Zero-Defects Mentality

[Pete]

From a statement by Cavguy in the Afghanistan ROE thread:


In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result.

By Ken White in the same thread:


THAT / those are the problem. Not tactical level training but the mentality we have developed over the last 30 years or so. That, I contend is inculcated by trying to define 'training' down to the lowest possible level and it is exacerbated by a culture that treats minor foul ups as major crimes while ignoring major crimes as non events. We have a minor tactical training problem -- we have major personnel management, integrity and military professional education problems.

I've noticed a number a number of guys mentioning a "zero defects" atmosphere in the 1990s Army. Please forgive me if I'm wrong, but I thought zero defects was a manufacturing quality control initiative adopted by DoD in the middle-1960s that eventually crossed over from the R & D community into troop units. Zero defects was eventually repudiated, at least outside of the engineering and manufacturing community.

A master sergeant told me his division in Germany wore pillow cases over their spit-shined boots when they marched to where JFK was going to review them so they wouldn't scuff their boots. A guy who had been in the 82nd told me that in the 1960s the way to prepare for an in-ranks inspection in fatigues was to have a friend hold your trousers while you jumped into them from the top bunk so they wouldn't wrinkle behind the knee. (No sitting down allowed.) When I served in '77-'84 we had spit-shined Corcorans and starched fatigues but nothing quite like that. By that time zero defects was a discredited philosophy.

Was the zero defects of the 1990s merely the unofficial resurrection of an old term?

[selil]

Numerous industrial technology forms were adapted in the 1980s and 1990s into management practices. (e.g.) McDonalds using six sigma on the management of drive thru order accuracy; Assessment of lawyers using total quality management on time sheet billing; the aforementioned zero defect for training.

[Pete]

Thanks. If that's true I'm surprised that the Army recycled a previously-discredited buzzword. I've heard of TQM and ISO 9000, which the 1960s zero defects preceeded by several decades.

[Cavguy]

Was the zero defects of the 1990s merely the unofficial resurrection of an old term?

Pete,

"Zero defects" was in colloquial use when I entered service in 1997 to describe the post-drawdown culture. It was an unofficial term to describe the perfection field grade officers felt was expected in order for promotion to higher grade. It grew to greater levels of absurdity resulting in a pre-9/11 attrition crisis among junior officers fed up with the army's culture. A good overview of the problem is the Army's own report on the problem from 2001 here (http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf):


WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US
OS-5. The soldiers interviewed in the field transmitted their thoughts in clear text and with passion. They
communicated the same passion and dedication for selfless service to the Nation and the Army as any
generation before them. Pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and Army values continue to
strongly influence the decisions of officers and their spouses to make the Army a career. However, they see
Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. Below is a summation of what they said:
• While fully recognizing the requirements associated with a career in the Army, officers consistently made
comments that indicate the Army Culture is out of balance and outside their Band of Tolerance. They cited
the following examples:


 There is an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. Officers characterize it
as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises, trying to do too much with available
resources, too many non-mission and late taskings, too many directed training events, and senior leader
“can do” attitudes that put too much on the plate. This impacts predictability in their professional and
personal lives and the lives of their families.


 The Army expects more commitment from officers and their families than it currently provides.


 The Army is not meeting the expectations of officer cohorts. Junior officers are not receiving adequate
leader development experiences. Many captains and majors do not perceive a reasonable assurance of a
future because of the Army’s CGSOC selection policy. Many retirement eligible lieutenant colonels and
colonels do not feel valued for their experience and expertise.


 Top-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for
junior officers leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive. They do not believe they are being
afforded sufficient opportunity to learn from the results of their own decisions and actions.


 There is diminishing, direct contact between seniors and subordinates. This is evidenced by unit
leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are often not present during training, leaders
who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late
taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.


 Most officers have not fully embraced the current officer efficiency report. They do not like the term
center of mass, forced distribution, and senior rater profile management strategies.

• In the area of leader development, the field raised the following issues:


 Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality
developmental experiences.


 Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for
success in full spectrum operations.

• In the area of training, officers said:


 The CTCs are a great training and leader development experience, one the Army must sustain.


 Army training doctrine is fundamentally sound, but must be adapted to reflect the operational
environment and the tools required to train in that environment.


 Units cannot execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine because of the
undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited training aids, devices, simulators,
and simulations (TADSS).

OEF/OIF has temporarily forestalled the deep cultural issues the report highlights. Much debate @ CGSC centers over when/whether the late 90s zero-defect culture will return to the Army.

[Entropy]

Just to add to Cavguy's excellent comment, the same zero defect mentality existed in the other services during the 1990's drawdown and, at least in the Air Force, it's continued to an extent in recent years with additional manpower cuts.

[Schmedlap]

Pete,

It was unofficial and I think the use of the "zero-defects" term refers to the non-technical meaning.

Much of training and operations in the late 90s and early 00s was based upon quantifiable measures (such as: number of Soldiers who qualify "expert" on a course that has prescribed time limits, specific target sequences at prescribed ranges, with a given weapon and certain number of rounds, etc, etc). There are many downsides to trying to measure everything and standardize everything to make measurements more easily comparable. The two big ones are...

1) You inevitably create a system where the participants focus on meeting the measured criteria.

"If all the boss cares about is APFT average and DUI's then we'll just PT all day and threaten fire and brimstone upon anyone who has a sip of beer!"

Meanwhile, how much emphasis is placed upon dry-fire drills and rehearsing vehicle egress? Here's a hint: how do you quantify those things?

2) You inevitably create a system where defects stick out on the scorecard like the running tally of errors on the scoreboard at a baseball game. That is the unofficial zero-defect mentality that arose in the 1990s. Risk averse leaders and a risk averse homefront resulted in heavy emphasis upon the error column.

When I was in Bosnia, I did not earn many kudos for facilitating what began as a trickle, and then a stream of families to their pre-war homes in one particular valley, for cracking down on a corrupt and lazy municipal employee who was stealing money intended for refugee camps, or for helping to reveal questionable NGO behavior in my sector (none of those were even mentioned on my OER). No, my kudos were earned by my unit's performance in the Brigade's "BCAT" Safety Assessment (I was the company safety officer). That was the big event that defined the rotation. It was also the most glowing line in both my rater and senior rater comments on the OER for that deployment. Why? Because I helped us to avoid a bunch of negative marks in the error column. Contrast this with my OIF OERs that had almost no mention of anything quantifiable with numbers.

Who cares about accomplishments? Risk-aversion, coupled with an obsession with measuring everything, and a professional education which (then) taught "what" rather than "why" resulted in a lot of leaders who were equipped to do little more than figure out what errors would be held against them, and then try like hell to avoid them.

That is my understanding of what "zero defects" refers to, as well as my understanding of where it came from, and why.:mad::mad::mad::mad:

I need a drink and shower.

[Pete]

Thanks. I remember reading a newspaper report about that study at the time it came out. In 1994-95 as a DoD contractor I went to the Persian Gulf three times with medical logistics soldiers--they were good people, but all the stuff about their "excellence" and how "outstanding" they were seemed pretty overdrawn. It seemed pretty much like the same Army I had been in, even though I had been field artillery.

[Ken White]

A civilian management trainer, Phillip Crosby, is credited with coining the term and IIRC, Donn Starry as CG TRADOC was a proponent in between bouts of developing Air Land Battle doctrine.:rolleyes:

The concept but not the phrase existed in the 1960s as a result of Robert Strange McNamara and his Whiz Kid systems analysis and operational research guys; they tended to ask for '...results, not reasons...' Same basic idea. "Engineering success' is another euphemism -- all mean the same thing, micromanagement.
I've noticed a number a number of guys mentioning a "zero defects" atmosphere in the 1990s Army... Zero defects was eventually repudiated, at least outside of the engineering and manufacturing community.Yep but it endures in heirarchial organizations like Armies.
A guy who had been in the 82nd told me that in the 1960s the way to prepare for an in-ranks inspection in fatigues was to have a friend hold your trousers while you jumped into them from the top bunk so they wouldn't wrinkle behind the knee. (No sitting down allowed.)Well that's true -- and the Old Guard honor guard folks going to ceremonies in the DC area go in buses with all the passenger seats removed for the same reason...

More than one Squad Bay was waxed with illegal paste wax (which the PX obligingly sold) and the Troops were forbidden form walking in the center of the bay, they had to go behind the bunks.
Was the zero defects of the 1990s merely the unofficial resurrection of an old term?I'd also bet the Pharaoh's Army had similar programs. So, allegedly, did a guy named Jean Martinet. I suspect the idea will be around far into the future -- even though it does not work and is counterproductive. Stupid, even.....

[Pete]

I believe zero defects was over and done with when Don Starry was at TRADOC--my recollection of circa 1980 is that it was a thing of the past and an example of how not to do things. At about the same time in Germany I was told that the Bad Tolz NCO academy had a paste-waxed floor that nobody was allowed to walk on.

Edit:

Found the following on the National Archives website under Records of the Army Staff, so the zero defects term has been around for a while.


Records of the Director of Review and Analysis, consisting of records relating to the zero defects program, 1965-74; command analysis reports, 1963- 67; army program reviews and summaries, 1951-68; reports and management control records, 1962-68 ...

[jkm_101_fso]

To caveat what Cavguy and Schmed said, there is one more aspect of ZD that I personally saw during deployments that really shook me to my core about WHAT it is that some leaders care about, operationally. I have to give an example to explain this better.

Let's say a platoon is conducting a routine patrol. One vehicle is hit by an IED and there are no KIA, but some injuries that required evac.

Upon return to base, the PL briefs the BN leadership on what happened.

The BN CDR chooses to mention this incident to all officers in the battalion at a meeting. He is proud of the fact that the Soldiers in the aforementioned patrol were all:

-Wearing their seatbelt
-Had their doors combat locked
-Were wearing all the proper PPE
-Were able to remove the sensitive items prior to the vehicle burning

The tone of the speech was one of victory, because they "did everything right", which apparently validated our collective performance as a Battalion.

I take several issues with this. First, there was no mention of what the platoon's actions on contact were. Second, there was no mention of WHY or HOW the IED got there in the first place. It was our battlespace. The fact that the IED was even there should not be overlooked and should be treated as being "beaten" by the enemy on that day; as opposed to ONLY our preparedness for the IED being considered a victory.

It made me think that our BN CDR, who was a great man that I really like, didn't consider the attack as a defeat; instead he was "institutionalized" to react only to the myriad of things that could have gotten him in trouble with the BDE Commander, i.e., Soldiers not wearing seatbelts, eyepro, etc. If that was his first concern, then obviously our success (defined in terms of quelling violence in our geographically assigned area) wasn't top priority. It seemed that he was more concerned about Force Pro and not mission success. And from my observation, this is not unique. It seemed very common.

So, we had a clash of cultures. LTs and CPTs were concerned primarily with mission success. The leaders were concerned with Force Pro and not getting into any "trouble". I can only attribute this to the way people "grew up" in the Army and what they were taught about priorities. I don't think it's fair to stereotype all folks this way, but I can only speak from what I've seen.

From all of my friends that chose to leave the Army, their number one beef was with leadership. Specifically that they didn't believe their leadership really cared how the unit performed in combat, but only that we didn't make any egregious errors during the process.

[slapout9]

A civilian management trainer, Phillip Crosby, is credited with coining the term and IIRC, Donn Starry as CG TRADOC was a proponent in between bouts of developing Air Land Battle doctrine.:rolleyes:

The concept but not the phrase existed in the 1960s as a result of Robert Strange McNamara and his Whiz Kid systems analysis and operational research guys; they tended to ask for '...results, not reasons...' Same basic idea. "Engineering success' is another euphemism -- all mean the same thing, micromanagement.Yep but it endures in heirarchial organizations like Armies.Well that's true -- and the Old Guard honor guard folks going to ceremonies in the DC area go in buses with all the passenger seats removed for the same reason...

More than one Squad Bay was waxed with illegal paste wax (which the PX obligingly sold) and the Troops were forbidden form walking in the center of the bay, they had to go behind the bunks.I'd also bet the Pharaoh's Army had similar programs. So, allegedly, did a guy named Jean Martinet. I suspect the idea will be around far into the future -- even though it does not work and is counterproductive. Stupid, even.....

Ken,

1-In the late 60's as you left the Martin Company main complex on Sandlake Rd. in Orlando they used to have a sign saying "Have A Zero Defects Day". Saw it many times as a kid. Yes the concept had been around probably since the late 50's........NASA and the SAC Bomber wing (also in Orlando) had a big part in it also.

2-My mom helped train Phillip Crosby when he was in the engineer training program, he didn't invent anything he just packaged concepts that had been at Martin Company for some time and made a lot of money on it.

3-Zero Defects was meant to be applied to Hardware.......not peopleware:wry: which is where it all started to go wrong.

4-Yes some people stood on their bunks to get into their starched GREEN Army men uniforms when we stood Guard Mount......sharpest looking didn't have to pull Guard Duty:). Zero defects has some benefits. We used to call it "Making The Man". Not sue why the phrase came about but that is what we called it.

5-Zero Defects was competing with The General Systems Theory which was also coming on strong at the same time and both views were heavily taught in the Orlando school system at the time. This started to come apart as I entered High School......Damn Hippies started calling it Ecology. :eek:

[BayonetBrant]

in every QTB I attended in the late 90s had a slide on Dental Cat IV's (Cat IV meant you were non-deployable until the issue was cleared up - usually just behind on annual screenings). If there was a Cat IV, the O-6 would grill you on why guys were Cat IV and what you were doing to fix them. He wouldn't worry about why your METL was assessed at the level it was, or what exercises were coming up to improve the METL, he wanted to know why your soldiers weren't - in his words - "ready to go to war."

Did I mention we were a non-deployable TDA unit?

It quickly became clear that the priorities were Dental Cat IVs, no one on the police blotter, high PT scores, and civilian education. MOS-related training be damned - our guys needed to be "ready to go to war" and "challenged as leaders".

[Schmedlap]

JKM,

That was the best example that I've ever read. You nailed it.

[Ken White]

Pete: Now that I think a bit, you're probably correct on Starry -- I believe it was one of the TRADOC deputies who pushed it and I know it was in the 74-75 (± a couple of years) period that it held sway. I can distinctly recall the ZD stickers Eighth Army put out last time I was in Korea, 75-76. Starry didn't get to TRADOC until after I retired in 77. Also agree that it was being derided by the early 80s. Shy Meyer hated the idea...

The term was used off and on for years in Army (and other) management circles but it didn't really get applied to operations in troop units until the mid-70s as I recall. That's the usage to which I thought you were referring and to which I referred though I didn't make that clear. :o

Slap: One of my wife's Uncles worked at MM Orlando for about 25 years including in that time frame. Agree that ZD in this respect started at Martin and that it preceded Crosby but it didn't hit Army units until the mid-70s -- and that was before Crosby is alleged to have introduced the phrase. :D

All those management Gurus essentially steal and package ideas...

jkm 101 fso and you have it right. It was and is to be applied to technical processes, not to things people do -- that vignette he cited displays exactly the mentality that was fostered by the 'concept' in the mid 70s. The Army picked up a lot of bad habits in Viet Nam and immediately thereafter. Too many of them are still with us. :mad:

[wm]

Other ways of understanding the "zero defects" concept are the phrases "practiced infantryman's eye" and "attention to detail."

The focus on these "details" happens to come about, I think, because resources may not be available to assess whether a unit is able to accomplish its mission. As a result, indicators are used instead. This line of reasoning is based on the fallacious presumption that your attention to detail, like keeping that "autobahn" in the barracks at the 7th Army NCO Academy spit shined, indicates that you will be able to get the big things right too.
Even if the extrapolation from detail to big picture achievement is correct, the big picture may vary as well. The meaning of mission accomplishment changes depending on time and place. What indicators one uses will probably change as a result.

Leaders accustomed to peacetime will use different indicators than leaders used to combat.
--It's pretty unlikely that a soldier will get blown up by an IED on Fort Bragg's Sicily Drop Zone, but that soldier may well have a parachute malfunction during a practice drop.
--A units' billets on Fort Benning will probably not be overrun by the irate citizens of Columbus, but add a little alcohol and some of those citizens may get in a fight with a group of troops at a Redsticks game.
--A Fobbit SGM may look at whether/how you wear your reflective belt; a PSG in a COP perimeter is more likely to look at whether/how you put out your aiming stakes for the machine gun. But at some level they both are trying to "conserve the fighting force" AKA keep troops safe (I hope).

Good leadership entails being able to distinguish what kinds of things "count" when assessing what really matters and applying that based on when and where one is.

[slapout9]

1964 US Army Missile Command
Title: Zero Defects


http://www.monmouth.army.mil/historian/bookdesc.php?title=Zero+Defects&table=Audio_Visual

Cain't watch on computer.....have to order it:(

[Pete]

The following is from a chronology of major events for the year 1964 on the Redstone Arsenal website. Gosh, mention of 1964 is enough to make a guy nostalgic for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution :mad: :


23 June 64 MICOM spearheaded DOD's massive drive, known as Zero Defects, to re-emphasize pride in workmanship and to bolster quality achievements throughout American industry. The command hosted a special seminar on its Zero Defects program to provide a pattern for implementing a DOD-wide prevention program which could be used by all military and industrial organizations. This conference was the first such event ever held by a DOD agency.

25 June 64 The REDSTONE missile, replaced by the PERSHING I, was classified obsolete.

25 June 64 The last CORPORAL artillery unit was inactivated.

[Ken White]

dod's massive drive, known as zero defects, to re-emphasize pride in workmanship and to bolster quality achievements throughout american industryMcNamara'a whiz Kids promulgated it but it was aimed at DoD industrial efforts, it did not permeate the Army as the mid 70s re-issue did... :d :d

[Pete]

It made me think that our BN CDR, who was a great man that I really like, didn't consider the attack as a defeat; instead he was "institutionalized" to react only to the myriad of things that could have gotten him in trouble with the BDE Commander, i.e., Soldiers not wearing seatbelts, eyepro, etc. If that was his first concern, then obviously our success (defined in terms of quelling violence in our geographically assigned area) wasn't top priority. It seemed that he was more concerned about Force Pro and not mission success. And from my observation, this is not unique. It seemed very common.

So, we had a clash of cultures. LTs and CPTs were concerned primarily with mission success. The leaders were concerned with Force Pro and not getting into any "trouble."

I've gotten the impression that the emphasis on Force Protection is something that sneaked into TTPs from peacekeeping in the Balkans in the 1990s and safety during peacetime field exercises--somehow it became "the way we've always done things." I really doubt that was something that was promoted at Fort Benning as a central tenet of infantry operations. In around 2000 I was at a meeting at Fort Detrick on the development of a vaccine where a female O-5 in the Medical Service Corps explained in all seriousness how a Risk Analysis is conducted for everything the Army plans to do, with emphasis put upon developing measures to minimize identified risks. Offhand I can think of few things that are more risky than infantry combat.

[Schmedlap]

Offhand I can think of few things that are less risky than infantry combat.
What about venturing into a chow hall without a reflective belt or daring to move a HMMWV on a military base without a ground guide? C'mon now.

Here is a great article (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200110/langewiesche) published in October 2001, but with much of the interviews and observations made prior to 9/11. This really captures the insanity of the Army before reality was thrust upon us.

[slapout9]

McNamara'a whiz Kids promulgated it but it was aimed at DoD industrial efforts, it did not permeate the Army as the mid 70s re-issue did... :d :d

Nah that ain't it...... in 64 you hadn't been out of the Marines long enough to understand advanced Army thinking yet.:D

Go to the link below and scroll down until you come to Zero Defects and you will find that on 25 April 1966 it Exploded onto Ft. Jackson and had an annual celebration 21 April 1967.


http://www.jackson.army.mil/Museum/History/CHAPTER%20IV.html


A lot of folks have a problem with the fact that the Army won the Cold War and The Race To The Moon all by themselves!!!!been going downhill since then by listening to the wrong folks.

[Cavguy]

What about venturing into a chow hall without a reflective belt or daring to move a HMMWV on a military base without a ground guide? C'mon now.

Here is a great article (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200110/langewiesche) published in October 2001, but with much of the interviews and observations made prior to 9/11. This really captures the insanity of the Army before reality was thrust upon us.

Great article. Missed that one in 2001. You can see a lot of the roots of our OIF/OEF problems about approaching the population and risk that continue to haunt us. As a retired 3-star recently said to me, that generation is going to have to retire before ours can make change.

Best quote of the article was from the Brit who observed about avoiding failure vs. seeking success.

[Ken White]

Nah that ain't it...... in 64 you hadn't been out of the Marines long enough to understand advanced Army thinking yet.:DI'd been out of the Corps for over ten years by 64 and had been in the Army long enough to be a PSG E minus seven type. However, a little later, at the critical time in 1966, I was playing around in the SE Asia War Games and I sure missed whatever was important and going on at Ft. Jackson. Fortunately, I have never been stationed at Ft Jackson so I probably missed a lot of cutting edge stuff.
A lot of folks have a problem with the fact that the Army won the Cold War and The Race To The Moon all by themselves!!!!been going downhill since then by listening to the wrong folks.Yup, particularly those that are convinced that a poor exit will give you twists in a T-10. :D

Units, Slap, units. ATCs weren't units in the true sense of the word. Foat Bragg didn't pay much attention to Third Army. :D

Does Frank Borman know the Army did all that? Hmmm. Well, he may, he was a West Pointer... ;)

[BayonetBrant]

that article was the one that caused so many of my peers to really look hard in the mirror and finally turn in their paperwork to get out. It was the Oct 01 issue but was on newsstands in August and I know more than a few people that said "screw this - this isn't how I'm spending my next 15 years" and they left.
How many got out before 9-11 or tried to come back after 9-11 I don't know, but I do know that reading that article put in black-and-white what many had felt for a while, and they didn't want to feel that way any more.

[Hacksaw]

As someone who grew up in the Army described (and as an editorial note: thank you very LITTLE to CAVGUY for making me feel old by disclosing when he joined the officer ranks)... while I think/believe (and even have anecdotal evidence that I wasn't that guy), I can't help but recognize that in small ways I fell as victim as anyone to the "be careful what you measure" syndrome...

All my vehicles were on-line, chalked, drip panned, topped off and "ready to go to war" each Friday afternoon.... hmmm.... it seems I assumed we'd always go to war on the weekend (probably half right given Murphy's Laws)...

I too kept very close tabs on medical/dental readiness because that was everyone's obsession... but I actually think that one makes sense based on pre-deployment goat screws I participated in sooooo many times...

But I also paid close attention when the leadership classes were taught that said underwrite honest mistakes... take responsibility for the failings of those in your command... pass the credit, but not the #### downhill... give guidance, but let subordinates surprise you with their ingenuity (nearly always rewarded)....

All that said, I probably also roger out on too many things I should have said what about our contemporaries in the next battery... It was all fun for a commander, not necessarily for everyone else...

I don't know... I'm not convinced it was all bad then and all good now... I just know this two very enduring principle holds true.... People do well what you check... and... be careful what you measure it might produce the opposite effect...

e.g. If I tell a Motor SGT... your team doesn't go home until that truck is off the deadline report, and the part to fix the truck is not in... I have no one else to blame when they get caught acquiring the part from some other unit's vehicle...

Need a beer after that soul bearing missive...

[Pete]

People do well what you check...
"The troops do well what the boss checks" is said to have been one of Bruce Clark's sayings. I heard that he was a holy terror in the late '50s and early '60s.

[slapout9]

I'd been out of the Corps for over ten years by 64 and had been in the Army long enough to be a PSG E minus seven type.

Thats exactly what I mean..........See how you began to excel with that good old Army training:D:D

[slapout9]

"The troops do well what the boss checks" is said to have been one of Bruce Clark's sayings. I heard that he was a holy terror in the late '50s and early '60s.

That is what Zero Defects was meant to do........be oriented on equipment.....wasn't designed to work as a tactical combat method against a reacting opponent:eek: Thats what you got Straegy and stuff for.;)

[Schmedlap]

e.g. If I tell a Motor SGT... your team doesn't go home until that truck is off the deadline report, and the part to fix the truck is not in... I have no one else to blame when they get caught acquiring the part from some other unit's vehicle...

Wow. Your mechanics were ambitious. Mine would have just tried to convince me that the fault was misdiagnosed and that the part is no longer necessary.

[Pete]

Slapout, Bruce Clark was Old School Army and not a zero-defects guy. He commanded CCB of the 7th Armored Division during its legendary stand at St. Vith in the Battle of the Bulge and was commander of USAEUR in 1960-1962. A battalion commander of mine said his temper was legendary. A biographical sketch of him is in the link below.

http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/bcclarke.htm

[Hacksaw]

Wow. Your mechanics were ambitious. Mine would have just tried to convince me that the fault was misdiagnosed and that the part is no longer necessary.

I was about to type something tongue in cheek and realized it would be a disservice to SFC Oh and many others... yes they were very ambitious, very good, and a large part of my unit's great success... weren't much to look at in Class A's but I bought many a pitcher of beer for guys who got vehicles operational (broken down in convoy) when others couldn't...:D

So yes they were ambitious, and loyal to a fault when they were called into the Bn Cdr's the following day and I went in first and took all the heat and they walked... funny thing was a week later the Bn Cdr bought me a beer and told me he'd have been disappointed if it had gone down any other way...

So they weren't all zero defect, just the overwhelming perponderence

Live well and row!!!

[selil]

Nah that ain't it...... in 64 you hadn't been out of the Marines long enough to understand advanced Army thinking yet.:D

Are you saying senility is a requirement for understanding the Army's advanced thinking skills?

[wm]

If I tell a Motor SGT... your team doesn't go home until that truck is off the deadline report, and the part to fix the truck is not in... I have no one else to blame when they get caught acquiring the part from some other unit's vehicle...

Need a beer after that soul bearing missive...

Hey Hack,
The only time I said something like that, I was lucky enough to have my motor sergeant respond with something like, "Sir, I what I heard you say was 'We can't do any more productive work tonight 'cause we don't have the right parts. Knock off and I'll buy you a beer. Just make sure you are at the class IX warehouse first thing tomorrow to get the parts you need.'" And I was also lucky enough to understand his response.

But then I ran an admin use motor pool, not a tactical one. I only had to make sure of a couple of simple things:
the shuttle bus got around to all the kasernes on schedule every day so troops could go on sick call, solve pay problems at finance, and get their mail at the consolidated mailroom; the MPs had enough patrol cars to maintain "law and order" (chasing down sheep in the pastures around the kasernes and finding good spots to sleep late at night);
the unit supply sergeants had trucks so they could do their runs to the QM laundry for the troops to have clean linen and clothes; and

the "choke and puke" (AKA dining facility) could get to ration breakdrown/TISA to pick up enough food to prepare the 10,000+ meals a day we served (Did I mention I was also the food service officer and my branch was not QM, OD, or TC?).
Unlike the guys in the armor battalion and 2 FA battalions whose motor pools were next door, we weren't too concerned about stopping the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)'s 3rd Shock Army or 1st Guards Tank Army when they decided to come rolling down the Fulda Gap (like that was ever really going to happen). We were a TDA outfit and didn't have to worry about those damn USR reports saying we couldn't do our wartime mission without a bunch of circle Xs.

Time for me to join you with that beer.

[Ken White]

Thats exactly what I mean..........See how you began to excel with that good old Army training:D:DI had as much responsibility and was more trusted as a Marine Corporal than I had/was as a PSG in the Army. Of course, I was far more trusted as a PSG than I was as a 1SG or a SGM -- or even as a mid to upper grade DAC. I know most of that less trust was due to passage of time and erosion of values plus general suspicion of DACs. Thus, I guess your comment; "A lot of folks have a problem with the fact that the Army won the Cold War and The Race To The Moon all by themselves!!!!been going downhill since then by listening to the wrong folks." is correct. Question is who were and are they listening to... :confused: :wry:

[Schmedlap]

I was about to type something tongue in cheek and realized it would be a disservice to SFC Oh and many others... yes they were very ambitious, very good, and a large part of my unit's great success... weren't much to look at in Class A's but I bought many a pitcher of beer for guys who got vehicles operational (broken down in convoy) when others couldn't...:D

I know exactly what you're talking about. I had a love-hate relationship with my mechanics. Hated them in garrison. Loved them when deployed. Getting them to do anything even half-assed in garrison was as hopeless as trying to unmelt ice cream. While deployed, it was like someone pulled the q-tips out of their brains. Putting a thrown track back on while under fire (despite my telling them to just skull drag the damn thing), pulling pack on an almost daily basis in a tiny patrol base that literally got mortared every fricken day, doing all of the emplacement and recovery of concrete barriers around polling centers and getting attacked several times in the process; filling Hescos and emplacing barriers at newly established outposts throughout our AO at night and then going back to fixing vehicles during the day; recovering damaged vehicles under fire, etc, etc. It was not glamorous, but it was hot, miserable, dangerous, and tedious.

A buddy of mine who recently deployed asked me what I would have done differently on that deployment, had I been the CO, rather than the XO. I told him, "I'd meet the support platoon everyday as they delivered LOGPAC and I'd thank them. And I'd meet the mechanics everyday on their maintenance pad to thank them for the day of work that they were about to put in." I had a lot of respect for the guys who did that miserable work and then re-enlisted.

[Steve the Planner]

Hack:

"e.g. If I tell a Motor SGT... your team doesn't go home until that truck is off the deadline report, and the part to fix the truck is not in... I have no one else to blame when they get caught acquiring the part from some other unit's vehicle..."

In one of those armor battalions in Germany in the 70's, we learned the essential lessons of Soviet economics---stockpile other stolen parts to use for trade for the ones you needed----heater parts at Graf in February were always worth their weight in gold. (OK, so I date myself, but not some much that Ken's don't make me feel young and chipper).

This Army training was all very helpful to me in later economics courses---I really understood command economies, and the black markets essential to make them work.

Steve

[slapout9]

Thus, I guess your comment; "A lot of folks have a problem with the fact that the Army won the Cold War and The Race To The Moon all by themselves!!!!been going downhill since then by listening to the wrong folks." is correct. Question is who were and are they listening to... :confused: :wry:

They (Army) failed to develop Congressional political influence cadres to the extent that the other services did......so we got beat out of a lot of stuff come budget time after we did all the hard development work. Ask 10 people did they know that the Saturn 5 that went to the moon was developed and built by the Army..... they would laugh at you. Ask them did they know that the Interstate Highway system that they take for granted was designed by the Army not just use in peace, but war and natural disaster, they would still be swimming in New Orleans if hadn't been for that. And after all that they would't even give us one slot of the original Astronauts:mad: And the Pershing II is still the baddest missile system out there.....pinpoint accuracy from 1500 miles on internal guidance.....no GPS required!

[Ken White]

In one of those armor battalions in Germany in the 70's... (OK, so I date myself, but not some much that Ken's don't make me feel young and chipper).M4A3E8, M26 or even an M41A1C at the newest... :D

[Pete]

Slapout, what you say about the Army as a developer of high-tech systems has an element of truth. Although the Cold War Army was dominated by the Armor and Airborne cliques, for a while in the late '50s and early '60s the Redstone Arsenal guys with their rockets and missiles gave the "I rode with Patton" and "I jumped with Ridgeway" factions a run for their money. Air Defense Artillery eventually became a branch of its own in 1968 when their tubes had been replaced by missiles. Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet in 1959 argued that the Army had to get away from an over-reliance on massive retaliation and high-tech and get back to old-fashioned Infantry soldiering. In more ways than one that is what this forum is all about.

With that having been said, what I want to know is whether Ken wore his Ridgeway cap with the brim stiffened or natural and wrinkled.

[Ken White]

With that having been said, what I want to know is whether Ken wore his Ridgeway cap with the brim stiffened or natural and wrinkled.It wasn't really a Ridgeway cap and few in the Army called it that, it was a Lousville Spring Up (LINK) (http://www.olive-drab.com/od_soldiers_clothing_m1951_cap_ridgeway.php) (well ,the good ones were, anyway). In the linked page, the two MPs in the top picture have Spring Ups; the one with the silver leaf is a Spring Up while the guys loading the truck in the bottom pic have stiffened field Caps.

Lot of people made fun of it but it was about the only headgear ever worn by the US Army that wasn't copied from someone else. It was a pain to wear and carry regardless of the web page's contention it was popular; that was sort of a mixed bag... :wry:

The original field cap which Ridgeway and the whole Army wore was worn 'natural and wrinkled' -- sort of; people applied their own mutations which is why Ridgeway wanted something done to improve uniformity and appearance (proving even the really good Generals can get wild hairs about inconsequential stuff...). The first fix was a flattened and folded newspaper or manila folder; the second was a plastic stiffener which cost $.35. Then came the Spring Ups. Of course, in Airborne units, even that wasn't enough so you had a plastic stiffener in your Spring Up and then shrunk the fabric so it was perfectly straight and unwrinkled... :rolleyes:

The sacrifices one makes for ones country... :D

[Schmedlap]

(OK, so I date myself, but not some much that Ken's don't make me feel young and chipper).

Young is very relative in the Army. At the age of 28, I was one of only a handful of people in my company who had used a PRC-77. Just me, the CO (when he was a cadet), 1SG, and the PSGs. Wow.

[Pete]

Shut up, Schmedlap, you're making me feel old with that PRC-77 talk. On the other hand, unlike a certain person the Army never gave either of us an M1 rifle or carbine or an M14. (I had to buy my own Inland carbine.)

[slapout9]

Slapout, what you say about the Army as a developer of high-tech systems has an element of truth. Although the Cold War Army was dominated by the Armor and Airborne cliques, for a while in the late '50s and early '60s the Redstone Arsenal guys with their rockets and missiles gave the "I rode with Patton" and "I jumped with Ridgeway" factions a run for their money. Air Defense Artillery eventually became a branch of its own in 1968 when their tubes had been replaced by missiles. Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet in 1959 argued that the Army had to get away from an over-reliance on massive retaliation and high-tech and get back to old-fashioned Infantry soldiering. In more ways than one that is what this forum is all about.

With that having been said, what I want to know is whether Ken wore his Ridgeway cap with the brim stiffened or natural and wrinkled.


It is all true, I grew up with it and watched it happen from the Cuban Missile Crisis on. A better book is War and Peace In The Space Age by General James Gavin. The Army never did believe it massive retaliation....They believed in "Bring The Battle Back To The Battlefield" and they also Believed that Special Forces were the people to handle the "The Brush Fire Wars of The Future" along with The Air Cavalry and the Marines. I see you are kind of new here so you may not have read all the previous posts on this subject (which has been discussed several times before). Which is why me and Ken rag each other so much, we already know what each other is going to say, except Ken never did learn the proper way to exit an aircraft without causing twists in his suspension lines.:wry:

[Ken White]

replaced the PRC 8/9/10 that replaced the SCR 300 I used in Korea? Where I also used an '03A1 with a star gauged barrel and a 7.8 power Unertl scope, much less an M1. Also carried occasionally a BAR that fired semi-auto (will reveal secret to that for a small fee)... :D

Note that Slap still believes all that foolishness they told him in Jump School in an effort to slow jumpers down prevent run out, high speed exit jumps which increase the possibility of hung jumpers -- that was bad juju for the boys in the Black hats who had a bunch of peacetime safety constraints. :D

I didn't get twists after I discovered that keeping your Static Line UNtwisted was the key to keeping your chute untwisted. Body position and exit have almost nothing to do with it. If they did, you'd never see twists on a helicopter jump -- but you do... ;)

It's probably noteworthy that the old 101st Jump School at Campbell which normally conducted a Benning-like three week jump School ran two Wing awarding courses with three jumps instead of five and of only four total days back to back during the Lebanon crisis of '58. The Benning course is as long and dumb as it is in order to justify Instructor Contact Hours (ICH) which the Staffing guides use to determine the manning for TRADOC and Division / Post Schools. Said ICH are the real reason most Army schools cram a 40 hour course into three to four weeks...

Solution to that problem is to do away with those really dumb staffing guides which are primarily job justification booklets for manpower survey teams. Just eliminating that staffing criteria and the survey teams can reduce the cost of training and that saving can be applied to better, outcome based training.

[slapout9]

Note that Slap still believes all that foolishness they told him in Jump School in an effort to slow jumpers down prevent run out, high speed exit jumps which increase the possibility of hung jumpers -- that was bad juju for the boys in the Black hats who had a bunch of peacetime safety constraints. :D



:D:D:D Good MoJo beats bad juju..... what is that they say about you cain't teach an old dog new tricks?



82nd ran a jump school too....stopped sometime in 60's.....still had the old 40 foot towers down the street from 2/504 when I was there.

[Ken White]

:D:D Good MoJo beats bad juju..... what is that they say about you cain't teach an old dog new tricks?No body at Benning ever had good mojo in my experience given half dozen each TDY trips and schools there... :rolleyes:

Only good thing at Benning is the Cafeteria in Building 4 where you are guaranteed to run across some folks you know...
82nd ran a jump school too....stopped sometime in 60's.....still had the old 40 foot towers down the street from 2/504 when I was there.THEY shut it and the 101st BAC down in 1962 and sent everyone to Benning for the greater glory of TIS.

Uh, them was 34 foot Towers, ol' Dawg. I done tole you a hunnert and fifty million times not to exaggerate.. ;)

[Pete]

What would be the point of having a BAR that fires in the semiautomatic mode? An M1 would would be lighter to carry around.

[Ken White]

What would be the point of having a BAR that fires in the semiautomatic mode? An M1 would would be lighter to carry around.away the fact you had an automatic weapon. As issued, the BAR had a slow rate (~350 rpm) and a fast rate (~550 rpm), you could easily modify it to keep the fast rate and change the slow rate to semi-auto. Most Marines did that, most in the Army did not, relying on trigger manipulation to crank off a single round to avoid disclosing the auto capability from defensive positions, particularly at night when the BAR man might be the only one that saw something. Trigger manipulation worked but it wasn't reliable and you could inadvertently crank off two or three rounds and give your location away, particularly if you were dead tired.

Yep, M1 is half the weight. However, it's an absolute bear to modify it to fire full auto -- and then you only have eight rounds (unless you go the BM 59 route, hard to do in most units without a machine shop...) ;)

[slapout9]

Uh, them was 34 foot Towers, ol' Dawg. I done tole you a hunnert and fifty million times not to exaggerate.. ;)

I couldn't help it:wry:I was watching about the 82nd going to Haiti and got excited.

[Pete]

Thanks, Ken. There's a lot that I never learned about infantry tactics. It was "Fire an M16A1"; "Fire an M60 Machine Gun"; and "Emplace a Claymore Mine" in MOS 13B One Station Unit Training at Fort Sill in 1977. Branch-immaterial OCS at Fort Benning the same year went into it in a little more depth, but not much. I always thought terrain appreciation for small unit ops was neglected, as in "put your perimeter here, not there."

[Ken White]

...I always thought terrain appreciation for small unit ops was neglected, as in "put your perimeter here, not there."It shows today in Afghanistan (it did not in Iraq to as great an extent due to the heavily urban character of the effort there) and I see some clips and stills of US troops, Army and Marines that make me scream "Nobody can be that #&#*@%$ ignorant!"

But they are. They aren't stupid, they're good kids and they're busting their tails -- they're just half trained...

You also highlight the big flaw in the Task, Condition, Standard process. Bunch of discrete tasks but no one really tries to tie 'em together to do jobs or missions...

[Pete]

The following is from American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military history, 2005. The book is a survey history intended for junior officers and NCOs that doesn't go into a lot of detail. Here's what it says about the founding of TRADOC and FORSCOM.


At an impasse between the Parker Panel and CONARC recommendations, Westmoreland in September 1971 directed his Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, then Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, to begin a separate Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), study to examine ways to streamline CONARC’s organization and resource management processes. DePuy concluded that CONARC was unwieldy, unresponsive to HQDA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and slow to adapt Army school curricula to incorporate doctrinal innovations coming from CDC. In February 1972 DePuy obtained the Secretary of Defense’s approval to break up CONARC and CDC and reassign their functions. Arguing that the collective training and maintaining of the readiness of active and reserve component Army units in the United States was a full-time job for any commander, DePuy recommended transferring all these functions from CONARC to a forces command. He further recommended consolidating CONARC’s schools with its combat developments functions from CDC into a doctrine and training command.

The book is available online at the link below:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/index.htm#cont

[Ken White]

Unofficially, it created two large staffs with a slew of Field grade and GO spaces to replace one large staff with the same thing. Advantage - PersCom. :mad:

It also reflected DePuy's penchant for excessive centralization and control -- it carried Bruce Clarke's "An organization does well only those things the boss checks" mantra to the Army. Unfortunately. :rolleyes:

Hacksaw mentioned the same philosophy -- he's right, so was Clarke. The problem is that gets transmuted, literally, to mean higher echelons must check things subordinate bosses are responsible for. Which was not the intent at all.

That said, no question that TRADOC and a FORSCOM like command are better than was CONARC or any single command with two very diverse missions -- but the rationale was as much or more about spaces (and faces) as it was about efficiency and it had little to do with effectiveness. :wry:

[Pete]

From time to time the debate over COIN mentions the "Fulda Gap" emphasis of Army doctrine from the end of the Vietnam conflict until recently. Indeed, Fulda Gap can these days be a term of derision. The quotation below is from a 1988 paper by Major Paul H. Herbert at the Combat Studies Institute entitled Deciding What Has to Be Done: Gen. William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This is as close to anything I've read to an admission that the Army deliberately turned to armor and mech infantry doctrine after Vietnam. Perhaps instead of COIN what we really need today is an infantry renaissance.


General DePuy had several reasons for this decision. He believed that responsibility for any single activity could not rest coequally on two agencies, especially if some product was expected quickly. The Arab-Israeli War had been a mechanized war in which the primacy of the tank had been confirmed with only some qualification. Certainly, the tank was central to the defense of NATO Europe, and it now appeared to be central to any conflict in the Middle East. To DePuy, the wars for which the Army must prepare were tankers' wars, and tankers should lead the effort.

DePuy was also inclined to give Fort Knox the go-ahead because of the personality of its commander, Major General Donn A. Starry. Starry was a protégé of General Abrams, and DePuy was "confident that [Starry under-stood] tactics" to a degree superior to most "other people of any rank in the Army." Starry was aggressive and enthusiastic in his efforts to bring the doctrinal lessons of the Arab-Israeli War home to the armor community. During Starry's first weeks at Fort Knox, he bombarded DePuy with personal telegraphic messages outlining new initiatives, proposing changes in priorities of missions, and seeking support in controversies with other Army activities. DePuy was not always pleased with his Pattonesque apostle of tank warfare, but DePuy knew that Starry was a self-starter who would spare no effort to get things done.

The climate Starry created around Fort Knox contrasted sharply with that at Fort Benning. Major General Tarpley was as competent as Major General Starry, but neither Tarpley nor his colleagues at Fort Benning were quite as ready to step to the steady drumbeat of mechanized warfare that the Arab-Israeli War provoked. Even had they been, it is unlikely that they could have readily overcome more than a decade's intense experience preparing officers and soldiers for the infantry-dominated war in Vietnam. Both personal and institutional experience placed Fort Benning in the unenviable position of advocating consideration of the lessons of the last war at a time when the Army was consciously trying to avoid that perceived bugaboo and gird itself to fight and win the next one, a war heralded by the events in the Sinai and on the Golan in October 1973. "I wanted the Infantry School to get away from the 2 1/2 mph mentality," said General DePuy years later, "but they were in the hands of light infantrymen ... they didn't do the mech infantry well at all. They didn't understand it. . . that is why I took these draconian measures with them. To shake them out of that lethargy."

The entire paper can be read using the link below:

http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/Herbert/Herbert.asp

[Ken White]

directly to any other -- I won't. I will point out that lessons of Arab-Israeli wars are very narrowly applicable and we have not done ourselves any favors by trying to adapt Israeli TTP which are quite successful for their missions, opponents and terrain. Survival concentrates the mine quite nicely... :wry:

We do not as a nation get pushed into that survival mentality and we have to do many things the Israelis do not -- and we have to do them worldwide against a host of far different opponents and non-supporters.

I will also agree that Donn Starry was aggressive and a self starter. Period. Tom Tarpley was known as the "Ghost of Building Four" for some reason... :rolleyes:

Bottom line is that Starry, DePuy and Tarpley were all part of the post Viet Nam problem and they had a lot of company in the upper ranks. The and the Army were pushed in that direction by then Chief of Staff Bernie Rogers who was a Rhodes Scholar, a smart guy and as Eurocentric as it was possible to be. The one guy that tried to fight it, Shy Meyer, who succeeded Rogers as CofSA, was ganged upon because he threatened too many rice bowls. The bureaucracy just waited him out.. :mad:

John Wickham learned from Meyer's experience and tried to take smaller bites of the Elephant when no one was looking, he was fairly successful. Following Wickham were several non-entities who accomplished very little...

All that said, there is little doubt in this long term infantryman's mind that Infantry is the most hidebound and conservative branch though I will mention that Knox has it's laid back and unproductive cycles. All that leads to on point:

It's not the branch, it is people.

Put the wrong guy in a job and that organization will go through a bad period until he rotates out. Our personnel system is really our worst enemy. Until we learn that -- or rather accept and change it because most people know it -- we are doomed to mediocrity. Get used to it, it's a fact of life in the US Armed Forces.

[Pete]

The two quotations below regarding the individual training of soldiers are remarkably similar. The following is from General Paul Gorman's The Secret of Future Victories:


The American Army paid for this lacuna not only in World War II, but also in Korea and Vietnam. By mid-1944, the U.S. Army had been forced out of the business of training divisions, and had to concentrate on operating Replacement Training Centers. These became quite efficient, in a sausage-factory sort of way. When the Army went to war in 1950, and again in 1965, there were a few division activations, and some revisiting of the McNair Mobilization Training Program, but by and large the Army simply increased inductions under Selective Service, opened up additional RTC assembly lines, and thus assured a stream of individual replacements to maintain the strength of divisions fighting in Asia. This training was a great accomplishment in many ways, but it, and the overall personnel policy it supported, operated to the distinct disadvantage of the infantry platoons in those divisions, constantly being drained not only by casualties but also by rotations, both in-theater and homeward. The notion of teamwork within the squad was very difficult to instill and to maintain in such platoons, and as General Fry points out, the consequence was undoubtedly needless casualties.

From 1944 through 1974, the primary product of the Army's training base--as the CONUS service schools and training centers that grew out of the AGF institutions came to be called--was individual replacements. Individual and collective training in units was relegated to unit commanders, who were to be guided by a version of the AGF MTP called the Army Training Program (ATP). The Combat Firing Proficiency Test prescribed by the AGF, described in detail above, was virtually the same as the Field Exercise for a Rifle Platoon in the Attack, prescribed in 1973--an approach march, movement to contact, encounter with enemy fire, return fire, and assault--all via live firing at pop-up cardboard targets--followed by a meticulous umpire critique based on a list of 50 specific procedures (checked observed or not observed) within the platoon. Over all those years, 1943-1973, Army training for dismounted action at the point of the arrow remained formulary, complicated, and situationally vague.

This is from Major Herbert's Deciding What Needs to Be Done:


As DePuy looked at the Army's training establishment, for which he now had responsibility, he saw an institution that was still planning for a mass mobilization similar to that of World War II. He did not see an institution that was attuned to the new strategy or adequate to the current needs. DePuy recalled from his own training in the 1940s that, because of the rapid expansion of the Army, the necessity to deploy troops quickly, and U.S. superiority in manpower, soldiers received the minimum essential training before they joined their units and went overseas. As a result, units often performed much as the 90th Division did before it became experienced. Given enough soldiers, this was a politically acceptable price to pay at the time. This World War II training experience set the mold in which postwar training was cast. While the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not require mobilization on the scale of World War II, the training experience for soldiers in both conflicts was much the same as for their World War II elders: large numbers of conscripts being hustled through a series of exercises in which minimum competence was the goal. Such training undoubtedly accomplished important socialization but not much military skill.

[Ken White]

What was your point? Since you posted those quotes, one can presume you have one.

What Paul Gorman though has little bearing, what Herbert though has less. what you think is of interest

[Pete]

I was making the obvious point that when we discuss Army training we're talking about a system that was originally designed to train the maximum number of men in the shortest possible period of time. Although it was suitable for the emergency of WW II it probably wasn't a good process to leave in place unmodified after the war.

In an Army course I took 20 years ago as a contractor it was said that no hours of instruction can be added to basic training without taking away an equal number of hours. That explains the remarkable decline in the time spent teaching rifle marksmanship.

I've wondered to what extent Lesley McNair modeled the WW II training system on the schools set up in France during the First World War. Except for the 1st and 2nd Divisions and some National Guard units most of the Doughboys who went to France were trained over there and not in the States. I read that some believed the school system set up over there siphoned the best officers and NCOs away from troop units.

[selil]

In an Army course I took 20 years ago as a contractor it was said that no hours of instruction can be added to basic training without taking away an equal number of hours.

That assertion is simply bunkum. The concepts of education and training allow for substantial increases in the relevant skills attained in shorter periods of time than previous generations. It's the solved problem. Once you solve something that took months or years it is easy to replicate. jeepers. We've been here before and can get past the linearity of educations philosophy.

[Ken White]

Not a perfect medium for communicating -- I'm over wordy mostly in an attempt to get past the lack of nuance and visual clues that we'd have in a face to face conversation. Sometimes that works, sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes things that seem obvious to us as we write do not come across as obvious to others. :o

The fact that the US Army training system is modeled after the WW I mobilization training process which was slightly modified for WW II had been discussed here numerous times. Here are just a few recent threads: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8184&highlight=mobilization+training), LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8034&highlight=mobilization+training), LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6657&highlight=WWI+training+system). A search will turn up more. Generally, it's a good idea here to run a Search before posting a 'new' thought; probability is someone else has already mentioned it. That is not said to deter posting but really to encourage it -- just with some knowledge of what might previously been said on the topic.

The current task, condition and standard foolishness is also a good mob / low IQ effort -- it is totally inappropriate for a professional force. :mad:

Basically, many here seem to agree that our training is broken and fortunately, a number of initiatives are underway to fix a lot of that. We're still training a low IQ conscript Army when we actually have a high IQ Army of volunteers that are fairly professional. The bad news is that the personnel system is in even worse shape than our training. I think the training will be improved, I'm not as hopeful on the personnel aspect... :wry:

Re: Rifle marksmanship -- that's getting fixed (LINK) (http://ntsa.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,120,171;journal,1,15;linkingpublicati onresults,1:113340,1), (LINK) (http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/12/04/31365-new-training-method-produces-better-marksmen/index.html), (LINK) (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/05/army_marksmanship_050408w/). That "nothing added without something being taken away" was from the 1980s and 90s, a time when we 'trained' (poorly) to budget, not to standard for all the lip service paid to standards. That's changing, not rapidly enough nor adequately but it is improving. Your comment re: McNair is spot on.

Selil is right, bunkum it is -- we're supposed to be smarter than that now...

[Pete]

I was fortunate to have received my first marksmanship instruction in Boy Scouts in 1964. Our Scoutmaster taught it the way he'd been taught M1 rifle marksmanship, which was really a recycling of the old M1903 POI. That was back when the loop sling, hasty sling, and sitting position were still taught. The Army gave us weekly access to a 50-foot indoor range at Fort Belvoir and it also lent us a half-dozen Springfield .22-caliber rifles, either M1922A1 or M2, with Lyman rear peep sights. My Army marksmanship instruction in 1977 consisted of a 50-minute lecture on the "Eight Steady Hold Factors" before we zeroed. I believe the abbreviated approach was mainly to save time.

[Ken White]

on the factors discussed at this LINK (http://home.comcast.net/~dsmjd/tux/dsmjd/tech/trainfire.htm). The major mistake was in cutting the initial Trainfire time allotment to devote that time to other 'important' topics like COO (LINK) (http://www.gordon.army.mil/eoo/co2dapam.htm), Rape Prevention and Army Values. It is being corrected. Hopefully...

Everything goes in cycles...;)

[reed11b]

Clicked on the COO link, not knowing what that TLA stood for. You sir, owe me a new keyboard.
Reed

[Pete]

David Liwanag, previously the commander of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, published an article on improving Army marksmanship in the July 2006 Infantry Magazine. Among the things he said were the following.


Extensive training center tests at Fort Jackson and Fort Carson showed that on the 112-shot/112-target qualification course then in place, over 12,000 Trainfire Soldiers hit 5 more targets, on average, than did KD-trained counterparts. The bottom line: KD [Known Distance] produced fewer first-time qualified Soldiers but more experts; Trainfire produced more first-time "Go" riflemen faster and cheaper, but fewer expert shots.

General Wyman [Willard G. Wyman, CONARC commander in 1958] pointed out, however, that there would always be a need for extended-range precision rifle fire and a cadre of expert riflemen to give quality marksmanship instruction. The objectives of the Army marksmanship system, he explained, were to quickly and cheaply train large numbers of basic, effective combat marksmen, with units developing precision riflemen for combat and competition. Unit and Soldier mobility and dispersion dictated there would always be a need to cover gaps and terrain using designated squad riflemen (distinct from snipers) who could effectively shoot and kill targets at extended distances to 500 meters.

The main thing I disliked about Trainfire was that with the exception of the zero target, one was unable to evaluate shot groups on a paper target. Other than hit or miss, go or no-go, there is no feedback.

The entire article can be read using the link below. Close to the end of the article the text appears to have been intermingled during the scanning process with that of an accompanying text box.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_4_95/ai_n16884008/

[Ken White]

The objectives of the Army marksmanship system, he explained, were to quickly and cheaply train large numbers of basic, effective combat marksmen...This is true with the emphasis on 'cheap' unfortunately. Reminds me of the old saw "You can have it cheap, quick or good -- you can have any two but cannot have all three."
...with units developing precision riflemen for combat and competition.Peacetime thinking. Willard Wyman was a reasonably smart if mediocre General (all Generals are sort of mediocre; the really sharp guys get killed off by their contemporaries on the way up as unfairly over competitive). In 40 years of service, he had a little over two years of 'combat' experience (all high level, thus the quotes).

Importantly, if the units do it, the good units will do a decent job, the poor ones will not. if it's worth training, it's worth training properly and thoroughly. Tabbing difficult and expensive training tasks out to units is a cop out
... Unfortunately Unit and Soldier mobility and dispersion dictated there would always be a need to cover gaps and terrain using designated squad riflemen (distinct from snipers) who could effectively shoot and kill targets at extended distances to 500 meters.(emphasis added /kw)That says it all -- Wyman took the wrong approach. He had and has a lot of company...