it happen.

Basically MG Flynn could have cut to the chase by saying, "people know how to do this stuff. How come we do not?"

Sorry to sound sniffy, but this is another classic case of most informed folks knowing what to do and what works better rather than worse, and then deciding not to do it, because of some human emotional need.

Steve the Planner
01-19-2010, 12:33 PM
Wilf:

Your apple didn't fall far from the tree.

I didn't meet a lot dummies in Iraq. Quite the contrary.

What I did meet was a lot of people who were mission focus, and not on what "should be gathered," but on what they had to get out today; a lot who collected info and ideas (often outside their immediate lane) but didn't know where to put it for others to use, and folks who, because of limited mobility (too much time inside the wire) tried to make up for it by BSing.

Somewhere in between, once "what is needed" was clearly articulated, the machine stood and delivered. No question that folks know how to do it.

Big question as to whether there is appropriate direction, organization. And, if the system is driven from the top, why are the tops so tardy in putting it together.

No offense but Iraq was chock-full of folks from broad backgrounds with plenty of opinions who had easy access to leaders. The Emma Sky's and others, high-level local nationals and advisors, and the top folks were always out asking them questions, and they, in turn were out sniffing around.

My understanding about Afghanistan is that too many folks are holed-up inside the wire, have limited contacts or communication outside the wire, and not enough energy? creativity? focus? direction? until now.

What's that all about?

Steve

davidbfpo
01-26-2010, 10:27 PM
Hat tip to KOW for picking this up, a ppt by Major General Flynn, entitled 'State of the Insurgency Trends, Intentions and Objectives' (Unclassified) and the link is:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/flynns-state-of-the-insurgency-bigger-stronger-faster/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+KingsOfWar+(Kings+of+War)

KOW has a summary and I cannot improve on it.


Then he drops what might be the biggest bomb in the entire deck: 'The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely' at least in terms of arms and ammunition, funding, and recruits. Now, that is a pretty grim portrait. Of course, the Taliban are not supermen, they have weaknesses and, according to Flynn, they are not yet a popular movement throughout the country. (moving on)

But he does make it clear what he is thinking: 'Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions'.

Seems sound to me. The rub, of course, is trying to turn that good advice into action and then reality.

I am surprised SWC did not pick this up earlier, although the ppt is dated late December 2009. One of the four comments raises issues that have appeared in many threads: end state sought, objectives etc.

davidbfpo
01-26-2010, 10:57 PM
The former UN Afghan intermediary, expelled in 2007, was interviewed AM today on BBC Radio 4; link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00q3fr2

Zenpundit cites Semple, alas without the link or reference, but IMHO accords with his radio interview:
Michael Semple —with two decades experience working in Afghanistan and Pakistan... that the Taliban and its allies cannot win. The balance of power....has shifted toward the Taliban’s natural enemies, and the Taliban hides this reality by dressing their civil war in the clothes of an insurgency being fought against Western powers. If this assessment is right, there may yet be hope for U.S. and allied efforts in Afghanistan.

Link to Zenpundit: http://zenpundit.com/

Ho, hum - a MG -v- an Irishman. Nothing like the un-expected.

Rex Brynen
01-26-2010, 11:48 PM
It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.

I think I've made this point before, the real risk—from an Afghan perspective---is that this become the prolonged reality. The international community slowly disengages from a COIN fight is can't win, but throws enough money and guns at the ANA/ANP, the ex-Northern Alliance, southern warlords, and others (including Iranian support to Hazara militias) to stalemate the Taliban. The Taliban, on the other hand, consolidate practical control over parts of the country, while fighting a continued civil war.

The depressing model here is Lebanon, 1975-90. Everyone (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the PLO, Iran, etc.) simply threw resources at local clients in such a way to prevent their opponents from 'winning."

Steve the Planner
01-27-2010, 12:40 AM
David:

The quote from Sempel is from the CNP conference in November.

Rex:

We are back to the same issue. If the Afghan government does not step up and become effective in at least 80% of the country, and, at the least, reasonably acceptable to a majority 60%+ in each, then we are chasing our tale.

Today, NATO has appointed the British Ambassador as it's Supernumary. No clue how that might relate/conflict with the current civilian effort, but the hope is that during tomorrow's one day conference in London, all things left unresolved for the last decade will miraculously resolve themselves since the newly-elected Karhzai government is on board (unlike the old one that wasn't very well thought of.

Morning is security and international cooperation. After lunch is sub-national governance. Take heart. It will be a completely new day on Friday.

The conference streams world wide so you can watch the miracles live and in color (with the usual internet stutters and delays).

Steve

PS- Sure wish I wasn;t on the same page with MG Flynn--a tough row to hoe.

Entropy
01-27-2010, 03:18 AM
I linked to this presentation in the thread on MG Flynn's report (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=90774&postcount=65) a couple of weeks ago.

Rex,

It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.

That's pretty much where I've been for a couple of years now. Personally, I think Afghanistan is ungovernable in its present state. It's frankly depressing.

Bob's World
01-27-2010, 04:33 AM
It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.

I think I've made this point before, the real risk—from an Afghan perspective---is that this become the prolonged reality. The international community slowly disengages from a COIN fight is can't win, but throws enough money and guns at the ANA/ANP, the ex-Northern Alliance, southern warlords, and others (including Iranian support to Hazara militias) to stalemate the Taliban. The Taliban, on the other hand, consolidate practical control over parts of the country, while fighting a continued civil war.

The depressing model here is Lebanon, 1975-90. Everyone (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the PLO, Iran, etc.) simply threw resources at local clients in such a way to prevent their opponents from 'winning."

And perspectives drive priorities, which in turn shape the nature of engagement.

When one defines 'victory' what perspective, exactly, are they assessing that from? Even in politics we describe these things in terms of one particular candidate or party "winning" and the other "losing." What of the populace? How did the populace fare? Did the people win or lose or really have no change in their lives from the perceived victory or loss?

This goes to what I have described as "Government-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the preservation of a particular government or even form of government over some other); or "Threat-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the defeat of some particular threat) with little regard to the impact on the very populace that is either governed by that government you seek to sustain (or take down, for that matter); or from which the threat one is hard-set to defeat emanates from.

I believe we see a bit of both of this in Afghanistan. We can say we are conducting "Population-Centric COIN", but that is really describing TACTICs, not the strategic/operational focus. At the strategic/operational level we simply cannot seem to wean ourselves from making our priority the preservation of some form or particular man in government; or from the defeat of some particular threat.

This is the phenomenon that I attempted to address in the two papers that I published regarding what I termed "Populace-centric engagement." (Thread and links on SWJ). Suggesting that in the emerging information age with vastly empowered populaces and corresponding evolving perspectives on "sovereignty" that now, more than ever, it might be far more effective to worry less about preserving or defeating governments; or defeating "threats" in the pursuit of national interests; but to instead focus on designing engagement that builds relationships with the very populaces of the world as well.

In reality this in simplest terms is a shift of priority. We state that the Defeat of the Taliban is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state that the preservation of the Karzai Government is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state instead, that enabling stability, good governance, and a positive relationship with the PEOPLE of Afghanistan is our priority.

This puts Mr. Karzai on notice that we are not here to protect, preserve or even support HIM. He is expendable. He must lead, follow, or get out of the way.

This prevents us from painting ourselves into an "exit strategy-less" corner that makes "defeat" of some particular threat the measure of success, when in fact, that threat may well hold a portion of the answer.

This prevents us from designing a scheme of engagement that may appear to make headway in preserving governmental stability in a country, or in quelling threats to that government, but does so on the backs of the very populace that government is supposed to support. I believe far too much of our Cold War and post-Cold War engagement in the Middle East in particular falls into this category. And I believe it is this very form of engagement that forms the existential threat to the U.S.; not the governments or threats that draw so much of our attention currently.

William F. Owen
01-27-2010, 04:46 AM
"The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely' at least in terms of arms and ammunition, funding, and recruits." Now, that is a pretty grim portrait. Of course, the Taliban are not supermen, they have weaknesses and, according to Flynn, they are not yet a popular movement throughout the country. (moving on)

But he does make it clear what he is thinking: 'Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions'.


Sorry you cannot have it both ways. If you cannot defeat the Taliban you cannot protect the population. Strategy is limited by tactical reality. To me the subtext here is "We do not know what to do. We might loose."

a.) Placing physical barriers on the Pakistan boarder is possible, and proven to work.
b.) Surely the strategic objective is to withdraw and let the ANA/ANP kill the Taliban? If the Taliban are so good, why not just let the ANA/ANP use the same methods to defeat them, just funded and equipped by NATO?

Entropy
01-27-2010, 05:16 AM
In reality this in simplest terms is a shift of priority. We state that the Defeat of the Taliban is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state that the preservation of the Karzai Government is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state instead, that enabling stability, good governance, and a positive relationship with the PEOPLE of Afghanistan is our priority.

This puts Mr. Karzai on notice that we are not here to protect, preserve or even support HIM. He is expendable. He must lead, follow, or get out of the way.



Just a few questions.

How do you operationalize such a shift in priority? How do you get the people to trust you, the foreign occupier, over Karzai, the Taliban or the local warlord? Karzai cannot be easily separated from his constituents and base of support. Once he is kicked to the curb, how do you prevent him and his allies from throwing a wrench into your efforts to bring governance and stability to the Afghan people (which is something that's happened at the provincial level on at least a couple of occasions)? Similarly, If defeat of the Taliban is not a priority, then what will prevent them from promoting instability? What do you plan to do about local leadership & powerbrokers, who are the gatekeepers to the loyalty local populations, to say nothing of the major players? Does the US and NATO have the resources and resilience build governance over the long haul provided Karzai doesn't play ball? In short, good governance is your goal, so how do you get there in the mess that is Afghanistan?

Bob's World
01-27-2010, 05:51 AM
Just a few questions.

How do you operationalize such a shift in priority? How do you get the people to trust you, the foreign occupier, over Karzai, the Taliban or the local warlord? Karzai cannot be easily separated from his constituents and base of support. Once he is kicked to the curb, how do you prevent him and his allies from throwing a wrench into your efforts to bring governance and stability to the Afghan people (which is something that's happened at the provincial level on at least a couple of occasions)? Similarly, If defeat of the Taliban is not a priority, then what will prevent them from promoting instability? What do you plan to do about local leadership & powerbrokers, who are the gatekeepers to the loyalty local populations, to say nothing of the major players? Does the US and NATO have the resources and resilience build governance over the long haul provided Karzai doesn't play ball? In short, good governance is your goal, so how do you get there in the mess that is Afghanistan?

Good questions. I once worked for a general who would announce to us staff nugs after we had slaved way at some problem for weeks and had achieved a major success "good job! We are now at step 2 of a 100 step process!" (We were all quite pleased when we were assessed at reaching "step 3")

So, what is step one? Well, much like the steps developed for defeating the destructive behavior associated with addictions, the first step is to admit that you have a problem and need to change. Most addicts don't get to that point until they are face down in the gutter with their lives and every relationship that they once valued in total shambles, and their financial and physical health squandered in the pursuit of their addictions.

I would offer that the US is a bit addicted to power and control, and that I would like to see us have that "come to Jesus" moment far prior to waking up face down as a nation in that proverbial gutter.

Step two is to simply recognize that governments come and go, threats rise and fall, but that populaces, while ever dynamic, are what endure. That by linking our efforts to approaches that prioritize our enduring relationship with the populace in the lands where our national interests may fall is in the long run far healthier than linking them to the current government there or some current threat emerging from there. Deal with those government and threats in the context of one’s prioritized relationship with the populace.

Step three would be a major shift of focus from the "State" Department. We are too designed in name and approach to dealing with "States", yet everyone recognizes the rise of non-states; the growing number of "failed" states, and the growing empowerment of people in general due to the access to greater and faster information. A "Foreign Office" construct is probably more inclusive and descriptive. Once the name is fixed they can then set about looking at how does the US approach to foreign policy need to be tuned up to operate with less friction in the emerging global environment. Certainly they'll still primarily work by through and with states. We hopefully just won't get so tied to the manifestations of government, and grow a better focus on the populace which that governance represents.

(I've never gotten past step three with that one particular general, so I'll stop there. Just getting to step three would be a tremendous shift in the right direction.)

William F. Owen
01-27-2010, 06:42 AM
We can say we are conducting "Population-Centric COIN", but that is really describing TACTICs, not the strategic/operational focus.

It's not even a tactic, and operations are designed to enable tactics. I see no connection with Strategy, except to ensure tactics are delivered at the right time and place.

POP-COIN is rubbish. It's a bad idea born of bad thinking. Why do the POP-COINs are basically dragging the population into the fight. Best way bar none to protect the population is to focus on breaking the will of the enemy.

It works. It's proven to work. What the POP-COINers keep referencing is irrelevant tactical action that has folk believe you are "winning battles" but "loosing the war." This is only true when tactics and operations are done very badly. Winning a battle should inextricably and immediately lead to next engagement. - Which is why the core functions are Find, Fix, Strike, and Exploit!

Infanteer
01-27-2010, 08:06 AM
I think this is violent agreement - isn't focusing on securing the population and exploiting your defeat of the enemy the same thing? I don't think anything will break "their" will more than having the locals tell them to take a hike; at least it seems more productive than killing "them" and waiting for the next guy to pop up and dig into the culvert.

Bob's World
01-27-2010, 08:17 AM
(laughing) you're killing me Mr. Owen, but at least you are consistent in how you go about doing it!:)

As I like to chide my new Brit friends (I've learned not to say "English" after a series of lectures delivered in Welsh, Scottish, and Irish accents...):

"The British Empire was disassembled one military victory at a time."

Feel free to quote me on that. Anytime one is commited to the preservation of an illigitimate government as their going in non-negotiable position, they are doomed to ultimate strategic defeat in addressing the insurgent populace, regardless of how often one achieves tactical victories in battles, or even campaigns.

It is closely related to the famous Vietnam War quote of "We had to destroy the village to save the village." How much of the populace must one kill in order to garner their support?

So, while I hear what you are saying, I will remain in the camp that recognizes the role of military operations in countering insurgency, but only as an inextremis force that comes in when the civil government failures have led to such a lack of control and secuity that they require assistance to bring the situation back within their span of control so that they can get on about the buisnes of addressing their shortcomings and providing good governance.

The military role in insurgency should be viewed the same as the military role in a natural disaster. Last in, first out. Excess capacity that is quickly brought in to curb the crisis, then just as quickly stood down to avoid excessive and inappropriate use of military power.

Viewing Insurgency as warfare, with an enemy that must be defeated, is IMO a very dangerous trap that is fallen in far too often, typically with poor or very temporary results. No one likes being suppressed by the government. Just ask my new Welsh, Irish, and Scottish friends.

William F. Owen
01-27-2010, 10:39 AM
I think this is violent agreement - isn't focusing on securing the population and exploiting your defeat of the enemy the same thing? I don't think anything will break "their" will more than having the locals tell them to take a hike; at least it seems more productive than killing "them" and waiting for the next guy to pop up and dig into the culvert.

Sorry but breaking their will is required. The Taliban are not democrats. They do not care what the population want or think. They want to inflict their values on them.
This is gap between Irregular Warfare and the ever-so context specific ideas about insurgency. The Taliban do not need popular support to take power. They just need to ensure no military force opposes them!

William F. Owen
01-27-2010, 10:58 AM
As I like to chide my new Brit friends (I've learned not to say "English" after a series of lectures delivered in Welsh, Scottish, and Irish accents...):

"The British Empire was disassembled one military victory at a time."

Feel free to quote me on that.
I'll certainly quote you. I collect such quotes as samples of fallacies.

Withdrawing from the British Empire was a plan. It was a strategy. We used force to ensure it happened on our terms. - The loss of Ireland in 1921 was merely a rejection of dominion status. We always planned to leave - as we had in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

We never intended to hold on to the Empire after WW2, and we made no real attempt to expand it, after the death of Queen Victoria. - the reasons are many and well known.

Successful military action generally ensured that we left in good order with a relatively stable government in place. We used force the create the political conditions demanded by the policy.
We withdrew from >60% of the empire without firing a shot.

What Americans seem incapable of learning from British Experience is the application of what is tactically feasible to support strategy. NOT applying a strategy with no clue as to what is tactically feasible.

- Thus you end up with the UK's failure in Basra, trying to operate in a huge city with only about 500 troops available on any one day! - same mistake now in Helmand. - Northern Ireland soaked up 27,000 troops at it's height!

Dayuhan
01-27-2010, 12:01 PM
In reality this in simplest terms is a shift of priority. We state that the Defeat of the Taliban is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state that the preservation of the Karzai Government is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state instead, that enabling stability, good governance, and a positive relationship with the PEOPLE of Afghanistan is our priority.

This puts Mr. Karzai on notice that we are not here to protect, preserve or even support HIM. He is expendable. He must lead, follow, or get out of the way.


What if he can't lead and won't follow, which on the basis of form to date seems likely? How do you propose to get him out of the way?

Bob's World
01-27-2010, 01:04 PM
What if he can't lead and won't follow, which on the basis of form to date seems likely? How do you propose to get him out of the way?

Easy. Pack it up and go home. If's he's legit, he'll prevail against both official and unofficial challengers. If not, he'll soon be replaced and we can make that government the same offer we made him; to be a supportive ally that will not allow them to harbor organizations bent on doing us harm. That in exchange for working with us on that concern of ours we will help them with concerns of their own.

My wife teaches third grade. She sets standards for rewards and punishments with her students and holds herself and them to those social contracts ruthlessly. As a result she has order in her classroom as everyone knows what the standards are and that they will be held to those standards. Our foreign policy is more like the classroom management of those teachers who agonize over hurt feelings if someone gets what's coming to them, or the burden to themselves if they actually perform as promised to either punish or reward certain behavior, teaching the class that the standards don't really mean anything. Those classrooms are chaos, and everyone suffers from it. Our foreign policy could use a good dose of 3rd grade classroom management.

Dayuhan
01-28-2010, 12:35 AM
Easy. Pack it up and go home. If's he's legit, he'll prevail against both official and unofficial challengers. If not, he'll soon be replaced and we can make that government the same offer we made him; to be a supportive ally that will not allow them to harbor organizations bent on doing us harm. That in exchange for working with us on that concern of ours we will help them with concerns of their own.


I think we all know he won't prevail. He'll probably be replaced by the Taliban (with possibly a few equally dysfunctional governments in between), who won't be interested in our help and will not care at all about what we will or will not allow. In short, this brings us back where we were before, which is why Karzai is pretty sure we won't do it.

Seems we're right back to something we've done before: harnessing ourselves to a Government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to fall. Hasn't worked so well in the past, and I can't say I'm terribly optimistic about the outcome this time out.

Bob's World
01-28-2010, 01:51 AM
I think we all know he won't prevail. He'll probably be replaced by the Taliban (with possibly a few equally dysfunctional governments in between), who won't be interested in our help and will not care at all about what we will or will not allow. In short, this brings us back where we were before, which is why Karzai is pretty sure we won't do it.

Seems we're right back to something we've done before: harnessing ourselves to a Government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to fall. Hasn't worked so well in the past, and I can't say I'm terribly optimistic about the outcome this time out.

My concern are the guys and gals who brief him up on his options prior to making those decisions. With an overly threat-focused intel community; and an overly state-foucsed policy team; we are ill equipped to provide him the type of analysis that is most relevant for the world we live in today. Between the "Good Cold Warriors" on one side, and the neo-socialists on the other the voices of reason are either too few or simply not allowed access to the debate.

Dayuhan
01-28-2010, 04:59 AM
My concern are the guys and gals who brief him up on his options prior to making those decisions. With an overly threat-focused intel community; and an overly state-foucsed policy team; we are ill equipped to provide him the type of analysis that is most relevant for the world we live in today. Between the "Good Cold Warriors" on one side, and the neo-socialists on the other the voices of reason are either too few or simply not allowed access to the debate.

I suspect that after our guys and gals brief him on his options (or tell him what we want him to do), his own guys come in and tell him what they want to do... and I suspect he listens more to his own guys. It's easier for him to feed us BS than it is for him the feed it to his own crowd

I think you're probably right about the exclusion of voices of reason..

Steve the Planner
01-28-2010, 05:26 AM
When the debate in the White House is between "fortune telling" military advisers without the underlying research and supporting data, and optimistic civilian advisers attempting, without credible information, attempting to define politically acceptable positions (which may, in the end, prove to be BS), the outcome is predictably political.

They reap what they sow.

My lines can't seem to cross on the point that, if there is no subnational governance structure, there is nothing for us to align to, or turn over to.

Like the Ambassador said, if President Karzai et al, whether through intentional or unintentional flaws, will not accept the burdens and responsibility for self-defense and self-governance, there can be no end game predicated on a free-standing and defensible government (not propped up by "foreign support"), and an effective turn-over of self-governing districts and provinces to a publicly-supported subnational structure.

We are there until we are not---absent a substantive change in conditions.

Dayuhan
01-28-2010, 08:02 AM
We are there until we are not---absent a substantive change in conditions.

I suppose the next question is whether we have the capacity to force any substantive change in conditions, or at least any substantive change that would be consistent with the interests that put us there in the first place.

wm
01-28-2010, 12:18 PM
I suppose the next question is whether we have the capacity to force any substantive change in conditions, or at least any substantive change that would be consistent with the interests that put us there in the first place.

The above quotation exposes the Catch-22 of the situation. If we (meaning outsiders, not the Afghan population) have the capacity to force a substantive change and exercise that capacity, then we have made no substantive change at all. We will have merely replaced one illegitimate government with another. Meaningful and legitimate change must come from within the AOR as an un-coerced expression of what the people living there want or are at least willing to leave with sans dysfunctional expressions of discontent (AKA violence).

Infanteer
01-28-2010, 05:30 PM
Sorry but breaking their will is required. The Taliban are not democrats. They do not care what the population want or think. They want to inflict their values on them.
This is gap between Irregular Warfare and the ever-so context specific ideas about insurgency. The Taliban do not need popular support to take power. They just need to ensure no military force opposes them!

That all sounds good in writing. It'd be nice if the Taliban lined up so I could break their will. What am I to do - start gunning down the 14-year old they get to dig the hole and the 9 year old they get to run surveillance?

I still don't see this great divide between "pop-centric" or "enemy-centric" ways of approaching the problem that seems to be argued about here. I view it in a Clauswitzian trinity. This insurgency, like any armed force, rely on the trinity. The leadership is ensconsed in Pakistan while the armed force really doesn't present itself in time and space in a manner that suites me, so I'll go after the third leg, the people. You'd be surprised how well a friendly hand goes, especially if their is something more in the other hand that benefits them.

Targetting the populace is a means to an end, not an end in itself (which some theorists have billed it as) - a mean to undercut them, push them into the open, and kill the guys who haven't given up because they can make better money with a bit of work than they can dodging aviation to dig a hole by a culvert.

Rex Brynen
02-20-2010, 01:56 PM
Military launches Afghanistan intelligence-gathering mission (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/19/AR2010021904918.html?hpid=topnews)

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 20, 2010


KABUL -- On their first day of class in Afghanistan, the new U.S. intelligence analysts were given a homework assignment.

First read a six-page classified military intelligence report about the situation in Spin Boldak, a key border town and smuggling route in southern Afghanistan. Then read a 7,500-word article in Harper's magazine, also about Spin Boldak and the exploits of its powerful Afghan border police commander.

The conclusion they were expected to draw: The important information would be found in the magazine story. The scores of spies and analysts producing reams of secret documents were not cutting it.

"They need help," Capt. Matt Pottinger, a military intelligence officer, told the class. "And that's what you're going to be doing."

The class that began Friday in plywood hut B-8 on a military base in Kabul marked a first step in what U.S. commanders envision as a major transformation in how intelligence is gathered and used in the war against the Taliban.

Last month, Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the top U.S. military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, published a scathing critique of the quality of information at his disposal. Instead of understanding the nuances of local politics, economics, religion and culture that drive the insurgency, he said, the multibillion-dollar industry devoted nearly all its effort to digging up dirt on insurgent groups.

"Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy," he wrote in a paper co-authored by Pottinger and another official and published by the Center for a New American Security.

...

Entropy
02-20-2010, 02:32 PM
So we are training analysts fundamental concepts afte they arrive in theater? Why aren't heads rolling?

Surferbeetle
02-21-2010, 02:57 PM
We continually see excellent analysis (http://www.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00250/TLO_Uruzgan_Assessm_250835a.pdf) of various areas of operation which describe components of the economic, governance, and security picture to which we allocate substantial blood and treasure to assess, describe, and influence. Our institutional knowledge is currently embodied in people however, and when they rotate out of positions of influence on regularly scheduled intervals, our forward momentum is lost until the newly arriving cohort has learned old lessons anew. Some would say that the promise of digital Knowledge Management is similar to Gutenberg’s printing press; people will only clamor for it if they have first-hand knowledge that it produces something of value that is easy to distribute and use.

A working unclassified common operational picture of an area of operation is within our grasp and it does not require starting from scratch to build something new. Instead, we could require that all personnel who are preparing to head out into theater must have a common training/educational experience with respect to the topic of civil information management. The training cohort would include Military E1 to O-10, DOJ/USDA/USAID/OGA GS-12 to GS-15 as well as SES, DoS FS-09 to FS-01, all contractors, and NATO partners. A 16 hour training block could be required of all and all would use an existing system, designated as the digital Knowledge Management system of record for the civil information portion of campaign, to work through an exercise in which previously gathered unclassified PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) and ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) must be used to resolve a situation in a measureable way.

Although not a silver bullet, unity of effort in the realm of Knowledge Management would be enhanced by requiring this common training/educational experience of all participants in the campaign. Economies of scale could be acheived by using the resulting after actions review comments process to continually improve the digital Knowledge Management system of record for the civil information portion of the campaign as each cohort goes through the initial training event and at regular intervals out in the field.

jmm99
02-21-2010, 03:48 PM
Curious about why in this:


from SB
.... Military E1 to O-10, DOJ/USDA/USAID/OGA GS-12 to GS-15 as well as SES ...

training for mil goes down to E1, but for civ agencies goes down to GS-12 (roughly = O-4 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Schedule#Military_rank_equivalency)). Are GS-11 and below untrainable ? ;)

I expect you have some rationale.

Regards

Mike

Surferbeetle
02-21-2010, 06:42 PM
Curious about why in this:


training for mil goes down to E1, but for civ agencies goes down to GS-12 (roughly = O-4 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Schedule#Military_rank_equivalency)). Are GS-11 and below untrainable ? ;)

I expect you have some rationale.

Regards

Mike


Mike,

Glad to see you are up, about, and sharp as ever. ;)

Could be wrong and mea culpa if so, however it is my observation in my small piece of the battlefield that on the civilian side (http://careers.state.gov/ap-jobs/employment.html) GS-12 + (or equiv) are commonly out and about...

As to the trainable question, I myself started as a GS-3 back in the day, most anyone is trainable it's the positions/opportunities/grades that are limited. :wry:

Best,

Steve

jmm99
02-21-2010, 08:13 PM
from SB

Could be wrong and mea culpa if so, however it is my observation in my small piece of the battlefield that on the civilian side GS-12 + (or equiv) are commonly out and about...

was the rationale. Which I guess could bring up the question of where we would be if the military force consisted only of MAJs and above. ;)

As a practical matter, the civilian "force" is pretty much limited to the provincial level and above. It doesn't have the Willies and Joes to handle my little villages and hamlets. Is that observation about correct ?

Regards

Mike

PS: looking at your DoS link, I find featured: Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 73,100.00 - 113,007.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-3/3; and Provincial Reconstruction Team Senior Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 102,721.00 - 153,200.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-IV/IV.

Where do those fit (approx.) into the GS pecking order ?

DoS's Office of the Legal Adviser (http://www.state.gov/s/l/3190.htm) basically is looking at GS-11 for regular, just out of law school hires and up into GS-15 for non-government laterals:


Compensation and Benefits
Attorneys are paid according to the General Schedule for Federal employees. For recent law school graduates with less than 1 year of relevant legal experience, the standard appointment is at GS-11, step one. Candidates with at least one year of experience, such as judicial clerks, will be appointed at GS-12, step one. Non-government laterals are appointed at the grade level (up to GS-15) and step that they would have earned had they joined the Office directly from law school. On a case-by-case basis, we may be authorized to compensate a newly appointed attorney with “superior qualifications” at a higher step level. Attorneys at the GS-11 level may be appointed at up to step 10 in their salary grade. The possible step increase varies for the higher grades. Salary levels for laterals from other Federal agencies are based on their current grade and step.

Steve the Planner
02-22-2010, 06:50 PM
Mike:

Your question:

"PS: looking at your DoS link, I find featured: Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 73,100.00 - 113,007.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-3/3; and Provincial Reconstruction Team Senior Advisor (ASO), SALARY RANGE: 102,721.00 - 153,200.00 USD /year ... SERIES & GRADE: AD-0301-IV/IV."

The answer is that they don't really. These are all term-assignment specialists whose links to any Common Operating Procedure or institutional framework was always tenuous at best. The first thing you learn about the State Department is how many people genuinely dislike/compete with each other within the organization. But all gather together around outsiders. Term-assignment folks are outsiders, even more so since Mr. Hoh's resignation. Just another of the many out-of-sync organizations and actors.

Beetle's points about a COP are on target, but, if you create one: (1) How do you institutionalize it so that it continues to build and be supported?; and (2) How do you operationalize it?

Right now, Afghanistan is a place of many actors, many actions, but little cohesive or sustainable traction or results. Militaries, civilians, internationals, NGOs.

Hit Marjah; drop in stability and "government in a box;" move to the next square. Come back to Marjah in two years.

So, what do you do with a COP if, for example, the first cut identifies deep structural and organizational divisions?

The problem as I continue to see it from MG Flynn's critique is that Intel has become disconnected from both the field and the actors.

It is not that some guys in some room didn't do a good job, and need to improve what they do in that room. It is that nobody has a clearly and effectively linked path between viable intel, actors and actions. (it is a very deep strategic problem that is not going to be solved in that hut in Kabul)

Better intel must be grounded in operations to become both effective, and sustainable. More action drives the COP; more COP drive the actions. Iterative and inter-active feedback systems.

davidbfpo
03-30-2010, 10:29 PM
Taken from al Sahwa blogsite a commentary: http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/03/fixing-intel-implementing-mg-flynns.html


A recent report written by the RC-West SOIC Director provides an excellent summary of their efforts to stand up one of these SOICs in Western Afghanistan.

There is a potential problem with the report al Sahwa cites, 'The Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) Comprehensive Understanding for Comprehensive Operations' by Regional Command (RC) West SOIC Director; there are two copies available via Google: on Cryptome:http://cryptome.org/dodi/af-soic-2010.pdf and ScribD (which SWC does not use). Neither has clear markings as to released to the public and some diagrams used are marked Unclassified / FOUO (the lowest US classification?).

The report and commentary are a reasonable read and will read again to follow better.

Steve the Planner
03-31-2010, 01:41 PM
David:

Having exhausted myself on the read of so many structural and operational issues, I am still back to several common problems.

First, I still don't see a credible effort at "population-centric" problem definition. To define the problem of one or a series of exogenous actors is not defining "the" problem, but defining "their" problem. Knowing who is in the room certainly defines what their problems are, but it does not indicate anything new or different.

Second, it is still to focused on defining the enemy, and the enemy's activities, rather than defining actual problems to which "breakthrough" solutions can be found. If the population is the target, do we know anything more (or less) about that population, or are we just regurgitating the same old tired crap that produced the same old tired answers?

Third, how does this do anything more than incorporating the buzzwords of civ-mil into an organizational chart?

We started this at the White House---their routine and traditional questions about "the population," the answers for which were non-existent: How many? How are they organized? Who is in charge? what do they need? How does what we are doing hope to change things?

This was followed by reports of a group of intel folks being brought to a hut at Baghram where they were shown the difference between what they produced, and the richer, deeper and more accurate coverage that newspaper reporters were creating in the same AO (including problem definitions and reactions). Why did they know so much more? Why was their take so different? How do we catch up?

Presumably, the purpose of the improved picture is to drive alternative solutions allowing us to, in theory, make substantive operational changes that produce substantially more effective results.

Now, at long last, we have----an organizational powerpoint.

As a consulting expert, I am usually brought in to solve a serious problem, the first step of which is to define the problem (usually a wicked one or I would not be involved). The next is to define options for solutions (usually Gordian Knot stuff).

I cross my fingers that Marjah does not demonstrate the full value of this effort: bringing Karzai and Mullen down to hear local gripes about the lack of paved roads and university education hardly seems like a productive way forward.

According to Bing West's coverage, Marjah was a McKeirnan effort planned months ago, so when does the fruit of the COP/SOIC ripen?

What happens if, for the Kandahar example, we discover that the core problem is Walid, and the folks he is associated with? We say he is a bad actor. The CIA says he is a hero. And the cat-and-mouse game continues. Does it all just stop there (same old, same old), or, does the new improved intel provide a breakthrough?

Steve the Planner
03-31-2010, 02:03 PM
From World Politics Review:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=5358


The Chowkay is one of those places on Afghanistan's fringes that are all but off-limits to foreign forces. The existence of such no-go zones, eight years into the Afghan war, represents a huge obstacle to NATO's efforts to uproot criminality and violent extremism. A lack of resources on NATO's part and the total absence of the Afghan government mean the zones are unlikely to disappear anytime soon.

The Chowkay shura, led by local elder Abdul Ghafai, was the last stop on a mission lasting several hours for elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. It was also a rare event: The last time NATO ventured deep into the valley was in February. Missions that far into the Chowkay are a roughly monthly occurrence, Snowden said. With small contingents of just a few hundred soldiers, each one responsible for several large valleys apiece across eastern Afghanistan, more frequent missions to the more remote locations are impossible.

The Afghan government, for its part, never ventures into the Chowkay unless as part of a NATO patrol. A low-ranking district agricultural official was the only Afghan government representative at the March shura.

JMA
03-31-2010, 03:27 PM
Wilf:

My understanding about Afghanistan is that too many folks are holed-up inside the wire, have limited contacts or communication outside the wire, and not enough energy? creativity? focus? direction? until now.

What's that all about?

Steve

Similar situation existed in Rhodesia where all traditional sources of intel dried up ... and so the Selous Scouts was borne to locate the enemy through pseudo and other OP type operations.

Steve the Planner
03-31-2010, 04:10 PM
Dexter Filkins' latest in NYT indicates that the decision has been made to keep Wali Karzai, then do the best "short-term" fix we can in Kandahar to work around him.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/asia/31karzai.html?src=mv

You just can't make this stuff up.

Sylvan
03-31-2010, 04:47 PM
Dexter Filkins' latest in NYT indicates that the decision has been made to keep Wali Karzai, then do the best "short-term" fix we can in Kandahar to work around him.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/asia/31karzai.html?src=mv

You just can't make this stuff up.

Sherzai gets removed and AWK stays.
And we wonder why things get worse.

Steve the Planner
03-31-2010, 05:34 PM
And that says it all.

The limits of Fixing Intelligence comes when you know the right answers but can't put them into place, so, pretty soon, you stop looking. Something about banging your head against a wall....

I was reading Tom Ricks latest post on a Galbreath presentation at Quantico. Citing an article by Catherine Cloud for Best Defense:


We can't win, he said, because we have no credible local partner. Galbraith, who recently served as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Afghanistan, argued that General McChrystal was tasked with coming up with the best possible strategy to win a war in Afghanistan, not to determine whether or not that best strategy would actually work. The kind of counterinsurgency campaign McChrystal recommended requires an Afghan national army to provide security, a police force to provide order, and a government to provide services and win the loyalty of the people. Of these, we are closest to having a passable Afghan Army. The Afghan police force is far from competent, and -- most importantly -- the Afghan government is widely viewed as illegitimate. Karzai's eight years in office have been marked by inefficiency and corruption. Galbraith believes the next five won't be any better.

Assuming he is still a close Holbrooke protege, it explains a lot about the likely success of the "Civilian Surge." The supposed non-military way out.

That famous line from acting school: "What's my motivation?"

William F. Owen
04-05-2010, 01:33 PM
Big question as to whether there is appropriate direction, organization. And, if the system is driven from the top, why are the tops so tardy in putting it together.
Well merely my opinion would be, why have they not asked the exam question. In irregular warfare the enemy is HARD to find, not impossible. "How do I find that enemy so that I can.....?"

The Emma Sky's and others, high-level local nationals and advisors, and the top folks were always out asking them questions, and they, in turn were out sniffing around.
Do not know Ms Sky, and never met her, but unless she said "you need to find these guys and kill them," then the only thing left unsaid was "do not kill the wrong people. It's counter-productive."

The flow down message from not focussing all military effort on killing the enemy is essentially the armies concerned are simply not good enough to do it. Is that true? I don't know.

Steve the Planner
04-05-2010, 04:02 PM
Wilf:

I think the exam question is misplaced. In irregular warfare, we find the enemy and neutralize them. I suspect that, for the most part, the enemy is known, as are the means to neutralize it.

In this bizarre COIN world, however, what happens when you: (1) find the enemy, but they are the folks you are supposed to support; (2) see that enemy so closely intertwined with undefined externalities that neutralizing them is a separate problem in itself; and, (3) find that the enemy (who we are supporting) is opposed to any path within our resources/capabilities/interests?

I remain concerned that, while the military intelligence community continues to do its thing in a very predictable way, it is missing the point in Afghanistan.

The answers are outside of its analytical sphere, and are not filtering their way in to substantially inform solutions that can work to bring positive transformation.

We can fill this site with answers on the tactics of success in a battle, but not on the strategies of success in a unique multi-dimensional war (or mission, or whatever we want to actually call this thing.

Plenty of folks on this board understand the scope of their sphere---why what is in front of them is not working---and how to alternatively effect what is in front of them. But, at every turn, it is the externalities that limit their success.

Something else is going to need to be developed or to occur. The traditional definitions are all wrong. The traditional questions asked are not the relevant ones. The traditional answers are not useful.

The Graveyard of Empires looms only if the empire cannot adapt to this non-empirical environment. Success is somewhere else.

How do we get at that?

William F. Owen
04-05-2010, 04:36 PM
Wilf:

I think the exam question is misplaced. In irregular warfare, we find the enemy and neutralize them. I suspect that, for the most part, the enemy is known, as are the means to neutralize it.
Well once the enemy is defeated/neutralised, you've won! What's the problem?

In this bizarre COIN world, however, what happens when you: (1) find the enemy, but they are the folks you are supposed to support; (2) see that enemy so closely intertwined with undefined externalities that neutralizing them is a separate problem in itself; and, (3) find that the enemy (who we are supporting) is opposed to any path within our resources/capabilities/interests?
COIN is not a bizarre world. Irregular warfare is very simple. We just choose to ignore the facts.
1. Then they are not the enemy! The enemy oppose you using violence. - so they CANNOT be supposed to support you! You cannot be half pregnant.
2. Then you haven't got point 1.
3. Then what are you trying to do?

In A'Stan the only thing military forces can do is ensure that the Taliban do not take power via force of arms! That is all! What's so hard about understanding that?

Ron Humphrey
04-05-2010, 04:51 PM
Well once the enemy is defeated/neutralised, you've won! What's the problem?

COIN is not a bizarre world. Irregular warfare is very simple. We just choose to ignore the facts.
1. Then they are not the enemy! The enemy oppose you using violence. - so they CANNOT be supposed to support you! You cannot be half pregnant.
2. Then you haven't got point 1.
3. Then what are you trying to do?

In A'Stan the only thing military forces can do is ensure that the Taliban do not take power via force of arms! That is all! What's so hard about understanding that?

As long as the military are also having to fill in the blanks on non-mil stuff required as well then they will also tend to try doing what any good team does. Get actions and what not at all levels to work towards common cause.

Supporting action's/narrative's/endstates/etc
You want to pull a British East India Company, or US Organizations that used to exist at levels capable of supporting this sort of thing out of your back pocket ready to go great.

Till then those there have to do the best they can with what they have.

So although I understand your concern with the "lack" of military doing military only we're all there now, and those Orgs aren't at least in any where near large enough scale to be able to fulfill their roles at levels needed.

So What is the answer you propose besides- We shouldn't be doin that stuff?

Steve the Planner
04-05-2010, 05:00 PM
Wilf:

Nail on the head.

In Iraq in 2007/8 there was a simple mission with a simple objective (end our involvement/turnover to the Iraqis) pursued by two primary elements/people (Crocker/Petreaus) with a common purpose and objective.

If someone believes that the US and West have a continuing governmental interest beyond just a "graceful withdrawal" from Iraq, I would invite them to demonstrate the evidence of that. Sure, we will have some substantial interests, maybe including going in again, but not now.

If we define the mission in Afghanistan as simply to keeping the Taliban from gaining power by force of arms, perhaps we are on track---persistent, continuous deployments, drones, and "village" battles (Marjah, etc.---every six months, a new village to mow the grass in). (Note that that is a far step beyond defeating/destabilizing AQ)

Question is: Whether we can find a "sustainable" and cost-effective approach that is not grounded in huge deployments, great peril and loss of life, billions of effort, and, creates an enduring foundation for self-generated sustainment of an Afghan civilian system that does not invite support (from some population areas) for continuing Taliban-related conflict and destabilization, protects its (sometimes ill-defined) borders, and substantially "controls" its ungovernable spaces?

The confusing mission "leap" (not creep) into defining the above solution as somehow or another springing from, and dependent on, the Karzai regime, and our ability to make them a modern, effective governing regime with a full and complete "writ of government" extended down to the relevant districts, seems to be the Achilles Heel in the latest chapters in western engagement in Afghanistan.

Are there other definitions, solution boxes? Yes.

Are they in the analytical works?

William F. Owen
04-06-2010, 07:35 AM
So What is the answer you propose besides- We shouldn't be doin that stuff?

I would propose seeking to fix the problem, by understanding the limits of the solution - not my place to create policy. That's for the elected official. - but using an Army to do something other than what it was created and designed for is not symptomatic of sound thinking.
I absolutely understand that we are where we are, but that does not forgive the stupidity of how we got there.

Steve the Planner
04-06-2010, 11:21 AM
Ron:

Right. The agencies/organizations needed to effectively engage the non-military issues simply don't exist.

For all the talk of reform/change at USAID, there is no actual proof of that being in the works, let alone accomplished.

There is a CFR interview with Ambassador Herbst (DoS), who heads the SRCS. It is rather sad actually. No adequate resources over a five year period to actually create or deploy much, and most of the early days appear to have ben spent on turf wars (still unresolved). Instead, they have minimal planning and coordinative staffing and resources---enough to field, on average, short-term deployments for 20 or so people to Afghanistan for planning/coordinative activities, mostly in and around the "whole of government" activities.

As Ambassador Herbst pointed out, they just don't have the staff or resources to effectively engage in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I keep looking at the reality versus concept of civ-mil, whole of government, etc... and keep coming back to the same realization as many folks here have. This entire spectrum of activities (civ, mil, stabilization, nation-building, reconstruction), for better or worse, is in the military's hands. Doing it as an accidental or of-necessity quick fix is chaotic and ineffective.

I was reading the recent intel lament on Kandahar (we just don't know enough about the place, who's in charge, what's going on). At some point, the military is going to have to grasp the basic and critical civilian information needed to discharge its default full-spectrum obligations, or it will just continue to mow the grass in a new place every few months.

Frankly, I find the current civilian governance outcomes over the last few years to be the almost inevitable result of the efforts applied. There is just no mystery to this stuff. If you want to create what is there, do what we have done/are doing, add several billion dollars, and wait a few years. (Bad government in a box)

My concern, especially as more soldiers move to a real complex urban challenge environment where intel and effort (at the higher levels) is ineffective, is for them.

God bless the soldiers in the field.

SWJ Blog
04-19-2012, 09:50 AM
Flynn and the Prospects for Defense Intelligence Reform (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/flynn-and-the-prospects-for-defense-intelligence-reform)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/flynn-and-the-prospects-for-defense-intelligence-reform) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
08-10-2012, 08:40 AM
The progress of MG Flynn is noted in an April 2012 SWJ article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/flynn-and-the-prospects-for-defense-intelligence-reform

The report on Afghanistan, the subject of this thread, was his first public appearance - well certainly for over here.

A man to watch IMO.

davidbfpo
10-29-2013, 03:53 PM
Well that is my take-away thought, from a short interview of MG Flynn, DIA and just one Q&A to whet the appetite:
Defense One: Given what we know of the National Security Agency’s massive signals intelligence gathering as a result of the leaks of former contractor Edward Snowden, is there a danger that the human intelligence side of the equation has gotten shortchanged?

Flynn: Well, I will just tell you that the best signals intelligence I have ever seen -- and I have seen an awful lot -- was enabled by human intelligence. The very best signals intelligence is usually the result of someone capable and brave enough to develop access that we otherwise would not have had. And that has led to a lot of successes.

Link:http://www.defenseone.com/management/2013/10/exclusive-interview-dia-director-flynn-why-al-qaeda-still-growth-market/72794/?utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report

davidbfpo
11-21-2013, 10:42 PM
A very short report on a speech @ Brookings, made this week by LG Flynn:
It's important that we leverage the technology in a smart way to understand what it is that's happening at the [tactical] edge and make, to a degree, the edge the center....Cyber is a new domain, and over a third of the world is connected somehow. Five hundred million people on Twitter, a billion people on Facebook, all this volume of activity -- [there is] a lot of noise. Inside the military, there's still a tendency to think of intelligence and cyber as the same. It's not like that at all.

Link:http://fcw.com/articles/2013/11/21/cyber-intell-cooperation.aspx

davidbfpo
04-30-2014, 11:27 PM
I am sure "over the water" there is more reporting than this, but this FP article appears to be a reasonable explanation:http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/30/defense_intelligence_agencys_flynn_leaving_after_r ocky_tenure

davidbfpo
08-08-2014, 03:34 PM
The last official interview given by MG Michael Flynn:http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/flynns-last-interview-intel-iconoclast-departs-dia-with-a-warning/

davidbfpo
06-20-2015, 02:31 PM
A FP comment as Mr Flynn comments on policy and for some comes close to a "chalk line". For me viewable:https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/19/out-of-uniform-and-into-the-political-fray/?

davidbfpo
07-17-2015, 11:10 PM
Nothing like a headline to catch one's attention and yes again ret'd General Flynn sallies forth. This time in a 'Head to Head' interview on Al-Jazeera, due to be broadcast 31st July 2015. Meantime here is a "taster":http://pr.aljazeera.com/post/124230887340/drones-cause-more-damage-than-good-al-jazeera

Asked if drone strikes tend to create more terrorists than they kill, Flynn replied:
I don’t disagree with that..I think as an overarching strategy, it’s a failed strategy. What we have is this continued investment in conflict....The more weapons we give, the more bombs we drop, that just… fuels the conflict. Some of that has to be done but I’m looking for the other solutions.

davidbfpo
08-01-2015, 10:30 AM
His interview is now available, 47 mins long (yet to be watched here) after yesterday's broadcast:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2015/07/blame-isil-150728080342288.html

Bill Moore
08-02-2015, 01:57 AM
For us folks in the U.S. this is the video link to the interview.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaqICPPokhw

Interesting interview, I always liked Flynn, but don't always agree with him. There is some truth to his comments that we invest in more conflict instead of strategic solutions. However, his claim that we could end these conflicts if just invest in developing a new economy in the region is a bit simplistic. Clearly, a growing youth bulge will need economic opportunity, but focusing on economic transformation ignores two key points. First, we don't have the power to transform their economic systems, we can only assist if they want to change. Second, it ignores the fact that these conflicts are being promoted by state and non-state actors seeking power, they're not interested in our efforts to help economically.

OUTLAW 09
08-02-2015, 12:29 PM
For us folks in the U.S. this is the video link to the interview.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaqICPPokhw

Interesting interview, I always liked Flynn, but don't always agree with him. There is some truth to his comments that we invest in more conflict instead of strategic solutions. However, his claim that we could end these conflicts if just invest in developing a new economy in the region is a bit simplistic. Clearly, a growing youth bulge will need economic opportunity, but focusing on economic transformation ignores two key points. First, we don't have the power to transform their economic systems, we can only assist if they want to change. Second, it ignores the fact that these conflicts are being promoted by state and non-state actors seeking power, they're not interested in our efforts to help economically.

In some aspects he is correct--the original arguments of the supporters of the expansion of globalism in fact promised us exactly that--but in fact globalization only benefited the Top Global 1000 and the super rich and did nothing for a majority of the countries.

If one looks at the Arab Springs and the color revolts---outside of the standard demands of rule of law and good governance and pushing back on corruption was the not so subtle demands for economic development and financial security of the various civil societies.

I keep going back to a very long debate I had in Abu Ghraib with a 50 year old Iraqi supporter of AQI-- a shoe manufacturer that complained bitterly to me that the US should stop the importation into Iraq of "cheap Chinese sandals" as he with his 50s shoe manufacturing equipment and very cheap Iraqi labor could not match the actual cost of 1.50 USD in the local markets.

That is when the negative effects of globalization come home.

An American in Iraq hearing complaints from an Iraqi Sunni AQI business supporter about Chinese underpriced sandals being imported and we the US should do something about it.

But again just how many Americans ever get the chance to see those effects up close and personal in other countries?

How much of the US Top 500-1000 have billions parked in overseas accounts because they do not want to pay US taxes for their overseas business---lets say if they invested say just 25% of that into overseas verifiable business/job creation then X amount off their US taxes and the government does not get stuck with development.

It is those Top 500-1000 that have greatly profited from globalization so why cannot they reinvest into return?

If one really looks at that massive amount of migration these days it is from;
1. wars, civil unrest etc
2. economic migration--simply people looking for work and a better economic life

So does it not behoove us to stem the flow of economic migration simply by investing in their future?

In the long run it is probably cheaper that all the wars we have been in -in the last say 15 years.

OUTLAW 09
08-02-2015, 04:51 PM
In some aspects he is correct--the original arguments of the supporters of the expansion of globalism in fact promised us exactly that--but in fact globalization only benefited the Top Global 1000 and the super rich and did nothing for a majority of the countries.

If one looks at the Arab Springs and the color revolts---outside of the standard demands of rule of law and good governance and pushing back on corruption was the not so subtle demands for economic development and financial security of the various civil societies.

I keep going back to a very long debate I had in Abu Ghraib with a 50 year old Iraqi supporter of AQI-- a shoe manufacturer that complained bitterly to me that the US should stop the importation into Iraq of "cheap Chinese sandals" as he with his 50s shoe manufacturing equipment and very cheap Iraqi labor could not match the actual cost of 1.50 USD in the local markets.

That is when the negative effects of globalization come home.

An American in Iraq hearing complaints from an Iraqi Sunni AQI business supporter about Chinese underpriced sandals being imported and we the US should do something about it.

But again just how many Americans ever get the chance to see those effects up close and personal in other countries?

How much of the US Top 500-1000 have billions parked in overseas accounts because they do not want to pay US taxes for their overseas business---lets say if they invested say just 25% of that into overseas verifiable business/job creation then X amount off their US taxes and the government does not get stuck with development.

It is those Top 500-1000 that have greatly profited from globalization so why cannot they reinvest into return?

If one really looks at that massive amount of migration these days it is from;
1. wars, civil unrest etc
2. economic migration--simply people looking for work and a better economic life

So does it not behoove us to stem the flow of economic migration simply by investing in their future?

In the long run it is probably cheaper that all the wars we have been in -in the last say 15 years.

Faced with rising wages and mounting costs at home, Chinese textile manufacturers opening mills in South Carolina (!) http://nyti.ms/1KIKHVT

Bill Moore
08-03-2015, 12:18 AM
If one really looks at that massive amount of migration these days it is from;
1. wars, civil unrest etc
2. economic migration--simply people looking for work and a better economic life

So does it not behoove us to stem the flow of economic migration simply by investing in their future?

In the long run it is probably cheaper that all the wars we have been in -in the last say 15 years.

I don't think migration had much to do with our recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, all the unicorns and rainbows talk about fixing the global economic system, much less a particular country's economic system, is well beyond our capacity UNLESS that country desires to commit to those reforms.

The issues in Iraq and Afghanistan are tied to the ancient reasons people fight: fear, honor, and interests. The key interest is one group desires to have power, and no they're not going to fix the underlying issues related to economic systems that only favor a few, they'll just shift the system so it benefits them.

Globalization is having both negative and positive impacts on the world, and the negative impacts are quite severe. Those impacted by it, like the Iraqi Shoe salesman you referred to would disagree that globalization is neutral. Interestingly enough, Australia, among other rejected the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement recently. I'm not convinced that the globalization we see today is irreversible. When states recognize it is hurting their interests, they'll establish protective barriers. Overtime that could lead to war.

SWJ Blog
09-08-2015, 11:56 AM
Lieutenant General (Retired) Michael Flynn and the Iranian Nuclear Agreement (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lieutenant-general-retired-michael-flynn-and-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

OUTLAW 09
11-29-2015, 03:55 PM
Solid article worth reading although in German.....
Ex-head of US military intelligence, Michael Flynn, regrets killing bin Laden & Zarqawi, turning them into martyrs.
http://spon.de/aeDec

davidbfpo
12-10-2015, 06:11 PM
From an FP email:
Retired U.S. Army general Michael T. Flynn, the outspoken (http://link.foreignpolicy.com/click/5698557.125846/aHR0cDovL2ZvcmVpZ25wb2xpY3kuY29tLzIwMTUvMDYvMTkvb3 V0LW9mLXVuaWZvcm0tYW5kLWludG8tdGhlLXBvbGl0aWNhbC1m cmF5Lw/52543f88c16bcfa46f6e463fBd52811a9) and at times controversial former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has signed a deal with St. Martin’s Press to write a book entitled “The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies,” due out in July 2016.

In a statement (http://link.foreignpolicy.com/click/5698557.125846/aHR0cDovL3d3dy5hZHdlZWsuY29tL2dhbGxleWNhdC9taWNoYW VsLXQtZmx5bm4taW5rcy1kZWFsLXdpdGgtc3QtbWFydGlucy1w cmVzcy8xMTM1OTQ/52543f88c16bcfa46f6e463fB27c68c6a) that came with Wednesday’s announcement, Flynn said he’s writing the book “to show that the war is being waged against us by enemies this administration has forbidden us to describe: radical Islamists.” He also wants to “lay out a winning strategy that is not passively relying on technology and drone attacks to do the job. We could lose this war; in fact, right now we are losing. The Field of Fight will give me [sic] view on how to win.”I did note, probably a week ago, some hostile tweets that he had had appeared on RT as a "talking head".

davidbfpo
01-16-2016, 02:34 PM
"Stranger than fiction", the media outlet, not the content. No it is true and IIRC ret'd General Tim Flynn, who retired from the DIA, has previously spoken to Russian outlets - RT?

Link:http://rbth.com/international/2016/01/14/michael-flynn-we-are-heading-for-a-big-war_559171

OUTLAW 09
07-09-2016, 05:41 PM
Still do not fully understand why the former US General Flynn and former CIA Chief is so close to the Putin inner propaganda circle....

Why did #Flynn attend 10th anniversary gala for Russia Today -- career intell officer celebrates Putin's propaganda? https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/751821573430976512 …

Flynn a strong advocate of cooperation with Putin’s Russia
https://twitter.com/costareports/status/751820676269432832 …

Your guide to Michael Flynn, the Islam-hating, Russia-loving general on Trump's VP shortlist
http://www.vox.com/2016/7/9/12129202/michael-flynn-vice-president-donald-trump …

OUTLAW 09
07-09-2016, 06:47 PM
Still do not fully understand why the former US General Flynn and former CIA Chief is so close to the Putin inner propaganda circle....

Why did #Flynn attend 10th anniversary gala for Russia Today -- career intell officer celebrates Putin's propaganda? https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/751821573430976512 …

Flynn a strong advocate of cooperation with Putin’s Russia
https://twitter.com/costareports/status/751820676269432832 …

Your guide to Michael Flynn, the Islam-hating, Russia-loving general on Trump's VP shortlist
http://www.vox.com/2016/7/9/12129202/michael-flynn-vice-president-donald-trump …

Mike Flynn was a career Army MI officer, a Cold War legacy. He knows exactly what RT is -- and what Putin (KGB ret) is. He has no excuses.

Will Mike Flynn keep appearing on RT if he's VPOTUS?
Asking for a friend.

OUTLAW 09
07-19-2016, 05:18 AM
Former US Intel General and CIA Chief praises the Russian propaganda media RT..........

Flynn gave Putin a standing ovation, at the end of speech praising successes of objective RT
\https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOaQA6uFacA …
https://twitter.com/cjcmichel/status/755237460356034564 …
Free flights to Moscow, free hotel as well BUT won't say if he takes money from RT.

Does he in fact still have a TS/SCI?????

It is also interesting that the well know left wing firebrand radio/TV populist Ed Schlutz also wroks for RT now.......

Those puzzling over Mike Flynn might want to read this story:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/04/donald-trump-2016-russia-today-rt-kremlin-media-vladimir-putin-213833 …

Lastly, here's Flynn (in another Kremlin-funded pub!) defending Russia's Syria position: http://rbth.com/international/2016/01/14/michael-flynn-we-are-heading-for-a-big-war_559171 …

.@GenFlynn joins chant of "lock her up." Says if he did a tenth of what @HillaryClinton did he'd be in jail.

A retired general just called for imprisoning the Democratic candidate. That totally didn't feel like Venezuela or anything. #RNCinCLE

Never watched a convention premised on throwing the other candidate in prison before outside of former Soviet Union.

davidbfpo
07-19-2016, 09:07 PM
A short review by Will McCants of Brookings, of Tim's book 'The Field of Fight and he ends with:
Whatever the case, the muddled argument offered in The Field of Fight demonstrates how hard it is to overcome ideological differences to ally against a common foe, regardless of whether that alliance is one of convenience or conviction.
Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/07/19-michael-flynn-trump-isis-mccants#.V450TpBFh-s.twitter

Bill Moore
07-20-2016, 12:22 AM
A short review by Will McCants of Brookings, of Tim's book 'The Field of Fight and he ends with:
Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/07/19-michael-flynn-trump-isis-mccants#.V450TpBFh-s.twitter

It is increasingly clear that those claiming the current administration doesn't have a strategy are equally confused. Simply stating give more support to moderates or get NATO do more are not prosposing strategies, they're only proposing more means to do what we're already doing. Flynn is crawling on the edge of a razor, he'll eventually fall is. You can critcize and have conflicted ideas until you're the one making the decision. Then you have to resolve your internal conflicts and act.

SWJ Blog
08-01-2016, 07:51 AM
Mike Flynn and the “Howling Waste” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mike-flynn-and-the-%E2%80%9Chowling-waste%E2%80%9D)

Entry Excerpt:



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davidbfpo
10-17-2016, 11:48 AM
Fascinating article, no doubt prompted by his support of Donald Trump:http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/how-mike-flynn-became-americas-angriest-general-214362

It ends with:
For his part, Mike Flynn admits to a sense of deep frustration as he walks through airports these days and sees soldiers patted on the back by an American public and politicians who long ago abandoned the fight. He’s still shouting that the war is not over, and the only way Flynn knows to bring those soldiers all the way home, and keep faith with those who never made it back, is to find a way to win it.Within is a passage on 'talking with the enemy', AQ in Iraq, which I don't recall being public:
As JSOC’s director of intelligence, Flynn interrogated the senior Al Qaeda commanders at length. Sitting across from them at the detainee screening facility at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Flynn wondered why such obviously educated and intelligent people were devoting themselves to tearing their country apart, regardless of the horrendous toll in innocent lives.
“Over the course of all those interrogations, I concluded that ‘core Al Qaeda’ wasn’t actually comprised of human beings, but rather it was an ideology with a particular version of Islam at its center,” Flynn said in the recent interview. “More than a religion, this ideology encompasses a political belief system, because its adherents want to rule things—whether it’s a village, a city, a region or an entire ‘caliphate.’ And to achieve that goal, they are willing to use extreme violence. The religious nature of that threat makes it very hard for Americans to come to grips with.”Amost stranger than fiction. I cannot recall any similar exchange in WW2, leaving aside "listening to the enemy" and the politeness shown at surrender ceremonies. Nor in post-1945 conflicts.

SWJ Blog
11-18-2016, 06:30 AM
Trump Is Said to Offer National Security Post to Michael Flynn, Retired General (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/trump-is-said-to-offer-national-security-post-to-michael-flynn-retired-general)

Entry Excerpt:



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SWJ Blog
11-18-2016, 04:02 PM
Not Afraid To Ruffle Feathers: How Michael Flynn Became A Trump Confidant (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/not-afraid-to-ruffle-feathers-how-michael-flynn-became-a-trump-confidant)

Entry Excerpt:



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SWJ Blog
11-24-2016, 03:30 PM
The Disruptive Career of Michael Flynn, Trump's National-Security Adviser (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-disruptive-career-of-michael-flynn-trumps-national-security-adviser)

Entry Excerpt:



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davidbfpo
12-22-2016, 10:06 PM
A different perspective, an Indian SME's commentary on the Flynn impact on Indo-US co-operation and concludes:
In this background it would be a tough job for New Delhi to forge “closer Indo-US relations” according to our preferences, through Flynn.Link:http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/NewsDetail/index/1/9504/NSA-Doval-Meets-With-Trumps-General-Flynn-Coalition-Against-Radical-Islam

SWJ Blog
02-08-2017, 02:13 AM
Michael Flynn: Trump is Like the Chariot Driver in ‘Ben-Hur’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/michael-flynn-trump-is-like-the-chariot-driver-in-%E2%80%98ben-hur%E2%80%99)

Entry Excerpt:



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davidbfpo
02-13-2017, 09:48 PM
A lengthy, scathing FPRI review of Flynn's 2016 book 'The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and its Allies'.

A sample passage:
Is what he says in these stories actually true? It’s impossible for me to know; there may well be a core of truth in all these stories. But the impression left is that of the making of a megalomaniacal fabulist—someone whose deep and deserved insecurities lead him to daydreams of revenge, victory, and adulation that ultimately displace his grounded sense of reality. If so, it’s easy to see why Donald Trump took to Flynn: Given the nature of the condition, it takes one to (not) know another one.Here's the last paragraph:
This is the world of mental habit that Michael Flynn brings to the job of the National Security Advisor—a job that puts a premium on coordinating the work of large organizations, sharing relevant information in a collegial manner, and generating and deliberating over options for the consideration of the President. It is hard to think of a worse fit. So why did President Trump choose Michael Flynn for this particular job? Please don’t expect me to answer that question.Link:http://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/field-of-fright/

davidbfpo
02-18-2017, 01:32 PM
A well written biography in the New Yorker, some I have seen before, but clearly a few people close to MG Flynn have helped. The impact of one man is emphasized, Michael Ledeen and his critique - to be polite - of Iran.

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/michael-flynn-general-chaos

OUTLAW 09
04-29-2017, 04:36 AM
Azor...BTW..this posting is not a digression BUT goes to the heart of my comments about Trump and his total lack of any FP built on anything that looks like "creditability"...especially in Syria and Ukraine....

NOW will you finally assume the simple fact that the TLAM strike was a true "Wag the Dog moment" because right now it seems that strike made no impression on either Putin and or Assad nor does it look like they got the "Trump grand Syrian strategy/FP message"?

This Trump WH will argue AS does Putin and that alone is strange..."it ain't us...it's them"...exactly as Putin in Ukraine and Syria......

NOW when his own selected NSA is tossed out for lying and under FBI CI investigation for collusion with Russia we get this from Trump himself....

"WELL Obama did it"....


WASHINGTON — Even though he named Michael Flynn to be his top national security aide, President Donald Trump on Friday laid the blame for any flaws in Flynn's vetting at the feet of his predecessor.
In an interview airing Friday evening on Fox News Channel's "The First 100 Days," Trump tried to deflect recent criticism of his decision to appoint Flynn as national security adviser despite Flynn's past lobbying on behalf of Turkish government interests and his acceptance of tens of thousands of dollars from a Russian state-sponsored television network.
"When they say we didn't vet, well Obama I guess didn't vet, because he was approved at the highest level of security by the Obama administration," Trump said, referring to the previous administration's approval of Flynn's security clearance.
"So when he came into our administration, for a short period of time, he came in, he was already approved by the Obama administration and he had years left on that approval," Trump added.
Though Flynn was indeed with the Trump administration for a short period before he was forced out, he campaigned vigorously for Trump for months during the 2016 election battle, including a fiery speech at the Republican National Convention in which he joined in as the crowd jeered Democrat Hillary Clinton. "Lock her up, that's right," he called out, applauding the delegates' chants.
President Barack Obama fired Flynn from his post as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2014, but Flynn maintained a security clearance that was reissued in January 2016. Trump appointed Flynn as national security adviser in January. He forced him to step down in February, saying Flynn had misled senior administration officials, including the vice president, about his contacts with Russian officials.
Trump's comments echoed the defense advanced by his press secretary Sean Spicer on Thursday, as the Pentagon's watchdog confirmed it was investigating Flynn, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, over whether he failed to get U.S. government approval to receive foreign payments.
Among those payments was more than $33,000 from the RT television network, which U.S. intelligence officials have branded as propaganda front for Russia's government. The network paid Flynn for attending a gala in Moscow. At the event, Flynn was seated next to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Earlier this week, the top Republican and Democrat on a House oversight committee said they believe Flynn broke federal law by failing to get permission to accept foreign payments and failing to disclose the payments after he received them.
Flynn attorney Robert Kelner has defended his client by saying that Flynn did disclose the Moscow trip itself in briefings with the DIA, which is a component of the Defense Department. Kelner said those briefings occurred before Flynn left on the trip and after he returned, citing them as evidence that Flynn was forthcoming.
Even though he may have disclosed the trip, both the House committee and the U.S. Army have said they have found no evidence that he disclosed the payments or receive permission to accept them.
In addition to the committee, the Defense Department's inspector general and the Army are scrutinizing the Russia-linked payments as well as Flynn's share of more than $530,000 worth of foreign agent work he did for a Turkish businessman. Flynn acknowledged in a filing with the Justice Department last month that his work investigating a Turkish cleric could have principally benefited Turkey's government.
On Friday, the ranking Democrat on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform faulted the Trump administration for blaming Obama.
"The White House had its own responsibility to fully vet General Flynn since new information became public during the transition — well after General Flynn's last background check — about his lobbying on behalf of foreign interests," said Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Md. "The White House needs to stop making excuses to protect General Flynn."
In addition to the scrutiny of his foreign payments, Flynn's foreign contacts are being examined as part of the wider inquiries into Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign. He has been interviewed by the FBI, which is investigating Trump associates' contacts with Russia, and he is being probed by the House and Senate intelligence committees.If you are President and are THIS uninformed on the USG security clearance processes THEN you have a serious problem or your briefers totally failed you.


"When they say we didn't vet, well Obama I guess didn't vet, because he was approved at the highest level of security by the Obama administration," Trump said, referring to the previous administration's approval of Flynn's security clearance.
"So when he came into our administration, for a short period of time, he came in, he was already approved by the Obama administration and he had years left on that approval," Trump added.

WHAT Trump failed and he did fail badly in an apparent lie...yes Flynn did hold a clearance while on active duty but when he was fired from DIA "for cause" and retired from the military his existing clearance was rescinded/suspended but exists still in the databases....had he then restarted a clearance requiring position within say 30 days of the recension it would have been simply reinstated in full with no reinvestigation but that was not the case and Trump and his merry band knew that from the beginning....

FUN Fact:..who introduced Flynn to Trump......Sessions the AG who has recused himself from all FBI Russian investigations.....coincidence...hardly

When one comes back into a position needing a clearance one must fill out a new SF86 and a reinvestigation starts all over again...BUT you during this period usually get what is referred to as an Interim clearance because a Final existed previously... until your Final is then approved.....

If the reporting is correct the FBI did in fact conduct face to face interviews with Flynn twice in the WH...which is unusual...SOME say it was because Flynn had lied on his SF86 under the section on foreign contacts..foreign earnings and foreign travel...

You personally know you are in trouble if there is a second face to face interview..."to go over your previous statements"...as that means the investigation has turned up something that is a contradiction....

Trump and his WH would have known this but evidently said nothing....

So again if a US President is this so uninformed JUST how is he to develop and drive a "creditable FP"....emphasis on the word "creditable"....

MUCH less "eradiate IS/AQ from the face of the earth"....

FUN Fact..you did see that in the face of Trump/Tillerson threats/deployment of THADD/carrier strike force against NK and the Trump claim China is doing everything for the US to stop NK WHAT was the NK response to the Trump bluff and it has been a bluff

They fired a ballistic missile AND what was the Chinese response..."it is not alone up to China to stop NK"...that message was as clear as water.

So the Trump FP of bluffing..."it ain't working"..and after bluffing what is left outside of war...because you no longer have "creditability".....????

BTW...here is the kicker after the above Trump public Flynn clearance comments....."suddenly" the WH "remembers" they did a background check and "knew about his Turkish lobbying" BUT evidently they missed the fact that this was a cover for Flynn to be paid by Russians for his work via their Turkish cutout...

Which is what now the FBI already knows....so is Trump and his WH racing to get ahead of anything the FBI will be releasing in the coming two weeks?

davidbfpo
12-01-2017, 05:29 PM
From the BBC News:
President Donald Trump's ex-national security adviser, Michael Flynn, has pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the FBI in January.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42192080

After the initial promise, IIRC coming to public notice after his public document on Afghanistan this is hardly the update one expected.