Vertical envelopment and the IED

[zealot66]

I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.

Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.

Also as a tracking, blocking and kill factor , it seems that airborne warefare would provide a quicker reaction and safer transport into a contact. Perhaps, this has been discussed and the reasons why its not being done as much but I'd like some professional opinions on this.

[Schmedlap]

It seems that one would be trading IED attacks for RPG and AA attacks, with the latter offering up juicier headlines (fewer incidents, but more killed per incident). It would also further remove Soldiers from the operating environment, as if sealing them off inside MRAPs had not done this already.

The focus on avoiding IED strikes seems similar to the debate over airport security. If the bomber is at the airport, then something is wrong, regardless of what he faces in the screening line. Likewise the focus on avoiding attacks during movement (whether IEDs against wheeled convoys, AA attacks against aircraft, or ambushes at LZs) should be shifted to stopping them from occurring.

[Doofous]

Air Assault (or Airborne or Airmobile) isn't the solution to Iraq or Afghanistan. Vertical envelopment has its place, of course. But for all the tradeoffs of vulnerability, the decision isn't just about RPGs vs. IED. It has to come down to the purpose of the mission. To connect with IPs and win some old-fashioned hearts and minds, you need to really see people and come into contact with them, not just drop in and lift out of the neighborhood. Aircraft can't linger to form alliances...grunts have historically been the most successful at that, and IMHO, that is what we need to do to begin working with locals and gain their respect.

Close combat with clearly defined enemy forces demands and rewards speed, power and audacity. Unfortunately, our enemy today is like the VC two generations ago...extremely difficult to distinguish from the IPs.

[jcustis]

I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.

Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.

This was precisely what we did during Operation KHANJAR in July of last year. So to answer your question, when you look at that operation, along with other ops like ANACONDA, we have the ability to project combat power through vertical envelopment, but the question comes up concerning why we would want to do so. The reasons are often very specific and attuned to the situation at hand.

This earlier thread highlights some details: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7694&highlight=strike+sword

Heliborne operations are difficult to sustain for a long duration, for a number of reasons. I wish I could post the photo of that mortarman carrying the baseplate and a load of other gear he shouldn't have. That highlights what happens when we try vertical envelopment but fail to fight light enough.

ETA: Just found it!

http://www.captainsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/khanjar_ii.jpg

[tankersteve]

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

[Firn]

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

Very much so. And the heat. And the sweat. Light infantry indeed.

Most of the points have been already adressed. A well armored vehicle is a (very) important element but only the last line of defense against IEDs. The COIN operations in Rhodesia and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that well designed armored vehicles play a very important part in troop survivability, but have also important drawbacks (greatly increased fuel consumption, reduced mobility, lesser situational awareness). Finding the right mix and balance as well as adjusting it in time and space is the great difficulty, as war is no science but art.


Firn

[Eden]

Other reasons why we travel on the ground:

We are, in fact, short of helicopters in Afghanistan. More are being sent, or so I glean from open sources, but we lack the resources to move many troops around by air. Moreover, any heliborne insertion results in a continuing committment of aircraft to logistically support the inserted force. Our allies are especially short of helicopters - I know it is something of a national scandal in the UK.

Also, the environment in Afghanistan makes employment of helicopters problematical in many areas due to climate and elevation.

[zealot66]

Thanks for the input. I know that COIN requires sustained presence on the battlefield. I was really curious on the supply of helo's in the area. Its just so frustrating to see a good many men die without confronting the enemy and just get whacked by a roadside bomb.

It does make sense that in being on the ground and clearing, holding and building will yield intelligence on who and where the ambushes take place. Gary Schroen in his book, first in in 2005 decried our resource allocation to Iraq and pretty much predicted what would happen in afghanistan. Little resources people and machines and believing the terrs have departed the region only to come back in droves. Again, thanks for clarifying some issues. I aint been there so its hard to understand some methods and why.

[Steve Blair]

If you review some possible lessons from Vietnam, you find that potential LZs are also quite susceptible to IED-type activities (the NV/NVA used to booby-trap LZs with unexploded bombs or shells, Chinese claymore copies in trees, and so on). So it doesn't necessarily get you around the issue, and in fact it can make it more complicated (downed birds and all that).

[Schmedlap]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base. Once curfew was lifted, the IED emplacers would come out. Anyone seen emplacing an IED was killed on sight. Suddenly, people were less enthusiastic about emplacing IEDs. The psychological impact was significant upon potential adversaries (most said, "screw that") and upon the populace (when lots of IED emplacers are shot in the chest from a single gunshot that comes out of nowhere - at least once per day - there is a sense that the Americans are now in control of security and the insurgents are dead men walking). Fewer IEDs improved our mobility, which made it easier to emplace fire teams in a wider variety of positions and continue to spread paranoia among our adversaries and reassurance among the populace.

[Doofous]

And there's a parallel with the value of vertical envelopment. In Vietnam, the shock value of airmobile tactics was compromised by two factors: telegraphing the arrival sites and times, and essentially utilizing the Hueys as aerial taxis to bring troops in and then have them simply walk around on random search-and-destroy missions that were based on a feeling that the enemy would be where we land -- classic military projection of your wishful thinking onto an enemy's likely decisions -- and a plausible explanation for why we were less effective than we could have been. We took a lot of casualties on LZs to booby traps (that's how I got mine) and snipers.

[Infanteer]

Flying to work, like driving to work, is part of the "commuting" problem.

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

[Tracker275]

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

Very accurate statement. What most folks seem to forget is that what may be the most technologically advanced military in the world is being bogged down by folks that operate more fluid and in an asymetrical descentralized operations strategy. The more we rely on technology, the more they will identify the weaknesses with far less money than it took for us to develop and defeat what they have thrown at us.

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.

What it comes down to in a nutshell is that no matter how you cut it, the faster lighter, and more adaptable force has proven to never win the battle, but win the war. This has been proven against the United States since the 1960's. The concept of "Light Infantry" has been destroyed by the modern day rucksack and the technological gadgets that we are forced to take with us onto the battlefield. Why is it that the RTO has to carry a 40lbs radio with spare battery and kit only to maintain commo sometimes spotty at best, and the insurgent uses a satphone that fits in his pocket and gets common 100% of the time?

You can't fight an unconventional war with conventional tactics. That is a proven fact. As I have previously stated, you will win the battle, but you will never win the war. If our ultimate focus is on staying on the roads most of the time, then you have set yourself up for failure in that you now channeling your forces into a choke point that is miles long. The balance between armor and mobility are a very tricky balance, and if the focus is entirely on defensive postures, then we have lost the best defense, which is a good offense. TTP's change constantly, however the US military does not move as fast as the battlefield. What always remains a constant about an IED, is that someone has to place it somewhere and it has to wait for someone to go by it. Personally, I have yet to hear of a foot patrol in who knows how long get attacked by an IED (I'm not talking about a foot patrol being dismounts either) here in Iraq, but I regularly go to scenes where vehicles have been hit. The one thing that we all laugh about here is that the Iraqi insurgents can't shoot.

So, if that is the case, why do we place ourselves in situations that they really do know how to do, and that is setup an IED?

Granted, this is my first post here, but this is my $0.02 on this subject for what it is worth.

[zealot66]

Thanks for that last post. It seems that light and mobile and good soldiering is the way to go. Any military that garrisons itself either thru heavy equipment or literal garrison without going outside the wire is outmanuevered by enemy. When contact occurs, the pursuit should ensue. I realize with IED's this isnt going to happen all the time but an idea of lightinfantry tactics to seek out and meet the enemy is better in the long run than riding around waiting.

[Xenophon]

There are other ways to mitigate the IED threat. Probably the best one is the one Schmedlap posted. Another is to decrease the size of A.O.s so that mounted patrols are not so necessary, but this is not always feasible and requires a larger amount of troops. The other is to stay off the roads by conducting dismounted patrols or, conducting old school mounted patrols via horse/donkey/camel (the original All Terrain Vehicle). But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV (one of the few times you'll hear me advocate a technological solution) but for large scale logistics I think the loggies are still going to be provisional route clearance for a long time.

[Rifleman]

But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV

In Vietnam, I believe the Mobile Guerilla Forces (Blackjack Projects) sometimes resupplied with fast movers dropping canisters. Basically like a bombing run. So I think your UAV idea for resupply has merit.

[Xenophon]

Yeah, I'm thinking just a flying pallet. Troops at a rear base strap on some boxes of ammo, some MRE's, some medical supplies, a "pilot" flies it out to the COP, then the troops there unload it, maybe throw on some empty ammo cans, an EPW or two, then the "pilot" flies it back.

[William F. Owen]

Yeah, I'm thinking just a flying pallet. Troops at a rear base strap on some boxes of ammo, some MRE's, some medical supplies, a "pilot" flies it out to the COP, then the troops there unload it, maybe throw on some empty ammo cans, an EPW or two, then the "pilot" flies it back.

You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!

[slapout9]

You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!


It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

[slapout9]

Original Hiller Flying Platform......made good Helicopters and VTOL Aircraft too.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwhBWxc0SSM&feature=related


That's Ken White driving it.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm rather surprised, Slap, that you missed the opportunity to mention this particular marvel of modern flight (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNWfqVWC2KI) :D

[slapout9]

rex, I am not allowed to expose any secerts of the Redneck Air Force:D

[Pete]

I wasn't in Vietnam, but I've heard that helicopter landing zones there could be extremely dangerous places. I'm sure our current adversaries would quickly figure that out and adjust their tactics accordingly. A guy I served with, now a retired lieutenant colonel who was in Vietnam, said he was amazed to see how slow soldiers were to exit helicopters during a training exercise he witnessed in the 1980s. He mentioned it as an example of how skills degrade when they are not frequently practiced.

[William F. Owen]

It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

Actually, I'm pretty against AIR CAV.
AIR SUPPLY, AIR MARCH and AIR SUSTAIN, all make sense to me, but using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

OK SOF may have some applications, but I just don't see putting Support Helicopters in harms ways as something sensible folks should do.

[Rifleman]

.....using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music? :D

Sorry, I just couldn't resist! :p

[John]

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

Chief Bratton (Chief of Police) NY, Boston and most recently LA - used to have his officers ride public transportation to work periodically so they saw the streets as did the people. I submit Soldiers have to do the same thing.

[John]

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music? :D


Don't surf!

[William F. Owen]

However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

All true, if done badly by stupid people. None of that is true, if done well, by a well-trained Army. All the negatives you cite had no impact on UK operations in South Armagh, or even the use of helicopters in other theatres, such as South Arabia, and Cyprus.

[Pete]

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The following is from American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:


Seeking to improve mobility, an Army board in 1962 [the Howze Board, named for its president, Lt. Gen. Hamilton Howze] had compared the cost and efficiency of air and ground vehicles. Concluding that air transportation had much to commend it, the group recommended that the service consider forming new air combat and transport units. The idea that an air assault division employing air-transportable weapons and aircraft-mounted rockets might replace artillery raised delicate questions about the Air Force and Army missions, but Secretary McNamara decided to give it a thorough test.

Organized in February 1963, the 11th Air Assault Division went through two years of testing. By the spring of 1965, the Army deemed it ready for a test in combat and decided to send it to Vietnam, where the war was heating up. To that end, the service inactivated the 11th and transferred its personnel and equipment to the 1st Cavalry Division, which relinquished its mission in Korea to the 2d Infantry Division and moved to Fort Benning, Georgia. Renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the reorganized unit had an authorized strength of 15,787 men, 428 helicopters, and 1,600 road vehicles (half the number of an infantry division). Though the total of rifles and automatic weapons in the unit remained the same as in an infantry division, the force’s direct-support artillery moved by helicopter rather than truck or armored vehicle. In the same way, it employed an aerial rocket artillery battalion rather than the normal tube artillery. In all, the division’s total weight came to just 10,000 tons, less than a third of what a normal infantry division deployed.

[TYR]

From my experience in Afghanistan I defiantly felt we needed more helicopters. The problem I see is that when helicopters are used they are not used properly. Most times a unit infiltrated right on top of their objective. All surprise and security was lost and usually the unit damaged the local’s private property in the process which isnt good if you want to make friends. I guess if you are going to plan for failure and land on top of your objective then yes you are taking a chance of getting RPG’d or shot down with a SAM. Sometimes I thought that some of those units who planned those operations wanted to replay “Blackhawk Down”. I was always a proponent for conducting an operation over a week or more, inserting far enough away from the objective area and walking in moving along the high ground to get to our objective area. After all, the enemy was using the high ground as well to move from village to village. In most cases the enemy wasn’t in the village anyway, but rather using Sheppard cabins further up the mountain or valley then coming down to do their business with in the village. Most village elders wouldn’t let the insurgents live within the village anyway. The village never wanted to risk getting extra attention from the coalition. Every time we walked in using the high ground the locals as well as the enemy were surprised and wondered where we came from. The further we were inserted from the Objective area the more success we had. The closer we inserted to the target area we always ran into a dry hole. If we inserted using vehicles we moved at night using non standard vehicles. The insurgents would never risk IEDing a Jinga truck for fear of turning the locals against them. After disembarking we moved on foot to high ground. When we got to the target area again we had success. It only takes one time driving down the restrictive roads in Afghanistan and getting IED’d to understand that whatever you are doing is probably not the preferred method. The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process. Not to say we shouldn’t move on the roads at all, but maybe employ a more balanced approach of getting to the objective. Airmobility defiantly can give you an advantage in Afghanistan. But it takes planning and resources. However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.

[Ken White]

Who made the first helicopter borne assault on 21 Sep 1951 (LINK) (http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles/history/innovations/operation_summit). They were far ahead of the Army in chopper use by 1960, much less by 1964. Still are, in many respects.

The Howze Board and the Air Assault test showed every flaw later to become apparent in actual Army helicopter operations. However, the Army wanted Birds so reality was not allowed to intrude. In the test, the rule was that if you could get the aircraft's full visibility tail number, you could consider it killed and the umpires would credit it. One little Airborne Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, on that two week test exercise in North and South Carolina, accounted for 20 plus Chinooks and over 100 Hueys--plus three Mohawks.

All that said, the birds do have their place, TYR is right on setting down elsewhere and walking to the objective -- which, as Wilf notes, is the right way to do it and does not cause the isolation phenomenon. The down side is that it takes longer. That is bad for overly impatient and demanding US Commanders who try to operate on a peacetime schedule (the MTCs teach bad habits as well as good...). It also means the troops are exposed (which of course, they should be...) but that is apparently not done today. :eek:

Never enough time to do it right...Combat is dangerous... :wry:

Who knew...:cool:

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution...

[Ken White]

shows that even though you were in the Army and now read a lot, you still don't really understand that Army...;)

I don't drop and give anyone 20, have not since jump school much less making SGT and that long before being a SGM. Nor did I ever 'drop' people, that's a stupid punishment or harassment that accomplishes nothing except antagonizing the troops needlessly. I have yet to see a few pushups make better Soldiers or clean a weapon or a latrine. All minor froth in any event as I'm not a SGM anymore, just an old retarded silly-villian who dang sure doesn't do pushups for anyone.

No. I'm not quibbling, now and only rarely otherwise. I'm merely expanding on your post. I'm also pointing out that your inference; the Army did this years ago, while correct apparently inadvertantly omits the fact that the Marines got there long before the Army did and refined the process perhaps more rapidly.

My post does refer back to the thread in the context of other recent posts and thus wasn't just another link or two posted with no real discussion. It also tried to add some context to your blind posted links and quote, thus I was trying to help, mot quibble. :wry:

You'll note I added mention of the Air Assault II Exercise and Test. It was conducted actually after that Resolution in October of '64 but it is, I think, relevant to this thread in the sense that said test showed all the flaws later operational experience with helicopters has revealed. As I've suggested before, if you want to flood the area with links, fine -- but we would hope you had some thoughts pertaining to them to add to the link.

In any event, I'm totally unsure what the relevance of the Howze Board being conducted before the Tonkin Resolution has to do with Vertical Envelopment and IED's as this thread has developed and I'd really appreciate knowing what that connection and point happen to be. :confused:

[Pete]

Ken, the "drop and give me two-zero" post was made in jest. I deleted it about 15 minutes after posting it when I thought it might be misconstrued--if you were offended I apologize. I enjoy the perspective and institutional memory you add to this forum and a few of the published anecdotes on the '50s and '60s I've posted here have been deliberate attempts to draw you out.

I brought up the subject of the Howze Board because Slapout had said that air cavalry was implemented for Vietnam; Willf added his thoughts on air mobility. I was reluctant to directly contradict anyone but thought some background on how the air mobile division came to be would add to the discussion. Usually when the Army makes a ruling on a concept the basic idea has been under consideration for quite some time, often on an ad hoc basis. It's a bit like the Army R & D stuff I used to do as a contractor--there's no funding or official backing to do any work until there's a TRADOC-approved requirements document.

In March 2003 the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, V Corps, took quite a beating in the vicinity of Karbala. I don't know what impact it may have had on air mobile doctrine and tactics.

[reed11b]

I have some STOL UAV plans from an old school FAC that had some published articles on UAV concepts a while back. They kind of address what Xenophon is saying though they are longer range in concept. I'll have to see if the owner of the concepts is okay with me sharing. There was a double ducted fan VTOL UAV design a few years back by the same company that was trying to make backpack vtol that was meant for resupply type missions. My though is that they would have to be able opperate autonomously to be viable.
Reed

[tankersteve]

They were conducting a deep attack against a brigade (I believe) of Iraqi armored forces. This was an AH-64 force. The attack was not coordinated well with any SEAD and the force got fired up quite a bit by small-arms fire, to the point that they couldn't continue the mission.

So what is the relevance? Well, the Army seems to be forgetting about deep attacks and is focusing on Apaches conducting direct support to ground forces - and are doing an excellent job of it. If reacting to a TIC, they show up overhead, and talk to the ground force commander, telling him what he has, and for how long, and asks for an update on the situation and what the ground force needs him to do. Simple, no JTAC/Anglico to work through, on regular FM nets. If it is a preplanned mission, a bit of coord can make sure that they have the same mission graphics that the ground force is using.

I am not an expert on Air Assault missions, I am just a big fan of the direction that attack aviation elements have gone. I would not be surprised if the deep attack has fallen completely out of favor, freeing up a lot more Apaches to work with the guys on the ground.

By far, the easiest and most responsive aviation asset available to the ground force maneuver commander.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

Not offended, just have a long term antipathy to dropping or 'smoking' people -- idle harassment IMO. I've never seen any benefit in it. None. The concept raises my hackles and being a curmudgeon, I tend to curmudge about it... :rolleyes:

Thanks for the expansion on the original post, that places it in context and makes sense. Might I suggest that wasn't apparent to an old slow Dude like me. The younger folks may have instantly gotten the connection but many of my synapses have synapped... :o

No need to try to draw me out, best bet is just to ask a question and I'll answer as best I can or admit I'm clueless (a frequent occurrence). Some folks post with a lot of links, I use very few. Everyone has their own techniques, which is fine but this is a discussion board where one can say what one thinks and ask questions, it isn't a forum where brevity is desired (good thing or I'd be in deep yogurt...). :D

As Tankersteve says, aviation doctrine is evolving and mostly for the better. Helicopters are great items of equipment but like anything else, they have to be used as designed and the limitations have to be respected. We misused them in Viet Nam (badly in some cases) and the Karbala attack was an exercise in bone stupidity. However, we are getting better.

Interestingly, Howze -- a former cavalryman and one of the better Generals of his era (he was the best XVIII Abn Corps Commander I've seen thus far, probably as good as was Ridgeway) was way back then adamant that attempting to directly attack ground elements with Armor and ADA using gun ships was excessively dangerous and that airmobile raids with carefully chosen LZs and the guns in support were the best use of airmobile assets...

He also said they'd be used for log support and overflying significantly dangerous terrain or routes subject to heavy attack -- and he pushed for more heavy birds (Chinooks) versus the lighter ones (UH1 / UH60). Unfortunately, he lost that one but the Marines listened and thus are replacing their Phrogs with Ospreys and the 53E with the K model...:cool:

[Pete]

Thanks Steve. Perhaps "Aviation doctrine and tactics" were the words I should have used.

Edit:
Ken, I'm glad you weren't offended. For a moment there I thought you might have something against people who live in West Virginia!

[82redleg]

In preparation for "WW3 (TM)" in Europe, Aviation (specifically, attack aviation) convinced the Army that they were a maneuver branch, vice a fire support element (witness the use of the Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion in the Vietnam-era Air Cavalry Division, vice the normal GS 155/8in composite BN). I think that Karbala finally showed the fallacy of this, and since then, attack aviation has generally been employed as a fire support asset (witness TankerSteve, and the increased emphasis on CCA).

As a fire supporter, this is a good thing, IMHO. It emphasizes the necesity of integrating the aviation plan into the ground plan, which sometimes falls by the wayside when you treat your aviation as a separate maneuver element.

[Ken White]

That move, IMO, was as bad as making SF a branch. Both fields originally were effectively branch immaterial and Officers from all branches got to fly and do SF things -- they then rotated back to the 'Big Army" and spread their wealth and knowledge and the two specialties reaped the benefit of a far larger pool of incoming folks which forestalled a lot of bureaucracy and inbreeding. It was beneficial for everyone. The Warrants in both branches (SF later) and the NCOs provided continuity and the system worked quite well. This from a guy who actually wore Branch Unassigned brass and had no beret even if he did have an 'S' suffix on his MOS in the days prior to the 18 series...:wry:

However, it was a pain to the Per community who cheerfully supported separate branches to lighten their workload -- great Guys, they're always giving...:rolleyes:

The few to many (it varied from time to time dependent upon the attitude of the Army leadership to the specialty in question) malcontents who argued for pure Branch status with the expectation that 'everything will be better, we'll be richer, we can write our own doctrine and we can control our own destiny...' have found out that it may be better in some respects but it's worse in others -- and it isn't much more wealth-showering, their doctrine is still shackled and they do not control their own destiny.

The Army, Aviation and SF all lost a bit...

Pete: How can anyone who reveres T.J. Jackson as one of his major Gods have anything against West by God... * :D

( * aka Byrdland ;))

[slapout9]

I brought up the subject of the Howze Board because Slapout had said that air cavalry was implemented for Vietnam; Willf added his thoughts on air mobility.

I said implemented....It was invented in about 1947 by General James Gavin and was original to be called the "Sky Cavalry Division".
If you can fins a copy of Airborne Warfare by Gavin you will see a drawing of what looks like a Chinook Helicopter offloading what looks like a half track for WW2.

I will try and find some links laterbut they are out there.

[slapout9]

Pete and all go to this thread that I started awhile back to find out what we really need to defeat IED's;)


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=49251#post49251



Also shows what the Army Air Cavalry should have for VTOL intead of Osprey thingy.

[Pete]

I was under the impression that Special Forces became its own branch mainly so its personnel wouldn't be discriminated against by their primary branches--perhaps the Aviation branch was brought into being for the same reason. At a Hail and Farewell in Germany as a lieutenant I sat next to the father of one of our lieutenants. He was an unassuming guy and I asked him whether he'd been in the Army, and he said yes, he'd retired as a major. Callow youth that I was, I wondered what he had done to screw up and only go that far. It was several years later when I was out of the Army that I read that Major Clyde J. Sincere of Special Forces had been awarded the DSC for his performance in a firefight in Vietnam. :o

Before First Manassas Thomas Jackson fought his first engagement as a brigade commander not far from where I live in the vicinity of Martinsburg. My impression of the "foot cavalry" aspect of his operations is that it was something he had learned before the Civil War as a light artilleryman. The modern field artillery has the acronym RSOP for reconnaissance, selection, occupation of position. Jackson had his mapmaker Jed Hotchkiss and he also had his staff make him tables of distances between various points in the Valley. Thus he was planning the routes of march of his command with the same attention to detail that an artilleryman uses to plan the movements of his battery.

[Ken White]

There was discrimination but much of it was simply that the guys were supposed to alternate SF or Flying tours and normal branch assignments and many (but not all) did not want to do normal branch assignments. This caused hair pulling by the Branch 'managers' and usually ended up antagonizing everyone involved...

Sincere was a Mike Force guy and later SOG, long time airborne head, When Creighton Abrams died and Fred Weyand became the Chief of Staff in 1974, the Army underwent a purge of the 'Airborne Mafia' -- a lot of old parachute hands were either told to retire or given really poor assignments from which the only escape was to retire -- many did. That purge went from LTGs down into the enlisted ranks; I was flatly told I had too much overseas time, too much airborne time, too much troop unit time and that I'd never again get an airborne Assignment, would go to TRADOC -- which I'd avoided for 25 plus years and that would be followed by a reserve component advisory job -- unless I wanted to go ahead and retire. So, a lot of good folks were retired too early. Abrams wasn't nearly as anti-airborne and SF as he's been painted; Weyand OTOH was really not a fan... :( :wry:

Ah, wonderful Martinsburg. Many fond memories from training at Camp Dawson a few times. Yep on TJJ -- Hotchkiss was a distant relative, mutual several Greats Grandparent was a Co Cdr in the Continental Line at Cowpens among other places and later got a land grant in Kentucky. TJJ got more brevet promotions for bravery in the Mexican War than anyone else and he was prone to put his guns where others would not... :cool:

Speaking of guns, best Arty thing I ever saw was two M110s firing simultaneous direct fire at 350m at an unsuspecting column of troops...:D

[Tracker275]

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces. I wasn't able to really see where anything was going very clearly after that, because there were a few posts that were more meant for PM conversation vs. open forum.

If this thread would like to continue in the direction that I believe the originator intended, I think that the time that TYR put into a response is well worth reading and restarting from that point. There was a lot of good information that TYR placed in there that answers a lot of questions about what would be ideal for the Afghanistan theater. Much of what he and I stated appears to be tied together real closely, and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities. However, I'm not seeing the lessons learned within both theaters being looked at very closely by senior leadership.

[William F. Owen]

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces.
Welcome to information age. The same happens in conversations.
Much of what he and I stated appears to be tied together real closely, and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities.
Noted. Some more detail perhaps?
The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process.
What is a “decentralize” Light Infantry concept? In an age of good HF radios, digital comms and SAT phones I think we have to be pretty careful of our descriptions of C2, and support.
The real issue here lies with the force protection postures and an inability to assess the comparative risks in line with the force protection policy.
However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.
The RLI Fire Force concept was born of necessity in not having a not enough helicopters, and very small army in a huge country. The trick wasn't the jumping out of DC-3's but the cueing of the strike action based on surveillance and intelligence. - so the "jump" was the easy bit.
It did work well against a very low quality irregulars, but it would have had real problems had the Terrs got more MANPADs (- and they had them, but only used them on airliners) and been skilled enough to stand and fight in numbers - something they only seem to have done very rarely.

[Ken White]

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces. I wasn't able to really see where anything was going very clearly after that, because there were a few posts that were more meant for PM conversation vs. open forum.That's one way to do it, others may have a different take. Best solution it seems would be to just ignore the digression and say what you think is important.If this thread would like to continue in the direction that I believe the originator intended.I think he got his question answered and left... :D I think that the time that TYR put into a response is well worth reading and restarting from that point...and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities. However, I'm not seeing the lessons learned within both theaters being looked at very closely by senior leadership.I suspect the last point is due to their recognition that the real answer to the original query is very much dependent on the old METT-TC factors (and, in this case, ALL of those factors) and what else is going on in the theater or area. That is, there are so many variations that the question could be discussed for a great many years with continually evolving answers. That and the fact there is no best answer...

You and Tyr both had good points, so did several others who apparently digressed from the thread and some who did not digress also had good ideas and comments. Discussion boards are like that. The bad and the good all roil together. ;)

[qp4]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base....

Also in 2005 we did the exact same thing. We had a COP about 12km from our main FOB that had only three roads in, so naturally these chokepoints became one of the most contested areas in our OE. After three months of dedicated SKTs and observation by tanks, we were down to one road that stayed red and two roads that were black. The AO continued to deteriorate for the next three years (that COP was the home of both DUSTWUN events in Iraq).

It got so bad that helicopters were being used as a transport rather than ride the roads. And as John points out:

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

And that AO that got so bad? It started to get better when we started walking everywhere.

v/r,
qp4

[zealot66]

Im still here. You all have alot more experience in debating this issue that I do. My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue. I think that terrain, strategy and even a landmine vs an IED demand differences in employment of troops. It is just a sick feeling to watch our casualties from IED's knowing that they werent even the result of a contact just some kid with a remote control. Keep going. I look at this board everyday and consider it an education.

I find the above posts about landing patrols away from the target and walking to a target very interesting and in though the terrain in afghanistan might prohibit some of this, The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?

[Ken White]

The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?The factors of Mission, Enemy, Troops available, Terrain, Time and local Civilians will affect every operation and those factors are infinitely variable. That essentially means that we are sometimes, perhaps even often, using them to their fullest. As for enough; depends on your viewpoint. In all cases, they have to be purchased, equipped, supplied and refueled and rearmed -- it boils down to what can be afforded. I'm sure most ground commanders believe there are never enough, the aviators from all nations do the best they can with what they have and believe the ground guys do not use their air assets as well as they should. The truth as usual lies somewhere in between.

As for setting down away from the objective, terrain is generally not an obstacle to dismounted troops (and if it is an impediment, it affects the bad guys as much as own troops) -- weather is always a factor and time becomes the issue and the (often presumed...) prohibition...

[Stan]

My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

One of the minor setbacks we discovered in Afghanistan was many suspected hazardous areas were found not to be contaminated with land mines and the other side of that is the misconception that WE share the international community's goal of a mine-free end state. Just a tad un-realistic, as well as not in keeping with our current approach to mine clearance - we actually hope for a mine impact-free end state.

The assumption is that our plans are effectively designed and managed :rolleyes:.

[davidbfpo]

Zealot66,

I know a few here will interested in the end product of:My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

I recall some Rhodesian annoyance - after 1980 - to find that the South Africans (SADF) had developed their anti-mining equipment and had not shared this with them. The SADF deployed their kit in Angola and SWAfrica - where I expect ex-Rhodesians, now in the SADF noticed. IIRC Peter Stiff authored a book on the Rhodesian counter-IED programme.

[jcustis]

The objective area vs. Walk in issue was the exact issueI looked at in a MC Gazette article a ways back that analysed Fire Force. We can technically do it, BUT I don't think we are doctrinally organized to do it.

[Pete]

Wait a minute, Mr. Custis, you wrote that article on the Rhodesian Fire Force concept in Marine Corps Gazette. Was the reluctance to walk to the objective mainly to enhance the speed of execution?

[jcustis]

If by THAT article you mean the one circa 2000, yes, that was mine.

Was the reluctance to walk to the objective mainly to enhance the speed of execution?

With this question, are you asking about the Rhodesians? If you are, I think the actions of the various elements (RLI, RAR, etc.) that provided Fire Forces were founded on the mobility that the helicopters provided first and foremost, but you have to remember the factors someone else already described.

The Rhodesian Sec Forces were very small, considering the land mass they were responsible for. With that in mind, and considering the fact that multiple sightings of terrorist "gangs" could be made in a single day and in a single ops area, the Rhodesians generally could not afford to walk to the objective. It just took too much time. That's not to say that they never walked about...it's just that in order to reset the Fire Force, the techniques employed worked best when they were dropped straight in. Please note that the Selous Scouts and C Sqdrn SAS boys did plenty of long range inserts to gain observation over enemy infiltration routes, encampments, etc.

Of note is the fact that the terrorists would often split up into very small groups (either on purpose or plain lack of discipline) and "bombshell" out for some distance before trying to go to ground. In order to assess the avenues of escape that they might try to use, the command helicopter usually pulled right into an orbit over the target area, so it makes sense that the maneuver sticks that were dropped in followed the same route and went straight to the area. Fire Force was the classic employment of counter-terrorist techniques that we hear argued for by some with regard to Afghanistan. It was conducted in a COIN campaign for sure, but the techniques only solved a single problem set.

I disagree with Wilf that Fire Force was borne out of the lack of helicopters. The use of old CH-47 Dakotas for parachuting sticks in was a result of the lack of aircraft, but the Fire Force was born out of precisely the mobility that the Alouettes and later Bell Hueys (only dispatched for FF work infrequently if I remember correctly) provided.

I also disagree that the concept would have had problems if pitted up against a more determine foe that employed more MANPADS. Although they didn't employ active anti-SAM measures in the way of IR decoys, the flight profiles employed and exhaust manifolds bolted on did work to an effect. It's also important to remember that the FF did not just stumble into a target area based off of some fleeting spot report. An OP was typically in position with a view of the tgt area, and knew the terrorist composition, strength, and armament, and had fed the information via radio retransmission to the ops center responsible for the FF strike.

If the terrs had decided to stand and fight, all the better targets for the 20mm Hispano autocannon and the .303 quad guns. They would have had a success here and there for sure, but I'm not certain it would have been operationally significant unless they brought down more than 10 helicopters. I cannot remember the numbers of aircraft actually shot down, but I think there were more incidents of combat accidents than anything else. And if the SAMs had become an issue, I suspect that the Rhodesians would have simply started attaching snipers to the OP teams so that those threats could be addressed.

We could achieve similar effects for sure with unmanned aerial systems in overwatch of a terrorist encampment, but we just employ Hellfire and JDAM to resolve those matters if the collateral damage factors don't give cause for concern, but I am convinced that there is no better ISR sensor than the Mark I, Mod I eyeball. In the Afghanistan context, we have to remember that the bad guys over there have a background in baiting and setting traps for heliborne forces employed by the Soviets, and the terrain in much of the country supports that sort of defense. I don't have a crystal ball view on what they might do against a force organized and employed like a Fire Force, but that goes back to my earlier point about the doctrinal issue. We simply do not keep the ground force commander aloft anymore, like the FF commanders did, and that prevents us from being able to effectively assess just what is going on relative to the threat's actions.

ETA: I think a great resource for training to this standard would be to start with FF vets, and supplement that with time spent talking shop with police chopper pilots from the large metropolitan depts.

If we were to put heliborne forces into an area to go up against some knuckleheads laying over on their way to say, Kandahar, methinks that we would need lots of them, and about five times the size of Fire Force elements in order to cover the various ratlines involved. There is a certain mobility luxury that the enemy might enjoy in the way of a brace of mopeds and red racing stripe Toyota pickups.

[Bob's World]

Probably the most effective LOO for reducing IEDs is to be much more aggressive in our IO campaigns, locally and globally, challenging the manhood of any Pashtun who would let an IED do his fighting for him. We cannot underestimate the power of the offensive warrior culture on these people. Sneaky defensive tactics are beneath them. We need to rub that in their faces.

Meanwhile there is no easy button cure to massive logistics packages that we must move daily. Those big diesel generators all over your FOB are sucking down fuel like rush hour traffic in LA. You won't fly that in with a UAV, or a C-130 for that matter.

Blowing up or sniping kids and night laborers hired to dig in IEDs is no solution either. Poppy money fuels this insurgency, and there are an endless supply of people who will work for cash; and the second order impact on creating anger and dissent among the populace by targeting these workers is far too significant to ignore.

I suspect going after IEDs is a lot like going after pirates, in that if you are looking on the roads and the high seas you are going after the symptoms and not the roots of your problem. There are key nodes to IED networks that must be ID'd and reduced or mitigated, and they are in the neighboring towns and extend into Pakistan and Iran. Similarly pirates are probably more effectively dealt with on land than at sea. We just need to step back from the problem far enough to see the solution.

Meanwhile, its a dangerous, high-stress world out there for a lot of our guys each and every day. Keep them in your thoughts and prayers.

[Infanteer]

I suspect going after IEDs is a lot like going after pirates, in that if you are looking on the roads and the high seas you are going after the symptoms and not the roots of your problem. There are key nodes to IED networks that must be ID'd and reduced or mitigated, and they are in the neighboring towns and extend into Pakistan and Iran. Similarly pirates are probably more effectively dealt with on land than at sea. We just need to step back from the problem far enough to see the solution.

I agree with you. We could wack IED makers and emplacers until the cows come home. Getting rid of IEDs is essentially getting rid of "ambushes".

In a small town, small town people pay attention to strange people (local or not) doing strange things. Small town people talk lots. Think of your own neigbourhood. If something out of place was on your street or backyard, you'd have a good idea that something was up. Small town people also generally know what goes on around their village - especially on the areas they frequently traffic (which are also areas you usually frequently traffic). They just have to be convinced to come forward with that information.

[davidbfpo]

From Bob's World above:Probably the most effective LOO for reducing IEDs is to be much more aggressive in our IO campaigns, locally and globally, challenging the manhood of any Pashtun who would let an IED do his fighting for him. We cannot underestimate the power of the offensive warrior culture on these people. Sneaky defensive tactics are beneath them. We need to rub that in their faces.

Bob,

From this faraway armchair this LOO (method) is not effective. Frontier warfare in the Imperial era was rarely a "stand up" fight, ambushes were favoured, albeit with rifle fire, not IEDs (although I think they were used) and within the Pashtun culture is are such 'sneaky tactics' contrary to their culture? My reading is that they are not. Add in the Soviet experience and the apparent success in the use of IEDs - hardly a good starting point for an IO campaign.

I anticipate some of those with real experience may be restrained from comment.

[Infanteer]

From this faraway armchair this LOO (method) is not effective.

Actually, you'd be surprised.

[William F. Owen]

Probably the most effective LOO for reducing IEDs is to be much more aggressive in our IO campaigns, locally and globally, challenging the manhood of any Pashtun who would let an IED do his fighting for him. We cannot underestimate the power of the offensive warrior culture on these people. Sneaky defensive tactics are beneath them. We need to rub that in their faces.

Have I understood you correctly, Bob? Why? I cannot think of any circumstance where that would succeed. What's more is I think an assumption that this argument could sway them verges on painting them as stupid and irrational.

Are such "Sneaky defensive tactics" beneath us? Can of worms?

....and I think it would backfire badly, when the Pashtun watch us call in fire-support, or the mention the fact that we have women flying combat in the theatre.

[Rex Brynen]

Have I understood you correctly, Bob? Why? I cannot think of any circumstance where that would succeed. What's more is I think an assumption that this argument could sway them verges on painting them as stupid and irrational.

My thought too--and as earlier mentioned, ambushes are very much the traditional Afghan fighting style.

[Ken White]

Not to mention promising to do things one has no intention of doing, being hospitable to one's guests while under the roof then killing them as soon as they cross the threshhold outbound -- or siccing the women and kids on the casualties of enemies. :wry:

More cultural wishful thinking, perhaps...

[Bob's World]

I think I actually laid out an array of activities to employ...but thanks for focusing on the first one as if it were the only one!

And no one assumes these guys are smarter, or tougher than I do.

I just figure if what is doing isn't working, one should try another tact. We are under-employing the IO LOO on all fronts, this one included. It won't cure the problem, but it will help.

[Firn]

My thought too--and as earlier mentioned, ambushes are very much the traditional Afghan fighting style.

Well ambushes are a favorite traditional welcome party for pretty much every tribe or folk living in the mountains. Oetzi the Iceman was killed by an arrow into the back by friendly people waiting hidden near the traditional resting place on this path running over the Similaun pass. A true Hunter's shot into the heart.

Dear Hannibal met a couple of other, initially very friendly people as he tried to cross the Alps:

"So long as the Carthaginians had remained in the plains the various chieftains of the Allobroges had left them alone because of their fear both of the Carthaginian cavalry and also of the barbarian troops who were escorting them. But as soon as the latter had set off for home and Hannibal's troops began to advance into difficult country, the Allobrogian chiefs gathered a large force and took up commanding positions alongside the road by which the Carthaginians would have to climb."

"In the narrow pass the marching column was rapidly losing cohesion; there was great confusion and excitement amongst the men, and still more amongst the terrified horses, so the tribesmen, in the hope that any hostile action by themselves would be enough to complete their discomfiture, came swarming down the rocky and precipitous slopes, sure-footed as they were from long familiarity with their wild and trackless terrain."

Another place, another ambush:

"The natives, springing from their places of concealment, fiercely assaulted front and rear, leaping into the fray, hurling missiles, rolling down rocks from the heights above."


This tradition continued happily:

Frederick's brother, Leopold of Austria, led an army of 3000 to 5000 men — about one third of them knights on horseback — to crush the rebellious confederates, planning a surprise attack from south via Lake Aegeri and the Morgarten pass and counting on a complete victory over the rebellious peasants.

The Confederates of Schwyz — supported by the Confederates of Uri, who feared for their autonomy, but not supported by the Confederates of Unterwalden — expected the army in the west near the village of Arth, where they had erected fortifications. A historically plausible legend tells of the Knight of Huenenberg who shot an arrow into the camp of the Confederates with the attached message "watch out on St. Otmar's day at the Morgarten".

The Confederates prepared a road-block and an ambush at a point between Lake Aegeri and Morgarten pass where the small path led between the steep slope and a swamp. When about 1500 men attacked from above with rocks, logs and halberds, the knights had no room to defend themselves and suffered a crushing defeat, while the foot soldiers in the rear fled back to the city of Zug. A chronicler described the Confederates, unfamiliar with the customs of battles between knights, as brutally butchering everything that moved and everyone unable to flee. This founded the reputation of the Confederates as barbaric, yet fierce and respectable fighters.

Note the great use of IRD (Improvised Rolling Devices), which were also greatly used during the Napoleonic wars and resurfaced as avalanches triggered purposefully by artillery fire. IRRC the Indians quickly rediscovered this specific method during the Kargil war. During all that time the simple stone powered by gravitation proved ever handy for the defender...


Considering history I'm pretty sure that human creativity in harming other humans knows little to no bounds and that the mountains make some designs more effective than in other places. Fighting smart can mean using those. This poses quite some challenge for the soldiers fighting there. The Helicopter can be part of the solution.


Firn

[zealot66]

Im reminded of a story I read about the Australian SAS doing 7-10 day recce's on main trafficways. SOP for the aussies to focus on good eyeball recon before moving assets in. They used this to good effect in vietnam. Using a small reconnaisance force and then moving larger troop movements into an area. Well, because they were not in command and control, this specific area intell on the IED activity was disregarded by the US and sadly several Marines were killed on this roadway.

I dont know what the standard is for US troops being out in observation posts and staying put but it was insinuated that the US is impatient in their reconnaisance and intelligence gathering and just balling it down the road or into an AO. Drones are not going to pick up everything and there is no replacement for eyes on target or humint.

Hopefully, the winter will provide a time for a complete intelligence build up for the spring offensive where the taliban are apparently staying put and waiting for the fight in Helmand province.

Again, Im an amateur in this field and I have read each and every post and appreciate the input.

[Ken White]

I just figure if what is doing isn't working, one should try another tact.I've often been assured I have no tact... :D

I do BTW, agree that what we're doing now is not working but I also don't think your suggestions will work either. The basic problem is that we are trying to do something that is just not going to be accomplished. IOW, the Goal is unachievable and should never have been undertaken. Therefor much of what anyone suggests is unlikely to 'work.' :(

Zealot66

The Troops of the 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div when in Kandahar during 2005 and before being relieved by the Canadian 1/PPCLI in 2005-06 were routinely pulling week plus dismounted and two week or more mounted patrols, all resupplied by helicopter. Those patrols were variously in Platoon or company strength and were quite successful. I have no idea why the technique is not used by others. :wry:

Or maybe a little bit of one... :rolleyes:

[Bob's World]

I've often been assured I have no tact... :D

I do BTW, agree that what we're doing now is not working but I also don't think your suggestions will work either. The basic problem is that we are trying to do something that is just not going to be accomplished. IOW, the Goal is unachievable and should never have been undertaken. Therefor much of what anyone suggests is unlikely to 'work.' :(

Zealot66

The Troops of the 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div when in Kandahar during 2005 and before being relieved by the Canadian 1/PPCLI in 2005-06 were routinely pulling week plus dismounted and two week or more mounted patrols, all resupplied by helicopter. Those patrols were variously in Platoon or company strength and were quite successful. I have no idea why the technique is not used by others. :wry:

Or maybe a little bit of one... :rolleyes:

People talking tactics, then someone jumps in and drags the conversation to the strategic level! I guess I stepped on that one Ken, nicely played...


Certainly, IMO, the critical issue that must be addressed in order to reduce the number of landmines in Afghanistan is the perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government. I believe an open, all stake holders invited, Loya Jirga is the best way to address that top strategic issue. This will have best impact on getting the TB leadership to stand down (or "reintegrate and reconcile")
TB leadership is largely waging a Revolutionary insurgency, so their incorporation, in a controlled, reasonable fashion, into governance makes sense.

As to the fighters themselves, they are largely fighting a resistance insurgency. Affairs in Kabul don't mean much them. They fight us because we are here, and because the TB leadership, flush with Poppy $$, can pay them a day’s wage for a day’s work, (which by the way most men find the preferred way to feed their families, not taking charity from some foreign NGOs). Even if that day's work is at night putting in IEDs or joining a team of fighters. We best address resistance insurgency by simply going home. Success with the Loya Jirga above allows us to VASTLY reduce our presence.

The fly in the ointment, is that no one can predict or control the results of a true Loya Jirga; thus why it is perceived as legitimate. Thus why the elections we enabled were NOT perceived as legitimate (did anyone wonder what the results would be??)

So, yes, I have strategic ideas as to reducing IEDs.

I also believe based on my training and experience that an IO campaign that hammers over the radio waves here (these people for large part do not read, so leave your flyers and billboards at home) the honor of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun people, and cowardly attributes of IEDs that kill local women and children as well as the foreign soldiers, is an important step that needs to be stepped up. Not a cure all, there will always be those that will rationalize it to be within the "rules."

[Cole]

It's not related to aviation and IEDs but the Israelis used to drag fences behind their patrolling jeeps to leave a unique pattern in the ground so anyone crossing it would leave footprints. Same principle applies to detecting anyone digging IEDs. I also recall sitting on the beach at Tel Aviv and watching all different kinds of helicopters constantly fly by along the coast right after the Palestinian intifada attempted a rubber raft beach landing back in 1990. Use air routes paralleling key ground routes and have a constant stream of aircraft watching for trouble.

Liked the idea of using helicopters to drop off 2-man to fire team sized OPs with good optics at multiple high terrain OP locations each night along troubled routes to include false insertions. Then have the helicopter return to base and pick-up a second squad and go park somewhere nearby on secure terrain to prepare to respond to any problems detected. Or monitor the OPs using loitering UAS with an Apache/UH-60 QRF ready to respond.

[Ken White]

People talking tactics, then someone jumps in and drags the conversation to the strategic level! I guess I stepped on that one Ken, nicely played...Just stating that it is my belief that we are pursuing the old impossible dream...

I don't disagree with what you suggest and I strongly agree that what we're doing now is not working, Yet, I really doubt your suggestions will make much difference if implemented. Unfortunately,we cannot leave just yet and are thus doomed to a holding action. Damned if we do, damned if we don't. Your oft stated advice to think about what we're trying to do before we implement is totally valid -- unfortunately, no one did that in 2001... :mad:

[Rex Brynen]

so too is disappearing when confronted by superior force

There's an excellent example of this, and of the Taliban scout/picket/sentry/early warning system, in today's NYT:

As Marines Move In, Taliban Fight a Shadowy War (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/world/asia/02taliban.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global-home)

By C.J. CHIVERS
New York Times
Published: February 1, 2010

KARARDAR, Afghanistan — The Marine infantry company, accompanied by a squad of Afghan soldiers, set out long before dawn. It walked silently through the dark fields with plans of arriving at a group of mud-walled compounds in Helmand Province at sunrise.

The company had received intelligence reports that 40 to 50 Taliban fighters had moved into this village a few days before, and the battalion had set a cordon around it. The Marines hoped to surprise any insurgents within.

But as the company moved, shepherds whistled in the darkness, passing warning of the Americans’ approach. Dogs barked themselves hoarse. The din rose in every direction, enveloping the column in noise. And then, as the Marines became visible in the bluish twilight, a minivan rumbled out of one compound. Its driver steered ahead of the company, honking the van’s horn, spreading the alarm. Spotters appeared on roofs.

Marine operations like this one in mid-January, along with interviews with dozens of Marines, reveal the insurgents’ evolving means of waging an Afghan brand of war, even as more American troops arrive.

...

On the morning of the sweep, made by Weapons Company, Third Battalion, First Marines, a large communications antenna that rose from one compound vanished before the Marines could reach it. The man inside insisted that he had seen nothing. And when the Marines moved within the compounds’ walls, people in nearby houses released white pigeons, revealing the Americans’ locations to anyone watching from afar.

The Taliban and their supporters use other signals besides car horns and pigeons, including kites flown near American movements and dense puffs of smoke released from chimneys near where a unit patrols.

“You’ll go to one place, and for some reason there will be a big plume of smoke ahead of you,” said Capt. Paul D. Stubbs, the Weapons Company commander. “As you go to the next place, there will be another.”

[motorfirebox]

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.
How much does location matter? What sorts of tools/equipment are necessary for creating these devices? The reason I ask is, if the requirements for building these devices are low, then hunting for locations may not be the best way to go about it. If all you have to do is assembly and some spot welding, for instance, then trying to find the location will be almost as difficult as searching for the devices themselves.

[reed11b]

Liked the idea of using helicopters to drop off 2-man to fire team sized OPs with good optics at multiple high terrain OP locations each night along troubled routes to include false insertions. Then have the helicopter return to base and pick-up a second squad and go park somewhere nearby on secure terrain to prepare to respond to any problems detected. Or monitor the OPs using loitering UAS with an Apache/UH-60 QRF ready to respond.

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what? Who knows, not I, and I am in one.
Reed

[Firn]

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what? Who knows, not I, and I am in one.
Reed

Two generations ago pretty much every countryboy here was able to construct traps to poach rabbits and other small animals. Even deers were caught rather easily (and cruelly) by using a certain type of wire tied to a noose and a bit of knowledge about their tracks. Trapping is certainly one of the oldest and yet most efficient ways to capture animals that mankind has created. Given all that creative booby trapping in the last centruy I'm not surprised at all that it is used in ever shifting shapes in the current conflicts.

Large parts of Afghanistan should be almost ideal country for LRS. A good location and good spotting scopes should enable you to detect a human from as far as 20+ km. This is just to show the capability of a good glas. Some Israeli units use excellent Swarovski.

@Rex Brynen: An interesting article. Nothing new under the sun, but it reinforces the need to reach or observe the objective without raising the alarm. This topic has been already adressed both at the strategic and the tactical level.

@Cole: Without knowing the specific instances of the use of such dragging devices I highly suspect that they use it to create an additonal layer of defense along their patrol routes. IIRC similar ideas were used along the German-German border. I doubt that they are as useful on the roads in Afghanistan which are used by quite some people.


Firn

[tankersteve]

"It's not related to aviation and IEDs but the Israelis used to drag fences behind their patrolling jeeps to leave a unique pattern in the ground so anyone crossing it would leave footprints. "

the Russians found that the Afghan fighters would bury mines in the road and then 're-print' the tracks of the vehicles that had previously passed, completely disguising the location of the mine.

Following in the tracks of the previous vehicle, if not immediately afterward, is not a sound technique. There are even mines that wait for the second vehicle to pass before exploding, IOT defeat overpressure mine clearing.

Unless we had a troop and sensor density that would preclude people from emplacing IEDs in anything other than a very hasty manner, we can always expect to find more of these weapons. And it still does nothing to defeat the individual from wanting to employ them.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what?You're absolutely right and so is Firn:Large parts of Afghanistan should be almost ideal country for LRS. A good location and good spotting scopes should enable you to detect a human from as far as 20+ km...Unfortunately, both your points are moot due to a combination of turf battles (Branch vs branch for the BfSB + USSF vs Big Army for the LRS mission), mediocre to poor training and extreme risk aversion.

Use of LRS has been severely constrained in the current operating environment by all three. There have been some notable successes but few Cdrs seem willing to take the nominal risk...

[zealot66]

Suprised this novice started such a long thread. Im an armchair historian and I cant help but think that in 10-20 years, people are going to be studying the question of losses due to the IED and mistakes overzealous, hardcharging glory hounds ran their men into bombs instead of methodical painstaking recon and more ways to lower the body count.

Booby traps in vietnam caused a ton of casualties but I see that in a different light of the jungle vs more open terrain. Instead of trying more soldiering skills and intelligence, it seems that America just tries to build bigger more expensive vehicles. Like I said, it just aches to hear of another casualty due to IED. Didnt even get a chance to fire at the enemy. I know its a painful reality of controlling the AO to be mobile and presence on the ground but There has to be an answer.

[Cole]

the Russians found that the Afghan fighters would bury mines in the road and then 're-print' the tracks of the vehicles that had previously passed, completely disguising the location of the mine.

Following in the tracks of the previous vehicle, if not immediately afterward, is not a sound technique. There are even mines that wait for the second vehicle to pass before exploding, IOT defeat overpressure mine clearing.

Unless we had a troop and sensor density that would preclude people from emplacing IEDs in anything other than a very hasty manner, we can always expect to find more of these weapons. And it still does nothing to defeat the individual from wanting to employ them.

TankerSteve, hear you on your last sentence, but while foreign fighters planting bombs in Iraq are no longer welcome, that isn’t true in Afghanistan. COIN techniques might persuade homegrown Taliban not to plant IEDs, but do little to deter non-local Taliban from Pakistan madrassas or the Chechnyan with a big bag of fertilizer.

As you point out, unpaved roads in Afghanistan simplify IED emplacement. But recalling the paved road leading from Barstow to Fort Irwin, just can’t imagine the need for many high ground OPs or COPs to watch the main road and prevent someone from setting up IEDs in the daytime. Night of course, is a different matter. And roads next to towns/compounds/trees/crops along the Helmand River valley and other flat areas make it hard to maintain constant surveillance of existing dirt roads, day or night.

Does that create opportunities for off-roading it away from civilians and chokepoints to safeguard both the populous and ourselves? It may not be the shortest route, but remote dirt roads observed from a few high terrain COPs/OPs, and easily targeted without collateral damage could reduce IEDs. Because primarily coalition supply vehicles would use these routes, anyone else on/near them on foot or in a vehicle is suspect and subject to search.

Engineers and the new Marine line-charge vehicle could clear or blow holes through suspected minefield areas, then cover it in clay or gravel and drag some sort of pattern producer (Firn it was near the border) behind the trail vehicle on the last patrol of the night. Shouldn’t be too many vehicles (or block off entries) on the new remote roads at night to make tracks and any IED planter still must cover footprints while replicating the unique ground pattern in the dark, not to mention get to and away from the remote road over miles of open terrain with no place to hide and a heavy load to bear.

Freshly dug dirt at night may well have a different IR signature, as well.
So augment that with higher flying UAS (TF ODIN down to Shadow) or aerostats/towers in each COP, and lower flying T-Hawks, and Ravens to maintain nightly surveillance. One COP could cover 10 kms on either side alternating between noisy, culvert-checking T-Hawks, and quieter Ravens to make the enemy believe the coast is clear. Use unmanned ground sensors near wadis.

Zealous66, you must admit the US flies in Afghanistan more than other allies and casualties are far less than Vietnam or the 14,000 the Soviets lost...and you should see some vehicles are coalition partners and the poor ANP use.

[Ken White]

...I cant help but think that in 10-20 years, people are going to be studying the question of losses due to the IED and mistakes overzealous, hardcharging glory hounds ran their men into bombs instead of methodical painstaking recon and more ways to lower the body count.In fact, I'm quite sure it is incorrect. The painstaking recon you suggest is possible and might lower the casualty count a bit -- it equally as well might not lower it. However, that 'painstaking' equals 'time' -- and time is sometimes in short supply. Mission demands quite often require efforts that are inimical to security. The History books rarely address that factor well because most of the historians don't understand it . Not to mention that soldiers are more likely to be lost by hesitant over caution than they are by aggressive maneuver.Booby traps in vietnam caused a ton of casualties...Booby traps? Weren't that many, particularly after 1965. There were some but there were also a far larger number of what we today call IEDs. but I see that in a different light of the jungle vs more open terrain.Jungle versus open is more than countered by short distances versus significant distance. Afghanistan is four times the size of South Viet Nam with twice the population -- and there were over 1.5M allied troops in that country at the peak. Afghanistan has less than a fourth as many Coaliton troops to cover that four times larger nation. My math skills were never good and are now quite rusty but I believe that's an exponential difference. Exponential or not, it is quite significant. Instead of trying more soldiering skills and intelligence, it seems that America just tries to build bigger more expensive vehicles.Thank an ignorant news media and a venal Congress for that. The terrible thing that is an MRAP was reluctantly purchased by the Armed Forces at Congress' insistence. You can also thank that Congress for underfunding training (big hardware projects mean more jobs and more votes than does training). Like I said, it just aches to hear of another casualty due to IED. Didnt even get a chance to fire at the enemy.Cannot understand why that aches. Nor am I sure that those casualties would feel a bit better if they did have a chance to fire, I don't think that makes much difference. Look at the bright side, the good news is that far fewer are dying in these wars than was true in the past (LINK) (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/20100125.aspx)... I know its a painful reality of controlling the AO to be mobile and presence on the ground but There has to be an answer.There is an answer and lacking that technique, you're doomed to have mines and IEDs planted -- kill everything that moves near your routes. I doubt you or most Americans will go for that. Even I think that's a bit far...

[Ken White]

. I think we are trying to fight a gentlemans war with barbarians. They do not honor the geneva convention or care about collateral damage. I think the only time this country truly won a war was in ww 2 when we literally took care of the problem. You can never win a PC war. The enemy laughs and shrugs and sees weakness in what we call moral strength.You are of course correct in all aspects. Unfortunately, World War II was the last war we fought without adoptingng those kinds of 'civilized' constraints -- as if war could ever be civilized...

While you and I may agree on that and many others also agree, there are a number of people in this country who do not agree that Thomas Jonathan Jackson was correct as quoted by G.F.R. Henderson "War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end (emphasis added / kw)."... Well, the Seal got enraged one night and lit the village up. There was no more problem.Things like that happened very frequently in WW II, frequently in Korea and occasionally in Viet Nam. They are and will be exceedingly rare today.

That declining occurrence rate is a function of the type of war, increasing gentrification (word of choice for a Family Board...), sadly increasing lawyerly involvement and vastly improved communication and reportage, the so-called 'information warfare' factor. It will only continue to decrease in acceptance as an acceptable response -- until the next existential war; then the gloves will again come off. Moral of that is to avoid thses little wars, they cost more than they're worth....I think one of the chief errors of the bush administration was prostrating ourselves to an imaginary border in pakistan. Who the hell is pakistan ? Who the hell were the Cambodes or Pathet Lao? track your prey, follow its spoor and kill it.The Bush mistake was in staying to 'fix' Afghanistan and Iraq. We should've slammed in hard and rapidly, removed the problem children and left, throwing money at the UN ion the way out and yelling "Cleanup on Aisle three..."

As for borders, not that easy to ignore IF you're trying to wage 'legitimate' war -- and the Politicians who try to wage war on the cheap, ignoring Stonewall, have to use the legitimate ploy...Hopefully the Taliban holds up in Helmand and wants to get their martyrdom in the spring. And we should disregard a two faced Pakistan and track down every insurgent in the valley and get rid of them. There should be no safe place. It sucked the blood from us in Vietnam and its doing it now too.In both cases, the tactical and operational environments suffer from achingly poor strategic choices. Sadly, we cannot now disregard Pakistan. Nor can we change the rules at this point. We just have to suck it up and hopefully, resolve not to try this foolishness -- stupidity, really -- again. :mad:

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I was referring to private discussions I had in Zimbabwe in 1985, with some ex-Rhodesian Army officers (notes not to hand, will update by PM). IIRC the Cilliers book, yes written by a South African, was critical and a Rhodesian academic who wrote about COIN.

[JMA]

JMA,

I was referring to private discussions I had in Zimbabwe in 1985, with some ex-Rhodesian Army officers (notes not to hand, will update by PM). IIRC the Cilliers book, yes written by a South African, was critical and a Rhodesian academic who wrote about COIN.

Thanks David, but I am more interested in the argument than the names of individuals. After 1980 everyone developed a story based on 20/20 hindsight. The SAS opinion was that had more strategic actions been taken earlier it would have had a marked positive effect. From a military perspective it is nearly always better to take them on in their external bases before they even enter the country but then who knows what the political pressures at the top are.

[William F. Owen]

From a military perspective it is nearly always better to take them on in their external bases before they even enter the country but then who knows what the political pressures at the top are.
Concur. All Wars are 80% political! Externals were a very sound military policy, but also politically counter-productive. No mystery or anything new in that.